Missionaries of Revolution

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SOVIET ADVISERS AND NATIONALIST CHINA 1920–1927

C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
and
London, England
1989

Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is printed on acid-free paper, and its binding materials have been chosen for strength and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wilbur, C. Martin (Clarence Martin), 1908–
Missionaries of revolution : Soviet advisers and Nationalist China, 1920–1927 / C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How.
p. cm. —
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-674-57652-7 (alk. paper)
1. China—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—China. 3. China—Foreign relations—1912–1949. 4. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—1917–1945. I. How, Julie Lien-ying, d. 1982. II. Title.
DS740.5.S65W55 1989
327.51047—dc19 88-19124
CIP

Studies of the East Asian Institute
Columbia University

The senior author dedicates this book
to the memory of
Julie Lien-ying How
and
Lydia Holubnychy

Contents

Acknowledgments

Three persons were deeply involved in the preparation of this book in addition to the undersigned: Julie Lien-ying How, Lydia Holubnychy, and Anita M. O'Brien. Ms. How is coauthor. We worked together on the revision of our earlier work from 1966 till 1980, mostly through correspondence. She had nearly completed her part of the research and writing when cancer overtook her. She died in April 1982. Her husband, Mr. William Chung-hou Hwa; was very helpful in sorting and forwarding her files on the project for further use.

Mrs. Lydia Holubnychy translated or abstracted some two thousand pages of memoirs of Russian participants in the China venture of the 1920s, as well as many recent Russian scholarly articles on the subject. She had almost completed a dissertation on "Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925" when she died tragically in May 1975. Her book was published posthumously by the East Asian Institute of Columbia University.

Mrs. Anita O'Brien typed the entire two-volume manuscript on a word processor, did the intricate work of proof correction, and arranged and assembled the product for printing. She cheerfully helped for several years until the work was finally done.

Julie How and I are indebted to many institutions and persons for help during the preparation of this book. The first of these are the Columbia University libraries, particularly the C. V. Starr East Asian Library. The East Asian Institute of Columbia University, with which both of us were associated for many years, gave great support in many ways.

I was able to do enriching archival research in Taiwan, Tokyo, London, Washington, New York, and Stanford, California, and discovered heretofore unpublished documents from the raid on the Soviet embassy compound in Peking on April 6, 1927. Also, I was able to confirm the authenticity of other documents, and to understand more fully the historical circumstances of the period under review.

In Taiwan I was privileged to study in the archives held by the Historical Commission of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, thanks to the kindness of the directors, the late Professors Lo Chia-lun and Huang Chi-lu, and, latterly, Professor Chin Hsiao-i. My good friends, Professors Chiang Yung-ching and Li Yün-han, both experts on the period, helped me extensively. I owe a debt to the late Professor Kuo Ting-yee, director of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in Taiwan, for opening doors and arranging interviews with a number of participants in the Chinese National Revolution.

In London, I spent several months on two occasions working in the archives of the British Foreign Office held in the Public Record Office, and also reading the papers of Sir Frederic Maze, held in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. In the PRO I found many unpublished translations of documents from the Peking Raid. British Foreign Office research continued over several years in the library of the British Information Service in New York, thanks to the courtesy of its then director general, Mr. Peter Hayman, and its librarian, Mrs. Ruth Isaacs. In Washington, with the assistance of Dr. John E. Taylor of the Modern Military Records Division of the U.S. National Archives, I found still other translations of heretofore unpublished documents. They had been forwarded by Major John Magruder, the American military attaché in Peking. Two other unfamiliar documents turned up in the collection of a former American consular official in China, Mr. Jay Calvin Huston, now held in the archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolu-

tion, and Peace in Stanford, and made available by its director, Dr. W. Glenn Campbell. Earlier, Ms. How and I had found and published several documents in the State Department archives.

Research in these archives and collections was made possible by grants from the East Asian Institute using funds from the Ford Foundation; a U.S. Department of State Fulbright award carried out under the auspices of the U.S. Educational Foundation in the Republic of China; and a senior research fellowship from the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, in Honolulu. The Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council awarded a grant to help with the costs of preparing this extensive manuscript for publication, financed in part by the Ford Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities.

With pleasure and nostalgia I mention the many friends, and among them former students, who helped by providing information, abstracting, research, and comments, which enrich this work: Professor Carol C. Andrews, Dr. Eugene Besenkovsky, Dr. Dov Bing, Dr. Dorothy Borg, Mr. Keith Bush, Mr. Fox Butterfield, Professor Gilbert Chan, Professor William Chase, Mrs. Lillian Chu Chin, Professor Ichiko Chuzo, Mrs. Janice Crabb, Professor J. Arch Getty, Dr. Dieter Heinzig, Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff, Professors Donald Klein and Steven I. Levine, Mr. Henry Lieberman, Mr. Anthony Ma, Dr. Carol Reynolds, Professors Douglas Reynolds and Withold Rodzinski, Ms. Caroline J. Rogers, Dr. Tony Saich, Mr. Ichiro Shirato, Professors Jan J. Solecki and Bruce Swanson, Dr. John E. Taylor, Professors T. K. Tong and Rudolph Viatkin, Dr. Ke-wen Wang, Ms. Julie Wei, Professor Thomas M. Williamson, Dr. David (now Sir David) C. Wilson, Col. William W. Whitson, USA retired, Dr. Eugene Wu, Professor Tien-wei Wu, and Ms. Xi Wu-i. Special thanks to Professor Li Yu-ning for reading several chapters and offering important new materials, and to Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff for translating many Comintern documents. I regret that I do not know the names of others who assisted Julie How, but to all the above I express our deep appreciation.

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January 1988

Abbreviations

Organizations

CC Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEC Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang
CI Communist International, or Comintern
CSC Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang
CY Chinese Communist Youth Corps
ECCI Executive Committee of the Comintern
KMC Kuominchun, the National People's Army under Feng Yü-hsiang
KMT Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party
NRA National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang
SY Chinese Socialist Youth Corp, later Communist Youth Corps

References

BDRC *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*
Ch *Chüan* or chapter
CHMK *Chung-hua Min-kuo shih-shih jih-chi*, compiled by Kuo Ting-yee
CSPSR *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*
CWR *China Weekly Review*
CYB *China Year Book*
FO British Foreign Office
FRUS *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*
HTCP *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, or *Guide Weekly*
HTSL *Hsien-tai shih-liao*
KFNP *Kuo fo nien-p'u*
KMWH *Ko-ming wen-hsien*
NA National Archives of the United States
NCH *North China Herald*
NYT *New York Times*
PFCS *Pei fa chan shih*
PRO Public Record Office of the United Kingdom
SLYM *Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien*

Introduction

This book has two principal subjects: first, a chronologically organized account of the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s led by the Kuomintang with assistance from the Chinese Communist Party; and second, the role of Soviet Russia and its emissaries in stimulating and attempting to guide that revolution. The time span, 1920 to 1927, is determined by our major source, documents seized on April 6, 1927, in a raid on part of the Soviet Embassy compound in Peking. These documents reveal a great deal about both our main subjects. They are "action" documents written on the spot by participants in the revolution. Among them are instructions, reports, minutes, letters, and resolutions drawn up by men planning and carrying out the revolutionary program. The writers probably never expected the documents to be made public.

The previous edition of this work, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927: Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), described the circumstances of the raid and the controversy over the authenticity of the documents as published. For those not familiar with the Peking Raid, the following brief account drawn from the 1956 edition may be helpful.

During the Northern Expedition (1926–28), Peking was under control of the Fengtien Clique headed by Chang Tso-lin. There was in Peking an active Kuomintang organization in which Communists played a leading role. From the viewpoint of the Peking government their activities were subversive. Some leaders of the two intertwined parties used part of the Soviet Embassy compound as a sanctuary. In view of this, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Chin secured permission from the diplomatic corps for the Peking metropolitan police to search certain offices in the compound adjacent to the embassy itself, and to arrest these suspects.

On the morning of April 6, 1927, a party of some three hundred police, detectives, and gendarmes was admitted to the Legation Quarter and began searching the area adjacent to the Soviet Embassy. They arrested a number of Chinese, including Professor Li Ta-chao, the cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party. When the police observed a fire in the nearby offices of the Soviet military attaché, they brought in fire-fighting equipment, put out the fire, and removed several truckloads of documents, many partly burned. They also found and carried off many Chinese Communist documents, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist banners and seals, and a quantity of arms. They also arrested a number of Russian citizens. In entering the military attaché's offices the police had exceeded their authorization; but the Peking government took the position that the harboring of Li Ta-chao and other revolutionaries within the Soviet Embassy grounds, where they conspired against the state and disseminated Communist propaganda, violated the Sino-Soviet Agreement of May 1924 and the principles of international law. The Russian government protested vigorously, demanding the return of all the documents and the release of the captives.

Examination of the seized documents began immediately after the raid. The British, American, and French military attachés played a substantial role in the initial work of sorting the documents and organizing their translation. The first document allegedly among those seized was published on April 19, and thereafter other transla-

tions and photographs were released to the Chinese and Western press. About thirty had been made public by the end of June, and they mainly concerned Russian espionage, military supplies to the Kuomintang and Kuominchun, and the work of the Soviet advisers in Canton. Controversies soon arose as to whether some forgeries were being published, a charge fanned by the Soviet government itself. The bibliography in Wilbur and How, *Documents*, lists and describes the published collections known to us. Our main source was *Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien* (Collection of Documentary Evidence of the Soviet Russian Conspiracy) (Peking: Metropolitan Police Headquarters, 1928).

As historians, it was our responsibility to appraise the authenticity of the allegedly seized documents that we were to use in our volume, and we devoted the initial chapter to this investigation, based on internal and external evidence. We concerned ourselves only with documents relating to the Chinese revolution and to Russian efforts to assist it. We concluded that the original Chinese documents from the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party were extraordinarily accurate as published when checked against independent contemporary sources. The original Russian documents, which we also used, appeared to be authentic despite errors attributable to the ignorance of the translators in Peking about persons and events in Canton, Hankow, and Kalgan. Since our volume was published, new information from Chinese and Russian sources has confirmed the authenticity of many of the documents we used. One document, the first to be published, which we declined to use because it could not stand historical scrutiny and might have been a forgery, has since been admitted to have been a forgery, but the only one among the documents.[1]

This is an entirely new edition. All the chapters are rewritten and forty-two documents have been added. Why is this? In the 1950s, when we worked on the original volume, little was known in America about the history of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Our work was, in a sense, pioneering. Since then, however, the historical field has expanded enormously. Scholars now have available much richer sources and many scholarly monographs related to our subjects. For example, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang has in Taiwan enormous archives, and it has published thousands of documents in its series *Ko-ming wen-hsien* (Documents of the Revolution). A few of our documents can now be traced back to, and further authenticated by, originals reproduced in this series. Scholars have used the KMT archives to great effect in monographs on our subjects. Historians in the People's Republic of China have published collections of articles from Chinese journals and newspapers of the revolutionary period on such subjects as the labor movement, the farmers' movement, the beginnings and early history of the Chinese Communist Party itself, and multivolume collections of biographies of early Communist leaders. The work of historians in China is becoming less didactic than previously. Many reminiscences of activists in both parties have been published.

Other valuable sources not available in the early 1950s come from Soviet Russia. In the 1960s and 1970s a few surviving participants in the Russian effort to aid the Chinese revolution published their memoirs. Some of these elderly veterans had diaries, and they were assisted in their work by scholars who had access to Soviet archives. Russian scholars have published books and articles on our subjects on the basis of these archives. Both types of publication are invaluable in offering new details on the role of the advisers in China. We are very fortunate to have had the assistance of the late Lydia Holubnychy, who was preparing a dissertation on Borodin in China, posthumously published as *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923–1925* (published for the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, by University Microfilms International, 1979). Mrs. Holubnychy translated for us some two thousand pages of Russian materials. Our friend Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff also pointed out and translated some items. We are now able to identify many of the Russians who

used pseudonyms in China, including the writers of some of our documents. The newly available Russian material enhances our understanding of the Russian aid missions in China.

In preparing for this new edition, we discovered about fifty documents from the Peking Raid that were new to us. Most have never been published. They were in the archives of the British Foreign Office held in the Public Records Office, and in the collections of American Military Intelligence in the U.S. National Archives. They were translated in Peking and forwarded to London and Washington respectively by the British and American military attachés. We also found two translated documents from the raid in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. They were among the papers of Jay Calvin Huston, an American Foreign Service officer in Peking and Canton during the 1920s, who collected much information on communism in China. A version of one of them (our Document 9), a report and military plan written in September 1925 by General V. K. Bliukher, who used the pseudonym "Galen" in China, was published in 1967 by Ms. A. I. Kartunova in a Russian historical journal. She found a typewritten text of Bliukher's report in the Central Archives of the Party, Institute of Marxism and Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Professor Jan J. Solecki published a translation of Ms. Kartunova's introduction and General Bliukher's report in *The China Quarterly* 35 (July/September 1968). His translation and the one made nearly forty years earlier in Peking are the same, line for line, except for different choices of words here and there. The two versions validate each other.

Some of the new documents are most interesting. To accompany the "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," there is now a history of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, and a "Short History" of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). Our earliest document is a preliminary set of regulations for Sun Yat-sen's military academy, which became known as the Whampoa Military Academy. A collection of eleven documents, written by Soviet advisers who worked with the NRA, appraises the condition of that army and its various components and services a few months before the start of the Northern Expedition. Another group includes a tabulation of Chinese Communists in the army and the Central Military-Political Academy in March 1926, statutes of the Communist Party's secret military apparatus in Kwangtung, and a questionnaire to be used in screening Party members. We give more examples below. Each document has been given a new introduction, the translations of ones previously published in our book have been refined, and authors are now identified when known.

We began work on this revision in 1966 but it took many years to integrate the new materials—actually, a never-ending process. We divided our work as follows: Martin Wilbur would write the chapters dealing with revolutionary developments up to July 1926, when the Northern Expedition began; Julie How (Mrs. William Hwa) would write a chapter on Soviet work with the Kuominchun and chapters covering the period between July 1926 and April 1927, when the Peking Raid put the terminus on the available documents. Each would edit the documents pertinent to his or her chapters. During the next ten years we each wrote hundreds of pages, which we exchanged for critical review.

Our plan could not be fulfilled. Julie How fought a losing battle with cancer before completing her part. She died in April 1982. Therefore it fell to her collaborator to complete her part and to edit all the documents. Because the volume had become overly long, he decided to extract and publish separately under her name one of the chapters that Ms. How had completed. This became *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun, 1925-1926: A Documentary Study* and appeared in *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. 19, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1985). Thus, the introduction, chapters 1 to 4, and the conclusion, epilogue, and index are by Wilbur; chapters 5 to 8 are by Ms. How,

edited and with some additions by Wilbur. The introductions to all the documents are by Wilbur, while refinements of the translations of the documents in Chinese were mostly done by Ms. How.

Our book traces the development of cooperation between the Chinese Nationalist and Communist parties for the sake of a "national revolution," as they were encouraged to do by Soviet Russia and the Communist International. It then recounts how the relationship fared during the period from about September 1922 to April 1927; how each of the Chinese parties grew in strength with Russian advice and material assistance; and how they competed as well as collaborated in the revolution until, at last, they were torn apart.

Much of the collaboration took place in Kwangtung province up to mid-1926, but in addition Soviet Russia undertook a large military aid program to armies associated with Feng Yü-hsiang in North China from the spring of 1925 on. Also the Kuomintang and Communist Party worked together and competed in movements among labor, students, and women in a number of scattered cities, such as Shanghai, Hankow, Peking, and others. Then all the major actors were involved in the revolutionary military campaign known as the Northern Expedition, which began in July 1926. Developments in different localities were interconnected.

The relationships of Soviet Russia and the Comintern with various Chinese parties and military groups were changing and complex. Each participant in the collaboration had its own objectives, which sometimes were congruent but often were not. Each tried to use the others to forward its goals. The national revolution was conducted within the now somewhat obscure social, economic, and political setting of China in the 1920s and in the broader framework of international politics during the early postwar years. Our account sometimes must deal with decisions of one actor, sometimes with another, and with the consequences.

To reconstruct coherently these complicated and sometimes geographically separate events requires a complex topical structure, but one in which developments are presented with careful attention to sequence. It is not our purpose to provide complete historical background for such topics nor to treat any of them in great detail. Our purpose is to place the documents in their historical settings.

It seems customary to use such terms as Soviet Russia, the Communist International, and the Kuomintang as though they were historical personalities—for example, "the Comintern decided" or "the Kuomintang issued a manifesto." We have done so frequently. Obviously, however, it was individuals or key groups within such organizations who made decisions and then used the organizational apparatus available to them in trying to carry them out. When we know which individuals or small groups within such organizations reached decisions or took actions, we identify them. One may ask, did the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang compete, or was it individuals with a sense of loyalty to one or the other party who attempted to act for that party's benefit? The answer is obvious, yet there is a dilemma. Certainly in China during the 1920s there was rivalry between two clearly structured groups—two parties—and it would seldom be possible to pinpoint the scores and even thousands of individual competitors. So we have often employed the convention of treating organizations as though they were historical personalities. In connection with certain events it is known what some prominent person wrote or how he acted, and often the action seems significant. But if we should attempt to discern the motives, we always would be in the realm of speculation.

Soviet Purposes

Since we now know a great deal more about the Soviet Russian effort in China during the 1920s than we knew before, our present book lays greater emphasis on the

Russians' role in aiding the revolution. The purpose of the missions was to encourage and assist a national revolutionary movement in China that should become part of the "world revolution" against capitalism and imperialism. Most of the several hundred men and women who worked in this cause had participated in the Russian Revolution and Civil War only a few years earlier. They were missionaries for the cause of world communism.

Soviet Russia had strategic interests in China as well as revolutionary ones. Russia and China shared a long border, and the Soviet government desired to establish diplomatic relations with the Peking government for the many advantages this would bring. An important Russian strategic objective was to acquire control over the Chinese Eastern Railway (formerly a Russian state enterprise), which traversed Manchuria and was a vital link in the Trans-Siberian Railway that joined the Russian Maritime Provinces with Central Siberia. Northern Manchuria was a zone of special Russian interest. Russia and China were rivals for dominance in Outer Mongolia, which China considered its own, but which was ruled by a Mongolian regime recently placed there by the Russian Red Army. Russia's unwillingness to permit China to control this buffer area was the stumbling block that prevented three Russian missions from effecting formal intergovernmental relations with Peking.

China fitted into Russia's world revolutionary strategy as a region that should be liberated from capitalist exploitation. In 1919 Lenin organized the Third, or Communist, International to be the general staff of world revolution, with its headquarters in Moscow. At its Second Congress in 1920 he articulated a strategy for undermining the great capitalist states by driving a wedge between them and their colonies. The Comintern, as well as the Communist parties in the dominant countries and in their colonies, should concentrate on this liberation struggle as a preliminary stage of the world revolution. China, though not a colony, was fitted into this scheme and the Comintern sent its agents there.

By early 1923, the Russian government had decided to aid Sun Yat-sen in Canton. It had been persuaded that Sun and the Kuomintang were potential leaders of a national revolution against imperialism. By the spring of 1925, the Russian leadership had also decided to assist the Kuominchun, a loose confederation of armies in North China under the nominal leadership of Feng Yü-hsiang, a principal opponent of Chang Tso-lin and the Fengtien faction, which dominated Manchuria. To assist and guide the national revolution, to strengthen the enemies of Chang Tso-lin, and ultimately to bring China into the "world revolution" as an ally of Russia—these were the great purposes of Russia's expensive aid missions. The effort in China turned out to be a trial run, and an object lesson, for many following Soviet efforts to stimulate and guide revolutions abroad.

Sojourners in a Strange Land

Most of the Russian sojourners in China were military officers, but there were also diplomats, political advisers, women in staff support positions, translators, economists, and other professionals. A few had been trained as Sinologists or had acquired a knowledge of the Chinese language while living in Manchuria, but most of the missionaries were ignorant of things Chinese when they started off to assist and guide the Chinese revolution. The great names among them were Karakhan, Borodin, Voitinsky, and Bliukher—the first as ambassador to the Peking government, which the other three were intent on helping to overthrow.

Lev. M. Karakhan (1889-1937), born of a wealthy Armenian family, educated to be a lawyer, and something of a dandy in dress and manner, was a veteran revolutionary who had resided in Petrograd and Harbin and been exiled to the Trans-Baikal region of Siberia. In 1917 he became a Bolshevik and during the revolution was a

member of the Military-Revolutionary Committee. In March 1918 he became deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs, in which capacity his name was attached to two famous declarations addressed to China, on July 25, 1919, and September 27, 1920. They promised to restore to China the rights it had lost to Tsarist Russia. He arrived in Peking in September 1923, at the age of thirty-four, with plenipotentiary powers to negotiate a treaty of mutual recognition between the Russian and Chinese governments. Through skillful diplomacy and an active campaign to win support from the Chinese public, he accomplished this feat on May 31, 1924. He became enormously popular with nationalistic Chinese intellectuals, though most members of the diplomatic corps regarded him with suspicion. He remained in Peking as the Russian ambassador until August 1926, with only a brief interlude in Moscow toward the end of 1925. In Peking he directed the Soviet military mission with Feng Yü-hsiang's army in the North, and he had a guiding hand with the mission working under Borodin's direction with the Kuomintang in the South.[2]

Michael M. Borodin (1884-1951) was born of Jewish parents, who named him Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg. His revolutionary career, carried on mostly in Latvia where he grew up, was interrupted late in 1906 when he became an emigré, first to England but shortly after to the United States, where he settled at the age of twenty-three. In Chicago he used the name Berg and briefly attended Valparaiso University. He met and married Fanny Arluck (Fanya Orluk, in her Russian name), who bore him two sons. He was active in the American socialist movement, organized and operated a school for immigrants, acquired American citizenship, and constantly extended his education. In 1918 he returned to revolutionary Russia, where he resumed his acquaintance with Lenin and Stalin and came to know most of the other revolutionary leaders. His good knowledge of English made him useful as a translator for some of Lenin's important writings and for work in the Communist International. Lenin sent him to Spain, Mexico, and the United States for underground organizational work. His last foreign assignment before China was to Great Britain, which he entered in 1922 as "George Brown," to help reorganize the British Communist Party. Arrested in Scotland in August, he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and deportation. Shortly after his return to Moscow in the spring of 1923, the Russian leadership selected him for work in Canton with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. A big, burly man with a deep voice and a large moustache, he arrived there on October 6, 1923, and soon became Dr. Sun's close adviser, helping to reshape the Kuomintang and provide it with a militant ideology. Tactful but resolute, Borodin had a magnetic personality and intelligence that were noted in many Chinese and Western accounts.[3]

The earliest of the four to arrive in China was Gregory N. Voitinsky (1893-1953). He was a laborer with only four years of formal education. Like Borodin, he had lived in the United States (1913-1918) and then returned to Russia where he joined the Russian Communist Party/Bolshevik. During the civil war he worked for the Party in Siberia, was arrested and sentenced to a life of hard labor in Sakhalin, but led a convict revolt and thus escaped. In Vladivostok he started working in the apparatus of the Comintern, and in April 1920, only twenty-seven years old, he was sent to China as leader of a small group of comrades. There he helped importantly in the early development of the Chinese Communist movement, both financially and in the training of young cadres. He had a winning personality, modest and unassuming. Young Chinese students and the aspiring Marxists liked him. Thereafter, Voitinsky became one of the Comintern's experts on China, drafting directives for the Comintern's Executive Committee to the Chinese Communist Party and writing on the revolutionary movement in China for the *Communist International* and *Imprecor* on the basis of personal knowledge and his developing theories. His knowledge came from several sojourns when he worked with the Chinese Communists Central Committee. The dates are unclear, but one of these periods seems to have been from April

1924 to March 1925, or even later. He was again in China from June 1926 to about June 1927 as the Comintern's principal adviser for the Communist Party's Central Comittee in Shanghai. During these periods he attended the Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the CCP (January 1925 and May 1927) and Central Committee plenums in May 1924, perhaps October 1925, and July 1926. Voitinsky seems to have impressed his Chinese colleagues with his engaging personality and lack of any appearance of superiority, which made him more acceptable than the domineering Maring. Still, his role as bearer of Comintern directives was not an easy one.[4]

General Vasilii K. Bliukher (1889-1938) was known in China by his nom de guerre, "Galen" (or Galin), which he adopted in Vladivostok in October 1924 for his false passport in China, viz, Zoi Vsevolodovich Galin, using the names of his two children and his wife, Galina. General Bliukher headed the military advisers working with the Nationalists from October 1924 to July 1925, and from May 1926 to August 1927. He, too, was a veteran revolutionary, of peasant background and working class experience. Drafted into the tsarist army at the beginning of World War I, he was severely wounded in January 1915, hospitalized, and then dismissed from further military service. In 1916 he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party/Bolshevik and was soon involved in revolutionary work among Russian soldiers. With the outbreak of the November revolution in 1917, he was appointed commissar of a Red Guard unit, then served as an officer in the Peasants and Workers Red Army throughout the civil war, winning distinction in the Urals, the Crimea, and the Far East. He was awarded four Orders of the Red Banner. In China "Galen" or "Galents" was a mystery man to the foreign community, but his name became a byword among Chinese sympathetic to the Nationalist cause.[5]

The selection of Karakhan to negotiate in Peking and of Borodin to work with Sun Yat-sen in Canton probably was done at the highest level of the Russian Communist Party, the Politburo.[6] Bliukher, who replaced General P. A. Pavlov (who drowned south of Canton on July 19, 1924), may have been nominated by the Revolutionary Military Council; and Voitinsky probably was appointed for his second and third tours of China duty by the Executive Committee of the Comintern. We know only a little about the selection of the several hundred other missionaries.

As a result of the meeting between Adolf Joffe and Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai in January 1923, and the Soviet government's subsequent decision to provide Sun with military advisers and other aid, Colonel A. I. Gekker recruited the first five officers from among the senior class of the Peasants and Workers Red Army Military Academy. Gekker had himself been principal of the academy before becoming military attaché on Joffe's staff in China, and he had participated in Joffe's discussions with Sun.[7] Now back in Moscow, he interviewed men nearing the end of their course work who had been nominated by a committee in charge of their first assignments. Several nominees had also been in Far Eastern studies. The five whom Gekker interviewed and approved were Alexander I. Cherepanov, who recounts the procedure,[8] Yakov German, Pavel Smolentsev, Nikolai Tereshatov, and Vladimir Poliak. They agreed to go and were considered volunteers; they left for China under orders from the Communist Party and the Government of the USSR, arriving in Peking on June 21, 1923. After a few months there, four of them went to Canton to help Borodin in military planning. On April 16, 1924, as preparations for a military academy in Canton progressed, Ambassador Karakhan and Borodin, who had gone north to consult with him, telegraphed Moscow requesting fifty workers for Canton. Moscow responded by sending groups of officers with a variety of military specializations to serve as instructors in the academy. They arrived in June, July, and October 1924, though not in as large a number as Borodin had requested. In June 1924 there were twenty-five, and in April 1926 fifty-eight advisers in South China.[9]

The same procedure of selection and volunteering was used when Karakhan's

negotiations with Feng Yü-hsiang and other Kuominchun generals resulted in a Soviet government decision to assist the Kuominchun forces in North China. General M. V. Frunze, people's commissar for war, proposed to the Military Academy of the Peasants and Workers Red Army that it select fifteen to twenty graduates to be sent to China. One of the third-year students, A. V. Blagodatov, who long after wrote his memoirs, recalled being told that the "Bureau of the Party" had nominated him and his acceptance "was expected."[10] The group left Moscow by train on April 7, 1925 and arrived in Peking some two weeks later. They, and others who came thereafter, were assigned by Karakhan and his military attaché to three of the armies nominally under Feng Yü-hsiang's command.[11]

Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova, a twenty-year-old student in the Eastern Department of Vladivostok's Far Eastern State University, got the chance with a number of classmates to go to China in June 1925. Graduates of the course were given a little money for their initial expenses, but Vera and other second-year students had to depend on their own meager resources to get there. For Vera, who had studied some Chinese, it was a great adventure, a chance to see the real China and work there for the revolution. She did not have a specific assignment; that would be determined by the Russian Embassy in Peking. She sailed with two other students on a freighter bound for Chefoo, and her account of discovering China, with its sights and smells, written forty years later, is one of the most delightful of the reminiscences available.[12]

The general purpose of the mission in Canton and later in Hankow, and those in Kalgan, Kaifeng, and later in Sian, was to train and guide Chinese revolutionaries. Such work involved many tasks. Borodin undertook to persuade Sun Yat-sen and his close associates to reorganize the Kuomintang into a centralized, disciplined, and effective leadership organ, to sharpen its reformist objectives and improve its propaganda, and to attract a mass following. This was accomplished. The group he headed was to reorganize, retrain, expand, and indoctrinate military forces that would support the Kuomintang in its revolutionary mission. In January 1926, about fifteen months after Borodin and the first military men arrived in Canton, General N. V. Kuibyshev set down the following as the "task" of the military mission: They were to organize and instruct a National Revolutionary Army in South China for national liberation from the yoke of imperialism and for unification of China into "one independent democratic republic"; to give every assistance to the government by working in its army and among the population to promote its democratic principles; to make popular the doctrine of communism and sovietism and to work toward a complete rapprochement and mutual support between China and the USSR; and to create in the army, labor organizations, and the peasantry the desire for "a further revolutionary movement." The group must also keep informed about counterrevolutionary forces in China, the people oppressed by them, and the people of adjacent countries, and it should make an exhaustive study of China, especially its southern part (Doc. 23, p. 1). Simultaneously, Borodin and Voitinsky sought to guide the Chinese Communist Party into policies formulated by the leaders of the Communist International in Moscow.

Several of our documents (3, 9, 21, 22, and 24) discuss army reorganization and training in Kwangtung, including work in the Whampoa Military Academy, which the Russians helped to organize and where many of them taught. Other documents (26-36) appraise the success of the effort, including work with a tiny air force and a decrepit navy, as of March 1926. A most interesting series (37-42) discusses political training of the National Revolutionary Army, including the guiding instrument—the Political Directorate or Political Training Department—and methods of indoctrinating officers and men. As a result of Russian guidance, the Canton leadership created a Revolutionary Military Tribunal; two of the documents (47 and 48) are its regulations and an ominous directive describing penalties it must impose for counterrevolutionary

crimes. The Canton mission also created schools to train Chinese in intelligence gathering and counterespionage, and they were careful to see that the latter—an incipient GPU—was controlled by themselves and reliable Chinese Communists (Doc. 20). Military advisers in both South and North were to gather strategic intelligence about China and about military conditions in enemy forces as well as within the armies they were instructing (Doc. 67).

Among our documents there are many from the Chinese Communist Party itself, but also a few that reveal the Soviet effort to guide the Chinese Party (Docs. 13, 43, 45, 73).

The need for interpreters—a perennial problem for aid missions—soon became evident and a reason for drawing on students of Eastern subjects, some of whom had begun the study of Chinese. Cherepanov describes the difficulty of trying to teach tactics at the Whampoa Military Academy without an adequate knowledge of either English or Chinese; and Blagodatov had the same complaint about the lack of interpreters to help the Kalgan group and instructors in the school of the Second Kuominchun. Poor interpreters made it almost impossible for Russian military advisers to talk with Chinese generals on complicated military matters.[13] An attempt to solve the problem by assigning Chinese Communists who had studied in Russia to the advisers in the North was only partially successful since some of them did not know the northern dialect. The author of Document 20 protested that his job of creating a counterespionage apparatus in Canton was impossible, since Peking had not sent him any interpreters. The one he had, Li, did not speak Cantonese (Doc. 20, p. 8). But adequate interpreters were in short supply. As late as December 1926, when the Northern Expedition was five months along, Khmelev reported that the question of interpreters had not been solved. Some advisers who did not speak a word of English had to be given English interpreters. "It is necessary most urgently to find somewhere the interpreters."[14]

Conditions of living and work differed among the missions depending on place and time. Canton was a thriving commercial city, but terribly hot and humid during several months of the summer. Sanitary conditions were abominable. At first the Russian instructors lived a barracks-style life on Whampoa Island, but, as the colony grew, most lived in Western-style houses at Tung-shan, a suburb east of Canton at some elevation. Some of the problems of mission life appeared at a meeting of the military advisers in Canton on July 1, 1925, when General Bliukher was about to leave: the need to augment salaries to meet rising costs of living, defining vacation rights, pay of arrears on bonuses for campaigning, local travel expenses, supply of yearly clothing rations, and methods of payment to families back in the USSR.[15] As time passed, the wives and children joined some of the military men, which created a more congenial atmosphere. Statutes for the South China Group drawn up in January 1926 refer to such amenities as a dispensary with dental office and consultation service for children, a club with dining room, and a kindergarten.[16] Vera Vishnyakova was transferred to Canton, arriving at the end of February 1926, and reports that there were about forty members of the mission, including many wives who were employed in staff jobs. The club and common dining room were in full swing, and the group had an active social life, though strictly within the confines of its own membership.[17]. Cherepanov remarks that some advisers who arrived later in Canton, direct from Russia where life was not easy, felt that those who had arrived earlier were living in bourgeois-like luxury and becoming "decadent."[18]

In an effort to understand the society in which they were living, the Canton group organized a "Circle for the Study of China." Our first document, a history of the Chinese Communist Party, was presented to the circle as a lecture by S. N. Naumov, who then published it in the journal *Kanton*, the mimeographed house organ of the advisers to the Kuomintang.

Conditions in Kalgan were very different. Kalgan was a frontier town on a spur of the Great Wall. Its main business was trade with Mongolia. Bitter cold in winter, it also suffered from dust storms blowing in from the Gobi Desert. Kalgan was headquarters for Feng Yü-hsiang's First Kuominchun, which the Soviet government decided in March 1925 to aid with arms and military advisers. The aid mission, which took up work in April, never became as large as the one in Canton, nor as successful in fulfilling its purposes. Its chiefs, though experienced commanders, never achieved the influence of Borodin and Bliukher. Whereas young Russian officers in the South campaigned with the Whampoa cadets they had trained, the officers in the Kalgan mission were disregarded by Feng's generals in the Tientsin campaign, their one opportunity to demonstrate their battlefield qualities.

Vera Vishnyakova was assigned to Kalgan as a student interpreter in September 1925. She describes the group's living quarters on the outskirts of town in a compound of the Salt Administration: Within the compound walls there were Chinese one-story houses in which the rooms opened directly onto the earthen courtyard. The furniture was Chinese—which means hard—and there was neither running water nor plumbing. The rooms were cold despite the portable cast-iron stoves that were kept constantly burning. Staff headquarters were in a larger building with offices, a common dining room, and a club. Yellow dust from the storms covered everything.[19]

Work with the First Kuominchun was frustrating because of the restrictions that General Feng and his senior commanders placed upon the advisers. Their technical skills were appreciated, such as their skill in building three armored trains and in teaching artillery and cavalry techniques. "The Marshal, a thrifty fellow, became convinced that our teaching is the cheapest of all, for we are covering our own living expenses," General Primakov explained to the Soviet Embassy.[20] Arms and munitions, which began to arrive in batches across Mongolia, were life-saving for the Kuominchun. Yet the advisers could not develop close personal relations with Feng, nor with his senior officers. They were suspicious that political work would corrupt their troops.[21] Advisers complained about obstacles to their work. "Just what are we? Some kind of medieval mercenaries?" one of them exclaimed. According to Vera Vishnyakova, "A feeling of dissatisfaction with the results of their activity tormented them as did uneasiness over their loved ones who remained at home. But still a spirit of optimism triumphed."[22]

An inspector of the Kalgan mission reporting to the Soviet Embassy in January 1926 found much to criticize in the group's inability to gain influence over the First Kuominchun. This, he explained, was because the Chinese, being practical folk, must see actual results before they have confidence in anyone. Before the Tientsin campaign, there had been no discussion between Feng and his generals and their advisers as to the wartime status of the advisers. "In short, our hopes have vanished like bubbles."[23] Nevertheless, he urged that the mission correct its mistakes and carry on. He recommended a more careful selection of personnel, men willing to serve for three-year terms, and that they should be allowed to bring their families with them.[24] A. S. Bubnov, heading a delegation to inspect all of the groups working in China, after hearing about the problems of the Kalgan group, recommended establishing precisely the term of service of the advisers, giving them vacations, and obtaining normal living conditions rather than barracks for the higher commanders.[25]

Another group of Soviet advisers worked for nearly a year with the Second Kuominchun, which had its headquarters in Kaifeng, Honan, only to witness its collapse in March 1926. Nominally commanded by Yüeh Wei-chün, the army was a heterogeneous grouping of units under commanders from various political factions. The Kuomintang had some influence in the Second Kuominchun, but some elements were defeated units formerly under Wu P'ei-fu, others were bandits, and there was a southern army merely allied to Yüeh. The Russian group that arrived at Kaifeng on

June 21, 1925 consisted of forty-three persons, most of them military advisers but including seven political workers, two engineers, a physician, and five interpreters. At first the mission's work seemed to be progressing, but actually it was frustrated on every hand. What the Chinese commanders wanted was Russian arms, but it was difficult to get them to land-locked Honan, and few were provided. The army had a military school modelled on the Whampoa Academy at Canton, and some of the Russian advisers were permitted to teach in it. General Yüeh rejected the curriculum for the school proposed by the Russians and took no action on other important recommendations. The Russians were completely ignored in operational matters and only learned of the Second Kuominchun's defeat near Tientsin in late November 1925 from press reports. When Wu P'ei-fu and other generals, aided by Red Spears, mounted a general attack against the Second Kuominchun, General Yüeh asked for Russian advisers at the front, but they were given no information, could not comprehend what was going on, and hence could offer no recommendations. Some of the advisers barely escaped as the units they were supposedly advising collapsed.[26]

An effort to provide advisers to the Third Kuominchun was even more disappointing. Finally, Feng Yü-hsiang's First Kuominchun was driven from Kalgan and the remnants began a long retreat to the Northwest in August 1926, accompanied by a few of the advisers, who were cut off from all contact with home.

Many of the Soviet missionaries suffered from ill health in China just as did missionaries of other faiths. In July 1925 when Blagodatov inspected the Kalgan group, he found that 75 percent of the advisers had dysentary, and some had to be sent back to Russia.[27] Cherepanov and some of his colleagues contracted dysentary during the first Eastern Expedition in Kwangtung,[28] and Vera Vishnyakova reports that in Canton her companions often fell ill from malaria, amoebic dysentary, and other complaints. "We all suffered from skin and stomach disorders."[29] The march into Hunan in July 1926 was made in terrific heat. Many Chinese soldiers died of cholera, and there was no medicine. According to Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin, all who participated in the beginnings of the campaign suffered from ill health. "En masse they had stomach trouble, absolutely all suffering from neurotic disorder." Two advisers contracted cholera, and one died from it.[30] After the Kiangsi campaign of November 1926, Khmelev reported that "a considerable percent of our workers are hospitalized in the Nanchang American hospital, while some of them rest in beds in their homes."[31] The Soviet aviators who flew and fought almost constantly in that campaign were exhausted. They had no medical center nor even medical orderlies. "We are, practically all of us, sick," wrote flier Sergeev after the campaign. "Especially we complain about our nervous systems, hearts, and stomachs."[32] Neither General Bliukher nor Michael Borodin escaped. In July 1925, Ambassador Karakhan reported to his Foreign Ministry that "Galen" had to leave Canton because he was completely ill. While on his second tour in China, Bliukher was hospitalized in Hankow after the first phase of the Northern Expedition. His old wounds had reopened.[33] Borodin was frequently ill in Hankow, suffering from the malaria he had contracted in Canton. Before departing on July 27, 1927 for the long overland trip to Russia, he had to retire to a mountain resort in Kuling to rest and recuperate.[34]

The Russian military advisers often took on dangerous tasks. Some actually led Chinese troops in combat. Few stayed in the rear doing staff work. General P. A. Pavlov, sent to head the military mission aiding Sun Yat-sen, drowned near Shihlung while on an inspection trip about a month after his arrival in Canton.[35] Some Russian officers working in Canton actually fought in the 1925 campaigns that brought Kwangtung under Nationalist control. Cherepanov personally tried to scale the walls of Tanshui early in the First Eastern Expedition, and four other advisers took a machine gun and stormed an elevation under enemy fire. In the battle to retake Canton from the Yunnan and Kwangsi forces, Cherepanov and a Chinese general crossed the

Pearl River in a sanpan under enemy fire. During the Second Eastern Expedition, adviser Yakovlev and a Chinese officer led an attack on the walls of Huichow. In his diary N. I. Konchits recorded a trip on a small, unseaworthy river gunboat that was used for a risky coastal voyage from Canton to southern Kwangtung, where he was to join the 10th Division. Another small gunboat overturned and sank as it was about to take him back to Canton, while its replacement tossed about wildly as soon as it reached the open sea.[36]

The advisers in the North also took great risks. Blagodatov records how he and several others went to Shantung to investigate the defeat of the Second Kuominchun in December 1925. They barely escaped seizure and being shot on orders of General Chin Yün-ao, a follower of Wu P'ei-fu. In March 1926, Blagodatov tried to lead an attack against Red Spears who were battling the Second Kuominchun near Loyang. He became stuck in the mud and was rescued in the nick of time by his Chinese interpreter. After the defeat of the First Kuominchun in August 1926, Chinese soldiers attacked a small contingent of Russian advisers, wounding two, one of whom died. Three Soviet fliers lost their lives in the North.[37] Vera Vishnyakova tells of two members of the Kalgan group she knew who died on duty. Balk, "a handsome fellow," got blood poisoning at the front near Tientsin and died two days later, while "the very young and cheerful Vikhrev" was killed by bandits in Mongolia while returning from an assignment in Ulan Bator.[38]

Likewise, during the Northern Expedition, Soviet officers advising Chinese commanders of corps and divisions were often at the front. V. K. Tairov had two horses killed under him, and his interpreter, Novikov, was killed while standing next to him. In Tairov's own words in a letter to a friend, "More than once I had personally to take command during the fight. . . . In a word the situation is a combat situation all the time."[39]

The Russian aviators took the greatest risks, flying over mountainous terrain without meteorological data and using inadequate maps, often without proper landing fields. They flew low over enemy troop concentrations or armored trains, firing or dropping bombs and being fired upon. During the Kiangsi campaign, two fliers were captured after a forced landing and spent three weeks imprisoned in Nanchang, chained to a wall. They might have been shot had they not been rescued when the Nationalist Sixth Corps captured and briefly held Nanchang. In spite of the dangers, General Bliukher often flew for reconnaissance.[40]

In June 1927, unknown enemies attempted to poison General Bliukher at a banquet. He recovered, but Zotov, his code clerk, also was poisoned and died the next day.[41]

What led these Russians, mostly young, to risk their health and even their lives in far off China? We can only speculate, for few of the accounts dwell on this point. We have called them "missionaries" and presume that many of them went to aid a revolution that was seen in Russia as part of the "world revolution" against capitalist imperialism. Opposition to imperialism was a fundamental sentiment of Russians who regarded themselves as revolutionaries. Borodin constantly told Sun Yat-sen that the two revolutions were one. Lecturing his officers on their duties during the First Eastern Expedition, General Bliukher said, in Cherepanov's account, "we are here to help the Chinese people and its revolutionary avant garde to escape the paws of imperialism and militarism." Cherepanov saw the effort of the military advisers who risked their lives in the battle to retake Canton in June 1925 as "their duty to proletarian internationalism." Vera Vishnyakova expressed sympathy for the anti-imperialist position of the Kuomintang, for she regarded herself as an anti-imperialist.[42] V. K. Putna, who briefly headed the Kalgan mission, was doubtful of the reliability of Feng Yü-hsiang as a champion of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement and, writing to Karakhan, listed seven reasons to believe he was

not.[43] Anti-imperialism was the test, in his eyes.

Though imperialism was the evil, the advisers were practical people: they made use of some products of imperialism as they found them in China, residing in the International Settlement and French Concession in Shanghai, traveling on British and Japanese ships, sending wives to the safety of Hong Kong when Canton was dangerous during the battle of June 1925, and taking sick officers to be cared for at the American missionary hospital in Nanchang. During part of his mission in China, Borodin sent his sons, Fred and Norman, to the Shanghai American School, where most of their schoolmates were children of Christian missionaries. The boys used their father's real name, Gruzenberg. They were American born, and English was their native language.

Most of the military men who came to China had been through the Russian Revolution and Civil War; many had been decorated for their valor. Vera Vishnyakova said of them, "Our advisers were the finest cadres of the Red Army." They received their salaries from Moscow, she pointed out, thus distinguishing them clearly from foreign mercenaries who worked as advisers in other Chinese armies.[44] They were not exactly volunteers in the same way that Catholic or Protestant missionaries had volunteered to bring their faith to China; but they were not mercenaries either. In China they had a job to do, and not only a technical job. They were to remake Chinese armies on the revolutionary side, applying the principles of organization and training found in the Red Army and the methods of politicization that had worked well in the Russian Civil War. They worked hard at their job.

Attitudes of the advisers toward China and their Chinese colleagues varied from person to person, and depending on time and circumstance. As a country, China proved fascinating—and maddening. The documents show that some Russian officers had a very low opinion of the competence of most Chinese commanders, both in the North and in the South. This was particularly true of General N. V. Kuibyshev, who succeeded Bliukher as head of the Canton military mission in November 1925 and tried to gain control over the National Revolutionary Army.[45] Russians were scandalized at the condition of the Chinese armies as they first found them. Disparagement surfaces in several of the reminiscences we have cited, and it is clearly revealed in Documents 3, 30, 70, and 71, all concerned with the forces in Kwangtung. Most of the series of documents dating around March 15, 1926, reporting on the preparedness of the National Revolutionary Army a few months before the Northern Expedition, are highly critical: they describe what Kuibyshev's staff members regarded as fundamental incompetence (Docs. 27-36). Yet Document 3, a history of the National Revolutionary Army, shows pride in what the Russian advisers had accomplished in two years.

Reminiscing about his sentiments on leaving Canton after two years there, Cherepanov says that he felt a love for the Chinese people, the soldiers of the NRA, his students at the Whampoa Academy, and the Chinese Communist Party.[46] Yet, in fact, few of the advisers knew any Chinese other than those they advised or their Chinese interpreters. These they got to know fairly well. After his first nine months in Canton, Bliukher was still uncertain of the reliability of several of the NRA's corps and divisional commanders he had worked with (Doc. 9). Chiang Kai-shek remained an enigma, as shown in Documents 49 to 51. Borodin, with his broad interests and keen curiosity, probably was acquainted with more Chinese than most, but his real confidants were Liao Chung-k'ai, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and Chang T'ai-lei. Whether his assistants, Volin and Yolk, who studied agrarian problems in Kwangtung for him, became well-acquainted with the group of Communists actively engaged in promoting the Farmers' Movement, we do not know. Young Vera Vishnyakova was under strict orders to avoid social contact with Chinese people in Peking and, like her colleagues in Canton, she rarely came into contact with Chinese individuals except

when interpreting. This policy was dictated, she wrote, in order "to avoid . . . accusations to the effect that we were spreading Red propaganda." She knew a maid servant and the daughter of Liao Chung-k'ai. Forty years later, when writing of her stay in China, she still bitterly regretted this isolation.[47] Tairov ("Teruni") knew Teng Yen-ta well and even lived in his house after the capture of Wuchang, but this was quite unusual (Doc. 69, p. 21).

The picture emerges of sojourners in a strange land, most of them unable to read or speak its language and knowing only a few people with whom they were professionally connected. Yet they were closely involved in a historic Chinese event.

Clearly, they regarded themselves as engaged in a great enterprise. The men working with the National Revolutionary Army took pride in their work. Cherepanov describes the tactical training he and his colleagues gave to Whampoa cadets who were to become platoon and company commanders, such as rapid attack and encirclement of enemy units no matter how small, and decisive counterattack. He concludes that "Our efforts were not in vain. In the campaigns that were begun soon after, the results turned out to be very appreciable." He attributed to the regiments and students of the Whampoa school the decisive role in the June 1925 victory over the Yunnan and Kwangsi armies in Canton.[48] The advisers also taught the revolutionary soldiers never to oppress civilians in the territories they entered, and several report how well this discipline paid off. During the Second Eastern Expedition, for example, Konchits noted in his diary for November 16, 1925 how "we" got volunteer coolies, but the enemy had to leave behind masses of cartridges because they could not get porters. "This is significant."[49] There were many other cases of popular assistance during the early stage of the Northern Expedition, as described in our essays. An example was reported by adviser Miliushkevich: When Nationalist troops captured P'ing-hsiang in Western Kiangsi, the populace refused to serve as coolies for Sun Ch'uan-fang's retreating soldiers and therefore the National Revolutionary Army took possession of a million enemy cartridges, as well as other ammunition that had been thrown into the river.[50]

Naumov concluded in November 1926 that the work done by the Soviet training mission in Kwangtung was a model "for our further work in other provinces of China" (Doc. 72, p. 9). An important part of that work had been the effort to reform the administration of the National Revolutionary Army and to create a system of central control. This ran against the grain of Chinese militarist autonomy. By the end of the first phase of the Northern Expedition, in December 1926, Bliukher could report two great improvements: the commander-in-chief now controlled and distributed all legal income to the several corps, and distribution of arms and supplies was centralized. But this was still not true of captured arms and locally requisitioned funds.[51]

Victories in the Northern Expedition brought prestige to the Soviet advisers and their country, and some saw themselves as the essential element in these victories. Khmelev was enthusiastic about the work of the advisers during the Nanchang campaign. "I personally think that only thanks to such discipline and unquestioned carrying out of Galen's orders on the part of our advisers that the third and last operation was carried out so excellently."[52] Artillery Adviser Borodin, also writing in December 1926, said, "The personal prestige of Russian comrades in the Canton army was of course huge because in all the units in which they were present they had no defeat at all except in cases when this or that [Chinese] commander was vacillating and acted contrary to the advice of the Russian adviser."[53]

The Nanchang populace greeted Bliukher with enthusiasm. He was so highly respected that "Now all Russian advisers are called Galen," wrote Khmelev.[54] Adviser F. M. Katiushin-Kotov wrote in January 1927 that "Everywhere, wherever Russian advisers moved along with the National Revolutionary Army, the population met them with wild applause." At a rally in Changsha to celebrate the taking of Hankow,

"When people saw me, a Russian adviser, they shouted in Chinese, 'Long live Soviet Russia!' 'Long live the USSR!' 'Long live the Soviet fliers!'" Portraits of Lenin plastered the walls of this well-prepared celebration.[55]

All was not harmonious in the aid missions, however. There were periods of great frustration, as the documents show. Men of powerful personality clashed among themselves and dominated their subordinates. Military men did not enjoy being controlled by civilian appointees. Apparently Bliukher and Borodin could not adjust their differences after Borodin returned from a trip north and Bliukher had been in charge in Canton for several months. Bliukher, who was ill anyway, went off to Peking to complain to Karakhan. Borodin then made it clear to the remaining military officers that he was boss, according to the emissary who was sent from Peking to investigate (Doc. 12). For its part, the Soviet military attaché's office was poorly informed on military developments in the South and asked Bliukher to write a report (Doc. 3, Introduction). Our Document 9 is that report.

General Kuibyshev, who replaced Bliukher, wrote a comprehensive account for Military Attaché Egorov. He ended with several complaints: he wanted his staff enlarged, more adequately prepared interpreters, prompt delivery of the munitions and communications equipment already requested, direct communications through couriers, and his own copy of the military code. Borodin, he charged, monopolized the only code. "If I had the secret code for direct communication with you, it would prove extremely beneficial" (Doc. 22, p. 60). Similarly, the man charged with creating a counterespionage system in the South complained that he was not adequately supported by Moscow and Peking, which had failed to send him promised personnel and even one interpreter. Without them, he said, "there cannot be any question about the further development of the work" (Doc. 20, p. 10).

When Borodin was preparing to leave Canton for Nanchang in November 1926, he was instructed by Peking to leave G. B. Skalov ("Sinani") in charge. The files discovered in the Soviet military attaché's office contained several complaints from "Sinani," who found his position after Borodin's departure completely anomalous because Borodin had failed to inform the Chinese leadership in Canton of his appointment. "Sinani" requested to be recalled, saying, "All affairs in Canton are managed and all representative work is done there by Borodin's wife, Fanny Borodin."[56]

There were personality conflicts in the Kalgan mission also. General V. K. Putna, first head of the mission there, wrote Ambassador Karakhan on May 18, 1925 to inquire what promises of supplies had been made to General Feng Yü-hsiang. Being in ignorance put him in an awkward position when Feng queried him about deliveries. Only a little later he wrote to General Michael Frunze, people's commissar for war in the USSR, complaining of uncertainty and disagreement about Feng's true nature, of the unrevealed promises to him, and especially of Karakhan's tight rein on the Kalgan group. "It is perfectly clear that he wishes to be personally responsible for everything. . . . We cannot do our best under his direction because it is not suited to our work." He sent Frunze copies of his correspondence to Karakhan and asked for Frunze's prompt support. His critical letter found its way into the files of Karakhan's military attaché.[57]

The euphoria of the first months of the Northern Expedition, so filled with heroism and victory, gradually turned to bitterness as the Kuomintang leaders became more conservative and an anti-Communist tide developed in response to rural and urban radicalism and Communist splitting tactics. Conservatism became more marked after the Peking Raid. By August 1927 Karakhan, Borodin, Bliukher, and Voitinsky had all departed for Russia and the aid missions were virtually ended. After the disastrous "Canton Commune" of December 1927 the rout was complete. Our epilogue describes the disillusioned wind-down of Soviet Russia's expensive four-year effort to stimulate and aid the Chinese revolution—the first extensive Russian effort to promote revolution abroad.

Notes

1. Ms. Xi Wu-i, a researcher in the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciencs, Peking, told CMW in November 1986 that she interviewed the elderly Chang Kuo-ch'en, the head in 1927 of the Commission for Translation and Compilation of the Soviet Documents, who told her that the first document published was the only forgery. She provided a copy of the interview protocol dated October 31, 1983. See her article "Distinguishing as Counterfeit the 'Instructions to the Military Attaché in China,' " *Lishi yanjiu*. Ms. Xi notes on page 185 that we had rejected the document. Her article was reviewed by S. Zhdanov, *Far Eastern Affairs* 1985, no. 4.

2. An account of Karakhan's diplomatic activity leading to the agreement of May 1924 is in Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924*.

3. Two scholarly biographies of Borodin in English are Lydia Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925*, and Dan N. Jacobs, *Borodin: Stalin's Man in China*.

4. There are dating ambiguities in V. I. Glunin, "Gregorii Voitinsky (1893-1953)."

5. An account of Bliukher's work in China is A. I. Kartunova, "Vasilii Bliukher (1889-1938)," which quotes documents in the Russian archives. Eleven documents produced by him are in Ms. Kartunova's book, *V. K. Bliukher v Kitae, 1924-1927 gg*.

6. Lydia Holubnychy's researches reveal much about the reasons for Borodin's selection, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 220-45.

7. Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 136, 140.

8. Cherepanov, *Zapiski. Voennoge Sovetnika vi Kitae*, pp. 1, 6-7, 11; draft translation, pp. 1, 3-5, 10; *As Military Adviser*, 16-18.

9. Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin," p. 31, quotes the telegram. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, recounts the arrivals. The *North China Herald* under the column "Sailings" lists quite a few who went on commercial vessels from Shanghai. Later the Soviet government ran a fleet of vessels between Vladivostok and Canton, avoiding Shanghai. Mirovitskaia gives the figures in "The First Decade," p. 30.

10. Blagodatov, *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi Revolutsii 1925-1927 gg*., p. 10.

11. Julie Lien-ying How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, gives a full account of these North China missions.

12. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vosstavshem Kitae, 1925-1927*, translated by Steven I. Levine as *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, pp. 1, 8, 16 ff.

13. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, p. 121; *As Military Adviser*, p. 84; Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 41, 59, 82.

14. Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Northern Expedition," p. 126.

15. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 39-40.

16. Document 23, p. 13.

17. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 178 ff.

18. Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, p. 146. The context implies he is referring to May 1926.

19. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 89, 99.

20. Primakov, *Zapiski Volontera: Grazhdanskaia Voina v Kitae*, p. 206.

21. This frustration is discussed in How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, and appears in the documents therein.

22. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 103.

23. How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, Document G, p. 79; Wilbur and How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers, 1918-1927*, p. 357.

24. Ibid., pp. 82, 359.

25. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 42. He reports an extended discussion on whether or not Feng should continue to be assisted and under what concessions on his part.

26. The above sketch is based upon How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, and the documents therein.

27. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 41.

28. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, p. 201; *As Military Adviser*, p. 120.

29. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 201.

30. Borodin, "Notes of the Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin on the Northern Expedition," p. 108.

31. Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 125.

32. Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser of the NRA Sergeev," pp. 128, 130.

33. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 123; *As Military Adviser*, p. 228; Kazanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 178.

34. Jacobs, *Borodin*, pp. 259, 285.

35. Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 210-11.

36. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, pp. 207, 211, 219, 312, 350; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 123, 125, 129, 153, 166; Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army of China," pp. 65, 86-87, diary entries for December 22, 1925 and March 4 and 6, 1926.

37. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 64, 91-92, 110, 235.

38. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 95, 130-31.

39. Katiushin-Kotov, "Notes of Adviser F. M. Katiushin-Kotov," p. 134; Teruni, "From a Letter by Adviser V. Ch. Teruni."

40. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 202; *As Military Adviser*, p. 256; Katsiushin-Kotov, "Notes," p. 133; Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 116; Sergeev, "Report," passim; Tselenko, "From Canton to Wuhan," p. 116.

41. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 325.

42. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, pp. 91, 217, 314; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 58, 128, 154; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 2.

43. How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, Document E, p. 21.

44. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 45.

45. Document 22. Also Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 15, and Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 190, 237.

46. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, pp. 363-64; *As Military Adviser*, p. 171.

47. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 79, 231.

48. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, draft translation, pp. 124, 314; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 86, 154.

49. Konchits, "In the Ranks," p. 62.

50. Katiushin-Kotov, *Notes*, p. 133.

51. Khmelev, *Report*, p. 123.

52. Ibid., p. 126.

53. Borodin, *Report*, p. 107.

54. Khmelev, *Report*, p. 126.

55. Katiushin-Kotov, *Notes*, p. 134.

56. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 183.

57. How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, Documents C and D, pp. 27-29.

Chapter 1

Forming a Tripartite Cooperation, 1920–1923

The central theme of this chapter is the development of a triangular relationship of cooperation between Soviet Russia, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Kuomintang. How did this relationship come about? Who advocated and worked for it? What benefits did the participants hope to realize? What resistance had to be overcome and what inducements were necessary to bring it about?

That such a triangular relationship should eventuate was the result of complex historical factors or forces, as well as of decisions made by individuals. In 1920 Soviet Russia was still in chaos, there was no Communist Party in China, and the Kuomintang struggled to survive as an influential political movement. Yet by 1923, Russia was on the verge of becoming deeply involved in Chinese internal politics, the Kuomintang was being revived, and China had a Communist Party, many of whose leaders had joined the Kuomintang to work within it. Communists called this relationship a "united front."

Influences of the World War on China

Our first document, "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," points out two results of the European war in explaining the emergence of a Communist Party in China—the growth of a Chinese proletariat and the effects of China's humiliation at the Versailles Peace Conference. This document is a valuable insiders' account of the communist movement from its beginnings until about September 1926. It provides a framework for understanding much that follows. Apparently it had joint authorship, with the basic information being supplied by Chinese Communists, and this then being commented upon by a Russian, now identified as Samuil Naumovich Naumov, who used the pseudonym S. Kalachev while working with the Soviet group in China. It was published in January 1927 in the Russian journal, *Kanton*, an informal organ of the Soviet aid mission in Canton. A manuscript copy was found in the Peking Raid.[1]

The "Brief History" explains that the war forced the bourgeoisie of the European imperialist countries to neglect China, resulting in the expansion of native capital and the greater intrusion of Japanese and American capitalism, and in the growth of factory industry in China to produce goods no longer available from Europe. Thus a Chinese proletariat developed "to a certain extent" and at the end of the war Chinese workers "directly encountered their enemy, the enemy which has enslaved China for many decades." At the Versailles Peace Conference, where "the victorious nations robbed the defeated," the "imperialist nations . . . had very little sympathy for enslaved China." They transferred territories in Shantung formerly occupied by Germany to Japan and Britain.[2] The impact of this humiliation "was singularly profound, and it will never be forgotten by the progressive masses of the Chinese people, especially the urban masses" (Doc. 1, p. 4).

Other factors related to the war, we may add, influenced Chinese political developments. In 1917, the United States encouraged the Chinese government to follow its lead in breaking relations with Germany and then to enter the war on the Allied side.

These decisions were among the factors that led to the split between the North and the South, when Sun Yat-sen and other opponents of the Peking government set up a rival regime in Canton, the first of three southern regimes headed by Dr. Sun. Japanese war loans to the government of Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui had a corrupting effect on the Peking government and brought it into disrepute. As a belligerent, China's primary contribution was to send thousands of laborers to the war zones to replace Allied manpower behind the lines. Later this had an effect on the Chinese labor movement and indirectly on the communist movement in China.

The war also had a profound effect on the attitudes of educated Chinese. Woodrow Wilson's enunciation of idealistic war aims and the two revolutions in Russia—first against the tsarist government and then the Bolshevik seizure of power from the government of Kerensky—stirred the Chinese reading public. There was also considerable disillusionment with Western civilization because of the ferocity of the war and the enormous slaughter.

The most profound shock came as a result of the Versailles Peace Conference, as noted by the "Brief History." As the conference proceeded, the Chinese delegation, representing one of the victors, learned of secret agreements of the European allies with Japan, and even agreements entered into by the Peking government, which promised to accept Japan's claims to Germany's holdings in Shantung. When Woodrow Wilson—in spite of his "Fourteen Points"—bowed to Japan's demands that these agreements be fulfilled, there was widespread outrage in China. An immediate result was the famous "May Fourth Movement" in 1919. This had a radicalizing effect on educated Chinese youth and was one of the immediate antecedents of the Chinese communist movement. It also stimulated Sun Yat-sen and a few close colleagues to revivify the Kuomintang. In short, the war and its immediate aftermath greatly stimulated Chinese nationalism and also led to a growing interest in Soviet Russia. Nationalism was the great driving force of the revolutionary movement we are here examining; "national salvation" its basic theme.

Two intellectual leaders who became disillusioned with the West and stimulated by the Bolshevik Revolution were Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en was the founder of a very influential monthly magazine aimed toward stimulating youth to patriotic endeavor, renamed *Hsin ch'ing-nien* (New Youth) with its second volume beginning in September 1916. Ch'en was a revolutionary with excellent credentials, though not in Sun Yat-sen's camp. In 1917 he became dean of the Faculty of Letters at the prestigious Peking University, which, under the leadership of its chancellor, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, became the center of an intellectual renaissance, as it was later termed by another renowned member of the faculty, Hu Shih. Li Ta-chao joined the editorial board of *Hsin ch'ing-nien* in January 1918 and the next month was appointed chief librarian of Peking University.[3]

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals had been introduced to European socialist thought and had some knowledge of Marxism, gained mostly through the writings of Japanese academic Marxists. Chinese journals published at the turn of the century, particularly those published in Japan around the middle of the first decade, carried articles on socialist theoreticians and on schools of European socialism.[4] After the founding of the Republic, interest in socialism seems to have waned. The Bolshevik Revolution rekindled interest in Marxism.[5]

Li Ta-chao was one of the first to be influenced. In July 1918, in an article entitled "A Comparison of the French and Russian Revolutions," he drew a parallel between the revolution of 1789 as heralding the historical tendencies of the nineteenth century and the Russian Revolution as performing a similar role for the twentieth. By November, his article in *Hsin ch'ing-nien* on the "Victory of Bolshevism" showed his genuine interest in Marxism and his belief that a great global struggle "between the world proletarian masses and the world capitalists" was soon to

break out.[6] Toward the end of 1918, Li began to draw about him a group of students for the serious study of Marxism. He was editor of a special issue of *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, published on May Day, 1919 (only a few days before the May Fourth Incident) and devoted to an academic and not uncritical study of Marxism. His own contribution, "My Marxist Views," was "by far the most systematic and serious treatment of Marxism" to appear in Chinese before Hu Han-min's essays later that year.[7] In December 1919, the Society for the Study of Socialism was organized among Peking students of various radical tendencies, holding its meetings under Li's auspices in the library of Peking University. In March 1920, the Marxists in the society set up their own organization, the Peking Society for the Study of Marxist Theory, with Li Ta-chao as its adviser.[8] From this group some of the early members of the Communist Party were recruited. Furthermore, Li used his editorship of the weekly supplement to the Peking newspaper, *Ch'en-pao*, to print a translation of Marx's "Wage Labor and Capital."

Ch'en Tu-hsiu came to a Marxist position about a year later than Li Ta-chao. In December 1918, the two men founded a journal of political opinion, *Mei-chou p'ing-lun* (Weekly Critic), but Ch'en's early contributions showed his enthusiasm for Western democracy and the victorious Allies. The Versailles awards of German concessions in Shantung to Japan changed his opinion. He was swept into the student protest movement and was arrested on June 11, 1919 while passing out pamphlets in the streets of Peking in protest of the repressive actions of the Peking authorities against the patriotic students. He served eighty-three days in prison. The magazines he helped edit were suspended and only *Hsin ch'ing-nien* survived. It resumed publication in November after Ch'en's release. Toward the end of 1919 or early in 1920, Ch'en moved to Shanghai where he continued to publish his journal. But now his writings began to show the strong influence of the Bolshevik Revolution and his growing understanding of Marxism.[9] Our first document recounts some of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's activities, but it states incorrectly that he alone was engaged in Communist work.

Several other persons important to our narrative, who were close to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had developed an academic interest in Marxism, but they did not become members of the Chinese Communist Party. They were editors of *Chien-she tsa-chih* (Reconstruction Magazine), established in Shanghai in August 1919 as an ideological journal to support Sun Yat-sen. Among them were Chu Chih-hsin, whose interest in Marxism went back to 1906; Hu Han-min, who wrote on Marxism and Lenin's theory of imperialism, and Tai Chi-t'ao, whose Chinese version of Karl Kautsky's introduction to *Das Kapital* and full translation of *The Communist Manifesto* were published in *Chien-she tsa-chih*. These revolutionary thinkers, and the other editors, Liao Chung-k'ai and Lin Yün-kai, were as familiar with Marxist literature—such as was available in China in 1919-20—as were any of the intellectuals of their day.[10]

Thus the ground was somewhat prepared among Chinese intellectuals when Soviet Russia began to take initiatives toward China. When details of the Karakhan Manifesto of July 1919 reached the Chinese reading public in the following spring, the effect was electric. Reflecting an early phase of Bolshevik revolutionary foreign policy, the manifesto offered to start negotiations for the annulment of Russian treaties with China of 1896 and 1901, and all agreements with Japan from 1907 to 1916. (These had established Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria.) Karakhan announced that the Soviet government was prepared to renounce "all acquisitions by the tsar's government which deprived China of Manchuria and other regions"; he renounced the Boxer Indemnity, abolished "all special privileges," and gave up "all factories owned by Russian merchants on Chinese soil." He renounced the right of extraterritoriality and offered to negotiate all other questions immediately. In addition, the manifesto as received in Peking contained a sentence

that later became highly contentious: "The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without compensation of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines which were seized from them by the government of the Tsars, that of Kerensky, and the outlaws Horvath, Semenov, Kolchak, the Russian generals, merchants, and capitalists."[11]

The contrast between this revolutionary Russian statement of purpose and the cruel treatment of China at Versailles less than a year before had a profound effect. The Shanghai *Min-kuo jih-pao*, which spoke for the Nationalist group around Sun Yat-sen, carried two editorials on the foreign powers' abuse of China ever since the Opium War, contrasting the unequal treaties with this generous offer. The May 1920 issues of *Hsin ch'ing-nien* carried a Chinese translation of the manifesto, a collection of responses by fifteen organizations, and editorials from nine newspapers and journals, all commending Soviet generosity.[12]

Sun Yat-sen's Interest in Foreign Aid and in Soviet Russia

Throughout most of his revolutionary career, Sun Yat-sen sought material aid from foreign powers or individuals to advance his causes. He appealed for moral support from the British public in 1897 for his Reform Party; he was extensively assisted by Japanese in the years between 1897 and 1907; and he tried to win American support in 1904 and to arrange a large financial deal with a few American promoters in 1910. He hoped to float a bond issue in France in 1908, and he proposed an alliance with Britain and the United States when returning to China during the Republican Revolution of 1911. In the years 1914 to 1916, while trying to overthrow Yuan Shih-k'ai, Dr. Sun appealed to the Japanese government for aid against his rival and did receive substantial grants and other assistance. He also tried to raise ten million dollars through an American promoter in exchange for concessionary grants in China. He probably received a large gift from the German Legation in Peking in the spring of 1917 when he opposed China's entry into the war on the Allied side, but soon thereafter he appealed to the American government for financial support of his Canton administration, which would join the war against Germany. He often communicated with foreign officials, trying to win their sympathy or to influence their government's policy toward China, and he was not averse to trying to play one country off against others.[13]

Dr. Sun considered himself a socialist and a revolutionary. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was one of the great events of the times; it was quite in keeping with his custom when he telegraphed Lenin about the end of June 1918, congratulating him in the name of the South China Parliament and the Chinese Revolutionary Party on the struggle of the revolutionary party in Russia. He ventured the hope that the Russian and Chinese parties might join forces in a common struggle. The telegram was published in *Izvestia* on July 5, and on August 1, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin sent a reply, though Sun later stated that he never received such a letter.[14]

When Sun telegraphed Lenin he was back in Shanghai after separating himself from his first Canton administration. The Chinese Revolutionary Party, which Sun had organized in 1914, had atrophied; it was reduced to a few of his personal followers. This was his bleak political situation when he expressed to Lenin the hope that the Russian and Chinese revolutionary parties might join forces in a common struggle.[15] Sun was then fifty-one years old.

Though in retirement in Shanghai, he was busy trying to revive his party, writing his political philosophy, preparing his vast scheme, *The International Development of China*, and encouraging his associates in Fukien to liberate Canton. During 1919 and early 1920, he held separate talks with two Russians on possible military cooperation

between the Kuomintang and the Bolsheviks, but without positive results.[16] He also talked with a member of the Organizational Bureau of Chinese Communists in Russia, one Liu Chang, who used the Russian name Fedorov, and who brought a plan that his group had thought up for a joint attack on Peking by revolutionary forces in South China, Central Russia, and the Russian Far East.[17] Dr. Sun began to regard Soviet Russia as a possible source of military assistance.

Soviet Russian Initiatives Toward China

Soviet Russian policies toward China, as they developed, followed two main paths. One was strategic-diplomatic: to protect and advance the interests of the Russian nation in the Far East. The other was revolutionary: to advance the cause of world revolution and weaken new Russia's enemies, the capitalist states. The domestic situation in Russia was rapidly evolving through a devastating period of civil war and then reconstruction, while the situation abroad also changed rapidly with the ending of the world war; hence Russia's foreign policy—and within this rubric, policies toward China—underwent evolutionary developments. The new Russian government naturally sought diplomatic recognition from the states of the world, and it attempted as soon as possible to establish relations with the government of China in Peking, where tsarist holdovers were still recognized.

The Soviet leaders conducted a "revolutionary foreign policy," which they regarded as very different from the policy of Tsarist Russia or of any other existing government. Thus, in July 1918, at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, Georgi Chicherin, commissar for foreign affairs, announced, "We renounce all conquests of the Tsarist Government in Manchuria and we restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory." He suggested that China buy back the Chinese Eastern Railway, and he agreed to renounce land rights of Russians in China and Mongolia. He stated that Russia was ready to renounce all indemnities. It was this revolutionary policy that explains the "Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China," issued by the Council of People's Commissars on July 25, 1919, and later known as the First Karakhan Manifesto, described above.[18]

The Second Karakhan Manifesto of September 27, 1920 was a more diplomatic document, addressed to the Chinese Foreign Office and designed to become a basis for negotiations. The first article contained a generous statement of Russian intent, which was qualified by the more careful phraseology of the other articles. Soviet Russia offered to negotiate a treaty of commercial and economic relations, to give up extraterritorial privileges for Russians in China, and not to accept Boxer Indemnity payments provided China did not pay the indemnities to any Russian consuls or others claiming them. The manifesto offered to conclude a special treaty for "the rules and regulations of exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the needs of the RSFSR."[19]

Two Russian delegations attempted to open treaty relations with the Peking government. The first was headed by M. I. Yurin, representing the Far Eastern Republic, a recently created buffer state meant to screen European Russia from Japan. This mission remained in Peking from August 1920 for about a year.[20] It foundered, in part, because of the invasion of Russian troops from the Far Eastern Republic into Mongolia in June 1921, to suppress the antirevolutionary forces of Baron Ungren von Sternberg. This accomplished, the Soviet troops assisted in the establishment of a new regime, the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia.[21] Then, on November 5, 1921, in Moscow, the Soviet Government and the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia concluded a secret treaty in which the two governments recognized each other without mention of China. This doomed the second Russian diplomatic mission, that led by Alexander Paikes, which was in Peking from December 1921 to May

1922. When the Chinese government received confirmation of the secret treaty, Paikes had to leave.[22]

The Bolshevik leadership also began to test the revolutionary possibilities in China. This testing was carried out by agents of the Foreign Office, the Comintern, or Communist International, and the International Council of Trade Unions. The Comintern was organized by Lenin to replace the Second or Socialist International. Its so-called First Congress, held in the Kremlin in March 1919, was merely organizational with pseudo delegates. It devoted little attention to Russia's eastern neighbor.[23] The Congress elected an Executive Committee (ECCI) to act for the Comintern during periods between congresses. This was a desperately difficult time for Russia and for Communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe.[24] The ECCI established a Far Eastern Secretariat, and sometime in 1920 a Special Department of this secretariat was set up in Irkutsk, a town in central Siberia on the Trans-Siberian Railway.[25]

One of the early acts of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat was to send an exploratory mission to China. The group was led by Gregory N. Voitinsky and included an interpreter, Yang Ming-chai, I. K. Mamaev and his wife, and M. F. Kuznetsova, Voitinsky's wife. They arrived in Peking in April 1920.[26] Before then a number of Russian Communists had come to China, including N. Burtman, who went to Tientsin, and A. A. Müller, Vilensky-Sibiriakov, and his interpreter, Abramson. M. Fromberg was sent to Shanghai by Iu. D. Smurgis, head of the Far Eastern Bureau of the International Council of Trade Unions, to assist in trade union work. There were also emigré Russian intellectuals, such as S. A. Polevoi and A. A. Ivanov-Ivan, professors respectively in Tientsin and Peking. Professor Polovoi assisted Voitinsky in meeting Chinese intellectuals, including Li Ta-chao.[27]

The theoretical basis for what became, in Communist parlance, a "united front" strategy in China was laid down in Moscow at the Second Congress of the Communist International, held from July 19 to August 6, 1920. Lenin had prepared "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," which attempted to generalize a strategy for revolution in a vast and heterogeneous area of "backward and colonial" countries that included Persia, India, Africa, China, and the Dutch Indies. It arose from a long Marxist tradition of class analysis and much revolutionary theorizing, as well as experience in Bolshevik seizure of power. It was designed to drive a wedge between the Western powers and the resources and peoples of the East, and to bring these people over to the side of revolutionary Russia.[28]

Lenin called for a worldwide struggle against imperialism; this would require a close alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. Such movements at the present stage of historical development would be led by bourgeois-democratic elements in the colonial and backward countries, he asserted. Communist parties and the Communist International must support these national movements, but "only on condition that the elements of future proletarian parties existing in all backward countries . . . shall be grouped together and trained to appreciate their special tasks, viz., the task of fighting the bourgeois-democratic movement within their own nations." In short, Lenin made it clear that cooperation was only tactical. "The Communist International must enter a temporary alliance with bourgeois-democracy in colonial and backward countries, but must not merge with it, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most rudimentary form."[29]

A Bengali delegate, M. N. Roy, prepared "Supplementary Theses" that opposed Lenin's concentration on bourgeois-democratic movements in colonial areas. Cooperation with bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movements would be useful for the overthrow of foreign capitalists in the colonies and would help to topple the capitalist system in Europe, he agreed. But he argued that "the foremost and necessary task is the creation of Communist Parties, which would organize workers and peasants and

lead them toward revolution and the establishment of Soviet Republics."[30]

After considerable debate a Dutch member of the commission, H. Maring, whose real name was Hendricus Sneevliet, informed the congress that the term "bourgeois-democratic movement" in Lenin's Theses had been changed to "revolutionary national-liberation movement."[31] This was Lenin's concession to Roy. But Lenin insisted that "every national movement can be only a bourgeois-democratic movement," since the great masses in backward countries were peasants who represented bourgeois-capitalist relations. He was willing to apply the term "national-revolutionary" to those movements whose leaders "would not oppose us in our efforts to educate and organize the peasantry and the masses of exploited people in general, in the revolutionary spirit." Otherwise communists must oppose the reformist bourgeoisie.[32]

The Communist International and Communist parties in the exploiting countries should assist the colonial and backward countries to throw off the yokes of feudalism and colonialism—that is, the British Communist Party for India, the French Party for Indochina. They should also prepare the proletariat and the peasantry for a second round of battle, the socialist revolution, which Lenin assured would follow very rapidly. The essence of the strategy for Communist parties in backward and colonial countries was simple: ally with national liberation movements led by the bourgeoisie but do not merge with them; support conditionally but prepare to fight!

China received only a small amount of attention at this congress. There was no Communist Party there in the summer of 1920, and the Russian leadership knew very little about the potential national liberation movements that might exist there.

Creating a Communist Movement in China

Western scholars have devoted much attention to the founding and early history of the Chinese Communist Party, and historians in Taiwan and in the People's Republic of China have amplified this work with extensive publication.[33] What follows is not a summary of this scholarship, but an effort to place our first two documents in their historical context.

When Voitinsky and his mission reached Peking, he soon met Li Ta-chao, who gave him a letter of introduction to Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai. The group moved there and Ch'en introduced Voitinsky to radical intellectuals, men inclined toward socialism or anarchism, several of whom were close to the Kuomintang.[34] One was Tai Chi-t'ao, then twenty-nine years old, who had a good knowledge of Japanese and was making a serious study of Marxism.[35] Another of the group was Li Han-chün, who had become acquainted with Marxism as a student in Japan and as an editor at the Commercial Press, one of the most prestigious publishing concerns in China. A third was Shen T'ing-i (alt. Shen Hsüan-lu), scion of a wealthy Chekiang family and one of the editors, along with Tai, of *Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun*. Another was Shao Li-tzu, a founding editor of the Shanghai *Min-kuo jih-pao*, or Republican Daily News, the principal organ associated with the Kuomintang. Several other younger radicals joined the discussions, and sometime in May 1920 a few of them set up an initiator group to organize a Communist Party. "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party" lists the members of this group as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Tai Chi-t'ao, Shen Hsüan-lu, Ch'en Wang-tao, Li Han-chun, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, and a name that might be either Juan Hsiao-hsien or Yü Hsiu-sung (Doc. 1, p. 11).[36]

The "Brief History" also tells us of the early work of the Communist group in Shanghai—the creation of journals for laborers and clerks; the organization of a foreign language school to train young revolutionaries, some to be sent to Russia for further training; and the beginnings of the effort to create trade unions. All of this can be confirmed from other sources. By September 1920, it says, there were seventy

organized comrades in Shanghai, "wielding influence over labor and able to direct the labor movement" (Doc. 1, pp. 11-12). The date seems too early and the number too large, unless the figure includes Youth Corps members. Nowhere does the "Brief History" mention Voitinsky and his team, nor the work of Fromberg and Smurgis.[37] But we know that Yang Ming-chai was placed in charge of a Sino-Russian News Service in Shanghai and that the wives of Voitinsky and Mamaev taught Russian in the school to a few young men being primed for training in Moscow.[38] Furthermore, Ch'en Tu-hsiu reorganized *Hsin ch'ing-nien* as a Communist organ beginning in September 1920, and the Comintern began to subsidize it. Yang Ming-chai and Voitinsky contributed articles to it.[39] According to the "Brief History," the only source of income for the Communist work was profits from *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, but it seems more likely that Voitinsky helped with finances.[40]

Our second document is a history of the Socialist Youth Corps, which was renamed the Communist Youth Corps in 1925. The document is a valuable source of information on early activities of the Corps and its conflicts with the Chinese Communist Party. It apparently dates from sometime between November 1925 and March 1926. After its discovery in the Peking Raid, a translation was printed in *The China Illustrated Review* of January 28, 1928. It has remained almost unnoticed by scholars. Marxist-inclined Chinese intellectuals established the Corps in Shanghai even before the formal establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. Document 2 gives a precise date for the founding of the Socialist Youth Corps, July 22, 1920. Secondary works usually give a date sometime in August. Units of the Corps were soon set up in other cities, and by January 1921 there were eight such organizations with more than 300 members. The document is very critical of the Corps during its first year because of the heterogeneity of the membership—socialist, anarchist, and communist. It also criticizes the political inactivity of most of the members, their aloofness from the masses, their tendency merely to study socialism, and their belief in the power of propaganda alone to bring socialism into being. The movement was characterized by internal conflicts over these issues until August 1921, when the organizations were dissolved, and a more unified Communist Youth Corps was created (Doc. 2, pp. 2-4). That the change of name occurred that early is doubtful.

One of the founders of the Youth Corps was Chang T'ai-lei, then about twenty-two years old, who had been a student leader in Tientsin and a member of Li Ta-chao's Peking study circle. He had a good knowledge of English, which was an asset in a movement where few Chinese or Russian activists knew the other's language. In May 1921 he went to Irkutsk, where he became a liaison man with the branch of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. His reports on the work of the Chinese Communist movement and the Socialist Youth Corps are among the earliest bits of contemporary information available for the organizing year.[41]

The "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party" next informs us of the creation of communist nuclei in Peking and Canton. The Peking group, organized in September, at first had six anarchists and only two communists, Li Ta-chao and Chang Kuo-t'ao, but three of the anarchists withdrew and four new and reliable members joined. They were Teng Chung-hsia, Lo Chang-lung, and Liu Jen-ching, with the fourth "unknown" at the time of writing in 1926. This group also started a labor journal and a night school for railway workers (Doc. 1, pp. 12-13). The four named members of the Peking nucleus, aside from Li Ta-chao and the anarchist, Huang Lin-shuang, were Peking University students who had been part of Professor Li's circle.[42] They became important members of the Party after it was formed, and the work that some of them did in organizing railway workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway had important consequences, as discussed in the next chapter.

The creation of the Canton group was made possible by the military campaign led by Ch'en Chiung-ming and a group of Sun Yat-sen's associates, which freed

Canton from the control of a Kwangsi military clique on October 29, 1920. Sun Yat-sen was invited back and arrived on November 29. Ch'en Chiung-ming invited Ch'en Tu-hsiu to come to Canton to be provincial commissioner of education. The communist leader started from Shanghai on December 16.[43] The "Brief History" states that Ch'en quickly organized a communist nucleus in Canton, and it names three persons, who had all been students at Peking University at the time of the May Fourth Movement, as his most important recruits: T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Kung-po, and T'an Chih-t'ang. Anarchist members later withdrew in disagreement with Ch'en's party program. Ch'en and his Canton disciples followed the same pattern of work, establishing a magazine for labor and a school to train propagandists (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14). T'an P'ing-shan, then already thirty-three, was soon to become one of the most important executors of the relationship between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.[44]

Other nuclei were set up during 1920-21. In Hankow, Tung Pi-wu was instrumental in setting up a group with the assistance of I. K. Mamaev.[45] Tung was a revolutionist who had participated in the seizure of power in Wuchang in 1911 and then had joined the T'ung-meng Hui, and later the Chung-hua Ko-ming Tang. He undertook several assignments for Sun Yat-sen. He had been groping toward Marxism with his friend, Li Han-chün.[46]

A young protégé of Li Ta-chao, a school teacher named Mao Tse-tung, played an important part in setting up a communist cell in Changsha, the capital of Hunan. Another group was formed in Tsinan, the capital of Shantung province.

Thus, from May 1920 onward, a communist movement was being formed. The early cadres were radical intellectuals already somewhat acquainted with Marxism, eager to rescue China but not very clear about what a communist party was. In this, Voitinsky, Mamaev, and Yang Ming-chai could give practical advice. They began trying to approach the proletariat by publishing journals directed toward labor and organizing schools and, in Shanghai, trade unions.

Sun Yat-sen in the South

Voitinsky called on Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai together with "Comrade Ch."—presumably Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Sun was preparing to return to Canton, so it would seem the call was made in November 1920. As reported by Voitinsky, this seems to have been their first meeting; if so, he spent about half a year in Shanghai before he saw the renowned nationalist leader. Sun immediately began to question Voitinsky about Russia and the revolution there. Toward the end of the discussion it became clear that Sun was greatly interested in how the struggle in South China could be joined with the struggle in Russia. Sun wondered if a powerful radio station could be set up in Vladivostok or Manchuria, so that the Russians could communicate with Canton.[47]

Sun Yat-sen had some contact with Russian representatives after his arrival in Canton. Early in 1921 a person using the name Alexieff opened a branch of the Soviet news agency "Rosta" in Canton, providing a source of information on developments in Russia. According to a well-informed Japanese journalist, Sun and Alexieff reached an agreement in March 1921, but for this we have no substantiating evidence. In June, soon after becoming president, Dr. Sun received a letter from Georgi Chicherin, the Soviet foreign minister, that had been written the previous October. It is possible the letter was brought to him by A. E. Khodorov, head of the Peking branch of Rosta and a person close to Yurin's mission from the Far Eastern Republic. Khodorov met Sun Yat-sen and talked with him about Russia and the Far Eastern Republic.[48]

In his letter, Chicherin congratulated China for its struggle against "the world suppressing yoke of Imperialism"; he proposed that trade between China and Russia

begin at once; and he urged that China "enter resolutely the path of good friendship with us."[49] Sun replied on August 28 that this was the first letter he had received from anyone in Soviet Russia. He admitted his relinquishment of the presidency to Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1912 had been a blunder, denounced Chang Tso-lin as "the head of a gang of murderers" and a tool of Japan, and cautioned Moscow against attempting to open relations with Peking. He argued that his was both the de jure and de facto government of China, and he told Moscow it "must wait until I put an end to the reactionaries who always appear in every country on the very next day after a successful revolution." He hoped for personal contact with his friends in Moscow, and he expressed a particular interest in "the organization of your soviets, your army, and educational system." He closed his letter to Chicherin with "best wishes to you, to my friend Lenin, and to all who have done so much for the cause of human freedom."[50]

Sun's plea that Russia wait on establishing relations with China until he had put an end to reactionaries reflected his intention to launch a military campaign against Peking. Sun negotiated with military commanders to organize a Northern Expedition and also sought alliances with military factions in the North. Ch'en Chiung-ming opposed the campaign and withheld his troops, but Sun went ahead anyway. On December 4, he arrived at Kweilin in northern Kwangsi and set up his military headquarters for a campaign into Hunan. His principal commanders and their forces were Hsu Ch'ung-chih and the Second Kwangtung Corps, Li Fu-lin and the Fu Army, and Chu P'ei-te leading a Yunnan force. Li Lieh-chün served as chief of staff and Hu Han-min headed the secretariat. The mixed force was said to number about 30,000 men.[51]

It was while Sun was at Kweilin that he met the Comintern delegate, Hendricus Sneevliet ("Maring"), toward the end of December. Their meeting is discussed below.

First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

An early account of the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party by a participant was completed by Ch'en Kung-po written in January 1924 as his Master's essay for Columbia University. Furthermore, Ch'en had two of the documents that resulted from the congress when he wrote, and they are preserved in his work, although in translation.[52] The "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party" also describes the congress. These early works are independent, but they verify one another in various respects, though conflicting in some details. The earliest account of the First Congress, however, has been found in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow, undated, unsigned, and written in Russian. Apparently by a participant and probably written not long after the congress was held, it provides important new information.[53] There are also various reminiscent accounts by participants.[54]

Russian scholarship based on archives shows that a preliminary conference among Chinese communists was held in March 1921, "on the recommendation and with the assistance of the Soviet Communists—the Far Easterners and the Comintern." One purpose was to eliminate the anarchists from the membership. On March 27, Shumiatsky in Irkutsk telegraphed the Executive Committee of the Comintern that a congress of the Chinese communists was scheduled for May, "with the participation and under the leadership of our representatives."[55]

Apparently with this knowledge, the Comintern dispatched Sneevliet ("Maring") as its delegate to China. He came by sea and arrived in Shanghai on June 3. There he met M. Nikolsky, who had been sent from the Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk.[56]

Sneevliet was destined to play an important broker's role in what became an uneasy triangular relationship among the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party, and Soviet Russia. A Dutch Communist, he had spent about five years in the East In-

dies, where he had helped to found the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV), which later became the Indonesian Communist Party. Together with a few other Dutch radicals he was instrumental in leading ISDV into the large Muslim organization, Sarekat Islam. A particular advantage in joining that nationalistic mass organization was the opportunity to recruit its young activists into the more radical ISDV. During 1917-18 ISDV grew rapidly and developed its own Indonesian leadership. Then, in December 1918, the government of the colony expelled Sneevliet for his disturbing activities. After a period in Holland, he came to Moscow, where he attended the Second Comintern Congress in July-August 1920 as a representative of Indonesia. He was appointed secretary of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, and he supported Lenin's position that communist movements and the Communist International should support bourgeois-democratic movements in colonies and backward areas. Sometime after the congress he was appointed the Comintern's representative in China.[57]

When Sneevliet arrived in China he was about thirty-four years old. Chang Kuo-t'ao, who met him soon after, describes him as "aggressive and hard to deal with; his manner . . . very different indeed from that of Voitinsky." "At first glance this Dutchman with a powerful physique looked like a Prussian officer. . . . At times he would assume a very severe posture, his eyes burning into you. And he would persist in his view with such a stubbornness that you would think he was prepared to challenge his opponent to a duel."[58] Some of his Dutch colleagues later described him as "a mystic whose search for salvation had begun with Catholicism and ended with 'the Richness, the Beauty, the Luster of Social Democratic Religion.'"[59]

Twelve delegates attended the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held in the home of Li Han-chün in the French Concession in Shanghai and opened on July 23, 1921.[60] Those who attended were: from Shanghai, Li Ta and Li Han-chün; from Peking, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Liu Jen-ching; from the Wuhan cities, Tung Pi-wu and Ch'en T'an-ch'iu; from Hunan, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Shu-heng; from Canton, Ch'en Kung-po; from Tsinan, Wang Chin-mei and Teng En-ming; and from Chinese members in Japan, Chou Fu-hai. Sneevliet represented the Comintern and Nikolsky the Comintern's Irkutsk Bureau. Pao Hui-seng (who later used the pseudonym "Ch'i-wu Lao-jen") attended, apparently as an unattached person, though sometimes listed as from Canton. The earliest account says there were 53 members; Chang Kuo-t'ao says there were about 59 members of the Party, and about 350 in the Socialist Youth Corps.[61]

Document 1, the "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," says erroneously that the congress met in May 1921 with eleven delegates. The number may be correct, however, if Ho Shu-heng was actually sent back to Hunan before the congress began and Pao Hui-seng was not a delegate. The document stresses the divergent ideological positions of the participants, who included students of socialism, democratic socialists, anarchists, and communists. Such diversity was characteristic of the period and is attested to by several of the reminiscences.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, too busy in Canton to attend, sent his draft of the Party program for discussion at the congress. He emphasized the education and training of Party members; guidance of the Party in accordance with democratic principles; discipline; and "caution in approaching the masses" with a view to recruiting them into the Party. Seizure of political power was only a problem for the future; first efforts should be devoted to work of a preparatory character. This extremely mild program, as the "Brief History" characterizes it, seemed too radical to some delegates, too impractical to others, while some saw no need to adopt a concrete program.

To illustrate improper ideological tendencies, the composers of Document 1 emphasize Li Han-chün's position. He argued that before definite decisions were reached on a Party platform and political policy, comrades should be sent to study the respec-

tive merits of the dictatorial Russian Communist Party and the democratic system in the German Party. Li "and his group" favored only the study of communism. Had the wavering opinion of Li Han-chün and Ch'en Kung-po not been repudiated at once, says Document 1, "our Party would have been extinguished and become a miscarriage." The majority resisted the current of thought of the "sitting on the fence" group and rejected Li's position. Hence, almost all of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's proposals on party centralization, discipline, and the ultimate objective were approved. However, the ultimate objective—"seizure of political power by proletarian organizations under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party"—was most objectionable to Li's "sitting on the fence clique," and they were ordered to leave the Party. This made possible a smooth election of the first Central Committee. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected secretary general (Doc. 1, pp. 15-17).

There may be anachronisms in this account, for example the expulsion of some members at the time of the congress, the election of a formal Central Committee, and the title of secretary general.

The early Russian manuscript account of the First Congress dwells on two issues that were debated: no conclusion could be reached whether Party members might also be officials or members of parliament. The other issue concerned the attitude that should be taken toward other parties, whether of hostility or of cooperation against common foes. The final decision was to oppose all other parties and groups, according to the early Chinese author.[62] His account is borne out by the program and decisions, provided in Ch'en Kung-po's account. The Party was to cut off all relations with the "yellow intellectual class," and other such parties. A person joining the Communist Party must first sever relations with any party or group that opposed its program. An attitude of "independence, aggression and exclusion" should be adopted toward existing political parties. In the struggle of politics "our party should stand up in behalf of the proletariat, and should allow no relationship with other parties and groups."[63]

Reflecting this attitude of hostility was the majority position on the proper attitude toward the government that Sun Yat-sen had established in Canton. The majority apparently wished to oppose it as vigorously as they would the government in Peking, and a manifesto was drawn up enumerating the evils of both, according to Ch'en Kung-po. The manifesto was not issued, however, but was referred to the newly elected central group, which apparently killed it. This may have been done on the advice of Sneevliet, who then, or soon thereafter, advocated cooperation with the Kuomintang.[64]

These items reveal that the group was not then looking for allies. Apparently, in July 1921 the leaders of the new Chinese Party did not know the alliance strategy articulated by Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress a year before. Yet, since this was to be a party of the proletariat and its chief aim was proclaimed to be the formation of industrial unions, members were permitted to join existing guilds or craft unions as a "first step" toward their "reorganization"—or, to be less delicate, their capture from within.[65]

The two documents that resulted from the congress give an impression of a very simple organization and a sketchy plan for action. The objectives of the Party as stated in "The First Program of the Communist Party of China 1921" are the following:

> A. With the revolutionary army of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalistic classes, to reconstruct the nation from the labor class, until class distinctions are eliminated.
>
> B. To adopt the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to complete the end of class struggle—abolishing the classes.
>
> C. To overthrow the private ownership of capital, to confiscate all the pro-

> ductive means, such as machines, land, buildings, semi-manufactured products, etc., and to entrust them to social ownership.
> D. To unite with the Third International.
> 3. Our Party with the adoption of the Soviet form, organizes the industrial and agricultural laborers and soldiers, preaches communism, and recognizes the social revolution as our chief policy; absolutely cuts off all relations with the yellow intellectual class, and other such parties.

"The First Decisions as to the Object of the Communist Party of China 1921" states that "to form industrial unions is the chief aim of our party. . . . The party should imbue the unions with the spirit of class struggle."[66]

The system of organizing the Party centered around the cell, which Ch'en translated as "soviet." One with less than ten members was to have only a secretary; larger ones should have a treasurer, organizer, and propagandist. A "soviet" with more than thirty members should have an executive committee. No hierarchy of organization at local, intermediate, and national levels was mentioned, but it was anticipated that a Central Committee would be elected by a National Congress when there were over 500 members or more than five local executive committees; until then a Provisional Central Committee should be organized. Secrecy was enjoined on the members, but there is no sense of a centralized and tightly disciplined party.[67]

The decisions called for organizing industrial unions, conducting propaganda, establishing training schools for laborers, and creating an institute to train party workers and conduct research. The main impression is of a group only on the verge of a program. "Imperialism" is not even mentioned in the two surviving documents that resulted from this congress.

Chinese Communists Tutored in the Search for Allies

The documents of the Second Congress, held a year later, show great development. The constitution is much more elaborate and the decisions on a wide range of subjects are detailed and sophisticated. Furthermore, the Communist Party by mid-1922 was definitely looking for allies, and the Kuomintang was its main candidate. This change may be explained as a result of the education that a few leaders of the Party received while attending conferences in Moscow and as a result of Sneevliet's tutorship.

Two Chinese Communists attended the Third Comintern Congress, held in Moscow from June 22 to July 12, 1921, shortly before the first congress of their Party in Shanghai. They were Chang T'ai-lei, who had been working with the Far Eastern Secretariat at Irkutsk, and Yang Ho-te.[68] The Third Comintern Congress paid very little attention to the Far East, and the first delegates actually from China were given only consultative votes. At the last minute a Commission on the National and Colonial Questions was set up and Chang was given a position in it. The commission engaged in extensive debate but was scarcely given any time to report to the congress. Chang, however, had the opportunity to debate Roy on the extent to which a Communist Party in Asia would cooperate with a bourgeois national movement. Reportedly he articulated the position of Lenin, in which, presumably, he was coached.[69] What nationalistic group? The question was still to be answered.

Document 1 also discusses the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which it calls "another important event for the CCP." The congress was held in Moscow from January 21, 1922 to February 1, with a closing session in Petrograd on February 3. It moved the Chinese Communist Party a step on the road toward the Kuomintang because some of the speeches by Russian leaders called attention to the Kuomintang as a potential partner. Yet it seems that the Comintern leadership had not yet decided

that the Kuomintang should, in fact, be supported.

In preparation for the congress, Chang T'ai-lei at the Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk prepared invitations to Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and other national groups, while in China members of the Communist Party in Shanghai recruited persons from a variety of organizations to take the hazardous journey to Irkutsk. According to the "Brief History" they finally succeeded in recruiting a delegation of thirty persons representing students, workers, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party, although most of the "delegates" had no organizational affiliation (Doc. 1, p. 21). According to Shumiatsky, who worked on preparations in Irkutsk, fifty-four Chinese arrived there, among whom twenty-three were members of the Communist Party and seventeen from the Communist [Socialist] Youth Corps, but only two were from the Kuomintang. By the time the Congress officially opened in Moscow, the Chinese delegation was down to thirty-nine (though some accounts give forty-two or forty-four), of whom fourteen were listed as members of the Communist Party, eleven as members of the Socialist Youth Corps, and only one as a member of the Kuomintang.

Chang T'ai-lei returned to China from Irkutsk.[70] He did not attend the Congress of Toilers he had helped to organize. On his arrival in China he was, relatively speaking, *the* Chinese expert on Soviet Russia and the Comintern, and, on becoming Sneevliet's interpreter, he had an opportunity to learn about and speak for the Dutchman's policy of seeking alliance between the Communist Party and nationalistic groups.

The great theme of the Congress of Toilers of the Far East was revolutionary liberation of colonial and semicolonial countries and solidarity with proletarian Russia. Japan, Korea, China, and Mongolia were the countries most discussed. It was necessary to develop true proletarian movements and inculcate among Asian workers and peasants the vision of soviets in the future. The point was strongly made that the peasantry of Asia must be drawn into the revolution, which could be accomplished by agitation for nationalization of land. Another important theme was the need for cooperation within the scattered ranks of bourgeois nationalists and proletarian revolutionaries to struggle for emancipation.[71]

The Kuomintang was singled out for mild praise and considerable censure. Zinoviev charged that some of its leaders close to Sun Yat-sen looked hopefully toward American capitalism for aid, and some believed that Mongolia should be returned to Chinese rule. G. I. Safarov, a prominent Bolshevik specialist on the East, criticized Dr. Sun's party for its failure to put land nationalization into effect within the areas it controlled.

After "Comrade Tao"—presumably Chang Ch'iu-pai—had defended his party, Safarov discussed Communist terms for cooperation with the Kuomintang.

> I am convinced that, in order to come to an understanding between the Communists, on the one hand, and the revolutionary nationalists, on the other, it is absolutely necessary for both sides to know each other well. We know that the Party which is at the head of the South China Government is a revolutionary-democratic Party. . . . We are convinced that this Party has done great revolutionary work which was absolutely necessary in China, and we hope to fight side by side with this Party in the future. But . . . we are not so naive as to imagine that this Party is a revolutionary Communist Party. . . . We say, in colonial and semi-colonial countries the first phase of the revolutionary movement must inevitably be a national-democratic movement. We give our support to this movement, as such, to the extent that it is directed against imperialism. We are supporting it . . . and will do so in the future, but, on the other hand, we cannot recognize this struggle as our struggle, as the struggle for the proletarian revolution.

The proletarian masses, Safarov went on to say, had a much greater task to fulfill—the complete liberation of their countries through social revolution. Communists in China might raise slogans of a democratic revolution in order to cooperate "with all the honest nationalist democratic organizations, if they have the interests of the toiling majority at heart." But, the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements must organize independently in class unions in order to carry on class struggle. The guild and craft organizations connected with the Kuomintang were not class unions, Safarov asserted. "Therefore, in dealing with you, followers of the Huomindan [Kuomintang], . . . we at the same time tell you openly and frankly: we are supporting and will continue to support your struggle insofar as it is a matter of a nationalistic and democratic uprising for national emancipation. But at the same time we shall independently carry on our Communist work of organizing the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of China."[72]

The Congress of the Toilers of the Far East was the first large gathering sponsored by the Comintern that devoted extensive attention to China. A few Comintern leaders descended from theoretical propositions to the specific problems of promoting revolution there. The Far East was beginning to attract more attention as hope of revolution in Europe faded. Comintern leaders were in a mood of retreat with respect to Europe and were moving toward the concept of cooperation between Communist and non-Communist labor movements and parties.[73] This mood reinforced Lenin's strategic doctrine of a united front of Communists and bourgeois nationalists against imperialism in the colonial regions of Asia. The Kuomintang was emerging in the minds of some Comintern leaders as a party that might be brought into such a front. Thus, in a letter to Lenin dated January 28, 1922, Chicherin stated that the question of establishing connections with Canton "is being discussed by us with the representative of the party of the Kuomintang . . . at the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East." Three of the Chinese delegates were invited to a discussion with Lenin; one was the Kuomintang delegate, Chang Ch'iu-pai, and another was the Communist, Chang Kuo-t'ao, who recalls that Lenin raised the question of possible cooperation between the two parties.[74]

Probably no Russian revolutionary leader had a clear idea what the Kuomintang was. Nor was China yet high on the Comintern agenda. Thus, at the First Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee, held only a few weeks after the closing of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, China did not figure in the discussions of the united front problem. In this matter, Europe was its only concern.[75]

For the Chinese delegates, however, the congress must have conveyed a strong impression. They were bombarded with the themes of proletarian solidarity, anti-imperialism, cooperation among revolutionary groups, and world revolution under Comintern leadership. Though Moscow was struggling with near famine conditions, the delegates were especially well cared for. The "Brief History" dwells, however, on the unfavorable impression which famine-ridden Russia made upon many of the delegates, and on the animosity created among Kuomintang delegates toward the Chinese Communists because of their arrogance. It says that Chang Ch'iu-pai and other Kuomintang delegates, whom it does not name, declared the Chinese Communists to be their enemies (Doc. 1, p. 22). With respect to Chang, the charge seems to be anachronistic.[76]

After the congress, Chicherin wrote a cordial letter to Sun Yat-sen in reply to Sun's letter dated August 28, 1921. He stressed the hope for more permanent relations and hinted that "a friend" would soon be calling on Sun. Discussions with the Kuomintang representative at the Congress showed accord on all points concerning "our future relations," wrote Chicherin, but he frankly told Sun that, no matter what one thought of the Peking government, it was the official government of the Chinese state, "and we are striving to establish normal relations with it."[77]

Communist Work after the Founding Congress

The "Brief History" provides a basic outline of work done in China during the months after the formal beginning of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921. Ch'en Tu-hsiu returned to Shanghai in order to direct the work, which was mainly propaganda and organizing of trade unions in Shanghai and North China. The account emphasizes difficulties in the publishing field because the Party stalwarts lacked confidence, and in the labor field because workers were suspicious of the Party's radicalism (Doc. 1, pp. 18-21).

The "Brief History" does not mention the assistance rendered by the Comintern agent, Sneevliet, alias "Maring." His own report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, however, dated Moscow, July 11, 1922, states that it was "the representatives of the Comintern" who invited Ch'en Tu-hsiu to undertake political work "in the small communist sect." And he adds that "We kept in constant contact with the little group." He mentions the organization of a workers' secretariat in Shanghai, its publications and support for some local strikes, and other details, but his account is critical of the fledgling party's indifferent accomplishment in the period between July and December 1921.[78] From other sources it is clear that Sneevliet provided considerable financial assistance to the Party and the work of the Labor Secretariat headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao.[79] Relations between Sneevliet and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were at first very frosty. However, when Ch'en was arrested and imprisoned by the French Concession authorities, it is reported that Sneevliet hired a French lawyer, put up $50,000 bail which secured the release of Ch'en and others arrested, and paid the $5,000 fine—all with Comintern funds.[80] Thereafter relations between the two improved.

Two other matters of great significance for the Chinese Communist movement may be noted. One was the relatively independent development in France of Communist organizations among the many Chinese intellectuals in the work and study movement there. A Socialist Youth group was organized in Paris in February 1921, which later led to the formation of a branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Many later important Communist Party members were radicalized while in France. In October 1921, a group of them was deported, including three Hunanese, Ts'ai Ho-sen and his wife Hsiang Ching-yü, who soon became important at the Party's central level, and Li Li-san, who became an outstanding labor organizer, first at the An-yüan mines in Kiangsi and then in Shanghai.[81]

The other important development was the establishment in Moscow of the University of the Toilers of the Far East (KUTV) in April or May 1921, for the purpose of training cadres from Eastern nationalities within Russia and from Asian countries. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who had gone to Russia as a journalist in late 1920, was employed to teach in the university. He was converted to Marxism in Russia and on his return to China early in 1923 strongly supported cooperation with the Kuomintang. The entering class at the university had some forty to sixty Chinese students,[82] many of them first recruited into the foreign language school in Shanghai where they received preliminary Russian language training from members of Voitinsky's team. Several of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's students became prominent in the CCP, such as Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Shu-chih, Jen Pi-shih, and Lo I-nung. Liu returned early in 1922 and became an important labor organizer. P'eng returned the next year and worked in the Party's Propaganda Department. The youthful Jen Pi-shih became a teacher in Shanghai University and a leader in the Communist Youth Corps, while Lo I-nung stayed longer in Russia, returning to China early in 1925 as a representative of the Peasant International (Krestintern). They are only a sample of the hundreds given training in Russia and sent back for revolutionary work in China during the 1920s. Our Document 13 emanates from the Moscow group of youthful Chinese Comunists.

Sneevliet Visits Sun Yat-sen

Sneevliet set off with Chang T'ai-lei on a tour of Central and South China, departing from Shanghai on December 10, 1921. They first visited Hankow and then proceeded to Changsha where they interviewed Governor Chao Heng-t'i, who gave them a small escort for the dangerous overland journey through southwestern Hunan to Kweilin, where they arrived on December 23.[83] Kweilin was the headquarters of the military campaign that Sun Yat-sen hoped to launch into Hunan. Sneevliet stayed in Kweilin for nine days and had several talks with Dr. Sun.[84]

In his report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Sneevliet described most briefly his conversations with Sun Yat-sen, though he discussed the Kuomintang and the situation in Canton in more detail. Sun "told me personally that he considers himself a bolshevik," Sneevliet reported. They had three long talks about the possibility for recognition by Sun's government and an alliance with Russia, but Sun considered this to be impossible until he had successfully concluded his Northern Expedition. According to Sneevliet, Sun declared that after the expedition he would immediately propose an open alliance with Russia. Together, Russia and China could complete the liberation of Asia, but a premature alliance would only provoke intervention by the Great Powers against him. In January 1922 he could go no further than to establish unofficial ties with Russia, and he agreed to send "one of his best comrades" to Russia.[85] According to a modern Russian study, presumably based on archives, Sneevliet proposed the organization in China of "a single revolutionary party, which would rally around itself different layers of the population, first of all workers and peasants, and also [proposed] to create a revolutionary army and schools for the training of military cadres."[86]

After these discussions, Sun telegraphed Liao Chung-k'ai in Canton telling him about "Maring's" visit and that Dr. Sun had learned of Russia's New Economic Policy, which he considered similar to his own Plan for the Industrial Development of China. He now felt his plan could certainly be carried out.[87] In a speech a few days after Sneevliet's departure, Sun described France and the United States as old-fashioned republics, and Soviet Russia as the only republic of the new type. He said the Chinese should build the newest type, one in which the nation is converted into a single family.[88]

Although our knowledge of what actually transpired in the discussions between these two strong-willed men is vague, at least it may be said that a principal Comintern advocate of cooperation between communist and nationalist parties had extensive discussions with the leader of China's best-known nationalistic party. Eight months later, after reporting to his superiors in Moscow, Sneevliet arranged for Chinese Communist leaders to *enter* the Kuomintang.

After the Kweilin visit Sneevliet proceeded to Canton, arriving January 23 and staying until February 3. He then went overland to Swatow in order to avoid Hong Kong, which was tied up in the Chinese seamen's strike. He arrived back in Shanghai on March 7, considerably enlightened about the Kuomintang and the South China labor movement and aware of the differences between Sun and Ch'en Chiung-ming.[89]

Sneevliet Proposes Communist Entry into the Kuomintang

Sneevliet's opinion of the Kuomintang had improved considerably. After his meeting with Sun Yat-sen he witnessed in Canton the early stage of the Hong Kong seamen's strike,[90] which broke out on January 12, 1922. The strike ended in victory for the workers on March 8. According to Teng Chung-hsia, a Communist active in the labor movement, during this interval the Canton government daily lent several thousand dollars, totalling approximately $100,000, to help striking seamen who had gone to

Canton. They numbered no less than 50,000, he writes. The successful conclusion of the strike influenced the Canton government to abolish all Chinese laws relating to the suppression of strikes.[91]

Sneevliet's own writings make it clear that the strike made a big impression on him, making him think more highly of Sun Yat-sen's socialism. The strike was an example of how indispensable the young proletarian class had become. It strengthened his conviction that, in semi-colonial China, the class struggle had become bound up with the struggle for national freedom. He met Ch'en Chiung-ming in Canton and discovered that Ch'en had certain socialist ideas. Sneevliet came to think that Kwangtung afforded a reasonable opportunity for organizing the masses.[92]

Chang Kuo-t'ao arrived at Shanghai from Moscow in March 1922, about the same time as Sneevliet returned there from Canton. Chang recalls that he reported the results of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East to the Party's Central Committee, which, he asserts, accepted his report with pleasure. He also held long talks with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who, Chang remembers, expressed strong agreement with Lenin's idea of Kuomintang-CCP cooperation, although he felt that the KMT had many defects. When Chang delivered his first report on his trip and the problem of establishing a united front with the Kuomintang at a meeting of Shanghai Communists, no serious argument ensued but there was astonishment and doubt on the part of those present.[93]

On April 6, 1922, Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote Voitinsky that "Maring" had proposed that the CCP and the Socialist Youth Corps join the Kuomintang but that they were categorically against this. Ch'en argued that the CCP and the KMT had completely different revolutionary aims. He stated that the question of entry into the KMT had already been discussed at meetings of comrades in Kwangtung, Shanghai, Peking, Changsha, and Wuhan, and everywhere the same negative reaction was produced. In fact, Ch'en stated, there was no possibility at all of their entry into the KMT.[94]

Sneevliet's accounts confirm that he advised the Chinese Communists to enter the Kuomintang. Early in April, after a quick trip to Peking, he met with some members of the Central Committee, probably in Shanghai. According to his written report to the ECCI of July 11, 1922, "I suggested to our comrades that they give up their exclusive attitude toward the Kuomintang and that they begin political activity *within* the Kuomintang, through which one can gain access so much more easily to the workers in the South and the soldiers. The small group does not have to relinquish its independence; quite the contrary, the comrades must decide together what tactics they should use within the Kuomintang. The leaders of the Kuomintang have told me that they will allow communist propaganda within their party. Our comrades were against this idea."[95]

On April 24, 1922, Sneevliet sailed from Shanghai for Europe after less than a year in China during which he had assisted with the formal organization of the Communist Party, held discussions with Sun Yat-sen, and planted the idea of cooperation between the two parties, but cooperation of a peculiar sort—the penetration of the Kuomintang by members of an autonomous Communist Party joining the senior body.

In April 1922, however, the Communist Party leadership was unwilling to go that far; it even questioned a "united front." Chang Kuo-t'ao, then chairman of the Chinese General Labor Union Secretariat, recalls that the Party's Central Committee felt that if it should decide to enter an alliance with other revolutionary parties, it must first obtain the right to represent the workers. Yet Kuomintang members had started long before to engage in the labor movement. Their centers of activity were Canton and Hong Kong, where they led the principal unions.[96] After the formation in Canton of the Socialist Youth Corps, Communists competed with the Kuomintang in the labor movement. The Canton Party organization paid particular attention to the pro-KMT Mechanics Union and the Seamen's Union. After striking seamen arrived

from Hong Kong, Communists intensified their activities among them.[97]
An article published in May 1922 and attributed to Ch'en Tu-hsiu concedes that the Kuomintang was more influential than the CCP among workers. It states that the influence of the parties that engaged in activity among labor, such as the Communist and Anarchist parties, was comparatively weak. As regards other political parties, the only one that expressed sympathy with laborers' activity was the Kuomintang, which was somewhat influential.[98]

Clearly, the issue of the nature of the relationship between the older Kuomintang and the infant Communist Party was not settled during Sneevliet's first period in China, and there was a likelihood of great rivalry in the labor movement.

The Socialist Youth Corps and an Anti-Christian Movement

The Socialist Youth Corps had an opportunity to expand its influence in March and April 1922 through an anti-Christian movement. Initially directed against the World Christian Student Association, which had scheduled a conference at Tsinghua University in Peking to begin on April 4, the opposition spread to many schools and colleges throughout China. Document 2, a history of the Youth Corps, claims that the anti-Christian movement was organized and guided by the Corps, and that the rapid growth of the Corps may be explained by the success of this propaganda. It claims that the Corps achieved a membership of 3,000 in seventeen organizations (Doc. 2, pp. 4-5).

Anti-Christian sentiments that began to develop in intellectual circles had a background of skepticism toward religion that was part of the broader intellectual tide during the 1910s and 1920s, characterized by rationalism and scientism and directly fostered by anarchists and later by Marxists. A debate on religion sponsored in 1921 by the newly formed Young China Society publicized criticism of Christianity among intellectuals. Some of the society's leaders were also moving toward communism, though the two parties soon became enemies.[99] Hostility toward Christianity had a long tradition in China, growing, in part, out of deep antiforeignism. The Christian missionary movement began to be seen as subversive because of an extensive missionary educational system that brought thousands of young Chinese into schools where they studied foreign subjects, often in a foreign language. Some outstanding colleges were under foreign control.

Thus, when it became known that an international Christian student organization was to hold meetings at Tsinghua, one of China's most foreignized government universities, a few Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai began to organize a protest movement. It is not clear who the moving spirits were, but it is likely that Ch'en Tu-hsiu was among them. The leaders of the Socialist Youth Corps helped to set up an Anti-Christian Student Federation (Fei Chi-tu-chiao Hsueh-sheng T'ung-meng) in Shanghai, which issued a declaration and manifesto on March 9. These denounced the scheduled meetings at Tsinghua and expounded an anticapitalist theme clearly derived from Lenin's theory of imperialism, although the manifesto did not use the term "imperialism." It denounced the activity of Christian churches and organizations such as the YMCA for duping Chinese into welcoming capitalism and becoming its "running dogs." (The term "cultural imperialism" had not yet found currency.)

On March 15, the Socialist Youth Corps journal, *Hsien-ch'ü*, devoted a special issue to the Anti-Christian Federation, printing its manifesto, telegram, and constitution, as well as anti-Christian articles by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Lo Ch'i-yuan, who was soon to become active in the Communist Party in Canton. The manifesto may have stimulated students in Peking to form a similar organization, the Great Anti-Religious Federation (Fei Tsung-chiao Ta T'ung-meng), with guidance provided by older intellectuals such as Li Shih-tseng and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei. This organization not only op-

posed the meetings to be held at Tsinghua, but attacked all religions in non-Marxist terms. In its manifesto, however, it singled out Christianity as the most obnoxious religion because of its subtle means of propagation, and it denounced the activities of the YMCA. Our history of the Youth Corps, written several years later, continues this hostility to the YMCA in China (Doc. 2, p. 8). The Anti-Religious Federation issued a circular telegram on March 21, purportedly signed by seventy-nine persons, including Li Shih-tseng and Li Ta-chao. The telegram vowed the federation's determination to "sweep the poisonous fog from mankind" so as to "show the light of human progress through the spirit of science."

The anti-Christian movement developed twenty-three student organizations in major Chinese cities. They publicized their views in newspapers and magazines, and by means of posters, handbills, and pamphlets. In addition to the New Culture leaders who supported the movement, prominent revolutionaries such as Wang Ching-wei and others publicized it in speeches and writings. In spite of this considerable campaign against Christian work in China, the World Student Christian Conference did meet at Tsinghua. On its last day, students in Peita organized an anti-Christian rally where some three thousand people heard speeches by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Li Shih-tseng, and Hsiao Tzu-sheng, who repeated their belief that science and religion were incompatible. Rallies were held in other cities, but gradually the movement died down, only to revive with renewed force in 1925. The leaders of the Socialist Youth Corps gained useful experience in organizing a campaign that grew out of their own passionately held beliefs, and which attracted new converts among China's educated youth. The Corps was to hold its First Congress early in May 1922.

Sun Yat-sen's Problems in the South

Despite Ch'en Chiung-ming's opposition, Sun, in Kweilin, ordered the launching of the Northern Expedition on February 3, 1922. Li Lieh-chün was to lead his troops to attack Kiangsi while Hsü Ch'ung-chih was to attack Hunan. At the same time Sun formed alliances with Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui. He also met with a representative from Szechwan.[100] The negotiations were aimed against Wu P'ei-fu.

Around this time Sun's Presidential Office received news of collusion between Ch'en Chiung-ming and Wu P'ei-fu, though Ch'en claimed that these reports were merely rumors.[101]

On February 20, Hsü Ch'ung-chih's troops reached Hunan's border. According to Sun's *Nien-p'u*, they were obstructed from entering that province because of collusion between Ch'en Chiung-ming and Chao Heng-t'i, military governor of Hunan. Ch'en Chiung-ming had meanwhile withheld supplies to the Northern Expeditionary forces for several months.

The feud erupted into violence when Teng K'eng, chief of staff of the Kwangtung Army, concurrently commander of its First Division, who was in charge of supplies for the Northern Expeditionary forces, was assassinated at Canton on March 21; he died of his wounds two days later. On March 26, Sun called an emergency meeting at which it was decided that Sun and the Northern Expeditionary forces would return to Canton. Ch'en left Canton for Waichow on April 20, and the next day his subordinate, Yeh Chü, issued a circular telegram announcing the dispatch of his army to Canton. On April 22 Sun arrived there to deal with the tense situation produced by the open rift with Ch'en.[102]

By then, both Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin had mustered their troops. Actual shooting began on April 29 in the vicinity of Peking. The Fengtien Army was soon defeated, and on May 5 President Hsü Shih-ch'ang ordered Fengtien troops to withdraw beyond the Shan-hai-kuan. Marshal Chang maintained actual rule in Manchuria and declared its independence.

In accordance with his agreement with Chang Tso-lin, Sun concentrated his troops in the vicinity of Shao-kuan and Nan-hsiung in northern Kwangtung at the end of April. On May 4, he ordered his Northern Expedition to begin, and he left Canton for Shao-kuan the next day to encourage his troops. Five days later, his forces started an offensive against Kiangsi, although by then the ally in the North had been defeated. Meanwhile, Sun attempted a reconciliation with Ch'en Chiung-ming, but without success.

Dalin's Observations on the Canton Scene

Serge Dalin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International of Youth and its representative in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, journeyed to China on the invitation, he said, of the Chinese delegation to the Congress of Toilers of the Far East so he might attend the First Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps and the First Trade Union Congress. He arrived in Canton on April 27, 1922, after an overland trip from Swatow to avoid Hong Kong. Between April 29 and June 12 or 14, according to his later account, he met Sun Yat-sen frequently.[103]

Dalin describes Sun's difficulties due to Ch'en Chiung-ming's opposition to the Northern Expedition and comments that Sun's military alliance with Chang Tso-lin was not comprehensible to many people, even to some of his friends. On his first visit, Sun informed him that he was going to transfer additional troops to the northern front and spoke of the Northern Expedition in very optimistic terms. They talked about the situation in Soviet Russia and agreed to hold further meetings.[104]

According to Dalin, all the members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had come from Shanghai to attend the First National Labor Congress. First, an Enlarged Meeting of the CC was held, attended by representatives of the CC of the Socialist Youth Corps and the Canton Party organization. The theory of a four-class alliance was raised. The essence of the question was the creation of a united national-revolutionary, anti-imperialist front of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and that part of the Chinese bourgeoisie that was interested in national liberation and democratic transformation, and coming to an agreement on this question with the Kuomintang and the working class supporters of Sun's government. Finally, states Dalin, "the question was that of Chinese Communists' entry into the Kuomintang and the Communist Party's influence on the policy of the Kuomintang." Writing long after the event, Dalin may have been anachronistic in this statement.

The question aroused extensive discussion. Dalin asserts that the representatives of the Canton organization tried to turn the National Labor Congress to support for Ch'en Chiung-ming. Other participants, whom he does not identify, favored unconditional entry into the Kuomintang. In contrast, Chang Kuo-t'ao and his supporters opposed a united front with the Kuomintang. The most correct position, Dalin alleges, was taken by Chang T'ai-lei and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai—actually, Ch'ü was in Moscow!—who advocated that Communists join the KMT under the condition of preserving the political and organizational independence of the Communist Party. The debate dragged on for several days. Ch'en Tu-hsiu vacillated but eventually acknowledged the necessity of a united front. The CC did not adopt a resolution on this question and decided to continue the discussion.[105]

Chang Kuo-t'ao corroborates Dalin on the split within the CCP, the support of Canton members for Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the failure of the CCP to decide on the question of a united front. He recalls that he and Ch'en Tu-hsiu went to Canton to direct the National Labor Congress and the First Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps. At the end of April they first called a meeting of the CCP's Canton Branch. Lin Tsu-han proposed supporting Sun, believing that his Three People's Principles and his advocacy of the Northern Expedition were worthy of admiration; cooperation

between the Communist Party and the KMT should be centered on cooperation with Sun. The majority, including T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Kung-po, and T'an Chih-t'ang, criticized Sun and expressed praise of Ch'en Chiung-ming for his sympathy for socialism and support of the Hong Kong seamen's strike. In view of such differences, the meeting reached no conclusion. In his closing remarks, Ch'en Tu-hsiu stated that the CCP should cooperate with revolutionary elements of the Kuomintang but that in view of that party's internal conflicts, the CCP should first study the situation before reaching a decision. According to Chang, the point at issue was cooperation with the Kuomintang rather than entry into that party; the majority criticized Dr. Sun.[106] Apparently the CCP was still far from the position advocated by Sneevliet.

The All-China Labor Congress in Canton

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party probably knew of the Twenty-one Conditions of Admission to the Communist International, adopted at the Second World Congress of the Comintern in August 1920. The Comintern's emissary to China, "Maring," had played an active part in the Second Congress. One of the conditions stated: "Communists must form nuclei within their countries' trade unions in order to capture these from within. They must combat the unions' existing leadership and the 'Amsterdam' International of Trade Unions. They must agitate for affiliation of the unions to the new Red Trade Union International (Profintern) centered in Moscow."[107] Clearly directed toward Europe, this directive became applicable to the Chinese Communist Party when it was admitted to the Comintern sometime in 1922.

On May 1, 1922, the First National Labor Congress was convened in Canton at the invitation of the Chinese Labor Union Secretariat. The CCP, in the name of the secretariat, had sent out invitations to unions throughout the country to send representatives to Canton for the congress.[107]

The "Brief History" does not discuss this labor congress, though it devotes considerable space to the growth of labor unions and of strikes with assistance from Communist Party members. Teng Chung-hsia, a Communist labor leader, gives an account in his history of the Chinese labor movement. He writes that 162 delegates attended, representing twelve cities and over a hundred unions with a total membership of 200,000. Eighty percent of the delegates were from Canton and Hong Kong. The rest were representatives of railway and miners' unions and unions in Shanghai and other cities. The congress opened with a May Day demonstration in which several tens of thousands took part. The political affiliation of the delegates was complex, including members of the KMT and the CCP, anarchists, and even representatives of industrial and commercial organizations. Although the basic strength of the Communists lay in the delegates from North China and the Yangtze River area, who constituted a small number, Teng claims that the CCP enjoyed prestige at the congress. No one objected to its three slogans: "Overthrow imperialism," "Overthrow militarism," and "Long live the Chinese Communist Party."[108]

The anti-imperialist slogan was raised under the influence of the resolutions of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. In the documents of the First Congress of the Communist Party, less than a year earlier, no mention had been made of opposing imperialism. Indeed, Chang Kuo-t'ao considers that the most important influence of the Congress of Toilers of the Far East was its determination of the anti-imperialist nature of the Chinese Revolution.[109]

Chang Kuo-t'ao claims that Communists controlled the First National Labor Congress although the majority of delegates were KMT members. Chang asserts that he drafted the majority of the resolutions although T'an P'ing-shan, who exercised the duties of chairman, directed the congress's proceedings.

Dalin paints a picture of hostility between the workers and Sun Yat-sen. Prior to

the congress, according to Dalin, they held a bad attitude toward Sun, which was worsened by the government's issuance of a decree requiring unions to obtain its permission to convene a congress, and assuming the right to depose union leaders and appoint its own candidates. The workers staged an open demonstration against the Kuomintang at the congress, starting with the election of the Presidium. The KMT delegates had been sent by the Party and not by unions, and when they demanded participation in the Presidium, their demand was rejected. The "Kuomintang delegation" walked out and never returned to the congress, he alleges.[110]

Two articles by Voitinsky written in 1922 go even further, asserting that the southern government had already revealed its truly antilabor policy in respect to strikes prejudicial to Chinese bourgeois interests. Because of this the First National Labor Congress refused to recognize Sun Yat-sen's government.[111]

Following the dispute over the election of the Presidium, delegates led by Hsieh Ying-pai, a KMT member and head of the Mutual Aid Society, made passage of a resolution stating that unions should not participate in political activities the condition for not disrupting the congress. Eager to proceed, T'an P'ing-shan agreed, and this resolution was the first to be passed.[112] It was, of course, contrary to the Communists' policy in the labor movement.

Furthermore, the delegates of the Kwangtung Mechanics Union and representatives of unions belonging to the Preparatory Committee of the Kwangtung Federation of Labor Unions had agreed in advance to take a common attitude toward resolutions proposed at the congress. They opposed all that they considered unreasonable and even walked out to express their opposition.[113]

Nevertheless, the congress passed a number of resolutions. In Teng Chung-hsia's view, three were important: those on organization of sympathy strikes, on the principle of organizing unions by industry, and on eliminating "ghosts that aid the Tiger," meaning workers who aided employers. He also asserts that the resolution calling on the General Labor Union Secretariat to serve as the national correspondence organ until creation of a national labor federation raised the position of the secretariat, particularly since nearly all the resolutions entrusted it with certain tasks.[114]

In spite of conflicting statements in these reminiscent accounts, we deduce that the Chinese Communist Party leaders were undecided in May 1922 about appropriate policy toward the Kuomintang, and that some leaders favored Ch'en Chiung-ming over Sun Yat-sen. However weak the Party was in delegates to the First National Labor Congress, its representatives worked assiduously to create a national labor organization, which the CCP should dominate.

The First Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps

Document 2, an account of the Youth Corps and its development, discusses briefly its First National Congress, which opened in Canton on May 5, directly after the close of the National Labor Congress. As background it tells that the Socialist Youth Corps in Shanghai and elsewhere had begun to carry on work among the masses and started independent political movements. Their first mass movement had taken place on January 15, 1922, the commemoration day of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. After the Anti-Christian movement, the Youth Corps began openly to take part in the labor movement, sometimes even directing strikes. The Shanghai organization took upon itself the initiative to consolidate separate youth organizations into a single body and called the congress at Canton. The date, May 5, 1922, the 104th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, was selected to emphasize the Corps' fidelity to Marxist revolutionary ideology. The principal questions discussed at the congress were the regulations and program of the Corps (Doc. 2, pp. 4-5).

According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the congress was held under the direction of

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who personally drafted its documents. The regulations adopted stated that persons between fifteen and twenty-eight who accepted the regulations and platform of the Youth Corps could enter it, according to proper procedure. The regulations also laid down the organizational principles.[115] Politically, the Congress called for the establishment of a democratic form of government and the abolition of militarist and imperialist domination. Economic aims included proper regulation of child and juvenile labor. The Congress also called for training of working youth in some trade, universal free education, and introduction of a phonetic alphabet. Members as well as the masses of Chinese youth were to be educated in a revolutionary spirit (Doc. 2, pp. 5-6). These generalized statements are confirmed by the program adopted at the congress.[116] Again, the influence of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East is evident in the coupling of foreign imperialists with militarists as the main targets of attack.

In addition, the attitude of the Youth Corps toward various organizations was defined in the program. The Congress expressed the opinion that moral support should be given to the national revolutionary movement, although the Kuomintang was not mentioned by name (Doc. 2, pp. 6, 8-9). The delegates also passed a resolution to support anti-Christian and antireligious organizations and to form youth groups within them.[117]

The congress elected a Central Committee and Shih Ts'un-t'ung was elected its secretary. The relations between the Socialist Youth Corps and the Communist Party were defined when the Corps officially recognized the leadership of the CCP.[118] The congress reportedly voted to join the Young Communist International.[119]

Dalin asserts that the Canton CCP organization's support of Ch'en Chiung-ming aroused Sun's suspicions and placed him in a very unfavorable position in conversations with Sun. But, he asserts, Sun was soon convinced that Soviet Communists were sincere toward him.[120] Sun's suspicions of Chinese Communists were well founded. Writing in 1927, Chou Fu-hai states that the Chinese Communist Party was in collusion with General Ch'en because he held real power in both Kwangtung and Kwangsi. One of the results was the monthly payment of five hundred dollars by General Ch'en to Ch'en Kung-po for the newspaper *Ch'ün pao*.[121]

The "Brief History" states that Sun was concerned solely with revolution without taking into consideration his actual and potential strength. It was evident that the Northern Expedition was doomed to failure. The Communist Party was not sympathetic to Sun, but it did not openly support Ch'en. The party had not yet acquired an important position and therefore could not express a definite opinion. Besides, it did not have any confidence in the success of the Northern Expedition. The opinion of other political, social, and revolutionary elements was also unfavorable to Dr. Sun (Doc. 1., pp. 26-27).

Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist Interest in Wu P'ei-fu

During this time, Communists in North China were cooperating with Sun's arch enemy, Wu P'ei-fu. According to the "Brief History," General Wu took an interest in, and wanted to make use of, the railway workers. At first he sanctioned and supported the organization of a union of workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway, hoping thereby to win them as allies (Doc. 1, p. 6). A contemporary acknowledgment of Wu's benevolence toward Communist organizing efforts came in Karl Radek's speech before the Fourth Comintern Congress on November 23, 1922. According to Radek, when General Wu began military operations against Chang Tso-lin he did not control the railways of North China, which were controlled by persons bought out by Japan. Therefore, Wu "turned for aid to the young Chinese Communist Party, and it supplied him with commissars, who at the time of his struggle [with Chang in April-May

1922] secured the railway lines for his troops. . . . Thanks to this support by the liberation movement, . . . our comrades succeeded in strengthening their position among the working masses in northern China."[122]

Both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Teng Chung-hsia credit Li Ta-chao with influencing Wu P'ei-fu toward a policy favorable to the rights of labor. Furthermore, Li is said to have suggested to Kao En-hung, the new minister of communications in the cabinet formed after the defeat of Chang Tso-lin, a plan to undermine the power of the Communications Clique on the railways of North China. The clique was close to Chang Tso-lin and had obstructed Communist efforts at labor organizing. Li proposed that Kao appoint secret inspectors nominated by Li; they would travel the railways to uncover activities of officials appointed by the clique that could lead to their dismissal and replacement by officials loyal to the Chihli Clique. The plan was adopted and six Communists were appointed. They used their positions to aid in labor organizing, while their salaries went to the Party.[123]

Li Ta-chao was also involved in the movement for a Good Men's Government, together with leaders of the "New Culture" such as Hu Shih and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei.[124] In this scheme, Hsü Shih-ch'ang and Sun Yat-sen would each give up his presidency, Li Yuan-hung would be invited to resume office, and a reunited parliament would reconvene in Peking. In spite of Li's support for the plan, the Communist leaders in Shanghai decided to oppose it as a reformist scheme that would dampen revolutionary ardor. Ch'en Tu-hsiu drafted a manifesto which was approved on June 10 and published on the 15th, and which derided the plan (see below). Chang Kuo-t'ao states that he took the manifesto to Peking and discussed it with Li Ta-chao, who unhesitatingly agreed with the Central Committee because he was becoming less hopeful about Wu P'ei-fu. A meeting of all the comrades in Peking also endorsed the manifesto.[125]

Sun and Dalin Discuss a United National-Revolutionary Front

Dalin asserts that in one of his talks with Sun Yat-sen he presented the Soviet viewpoint on the present state of the Chinese Revolution and on the necessity of organizing a united national-revolutionary front and its possible program. These problems later dominated their conversations.[126] Dalin writes that Sun asked him many times whether it would be possible for Soviet Russia to help him realize the plan of railway building. Sun cherished great hopes about Soviet aid to China's economic development. At their last meeting, Sun expressed regret that Kwangtung was located so far from Soviet borders. He complained about the shortage of workers in his party who were fully devoted to the task of revolution, the shortage of administrators, technical specialists, and the like, and exclaimed how good it would be if he could obtain some cadres from Soviet Russia.[127]

Sun's last talk with Dalin was either June 12 or 14, hence only shortly before Ch'en Chiung-ming's coup d'etat. On the night of June 15-16 the troops of Yeh Chü, Ch'en's subordinate, surrounded Dr. Sun's presidential residence. Sun, having been warned, escaped with a few followers to a gunboat in Canton waters. There he remained for more than two months, hoping to be rescued by his Northern Expeditionary forces. But they were defeated and Sun left by arrangement for Hong Kong on a British river gunboat on August 9.

Soon after the coup, Dalin received a message to meet Eugene Chen, who was in hiding but made his way to Sun's gunboat at night. Sun had asked Chen to tell Dalin that he had taken all the documents pertaining to his "negotiations" with him to the gunboat.[128] At later meetings with Mr. Chen, Dalin learned of Sun's growing disillusionment. In one message Sun stated, "I have been disappointed in almost everything I previously believed in. Now I am convinced that the only real and sincere friend of

the Chinese Revolution is Soviet Russia." In their last meeting Chen conveyed a message from Sun that he planned to go to Shanghai to continue his struggle. In case of failure he would go to Soviet Russia. Chen also brought a hastily written letter from Sun to Chicherin, stating that Dalin would tell the Russian foreign minister about Sun's situation, and that Sun would not cease to struggle. He conveyed his friendly feelings to Lenin. Dalin then returned to Moscow.[129]

Departing for Shanghai on August 9, Dr. Sun could look back on his nearly two years in Canton with disappointment. He had established a national government with himself as president, but no foreign government had recognized him or his regime. He had sought financial aid for his development schemes from America, but he had been blocked by the State Department. His effort to mount a military campaign northward in alliance with Chang Tso-lin had come to naught, and he had been betrayed by his presumed subordinate, Ch'en Chiung-ming. However, until Ch'en had destroyed his position in Canton, Dr. Sun had reason to hope that his effort to strike a deal for German assistance in equipping and training his army with the help of Admiral von Hintze might have succeeded.[130]

Before departing, Sun discussed with his followers the position China ought to take in foreign affairs. Reportedly, he said that China should ally with Soviet Russia or Germany. Russia was the country closest to China in terms of territory and relations. German interests were similar to China's, and Germany did not entertain aggressive thoughts; the two countries could help each other to promote their interests. Unfortunately, said Sun, the Chinese people did not understand the true nature of Germany and Russia. They did not realize Germany's talent and learning, which could help China's industrial development and reconstruction. The people feared Soviet Russian communism, not realizing that Russia's New Economic Policy had long ago changed its communism. Soviet Russia had actually adopted national capitalism. Sun stated that Russia had abolished its laws prohibiting private ownership more than a year before. Yet the Chinese people still considered Soviet Russia communist and extremist. China must not blindly follow other countries and allow itself to be used.[131]

The Communist Party Presses for a United Front of Revolutionaries

Despite its earlier coolness toward Sun Yat-sen, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party took a definite stand for him and against Ch'en Chiung-ming after the June 16 coup. Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls that Ch'en Tu-hsiu told important Kuomintang members in Shanghai that General Ch'en had rebelled against the revolution and that the Communist Party would immediately sever connections with him and denounce him. The Central Committee told T'an P'ing-shan, who was responsible for the Canton Communist branch, to sever all connections with Ch'en and support Sun. However, the Canton Communists did not follow the CC's orders. Ch'en Kung-po and T'an Chih-t'ang continued to work for the *Ch'ün pao* and write articles favorable to Ch'en Chiung-ming.[132]

Shortly before Ch'en's coup against Sun, the Chinese Communist leaders had decided to seek what they called a united front with other parties, particularly with the Kuomintang. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Central Committee in Shanghai considered it necessary to issue a manifesto based on the policies decided at the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and in opposition to the reformist plan for "Good Men's Government," which was being promoted by Peking intellectuals, including Li Ta-chao.

Analysis of the manifesto,[133] dated June 15—just before Sun Yat-sen's flight to a gunboat—and published two days later, supports Chang Kuo-t'ao's contention that it was prompted by the political situation in Peking. The manifesto stated that a true

democratic party must display two characteristics: 1) its policy must not deviate from democratic principles; and 2) its action must always support democracy and struggle against militarists. From this point of view, among the existing political parties in China only the Kuomintang was relatively revolutionary and democratic. Its government in Canton did not suppress the labor movement and it abolished laws forbidding strikes. However, the Party's action was often contradictory. Externally, a certain clique wanted to establish intimate relations with imperialists. Internally, the Party had twice joined hands with northern militarists. It must change its wavering policies, the manifesto warned.

Turning to the current situation, the manifesto stated that the proposal to reinstate the president and restore parliament was radically wrong. It also opposed the proposal for a federation of autonomous provinces. The CC conceded that Wu P'ei-fu was better than Chang Tso-lin, but both were militarists who obstructed democratic government. The manifesto called on members of the Kuomintang to accomplish the mission of democratic revolution. It called on peasants, workers, students, soldiers, policemen, and merchants to join the democratic war against militarists and warned them not to listen to the scholars and politicians of the petty bourgeoisie.

The CC then came to the heart of the matter: establishment of a united front. It declared that the Chinese Communist Party was the vanguard of the proletariat, fought for the proletariat, and was for proletarian revolution. However, under present political and economic conditions in China and in accordance with the historical process, the proletariat's most urgent, immediate task was to join with the democratic party for revolution against the feudal militarists until their elimination and the establishment of democratic government.

The manifesto listed eleven immediate aims: revision of the tariff system; abolition of the militarist regime; confiscation of militarists' property and distribution of their land to poor peasants; general suffrage; freedom of assembly, etc.; enactment of laws for the protection of child and female labor, regulations governing factory sanitation, and labor insurance; abolition of the *likin*; enactment of laws regulating the rate of taxation; compulsory public education; reform of the legal system, abolition of capital punishment and torture; adoption of a progressive tax; and recognition of the equal rights of men and women.

These aims could never be achieved through compromise, the manifesto stated. The Communist Party's method was to invite revolutionary democratic parties such as the Kuomintang and all revolutionary social organizations to a joint conference to discuss the formation of a united democratic front against feudal militarists based on the above aims. There should be a joint war to liberate the Chinese people from double oppression by foreign powers and by militarists. It was a war China needed, a war it could not avoid.

This public declaration of the Chinese Communist Party does not use the word "imperialism" (*ti-kuo-chu-i*), although it opposed foreign privilege in China. An important thrust is against "feudalism"—and more specifically, militarism. Although the manifesto criticized the Kuomintang, the Central Committee of the Communist Party now regarded it as a potential partner in revolution. Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls that printed copies were sent to Sun Yat-sen and other important KMT members, with expressions of hope that a united front based on a two-part alliance could soon materialize.[134]

The timing of the manifesto and its contents apparently were decided upon without Comintern advice. On June 30 Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote Voitinsky, informing him that there was no longer any rejection of the possibility of cooperating with the Kuomintang and a "small hope that the followers of Sun will for a short time walk the same road with us."[135] His letter shows that he understood the temporary nature of the proposed alliance under Comintern doctrine.

The Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

Document 1 presents a succinct account of the Second Congress in words of praise. The Party was much stronger than at the time of the First Congress, both in numbers and in the quality of leadership, according to the "Brief History." Those assembled were united in Marxist doctrine, platform, and objectives, and were capable of dialectical reasoning, it tells us. It then summarizes the political platform adopted by the congress and gives an appraisal of its accomplishments. The most important was the decision that the newly elected Central Committee should call all genuinely revolutionary forces to a unification conference. "In other words, it strove to create a united front of the revolutionary elements in the Chinese social structure" (Doc. 1, pp. 23-24).

This brief account can be considerably amplified. The date of the congress was probably July 16-23, 1922, and it met in Shanghai.[136] There were at least nine official delegates and a few unofficial ones, representing a total of 123 members.[137]

According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the congress accepted reports from Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, and Chang himself. He remembered that the drafting of a new manifesto to replace the "First Manifesto" was the most important task. It was entrusted to a committee composed of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ts'ai Ho-shen, and himself. The congress was suspended for about a week while the committee worked, then resumed its sessions when the final version was completed and passed it.[138]

The greater part of the Manifesto of the Second Congress is devoted to an exposition of imperialist aggression, beginning with the statement that the development of European and American capitalism depended largely upon the exploitation of Africa and Asia as its markets.[139] As a result, 1,250,000,000 colonial and oppressed people (as well as millions of proletariat in capitalist countries) were dying under the oppression of bankers, industrialists, and their governments in London, Paris, New York, or Tokyo. The manifesto surveys imperialist exploitation of China since the "aggressive acts of the British fleet" in 1839 and states that China had become the joint colony of the Great Powers. It denounces the Paris and Washington conferences and claims that the peculiar political conditions in China were a result of American-Japanese conflict. It accuses Japanese imperialists of having aided at different times the Anfu Clique, Chang Tso-lin, and the old and new Communications Clique, while Britain stood behind Wu P'ei-fu, and the United States made connections with the newly rising Chinese bourgeoisie and intellectuals in order to realize its plan of economic aggression.

The manifesto then states that two contradictory trends characterized recent world politics: the plan of capitalistic and imperialist powers for joint control of the proletariat and the oppressed nations of the world; and the world revolutionary movement and the national-revolutionary movements of oppressed nations led by the vanguard of the world proletariat—the Comintern and Soviet Russia—to overthrow international capitalistic imperialism. China was under the rule of militarists and bureaucratic feudalism. The existing political situation facilitated the aggression of the imperialistic powers. In the recent Mukden-Chihli War, British and American imperialism stood behind Wu P'ei-fu, while Japanese imperialism stood behind Chang Tso-lin. Great Britain supported the reactionary Ch'en Chiung-ming to overthrow Sun's democratic government in Kwangtung, it states.

In a new interpretation of the Kuomintang, the manifesto states that the Canton government under the Kuomintang represented the democratic movement of the enlightened Chinese bourgeoisie. Although the government had now fallen, the democratic movement of the petty bourgeoisie would not be extinguished. Furthermore, the intellectual, commercial, and industrial classes must rid themselves of American manipulation before the democratic movement could succeed.

The manifesto pays particular attention to the peasantry, stating that the three hundred million Chinese peasants constituted the greatest factor of the revolutionary movement. The labor movement already was developing.

The manifesto states that "we, the proletariat, having examined the present political and economic conditions in China, propose that the proletariat and poor peasants should assist the national-revolutionary movement. Only united action between proletarian forces and democratic revolutionary forces can expedite extraordinarily the success of a truly democratic revolution." Support of the democratic revolution did not mean, the manifesto stresses, that the proletariat was surrendering to the petty bourgeoisie. The proletariat has its own class interests. When the democratic revolution had been accomplished, the proletariat would obtain only a little freedom and certain rights; it would not be completely liberated. It must carry out the second stage of the struggle to realize the proletarian dictatorship in alliance with the poor peasantry. If the organizational and fighting strength of the proletariat was strong, this second step could be successful immediately.

The objective of the CCP is to organize the proletariat and employ the tactics of class struggle to establish the regime of proletariat-peasant dictatorship, abolish the system of private property, and achieve gradually a communist society. But in the immediate interests of the proletariat and poor peasants, the Party was obliged to lead the proletariat, poor peasants, and petty bourgeoisie to form a democratic united front. The manifesto lists the Party's objectives for workers and poor peasants in the united front. (A summary of the objectives is found in Document 1, pp. 23-24.) The first two call for struggle against militarism and imperialism. The third calls for the unification of China proper (including the Three Eastern Provinces) as a truly democratic republic. Point four calls for the granting of the right of self-determination to the frontier peoples of Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang. Point five calls for a federation of China Proper, Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang, as the Chinese Federal Republic.[140] Points six and seven concern civil liberties and labor and land legislation.

The manifesto presses the importance for workers to organize in the CCP and the labor unions. They should develop their own fighting strength and prepare to unite with poor peasants to organize soviets in order to reach complete liberation. Finally, it declares that the CCP is a branch of the Comintern. Alliance between the world proletariat and oppressed peoples is the only road to world liberation. The manifesto ends with a series of slogans, the last of which is "Long live the Comintern!"

The Manifesto of the Second Congress seems even more clearly to be based on the resolutions of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East than was the "First Manifesto." In his later apologia, Ch'en Tu-hsiu stated this to be the case.[141] There are major differences between the two statements. First, there is a far greater emphasis on imperialist aggression, and hence on the need for anti-imperialism, in the new manifesto. Second, while the First Manifesto calls for a united front between parties and groups, the new manifesto defines the united front as a three-class alliance of the proletariat, poor peasants, and petty bourgeoisie. While the First Manifesto warns against the petty bourgeoisie, the term is now applied favorably to the Kuomintang. Third, there is a new emphasis on the role of poor peasants. Fourth, it defines in explicit terms the plan for a two-stage struggle: the anti-imperialist and antimilitarist national revolutionary struggle, to be followed by the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie. Finally, it calls for an alliance between workers and peasants with oppressed peoples of the world and stresses the role of the Comintern and Soviet Russia.

Important Decisions of the Second CCP Congress

The CCP elaborated on its united front tactics and the theory of a two-stage struggle in "The Decisions of the Second Conference [Congress] of the Communist Party of

China, 1922."[142] These state that the Second Congress decided to call the oppressed masses of China to help protect Soviet Russia, the proletariat's motherland. They state that "We join the nationalists' battle line so that the working class may secure political power *at the outset*" (italics ours). They also outline the method of bringing about a united front, stating that the Second Congress approved the policy of "joining the Nationalist joint battle line" as proposed by the CC because it met the urgent needs of present conditions. The policy should subsequently be expanded as follows: 1) the Kuomintang and the Socialist Youth Corps should open a representative conference to discuss the best method of summoning other revolutionary parties and working out a program; 2) members of Parliament favoring communism should unite and form a left wing of the Democratic Alliance; and 3) labor unions, peasant groups, merchants' associations, and other groups are summoned to organize the Democratic Alliance. The fourth decision states that the CCP formally decided to become a member of the Comintern and to be a branch party. The fifth decision, a complete reversal of a decision taken at the First Congress, states that the CCP should "rush into Parliament." There, and in various assemblies, it should fight for all benefits that could be secured for the proletariat and poor peasants. The CCP accepted the principles of the Second Congress of the Third International, the decision stated.

The sixth, "The Decision Concerning the Labor Movement and the Chinese Communist Party," indicates the Party's concentration on labor. Since labor organization was not strong and there were not many union members, the duty of the Party was to enlarge and properly direct the labor movement in accordance with nineteen fundamental policies. One policy states that some of the comrades often held that labor unions should not become a political movement. This was the tendency of anarchical syndicalism, which was a great mistake. Another states that the principal activity of labor unions was to struggle against capitalists and the government. The eighteenth policy states that Communists, when active in labor unions organized by the Nationalist, Anarchist, or Christian parties, were not permitted to direct workers to leave these organized unions. Their tactics were to increase their own influence within those unions to such an extent that they could overthrow the leadership of the Nationalist, Anarchist, or Christian parties and assume control themselves.

"A few less important points" on the labor movement include the statement that the CCP should be active in the progressive guilds, from which the employers might be excluded later. Another calls for the Party to be active in conservative guilds and groups organized by the bourgeoisie, within which Communist groups should be organized.

The seventh decision concerns the "Young Men Movement." The party should remember that the welfare of young workers was its first objective and recognize that the national-revolutionary struggle was the only chance to organize a proletarian revolution. It should absorb the revolutionary young labor mass. The congress recognized that the platform and decisions of the recent Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps were the foundation upon which to base all practical revolutionary plans. The Socialist Youth Corps was an independent party on the side of young workers with regard to bettering their economic conditions, but for purposes of a general political movement the Corps should always be controlled by the CCP. The Second Congress recognized the need for the various levels in each organ to confer with the other. The Central Committees of the two parties should decide how to do this.

The eighth decision concerns the women's movement. It states that Soviet Russia was the only place where women had begun to realize equality and liberty. The equality and freedom that women had achieved under the dictatorship of the proletariat within five years far exceeded what women had received under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in a century, it asserts. The CCP's movement was a necessary step to reach the goal of emancipation. As soon as it could, the Party would adopt the

Comintern's decision for each Communist Party to organize a special committee to lead women.

The final decision concerns the constitution of the Party. All actions of the Party should be related to the great mass of laborers. The one aim of those at the controlling center should be to prepare and discipline their members so that they would be ready for revolution when the time was ripe. The decision lists seven principles in forming a "serious, centralized, and disciplined organization." The organization from the Central [Committee] down to the small group [cell] should have centralized and iron-like laws. Every comrade should be trained by the Party to almost military discipline in his actions. Every member's speech should be the Party's speech, his actions as prescribed by the Party. He should possess no individual interest apart from the Party. Finally, every comrade should understand that when the Party enforced its dictatorship and discipline, it did not do so after the fashion of bourgeois laws and orders but enforced its will in preparation for revolution.

"The Decisions" confirm the "Brief History's" assertion that the Communist Party had come a long way from the First Congress. The emphasis on organizing the CCP as a "mass party" with tight organization, and on preparing its members for revolution, were dominant themes underlying the Party's united front tactics. The decisions concerning the labor union movement in particular demonstrate that the Party had accepted the technique of infiltration and capture from within.

The Second Congress apparently failed to place the Socialist Youth Corps completely under Communist Party control. The "Decisions" refer to the Corps as an "independent party," perhaps reflecting its numerical superiority. The term foreshadowed future conflict, as may be seen in Document 2.

Tightening the Party's Organization

"The Organization of the Communist Party of China," the regulations passed by the Second Congress, again furnish proof of the Party's development since the First Congress.[143] The regulations do not seem to be based on a specific set of regulations of the Russian Communist Party. Nevertheless, the concepts are similar. The document is divided into six chapters, dealing with membership, organization, conference, discipline, revenue, and a supplementary rule. While the "First Program" of a year before discussed only the organization of local soviets, which were directly subordinated to the Central Committee, the new regulations define the organization of small units, local, regional, and central committees, and their interrelations. The chapter on discipline defines the concept of a "serious, centralized, and disciplined party." Supreme authority was vested in the National Congress and, when it was not in session, in the Central Committee. The decisions of the congress and the CC were to be accepted absolutely by all members. The commands of higher organs of the Party were to be enforced by the lower committees. Otherwise the latter could be dissolved or reorganized by the central governing bodies of the Party.

The regulations also outline improved organizational methods in working with laborers and other groups. While the "First Program" called for using organizations of laborers and others and placing these organizations under the direction of the local executive committee, the new regulations outline a more subtle method: the organization of Communists among such groups. Article 4 on organization states, "In every village, factory, railway, mine, regiment, or community surrounding such units where there are from three to five communists, a group may be organized in which a leader is elected to act under the jurisdiction of the local branch party. . . . The organization in groups is the regular method of organization in our party, and forms a unit of discipline and activity which all members should enter."

The chapter on revenue stipulates the dues to be paid by different categories of

members, the largest amount being a dollar a month. Aside from dues and "extra contribution within the Party," the chapter lists "subsidy outside the Party." While the sources of subsidies are not indicated, it appears that the Comintern was at least one of them since the Shanghai Communist organization accepted Comintern funds.

According to Article 7, five members should be elected by the congress to organize the Central Committee. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ts'ai Ho-sen, and Kao Chün-yü were elected.[144]

Two more articles of the regulations deserve mention. Article 23 states that members were not allowed to become state officials of a capitalist nation without special consent of the Central Committee. Thus it resolved the controversy over Article 14 at the First Congress. Article 22 states that any member of the Party, unless by special consent of the CC, was not permitted to enter another political party or group; when entering the CCP he who had been a member of any other political party or group should formally resign from it unless he had the consent of the CC to remain in it. Article 22 thus reversed the decision of the First Congress to adopt a policy of aggression and independence toward other parties. It is particularly significant in view of the fact that a little more than a month later, in September 1922, a few leaders of the CCP entered the Kuomintang.

One may interpret the existence of Article 22 in different ways. The document may have been amended to include the article after the CCP had decided on the policy of entry into the Kuomintang. Another possibility is that the Second Congress was split on the issue of entry. The Soviet historian, Glunin, correctly asserts that the change from the positions taken by the First CCP Congress was due to the work of the Comintern. Yet, he states, the CCP adopted painfully, and with many contradictions, the Comintern's strategy and tactics; while it is obvious from the decisions of the Second Congress that, though agreeing to cooperate with the Kuomintang, the Congress did not follow Maring's advice to join it. The Congress silently expressed its negative attitude toward this proposal.[145]

Still another possibility is that Dalin had, during his conversations with Sun, learned that he would not approve of a two-party alliance but would permit Communists to join the Kuomintang. This indeed was Sun's stand when, according to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Dalin raised with the KMT the policy of united front among democratic revolutionary parties. Sun sternly rejected the offer. He said he would allow elements of the CCP and the SY to enter the KMT and obey it; he would not recognize the alliance outside the party.[146] Ch'en's account of Sun's position seems accurate. In view of Sun's self-image as a national leader and his dream of unifying China, as well as his suspicions about Communists, Dr. Sun would undoubtedly have rejected a two-party alliance with the CCP. To him, the minuscule CCP, founded barely a year before, could scarcely have seemed suitable as a partner.

Whatever the reasons for including Article 22, it did permit Communists to join another party with Central Committee consent. It was a step toward infiltration.

Having adopted the policy favoring a united front with the Kuomintang, the CC took firmer steps in dealing with the Canton Communists. It again wrote the Canton Communist Branch Committee, reprimanding it for its attitude toward Ch'en Chiung-ming and threatening disciplinary action if it did not immediately change its attitude. Finally, because the Canton Communists did not completely obey the CC's direction, T'an Chih-t'ang was expelled. Ch'en Kung-po withdrew from the Party after receiving a stern warning. T'an Ping-shan temporarily left his duties as branch secretary.[147]

Sneevliet's Role as a Broker

Meanwhile, Sneevliet ("Maring") was pursuing his own line in Europe. In an article he sharply criticized Sun's economic and political philosophy and accused the KMT

of relying on militarist means and failing to arouse the masses. He also attacked the apathy of all Chinese intellectuals, "including even those who call themselves Marxists." As a corrective, he advised the Chinese Communists to enter trade union work in South China, then under Kuomintang influence, to shift the whole movement to the left. He emphasized improving Communist relations with Sun in opposition to the militarist cliques in China.[148] He argued for implementation of the theses of the Second Comintern Congress.[149]

On July 17, 1922, Sneevliet reported to the ECCI in Moscow that its best chances lay with the Kuomintang. This was exactly at the time the CCP was holding its Second Congress. He sharply criticized the Chinese Communists for their sectarian refusal to take part in the practical politics of South China.[150] Sneevliet's view was supported by Markhlevsky, a Polish Communist, who had been working for the Comintern in North China. The following day, the ECCI formally accepted its agent's views. A Communist International order, dated Moscow, July 1922, states that the CC of the Chinese Communist Party, according to the decision of the Presidium of the Comintern of July 18, must remove its seat to Canton immediately after receiving the note and do all its work in close contact with Comrade Philips, Sneevliet's new alias. (At this time the Presidium of the ECCI was made up of Zinoviev, Bukharin, E. Gennari, F. Heckert, Radek, Bela Kun, and B. Souvarine.[151]) The order was signed "Far Eastern Section of the Comintern, Voitinsky, Moscow, July 1922."[152] This was a month after Ch'en Chiung-ming's coup against Sun, but before Sun had left for Shanghai.

Sneevliet departed for China soon after this meeting in Moscow, bringing the orders of the Communist International. He was also given a certificate written on ECCI letterhead and dated Moscow, July 24, 1922. It certified that "Mr. Philips" had been appointed by "us" as the Far Eastern correspondent of the *Communist International* and the *International Press Correspondence*. The certificate was signed "The Presidium of the ECCI, Karl Radek."[153]

It may seem strange that the ECCI ordered the Chinese Communist Party to remove its seat to Canton at a time when Sun Yat-sen was in refuge on a gunboat and the city was under Ch'en Chiung-ming's control. Sneevliet knew about the coup d'état against Sun Yat-sen, for he mentioned it, and the dissolution of the southern government, in his report of July 11 to the ECCI. Perhaps he was so favorably impressed by potentialities in Canton, including Ch'en Chiung-ming's interest in Russia and stated willingness to have an office of the Communist International in Canton, that he was unconcerned by Sun's defeat.[154] In view of the Chinese Communist leaders' earlier rejection of Sneevliet's policy of Communists entering the Kuomintang, the phrase "do all its work in close contact with Comrade Philips" probably was designed to enhance his authority vis-à-vis the Chinese Party.

Sneevliet's policy was endorsed in August when the ECCI issued its first official directive on the question of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT in an instruction to its representative in South China. It is a straightforward directive calling for Communists to join the KMT.[155] The Special Instruction states that (1) "Based on Maring's report" all activity of the representative must be based on the Resolution on the Colonial Question of the Second Comintern Congress; (2) the ECCI looks upon the KMT as a revolutionary party; (3) to fulfill their tasks, Communists must form groups of their adherents within the Kuomintang itself and in the trade unions. Out of these groups it was suggested to form a propaganda organization; and (4) this organization should as far as possible be created with the consent of the Kuomintang although it should preserve complete independence; since the Kuomintang was responsible for the southern government, for the time being it should avoid clashes with imperialist countries.[156]

Sneevliet returned to China together with the Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe, leav-

ing Moscow about July 24 and on August 12 reaching Peking.[157] Sneevliet went on to Shanghai, though we are unsure exactly when he arrived. Very likely, it was soon after Sun Yat-sen arrived on August 14. The instructions that "Comrade Philips" carried for the Communist Party's Central Committee to move immediately to Canton were disregarded.

Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls that after "Maring's" return to Shanghai he criticized the political program adopted at the Second Congress of the CCP. At a meeting he stated that Sun would not approve of its united front policy but would only allow Communists to enter the Kuomintang. He stated that the Comintern approved of the policy of entry into the Kuomintang, and he insisted that the Central Committee call another meeting to discuss the question, but none of the Chinese leaders agreed with him.[158] Ch'en Tu-hsiu also stated that soon after the end of the Party Congress, the Communist International sent its delegate, "Maring," to China; he demanded that all members of the Central Committee hold a meeting at West Lake, Hangchow.[159] According to an account written by Sneevliet in 1926, he contacted Sun immediately after the latter's arrival. Their meeting took place in the home of a non-KMT member in the French Concession. Sun expressed deep disappointment in Ch'en Chiung-ming but seemed as energetic as ever. They discussed the political situation in detail. Sun informed him that he now regarded a closer relationship with Soviet Russia as absolutely necessary.[160]

Sneevliet urged Sun not to try to recapture Canton by purely military means but to start a campaign of mass propaganda and organization, with Shanghai as the base. He especially stressed the importance of mass propaganda.[161]

The "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," based on Chinese Communist informants, gives interesting information at this point. It states that despite the fact that Sun was an insignificant figure, having just lost his base in Kwangtung, the Communist Party believed that he and his comrades were the only democratic elements who, given the opportunity, could be expected to succeed. The CCP therefore sent representatives to call on Sun and presented him with a proposal for KMT-CCP cooperation, while promising all kinds of assistance. Sun accepted the proposal at once. In this he was supported firmly by the most prominent members of the KMT in Shanghai, such as Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, and Hu Han-min. But there was already a right wing that opposed the decision. The talks led to definite results (Doc. 1, pp. 27-28).

The CCP's representatives who called on Sun were Li Ta-chao and Lin Po-ch'ü (Lin Tsu-han). They negotiated with Sun on problems of cooperation between the KMT and the CCP in August. Li in many other ways worked for the policy of cooperation.[162] In his political report to the Second KMT Congress in January 1926, Wang Ching-wei stated that Chang Chi introduced Li Ta-chao to Sun. Li expressed respect for Sun and willingness to join the Kuomintang. However, he told Sun that he was a member of the Comintern and could not relinquish membership in that organization, to which Sun agreed. Wang stated that this was the beginning of the KMT's admission of Communists.[163]

The Communist Party's Hangchow Plenum

Although Sun agreed to allow Communists to join the Kuomintang, Sneevliet still had to convince the Chinese Communist leadership of the soundness of his policy. The "Brief History" states that in August the entire question was raised again at a plenary meeting of the CC of the CCP at Hangchow, at which a resolution was adopted to try to bring about an amalgamation of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party in terms of internal organization. The resolution was adopted unanimously, it states, although some individual comrades were opposed to it (Doc. 1, p. 28).

The Hangchow Plenum took place on August 29–30, with Sneevliet present, according to a Russian scholar with access to Comintern archives.[164] Accounts differ as to how the resolution was adopted. In his "Letter to All the Comrades of the Party" in 1929, Ch'en Tu-hsiu asserts that "Maring" took the position that the KMT was not a party of the bourgeoisie but a party representing an alliance of various classes. The proletariat should enter it in order to push forward the revolution. This proposal, Ch'en asserts, was opposed by all five members of the Central Committee—Ch'en himself, Li Ta-chao, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ts'ai Ho-sen, and Kao Chün-yü (Kao Shang-te). They contended that entry into the KMT would confuse class organization and curb the CCP's independent policy. Finally, Sneevliet asked if the Chinese Party would obey the decision of the Comintern. The CC "could not but accept" the Comintern's decision for the sake of "respecting international discipline."[165]

Chang Kuo-t'ao confirms Ch'en Tu-hsiu's assertion. "Maring," according to Chang, contended that the KMT was not a bourgeois party but a federation of revolutionary elements of various classes. He stated that Sun would only agree to admit Communists into the KMT; he would not countenance a united front on an equal basis. The CCP should respect the Comintern's views, Sneevliet stated. He pointed out that by joining the KMT, Communists could solidify revolutionary forces and at the same time revolutionize the KMT. They could especially influence and grab hold of the working masses led by the KMT.

Chang recalls that he and Ts'ai Ho-sen spoke most vigorously against Maring's proposal. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was also opposed and spoke at great length, arguing that the KMT was a political party of the bourgeoisie. But if this was the Comintern's irrevocable decision, the CCP should obey; at most it could only express disagreement. Maring stated that this was the policy already decided by the Comintern. Ch'en Tu-hsiu then stated that the Party would obey on condition that the KMT abolish such initiation practices as taking an oath of obedience to Sun sealed by a fingerprint, and if he would reorganize the Party according to democratic principles. Li Ta-chao, according to Chang, took a mediatory position. Though sympathetic with some of the views of the other Chinese comrades, fundamentally he agreed with Maring. Finally, the conference passed, but not in written form, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's resolution that a small number of responsible comrades would enter the KMT after it had abolished fingerprinting practices.[166]

Sneevliet presents a very different story. In his comments written in 1930 on Ch'en Tu-hsiu's 1929 "Letter to All Comrades in the Party," he merely states that the Hangchow Plenum opened up the possibility of cooperation with the Kuomintang.[167] But in 1935, he told Harold Isaacs of the arguments he presented at the Hangchow Plenum and that the majority of the members present accepted his views, though Chang Kuo-t'ao opposed them. Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed with Sneevliet's point of view, he alleged. When asked by Isaacs about the divergence between his account and that of Ch'en, he countered that there were no demarches against the policy thereafter, and that "I possessed no specific instructions from the Comintern. I had no document in my hand."[168]

Sneevliet's statement is suspect because he did carry an order from the Far Eastern Section of the Comintern to the CC of the CCP that it must do all its work in close contact with "Comrade Philips," Sneevliet's new alias. Also, we know that the ECCI did issue instructions in August for the Chinese Communists to join the Kuomintang, although this may not have reached Sneevliet by the end of the month.

The "Brief History" explains that adoption of the resolution to try to bring about an amalgamation of the KMT and CCP in terms of internal organization was necessitated by the situation that the working class and its party were unable, with its own forces alone, to handle their colossal problems. It was very difficult to work among the vast masses. On the other hand, the KMT was inactive; it was not actually a party

at all but merely a collection of groups and individuals espousing Sun's principles, the "Brief History" alleges. The Party practiced ceremonies of an ordinary bourgeois character in initiating new members, such as an oath of personal allegiance to Sun Yat-sen, sealed with a fingerprint. The Communist Party was willing to cooperate with such a "party" because it provided the only legal access to the mass movement (Doc. 1, p. 28).

Numerical weakness probably was a reason for the Communists' agreement to enter the Kuomintang. As the "Brief History" states, following the Second CCP Congress, labor unions developed with great vigor. It claims that altogether between 125,000 and 150,000 workers were under Communist guidance, although Party membership did not total more than two to three hundred, excluding Youth Corps members (Doc. 1, p. 30).[169]

Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls that Li Ta-chao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ts'ai Ho-shen, and Chang T'ai-lei officially joined the Kuomintang at a ceremony presided over by Sun Yat-sen. They were all introduced by Chang Chi, Sneevliet's friend. Later Chang Kuo-t'ao joined.[170]

Having bowed to Comintern discipline, Ch'en Tu-hsiu expounded the new official line of the CCP. In September he founded the *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* (Guide Weekly), which was mainly devoted to promoting the idea of alliance with the Kuomintang. The opening statement says that the majority of the Chinese people crave peace and unity. Citizens demand fundamental liberties of a constitutional republican government: freedom of speech, assembly, organization, publication, and religion. Under the system of warlord rule, they do not enjoy these essential liberties. The great obstacle to peace, unity, and civil liberties is the civil wars of the warlords, but foreign imperialism prevents China's free political and economic development. The foreign diplomatic corps is China's supergovernment, and most financial powers of the central government are controlled by the foreign inspector general of customs. Foreign currency circulates throughout the country, and most railways are under foreign control. Foreign bankers and industrialists are in league with the country-selling party to acquire rights to China's railways, mines, and major industrial resources, while the treaty-imposed tariff prevents China's industrial development and harms China's handicraft industries. In reality China is a colony of the powers. The Chinese people must arise and resist the foreign imperialist invasion and strive to make China a truly independent country. *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* will work for the realization of unity, peace, liberty, and independence, the opening statement concludes.[171]

In another article, Ts'ai Ho-sen urged upon the Kuomintang that it resume its revolutionary cause. Victory in this revolution required the closest relations with the masses and alliance with Soviet Russia. The Kuomintang should summon the brave people of China to resist international imperialism and the power of feudalism, the fundamental causes of China's calamitous situation.[172] Ch'en Tu-hsiu explained that the Kuomintang was a complex organization representing the interests of the entire Chinese people rather than any particular class. Due to the underdeveloped nature of Chinese-owned industry, clearly defined class distinctions had not yet emerged in Chinese society, he averred.[173] In an article on "Nation Building," Ch'en advocated the creation of a truly independent national army composed of all classes, but particularly of the oppressed. Its twin targets should be imperialism and militarism, which, according to Ch'en, cooperated to rob the Chinese people of freedom and national independence.[174]

The themes of anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism became the focus of nationalist propaganda and the emotional driving force of the national revolution, hereafter. In accordance with his agreement with Sneevliet, Sun took steps to reorganize his Party. On September 4, 1922, he convened a meeting attended by fifty-three comrades including Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Chi, Chang Ch'iu-pai, as well as many others,

such as Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, and Liao Chung-k'ai, who became leaders of the reorganized Kuomintang. Chang Ch'iu-pai had been the Kuomintang representative at the Congress of the Toilers of the East. They unanimously approved of Sun's plan to reform the Party. Two days later, he appointed a committee of nine to draft reorganization plans. The committee again included Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Chang Ch'iu-pai.[175]

Ch'en Tu-hsiu took a passive attitude toward participation in the KMT's Drafting Committee because he lacked confidence in the policy of Communists entering the Kuomintang, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao. He soon left for Moscow to attend the Fourth Comintern Congress and thus did not take part in the final stages of the KMT's reorganization plans. In fact, the Communist leaders moved the CP headquarters and the Labor Union Secretariat to Peking at this time,[176] which took them far away from the leaders of the Kuomintang.

Sun Yat-sen's Broader Political Efforts

Sun Yat-sen's admission of Communists into his party and his preliminary moves to reform it appear to be efforts to entice aid from Soviet Russia. But at the time they were only incidental to his much broader political aims—to recapture Canton and, if possible, to become president of the Republic in Peking.[177]

The day after his arrival in Shanghai, Sun issued a declaration denouncing Ch'en Chiung-ming for his obstructive tactics in 1921 and his coup of June 16. He called for punishment of Ch'en and his followers. Sun formed alliances with Chang Tso-lin, Wang Yung-ch'üan of Fukien, and Lu Yung-hsiang of Chekiang. By October Sun's Northern Expeditionary force, which had been defeated by Ch'en Chiung-ming in July when it tried to rescue Sun, was established east and west of Kwangtung. Hsü Ch'ung-chih and other southern generals controlled part of central Fukien, including the provincial capital. This army was supposed to attack Kwangtung from the east but first it must get into southern Fukien. The western wing consisted of Chu P'ei-te's small Yunnanese force, which had succeeded in taking Kweilin in northern Kwangsi. General Chu negotiated with small units to form a coalition to march on Canton along the West River route, in hopes of driving out Ch'en Chiung-ming.

Sun was assisted by a group of comrades in Hong Kong, who set up an office to raise funds and negotiate with various commanders for a coordinated campaign against Ch'en Chiung-ming. The main organizers were Teng Tse-ju, Ku Ying-fen, Lin Chih-mien, Lin Shu-wei, and Li Wen-fan. The group was joined at the end of October by Tsou Lu, sent by Dr. Sun as his special deputy. This office raised more than 400,000 Hong Kong dollars, equivalent to U.S. $231,292. The money was used mainly to pay mercenary forces from Yunnan and Kwangsi to undertake a drive on Canton in conjunction with units of the Kwangtung Army, which would turn over at the proper time. Dr. Sun carried on a lively correspondence with commanders, urging them to participate in the campaign to oust Ch'en Chiung-ming.[178]

Explorations Between Adolf Joffe and Sun Yat-sen

Adolf Joffe, accompanied by his wife, arrived in Peking on August 12, 1922. A top Soviet diplomat, he was the second fully accredited Soviet negotiator sent to Peking with the mission of arranging for treaty relations between China and Soviet Russia. Although his mission was to establish relations with the government in Peking, Joffe moved almost immediately to establish contact with Sun Yat-sen. He sent a special representative with a letter to Sun, who saw him on August 25 (this probably was Sneevliet). Five days later, Sun wrote cryptically to Chiang Kai-shek that with regard to a certain matter, his [Joffe's] special representative had recently brought a letter

inquiring about Far Eastern problems and their means of solution. Sun had answered the letter point by point. Discussion of all matters could be carried on easily now that letters had been exchanged. Sun informed Chiang that [Joffe] had a military aide and that Sun had asked him to send the aide to Shanghai for detailed consultation on the military situation. He thought the aide might arrive soon. Therefore, Sun hoped that as soon as Chiang felt better he would come to Shanghai to make preparations.[179]

For several years Sun Yat-sen had thought of Soviet Russia as a source of military aid in his plans to capture Peking. As will be shown, he retained this hope in his approaches to Joffe. That diplomat's frustrations in trying to negotiate with the Peking government probably led him to a keener interest in Sun Yat-sen.

During the first few weeks in Peking, Joffe was warmly received by Chinese intellectuals and created a very favorable impression in the Chinese press by his speeches and press releases. He had several exploratory interviews with Dr. Wellington Koo, the foreign minister, and on September 2 he proposed full-scale negotiations. Dr. Koo responded with the demand for Soviet evacuation of Outer Mongolia, and at this point the Russian envoy went to Changchun in Manchuria to negotiate with Japanese representatives for a settlement of several serious issues between Russia and Japan.[180]

In late September and during October Mr. Joffe sent a series of notes to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These indicated that the Soviet renunciation of the Boxer Indemnity was still to be negotiated, that the Russian government had claims on the railway, and that there were security problems with respect to the Siberian-Manchurian border areas. In early November Joffe began to press Russia's claims with respect to the railway. He demanded the arrest of the general manager, Mr. Ostroumov, and the temporary appointment of a new administration "in agreement with Russia," which would completely replace the Russo-Asiatic Bank; and he threatened that the action of the Chinese government would have important bearing on the policy of his government in the forthcoming negotiations. On November 5 he sent a note emphasizing Russia's continued interest in the railway, "which is a portion of the Great Siberian Railroad"; and he hinted that "unless the Chinese Government discontinues its ignoring of Russian interests, Russia will, perhaps, after all, be obliged to consider herself free from those promises which she voluntarily gave" in the Karakhan notes of 1919 and 1920.

Mr. Joffe revealed Russia's intentions more openly in a speech read on his behalf—for he was plagued by illness—at a dinner celebrating the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution. With respect to Russian troops in Urga, he said it would be impossible to withdraw them, not only from the viewpoint of Russian interests but also "from the viewpoint of real Chinese national interests, rightly understood." As to the Chinese Eastern Railway, "which unites two parts of Russian territory," the Russian people "must inevitably accept this only heritage of the Tsar's regime . . . ." Russia hoped that its interests "will be understood and satisfied by China, and that necessary guarantees will be given." This speech, which was of course more circuitous than is evident from a few selected passages, was widely reprinted, as were Mr. Joffe's notes to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, causing considerable Chinese disillusionment. In a note on November 14 he denied that Russia had made any specific proposals in 1919 or 1920 with respect to the railway except that a treaty be concluded to regulate it. This note ended on an ominous tone. Mr. Joffe denied rumored concentrations of Russian troops on the Manchurian borders and alleged Red Army preparations to occupy the railway zone; he claimed the charges were untrue since "the Red Army needs no preparations to occupy the CER." The Russian government was not taking a single step contrary to the interests of the Chinese people; and it would "change this policy only in the event it is forced by the hostile acts of the Chinese Government."[181]

Sending protesting and threatening notes did not get Mr. Joffe any closer to true negotiations. In fact a formal negotiating conference never was convened. Joffe's mission was complicated by instability in the Peking government, which underwent a cabinet crisis beginning November 18 and lasting until the end of the year.

During this difficult period from August through December 1922, Joffe sent four letters to Sun, who responded with three from Shanghai. These letters have never been published, as far as we know. Professor S. Tikhvinsky, who has seen the letters in Soviet archives, states that Joffe informed Dr. Sun of the internal and international situation of the Soviet Union, his negotiations with the Peking authorities, and the difficulties he encountered. According to Tikhvinsky, Sun's correspondence shows that he did not have a clear understanding of the aims and tasks of the Soviet state's foreign policy. Sun did not always comprehend its principal differences from the policies of other states and expressed concern in regard to provocative rumors spread by imperialists and White Guards about alleged preparations to send Soviet troops to North Manchuria and about the intention of the Soviet government to enter into alliance with Wu P'ei-fu in order to drive Chang Tso-lin from the Northeast. Sun did not understand why the Soviet government did not wait for him to resume power in the South, organize a new Northern Expeditionary force to occupy Peking, and then hold negotiations to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations. In letters to Sun, Joffe and Chicherin explained the actual situation in Soviet Russia, stating that speedy normalization of relations between China and Soviet Russia would be of benefit to the people of both countries.[182]

In another account, Tikhvinsky summarizes Sun's letters to Joffe. Sun described the current political situation in China, shared his political and military plans, and denounced the Peking government as "the agent of a certain foreign power." He stated that this was particularly true as regards negotiations and relations with Soviet Russia. It was quite obvious that some powers did not want China to reach an agreement with Soviet Russia before they compelled Moscow to accept terms of economic capitulation. At the same time, they did not relish the prospect of an agreement of any kind between Sun and Soviet Russia that would free China from their clutches politically and economically.[183]

It is possible to learn a little more about Sun's efforts in relation to Soviet Russia during this period. Sneevliet played some role as an intermediary.[184] On November 21, Dr. Sun wrote to Chiang Kai-shek in a way that suggests that he believed his relations with Russia were developing favorably, though he found the situation complicated and difficult. There was also the implication that Sun was trying to arrange to send Chiang to Moscow as his emissary.[185]

No doubt Sun's difficulties were compounded by his alliance with Chang Tso-lin, a principal target of Soviet hostility. In an apparent move to reassure Soviet Russia on this score, Sun wrote Lenin on December 6, 1922. He said he was making use of an opportunity to write him about an important matter. Lenin could force Chang Tso-lin, within the limits of wisdom, to do whatever was necessary for the safety of Soviet Russia. If he followed such a policy, not only would Lenin avoid a dangerous reaction against him in China, but he would also be helping Sun to create conditions that would facilitate and accelerate the joint work of Russia and China. He proposed that in the near future he send a plenipotentiary representative to Moscow for joint discussion with Lenin and other comrades on united action in the legal interests of the two countries. He again warned that the negotiations with the Peking government were not only a loss of time but perhaps also dangerous because Peking was a servant and tool of the imperialist powers.[186]

One of Sun's letters to Joffe was brought by Chang Chi in December. According to recent Russian scholarship, the purpose of Chang's mission was to arrange a meeting between the two men in Shanghai.[187] Many years later Chang recalled that he

found Joffe in bed, suffering from a nervous disease. After reading Sun's letter, Joffe asked Chang to tell Sun that the Russian Revolution had just been accomplished and the situation was very dangerous. Therefore it was necessary to make connections. Revolution must go through zigzags and not on a straight line. From this reply, Chang Chi deduced that Sun had written objecting to Russian negotiations with Peking.[188]

According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Chi's main hope was that Soviet Russia would help the Kuomintang with munitions via Outer Mongolia so that the Party could start military action against the Peking government. When Chang Chi learned from Joffe that it was impossible to realize this plan, his enthusiasm for the policies of alliance with Russia and admission of the Communists began to cool.[189] There is interesting confirmation of some such scheme in the report of a letter from Sun to Joffe, written, supposedly, at the end of December 1922, in which Sun outlined a plan to lead an army of 100,000 from Szechwan to Outer Mongolia for a drive on the Chinese capital. He wanted Russian arms and other equipment and Russian instructors. In reporting this to Moscow, Joffe called it Sun's "old dream."[190]

Nevertheless, Chang Chi probably found Joffe amenable to a meeting with Sun in Shanghai. Efforts to negotiate with Dr. Koo had reached an impasse. In an article Joffe sent from Peking to Moscow on December 12, he devoted attention to the Kuomintang as the organization closest to being a genuine political party in China, serving as the meeting point for nationalism and revolution. Joffe stated that the individual ties of Wu P'ei-fu or Chang Tso-lin were really not very important. "Dictators come and go. But the masses remain, and just as in China there has already been born a mass, national-revolutionary movement, so, on it depends the fate of China." He concluded by saying that if the possible entente between Wu P'ei-fu and Sun materialized, so much the better, but in any case, Russia stood for support of the national revolutionaries.[191]

The Fourth Comintern Congress and China

Meanwhile the Comintern at its Fourth Congress convened in November 1922 had defined in more concrete terms the policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie in colonial countries. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Liu Jen-ching attended to represent the Chinese Communist Party. Ch'en did not address the congress; his party's position was stated in speeches by Liu Jen-ching, a protégé of Li Ta-chao and a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party, about twenty-four years old at the time of the Fourth Congress.[192]

Liu explained in a speech why the Chinese Communist Party had decided to form a united front with the Kuomintang. The main purpose was to exterminate imperialism in China. In a frank exposition he stated that the nature of the united front was to be expressed in the fact that "we, under our own names and as single individuals, will join the party." He stated two reasons for this: (1) to wage propaganda among the numerous workers organized in the National Revolutionary Party and to win them over; (2) Communists would be able to fight imperialism only when they combined the forces of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. They intended to enter into competition with the KMT in agitating and organizing the masses. Had they not joined this party they would have remained isolated. The masses would rather follow the bourgeois party. If they joined the KMT, they could show the masses that they were for revolutionary democracy but that for them revolutionary democracy was only a means to an end. Liu then concluded, "We shall be able to gather the masses around us and split the Kuomintang."[193]

Ch'en Tu-hsiu participated in the group that worked out the Theses on the Oriental Question.[194] This long document states that the main task of all national-revolutionary movements was to achieve national unification and independence. The

struggle against imperialist oppression in colonial and semicolonial countries had been intensified. The Comintern supported any national revolutionary movement against imperialism, but only a consistent revolutionary line was capable of leading the oppressed masses to victory. The theses continue, "Only agrarian revolution, which has at its task the expropriation of large land holdings, is capable of arousing huge peasant masses." The revolutionary parties of all Oriental countries were obliged to define clearly their agrarian program, and to force the bourgeois-nationalist parties to the largest degree possible to adopt this revolutionary agrarian program as their own. The theses added that the struggle for influence over peasant masses was a means to prepare the native proletariat for political leadership. The Communist parties of the colonial and semicolonial countries of the Orient should participate in any movement that would open to them the road to the masses.[195]

Emphasis on a radical agrarian program was a significant feature of the theses. It was to be reflected in instructions from the ECCI to the CCP in May of the following year.

On January 12, the ECCI officially passed a resolution that named the Kuomintang the only "serious nationalist-revolutionary group in China." Since the independent workers' movement was still very weak and the central task was national revolution against the imperialist and feudal agents, the ECCI found it necessary to coordinate the activities between the KMT and the young Chinese Communist Party. Hence it was expedient for members of the latter party "to remain within" the KMT. However, the Communist Party should preserve its own organization with its strictly centralized apparatus. The organization and education of the working masses and the creation of trade unions with the purpose of preparing a strong, mass-based Communist Party were the important and specific tasks. This work was to be done under the Communist Party's own banner and independently of any other political group, while avoiding conflicts with the national-revolutionary movement. The CCP must oppose every Kuomintang attempt to court the capitalist powers or their agents, the Chinese military governors hostile to proletarian Russia, and it must influence the Kuomintang to unite its efforts with those of Soviet Russia against European, American, and Japanese imperialism. While supporting the Kuomintang in all its national-revolutionary campaigns, the Communist Party should not merge with it and during these campaigns should not fold up its own banner.[196]

Thus, by January 1923 at the latest, the leadership of the Comintern had decided on the Kuomintang as the bourgeois-democratic, or national-revolutionary, force in China that it and the Chinese Communist Party should support. Wu P'ei-fu, Ch'en Chiung-ming, and other potential "national revolutionaries" no longer were part of the calculus. But support in what way? This still had to be worked out.

Efforts to Revitalize the Kuomintang

After three months, the Drafting Committee appointed by Sun Yat-sen to plan the reorganization of the Kuomintang had completed its work.[197] On January 1, 1923, the Party issued a "Manifesto on the Reform of the Chinese Kuomintang," outlining its new policies. The manifesto begins with an exposition of the Three People's Principles and the Five-Power Constitution. After reviewing the founding of the various predecessor organizations and their record before and after the Republican Revolution, it states that the Three People's Principles and the Five-Power Constitution had not been fully carried out. Hence the Party was determined to struggle until final success. The manifesto then lists the Party's plans for national reconstruction and its present policies.

First, the Party blamed the despotic Ch'ing dynasty for sacrificing national rights and signing unequal treaties with the powers, thus reducing China to the status of a

colony. The Party's Principle of Nationalism meant elimination of inequality among peoples and unifying the peoples within the country to create a great Chinese Republic. The Party called for popular education and revision of the treaties. Second, the Party criticized the parliamentary representative system and called for universal suffrage; direct exercise by the people of the rights of initiative, referendum, and recall; and absolute freedom of assembly, and other civil liberties. Third, the Party declared that the economy of Europe and the United States suffered from inequality which bred conflict. China suffered from poverty. To avoid the conflicts that beset Europe and the United States, the Party advocated a balance between economic and social development. It listed a seven-point platform: enactment of a land law; nationalization of railways and other large enterprises; census; reform of the currency; enactment of laws to protect labor; establishment of equality between men and women; and gradual development of equality between landlord and tenant through improvement of rural life.[198] This was a rather mildly reformist document.

The Party Platform, promulgated on January 2, embodied many of the concepts proclaimed in the manifesto.[199] The Party Constitution, also promulgated on January 2, consists of six chapters dealing with membership, organization, meetings, revenue, discipline, and supplementary rules. The chapter on organization grants the Party's Leader (*Tsung-li*), who is not named, authority over Party affairs. In addition to the Central Party Office or Headquarters, there were to be three lesser levels within China and abroad: general branch offices in each province, region, or major city; branch offices at the county level; and suboffices in town or *hsiang*. In addition there were to be Information Offices, probably in places where there were few members but the Party needed an outlet. Instead of a simple division of Headquarters into four departments as in the 1920 scheme—General Affairs, Party Affairs, Finances, and Propaganda—there was now added a Department of External Relations and a number of advisory bodies. A group of counselors, together with the heads of departments and committees, were to form a Central Cadre Council (Chung-yang Kan-pu Hui-i), which was envisioned as the principal coordinating body. Under the chairmanship of the Leader it should meet monthly. There were five functional committees to study and deal with legal, political, and military affairs, with problems of farmers and workers, and of women in China and abroad.

Another innovation was a planned Congress of Representatives from China and abroad that should meet once a year. This congress was empowered to elect heads of central departments, examine and decide on Party budgets and accounts, and amend the constitution. This forecast an attempt to create an enlarged nationwide and worldwide organization, apparently with more democracy than had characterized the earlier organizations. Any adult Chinese who accepted the Party Platform and would abide by its rules could join on being introduced by two members, signing the register, and being given a certificate. The loyalty oath was dropped. There were four grounds for expulsion: joining another party, openly revolting against the Party, revealing Party secrets, and behaving in a manner that injured the Party's reputation. The second and third were new elements. Thus, the constitution forbade a Kuomintang member to join another party (as earlier regulations had also done), though Dr. Sun had inducted some members of the Chinese Communist Party and permitted them to retain their other membership.

The center of decision making was the Leader, as in most of the predecessor parties, but he was made more important and his powers were stated somewhat more explicitly. Article 4 says, "This Party has one Leader, who represents the Party and has general authority over Party affairs." The Leader appointed his advisers, counselors, heads of departments and their principal staff members, and the members of the functional committees. He convened the Congress of Representatives and the Central Cadre Council and chaired their sessions. The new text did not name Sun Wen

as the Leader, nor did constitutions of the predecessor parties, but there is no question that he was being described.[200]

This constitution does not describe so tightly knit an organization as the Chinese Communist Party is pictured as aspiring to be in its constitution adopted the previous July, based as it was on Bolshevik principles. In January 1924, the Kuomintang would adopt a new constitution in which Bolshevik principles of organization were clearly evident, and Sun Wen would be named its Leader.

The Recapture of Canton

The efforts of Sun and his colleagues in Hong Kong to recapture Canton bore fruit. The armies on the eastern wing, in Fukien, played very little part except to draw off some of Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces to defend Northeast Kwangtung. On the west things developed much more favorably due to topography, the lure of Canton, and the funds that Sun's colleagues in Hong Kong dispensed.[201]

On December 6 a group of generals met for a strategy conference at the town of Pai-ma, about fifty miles up river from Wuchow. Attending were Yang Hsi-min, Fan Shih-sheng, Chang K'ai-ju, Chu P'ei-te, Liu Chen-huan, and Shen Hung-ying, according to Tsou Lu's account, though it seems likely that some were represented by deputies. They determined to launch the campaign against Wuchow on the 10th.[202] Wuchow turned over on December 28. All Kwangtung troops that had been up river returned and troops in the city began moving down river in commandeered vessels. Two main "Rebel Punishing Armies" descended on Canton. Yang Hsi-min commanded a combined Yunnan and Kwangsi force that followed the east side of the river—that is, the left bank—while Liu Chen-huan commanded a combined Kwangsi and Kwangtung force on the other side. River gunboats offered no resistance; apparently they had been bought over. Towns along the West River fell one after the other with only token resistance from Cantonese garrisons. Generals Lin Hu, Yeh Chü, and Hsiung Lüeh offered some resistance but were defeated.[203] By January 11 the advance guard had taken San-shui, the strategic junction of the North and West rivers, about thirty miles from Canton. Then came a few days' pause to allow Ch'en Chiung-ming to withdraw to his bastion, Huichow. He left Canton on the night of the 15th. The next day and for several days thereafter Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops poured in, while various Kwangtung units switched to the winning side.[204]

The months of fund-raising and plotting since Dr. Sun's expulsion from Canton the previous August had paid off. The city was "liberated." Now Dr. Sun could have a base once more.

The Meetings of Sun Yat-sen and Adolf Joffe

Adolf Joffe arrived in Shanghai on the evening of January 17. The next evening Dr. Sun entertained him at dinner and thereafter they conferred several times at Sun's residence in the French Concession. On January 23, Mr. Joffe gave a dinner for Dr. Sun and a number of his closest friends at the Great Eastern Hotel.[205]

Remarkably little has been revealed about the substance of their conversations, but recent Russian publications provide some information based upon archives. Documents in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense reveal that in the course of their negotiations Sun and Joffe discussed the peculiarities of the Communist movement in such countries as China and the current condition of Sino-Soviet relations, including the Mongolian question and the problem of the CER. Sun informed Joffe that he was planning to institute reforms in the army and in the Kuomintang and that he intended to organize an expedition against the reactionary military clique in Peking. However, his resources were insufficient and he lacked specialists capable of

organizing an army that could fulfill these complex tasks. Hence he would like financial and advisory aid from the USSR.[206] According to another Russian account, the negotiations helped Sun to comprehend correctly the policy of the Soviet state and dissipated his doubts and apprehension. Sun decided to ask for Soviet aid and advice on a series of questions, including those on the organization and activity of the KMT and those pertaining to military problems. Elsewhere, the writer informs us, enigmatically, that "the same questions contained in Sun's letter" to Lenin of December 6 "were raised and favorably solved."[207]

Another account says that Sun Yat-sen stated his intention to send a military mission to Russia to study the organization and functioning of Soviet party and government agencies, and to negotiate for assistance to the Chinese revolution. He also expressed the thought that "it would be very useful if Moscow assigned to him advisers on military and political problems." Mr. Joffe promised to inform Moscow in detail about their negotiations and they agreed to make public a joint declaration.[208]

A British intelligence report on the meetings, from information supplied by "two well-placed agents in Shanghai," says that some military questions arose and as a result "Gen. Gecker," Joffe's military aide, was hastily called to Shanghai, arriving on the 25th. His appointment as a military adviser to Dr. Sun may have been discussed, but apparently no decision was reached. He left for Peking on the 28th.[209] The agents also reported that Joffe had offered Russian moral and financial support to Sun and the Kuomintang on condition that they agree (a) immediately and openly to recognize the Soviet as the legitimate government of Russia; (b) to conclude an open alliance with the Soviet government; and (c) to place no restrictions on Bolshevik propaganda in China. "As far as could be ascertained," Dr. Sun was agreeable to the first two conditions but not to the third, probably because of the friction between the capitalist supporters of the Kuomintang and its other members who advocated communism; he could do nothing without the support of the rich members of the Party. The final agreement, "according to the information received," was that Sun and the Kuomintang would recognize the Soviet government once they had achieved supremacy in China; in return, the Soviet government would give moral and financial support to Sun Yat-sen.[210]

Until the minutes of the conversation have been published from the archives, the real substance of bargaining cannot be pushed much further. The joint statement issued in English on January 26, the day before each of the men was scheduled to sail, Mr. Joffe for Japan and Dr. Sun for Hong Kong, reveals only a bit more.[211]

The Joint Statement issued by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Mr. A. A. Joffe, Russian envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary to China, states that they had held several conversations which revealed the identity of their views on matters relating to Chinese-Russian relations, more especially on the following points: (1) Dr. Sun held that the Communist order or even the Soviet system could not actually be introduced in China. This view was entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who was further of the opinion that China's paramount and pressing problem was to achieve national unification and attain national independence. Regarding this task he had assured Dr. Sun that China had the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and could count on the support of Russia. (2) Dr. Sun had requested that Mr. Joffe reaffirm the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government, dated September 27, 1920. Mr. Joffe had accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Dr. Sun that the Russian government was ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of renunciation by Russia of all treaties and exactions which the tsardom had imposed on China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway. (3) Dr. Sun was of the opinion that the realities of the situation pointed to the desirability of a modus vivendi in the matter of the present management of the railway. He agreed with Mr. Joffe that the existing railway man-

agement should be temporarily reorganized by agreement between the Chinese and Russian governments without prejudice to the true rights and special interests of either party. At the same time, Dr. Sun considered that General Chang Tso-lin should be consulted on this point. (4) Mr. Joffe categorically declared to Dr. Sun (who had fully satisfied himself as to this point) that it was not and never had been the intention or purpose of the present Russian government to pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China. Hence Dr. Sun did not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China. Mr. Joffe had parted from Dr. Sun on the most cordial and friendly terms. On leaving Japan, to which he was now proceeding, he would again visit the south of China before finally returning to Peking.

As we should expect, the Joint Statement reveals nothing about any agreement on Soviet-Kuomintang relations, if such were reached. Joffe merely declared that "China" could count on Russian support in its struggle to achieve national unification and independence. The remaining three articles pertain to the main issues that had stymied Joffe's negotiations with the Peking government. Sun professed to accept Joffe's reaffirmation of the principles defined in the Second Karakhan Manifesto, to agree with Joffe regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, and to accept his assurances regarding Outer Mongolia.

In the absence of contemporary inner accounts, it is only safe to conclude that Joffe promised to recommend to Moscow that it assist Sun Yat-sen materially. Within two months this is what the Russian leaders decided to do.

Apparently Dr. Sun had some reason for optimism as a result of his talks with Joffe, the most important Soviet official he had met, for he sent one of his closest associates, the American-born and Japanese-educated Liao Chung-k'ai, to Japan to confer with Joffe. Liao was then forty-four years old, ardently patriotic, and competent in English. Chinese sources are most unrevealing about the supposedly month-long talks between the two men. If Liao wrote to Sun, the letters remain unpublished. Katsuji Fuse, a newspaper correspondent who interviewed Joffe in Japan, later wrote that Joffe and Liao drafted plans for a military academy modelled on the system developed by Trotsky in Soviet Russia, and that Joffe promised assistance for establishing such an academy.[212]

In January 1926, after Liao's assassination, Wang Ching-wei stated that as a result of Liao's month together with Joffe at Atami, Liao knew many things others did not know, such as Soviet Russia's current situation, its attitude toward the oppressed peoples of the East, and its reasons for wanting to cooperate with China. All these questions became very clear to Liao and on his return to China he helped Sun carry out his alliance with Soviet Russia. At the time many comrades were dubious, but Liao Chung-k'ai worked on it firmly because in the course of arguing with Joffe for a month, he had studied all questions.[213]

It is certainly true that Liao Chung-k'ai became a strong supporter of Sun's collaboration with Soviet Russia and the Comintern. And in March 1923, shortly after the talks and possibly on Joffe's advice, "the leading organs of the RCP/b and the Soviet Government found it possible to render assistance to Sun and to send advisers to him." We are told even more specifically by the modern Russian scholar, A. I. Kartunova, that in March 1923 the Soviet government decided to render financial aid of about Mex $2 million to the revolutionary government of Sun Yat-sen.[214] By then, Sun was back in Canton.

* * * * *

Thus by January 1923 a triangular relationship was nearly in place. Sun Yat-sen was again active on the political stage and had taken steps to revitalize the Kuomintang,

as Comintern emissaries to China had been advising him to do. Leaders of the young Chinese Communist Party had agreed that their party and the Socialist Youth Corps should, as a tactical measure, join with the Kuomintang in a national revolution, and they had even accepted, though reluctantly, Sneevliet's instruction that Communists should join and work within the senior party. They understood, however, that this was only to be for the first stage in the revolutionary process; in the second stage the proletariat would fight the bourgeoisie for mastery of the state.

Soviet Russia's leaders were eager for their government to enjoy full diplomatic relations with the Peking government, in spite of Sun Yat-sen's protests. Official relations with the Chinese government, which all the powers recognized, would strengthen the Russian political and economic position in China and help to consolidate Russia's strategic position in the Far East. Yet all Soviet Russian attempts to gain recognition had failed, for two fundamental problems divided the two governments—Russian support of a separatist movement in Outer Mongolia which China claimed as its own, and Chinese control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, which Russia wished to regain.

The Russian leadership was beginning to promote revolution in China through the agency of the Communist International. The Comintern had assisted in the formation of a Communist Party and a Socialist Youth Corps in China, and the Russian and Comintern leaders had finally settled upon the bourgeois-nationalist group—the Kuomintang—that they would assist in the national-liberation phase of the revolution. Yet many aspects of this ambiguous relationship had still to be worked out, and the nature of Russian assistance to the Chinese revolution had still to be determined.

Only two of our documents throw light on the historical process leading toward this relationship. This is because all the documents in our collection were found in a raid on the Soviet Embassy grounds in Peking. Not until the arrival of Ambassador Lev Karakhan in September 1923, and Borodin's arrival in Canton the next month, did documents concerning the Chinese revolution written by Russians or Chinese involved therein begin to accumulate in files in Peking. When Karakhan succeeded in gaining possession of the Tsarist Embassy in September 1924, the files had a definite home.

Notes

1. See introduction to our Document 1. We are indebted to Dr. Dieter Heinzig for this identification. It is confirmed by E. F. Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress of the Communist Party of China," p. 26 n. 3.

2. The Russian account is incorrect. Weihaiwei had been a British leasehold since 1898 and hence was not transferred to Britain as a "result of the imperialist war." In October 1930, Great Britain returned control of Weihaiwei to China.

3. Brief biographies of Ch'en and Li are given in Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, and Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*. Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu*, ch. 3, "Revolutionary Teacher in Anhui," pp. 60-95. On Ch'en's intellectual passage to Marxism, see Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West*, pp. 306-20. See also Richard C. Kagan, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography." An excellent intellectual biography is Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*.

4. Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China*; Scalapino and Schiffrin, "Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement." Also, Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, *The Chinese Anarchist Movement*.

5. On the sources available in China for a knowledge of Marxism, and reasons why some intellectuals turned toward its study, see Jerome Ch'en, "The Chinese Communist Movement to 1927," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 12, part I,

pp. 505-14. The most complete account is Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, *Modern China and Its Revolutionary Process*, pp. 486-626, published after this was written.

6. Meisner, *Li Ta-chao*, pp. 63, 67-68.

7. Ibid., p. 90. On Li's turn to Marxism see also Chester Tan, *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 106-10.

8. Meisner, *Li Ta-chao*, p. 116.

9. Authorities differ on the date of Ch'en's move to Shanghai. On his shift toward Marxism, see Julie Lien-ying How, *The Development of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Thought*; Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, pp. 18-23; Yu-ju Chih, *The Political Thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu*, pp. 91-93, and Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu*, pp. 137-46.

10. Corinna Hana, *Sun Yat-sen's Parteiorgan Chien-she (1919-1920): Eine Quelle zur Bewegung vom Vierten Mai in China*, provides an excellent account of the journal.

11. Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, pp. 269-71 for an English text of the Karakhan Manifesto, and pp. 28-33 and notes for discussion of its subsequent emendation and Russian denial of the disputed sentence.

12. *Hsin ch'ing-nien* 7, 6 (May 1920), pp. 1239-67 in Japanese reprint edition. The *Min-kuo jih-pao* editorials are in this collection.

13. The historical record is treated in some detail in C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*.

14. Part of the telegram is quoted in S. Tikhvinskii, *Sun Yat-sen: On the Occasion*, p. 23, and indirectly quoted in Tikhvinskii, *Sun Yat-sen and Problems*, p. 5, referenced to *Izvestia*. Sun's telegram is mentioned by Tsou Lu in his *Chung-kuo Kuomintang shih kao*, p. 342, and by other Chinese sources, but we have not seen a text.

15. On Sun's first Canton administration see Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China*, pp. 375-78, 384-88; George T. Yu, *Party Politics in Republican China*, pp. 146-49.

16. Reported by George Sokolsky, a member of Sun's staff, to the American Consulate in Shanghai, USDS 761.93/142, Dispatch, Cunningham, Shanghai, March 30, 1920. M. Popoff's exploratory visit to Shanghai in 1919 is noted in H. Owen Chapman, *The Chinese Revolution, 1926-27*, p. 45.

17. Persits, "The Eastern Internationalists in Russia," pp. 87-89. According to Garushiants, "The Struggle of Chinese Marxists," pp. 84-85, the Central Organization Bureau of Chinese Communists in Russia was established in June 1920 and approved by the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on July 1. Presumably, Liu Chang's trip followed.

18. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 28-30, 269-71.

19. Ibid., pp. 148-50, 272-75.

20. A young member of the mission published vivid recollections many years later, now translated and published in English. Marc Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*. The second part deals with Kasanin's second mission to China as a member of General Blyukher's staff in 1927.

21. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 163-71. Chicherin, in a note to the Chinese Foreign Office of June 15, 1921, promised that the Russian troops would be withdrawn from Mongolia when their mission against Ungren had been accomplished. However, the occupation of Urga by Soviet armed forces continued for several years. See Peter S. H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy*, pp. 375-76.

22. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 172-78.

23. Lydia Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China, 1919-1923*, p. 15.

24. The situation is vividly described in Edward Hallett Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution*, III, 127-53.

25. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 84–85.

26. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, p. 32, based upon Yu. M. Garushiants, "The Struggle of Chinese Marxists," p. 86, which is itself based on reminiscent Chinese accounts and not on Comintern archives. In her later work, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923–1925*, pp. 143–44, Mrs. Holubnychy says that Mr. and Mrs. Mamaev may have joined the group later, and that L. A. Perlin also participated in Voitinsky's work. We are uncertain when M. F. Kuznetsova was married to Voitinsky. Yang Ming-chai came from Shantung but had lived in Russia for many years, and after the Bolshevik Revolution he joined the Russian Communist Party. There is a brief biography in Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*, II, 982–83. I. K. Mamaev had some knowledge of Chinese and was in charge of Chinese affairs at the office of the Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk. He returned to China in the autumn of 1924 for revolutionary work.

27. See Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 142–44; Wei, "The Founding of the Chinese Commnist Party," pp. 36–37; and Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress," p. 34 n. 1.

28. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 18, 39–44, and 63–70, for excerpts from the Theses and other documents on the subject. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 42–58 for a valuable analysis.

29. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 49–50.

30. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 130–31.

31. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, p. 18, based on a 1920 stenographic report of the Congress.

32. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 68–70. Mrs. Holubnychy pointed out that Roy's Supplementary Theses were passed by the Congress as well as Lenin's. Roy's original version is preserved in Soviet Party archives, much amended by Lenin's own hand, of which she gave examples. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, pp. 19–20.

33. Among scholars in Taiwan one may mention Kuo Hua-lun (Warren Kuo), Wang Chien-min, and Cheng Hsueh-chia. Among important recent publications in the PRC are the twelve-volume collection of biographies of early CCP members, Hu Hua, ed., *Chung Kung Tang shih jen-wu chuan* (1980–); the two-volume *"I-ta" ch'ien hou* [Before and After the First Congress] (1980); and the collection of reminiscences of the First Congress, *I-ta hui-i-lu* (1980). Tony Saich has used these recent PRC publications for his important article, "Through the Past Darkly: Some New Sources on the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party." For all the above, see the bibliography.

34. James Harrison has identified fourteen individuals who may have participated in the discussions. James Pinckney Harrison, *Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72*, p. 522 n. 32.

35. Herman Mast III, "Tai Chi-t'ao, Sunism and Marxism During the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai," p. 240. In the April 1, 1920 issue of *Hsing-ch'i ping-lun*, which he edited, Tai had an editorial praising the Karakhan Manifesto of the previous July. He called on all conscious people to join their allies, the Russian workers and peasants and the Red Army, in the struggle against capitalist imperialism in Asia. Ibid., p. 239. This was written before Tai met Voitinsky.

36. Ch'en Wang-tao was educated in Japan and was on the editorial staff of the *Kuo-min jih pao*. He had made a translation of *The Communist Manifesto*, which was published in April 1920, according to Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 299. Shih Ts'un-t'ung (alt. Shih Fu-liang) as a student in Chekiang First Normal School had published an article, "Oppose Filial Piety," in a student journal in November 1919 that created a storm. The magazine was suppressed and Shih, with his schoolmate Yü Hsiu-sung (alt. Yü Shou-sung), withdrew and went to Peking to join a Work-and-Learning Mutual Assistance Corps that was supported by leading faculty

members of Peking University. Ibid., p. 306. Chow adds three names to this list, Shao Li-tzu, Li Ta, and Juan Hsiao-hsien (pp. 248-49). His valuable account is not sourced. "Ch'i-wu lao-jen," that is, Pao Hui-seng, p. 16, states that Voitinsky met Tai Chi-t'ao, Li Han-chün, Shen Hsüan-lu, and Chang Tung-sun, but Chang and Tai withdrew and the others were joined by Li Ta, Yü Hsiu-sung, and Shih Ts'un-t'ung. The "Brief History" points out that four of its list of seven left the party, naming Tai, Ch'en Wang-tao, and Li Han-chün. It is unclear who the writer, Naumov, thought the fourth was, but it may have been Shen T'ing-i, who withdrew in 1925. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, I, 108, dates the organization toward the end of August and lists Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta, Li Han-chün, Ch'en Wang-tao, Shen T'ing-i, Shao Li-tzu, and Shih Ts'un-t'ung as the seven original joiners.

37. A letter of Iu D. Smurgis, dated October 13, 1921, describes work of the Trade Union Secretariat of the CCP after its First Congress, using the first person as though Smurgis is writing of his activity in Shanghai. However, in A. I. Kartunova's note it is stated that M. Fromberg carried out his tasks in Shanghai chiefly in contact with G. N. Voitinsky. See Kovalov, "New Materials on the First Congress," pp. 33-34.

38. Glunin, "Gregory Voitinsky," p. 71; Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 249; Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*, II, 982-83.

39. Shevelyov, "On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China," p. 131; Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 45, n. d; Chow Tse-tsung, *Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement*, p. 29, for a list of contributors (but not Voitinsky); and Glunin, "Gregory Voitinsky," p. 71.

40. Sneevliet ("Maring"), who succeeded Voitinsky as Comintern delegate in China, reported to the ECCI on the state of the Chinese Communist movement as he found it in June 1921. "This group had its branches in seven or eight centers. However the membership was not more than 50-80 in entire China. One worked with the aid of Labour Schools. These schools had again to be abandoned when Comrade Voitinsky departed and this group subsequently found themselves without financial means." Dov Bing, "Ma-lin's Activities in China from the Beginning of June till December 10, 1921," p. 29, presents a translation from the German of Maring's report, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring fur die Executive," Moscow, July 11, 1922. Another translation is in Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*, p. 366. According to the late Professor Wang Chien-min, Voitinsky turned over 2,000 yuan as an initial fund to start a printing establishment which should be self-supporting thereafter. Unfortunately, the statement is not sourced but the details are specific. Wang Chien-min, *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang shih kao*, I, p. 28.

Chou Fu-hai, a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party, relates a quarrel between Ch'en Tu-hsiu and "Maring" in September 1921 over money spent by the Communist International in China. "Maring" said that it totalled more than 200,000 (currency not specified), with very few results, implying that Chinese comrades had not exerted themselves. Ch'en retorted that half the money had been spent by the Comintern delegates for their own expenses. Chou, "I Escaped from the Red Capital Wuhan," p. 143. This was written in 1927, but Chou had been in Shanghai in the summer of 1921 and was in a position to know of the quarrel. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 139, cite an undocumented statement that after the formation of the Socialist Youth group in August 1920 it began to receive a monthly contribution of $5,000 gold from the Comintern.

41. B. Z. Shumiatskii, "From the History of the Comsomol and Communist Party of China," written in 1928, is largely based on Chang T'ai-lei's reports. Biographies of Chang, who lost his life in the Canton Commune of December 1927, are in both Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, 111-12, and Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dic-*

tionary, I, 49-52.

42. Biographies of the four students are in Boorman or Klein and Clark. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, who attended the founding meeting in Peking in mid-September 1920, nine persons attended (he names seven), the majority being anarchists. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 111. Much scholarship has gone into recounting the creation of the several Communist circles before the official establishment of the CCP: see Wei, "The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party"; Saich, "Through the Past Darkly," pp. 3-10, based on extensive use of *"I-ta" chien hou*.

43. KFNP, pp. 807, 815; date for Ch'en's departure is from Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*, I, 140. Our Document 1, p. 13, states that it is unclear whether Ch'en Chiung-ming invited Ch'en Tu-hsiu on his own or through Dr. Sun. The point is not clarified in KFNP. However, Wang Chien-min, *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang shih kao*, I, 33, says Voitinsky and Ch'en traveled together to Canton and there called on Ch'en Chiung-ming, who invited Ch'en to become commissioner of education on the recommendation of the anarchist, Liang Ping-hsien. No source is given.

44. Biographies of T'an P'ing-shan and Ch'en Kung-po in Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, and a biography of Ch'en in the introduction to his *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 5-16. T'an Chih-t'an, the nephew of T'an P'ing-shan, was also a leader of the Kwangtung Communist group up to 1927.

45. Harrison, *Long March to Power*, p. 30, has Mamaev arrive in Wuhan after the group was started on September 9, 1920.

46. Biographies of Tung in Boorman and in Klein and Clark. On Mamaev, see Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 338, for Tung's reminiscences of his meetings with Mamaev in which dictionaries were much used.

47. Voitinsky's account was a memorial tribute to Sun, published shortly after his death, in *Pravda*, March 15, 1925. A partial translation in Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 218-19.

48. Information on Alexieff in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, p. 236, n. 11. On Khodorov, see Marc Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 108.

49. Quoted in Eugene Chen, "Sun Yat-sen—Some Memories."

50. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 219-21, translated from *Bolshevik* 19 (October 1950), pp. 46-48.

51. KFNP, pp. 834-50. Sun's planning began about July 15, 1921.

52. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*. The introduction by Wilbur contains a discussion of the circumstances of Ch'en's study at Columbia. Professor Vladimir Glunin of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, informed Wilbur on January 24, 1978 that archives in Moscow contain documents of the First and Second CCP Congresses, which he checked against the English version in Ch'en's essay. He stated that they are the same documents, differing only in a few words of translation. But see note 63 below.

53. Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress." First published in 1972 in *Narody Azii i Afriki* 6, pp. 150-58, it has been translated into English by Arlo Schultz and published in *Chinese Studies in History* 7, 3 (Spring 1974). It is from this anonymous manuscript that the opening date of July 23, 1921 is deduced. The letter from Smurgis states that the congress "was held from July 23 to August 5 in Shanghai." Ibid., p. 33.

54. Various reminiscent accounts were cited by Wilbur in the introduction to Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 18-22, and by Warren Kuo in "A Further Discussion on the Founding Date," pp. 17-20. These, and more reminiscences of much later date, are published in *I ta hui-i-lu* and *"I-ta" ch'ien hou*, vol. 2.

55. Shumiatskii, "From the History of the Comsomol," p. 213, based on Chang T'ai-lei's reports. See also Persits, "From the History of the Making of the Communist Party of China," pp. 50-51, and Harrison, *Long March to Power*, p. 32.

56. Date of Sneevliet's arrival from Dov Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," p. 680. Little is known of Nikolskii. He is mentioned as Ni-k'o-lo-ssu-fu-chi in the reminiscences of Chou Fu-hai and Chang Kuo-t'ao, cited above. In Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 139 n. 7, he is called Nikorusky.

57. Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, pp. 13-60, for a scholarly account of Sneevliet's career in the Dutch East Indies and his work in the Second CI Congress. Also Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years," pp. 677-79. Bing's theme is Sneevliet's central role in originating the penetration strategy, persuading the Comintern to adopt it, and then implementing it in China. An important new study, based on the Sneevliet archives, is by Tony Saich and Fritjof Tichelman, "Hank Sneevliet: A Dutch Revolutionary on the World Stage."

58. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 137, 139.

59. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 13. As Dr. McVey characterizes him, "Sneevliet's zeal made him demanding of his colleagues and chronically incapable of compromise, but at the same time he was never so sure of his own interpretation of the socialist faith as to be immune from changes of denomination."

60. The official date for the opening celebrated in China is July 1. The validity of this date was first challenged by Wilbur in his introduction to Ch'en Kung-po's *The Communist Movement in China*, using the reminiscences of a number of participants and an account of a murder found in *North China Herald* to give the dates July 20 and 30 as approximating the period during which the First Congress was held in Shanghai. Now both Russian and Chinese scholars have determined that the Congress began on July 23. See Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, p. 147, on the Russian findings, based on Comintern archives; Tang Tsou, "The Historic Change in Direction and Continuity with the Past," p. 320 n. 1; and Saich, "Through the Past Darkly." Saich also constructs a list of the participants. His main source is the extensive Chinese compilation, *"I-ta" ch'ien hou*. This publishes a translation (pp. 20-23) from the Russian of the early manuscript report on the First Congress, that published by Kovalev. It is also translated in Kuo "A Further Discussion on the Founding Date," pp. 30-33.

61. Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 361, lists fifty-two founders of the CCP reconstructed from various Chinese sources.

62. Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress," pp. 23-25.

63. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement*, pp. 102 and 105, from the First Program of the CCP and the First Decisions as to the Objectives of the CCP. These have been translated back into Chinese in *"I-ta" ch'ien hou*, pp. 9-11 and 15-17, together with versions from Russian. The First Program lacks item 11 in both the English version (that of Ch'en Kung-po) and the Russian version. This has been interpreted to mean that the two versions validate each other as coming from a common source. Another possibility is that Ch'en Kung-po may have given a copy of his master's thesis at Columbia to some Russian worker in China, and the Russian version is merely a translation from it. According to Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, p. 148, Ch'en's essay "was known to Russian authors long before its discovery at Columbia University. (See article on Ch'en Kung-po in Baranovskii and Schwarsalon, p. 283.)" That work, according to her bibliography, was published in 1928.

64. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 82, describes the debate and the deferment. In his 1944 account, Ch'en gives himself credit for persuading Ch'en Tu-hsiu not to issue the manifesto. Ch'en, "I and the Communist Party," p. 20. Chou Fu-hai has "the Russians" reversing this decision: "I Escaped from the Red Capital Wuhan," p. 142. Ch'en Kung-po, in his 1944 account, p. 19, has "the Russians" advocating that a decision forbidding members to join in governments or even be school principals be annulled. On Sneevliet's thinking on the appropriate attitude for the Communist Party toward other nationalist groups, see Saich and Tichelman, "Hank

Sneevliet," p. 178.

65. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 104. Ch'en uses the term "technical unions" for "craft unions."

66. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

67. Ibid.; discussion, pp. 29-30.

68. Shumiatskii, "From the History of the Comsomol," p. 216. Professor Bing has translated from Russian Chang T'ai-lei's draft "Theses on the Colonial Question to the Third Congress of the Communist International," as given by Shumiatskii. Bing, "Ma-ling's Activities," pp. 25-27. Yang Ho-te is scarcely known except through Shumiatskii.

69. For Chang T'ai-lei's position one must rely on Shumiatskii's account, for there are no minutes available of this commission, according to Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 144 n. 27. Shumiatskii, writing in 1928, has Chang in 1921 saying: "The task of the communists of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East is as follows: without surrendering their independent program and organization, the communists must gain predominance in the national revolutionary movements; they must draw the participating masses away from the domination of the national bourgeoisie, and they must force the bourgeoisie to follow the movement for the time being under the slogans 'away with the imperialists' and 'long live national independence.' However, when the moment arrives, this bourgeoisie must be cut off from the movement." Translation in Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 144.

We have followed Mrs. Holubnychy's interpretation of the neglect of the East by the Third CI Congress. *The Comintern and China*, pp. 47-52.

70. Shumiatskii, "From the History of the Comsomol," pp. 224-26. The Moscow tally comes from the records of the Congress as cited by Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China*, pp. 78 and 298 n. 14. Sorkin, "The Congress of the Peoples of the Far East," p. 79, gives a similar analysis. He mentions Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Wang Chin-mei, Teng En-min, and Chang T'ai-lei as young Chinese Communists attending, though Chang returned to China from Irkutsk. Chang Kuo-t'ao also attended the Congress and has a graphic account of his preparations and difficult journey to Irkutsk. He also gives some details about the make-up of the Chinese delegation and says he was the only representative of the Chinese Communist Party, others representing labor unions, student unions, or liberal professions. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 177-86.

71. The first official record of the Congress is Communist International, *The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East*. We have depended upon secondary accounts: Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 78-86; Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia*, III, 518-21; Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 78-86; Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 161-64.

72. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 224-28, from Safarov's statement at the Tenth Session, January 27, 1922.

73. This retreat and move toward united front is well described in Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia*, III, 381-461, chapters 30 and 31. In chapters 33 and 34 (pp. 484-540), Carr describes the intensified Russian diplomatic, military, and revolutionary offensive in the Far East. He sees the winter of 1921-22 as a turning point.

74. Letter quoted in Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen—a Friend of the Soviet People," p. 31. The Lenin interview is described in Chang, *The Rise*, I, 206-209.

75. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, p. 60. The plenum met February 21 to March 4, 1922.

76. S. A. Dalin, who attended the Congress of the Toilers, met Chang there, and then came to China, says that when Chang Ch'iu-pai came to Canton he exerted an influence on Sun favorable to Soviet Russia. Dalin, "The Great Turn: Sun Yat-sen in 1922," p. 281. Chang Kuo-t'ao, while critical of Chang, says that he did make a

suitable presentation of the theory that the KMT and CCP should cooperate against imperialism, which led Dr. Sun and his followers to pay greater attention to the question of such cooperation. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 218. These are independent accounts. In January 1923, when Dr. Sun established an External Relations Bureau in Kuomintang Headquarters in Shanghai, he appointed Chang Ch'iu-pai to head it. This was just at the time he was negotiating with Adolf Joffe and moving toward a Soviet orientation. KFNP, p. 945. By November, however, Chang was among the Kuomintang leaders in Shanghai who were skeptical about, or opposed, the planned reorganization of the party; he feared that its original spirit would be harmed by elections. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung tao ch'ing tang*, p. 227, based on minutes of a cadre council meeting on November 18, 1923.

77. A Russian version of the letter is in *Dokumenty Vneshnei Politki SSSR*, V, 83-84, kindly translated by Mrs. L. Kisselgoff. It is unknown whether Sun ever received the letter.

78. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring" (July 11, 1922), pp. 366-68.

79. Chou Fu-hai, who was acting in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's place until he arrived in Shanghai, states that during the less than two months he served as acting committee chairman, 12,000 yuan passed through his hands; salaries were 80 yuan per month. This did not take into account whatever was spent by Chang Kuo-t'ao for the Labor Secretariat, funds for which were transmitted separately. Chou, "I Escaped from the Red Capital Wuhan," p. 143. Chang Kuo-t'ao does not say how much he used, but he recalls his dispute with Ch'en Tu-hsiu over the fact that he submitted his plans and budget to "Maring" and paid the salaries of people working under the plan. Ch'en regarded this as "a revolution of mercenaries," but Chang defended his action because without funds all planning would be empty talk. Later the Chinese leaders agreed to make the top salary for a party worker no more than 25 yuan per month. After Ch'en and the Dutchman had made their peace, they arranged for a regular Comintern subsidy, but Chang does not specify how much it was. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 162, 167, 169. James Harrison, drawing on a variety of sources, including those herein, estimates that the Comintern spent about 6,000 yuan a month in Shanghai during the summer of 1921 for Communist work, and he provides some examples. Harrison, *Long March to Power*, pp. 36, 526 n. 65.

80. "Ch'i-wu lao jen," in Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 345. Some believe the author to be Pao Hui-seng, one of those arrested. Chang Kuo-t'ao describes the arrest and Ch'en's quick release, but nothing about the Dutchman's asistance. *The Rise*, I, 164.

81. Biographies in Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*. See Conrad Brandt, *The French-Returned Elite in the Chinese Communist Party*. *North China Herald*, October 22, 1921, p. 221, reports the deportation as October 14.

382. Bernadette Yu-ning Li, *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai*, p. 67, gives the lower figure; Harrison, *Long March to Power*, p. 25, gives the higher one, based on a recent Russian study.

83. Bing, *Revolution in China: Sneevlietian Strategy*, pp. 69-70, and Bing, "Chang Chi and Ma-lin's First Visit to Dr. Sun Yat-sen." Stuart Schram, *Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century: Mao Tse-tung*, p. 67, citing a letter from Chao Heng-t'i to T'an Yen-k'ai, dated December 19, 1921, in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

84. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring," pp. 368, 371. A. I. Kartunova, "The Comintern and Some Questions on the Reorganization of the Kuomintang," p. 302; Bing, "Chang Chi and Ma-lin's First Visit," gives the dates as December 23-January 1, 1922. Teng Chia-yen, "A True Record of Ma-ting's Visit to the Leader," says "Ma-lin" stayed three days in Kweilin and saw Sun twice. Teng

acted for Sun as Sneevliet's receptionist. KFNP, II, 853-55, attempts to reconstruct the circumstances from secondary sources.

85. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring," pp. 369, 371-72. Teng, "A True Record," p. 1411, an independent source, says that Sun rejected the idea of an alliance with Russia at this time because of the danger to his rear from Great Britain. Later, when he had taken Peking, they could plan for full cooperation.

86. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, p. 156, citing an article by M. F. Yuriev, published in 1966. George Yu in *Party Politics in Republican China*, p. 163, brings together Chinese accounts of the meeting, while Bing reconstructs the conversation based upon a melange of Sneevliet's later writings and Chinese accounts, in "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," p. 682.

87. Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report to the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang of China," p. 3855; Wang says he and Liao were recipients of the telegram. Tsou, *Kuomintang*, Chungking ed., p. 304, Taipei ed., p. 342.

88. *Kuo Fu ch'üan chi*, III, 233-35, speech dated January 4, 1922. (Hereafter KFCC.)

89. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring," pp. 372-73.

90. Bing, *Revolution*, p. 86, citing "Uit Het Verre Oosen," March 19, 1922, in *De Tribune*, May 6, 1922, p. 1.

91. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yun-tung chien shih*, pp. 47, 59, 67.

92. Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," pp. 682-83, based on a variety of Sneevliet's contemporary writings.

93. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 218, 220, 223.

94. V. I. Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China (1920-1927)," p. 252.

95. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring," p. 374. Emphasis in the original. Bing gives a similar translation in "Was There a Sneevlietian Strategy?" p. 349.

96. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 222. Chang denies that "Maring" had at this time proposed that Communists enter the Kuomintang, but his memory is faulty—for example, he remembered that Maring had left Shanghai for Moscow before his own return to Shanghai, which is incorrect.

97. Ch'en Kung-po, "I and," pp. 16, 30. See also *Chung-kuo lao-kung yun-tung shih*, I, 200, on Communist efforts to establish unions to compete against existing unions, especially after February 1922.

98. "Attitude which Should Be Taken by the Communist party During the Present Laborers Activity," *Ch'un pao*, May 23, 1922, which is enclosure no. 5 in J. Calvin Huston's dispatch, "The Recent Rise of Labor Unions and the Growth of Chinese Socialism in Canton under the Aegis of the Kuomintang." On page 50 of the dispatch, the article is called "Communist Declaration of Ch'en Tu-hsiu." Our Document 3, which will be introduced in the next chapter, states that the Kuomintang and Dr. Sun's government gained popular sympathy by their support of the strike.

99. The following is based on the study by Ka-che Yip, *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-1927*, pp. 22-28.

100. KFNP, 859-62. Li Meng-keng, Chang's representative, arrived at Kweilin on February 12 to discuss cooperation. Chou Shan-p'ei, Tuan's representative, arrived in Kwangtung on February 20 for discussions. Sun saw Wang Hsi-min, representative of Szechuan, on February 1.

101. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, I, 131.

102. KFNP, II, 862-68.

103. S. A. Dalin, "The Great Turn: Sun Yat-sen in 1922," pp. 255-56. Dalin states that he made detailed records of his talks with Sun and in 1923 wrote a book, which he supplemented in 1925 after Sun's death. For this article published in 1966,

he excluded some of the episodes and added facts preserved in his memory. The account has some historical inaccuracies.

104. Ibid., pp. 260, 262–63.

105. Ibid., pp. 266-67. Dalin states that representatives of the CC of the Socialist Youth Corps took part in the meeting. This seems odd. The CC of the SY was elected at the First Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps, which did not convene until May 5, 1922.

106. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 232. T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Kung-po, and T'an Chih-t'ang were leaders of the Canton Communist organization. Chang asserts that they had started cooperating with Ch'en Chiung-ming under the influence of Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

107. Hugh Seaton-Watson, *From Lenin to Malenkov: The History of World Communism*, p. 73.

108. An announcement of the meeting published in Shanghai on April 22, and a few other documents related to the Labor Congress, are printed in *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an-kao tzu-liao*, pp. 319-25. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 68-70. Teng originally used the figure of 270,000 for the total union membership. The publisher changed it to 200,000, citing *Hsiang-tao* 155 (May 1926). According to our Document 2, p. 5, the Socialist Youth Corps and the CCP jointly organized the demonstration on May 1. Some 50,000 participated.

109. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 217.

110. Dalin, "The Great Turn," p. 265.

111. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 91, citing G. Voitinsky, "Struggle of the Chinese Proletariat," *Novyi Vostok*-2 (1922), pp. 341-50; and *International Press Correspondence* 98 (November 13, 1922), p. 874.

112. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, p. 201. Chesneaux also mentions this resolution, citing a reporter of *Hsin shen pao* who wrote that ten resolutions were passed at the congress. See Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927*, p. 186.

113. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, p. 201.

114. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 72-75. Teng states that the original document was lost. He lists nine resolutions. Others called for the eight-hour work day; use by all unions of the same banner and insignia; and calling of the Second National labor Congress at Hankow on May Day, 1923. Two resolutions set memorial days in honor of workers killed in Hunan and Sha-t'ien, Kwangtung, respectively. Teng does not mention the resolution calling on unions not to particpate in political activities. Ch'en Kung-po's 1924 essay lists eight resolutions. Those not mentioned by Teng called for the adoption of a labor song, respect for May Day, and organization of an association of coolies throughout the country. See Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 77-78.

115. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 239. Chang also states that seventeen units were represented at the congress, but he places the total membership at approximately two thousand. Documents from the congress, including the regulations, are reprinted from *Hsien-ch'ü*, the organ of the Socialist Youth Corps, dated May 15, 1922, in *"I-ta" ch'ien hou*, pp. 26-45.

116. See *"I-ta" ch'ien hou*, pp. 32-33.

117. *Hsin ch'ing-nien* (July 1922), p. 128, as cited by Yip, *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students*, p. 97 n. 44.

118. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 240.

119. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chih t'ou-shih*, p. 49.

120. Dalin, "The Great Turn," p. 257.

121. Chou Fu-hai, "I Escaped," p. 145.

122. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, p. 69, translated from *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistichen International*, p. 630. Also, in Karl Radek, *Piat' let Kominterna*, pp. 299-301. A. E. Khodorov, a Soviet Foreign Office writer,

applauded Wu P'ei-fu's victory over Chang Tso-lin and suggested that Russia, with Wu's help, could drive Chang Tso-lin and Japanese imperialism out of Manchuria. A. E. Khodorov, "The Manchurian Problem," pp. 566-67, as noted by Holubnychy, p. 70. Khodorov's article is undated.

Wu P'ei-fu's connection with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party is ably presented by Odoric Y. K. Wou, *Militarism in Modern China: The Career of Wu P'ei-fu, 1916-39*, pp. 202-205.

123. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih kung*, pp. 19-20; Chang, *The Rise*, I, 275. Kao En-hung was appointed to his post on May 24, 1922. Chou Fu-hai gave an independent version of this arrangement in "I Escaped from the Red Capital," pp. 144-45. The American Consul General in Tientsin had heard of the arrangement between Wu P'ei-fu and Li Ta-chao by early 1923. Huston, "The Labor Situation in China," p. 43. The six Communist inspectors are named in Wou, *Militarism in Modern China*, p. 204.

124. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 243. In his Political Report to the Second Kuomintang Congress in January 1926, Wang Ching-wei stated that some comrades criticized Li Ta-chao for his contacts with Wu P'ei-fu but, Wang pointed out, these contacts occurred before Li joined the Kuomintang. See Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report," p. 3855.

125. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 244-45.

126. Dalin, "The Great Turn," p. 269. Judging by the context, this conversation took place before May 6, when Sun left for Shao-kuan to launch his northern campaign.

127. Ibid., pp. 272, 281.

128. Ibid., p. 283.

129. Ibid, p. 285. It has been published in Sun Yat-sen, "From Sun Yat-sen's Correspondence," p. 102.

130. For Sun's interest in Germany as a possible source of support, see Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 108-11.

131. Chiang Kai-shek, "A Record of President Sun's Hardship," pp. 48-50. Also KFCC, IV, 518-19. Chiang arrived at Canton to join Sun on the S.S. *Yung-feng* on July 29.

132. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 249. Dalin corroborates Chang regarding the Canton Communists, stating that after the coup the local Communist leaders acted openly in alliance with Ch'en Chiung-ming. Dalin, "The Great Turn," p. 268.

133. Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-kuo Kung-chan Tang tui-yü shih chu ti chu-cheng*, partial translation in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 54-63.

134. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 248-49.

135. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 252.

136. The dates appear at the end of a document, "The Organization of the Communist Party of China," appended to Ch'en Kung-po's 1924 essay. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 135. Chang Kuo-t'ao dates it around July 10. *The Rise*, I, 247. Our Document 1 dates it June and July. Warren Kuo points out that Chinese Communist historians have differed on the date (May or July) and place (Hangchow or Shanghai) of the congress. He accepts our conclusions. Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 38-41.

137. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 247. The official delegates were Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Kao Shang-te, Pao Hui-seng, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, Chang himself, and two others whose names he did not recall. A number of unofficial delegates, including Chang T'ai-lei and Hsiang Ching-yü, also attended. Ch'en Kung-po in his 1924 thesis asserted that more than eighteen provinces sent representatives. See Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 82.

138. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 246. Chang explains why the Second Congress drafted a new manifesto. As preparations were being made for the Second Congress, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Hsiang Ching-yü, and others returned to Shanghai from France, while Liu Shao-ch'i, Yuan Ta-shih, Ch'en Wei-jen, and others returned from Moscow. They approved of the "First Manifesto," but thought it contained some inadequacies. Anxious to heed the views of comrades recently returned from abroad, Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed to produce another manifesto to correct the inadequacies of the "First Manifesto."

139. "Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party" and Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, appendix 3.

140. Since the negotiations of both Yurin and Paikes with the Peking government had floundered mainly because of Outer Mongolia, it is noteworthy that the CCP was willing to forgo the claim of Chinese sovereignty in that region as well as in Tibet and Sinkiang.

141. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan tang t'ung-chih shu*, full translation, p. 226. Ch'en states that the Second Congress adopted a united front policy in accordance with the resolution of the Toilers Congress and issued a manifesto proclaiming the policy.

142. These are found in Ch'en, *The Chinese Communist Movement*, appendix 4. An incomplete version of the Decisions is given in *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*, pp. 344-55.

143. As found in Ch'en, *The Communist Movement in China*, appendix 5.

144. They were the five members of the Central Committee at the Hangchow Plenum in August 1922, according to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan tang*, and thus were apparently elected at the Second Congress. However, Chang Kuo-t'ao asserts that the congress felt it was only necessary to elect three members. Li Ta stated that he wished to concentrate on writing and requested to be relieved of responsibility for propaganda work. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Ts'ai Ho-shen were elected to the CC. Ts'ai took over Li's responsibility for propaganda. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 248.

145. Glunin, "Comintern," pp. 253-54.

146. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan tang*, full translation, p. 226. Ch'en, writing in 1929, erroneously stated that Dalin arrived in China at the time of the Second Congress. He may have confused this with the Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps.

147. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 249. Ch'en Kung-po insists that he withdrew from the Party on his own initiative after Chang T'ai-lei brought him a letter from Ch'en Tu-hsiu asking him to go to Shanghai because of suspicion that he was helping Ch'en Chiung-ming. He left Canton in mid-November 1922, for Japan en route to study in the United States. See Ch'en Kung-po, "I and," pp. 41-43.

148. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 87-88, citing G. Maring, "The Revolutionary Movement in South China," *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional* 22 (1922). The issue of the magazine is dated September 13, 1922, but the article might have been written prior to Ch'en's coup.

149. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 79, citing the same article.

150. Ibid., p. 78, citing "The Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on July 17th," *International Press Correspondence*, July 28, 1922, p. 470. A fuller account is in Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," pp. 685-88, quoting mostly from Maring's report of July 11, 1922.

151. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, p. 391.

152. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 79, citing original document in closed section of Sneevliet Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. On Markhlevsky, see George Alexander Lensen, *Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 32-33.

153. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 79, citing *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme*, photo of document facing p. 60.

154. Sneevliet, "Report to the Executive of Comrade H. Maring," pp. 372-73.

155. Glunin, "Comintern," pp. 251, 254.

156. Kartunova, "The Comintern," p. 302. We presume this to be the directive mentioned by Glunin. Both scholars call it the ECCI instruction to its representative in South China. A translation of the text may be found in Bing, "Was There a Sneevlietian Strategy?" p. 351.

157. Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years," p. 690 n. 63.

158. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 250. He dates this as a few days after the end of the Second Congress, but at least three weeks seems more likely.

159. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan tang*, full translation, p. 226.

160. Bing, *Revolution*, p. 119, citing "Met en Bij Soen Yat-sen, Enige Persoonlijke Herinneringen," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926. Bing dates the meeting as August 25, 1922, citing the same source. Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years," p. 690. This is KFNP gives for Sun's meeting with an unnamed representative from Joffe.

161. Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years," pp. 690-91, citing "De Chineesche Generaal en de Chineesche Revolutie: Tsjen Tsjoen Ming en Tsjang Kai Sjek," *Klassenstrijd*, 1927, p. 143.

162. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 255. See also Yuriev, "The Establishment of Cooperation," p. 152.

163. Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report," p. 3855. See also Wang Ching-wei, "On Separating the Communist from the Kuomintang in Wuhan," p. 595. T. C. Woo states that Li told Sun he could not give up membership in the CCP. See T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 151-52.

164. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 254.

165. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan-tang*, full translation, pp. 226-27.

166. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 253-57. Chang adds Chang T'ai-lei's name to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's list of persons present at the meeting. Maurice Meisner builds a strong case for Li's mediatory role in political disputes and his consistent advocacy of cooperation with the Kuomintang. Meisner, *Li Ta-chao*, pp. 218-19.

167. Bing, *Revolution*, p. 96, citing "Aantekeningen van Maring: Tsjen Toe Sioe, De Oorzaken van der Nederlaag der Chineesche Revolutie" [Notes by Maring: Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the Causes of the Defeat of the Chinese Revolution], *De Nieuwe Weg* (Amsterdam, 1930). According to Bing's article, "Sneevliet and the Early Years," p. 690 n. 65, this contains a translation into Dutch of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's *Kao ch'üan tang*, together with Sneevliet's commentary.

168. Harold Isaacs, "Documents on the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution," p. 106. Though Sneevliet was confused as to dates, he was certainly referring to the plenum of August 1922.

169. The figure on membership seems accurate. As noted, the total membership at the time of the Second Congress in July 1922 was 123. By the time of the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922, the CCP claimed 300 members, of whom 180 paid dues. See Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 92, citing *VI. Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala, Izbrannye Doklady, Rechi, i Resoliutsii*, p. 18.

170. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 260. The ceremony probably took place between August 30 and September 4, 1922. Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation," p. 280, states that "the leftists, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu," refused to join the Kuomintang, but the statement is not dated. He seems to refer to 1925.

171. *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* I, 1 (September [13], 1922), pp. 1-2. (Hereafter cited as HTCP.)

172. Ibid., pp. 4-6, article "On Unification and the Kuomintang," by Ts'ai Hosen.

173. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "What Is the Kuomintang," HTCP, I, 2 (September 20, 1922), p. 16.

174. HTCP, I, 2, p. 9.

175. KMWH, VIII, 1039-43, citing Chü Cheng, "The Reform of Our Party in General," in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang pen-pu kung pao* I, 1 (January 1923).

176. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 267. On reasons for the move to Peking, see pp. 271-74.

177. Evidence is presented in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 125-30.

178. There is much material on this planning. KFNP, pp. 914-43, focused on Sun's actions from October 1922 into January 1923; KFCC, V, 481 ff. for Sun's letters to generals; KMWH, LII, 238-436 and 482-86 for several extended accounts of the work of the Hong Kong office and of the successful military campaign down the West River route. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, 1132-35, Taipei ed., 1065-72, for an account of Tsou Lu's activities.

179. Sun Yat-sen's letter to Chiang Kai-shek, August 30, 1922, in Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng shou cha mo chi*, pp. 5-6 (a photographic reproduction). The version of the letter in KFNP, pp. 907-908, identifies Joffe by name. Chiang was then in Ningpo. Partial translation in S. I. Hsiung, *The Life of Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 172; Shao Chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism*, p. 59.

Li Yün-han, citing Wang Yü-chün, *Chung-Su Wai-chiao*, pp. 448-49, speculates that the contact man may have been L. E. Leonidov. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 142. However, Wang lists him as a commercial counselor posted in Shanghai who arrived in Peking on August 31 to join Joffe; he was not among those listed as arriving with Joffe (see Wang, pp. 335-36).

180. Mr. Joffe's unsuccessful efforts in Changchun have been carefully described, on the basis on both Russian and Japanese diplomatic sources, by Lensen, *Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 49-84.

181. All quotations from Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 191-95. A text of Joffe's speech appears in *The Living Age*, January 13, 1923.

182. S. L. Tikhvinskii, *Sun Yat-sen; Vneshnepoliticheskie, Vozzeniia i Practika*, pp. 264-66.

183. Tikhvinskii, *Sun Yat-sen: On the Occasion*, p. 30. Unfortunately, no dates are given for Sun's letters.

184. Bing, "Sneevliet," p. 692, says he "travelled resolutely back and forth between Shanghai and Peking," citing a manuscript dating from 1935. Chang Kuo-t'ao described Sneevliet as a "matchmaker" between Joffe and Sun. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 264.

185. Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng shou cha mo chi*, pp. 2-3; KFCC, III, 495-96; KFCS, p. 817. Partial translations in Leng and Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen*, p. 61; Hsiung, *The Life of Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 160-62 (a photographic reproduction facing p. 142).

186. Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen—a Friend," p. 32. The entire text of Sun's letter is not given. Elipses in Kartunova's text.

187. Ibid., p. 31, and Tikhvinskii, *Sun Yat-sen: On the Occasion*, p. 31. Professor Tikhvinskii adds that Joffe had decided to go to Japan in view of the delays in his negotiations. The date of Chang Chi's arrival in Peking is uncertain because he has given several different dates in his reminiscences. It seems certain that he arrived after December 5, since a letter of that date from Chao I-t'ang in Peking to Sun Yat-sen mentions Chang's expected arrival. See Wang, *Chung-Su wai-chiao*, p. 449.

188. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, I, 143-44. Chang Chi's account, dated September 21, 1941, is from *Chang Po-ch'üan hsien-sheng ch'üan chi*, p. 195.

189. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 267.

190. A. N. Kheifets, *Sovetskaia Diplomatiia i Narody Vostok, 1921-1927*, pp.

148-49.

191. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 201, citing A. Joffe, "Chinese Puzzle," *Izvestiia*, no. 3 (1740), January 5, 1923, p. 2.

192. Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, II, 401. Chang Kuo-t'ao states that Ch'en was not esteemed by the Comintern at the Congress. Chang, "My Reminiscences," *Ming pao* 9, p. 90; not found in *The Rise*, I.

193. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 151, translated from *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistschen Internationale*, Hamburg, 1923, p. 615. Also in Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*, pp. 382-86.

194. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 255.

195. Abstracted from Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 180-81. There is a long, though incomplete, translation in Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 231-37.

196. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 343-44.

197. See KMWH, VIII, 1040-43, citing Chü Cheng, "The Reform of Our Party."

198. "Manifesto on the Reform of the Chinese Kuomintang." A translation is given in Li, *Political History*, pp. 446-50, and has been reprinted with corrections in Milton J. T. Shieh, *The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1966*, pp. 65-70.

199. "Party Platform of the Chinese Kuomintang," KMWH, VIII, 1047-49.

200. "Constitution of the Chinese Kuomintang," KMWH, VIII, 1049-52.

201. KMWH, LII [sic], 419-26.

202. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, pp. 1067-68; quoted in KMWH, LII, 299-300; KFNP, II, 931-32.

203. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, p. 1068. KMWH, LII, 360-80, reprints a series of dispatches appearing in Shanghai *Min hsin jih-k'an* from January 3 to 17, 1923, concerning the descent upon Canton.

204. NA, USDS 893.00/4873. Dispatch, Tenney, Canton, January 20, 1923, for a vivid and informed description of the takeover. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, p. 1068, lists local military men who turned over at the last minute; also in KMWH, LII, 301.

205. PRO: FO 371/9181/F946 [F946/12/10], dispatch, Barton, Shanghai, January 22, 1923, to H. M. Chargé d'Affaires, Peking. Sir Sidney Barton reports a call on him by Eugene Chen on January 19, in which Mr. Chen told him of attending Dr. Sun's dinner for Mr. Joffe the previous evening. Other accounts of meetings in KFNP, p. 246, and NCH, January 27, p. 243.

206. R. A. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," pp. 25-26, and Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin," p. 24. However, no minutes or direct reports of the conversations are published in these or the next Russian sources.

207. A. I. Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen and Russian Advisers," p. 171; Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen—A Friend," p. 32.

208. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, p. 186, based upon I. Ermashev, *Sun Yat-sen*, a popular biography which gives no sources though appearing to quote from Joffe and Sun. It was edited by Professor S. L. Tikhvinskii, a specialist on Sun Yat-sen. Ermashev also describes Joffe's advice to Sun on reforming his party and reorienting the Three Principles of the People to make them specifically anti-imperialist.

209. PRO FO F902/650/10, "Secret Report on Activities of M. Joffe in Shanghai." Dated March 24, 1923. A few months later A. I. Gekker selected the first group of Russian military officers to go to China to serve Dr. Sun.

210. Ibid. It is not clear whether the intelligence agents expected the Soviet aid to come after recognition or was contingent only upon the agreement to give recognition later.

211. This statement apparently was first published in *The China Press* of January 27. NA, USDS 761.93/305, dispatch, Cunningham, Shanghai, January 27 to Schurman

in Peking, containing a clipping. The *New York Times* of January 27 carried a digest in an Associated Press article from Shanghai dated January 26, the date the declaration was issued. A Chinese translation was published in the Shanghai *Min hsin jih-k'an* on January 28, apparently the first Chinese version, also in *Tung-fang tsa-chih* XX, 2 (January 25 [sic], 1923), pp. 9-10, together with a photograph of Mr. Joffe. The statement is reprinted in Shieh, *The Kuomintang*, pp. 71-72, and in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 137-38.

212. Fuse Katsuji, *Su-Wo ti tung-fang cheng-ts'e*, pp. 229-32. We suspect that Japanese intelligence files would contain information on the talks, judging by the wealth of documentation on Joffe's mission to Japan provided in Lensen, *Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R.*, much of it from spy reports and intercepts.

213. Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report," p. 3856.

214. Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen and Russian Advisers," p. 171, and Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen—a Friend," p. 34.

Chapter 2

Starting a Revolution with Sun Yat-sen, February 1923–March 1925

This chapter, covering a two-year period, centers on the efforts of Soviet Russia and its advisers in China to shape the Chinese revolution. To put this into perspective, it describes the position in which Sun Yat-sen found himself in Canton after his return there, and the actual state of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party early in 1923. Russian policy evolved and Russian influence unfolded gradually, and they met with opposition in both Chinese parties. While eager for Russian help, Dr. Sun was a strong-willed person of long revolutionary experience, who had spent a lifetime developing plans for China's betterment. His colleagues in the Kuomintang leadership were experienced Chinese revolutionaries. Though most of the Communist leaders were from the second revolutionary generation, a few had participated in the anti-Manchu movement and had long worked to improve China. Soviet advisers, relatively ignorant of Chinese conditions, tried to guide these experienced men in starting a fresh revolutionary movement in an unpromising political situation. Opponents of the policies the advisers advocated soon emerged, particularly regarding the policy of Communists joining the Kuomintang and working within it.

Yet both parties benefited by Russian assistance and advice. Dr. Sun did revitalize his party with the help of Borodin and a few Chinese comrades. His military academy was firmly established, and groundwork had been laid for a Party-controlled army. The Communist Party grew in membership and gained experience in the labor and peasant movements, both of which it sought to dominate. Communists tried to steer the Kuomintang leftward, as did Borodin. The seeds of conflict between the two parties, and within each of them, were well planted by 1925, as this chapter shows.

Dr. Sun's Return to Canton and His Difficulties

Dr. Sun was scheduled to sail for the South on January 27, the day after he and Joffe issued their Joint Statement, but he was unable to go because of a coup d'etat against his supporters in Canton on the night of the 26th. It took several weeks of negotiations before it was safe for Dr. Sun to return and resume the title of Generalissimo, but which commanders would obey his orders was problematic.[1]

He returned to Canton on February 21 after a cordial reception in Hong Kong, where he discussed finances with British and Chinese business leaders and addressed an enthusiastic audience of Chinese students at the university.[2] Back in his base, Dr. Sun faced difficult problems trying to organize a government without adequate funds and no real command over military forces. He tried to arrange a large development loan from British interests and to secure a few million dollars from Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong but was thwarted by the unstable military situation. In April, General Shen Hung-ying, with the backing of Wu P'ei-fu, tried to seize control of the city but was driven back in a month-long battle by a combination of forces cooperating with Dr. Sun and unwilling to give up their lucrative holdings. Shortly thereafter, a coalition of generals under Ch'en Chiung-ming tried to capture Canton from the east, while the Generalissimo tried to conquer General Ch'en's base

at Huichow (Waichow). This campaign went on intermittently during the summer and required much of Dr. Sun's attention. His armies demanded cash to go into battle. Millions of dollars were extracted from the city in the form of extra levies and the sale of public properties to finance these battles to hold Sun's base, which aroused much opposition in the Canton business community.[3]

In March 1923, the Russian leadership had decided to assist Dr. Sun's movement with advisers and financial aid. Adolf Joffe, still in Atami, telegraphed this good news for Dr. Sun on May 1. The telegram in Russian resides in the files of Hank Sneevliet, who had returned to Canton in late April. Joffe stated that he had received an answer from his government to the specific questions the two men had discussed personally, that is, in Shanghai three months before. "We" consider extensive ideological and political spade work to be "indispensable" as the basis of "your revolutionary military operations," and also the creation, as far as possible, of a centralized staff. "We are ready to lend your organization the sum of up to two million gold rubles for preparatory work on the unification and national independence of China." This sum could be spent in quarterly installments over one year. Russia would be willing to assist in the organization of a military force in northern or western China, but it could only give modest amounts of arms, the details of which Joffe specified. He proposed what seems related to Dr. Sun's Northwest scheme, the creation of a military school that would prepare "in a political and military sense" courses for a revolutionary army in the North and West. Joffe then enjoined secrecy, offered Dr. Sun assurance of "definite success," and wished him "speedy release from the present problems." He hoped to discuss the details with Dr. Sun in Canton, but in the meantime Sun could discuss matters with "Comrade Maring."

Dr. Sun responded on May 24, in a telegram requesting the first installment and stating his intention to reorganize his party "immediately," establish newspapers and journals in a number of cities, and develop propaganda among northern soldiers "soonest possible." He stated that a northwestern border delegation would come to Moscow to discuss organizing a military force. Sun also told Joffe, through Soviet Consul Vilde in Shanghai, that he had again given strong advice to delegates in Mukden for Chang [Tso-lin] to accept the Railway Agreement.[4] As discussed below, the delegation to be sent to Moscow for military consultations arrived four months later, headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other Communist leaders visited Dr. Sun in May. It was a particularly discouraging time for the Chinese Communist Party.

The Communist Party in Early 1923

According to the "Brief History," the incident of February 7, 1923, when generals of the Chihli Clique suppressed a strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway with military force, was a blow to the entire Communist Party and labor movement. It caused intense conflict among young Party members, some of whom blamed the leaders of the Central Committee, who, for their part, blamed the local committees for poor execution of their work (Doc. 1, p. 31). Behind the disaster were complex circumstances.

In the autumn of 1922, workers struck on a number of railways and mines in North China, demanding better wages and recognition of unions. Some strikes were settled by negotiation, others by military force. By the end of the year North China's railways had many union-like organizations at terminals, yards, and major stations, but they were heterogeneous in character and not closely linked. Communist organizers had established labor clubs at stations along the Peking-Hankow line, and the Labor Union Secretariat in Peking hoped to create a national federation of railway unions. As a first step the Secretariat intended to create a general union for the Peking-Hankow Railway, where its influence was strongest.[5]

Delegates of clubs along the line, many of the secretaries of which were Com-

munists, met at Chengchow, Honan, on August 10, 1922, and set up a preparatory committee; this met again on January 5 to finalize a constitution and set an inaugural date. They picked February 1 and selected centrally located Chengchow, where the Ping-Han and Lung-Hai railways cross, as the meeting place.[6] Plans were announced, invitations sent to representatives of other unions and to distinguished citizens, and the manager of the line assisted by giving various facilities. Shortly before the appointed time, delegates began to arrive.[7]

Suddenly, on January 28, the organizers learned that General Wu P'ei-fu had forbidden the meeting. He ordered the Chengchow commander to prevent it and instructed the chief of police to warn the organizers not to assemble. He also alerted the military governors of Hupeh and Honan and the Peking garrison commander, all members of the Chihli clique. The organizers sent a delegation to Loyang on the 30th to see General Wu, but he forbade them to hold the inaugural meeting at Chengchow as planned.[8] In this dangerous situation, some leaders advocated bowing to the general's orders and holding the meeting elsewhere, but others insisted upon the right to meet as planned and apparently swayed the majority.

On February 1 the delegates tried to hold a parade and the inaugural meeting but found Chengchow's streets filled with troops and police, who broke up the meeting, sealed the union's office, and even closed the restaurants where banquets were scheduled. Most of the delegates dispersed, but the leadership met secretly and determined to call a general strike on the railway on February 4, unless the authorities acceded to five demands.[9]

The ensuing tragedy of February 7 was the climax of an escalating conflict. We do not know General Wu's reason for suddenly forbidding the meeting, but reportedly he was suspicious that the union intended to call a general strike immediately after the Chinese New Year. This could cost him some $50,000 a day in railway revenues and might disrupt his military plans in the Yangtze valley. Hence his orders.[10]

The "Brief History," however, develops a theory of planned provocation. "Wu P'ei-fu, convinced that capitalist interests must be protected, forbad the convocation of the congress which he had previously approved. His action was clearly a direct provocation by him and the capitalists supporting him. They were well aware that the workers would regard such action as provocative and that the strike would thus assume a political nature, at which time drastic action could be taken in accordance with martial law. Subsequent developments justified their expectations" (Doc. 1, p. 7).

Since the strike was held, was then crushed, and many of the unions already formed were smashed, the suppression appeared, after the fact, to have been planned that way. The "Brief History" reasoned so in another statement: "When things first began to develop on the Peking-Hankow Railway, the masses were in a revolutionary frame of mind. The authorities were inclined to be tolerant and even sanctioned the convocation of a congress. Later, alarmed by the continuous advance of the labor movement, which threatened their own position, they determined to destroy it" (Doc. 1, p. 31).

The strike began on the morning of February 4, and by noon no trains were running on the line. Each branch of the union had an inspection corps which enforced the strike and protected railway property. At most places the course of events was similar: authorities attempted to persuade workers to go back and intermediaries negotiated, but the strike leaders held firm; then mounting frustration and conflict; finally suppression by military force. Suppression was particularly harsh at railway yards near the southern and northern ends of the line. At Chiang-an (or Kiang-an) near Hankow, more than thirty workers were killed, including several leaders executed, thirty-four were wounded, and over fifty arrested. At Ch'ang-hsin-tien, near Peking, three or four workers were killed by rifle fire and a score seriously wounded; later two leaders were executed, one a Peita student.[11]

The leaders of the strike tried to gain public support, and a few unions on other railways and in industrial enterprises in the Wu-Han cities mounted sympathy strikes, but all were quickly suppressed under martial law. Most of the leaders went into hiding or fled to Shanghai. According to Ch'en Ta, an outstanding authority on Chinese labor problems, the labor movement in the Wu-Han cities never really recovered until the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition arrived there in September 1926, so harsh and continuous was the repression.[12] In Peking the government, using martial law, prohibited distribution of agitation literature and closed down organizations created to gather relief funds, and it forbad alliances between students and workers. As a result of such restrictions the Labor Secretariat could no longer operate openly. Shanghai now seemed safer than Peking, and the Communist leadership decided to move back there.[13]

But in Shanghai, rival Kuomintang and Anarchist organizers concertedly attacked the Communist leadership of the strike and tried to drive their Party out of union activity. Repression forced the members of the Labor Secretariat to restrict their activities until it gradually ceased functioning.[14] Conceiving the Communist Party as the party of labor, its leaders discovered themselves losing influence among workers nearly everywhere. The "Brief History" summarized the situation: "In the one year following the Second Congress [July 1922], the Communist Party encountered difficulties in many ways and suffered a serious defeat, but it was able to escape total destruction" (Doc. 1, p. 32).

The Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

The tragic ending of the Peking-Hankow Strike was a blow to the leftist mood of the Communist Party, according to a recent Soviet historian. Hence, in the spring of 1923 contacts between the CCP and the KMT became more active. In March, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, after his return from Moscow and the Fourth Comintern Congress, visited Canton and established direct connections with Sun Yat-sen. Subsequently Ts'ai Ho-shen, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and other prominent Party activists visited Canton and obtained the possibility of conducting work legally in the territory controlled by Sun's government.[15] Furthermore, a number of important Communists joined the Kuomintang after the admission of the first few in September 1922. Among them were Chang T'ai-lei, a leader of the Socialist Youth Corps, who became a member of the Kuomintang Propaganda Department; Hsia Hsi and Liu Shao-ch'i, who then were sent by the Kuomintang back to Changsha to set up KMT branches; Chu Chi-hsün and Hou Shao-ch'iu, introduced by a KMT veteran, Shao Li-tzu; Liu Po-ch'ui (alt. Liu Fen), who became a KMT organizer in Hankow; and Teng Chung-hsia, the young labor organizer. Two members of Sun's party who joined the Communist Party were Lin Tsu-han (alt. Po-ch'ü) and T'an P'ing-shan. Lin introduced many Communists to join the senior party, and T'an became a member of Sun's propaganda organization.[16]

The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern of January 12, 1923, briefed in the previous chapter, had stressed that "under existing conditions it is expedient for members of the CCP to remain within the Kuomintang." Yet the Communist Party "must retain its own organization with its strictly centralized apparatus." These two instructions opposed, on the one hand, the continued resistance of some Communist leaders to the strategy of joining the Kuomintang and, on the other, the danger that the Communist movement might become submerged in the larger nationalist movement led by the Kuomintang.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's articles published in the spring of 1923 emphasized the need for the proletariat to cooperate with the bourgeoisie. In an article published in *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* on April 25, he reiterated China's need for a bourgeois-democratic revolution. He warned against romantic leftism, which he considered wrong because every

class revolution must be built on the capacity of that class; it could not be accomplished by romantic leftist concepts. At the same time he warned against rightist tendencies and criticized the Kuomintang for compromising with the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie.[17]

By late April 1923, Sneevliet was in Canton after his winter trip to Moscow.[18] In a report sent to the Comintern and Profintern on May 14, he wrote that if Sun stayed in the South, it would be possible to work legally in Canton. Sun, he said, had appointed Ch'en Tu-hsiu and another comrade as members of a propaganda commission, and they would be paid for their work by the KMT. He added, "Together with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, we have worked out a plan of the reorganization of the Kuomintang and we have discussed it with Sun and a few other leading members of the Kuomintang." In Peking Li Ta-chao had received from Sun a mandate to lead the work of the KMT group there. Sneevliet reported that Liao Chung-k'ai had, in Sun's name, asked him to help carry out the plans for reorganization. Sneevliet concluded that unless one radically changed the organization of the Kuomintang and the methods of its work, one could not expect much from that party.[19]

In his next report of May 31, Sneevliet wrote that Ch'en Tu-hsiu had prepared a project for the reorganization that had been discussed with Sun and later accepted by him. Propaganda occupied the central place, but Sneevliet expressed the fear that as long as Sun concentrated all his strength on the conquest of Kwangtung, the plan would be impossible to realize.[20]

The Communist Party held its Third Congress from June 10 to 19, 1923 in Canton.[21] According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, who attended the meeting, there were at least seventeen delegates with voting rights, representing more than four hundred Party members.[22] Our Document 1 contains an early account of this Congress with the benefit of original documents. The "Brief History" praises the Party leaders unreservedly, whereas most Communist accounts written after the disasters of 1927 blame the leadership for its errors. Document 1 lists with approval six more important decisions. The Communist Party was almost connected with the Kuomintang, it states, and this situation charged it with great responsibilities. The important resolutions were: (1) the CCP's activities should be centered on the development of the national revolutionary movement; (2) the CCP should recognize the KMT as the nucleus and leader of the national revolutionary movement; (3) CCP members should join the KMT; (4) the CCP should positively help in the creation and formal organization of the KMT as the political party of the great masses; (5) the CCP should help strengthen the KMT's influence among workers and especially peasants; and (6) the CCP should take the initiative in the reorganization of the KMT in order to transform it into a genuine political party. The Congress also put forward a "draft program" of eighteen points, a comprehensive and reformist approach to rectifying China's foreign relations, political system, public finance, education, judiciary, tax system, farm economy, and conditions of labor (Doc. 1, pp. 32-37).

Explaining the resolutions, the "Brief History" states that labor was incapable of independent struggle, and that the progress of its struggle depended on the development of the great national revolutionary movement. Hence the emphasis on the need to create a political party capable of controlling and directing that movement. The KMT problem aroused long debate. It was finally resolved that the KMT should have influence among the working masses, especially the peasantry, since the CCP could not win over the entire masses in the near future. Had the CCP resolved otherwise, the negotiations on amalgamation with the KMT would have lost their significance. The CCP, in fact, needed the KMT as a means of organizing and influencing the vast masses and of directing the national revolutionary movement. This statement is followed by the text of the Party's basic political program (Doc. 1, pp. 32-36).

Excerpts of the text of the "Resolution Concerning the National Movement and

the Kuomintang Question," adopted by the Congress, similarly explain that CCP members should join the KMT because the proletariat had not yet become strong. "We enter the Kuomintang but still preserve our organization. Furthermore, we must make an effort to absorb truly class-conscious revolutionary elements from various labor organizations and the Kuomintang Left, gradually expand our organization and tighten our discipline. . . . All revolutionary elements who understand the necessity of the National Revolution and furthermore have class-consciousness should as far as possible enter our organization. We must conduct widespread propaganda among the masses on the need to protect the interests of the laboring class in the National Movement."[23] The resolutions reveal what the Chinese Communist Party hoped to gain for itself by joining the Kuomintang. The Congress's decision that all members should join the other party and expand its influence among workers and peasants, especially the latter, constitutes a significant milestone in the evolution of the CCP's policies toward the KMT.

According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the new policies were contained in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's report to the Congress—his Theses. In the heated debate that ensued, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai supported Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ts'ai Ho-shen, and Mao Tse-tung were opposed. Chang proposed an amendment providing for the following points: The CCP should strengthen its leadership of the labor movement and expand its organization among workers; while the CCP should cooperate closely with KMT-led unions and KMT members in unions, Communist members among workers, with few exceptions, should not join the KMT; while the CCP could not obstruct the KMT's activities among workers or entry of workers into the KMT, it should not adopt the policy of positively introducing large numbers of workers to enter the KMT. His amendment was defeated by one vote, cast by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, apparently in the Resolutions Committee. Chang makes it clear that "Maring" (Sneevliet) was the prime mover behind the decisions of the Congress. Ch'en always harbored doubts about the correctness of the policy of Communists' entry into the KMT, according to Chang. The greatest difference between Ch'en and Maring concerned Maring's overestimation of the Kuomintang. To safeguard unanimity of policy within the Kuomintang and to promote Communist influence therein, Ch'en proposed the organization of a Communist Party fraction within the Kuomintang. The proposal was passed unanimously without discussion.[24]

Sneevliet's position has been reconstructed by Dr. Tony Saich on the basis of the Sneevliet archives in Amsterdam. These contain Sneevliet's notes on the Congress, which he attended, and his speech to the delegates. The notes present the positions of Li Ta-chao and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who supported Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and of Ts'ai Ho-shen and Chang Kuo-t'ao, who were Sneevliet's main antagonists. Chang was fearful that if the whole membership of the Communist Party were to enter the Kuomintang, Communist interests would be submerged. He particularly opposed leaders of the labor movement joining, for he believed the Communist Party should lead an independent labor movement and build a mass party of workers. It was unthinkable that Communists should lead the workers into the Kuomintang's labor movement, a point on which Chang received strong support.

In his speech to the Congress, Sneevliet defended himself and Ch'en Tu-hsiu against the charge that they wished to dissolve the Communist Party and that he, Sneevliet, worshipped the Kuomintang. He was particularly concerned that the delegates had not accepted the Resolution of the Comintern's Executive Committee—referring to the Resolution of January 12, 1923—and that the discussion had developed into disagreements over Communists joining the Kuomintang. He accused both Ts'ai Ho-shen and Chang Kuo-t'ao of ignoring the ECCI's formulation that the central task in China was the national revolution and hence that the activities of the KMT and CCP should be coordinated. The idea of an independent labor party was an

illusion, in Sneevliet's view, and derived from an overestimation of the Chinese proletariat's potential. Sneevliet defended Ch'en Tu-hsiu's theses as being the only correct formula for cooperation with the Kuomintang.

According to Sneevliet's notes, the vote on the issue of accepting Ch'en's theses went twenty-one to sixteen in Ch'en's favor, and so the theses were converted into "Resolutions Concerning the National Movement and the Kuomintang Question."[25] If the delegates were as divided as the vote indicates, the issue, it seems, really had not been settled.

One of the final acts of the Congress was to elect a new Central Committee. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, those elected were Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and Mao Tse-tung. As leader of the opposition, Chang lost his position on the Central Committee, being replaced by the thirty-year-old Mao. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was reelected party secretary, Ts'ai Ho-shen the propaganda chief, and Mao Tse-tung chief of the Organization Department, replacing Chang.[26]

The Congress issued a manifesto recognizing the Kuomintang as the central force of the National Revolution and expressing the hope that all revolutionary elements would rally around it. The Communist Party would always support the interests of workers and peasants, and its special task was to undertake organizational and propaganda work among the masses and lead them to join the National Revolution.[27]

On June 20, the day after the Congress ended, Sneevliet wrote the ECCI that in his opinion, for China to have a mass party made up of workers was utopia. If the Kuomintang did not exist, the Communists would have had to create a national party that would lead the revolutionary struggle. But since such a party did exist, he thought it was necessary to reorganize it and inoculate it with the anti-imperialist concept.[28] The newly elected Central Committee of the Communist Party decided, however, to move the Party's headquarters back to Shanghai as quickly as possible. This would make cooperation with the Kuomintang in Canton difficult. The Central Committee also decided to send a letter to Dr. Sun calling on him to give up his military campaigns and go to Shanghai to convene a National Congress. It would instruct local branches of the Communist Party to organize demonstrations in support of the demand for a National Congress. The Communist Party would also call a conference of workers' organizations as soon as possible.[29]

Sneevliet stayed on in Canton till near the end of July trying unsuccessfully to guide Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai in the reformation of the Kuomintang. We may speculate that his domineering personality did not endear him to Dr. Sun, who regarded himself as China's paramount revolutionary.

Further Initiatives by the Comintern

Three weeks before the Third Congress met, the Executive Committee of the Comintern prepared instructions for the meeting in the form of a detailed set of thirteen policy points, but since the directive did not reach China until the Congress was over, it had no bearing on its debates and resolutions.[30] Dated May 24, 1923, the directive did, however, influence later policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Incorporating an emphasis on the agrarian revolution which had emerged at the Fourth Comintern Congress of November 1922, its main thrust was the necessity to broaden the national revolution by aggressively preparing for agrarian revolt, and to reform the Kuomintang and make it the leader of a democratic anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front.

The directive opened with the assertion that the national revolution in China and the creation of an anti-imperial front would necessarily be followed by an agrarian revolution of the peasantry against the remnants of feudalism. Hence, to assure victory, peasants with small landholdings must be drawn into the movement. "Thus the

peasant problem becomes the central point of the entire policy"; to ignore this was to misunderstand the social and economic foundations upon which victory against foreign imperialism and the domestic feudal regime must be based. Therefore, the Communist Party must aim at an alliance between the workers and the peasants. It should continuously propagandize for confiscation of land of landlords, monasteries, and churches, to be given free to the tenants; abolition of starvation leases and the existing system of taxation; abolition of the mandarinate and creation of peasant self-government. The masses of peasant poor must be taught the necessity of struggle against foreign imperialism.

The prime duty of Communists was to turn the Party into a party of the proletarian masses and to gather them into trade unions. While maintaining the previous position that the central task for China is the national revolution against imperialists and their domestic feudal agents, "our basic demand of the Kuomintang must be its *unconditional support* of the workers' movement in China."

Though "we are supporting Sun Yat-sen" in the civil war against the northern militarists, "we require the Kuomintang to create a broad political national movement by means of systematic propaganda and agitation" to draw the broadest possible masses into the struggle against the northern militarists and foreign imperialism. The Communist Party must continuously influence the Kuomintang in favor of agrarian revolution, insisting on confiscation of land in favor of the poorest peasantry, thus to insure peasant support for Sun's revolutionary army. It must do whatever possible within the Kuomintang to prevent alliances between Sun Yat-sen and the militarists. To prevent this, the Communist Party must demand the earliest possible convocation of a Kuomintang convention to focus on creation of a broad national democratic front.

The directive then instructed the Chinese Communist Party to broaden its aims and increase its membership until it became a general anti-imperialist movement; to utilize the anti-Japanese boycott movement as an element in the struggle against the northern government; and to insist on the abrogation of treaties and agreements imposed on China by the imperialist powers. The Party must find means to draw together large strata of Chinese democracy in the anti-imperialist movement, first of all the Kuomintang and the organizations of revolutionary students.

While the Comintern leadership was sending instructions to the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet government was selecting representatives to work for the revolution in China. Colonel A. I. Gekker, who had been Adolf Joffe's military attaché in Peking and may have joined him in Shanghai for talks with Dr. Sun, was in Moscow selecting a team of young Russian officers for service in Canton. On June 21, 1923, five of them arrived in Peking—Alexander I. Cherepanov, Yakov German, Pavel Smolentsov, Nikolai Tereshatov, and Vladimir Poliak.[31] More significant decisions were the appointment of L. M. Karakhan, deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, to replace Joffe in negotiating a new treaty with the Chinese government in Peking, announced on July 27; and the selection of Michael M. Borodin (original surname Gruzenberg) as Russia's chief agent with Sun Yat-sen. Mr. Karakhan arrived in Peking with his party on September 2, and Borodin some days later.[32]

Controversy within the Socialist Youth Corps

The narrative presented in Document 1 has a gap between the Third Congress of the Communist Party and August 1924, but this is made up, in part, by Document 2, "Report on the Communistic Movement of the Youth in China." After its First Congress in May 1922, the Socialist Youth Corps had grown to a membership of about 4,000, and its members were active in instigating and guiding strikes, organizing trade unions, guiding the student movement, and in oral and printed propaganda. About the

middle of 1923, however, there was disagreement among Communists about joining the Kuomintang. The Corps attempted to evade entry. "Left" elements entered the more "left" corps, and there was a tendency to transform it into a party different from the real Communist Party, so Document 2 tells us. "The movement approached when the good points of the League [as it is termed] threatened to assume a very dangerous tendency" (Doc. 2, pp. 6, 9, 11).

Apparently this tendency was corrected at the Second Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps held in Nanking in August 1923. Centralization of authority and discipline were principal matters discussed. Details are unknown, but the Congress passed a resolution approving the decision of the Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, but with an amending proviso that "This entry must not cause the weakening of the independent work of the Party and of the League among the working class" (Doc. 2, pp. 7, 9).

Part of the text of a resolution that may embody this decision is available in a hostile source,[33] which quoted from a document published and distributed by the Corps' Central Committee on August 25, 1923. Entitled "Decision by the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Regard to the Report of the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," it states that the Corps will energetically assist the Communist Party to expand the Kuomintang organization all over China and will make extensive revolutionary propaganda among the laboring masses in order to enlarge the national revolutionary Kuomintang. But members, in joining the Kuomintang, should take their direction from the executive committees of the Corps at various levels, and these should take their direction from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Members in the Kuomintang should support what Chinese Communist Party members advocate and should unite with them in word and deed. The Corps should preserve its strict and secret organizational independence. The document then quoted from the "Resolution Concerning the National Movement and the Kuomintang Question," quoted above.

In spite of some disagreement between the Communist Party and the Youth Corps, according to Document 2, "experience proved . . . the expediency of the work of the Party inside the Kuomintang, and the League also began to work actively with the Kuomintang" (Doc. 2, p. 9).

A number of leaders of the Socialist Youth Corps did join the Kuomintang in 1923 and work within it even before the Second Congress. In France the Communist Youth Corps, with some eighty members, petitioned to join the Kuomintang, and this was granted on July 19, 1923, provided the members agreed to work under the Kuomintang's ideology. Chief among this group were Chou En-lai, Li Fu-ch'un, and Miss Ts'ai Ch'ang. Some members of the small Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Japan joined, probably also in 1923, and by the end of the year, according to the historian Li Yün-han, the majority of Youth Corps and Communist Party members had entered the Kuomintang.

Chiang Kai-shek's Mission to Russia

Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow in the summer of 1923. Chiang was then thirty-five years old and had been a somewhat irregular member of Sun's entourage. In June he was chief-of-staff of the Generalissimo's Field Headquarters, but he departed abruptly from Canton on July 14, leaving a letter intimating his wish to be sent on a mission to Russia.[35] This was quickly arranged, possibly on the basis of earlier talks between Sun and Sneevliet in Canton. On August 5, Chiang received Sun's instructions to meet with "Maring," who had returned to Shanghai, and with several of the most important Nationalist leaders, to plan his trip. The mission left for Russia on August 16; in addition to its leader, the group consisted of Shen Ting-i and

Chang T'ai-lei, two young Communists who were also members of the Kuomintang, and Wang Teng-yün, about whom little is recorded.[36] The party arrived in Moscow on September 2, the same day that Lev Karakhan and his party arrived in Peking to open negotiations with the government there.

In a letter to Karakhan dated September 17, Sun explained the purpose of Chiang's mission: "I have dispatched him to Moscow to discuss ways and means whereby our friends there can assist me in my work in this country. In particular, General Chiang is to take up with your government and military experts a proposal for military action by my forces in and about the regions lying to the Northwest of Peking and beyond. General Chiang is fully empowered to act in my behalf."[37]

This enigmatic scheme for Russian help to Sun's forces "to the Northwest of Peking and beyond" is explained by scholarship based upon Russian archives. Sun's plan was to create new military forces in Shansi, Western Manchuria, and Mongolia, and—with Russian help—to defeat Wu P'ei-fu's coalition in a drive on Peking. The Russians listened and asked for time to learn more about actual conditions in China, and then on November 11 gave a completely negative reply. "To begin military operations in the way stated in the submitted project would be an adventure doomed in advance to failure." E. M. Skliansky, deputy chief of the Revolutionary Military Council, lectured the delegates on the need for careful and prolonged organizational and political work among the masses, as well as military preparations. Only thereafter could large-scale military operations be undertaken successfully.[38]

The delegation also had another purpose: to develop closer relations between the Kuomintang and the leadership of the Russian Communist party. Members of the delegation and Comintern formed a commission to study the question, but nothing is known of its work. Chiang Kai-shek consulted several times with Sneevliet (now back in Moscow) and with Voitinsky, and he was invited to attend a session of the Comintern's Executive Committee on November 25. There he made a speech emphasizing that the Kuomintang, basing itself on Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, was the center of the revolution in the East; that its only enemies were the militarists dominated by imperialism; and expressing the wish that many Comintern leaders would visit China so as to understand the true situation there.[39]

Chiang's "Diary" pictures a growing disillusionment with Russia as a potential ally. He was first aroused by the attitude of Chinese students in Moscow, who he considered egotistical, subservient to the foreigners, and neither knowing about nor showing respect for the father of their country, Sun Yat-sen. Chiang also had futile discussions and correspondence with Soviet leaders over the issue of Russia in Mongolia. It was near the beginning of this disillusionment that Chiang learned, on October 25, in a telegram from Sun Yat-sen, of Borodin's arrival in Canton. Writing to Chicherin the next day, Chiang quoted from the telegram: "It has now been made entirely clear who are our friends and who are the enemies." Sun wished him to thank "the friendly government and party which sent their representative, Borodin, to Canton to aid warmheartedly and sincerely."[40] In his book *Soviet Russia in China*, Chiang reports that on his farewell visit to Trotsky on November 27, the revolutionary leader asked him to take a verbal message to Dr. Sun, saying, "Except direct participation by Soviet troops, Soviet Russia will do her best to help China in her National Revolution by giving positive assistance in the form of weapons and economic aid."[41]

The climax of Chiang's disillusionment came on November 28, the day before his departure, when he read carefully the text of a Comintern resolution on the Kuomintang, presumably the Resolution of the Presidium of the ECCI, "On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Kuomintang Party."[42] Perhaps Chang Tai-lei translated it for him.

The document begins with a statement that the national liberation movement in

China headed by the Kuomintang is now at the organizational stage. After its successful revolution against the Manchu dynasty, the Kuomintang failed to complete the destruction of feudalism mainly because it did not bring the broad masses of peasants and townsmen into the struggle but depended, rather, on military means against the reactionary agents of imperialism. The Presidium noted with pleasure that revolutionary elements in the Kuomintang headed by Dr. Sun now realized the need for a close union with the masses to expand the base of the revolutionary movement in China, and expressed its confidence that the three principles of the Party would henceforth be interpreted in new terms.

Nationalism would be seen as the struggle against world imperialism and its stooges, for China's independence, a struggle that must have the support of broad sections of the peasantry, workers, intelligentsia, merchants, and industrialists. For each, nationalism should mean abolition of oppression by foreign imperialism and domestic militarism. For the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie, nationalism means the development of national economy, but for the workers it will mean abolition of exploitation by both foreign capitalism and the native bourgeoisie. As imperialism is weakened, the Kuomintang should show that the masses are immediately given the possibility to strengthen their organizations to continue the struggle. Another aspect of nationalism should be *cooperation by the national movement of China with the revolutionary movement of nationalities oppressed by Chinese imperialism.* The Kuomintang should publicly advance the principle of self-determination of the nationalities inhabiting China, to be realized, after completion of the revolution, in a free Federal Republic of China, made up of the nationalities of the former Chinese empire.

The principle of *democracy* should not be regarded as "man's inborn rights," but as a revolutionary principle in the interests of the working people. Democratic rights shall be enjoyed by those people and organizations that support the struggle against imperialism but be denied to those that help foreign imperialism or their stooges in China.

The principle of "state socialism" should be interpreted to mean *nationalization of foreign firms, enterprises, banks, railways, and inland waterways*; it may cover Chinese national industries but cannot be interpreted to mean *nationalization of land by the state*. It should be explained to landless peasants that the aim is to turn the land over to those who till it after the abolition of the institution of landlords who do not work their land. The state should lighten the peasants' taxes and assist them with irrigation, land reclamation, and resettlement.

The Resolution declares that the working class in China is the only class whose interests are the same throughout the country and hence is bound to play an outstanding role both in national unification and in the anti-imperialist struggle for China's independence. The Communist International expresses confidence that the Kuomintang will seek in every way to release the energies of the working class by supporting its economic organizations and its class party—the Chinese Communist Party. Reciprocally, the Communist International recommends to the Communist Party, the working class, and the peasants to give all possible assistance to the Kuomintang because its struggle against imperialism and feudalism will help emancipate them.

Finally, the Kuomintang should realize the need to form a common front with the worker and peasant state of the USSR against the imperialists, and the need for closer contacts with the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in Japan and the national liberation movement in Korea.

Although Michael Borodin had already been in Canton for nearly eight weeks, these resolutions depicted the reformation of the Kuomintang and the direction of the Chinese revolution that leaders in Russia intended he should bring about. Borodin received a copy in Shanghai only on December 30, 1923.

Borodin Begins Work in Canton

Borodin arrived in Canton on October 6, 1923 with the mission of developing the Chinese National Revolution through the revitalization of the Kuomintang. He was to steer it along the directions laid down by Lenin and other theorists of the Communist International, and to guide the Chinese Communist Party in its cooperation with the Kuomintang during the bourgeois-democratic phase of the revolution. Borodin was an experienced revolutionary, thirty-nine years old, who had spent most of his adult years in the United States. In July 1918 he had returned to Russia and plunged into revolutionary work. He worked with Lenin and knew many governmental leaders well. He was active in the work of the Communist International, visiting Spain, Mexico, the United States, and England for organizational tasks. After he received the China assignment, he prepared himself by reading all he could find on that country, and he must have been well-instructed on Comintern and Soviet Foreign Office policy.[43] Borodin and Karakhan were to execute different aspects of a complex policy; they coordinated their work by correspondence and periodic visits by Borodin to Peking.

Lydia Holubnychy has given the most complete account available of Borodin's early work in Canton and his relations with Sun Yat-sen, based on Russian, Chinese, and Western sources. Here we give our own summary of the available information, which is by no means complete.[44]

Borodin brought a letter of introduction from Karakhan[45] and reported to his superiors on his first meeting with Sun Yat-sen. After the preliminaries, Dr. Sun "expressed the opinion that if he could stay in Central China and Mongolia he would be able to act quite freely with respect to imperialism. As regards Central China, everything depends on the success of the northward movement of his troops. He is also waiting for the result of the negotiations of his representatives in Moscow. Evidently he expects great things from these negotiations. The Mongolian base is very attractive to him. Mongolia, he said, offered great possibilities, first of all because in the north he has more followers than in the south. In Mongolia, with friendly Russia at his rear, he would be able to carry on a more open and effectual policy. For the present he finds it necessary to hold Kwangtung and therefore his army must be increased and strengthened. To do this he needs help, which, as he thinks, may be extended to him through Vladivostok. A direct steamer route from Vladivostok to Canton, not calling at Hong Kong, may be used to this effect. . . . Military supplies which are indispensable and which, owing to the blockade, cannot be received, could be brought from Vladivostok."[46] This report comes from the Peking raid and reflects closely Sun Yat-sen's hopes for Russian aid as they are known from other sources.

During the next few weeks Borodin met frequently with Dr. Sun and other Kuomintang leaders, trying to win their confidence. The main thrust of Borodin's early advice was the need to revitalize the Kuomintang and to develop a clear anti-imperialist stance. On October 25, Dr. Sun appointed a nine-man Provisional Central Executive Committee with five alternates, which would meet in Canton to draft a new Party program and constitution and to prepare for a national congress. He appointed Borodin the adviser to this committee, which held its first meeting on October 28.[47]

Borodin also worked with the Canton Communists. He had stopped in Shanghai and met Ch'en Tu-hsiu. On October 9 he sent a letter from Ch'en to Tam [T'an P'ing-shan], which informed him that Borodin was the representative of Russia. Two days later he met with T'an P'ing-shan, Juan Hsiao-hsien, and Fu Yun-yu, as well as with German and Poliak, the first two Russian military men sent to Canton to assist him. According to the minutes, Borodin told of his plan to reorganize the Kuomintang by the creation of a provisional national committee headed by Dr. Sun

and consisting of the most prominent members of the Kuomintang, Communists, Socialist Youth, and workers' unions. An executive and administrative committee of nine would organize provincial Kuomintang committees and subcommittees. The influence of the Communists would depend upon their activity. He stated that the plan had been discussed in Shanghai and in the Central Committee (presumably of the Chinese Communist Party). However, the Canton Communists were skeptical that the plan could be carried out.[48] At a meeting on October 13, Borodin was able to reassure the group that Sun Yat-sen and other prominent Kuomintang leaders would consent to the reorganization of the party "approximately as outlined in his plan." He advocated taking advantage of the Congress of the Kuomintang, meeting at that time, to carry on agitation for the reorganization. He was referring to a Kuomintang Fraternal Conference convened in Canton on October 10 and lasting for a week.[49]

Shortly after his arrival in Canton, where he represented himself as the head of a Russian trade delegation, Borodin gave a press interview in which he praised the potential of the Kuomintang, although he thought it had not yet organized itself sufficiently. Because the Party had Sun Yat-sen as its leader, Sun would be able to give it a spirit of militancy and a national organization so that it could "draw added strength from the mighty spirits of nationalism to which China is rapidly awakening." Borodin added that the most important condition for the development of the labor movement in China lay in its alliance with the national struggle for the unification, freedom, and independence of China, which "can be attained only upon the success of the struggle led by the Kuomintang party. So long as China remains in her present state of a semicolony, labor has no hope of ever achieving its aims."[50]

In a meeting on October 17, attended by the most prominent Communists, leaders of the Socialist Youth Corps, and labor union leaders, Borodin tried to reassure his listeners. "In the press I spoke of the Kuomintang, but to us it means I was speaking of the increase, in the end, of the influence of the Communist Party." While working for the stabilization of the Kuomintang, "it must never be forgotten that in reality the work is done for the stabilization of the Communist Party, which aim should always be kept in mind."[51]

A careful reading of Borodin's early reports from Canton and his public statements shows that he took pains to ingratiate himself with Sun Yat-sen by public flattery and to win his confidence in private conversation. He stressed from the beginning the necessity of reorganizing the Kuomintang to fashion it into an effective leader of the nationalist revolution, the success of which he assured his listeners. He held up Soviet Russia as the successful revolutionary model and linked the soviet governmental philosophy with the Three Principles of the People. And he strove to differentiate himself in the minds of Chinese from other foreigners whose acts had oppressed China. He had come to serve. Privately, he reassured Canton's Communist leaders that the interests of their Party were paramount.

Borodin's Effort to Launch a Radical Program

In the autumn of 1923, Sun Yat-sen's hold on Canton was precarious. In the third week of October the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming began an offensive that became menacing. By November 8 the Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung forces that supported Sun were in general retreat, and the next day the Generalissimo placed Canton under martial law because enemy troops had reached Shihlung on the railway only forty miles away. By mid-November it was uncertain whether Sun's forces could hold the city or whether he would be forced to flee.[52] During this crisis, Borodin urged a radical program to mobilize mass support.

On November 13 he met with a group of leaders of the Kuomintang's newly created Canton regional committees and urged that the Party issue two decrees and a

manifesto. One decree should promise land to the peasants through confiscation and distribution of landlord holdings, while the other should promise labor an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and other rights. The manifesto should explain to Canton's petty bourgeoisie how they would benefit from the higher living standards of the peasants and workers which these reforms would cause. Borodin argued that if these promises were immediately publicized to the peasants and workers, they would rally to the support of the troops fighting Ch'en Chiung-ming. Liao Chung-k'ai translated Borodin's speech and, according to Borodin's contemporary report, "it was, generally speaking, well received, especially by the ranks of the 'extreme left,' i.e., by Communists and the socialist youth. . . . My proposals were accepted unanimously and the meeting distributed the work among the regions. The members of the government went to the house of Sun to draw up the decrees."[53]

Borodin's effort to get a radical land decree failed. As he remembered the circumstances, Kuomintang leaders began to waver, and some went to Dr. Sun "to sabotage enactment of the decrees into law." On November 16, Borodin went to see Dr. Sun at his home in Honam. Sun did not object to the labor reforms, but there was strong opposition in the Kuomintang to the proposed land measures. After considerable bargaining, Dr. Sun agreed—according to Borodin's account—to a decree reducing land rent by 25 percent, and to another providing for establishment of peasant unions.[54] Even this reform was not carried out.

Borodin's proposal for land expropriation was in line with the Comintern Directive of May 1923 to the Chinese Communist Party, particularly in its emphasis on distribution of landlords' land to poor peasants to win their support for the Nationalists' armies. However, it was a form of social revolution much too radical for the Kuomintang at the time. In fact, opposition to Borodin's prescriptions was already emerging among Kuomintang leaders.

Opposition to Borodin's Influence

After Borodin and Liao Chung-k'ai had left for Shanghai toward the end of November to explain to Kuomintang leaders there the proposed reorganization of the Party, eleven members of the Kwangtung branch sent Dr. Sun a petition. The signers were influential persons, many with long Party affiliation.[55] They complained that the new system of Party organization and the drafts of the Party's constitution and program that had emerged under Borodin's direction had been decided upon previously by Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Communist Party. The motivator of the present cooperation with the Communist Party was, they charged, the Communist International in Moscow, whose policy was to stir up class struggle in capitalist countries to hasten social revolution, and to unite labor, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie in nascent capitalist countries to produce national revolution. They attacked Ch'en Tu-hsiu, charging that bringing his adherents into the Kuomintang was a plot to take it over, and they warned Dr. Sun that within five years Ch'en might be elected leader of the Kuomintang.

Sun Yat-sen rejected the criticism. The draft of the new constitution, he wrote, was "prepared by Borodin at my request and checked by myself. The original was in English and was translated by Liao Chung-k'ai. Ch'en Tu-hsiu had no part in this and no suspicion should be cast on him." The Russians, he said, had advised the Chinese Communists to join the Kuomintang and work in unison with it, explaining to them the importance of the Principle of Nationalism. "If Russia wants to cooperate with China, she must cooperate with our Party and not with Ch'en Tu-hsiu. If Ch'en Tu-hsiu disobeys our Party, he will be ousted." "The capitalist countries will never be sympathetic to our Party. Sympathy can only be expected from Russia, the oppressed nations, and the oppressed peoples. It was not Ch'en Tu-hsiu's but Russia's idea to befriend us." He warned against suspicion of Russia because of suspicion of

Ch'en Tu-hsiu.[66] This was only the first of several protests within Dr. Sun's Party over his new orientation.

Borodin's Draft of the Kuomintang's New Constitution

The constitution that Borodin drafted and Liao Chung-k'ai rendered into Chinese was published in the first issue of *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, dated November 25, 1923.[67] It was very different from the preceding Kuomintang constitution adopted in January 1923. The Party structure was entirely new, reflecting the structure of the Russian Communist Party/Bolshevik. There are also interesting similarities with the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party adopted at its second Congress in July 1922.[68] Borodin's draft was the model for the constitution adopted by the Kuomintang Congress in January 1924, but the latter contains significant differences.[69]

Borodin's draft describes a Party with five levels of organization—national, provincial, county, district, and subdistrict, the last being the basic unit for membership. An annual National Congress of Representatives elects a Central Executive Committee and a Central Supervisory Committee. Between congresses the CEC holds dominant power throughout the Party. It organizes central Party headquarters, appoints chief officers, and manages finances. Lower levels of the Party have congresses and executive committees also, but power descends, all lower organs taking their orders from higher ones. All members are under Party discipline; they must accept and execute Party decisions. For infractions they may be warned or expelled, but systems of investigation and appeal are specified.

A notable innovation is the system of Party fractions (*tang t'uan*), which operate in other organizations such as labor unions, clubs, merchant associations, schools, and municipal, county, or the national parliament. To increase Kuomintang power in such bodies, all members of a fraction must act in unison under instructions from the Central Executive Committee or a lower executive committee. Members of a fraction may debate strategy in their secret caucus but must show a united front once a decision is reached. Those who disobey will be punished. A Party member serving in an assembly shall prepare a letter of resignation from that body and deposit it with his Party headquarters; if the member commits a major infraction of Party discipline, the headquarters will publish the resignation letter.

In Borodin's draft, the National Congress has the power to elect the Party leader, who is the chairman of the Central Executive Committee. This is all that is said about the Leader, which may have led Teng Tse-ju and his colleagues to warn Dr. Sun that his position might not be secure. In the constitution adopted by the National Congress in 1924, a new chapter named Sun Yat-sen as Leader, made him chairman of the National Congress of Representatives and of the Central Executive Committee, and gave him veto power over the decisions of both.[60]

Reorganization of the Kuomintang, Late 1923

Sun Yat-sen sometimes made the claim that the Kuomintang had several hundred thousand members.[61] A report on party affairs made at the Party Congress in January 1924 said that at the end of 1922 membership "according to the system" had reached 238,000, "but there were many empty places." This seemingly meant that numerous roll books, each having space for one thousand names, were only partly filled.[62] Some of the 1922 membership was made up of entire labor unions, such as the Seamen's Union, and probably of military units as well.[63] Whatever the figures may have been in 1922, the registers for Canton and some fifty county branches in Kwangtung had been lost as a result of Ch'en Chiung-ming's revolt in June 1922. Hence in late 1923 the Provisional Central Executive Committee undertook a recruitment drive. In De-

cember there were only 1,023 registered members in Shanghai, one of the two main centers of the Party in China. By the time of the Kuomintang Congress in January 1924, Hunan had some 475 members, Canton had 8,218, and the rest of Kwangtung had 5,377. The registration for the whole of China was reported to be "more than 23,360," while there were about 4,600 members overseas.[64]

The Provisional Central Executive Committee appointed by Dr. Sun met twenty-eight times. Sun is listed as attending only three of the meetings and Borodin as attending four, though he may have attended more.[65] In preparation for a National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates, the committee determined how the delegates were to be selected (three for each province or major municipality to be appointed by Sun and three to be elected by the members); drafted a manifesto, Party program, and constitution; and prepared the agenda. It reregistered members and organized district and subdistrict offices in Canton; investigated conditions among farmers, workers, and the middle class; unified two propaganda organizations in the Generalissimo's Headquarters; and negotiated with various journals throughout the country to respond to the opposition press. It established a journal, *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, to crystallize opinion in the Party, explain revolutionary ideology, and publicize the true intent of the planned reorganization. It set up a school to train members of district and subdistrict executive committees, and drafted plans for a party press and propaganda school. It gave preliminary consideration to establishing a Party military academy. The committee also supervised the selection of delegates to the Congress from both China and abroad.[66]

In Shanghai, Liao Chung-k'ai and Borodin met with leading Kuomintang members to explain the reason for the reorganization, and the new five-tiered structure topped by a National Congress and a Central Executive Committee. Apparently Liao had to quiet some opposition.[67] On December 23, Borodin heard Hu Han-min and Liao defend the planned reorganization. He also attended a joint meeting of members of the Chinese Communist Party and the Socialist Youth Corps, where he explained the purpose of the alliance with the Kuomintang and the proposed reorganization. With this group, too, Borodin had to defend the plan. He assured the meeting that the reorganization was "being carried out in line with the plan worked out by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which is coordinated with the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth, and [then] presented to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang for discussion. Relations of the Communist Party with the Kuomintang are conducted in accordance with the decisions of the Comintern on the support of national revolutionary movements and with the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist Party of China."[68]

On December 30, while in Shanghai, Borodin saw the Comintern's November 28 resolution "On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Kuomintang Party," which sought to redefine Sun's Three Principles in Russian revolutionary terms. He wrote to Voitinsky that it seemed his entire work in China had been conducted in the spirit of the theses, and he expressed optimism that he could begin to influence prominent Kuomintang members accordingly in their attitude toward the political party and economic organizations of the working class. "So far as the latter is concerned, I pursued and am pursuing the policy of pressure from within. The more the Communists are active within the local organizations of the Kuomintang, the sooner will we secure such an attitude of the Kuomintang toward the Communist Party."[69]

While Liao Chung-k'ai and Borodin were still in Shanghai, the twenty-second meeting of the Provisional Central Executive Committee was held on January 3. Among other items of business was the decision on how to reply to a letter from the head of the San Francisco branch of the Party expressing his opinion about the planned reorganization of the Kuomintang. We may infer that the letter questioned

Sun's Russian orientation. The Provisional Committee decided upon the following reply. "The communist system introduced in Russia at the time of its revolution was different from our Party's Three Principles of the People, but now Russia has instituted its New Economic Policy, which is National Capitalism and the same as our Party's Three Principles of the People. Therefore it is not our Party which should study Russia but really Russia which should study our Party."[70]

Plans to Organize a Nationalist Military Force

Sun Yat-sen had long felt the need for a reliable military force to free himself from dependence on mercenary armies. One of the objectives of Chiang Kai-shek's mission to Moscow was to learn as much as possible about the organization and training of the Red Army. In Sun's first talks with his new adviser, he stressed the need to strengthen his army and his hopes for Russian military supplies from Vladivostok. On November 19, just after Ch'en Chiung-ming's threat to Canton had been turned back, the seventh meeting of the Provisional Central Executive Committee decided to organize a military training system with about ten instructors who would teach the cadets both Party ideology and military skills.[71]

In his meeting with the Central Cadre Council in Shanghai on December 9, Liao Chung-k'ai reported on the first steps to create the new military force. Some 600 men were receiving political education in the mornings—being taught, for example, that only the Kuomintang could reconstruct the country—and in the afternoons were being trained in the latest European military methods. In one year it was hoped to produce two divisions of a genuine Party army.[72]

Our Document 3, "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of Its Origin, Development, and Organization," gives a devastatingly unfavorable picture of the military forces nominally under the authority of Generalissimo Sun in the winter of 1923, as observed by the first Russian officers in Canton. They believed that only Sun's bodyguard of 150-200 men could be called a unit entirely subordinate to him. The account then categorizes other armies in Kwangtung. Some were led by old companions of Dr. Sun, nominally forming an "Allied Army," but their units were all independent possessions of the generals, who schemed to return to their own provinces after fattening on Kwangtung. In addition, the province was inundated by "petty armies," often no more than a hundred men. Each unit acquired its own finances. The higher officers were mostly ex-bandits with no military training, according to this account, which is somewhat misleading.[73] These officers turned everything over to the officers of middle or lower rank, who did have some military education. Many were opium smokers. Junior officers were mostly old soldiers, illiterate and without military education, but the task of training the soldiers and the burden of actual fighting fell upon them. A large percentage of enlisted men had served ten or more years, and many were sick. The local population was hostile because of their looting and marauding.

Supply was haphazard. Each commander collected taxes in the region where his army was quartered and treated the money as his personal property, spending as little as possible on his army. What he did allocate passed down through subordinate officers, each of whom kept a proportion for himself so that very little reached the soldiers. "Everybody was stealing, beginning from the commander of the army down to the company commanders." As a result, soldiers were ill-clad and underfed, their pay withheld for years. Their rifles were of various models and calibers, and provision of ammunition was unsystematic. Almost no attention was paid to rifle practice, and the soldiers did not know how to shoot (Doc. 3, pp. 1-5).

In sum, in the Russian officers' view, the fighting value of the army was virtually nil. This was the situation the few of them in Canton saw themselves confront-

ing in their assignment to assist the Kuomintang to develop an efficient military force.

The situation was indeed discouraging. In the territories in and around Canton and along the North River and West River districts there were the following autonomous "armies" in late 1923, as well as many lesser bands: four Yunnan armies under generals Yang Hsi-min, Fan Shih-sheng, Chiang Kwang-liang, and Chu P'ei-te; the Kwangsi Army under Liu Chen-huan; the Hunan Army under T'an Yen-k'ai and another mixed force under Ch'eng Ch'ien; a Kiangsi force under Li Ming-yang; various Kwangtung divisions and brigades theoretically commanded by Hsü Ch'ung-chih, who was then in Shanghai; a Cantonese force on Honam Island under the ex-bandit Li Fu-lin; a Honan force under Fan Chung-hsiu, also a former bandit; and a peace preservation force, the Gendarmes, under Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. The total force in the vicinity of Canton may have numbered between 30,000 and 40,000, although the Russians' report used the figure of 150,000—"on paper."[74]

Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Canton about the time the Kuomintang Congress of Delegates was convened on January 20, 1924, though he was not a delegate. On the 24th Dr. Sun appointed him head of a preparatory committee to plan for the establishment of a military academy. The site chosen was Huang-p'u (hereafter Whampoa) on the island of Ch'ang-chow, about ten miles south of Canton, where earlier provincial military and naval academies had existed. After attending one meeting of the committee, Chiang left Canton in disgust on February 21, not to return until April 21 when plans for the academy were nearly complete.[75] The committee met thirty-two times, laying down organizational principles, preparing the site, selecting staff, and recruiting and examining students. In Chiang's absence, Liao Chung-k'ai acted as head of the committee.[76]

Document 4, "Regulations of the Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton," is an early set of regulations for the academy, which may have been drawn up by the Preparatory Committee. It describes the proposed staff much as we know it from Ch'ien Ta-chün's reminiscent account.[77] There is one important difference. The first of the General Rules states that the Generalissimo is the chief principal of the school, and rule 15 states that there is an assistant chief, who is second in command. Rule 17 spells out the subordinate relationship.[78] But in fact, when Chiang Kai-shek finally returned to Canton, Dr. Sun "especially appointed" him principal of the Army Officers Academy on May 2.[79] He was not second in command.

Document 4 is valuable for its considerable detail concerning the principal officers of the academy and their duties, rules for cadets, nature of the curriculum, political training both for officers and for cadets, and its regulations concerning expenditures, system of paying officers and cadets, and the auditing of accounts. A notable point about the staff is the designation of a chief of the Political Department, subordinate to the assistant chief and, according to his instructions, in control of the political life of the school (Rule 17b). An appended handwritten note at the end of the document states that "All orders of the assistant chief of the school must be signed by the chief of the Political Department." If he "refuses to sign any order of the assistant chief of the school, this order must be considered by the Generalissimo and the president of the Kuomintang Party." This, of course, reproduced the principle underlying the political commissar system in the Red Army. However, we do not know who added this postscript and on what authority.

Student applicants began arriving in Canton even before preparations had been completed. On February 10 the preparatory committee allocated quotas for admission from various provinces, making a total of 313, in addition to some 30 to 50 provisionally recruited. In some provinces recruitment would have to be done secretly.[80] An issue of the Kuomintang weekly for February 24, 1924 carried an invitation to Party members in each province to nominate fifteen young men in middle school or

graduates of higher primary schools, ages eighteen to twenty-five *sui*, to come to Canton to take the entrance examinations for the military school. If accepted, the cadets would be paid 10 yuan a month plus food and lodging, and on graduation they would become soldiers or corporals and must put in one year of service in the army for each two months in the school. The candidates must be patriotic and of good character. Each should write an essay stating why he wished to serve the country. The next issue, for March 2, announced regulations for the examination and selection of the cadets.[81]

In Shanghai, which would be one of the major recruitment centers, Wang Ching-wei reported to the local Central Executive Committee on March 13 that the maximum enrollment at this time would be 150, with a minimum of 120. The group appointed five veterans, Hsieh Ch'ih, Yü Yu-jen, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Teng Yen-ta, and Tai Chi-t'ao, to read examination papers and decide on who would fill the provincial quota. Those who passed would have their expenses paid to Canton.[82]

Document 3 gives a brief account of the founding of the Kuomintang's military school at Whampoa. The school's mission was to train junior officers with a good political education, who could be sent into units of the various generals to assist in "army reorganization from below," or, when the government was financially able to create its own force, the cadets would serve as cadre for new units organized according to new regulations. The document states that "The school was organized by us in 1924, and at first it was maintained at our expense" (Doc. 3, p. 5).

There is considerable confirmation for the latter statement. Sun Yat-sen telegraphed Chiang on February 29 that the problem of finances had been settled, though he did not say how. Nor did Liao Chung-k'ai, who telegraphed him on April 3, saying rather sarcastically, "As to funds for the military academy, I will not ask about disbursements and you will not ask about their source. There is no lack of funds, and [you] can proceed to administer with peace of mind."[83] Borodin told Louis Fischer in 1929 that the Soviet government made a grant of three million rubles for the organization of the school and its initial running expenses.[84] More recent Russian studies make it clear that Borodin regularly subsidized the Whampoa Academy, and by October the monthly subsidy may have been 100,000 Canton dollars.[85]

Kwangtung taxpayers also probably helped to support the Kuomintang's military academy. Chiang Kai-shek's "diary" states that on May 22, which was after the opening of the school, the Financial Commission decided to allocate $186,600 (silver) from the Provincial Finance Office for costs of establishing the school, while the initial monthly expenses of $30,000 would be contributed by four financial offices.[86]

The National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates

The National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates was convened in Canton on January 20, 1924, with 196 delegates appointed or elected and 165 present on the opening day. In general, three were appointed by Dr. Sun and three elected from each of twenty provinces and four major cities, and there were a few named delegates from the borderlands. There were about forty representatives of overseas communities and three specially appointed women. About twenty delegates were members of the Chinese Communist Party as well as the Kuomintang.[87]

In his opening address, Sun Yat-sen called attention to two important points: organization of the Kuomintang as a strong and effective Party, and utilization of the Party's strength to rebuild the nation. As he pointed out, the latter was not a new idea; for years he had advocated Party government in view of the chaos in China. Now, however, he realized it was too early to speak of Party government. The first duty of a revolutionary Party, Sun declared, was to build the nation. The Chinese Revolution had thus far failed because the Kuomintang's strength had been scattered.

The most important thing about a political party, he said, was the need for every member to be imbued with a cooperative spirit. Party members must sacrifice their individual freedom and contribute their total capabilities to the Party.[88]

His new orientation effected significant changes in the Party's professed ideology, influenced, it clearly seems, by Borodin and the more radical leaders of the Kuomintang. There are clear echoes of the ECCI resolution of the previous November 28, which Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai had translated into Chinese. This echoing is particularly evident in the reinterpretation of the Three Principles of the People, expounded in the Manifesto of the Congress, which was passed on January 23.[89] The most striking innovation was the new emphasis on anti-imperialism in the Principle of Nationalism. The Party had two principal objectives: (1) freedom and independence of the Chinese people and (2) equality of all peoples or races within the Chinese Republic. Primary importance was attached to the former, however, as is evident in the following passage: "To whatever class, the meaning of nationalism is none other than the elimination of imperialist aggression . . . to the majority of the people, the objective in the struggle for national liberation is none other than anti-imperialism." The manifesto denounced imperialism as the source of all of China's afflictions. Chinese militarists, the chief target of attack in earlier Party pronouncements, now occupied only the second spot as conspirators allied with imperialists.

While the new stress on anti-imperialism stemmed partly from Sun Yat-sen's disillusionment with the West, Communist influence is clearly discernible. The Communist Party, in accordance with Comintern policy, had raised the slogans of anti-imperialism and antimilitarism in a manifesto issued in July 1922, denouncing imperialists as the principal enemies of the Chinese people and accusing Chinese militarists of being their tools. Specifically, the Chinese Communist Party accused Britain of supporting Ch'en Chiung-ming against Sun Yat-sen in Kwangtung.[90] The "Brief History" states that the CCP decided to take up the most pressing problems with the Kuomintang and build them up as slogans of the day—"Down with imperialism!" and "Down with militarism!"—when it began collaboration with that Party in 1922 (Doc. 1, pp. 28-30). In contrast, in a KMT manifesto issued on August 15, 1922, before his new orientation, Sun Yat-sen had made no adverse mention of imperialism in describing Ch'en Chiung-ming's coup of June 16, 1922.[91] Yet the Kuomintang's anti-imperialist policy was foreshadowed in the manifesto on the "First Reorganization" issued on January 1, 1923—after the admission of a few Communist leaders into the Party. In this, the Kuomintang chastised the Manchus for sacrificing national rights and signing unequal treaties with the Powers, thus reducing China to the status of a colony. It advocated revision of the Unequal Treaties to recover China's position of equality and independence in international relations.[92] In the Party Program of January 1924, the Kuomintang went a step further and pledged to abolish the Unequal Treaties.

Anti-imperialism was linked also with the Principle of Democracy. The Kuomintang advocated direct exercise by the people of the rights of election, initiative, referendum, and recall, and it advocated division of the government into five branches according to Dr. Sun's concept of the five governmental powers. Echoing the November 28 Comintern resolution, the Party now declared: "Only truly anti-imperialist individuals and organizations may enjoy all rights and liberty. All those, whether individuals or organizations, who betray the country and the people and who owe allegiance to imperialists and militarists are barred from the enjoyment of such rights and liberty." The democratic representative system was criticized: the so-called democratic system in various countries was often monopolized by the bourgeoisie and transformed into an instrument of oppression against the common people, the Party declared. The democracy championed by the Kuomintang, on the other hand, was the joint possession of the common people and not the property of a minority.

Distrust of the representative system of government bolstered the theory of political tutelage, envisaged early by Sun Yat-sen as a transitional stage between the military period of struggle to establish a republic and the final stage of constitutional government. During the period of political tutelage, power was to be wielded by the Party while it prepared the people for constitutional government. In January 1924, the theory was fortified by new stress on Party centralization. All means should be used to educate and train Party members as revolutionary elements. Propaganda must be disseminated nationwide so that the people would join the revolution to seize political power and suppress their enemies. Upon seizure of power and establishment of a government, political power was to be exercised by the Party to forestall counter-revolutionary movements within the country, to deal with imperialist conspiracies against the Chinese people, and to eliminate all obstacles to the execution of the Kuomintang's principles. Only an organized and powerful Party was capable of carrying out such tasks for the benefit of the entire people, the manifesto declared.

The most important provisions of the Principle of the People's Livelihood, according to the manifesto, were equalization of land and regulation of capital. These were long-held ideas of Dr. Sun. The new element, distinguishing this from the manifesto of a year before, was the concept of the function of the masses in the National Revolution. Anti-imperialist sentiment of poor peasants and workers was particularly strong because of their hard living conditions, the Kuomintang averred. Victory in the national revolutionary movement therefore depended on nationwide participation of the peasantry and labor. The Kuomintang should lend its total strength to help develop the peasant and labor movements in order to strengthen the forces of the national revolutionary movement. It must also demand that peasants and workers join the Kuomintang and struggle ceaselessly to promote the national revolutionary movement. The Kuomintang's struggle for national liberation, declared the manifesto, was supported by intellectuals, workers, peasants, and merchants—reflecting the Communist analysis of the Kuomintang as a political party representing various classes.

If one compares the Resolution of the Presidium of the ECCI of November 28, 1923, "On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Kuomintang Party," which Borodin brought back to Canton, with the Manifesto of the Kuomintang passed on January 23, 1924, the similarities are striking. Nevertheless, the strong Russian influence met with resistance in the Kuomintang, and Sun Yat-sen was a man with strong ideas of his own.

Borodin has left an account of his difficulties in getting so radical a manifesto drafted and presented to the Congress.[93] He tried hard to have included a specific statement on expropriation and redistribution to tenants of lands of large and absentee landowners as well as a clear statement of the Chinese Nationalist movement's united front with Soviet Russia. He was unsuccessful in persuading Dr. Sun, who feared to alienate wealthy Chinese supporters and to arouse the antagonism of England and France, according to Borodin. On the day the Congress was to vote on the manifesto, Dr. Sun considered withdrawing it and substituting a milder program he had drawn up for a national government, and which the conservatives at the Congress would not find objectionable. Representatives of overseas branches of the Party, officials, merchants, and landowners were doing everything possible to persuade Dr. Sun to give up the prepared manifesto, according to Borodin. He used all his powers of persuasion to get Dr. Sun to back it. Finally Dr. Sun decided to go ahead, presided over the meeting at which the manifesto was debated, and cast the first vote in its favor.

Opposition to Communists in the Kuomintang

Another issue was the admission of Communists into the Kuomintang, a central point in Comintern strategy. On January 24, a delegate from Shanghai, Ho Shih-chen, pro-

posed to the committee studying the draft of the new Party constitution that a rule be added to forbid any Kuomintang member from belonging to another party. The Communist members then held a caucus to decide how to meet this challenge. They chose Li Ta-chao and two members to prepare a statement.[94] On January 28, when the constitution was voted upon, Fang Jui-lin of the Canton city delegation proposed an amendment to prohibit dual party membership. In response, Li Ta-chao presented a statement explaining and defending the position of Communists in the Kuomintang.[95] They joined, Li said, in order to contribute to the Kuomintang and not to use its name to promote Communism, and they joined as individuals, not as a party. The Communist Party was a branch of the worldwide Third International, he explained, and since the present revolution was both national and worldwide, the Communist members served as a link between the Kuomintang and the Third International. Theirs was an open and upright action and not a secret plot, Li assured the delegates; he begged them not to harbor suspicions but to let the future show whether or not the Communists were completely loyal to the National Revolution and the Kuomintang. After considerable debate the amendment was rejected and the issue was settled—temporarily.[96]

The Communist delegates, nevertheless, were in an anomalous position. While their spokesman professed that they were not a party within the other party, they did form a "fraction," a group that met secretly to unify their strategy in trying to steer the Kuomintang and direct the National Revolution.

On the last day of the Congress, Sun Yat-sen proposed a slate for the Central Executive Committee, and it was elected by a show of hands. Scattered among the veterans of the Kuomintang in the twenty-four-member slate were three Communists, T'an P'ing-shan, Li Ta-chao, and Yü Shu-te. Among the seventeen reserve members of the CEC, seven were Communists: Shen Ting-i, Lin Tsu-han, Mao Tse-tung, Yü Fang-chou, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Han Lin-fu, and Chang Kuo-t'ao.[97] There were none among the five members and five alternates in the Central Supervisory Committee, a sort of censorate. Communists gained a strategic foothold in the Kuomintang when the CEC appointed T'an P'ing-shan as head of the KMT's Organization Department, the most important central organ. He was also one of the three members of the Standing Committee of the CEC, together with Liao Chung-k'ai and Tai Chi-t'ao. Among the seven other departments, Lin Tsu-han was appointed head of the Farmers Department.[98]

After the initial CEC plenum, most members dispersed to various centers to take up the work of building provincial and low-level organizations. Communists were particularly strong in the Peking group, with five out of twelve, and in Shanghai, with three out of ten. However, they had no strength in the Szechwan, Hankow, or northern borderlands groups, and only two out of thirteen in the Canton group. With the Kuomintang Congress out of the way, the Canton group had to begin nearly from scratch to create bureaus of the central headquarters and appoint staff; to supervise reorganization of party branches in other major cities and even in counties near Canton; to lay plans for the women's movement, youth movement, labor movement, farmers' movement, and national propaganda work; to establish party units in various armies, schools, police, and labor unions; and to create the long-planned party military academy. Sun Yat-sen, on the advice of Borodin, started giving weekly speeches that became the final version of his *San Min Chu-i*.[99]

Communist Work within the Kuomintang, Spring 1924

During the months after the Congress, the Communist Party concentrated on creating as many local KMT cells as possible and increasing their membership. In February 1924, the Central Committee, at its Second Plenum, adopted "Resolutions on the Na-

tional Movement" as a practical guide for the organizational work of the CCP within the Kuomintang.[100] The national movement must constitute the main task of the Party at present. Broadening the KMT's organization and rectifying its political errors must be the main task of the movement since a large political party able to work openly was essential. The resolutions paid special attention to broadening the mass base of the KMT by appealing to workers and peasants as well as merchants, shopkeepers, apprentices, and students. Communists should, on the basis of Sun's nationalist ideas, "force the KMT to propagate and take measures to strengthen the anti-imperialist movement."

Why cooperate with the Kuomintang? the resolutions asked. Because under present economic conditions, China must pass through the national revolution of the People's Livelihood, which is the Kuomintang's mission. Since that Party's organization and discipline were lax, its members could not complete the National Revolution speedily; hence, the Communist Party had decided that its members should join the Kuomintang and encourage it to fulfill its task. Though not entirely satisfied with the results of the Kuomintang Congress, Communists should not categorize those members who were cool toward them as "Rightists" nor treat them disrespectfully, as this would only create a Right faction. The correct strategy was to try to convert the Right into a Left and not adopt an attitude that would drive the Left to Right. Communists must serve strenuously in the Kuomintang to demonstrate cooperation, but they must find ways to guide its meetings and work. In any Kuomintang organization, the Communist members must carefully discuss methods of work for that body and educate comrades in correct procedure. Communists should constantly propagandize the Kuomintang's new manifesto and not permit that Party's members to disregard it. In selecting personnel for work in the other Party, care must be exercised to pick competent and suitable Communists so as to earn the Kuomintang's respect and trust.[101]

Two of the resolutions were later called to Sun Yat-sen's attention.: "(7) Hereafter in all propaganda, publishing, people's organizations, and other concrete movements related to the National Revolution, our party should use the Kuomintang name and do it as Kuomintang work. We can thereby conserve energy and talent, cause the Kuomintang to change and develop, and concentrate and enlarge the effect of our efforts. But in matters which we recognize as essential and in which the Kuomintang is unwilling to use its name, we will still do them as our Party's individual activity."

"(8) Naturally, while developing the Kuomintang organization, we may not arrest the development of our own Party's organization. But when we introduce new persons into our Party we should select them very carefully. No one who does not thoroughly understand our Party's ideology, strategy, and discipline, nor earnestly desires to take up the duties of our Party, should lightly be drawn into membership. If we draw in many weak elements, not only will the Kuomintang misunderstand our purposely drawing away its members, but it will cause our Party organization to grow lax and confused."[102]

The Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Corps held an enlarged plenum from March 22 to April 1, 1924 and accepted the resolutions of the Communist Party's Central Committee plenum. It also passed resolutions on strategy in local work, such as concentrating in the Canton labor movement on seamen and railway workers; in Shunte (the county south of Canton) on trying to become the heart of the future farmers' corps; in Shanghai on influencing the Student Federation by working through the Kuomintang Youth Bureau. A resolution on the attitude of Youth Corps members in the Kuomintang cautioned against creating unnecessary conflict or competing for high-level positions. Instead, members should strive to induct farmers, workers, and middle school students so as to increase the number of revolutionists

and expand proletarian power in the Kuomintang.[103]

According to a recent Russian scholar who used Comintern archives, members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International became concerned that such concentration on organizational work in the Kuomintang threatened the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party within the larger body. The ECCI decided to take immediate measures to correct this "deviation" and entrusted the task to Gregory Voitinsky, who had arrived in China in April 1924 as the Comintern's agent with the Chinese Communist Party.[104] Voitinsky, however, found this concern unwarranted. In a letter dated April 24, he wrote, "Among our comrades one cannot even see a trace of 'fraternizing' with the members of the Kuomintang, and, on the contrary, the more they deal with the Nationalists, the more they feel an ideological alienation from these elements."[105]

The Communist Party's Central Committee held plenary meetings in Shanghai from May 10 to 15, in which Voitinsky participated. This Third Plenum adopted a "Resolution on Communists' Work in the Kuomintang," which condemned a tendency toward Rightist deviation, apparently the trend the ECCI had feared. It stated that the emphasis should be on propaganda work within the Kuomintang; Communists should strive to become actual leaders of the KMT Propaganda Department. The plenum recognized that a struggle between Right and Left in the Kuomintang would become inevitable and worked out tactics in respect to this struggle—to strengthen the KMT Left.

In its "Resolutions on the Trade Union Movement," the plenum demanded the creation of "fighting-ready trade unions of purely class character" for the vanguard units of the Chinese proletariat—railway workers and miners. Communists should not aid the Kuomintang to permeate the ranks of the industrial proletariat organizationally "since that would be the crudest mistake." The Kuomintang might be assisted, however, in its organization of artisan and salesmen unions. The plenum proposed that the CCP place its members in the Kuomintang Labor Department in order to influence the unfolding of the class struggle and to create an all-worker front.[106]

The plenum also condemned the Leftist deviation which demanded that the Communist Party break with the Kuomintang. Chang Kuo-t'ao, who attended the meetings, states that many of the participants were anxious about the Communists' dual Party membership but, realizing that this was a policy firmly maintained by the Comintern, were unwilling to debate the issue once more. He says the important decision of the plenum was that a small number of CCP members should undertake practical rather than routine work within the KMT, that is, leadership of mass movements. The majority should concentrate on work with the broad masses of workers, peasants, and young intellectuals in order to develop their own Party—i.e., the Chinese Communist Party.[107]

Li Ta-chao journeyed to Moscow in June 1924 to head the Chinese delegation to the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, meeting from June 17 to July 8. In a speech to the Congress on July 1, he clearly stated the basic policies of his party at this time. After giving nine examples of imperialist aggression against China in the preceding year, Li stated:

> Our party believes that in a semicolonial country like China, a national revolutionary movement, led by a single centralized party which could unite all mass activities, must be launched. That is why members of our party and the Young Communist League, in accordance with the instructions of the Comintern Executive, joined the Guomindang Party on an individual basis, in order to reorganize it, change its program, and arrange matters so that a bond would be forged with the masses. Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang's "left" wing decided to reorganize the party along the lines we suggested, and its

reorganization in January 1924 made a profound impression on the Chinese people. . . .

In conclusion, I would like to say that the main objective of our work in the Guomindang is to arouse the masses' revolutionary spirit and direct it against world imperialists and domestic militarists. Working within the Guomindang, we are winning over the "left" wing and in this way accelerate the growth of the wave of revolution. Although the onset of reaction has made the growth of the working-class movement more difficult, workers' organizations in the North are still in our hands. In the South, especially in Canton, Guomindang has some influence among workers, but our tactic there is to come to the leadership of the workers' movement in order to make it the revolutionary vanguard.

The Chinese Communist Party's forces are insignificant. Its front lines are extended, because it has to lead the workers' movement and the national movement simultaneously. All this time we have been conducting our work in accordance with the resolution on the united front against imperialism adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress. We hope that the Fifth Congress will pay special attention to the Chinese question and give the Chinese party instructions on its future work.[107a]

Conflict within the Kuomintang over Communist Activities

The CCP Central Committee's perception of an emerging struggle between radicals and conservatives within the Kuomintang leadership was well founded. Two Shanghai members of the Kuomintang's Central Supervisory Committee, Chang Chi and Hsieh Ch'ih, were shown the copy of the Youth Corps journal that contained resolutions of the Corps and of the Communist Party on strategy and tactics for the work of their members in the Kuomintang.[108] Thereupon Wang Ching-wei and Chang Chi called on Ch'en Tu-hsiu and confronted him with evidence. They particularly objected to the formation of CCP and SY fractions within the Kuomintang and stated that Hu Han-min and Hsieh Ch'ih also opposed this. As Ch'en told Chang Kuo-t'ao shortly after the discussion, these important Kuomintang leaders considered the practice of fractions within their Party to be a violation of Li Ta-chao's statement to the recent Congress asserting that Communists joined as individuals and not as a Party within the other Party. Though very embarrassed, Ch'en Tu-hsiu replied that the fractions were organized to insure that comrades abided by Kuomintang decisions and worked actively; there was no intention to struggle for power or do anything harmful to the Kuomintang. This interpretation did not satisfy Wang and Chang Chi. The whole difficulty, Ch'en told Chang Kuo-t'ao, resulted from the policy of joining the Kuomintang. To abolish fractions would mean to dissolve the Communist Party within the other organization, which could not be permitted; yet the Kuomintang could not approve of Communist fractions within their Party. He saw no way out of the dilemma.[109]

The focus of Kuomintang resistance to Communist penetration now shifted to Canton. On June 1, Sun Fo, Dr. Sun's son and the mayor of Canton, and Huang Chi-lu, both of the city's Party Office, proposed to Central Party Headquarters that it restrict Communist agitation.[110] Chang Chi and Hsieh Ch'ih went to Canton to impeach the Communist Party before Sun and other Kuomintang leaders. On June 14, Hsieh Ch'ih offered a draft report to the Central Executive Committee. After reading it, Dr. Sun asked that the matter be deferred until the return of Borodin, who was expected back soon from a visit to the North.[111]

On June 18, Teng Tse-ju, Chang Chi, and Hsieh Ch'ih of the five-man Central Supervisory Committee, placed a formal "Impeachment of the Chinese Communist

Party" before the Leader and the Central Executive Committee. They quoted passages from the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the Second Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps, which stressed their revolutionary goals in joining the Kuomintang, instructed their members to be united within the other Party, to maintain organizational independence, to steer the Kuomintang toward Russia, and to recruit the best elements into their own organization. They next quoted from the Youth Corps journal some of the resolutions briefed above, which were all dated later than Li Ta-chao's profession at the Kuomintang Congress that the Communist Party had no ulterior motives in joining. They also quoted, without source, an instruction to all Communist Party and Youth Corps members in the Kuomintang, without regard to position, to advocate that the Peking Government recognize Soviet Russia and sign the agreement negotiated between C. T. Wang and Karakhan.

The impeachers said that they did not oppose membership in the Kuomintang of Communists and Socialist Youth Corps members, but they considered it entirely improper that there should be a party within the Party. They particularly objected to attempts by Communist fractions to convert Kuomintang publications to their own propaganda as, for example, in pressing the theory that "the National Revolution of the bourgeoisie is not the final revolution." In a supplement, the accusers pointed to the number of Communists in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee holding important positions; the fact that the two parties had, in reality, formed a joint front for work among students, youth, women, workmen, and farmers; and to the anomaly that the majority of officers sent out on Kuomintang business were Communists. Fearing for their Party's future, Teng Tse-ju, Chang Chi, and Hsieh Ch'ih requested the Central Executive Committee to come to a fundamental decision.[112]

The principal issue was thus the existence of Communist Party fractions within the Kuomintang, which in its new constitution described the KMT system of fractions in other organizations. This subject took a prominent place again in the conversation on June 25 between Borodin, Hsieh Ch'ih, and Chang Chi, with Sun Fo serving as interpreter. Borodin sought to defend the Communist Party fraction by stating that the Kuomintang was dead; the entrance of new elements such as Communists, organized in fractions, might stimulate the competitive spirit of the Party's old members and thus revive the Kuomintang. He hoped that the struggle between the Right and Left in the KMT would produce a centrist group as the center of the Party. If the Kuomintang were to be transformed into a Communist Party, Borodin said, he would oppose it and leave Canton. But he made the price for Russian cooperation clear; Communists must remain in the Kuomintang, yet keep their separate organization.[113]

The issue was finally resolved in favor of continued membership by Communists within the Kuomintang. The practice of Communist fractions continued. On July 3, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee decided to issue a manifesto setting forth its attitude, to convene a plenum of the CEC, and to request Sun Yat-sen to decide. The Political Program and Manifesto of the Kuomintang Congress should serve as the standard: All members who showed revolutionary determination and sincerely respected the Three Principles of the People should be Kuomintang members, no matter to which faction they had previously belonged; but all who violated the Manifesto and Program should be treated according to regulations.[114] On July 7 the KMT issued a manifesto explaining the reason for admitting Communists into the Party and confirming the CEC's criteria for membership.[115]

Sun Yat-sen appointed Borodin adviser to a new Party organ, the seven-man Political Council, which he created (probably at Borodin's suggestion) to advise on important political issues.[116] This gradually became the most important organ in the Party, but one not mentioned in the recently adopted constitution. Borodin felt uneasy about the conflict within the Kuomintang. In a report dated July 15, 1924, he stated

that a sort of unification was taking place between the Right and Left, including Sun Yat-sen, with regard to relationships with the Communists. With few exceptions all the leaders would struggle against them except that they feared the total isolation of their Party. This fear forced the so-called Leftists to restrain the Rightists from taking decisive measures against the Communists, in Borodin's opinion.[117] "Isolation" no doubt meant loss of Russian support.

Many Communists were restive, but Borodin and Voitinsky insisted they remain within the Kuomintang. According to V. I. Glunin, Voitinsky argued that it was the CCP's duty to organize the masses and to force the Kuomintang to turn to the masses, hence they should try to influence the Kuomintang both from within and from without. Borodin did not consider the problem so critical that it was necessary to prepare for a possible break. Members of the Communist Party's Central Committee were divided on the issue, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ts'ai Ho-shen, and Mao Tse-tung advocating a break, while T'an P'ing-shan and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who were both in Canton, supported Borodin's position. The head of the party, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, wrote to Voitinsky demanding that the Comintern work out a new policy. He contended that "we should not support the Kuomintang without any conditions and limits, but [should] support only those isolated spheres of its activity which are in the hands of the Leftists, for otherwise we are supporting our enemies." Without waiting for the Comintern's reply, the Central Committee sent a closed "Circular Letter No. 15" to all district committees of the Party and to all cells, directing them to prepare for a break. The letter was signed by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Mao Tse-tung.[118] The break came only three years later, however.

The Communist Issue Temporarily Settled

Thus some leaders in both parties opposed the Comintern's policy of having Communists work within the Kuomintang. The issue was temporarily set to rest by decisions of the new Kuomintang Political Council, endorsed by the Second Plenum of the Central Executive Committee. The plenum took up the issue on August 19, 20, and 21. Twenty-one regular or alternate members attended, and Chang Chi and Hsieh Ch'ih were on hand to present their arguments. Six among the group were Communists, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai acted as their spokesman. Although the debate was heated, the members of the plenum looked to Sun Yat-sen for the decision.[119] It came in the sixth meeting of the Political Council on August 20, which adopted resolutions on "The Problem of Communists within the Party" and "The Problem of Liaison Between the Kuomintang and the World Revolutionary Movement." The latter was a scheme to set up a three-man committee with one Kuomintang member appointed by the Leader, one Communist, and one representative of the Communist International. It would supervise Communist activities that were related to the Kuomintang.[120] Both resolutions were adopted the next day by the Central Executive Committee and became Party policy. Thereafter Kuomintang members were informed by an "Instruction on Questions Relating to Admission of Communists."[121]

The Instruction reaffirmed the policy of admitting Communists and credited their party with special responsibility for the proletariat within the Kuomintang, which itself struggled to benefit all classes. Essentially setting aside the charges made in the impeachment, the Instruction recognized the need of the Communist Party for secrecy and explained the plan for an International Liaison Committee to solve this problem. It exhorted the comrades to cooperate with each other to complete the National Revolution.

The "Brief History" informs us that the [KMT CEC] plenum solved completely the problem of the Party's entrance into the Kuomintang, raised the morale of disheartened Communists, and inspired and heartened the Party (Doc. 1., pp. 37–38). It

was another victory for Comintern policy and for those in the Kuomintang who formed the emerging Left Wing.

Attempts to Unify the Southern Labor Movement

Canton was a progressive city, and movements to organize labor and improve working conditions had a long tradition there. Labor organizations were of many sorts, traditional and modern: monopolistic craft guilds, benevolent societies to aid workers, associations to encourage modern industry, and unions of seamen, railway workers, mechanics, and factory workers. Several labor federations existed in Kwangtung, such as the Kwangtung Mechanics Union, which listed unions among engineers, electricians, mechanics, and foundrymen; the Seamens Union, with headquarters in Canton and branches in Hong Kong and other southern ports; and the Kwangtung General Labor Union, which in 1922 supposedly embraced sixty-eight unions in Canton. Several Kuomintang associates of Sun Yat-sen were labor organizers, such as Huang Huan-t'ing, Ma Ch'ao-chün, Ch'en Ping-sheng, and Hsieh Ying-pai, while a number of younger Cantonese radicals who joined the Socialist Youth Corps and the Communist Party also had begun to work with labor, including T'an P'ing-shan, T'an Chih-t'ang, Feng Chü-p'o, and Yang P'ao-an.[122] In 1924 the two parties, though superficially united in the National Revolution, were rivals for control over the labor movement in the South.

After the close of the Kuomintang Congress, the Central Executive Committee established a Labor Bureau in Central Party Headquarters, placing Liao Chung-k'ai in charge. The secretary of the bureau was Feng Chü-p'o, a Cantonese intellectual who had early joined the Communist Party and had served as the local representative of the Communist Labor Union Secretariat in 1921-22. He had also been a member of Sun Yat-sen's propaganda apparatus in 1923. His earlier efforts to penetrate the Mechanics Union had earned the suspicion of more conservative labor leaders.[123] Since Liao was exceptionally busy with many official duties, much of the work of the Labor Bureau fell to Feng. To complicate matters, the Canton Municipal Kuomintang Headquarters had a Labor Bureau under Ch'en Shu-jen, which was a center of opposition to Communists.[124]

During March 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang discussed plans for organizing a Conference of Canton Workers' Delegates as an effort to unite the fragmented labor movement under the Kuomintang banner. Delegates should be elected from communications workers, factory workers, handicraftsmen, and other groups, each having a federation of unions. A conference of delegates would then elect a Central Executive Committee to manage the labor movement.[125] Another CEC meeting discussed plans for setting up lowest level Kuomintang units (*Ch'ü fen-pu*) for workers on the Canton-Hankow Railway, in the Arsenal, and for Canton seamen, all to be under the Kuomintang's Canton Municipal Headquarters.[126] At a third meeting, Liao Chung-k'ai presented the Labor Bureau's plan to organize discussion meetings among Canton workers. The Kuomintang was to organize speaking corps within each union to explain its ideology. Apparently these propagandists were conceived of as being in a structured organization holding its own general meetings every three months.[127]

Kuomintang plans to unify and convert labor presumably led the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Corps at its plenary meeting toward the end of March to instruct the comrades in Canton to "beg admittance to the Kuomintang's labor unification movement and, under the Kuomintang banner, guide labor into the struggle for national revolution as well as economic struggles." Yet the Socialist Youth Corps in Canton was also instructed that, in its own work, it should concentrate on the Seamen's Union, the "Worthy Workers' Union," and the Canton-Hankow and

Canton-Kowloon railways. "ZY cells" should be expanded as rapidly as possible on the Canton-Hankow Railway, while the Young Workers Supplementary School in the Arsenal should be used to create cells among arsenal workers.[128]

Liao Chung-k'ai planned a Labor Day rally for May 1, to stimulate the labor movement and draw it closer to the Kuomintang. All unions in Canton were invited to participate, and there was a very large turnout. Sun Yat-sen made a long address in which he tried to direct Chinese labor away from class struggle and into a struggle against foreign economic privileges in China. By organizing, they would achieve equality with native capitalists.[129]

Following a rally there was a week-long conference of Canton workers' delegates, designed to set up a strong central organization. This was not easy, for many of the union leaders declined to participate. The resolutions adopted by the conference reveal the difficulties—how to bring workers into larger unions, how to amalgamate unions, and how to govern unions and confederations. Complicated procedures suggest the rivalries that had to be accommodated. The conference leaders hoped to create industrywide unions of all workers in the telegraph system, all hands on river boats, and all employees on the three railways leading from Canton, and then to confederate these. The government was asked to set up schools for workers, which should be managed by the Executive Committee of the Conference of Canton Workers' Delegates, as the new organization was called. The head of this committee was to be the head of the Kuomintang Labor Bureau, that is, Liao Chung-k'ai.

Another resolution demanded that the government forbid merchants' corps from mixing in union business, punish corpsmen who harmed workers, and require compensation. It should forbid workers from joining merchants' corps and should permit them to organize self-defense corps of their own.[130] Soon after the conference, T'an P'ing-shan was appointed head of a small workers' corps (*Kung-t'uan chün*). It was armed and drilled.[131] The "labor army" and the Canton merchants' corps had a sanguinary clash on October 10, as described below.

A conference of Transport Workers of the Pacific, organized by the Red Trade Union International, met in Canton in June 1924 with representatives of secret railway unions in North China and leaders of some Canton unions, as well as a few seamen from the Philippines and Indonesia. Voitinsky, the Comintern's representative in China, came to Canton to attend as did Leo Heller, a Profintern official. The resolutions that concerned China indicated a Communist intention to bring railway workers, seamen, telegraph and telephone operators, postal employees, and electricity workers into a single federation under their own Party's control.[132]

On June 19 an Annamite revolutionary, Pham Hong Thai, attempted to assassinate the governor-general of French Indochina, Martial Merlin, who was attending a dinner in his honor at the Victoria Hotel on Shameen. Though the governor-general escaped injury, five guests were killed and twenty-eight persons wounded, and the bomb thrower drowned as he fled the scene.[133] As a consequence the British and French authorities planned to impose security measures that would require each Chinese entering the concession after 9 p.m. to show a pass bearing a photograph of the individual. Liu Er-sung, a Communist labor leader, is credited with organizing a very successful strike which began July 15 to protest the regulations. It lasted until August 19. All Chinese employees of consulates, banks, and stores, house servants, and Chinese members of the police force left Shameen, and strike pickets guarded the bridges leading to the island to prevent any Chinese from entering without passes issued by the Strike Committee. A "People's Association Against the Shameen Regulations" gathered funds to support the strikers, and at least twenty-six unions allied themselves with the strike. Slogans denounced the Unequal Treaties, foreign control of customs, and other grievances that were part of the anti-imperialist theme being pressed both by the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.[134]

The strike was settled by a compromise among the parties. As it turned out, the strike was a dress rehearsal for the great Hong Kong-Canton strike of a year later. Precedents were the Strike Committee under the Kuomintang Labor Bureau, which coordinated the effort, organized pickets, gathered funds, and distributed relief.[135] The Canton government pretended to a neutral position as mediator between the Strike Committee and the Shameen authorities. In its anti-imperialist character the strike won support of patriotic Chinese both at home and abroad.

Liao Chung-k'ai was not successful in unifying the Canton labor movement under the Kuomintang banner, although the Party's political influence within the working class grew. Old union rivalries persisted. Conservative organizations such as the Mechanics Union opposed the influence of Communists within Dr. Sun's party. The Communist Party competed for control over the growing labor movement.[136]

Beginnings of the Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung

In the 1920s Kwangtung had a population of 30 to 35 million, with the heaviest concentration in the south-central delta, along the three main rivers that flowed into it, and in the Han River valley in the east. Though Kwangtung was one of China's most urbanized provinces, it had a vast farm population living in thousands of villages. Most of these were single or multilineage agglomerations—clusters of families descended from common ancestors. Each lineage was knitted together by religion, custom, and traditional law. They were usually dominated by "elders," well-to-do and relatively well-educated men of affairs—"the gentry" in Western parlance. Custom gave them considerable power, and they represented the village in its political relations with the outside world. They were also likely to manage the lineage's corporate property, which supported the ancestral temple and provided some benefits to the needy in the lineage. In villages with several lineages one usually dominated, and there might be intense interlineage rivalry.

Competition was the rule of life in rural Kwangtung. Agriculture was favored by a salubrious climate and was highly commercialized in areas near the large urban concentrations. Yet Kwangtung could not support its rural population by farming and ancillary occupations. Many adolescents went to cities to work, and many young males went abroad for a life of toil. Some emigrants made good in Southeast Asia or the Americas and were able to remit money home, which boosted family income and contributed to social differentiation among village residents. Migrants who did well abroad and then returned might build ostentatious houses, invest in farmland to rent, and move into the local elite. In addition to the landowners who lived on rents, a village might have owners operating farms, part owners/part tenants, exclusively tenants, and hired farm laborers. Larger villages would have workers in service trades—carters, boatmen, builders, carpenters, water carriers, shopkeepers, peddlers, servants, among others. The population of rural Kwangtung was a mosaic of the well-to-do and powerful, the adequately provided, the struggling poor, and the impoverished. Yet the poor and rich were linked in common lineages.

The province probably had as high a proportion of its farmland under tenancy as any other in China, but there were great variations in tenancy practice. Tenancy was often but not necessarily linked to poverty. Much depended on the size and quality of the land being cultivated and the labor power the tenant could muster. Still, 50 percent or more of the main crop and various forms of service customarily went to the landowner. In times of bad harvest, a landlord could be lenient or demanding, depending on the personal relationship between him and his tenant. Good land for rent was scarce; tenants were the eager ones.

Power and privilege were enforced in many ways. Kwangtung was a turbulent province. Interethnic warfare and interlineage feuding were endemic. Wealthy villages

fortified themselves, and many, perhaps, most, villages kept permanent contingents of guards. Banditry and piracy were widespread, as were rival secret societies. Many parts of the province were much fought over by extraprovincial militarists. Throughout rural Kwangtung, as in all of China, local toughs and enforcers sold their fighting ability. They guarded lineage villages from outside interference and "protected" markets and gambling establishments, taking a "cut." In short, they fitted the old name for them: "local bullies" (*t'u hao*). Local defense corps, *min-t'uan*, were often manned by such mercenaries. *Min-t'uan*, the lowest level of officially recognized military forces, were used to uphold "peace and order" and were normally organized and directed by men of prestige in larger lineages. Another group in rural Kwangtung, as elsewhere in Chinese society, were the *lieh-sheng*, "evil gentry." They were men on the fringe of the local elite, displaying the externals of the Confucian moral code, but involved in various rackets such as controlling access to irrigation water and forcing farmers to purchase "water certificates." The connection was often close between "local bullies and evil gentry" and the underworld of bandits, pirates, gambling protectors, smugglers, and other exploiters.

Yet the mix of conditions varied from region to region. In the southeast there was a long-standing and periodically violent feud between Red Flags and Black Flags, organizations manned by farmers. The Triads were strong in the delta counties, and the Big Sword Society was strong in the mountainous north and west. The Small Sword Society could muster hundreds of villages in counties north of Canton. There were alliances for mutual protection among villages of common surname and between several surname groups. Some gentry-led associations united *hsiang*, the lowest territorial units within counties, and there were so-called self-governing societies, local merchant associations, agricultural associations organized by reformers, and credit societies organized by farmers.

Kwangtung's tightly knit and conservative social structure, its many forms of organization, its commercialized agriculture and high level of tenancy, the poverty and grievances of the exploited, and endemic violence made up the soil into which the farmers' movement was to be planted.

Sun Yat-sen had long advocated "Land to the Tillers," but neither he nor his Party had done much to bring about this slogan. The Chinese Communist Party, in both its First and Second Congresses, mentioned the need to organize the poor peasantry, but the Party's true concern was the urban proletariat. In discussing the political program adopted by the Party at its Second Congress in July 1922, the "Brief History" mentions only vague legislation on the peasant problem: "Abolish the *likin* and other abnormal taxes and levies, substituting for them a consolidated income tax; enforce fixed land rents" (Doc. 1, p. 24). The "Decisions" of this Congress devoted a long section to organizing labor, some space to work with youth and women, but nothing specifically to organizing the peasantry.[137]

The Comintern began to pay serious attention to agrarian revolt in the Orient at its Fourth Congress in November-December 1922. Its General Thesis on the Oriental Question stated: "(3) Only agrarian revolution, which has as its task the expropriation of large landholdings, is capable of arousing huge peasant masses, which are destined to exert a decisive influence on the struggle with imperialism. . . . The revolutionary movement in backward countries of the Orient cannot succeed unless it is based on the actions of the broad peasant masses. Therefore, the revolutionary parties of all Oriental countries are obliged to define clearly their agrarian program. . . . In order to draw into the struggle for national liberation the peasant masses it is necessary to force the bourgeois-nationalist parties to the largest degree possible to adopt this revolutionary agrarian program as their own."[138] The Executive Committee of the Comintern followed this up in May 1923 with specific instructions to the Chinese Communist Party in preparation for its Third Congress: The Party was to draw in the

peasant masses and press forward with preparation for an agrarian revolution. According to the "Brief History," the Third Congress spelled out a few more points for legislation that would benefit peasantry (Doc. 1, pp. 35-36).

Some time later, policy in respect to the peasant movement was placed under the control of the Communist Party rather than under the Socialist Youth Corps.[139] The Corps could claim some credit for work with peasants in the years 1922-23. A reference to this in Document 2 states that the Corps directed the peasant movement, which began to carry on armed struggle against Ch'en Chiung-ming (Doc. 2, pp. 9-10). This referred to the work of an outstanding Corps leader, P'eng Pai, who, during 1922 and 1923, organized tenant farmers in his native Hai-feng *hsien*, east of Canton, under the patronage of Ch'en Chiung-ming and with the help of other radical youths in the Socialist Youth Corps.[140]

Borodin, as we have seen, attempted to persuade Sun Yat-sen to adopt a radical land program during the military crisis of November 1923, and again during planning for the Kuomintang reorganization. The manifesto adopted by the Kuomintang Congress emphasized the importance of drawing the peasantry into the revolution—a new development in the Party's ideology. After the Congress, the Central Executive Committee set up a bureau to work with farmers and appointed Lin Tsu-han, a Communist, as its first head, though he was replaced in April by a non-Communist, P'eng Su-min.[141]

Work began slowly. On February 20 the Central Executive Committee decided that the Farmers Bureau was to do research on farmers' conditions, consider methods for organizing farmers and mounting a movement, call a conference of farmers and arrange for the Kuomintang to represent them, and publish a farmers' journal in cooperation with the Propaganda Bureau.[142] On March 19 it approved plans for separate associations of self-cultivators, tenants, and hired laborers, to help members of these groups against mistreatment by officials, landlords, and employers, respectively. Borodin had left for Peking on March 8, so he was not available to offer advice. The CEC also planned to set up farmers' guards and a variety of educational programs for farmers. Kuomintang offices at the county, district, and subdistrict level were to be responsible for the work.[143] Shortly thereafter, P'eng Pai, who had been driven from Hai-feng because of the radicalism of his movement, became secretary of the Kuomintang Farmers Bureau. He became a power within the movement as it developed.[144]

Planning came into focus in June. The Kuomintang issued a proclamation on June 19 outlining a simple plan for organizing farmers into associations (*nung-min hsieh-hui*), which were to be completely independent, and were permitted to organize guards recruited only from their own members and to be used only in the defense of their own villages. The basic level of organization was to be the *hsiang* association made up of twenty-five or more farmers, none owning more than 100 *mou* of land (about 16 acres). Certain undesirable types were excluded but the earlier concept of separate class organizations was omitted. Ultimately there were to be associations at five levels, corresponding to those of the Kuomintang. The government promised to assist and guide the movement so that China's farmers would reach a position of self-governing independence.[145]

The KMT Central Executive Committee also authorized the appointment of twenty special deputies who, under the direction of the bureau, were to go into the field to investigate, propagandize, and organize farmers' associations. To prepare them, a Farmers' Movement Training Institute should be set up.[146] The first class of the institute began on July 3 with P'eng Pai as its director. Students received both theoretical and practical training, including ten days of military drill. Thirty-three graduated on August 21, and Sun Yat-sen gave a speech on the importance of their work. He cautioned them against fomenting rural class struggle: all classes should

unite in the revolution. Twenty-four of the graduates were appointed as special deputies to organize farmers' associations in Canton suburbs and nearby counties.[147] Lo Ch'i-yüan directed the second class of the institute, which had an enrollment of 225, though only 142 graduated from the two-and-a-half-month course on October 30, 1924.[148]

Thus, during the initial phase there was a bureau of the Kuomintang in charge, with a very small staff; a school for training organizers; and some 175 graduates, many of whom were in the field hoping to show farmers how to organize. Farmers' associations were to be united into countywide, provincewide, and then national organizations, and the associations were to be autonomous, under the control of neither the government nor the Kuomintang. It was still a reformist program.

The Communist Party, however, intended to control the movement. In a frank bit of history a Communist writer, probably Lo Ch'i-yüan, relates how his Party organized itself to direct it. After January 1924, "we used the name of the Kuomintang Central Farmers Bureau" for work and opened the Farmers' Movement Training Institute. At this time, the account continues (referring to the summer of 1924), a Farmers Committee (*nung hui*) was organized in the Party—that is the CCP—"to direct the Kuomintang Central Farmers Bureau." The account then states that this committee directed not only the bureau but also, after they had been set up, the Provincial Farmers Bureau, the Provincial Farmers Association, various local farmers' committees, and the special deputies.[149] Elsewhere the report states that 99 percent of the special deputies were "comrades."[150] Two other writers, who were in a position to know the facts, state that only Communist applicants were permitted to pass the entrance examination for the first class of the institute.[151]

The "soul and spirit of the movement" in Kwangtung, in the words of an impartial observer, were Lo Ch'i-yüan, P'eng Pai, and Juan Hsiao-hsien.[152] All had been early recruits into the Socialist Youth Corps in Kwangtung and now were members of the Communist Party as well as the Kuomintang.

Organizing of farmers' associations began in Canton suburbs and in nearby counties. An official report states that by September 1924 some forty-seven associations had been created, including five county associations.[153] By April 1925 the five adjacent counties had a reported ninety-one associations with 10,890 members, the Canton suburbs had eleven associations with 1,500 members, and Dr. Sun's native county, Hsiang-shan, had fifty-eight associations with 8,000 members.[154] These membership figures clearly are estimates. They represented a tiny fraction of the rural population in the areas under jurisdiction of the revolutionary government.

In two other regions Communist organizers had greater success. In Kwang-ning county northwest of Canton on the border of Kwangsi, graduates of the Training Institute, led by P'eng Pai, succeeded after a protracted struggle in organizing tenant farmers and overcoming their landlords—in most cases persons of different lineages—in a rent-reduction battle, with military help from Canton.[155] Then they were able to create many new farmers' associations, reportedly 294 by April 1925, with nearly 55,000 members.[156] The second area of great success was Hai-feng county, which was captured during the Eastern Expedition in February 1925. P'eng Pai returned to the *hsien* capital on February 28 and quickly revived the movement, which had been suppressed a year before.[157] By April it was reported that Hai-feng had 70,000 members and neighboring Lu-feng had 12,000, both obviously estimates, with the number of associations unspecified.[158]

A great deal of conflict accompanied the movement to establish farmers' associations that would protect their members against oppression, mobilize them to resist some new tax, or set tenants against landlords in a rent-reduction movement. The outside organizers could scarcely penetrate the villages. Men of power and property frequently set *min-t'uan*, or simply hired toughs, against the new associations. Some

organizers were murdered and some villages burned. In some regions farmers fought back, sometimes supported by troops, as in the two most successful areas.[159] It was not the peaceful solution that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had urged.

Efforts to Improve the Nationalists' Military Position

Document 3 gives an analysis of political trends in Kwangtung about mid-1924 as affected by the increasing radicalism of the Kuomintang after its reorganization. Within the party, it says, merchants of the compradore class and large landowners went over to the Right Wing in opposition to Dr. Sun, whereas democratic elements created the Left Wing, which the Communist Party joined. As a result of Dr. Sun's anti-imperialist policy, including his support of the Shameen strike, relations between Canton and Hong Kong became more strained. The activity of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang made the difference between city and village ever more evident and drove the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners into opposition to the government and its measures. Hong Kong, it alleges, gave active support to this opposition, both to the merchants' volunteer corps and to Ch'en Chiung-ming. For its part, the government had almost no support in the province because of the "arbitrary and licentious acts" of so-called government troops, which undermined its authority even among those classes upon which it tried to rely (Doc. 3, p. 3).

It would be a formidable task to unify the heterogeneous forces that garrisoned the area nominally under the authority of the Generalissimo's government and to reshape them into an effective revolutionary army. Some of the steps necessary would be to centralize revenue collection and payment of troops, centralize arms procurement, provide standardized military training, indoctrinate officers and troops in a common ideology, and finally to create a unified and effective command structure. These were difficult measures to carry out, given the military government's slender resources in money and personnel, its dependence upon the commanders themselves, and the fact that unification ran against the particularistic interests of those officers and their top lieutenants.

One device was to give local military commanders important functions within the Kuomintang. Toward the close of the National Congress, Dr. Sun chose General T'an Yen-k'ai and General Yang Hsi-min to be members of the Central Executive Committee and generals Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Liu Chen-huan, and Fan Chung-hsiu as reserve members of the Central Supervisory Committee.[160] These men were commanders respectively of the Hunan, Yunnan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Honan forces within Kwangtung. On March 15, 1924 the Central Executive Committee appointed them to organize Party cells in their armies, and also generals Chu P'ei-te, who commanded a separate Yunnanese unit, and Lu Shih-t'i, in command of the centrally controlled Third Corps.[161]

Periodically Dr. Sun, as Generalissimo, tried to persuade the "guest armies" to permit his headquarters to collect all taxes and distribute military pay and provisions equitably. In March 1924 he issued strict orders on the unification of Kwangtung finances, forbidding army officers to collect taxes directly. However, generals Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan paid no attention, and this led to an angry confrontation and Sun's threat to quit Canton, which had no effect on their appropriation of revenues.[162] The Generalissimo's Headquarters was one of many competitors for Kwangtung tax revenues. Its largest source of funds seems to have been the Canton municipal government, of which Sun Fo was mayor.[163]

A great difficulty in creating an effective military force was arms procurement. The Shih-ching Arsenal could produce only twenty-five to forty rifles per day, as well as eight machine guns and 700,000 to 900,000 cartridges a month.[164] But the arsenal was run like a commercial enterprise: it sold arms to whatever general could pay

for them. Full production could not be carried on because some equipment imported from the United States was still in a warehouse awaiting full payment. In June, Canton merchants agreed to purchase bonds to the value of US $470,000 to pay off the balance and were promised that the bonds could be used to purchase arms and ammunition from the arsenal.[165] Dr. Sun issued an order that after July 7 no more arms and ammunition should be supplied by the arsenal to the commanders of the mercenaries, a bold gesture, but the arsenal was controlled by General Fan Shih-sheng.[166]

The Kuomintang's military academy at Whampoa commenced operations early in May 1924, when the first group of 350 students went to the island and were formed into three companies. A second group of 120 preparatory students entered a few days later and formed the fourth company. Sun Yat-sen appointed Chiang as commandant, or principal (*hsiao-chang*) on May 2 and appointed Liao Chung-k'ai as the Kuomintang's resident representative at the academy on May 9. As Party representative he was the chief political officer. Theoretically the two were coequal. Chiang was the younger man, age thirty-six, but running the academy was his main task, whereas Liao, because of many other jobs, could devote little time to its affairs. On May 8, Commandant Chiang addressed the staff and students and stressed that the 906 persons at the Academy were all comrades; all were to share a common life on Ch'ang-chou island.[167]

The academy had six departments. Tai Chi-t'ao, a Party veteran, headed the Political Department, but he left Canton within a month. The Instructional Department, with classroom functions, was headed by Wang Po-ling (Wang Ma-yü), who had attended the Peiyang Military Academy and the Japanese Military Officers Academy in Tokyo and had taught in the Yunnan Military Academy. His department had some fifteen instructors, several of them graduates of the Paoting Military Academy. The Training Department was responsible for outdoor work, turning the men into soldiers. Its chief was Li Chi-shen, a graduate of the Peking Officers College and a veteran of the Kwangtung First Division, which had proved loyal to Sun Yat-sen. Li's second-in-charge was Teng Yen-ta, a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy, and also from the First Division. Ho Ying-ch'in was chief instructor; he had had his military education in Japan at the same time as Chiang Kai-shek. The other three departments were concerned with administration, military supply, and medical work. Below were various lower-level officers, orderlies, and guards, making a total staff at Whampoa of about 400.[168]

The program for each class was planned to take six months and would combine indoctrination in revolutionary ideology with military training. On May 13 Sun Yat-sen appointed several Party veterans as political instructors: Hu Han-min to lecture on the Three Principles of the People; Wang Ching-wei on Kuomintang history; Tai Chi-t'ao and Shao Yuan-ch'ung on the politics and economics of Europe and America. Speeches by Commandant Chiang were a regular feature of the students' indoctrination. They stressed patriotism, revolutionary zeal, loyalty and subordination to the Kuomintang, the need for sacrifice, group solidarity, and sympathy with the Chinese common people.[169] A branch of the Kuomintang was established in the academy on July 3, which officers and cadets were expected to join. Chiang insisted that all must subscribe to the Three Principles of the People. "No other ideology may be brought into this school. . . . If there are any who doubt the Three Principles or criticize them, they are rebelling against the Party and are our enemies."[170]

Military instruction included class work and field training. The daily schedule began at 5 a.m. and lasted until 9:30 at night. There was instruction in infantry, engineering, artillery, supply service, and military police work. In addition to the instructors trained in Chinese military schools and in Japan, three Russians assisted at the beginning, Alexander I. Cherepanov, Vladimir Poliak, and Nikolai Tereshatov, all

graduates of the Red Army's Officer Academy. Cherepanov has left an interesting account of the school and of the Russians' instructional work.[171] The Russian advisers emphasized practical training in tactics and shooting, matters in which, according to Document 3, Chinese troops were most deficient. In training for battle they emphasized swift attack under fire, flanking the enemy no matter how small the attacking unit, and counterattack to prevent enemy offensive action. He says the advisers took no part in the political indoctrination "in order not to give pretext to the Rightists to accuse us of 'exporting communism'."[172] Small groups of new Russian advisers came in July and October.

Sun Yat-sen's first chief Russian military adviser was General P. A. Pavlov, a well-educated, thirty-two-year-old commander who had distinguished himself as a leader in the Red Army during the Russian civil war.[173] He arrived in Canton about June 20, using the name "Govoroff," and accompanying Borodin on his return from the North.[174] General Pavlov's main effort was directed toward the unification of the heterogeneous armies protecting the Canton base. He proposed the creation of a Military Council, and this was done on July 11. Its members were the principal commanders—Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Yang Hsi-min, Liu Chen-huan, T'an Yen-k'ai, Fan Chung-hsiu, and Chiang Kai-shek—with a spicing of three civilians, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai, and Wu Ch'ao-shu.[175] Creation of the Military Council was a step toward creation of a centralized command, though this came considerably later.

At the first meeting of the Military Council on July 15, General Pavlov proposed a six-point program. The first was to create a political apparatus in the allied armies. Military-political workers should be given short-term training at the academy and then be sent into the various corps and divisions, where they would direct propaganda work. One member of the CEC who was also a member of the Military Council should be put in charge of all political work in the armies. The second called for retraining of command-level officers in the allied armies, with emphasis on political education and training in uniform military tactics. The existing military schools were to be improved and elite units drawn from each army were to be created through special training. Pavlov's third proposal was to create a special fortified region of Canton based on the system used in Russia during the civil war, and preparations to mobilize all material resources for Canton's defense. The last three were to organize armored forces, to organize a mass peasant movement in the enemy's rear, and to institute military censorship.[176] General Pavlov also tried to estimate the chances for success in a northern military campaign, which Dr. Sun contemplated undertaking. His preliminary view was negative. He then went to inspect the eastern front and was tragically drowned in the East River near Shihlung on July 19, after only a month in Canton. Dr. Sun ordered a public funeral which was held on July 23.[177]

Following up on Pavlov's suggestion, Dr. Sun Yat-sen appointed Chiang Kai-shek as chairman of a Preparatory Committee for Military Training in the Various Armies, and Wang Ching-wei as chairman of a similar committee for political training. The plan did not work at this time, but the idea of unified military and political training later was achieved as more Russian advisers served and military unification was slowly enforced. By October 1924 the academy had an enrollment of 1,000 cadets, who received instruction under the direct guidance of Russians. To introduce political work, a Political Section was organized in the school, and the cadets took a lively part in the political life of Kwangtung (Doc. 3, p. 5).

Another forward-looking step was preparation of an entirely new military force as the nucleus of the National Revolutionary Army, the purpose for which Whampoa had been established. Chiang Kai-shek presented his conception of this new force to the political Council on August 11, 1924. He proposed the creation of a division to be built up in stages over the next year. The main problems were financial and procurement of arms. Chiang estimated it would cost $436,000 to establish a regiment with

its equipment, while the division would cost $2,720,000, excluding the price of twelve cannons. He suggested this large figure be met by an allocation of a little over $220,000 a month.[178]

On September 3, Chiang appointed Ho Ying-ch'in to start preparations for a training regiment, which would be organized according to the Soviet system. This ultimately became the First Regiment of the new force. Recruitment was already underway, with Ch'en Kuo-fu in charge of a secret agency in Shanghai. Chiang wanted the soldiers recruited in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang, the latter his home province. Many back-country boys were shipped off in batches to Canton. When the First and Second Training Regiments were formed, these and other recruits filled the ranks, the lower officers were Whampoa cadets, while most of the higher officers were drawn from the academy staff.[179]

Procuring arms was the difficult problem, but it was solved by the first shipment of Russian arms, which arrived in October, and by the arms confiscated from the merchants' corps.[180]

The Merchants' Corps Incident, August-September 1924

In essence, the Merchants' Corps Incident was a contest for power between leading merchants of Canton and surrounding towns and the government of Sun Yat-sen and some of the military forces nominally under his command. The conflict had several causes. One was the incursion into the Canton region of extraprovincial mercenary forces that fattened upon the city. Another was the heavy taxation occasioned by Dr. Sun's wars against rivals. A third, of later origin, may have been the Kuomintang's officially sympathetic attitude toward the Communist Party and encouragement of labor to organize unions independent of the old craft guilds, as well as fears among some Cantonese that Dr. Sun was planning to organize a Bolshevist government or "introduce Bolshevism."

Kwangtung towns normally kept self-defense corps, paid for by shops and well-to-do citizens. In 1923, after the Yunnan and Kwangsi troops entered the Canton area, the Canton Merchants' Corps was revived, while neighboring towns also established or enlarged their corps and began to federate them. Some of the corpsmen were shop clerks, others were hired fighters. During most of 1923, the Canton Merchants' Corps was not pitted against the Generalissimo's government but against the extraprovincial mercenaries; yet by early 1924, the American consul general was "reliably informed" that feeling among leading merchants in Canton against Sun Yat-sen was growing acute; they hoped to build up their force and ultimately to expel him. The head of the Canton Merchants' Corps was Ch'en Lien-po (Chan Lim-pak, in Cantonese), a former chairman of the Canton General Chamber of Commerce, who was also compradore of the Canton branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. He and his brother, who was chairman of the Canton General Chamber of Commerce, were active in shipping, mining, banking, and insurance. They were powers in the Chinese business world and had ties with "British imperialism." In May 1924 a federation of Kwangtung Merchants' Corps was formed with Ch'en Lien-po as commander in chief. In July, merchants tested their strength against Sun's government by using the corps to picket Canton in protest against a 50 percent sales tax on land transfers; they got the tax withdrawn. Merchants then created a Traders' Protective League to decide what new taxes they would accept. Such independence was a threat to Dr. Sun's government, always in need of funds.[181]

Ch'en Lien-po placed a large order for arms in Belgium, and the arms were shipped on a Norwegian freighter, the *Hav*, destined for the Merchants' Corps and some units of the Yunnanese forces. When the vessel arrived in Canton waters about August 8, Dr. Sun ordered Chiang Kai-shek to intercept it. With the help of two

gunboats, Chiang forced the *Hav* to move to Whampoa where the arms were off-loaded on the 13th, precipitating a crisis. The shipment consisted of nearly 10,000 German rifles, Mauser pistols and revolvers, and over three million rounds of ammunition. Dr. Sun proposed to hold the arms pending an investigation; he suspected that Ch'en Lien-po was in league with Ch'en Ch'iung-ming.[182]

A protracted struggle ensued, with the merchants demanding their arms and threatening a general strike, protesting to the consular body and the diplomatic corps, and telegraphing to Overseas Chinese communities, presenting their case against Dr. Sun. The government brought troops and Whampoa cadets into Canton, mobilized the Gendarmes, and tried to win support from various groups in the city. On August 25, the merchants enforced a general business stoppage in Canton and neighboring towns; Dr. Sun ordered the strike to end immediately and declared martial law. Matters were at a standoff during five weeks of negotiation and indecision.

Dr. Sun's Northern Expedition, September-October

During the first week in September, Dr. Sun decided to launch a Northern Expedition from Shao-kuan, directed against the Chihli clique. It was his third such attempt. General Wu P'ei-fu had been attempting to unite China by force, and only Manchuria, Chekiang, Shansi, and the southernmost provinces of China were outside the sphere of the Chihli clique. Chang Tso-lin, leader of the Fengtien clique, Tuan Ch'i-jui, leader of the Anfu clique, Lu Yung-hsiang, military governor of Chekiang, and Sun Yat-sen were loosely allied against Wu P'ei-fu and the government in Peking. A contest for control of Shanghai had been brewing between a member of the Chihli faction, Ch'i Hsieh-yüan, military governor of Kiangsu, and Lu Yung-hsiang, who controlled the Shanghai area through his subordinate, Ho Feng-lin. Lu's allies, by sending troops to threaten the rear of Wu P'ei-fu's subordinates, might give indirect aid to Lu Yung-hsiang.[183] General Lu telegraphed Dr. Sun on September 4, asking for his help. The decision to launch a Northern Expedition was reached in meetings of the Kuomintang Political Council and a military conference in the Generalissimo's Headquarters between September 3 and 10. On the 12th, Dr. Sun departed for Shao-kuan, the railhead 140 miles from Canton near the mountainous border of Kwangtung.[184]

In a letter to Chiang Kai-shek dated September 9, Dr. Sun stated "three vital reasons" why it was necessary to carry out the Northern Expedition. He argued the necessity of abandoning Canton and finding a new life through the battlefield in cooperation with the Fengtien Army and Chekiang in the effort to overthrow Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu.[185] In a proclamation on the objectives of the Northern Expedition issued on September 18, the Kuomintang declared that the Northern Expedition was anti-imperialist and antimilitarist. "In other words, the objective of this war is not only the overthrow of militarists but also, and more particularly, the overthrow of imperialism upon which the existence of militarists depends. This must be done so that the root of counterrevolution may be forever eliminated and China may rid herself of her semicolonial status and become a free and independent nation."[186]

In setting up his military headquarters at Shao-kuan, Dr. Sun took with him his own guard, a company of cadets from Whampoa Military Academy, part of the Gendarmes of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, and a "farmers' army" under T'an P'ing-shan, made up of students of the second class of the Farmers' Movement Training Institute. Various "guest armies" from Honan, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Yunnan gradually assembled about Shao-kuan. T'an Yen-k'ai, the leader of the Hunan Army, was appointed commander-in-chief, and the various units were named *Chien Kuo Chün*. The Yunnanese forces of Yang Hsi-min and the Kwangsi troops of Liu Chen-huan would not participate in the expedition. Dr. Sun left Hu Han-min in Canton as the acting Gen-

eralissimo.[187]

There was considerable opposition to the expedition within Dr. Sun's entourage, and it seems likely that Borodin opposed it, as did General Bliukher, who arrived in October. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was against it, according to Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who was close to Borodin. On October 10, Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote to Voitinsky, stating, "we consider that the Kuomintang should discontinue its military actions (including the Northern Expedition) and leave the Kwangtung Government." Teng Chung-hsia voiced his opposition in the October issue of a new labor journal, stating flatly, "The Northern Expedition has nothing to do with the true revolution of national liberation and the unions and farmers' associations should not get involved in it." Ts'ai Ho-shen opposed it in the Communist journal *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* (Guide Weekly).[188]

The first shipment of Soviet arms arrived off Hong Kong on the *Vorovsky*, which had come via the Indian Ocean. The *Vorovsky* reached Canton on October 7 and, on Dr. Sun's instructions to Chiang Kai-shek, the arms were unloaded openly at Whampoa as a challenge to the British, being neither smuggled ashore nor passed through Customs. There are contradictory accounts as to the size of this first shipment of arms, but it probably included a few field guns, heavy and light machine guns, rifles, and pistols, with ammunition for all. Nine Russian military advisers aboard were immediately sent to the Whampoa Academy. They were: T. A. Beschastnov, G. I. Gilev, M. Ya. Gmira, P. Dzenek, Pollo, Zil'bert, F. G. Matseilik, V. P. Rogachev, and V. A. Stepanov.[189]

Vasily Konstantinovich Bliukher, who used the pseudonym "Galin" or "Galen," arrived in Canton from Vladivostok at about this time also. A natural military genius with long command experience, he was only thirty-five years old, and pictures show that he was completely bald. He became the most important of all the Russian military advisers to the Nationalist Party.[190] A number of Russian officers journeyed to Shao-kuan to meet Sun Yat-sen and joined in the celebration of "Double Ten," the Nationalist holiday.[191]

Letters exchanged between Dr. Sun and Chiang Kai-shek suggest Sun's preoccupation with the Northern Expedition. He instructed Chiang on October 7 to transfer the Russian arms immediately to Shao-kuan. Two days later, he ordered Chiang to organize a Revolutionary Committee to cope with the Merchants' Corps. On the same day, however, he sent Chiang a secret telegram with orders to abandon Whampoa and to send all weapons and students to Shao-kuan to concentrate on the Northern Expedition.[192]

Suppression of the Merchants' Resistance

Throughout September there were negotiations between Sun's representatives and the merchants for return of their arms, for a price. Early in October, General Li Fu-lin, who succeeded Sun Fo as acting mayor of Canton, worked out an agreement for the return of 5,000 rifles to the merchants, for which they would pay $200,000 and permit a citywide assessment equivalent to one month's house rent. According to a later public statement of the government's case, the rifles were handed over to General Li on October 9 in the presence of representatives of the Merchants' Corps, although at the last minute the representatives suggested and the government agreed to deliver some of the ammunition and to hold back 1,000 rifles.[193]

According to his "diary," Chiang Kai-shek defied Sun's secret order to abandon Whampoa and send all weapons and cadets to Shao-kuan. On October 9, he wrote Sun warning him of the danger in Canton and urging him to return.[194] In a separate letter, Chiang also reported to Sun that Borodin had just paid him a visit at the Whampoa Academy. During their talk, Chiang said, Borodin expressed himself

strongly against the inclusion of Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min on the Revolutionary Committee, which was to deal with the Merchants' Corps. Chiang disagreed with Borodin and requested Sun Yat-sen to include both Wang and Hu. Sun's reply is suggestive of Borodin's influence. It was unnecessary to include Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei on the Revolutionary Committee, Sun told Chiang, because the revolution must follow the Russian pattern and Hu Han-min had lost faith in this. Wang Ching-wei, he said, was basically not a Russian-type revolutionary. Neither was suited for taking drastic action.[195] On October 10, the Revolutionary Committee was established with Sun at its head, and the next day, despite this letter, Sun appointed Wang Ching-wei to the committee. The other members appointed were Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Liao Chung-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, Eugene Chen, and T'an P'ing-shan. Hu Han-min was not listed, although he participated later as Dr. Sun's deputy.[196]

On the Republican national holiday, October 10, a violent clash erupted between the Merchants' Corps, unloading its arms on the Canton waterfront, and a parade of laborers, Whampoa cadets, students, teachers, and school children. The parade leaders demanded the right to march along the waterfront; the Corps refused. Someone started shooting, and with this the Merchants' Corps opened fire on the laborers and cadets. About a dozen paraders were killed, eight Corpsmen wounded, and many spectators killed, wounded, or drowned trying to escape the melee.[197] The merchants immediately ordered a general strike, asserting that less than half their arms and munitions had been returned. On the 13th the government brought some 5,000 troops into Canton and ordered them to disarm the Merchants' Corps; it also declared martial law and ordered the shops to open immediately.[198] In the battle for control of Shanghai, Ch'i Hsieh-yuan had defeated Lu Yung-hsiang, Sun's ally, and Lu fled to Japan on October 13. This eliminated one reason for the Northern Expedition.

On October 14, Sun ordered the following units placed under Chiang's command: the Gendarmes, the Workers' and Farmers' Self-Defense Corps, the aviation unit, the armored car battalion, the arsenal, the Whampoa Military Academy, and the Yunnan Army School. That night Chiang, according to his "diary," led an attack on the stronghold of the Merchants' Corps that ended in complete victory for the KMT.[199]

Chiang's account is disputed by other sources. A. I. Cherepanov has given an account that partly substantiates and partly refutes Chiang's "diary." According to Cherepanov, the Revolutionary Committee had its headquarters at the academy, and he lists the units under Chiang Kai-shek's command: 800 Whampoa cadets, 320 members of the Workers' Militia and Peasant Detachment, 220 cadets from the Hunan military school and 500 from the Yunnan military school, 250 servicemen from two armored trains, and about 2,000 from the police units (Gendarmes) of General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. He also reports that General Yang Hsi-min absolutely opposed the appointment of Chiang and threatened to disarm the Whampoa Academy and shoot Chiang if he took part in crushing the Merchants' Corps rebellion. He pictures Chiang as greatly frightened and leaving Cherepanov himself in charge of the academy's defenses, implying that Chiang was planning to run away. According to Cherepanov, the units designated to crush the rebellion were under the command of Sun Yat-sen, who personally directed all the operations. (Sun's direct command is not substantiated in other sources.) He describes the fighting on the basis of what he was told and does not mention a role for the Whampoa cadets.[200]

Document 5, Borodin's report on the Revolutionary Committee, is an important addition to the available sources on this subject, particularly since it is dated the morning of October 14, 1924, the day before the suppression of the Merchants' Corps took place.

Borodin's report offers striking corroboration of Chiang's own record of the incident. It gives, for instance, an almost identical list of the units placed under Chiang's command. While Borodin reported that Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Fan Shih-sheng, and other

commanders were also scheduled to participate in the attack, he added that in case their armies "declare unwillingness to move," the units under the Revolutionary Committee's direct control would take action (Doc. 5, pp. 10, 13). Borodin thus showed confidence in Chiang, who commanded these units, and doubt as to the loyalty of the other troops. Despite Borodin's apprehension, the troops not directly controlled by the Revolutionary Committee cooperated in the successful attack.

According to Document 5, the Revolutionary Committee had a Political Department headed by Wang Ching-wei, with Chou En-lai, Liao Chung-k'ai, and T'an P'ing-shan as his deputies. "They determine the actions of the Revolutionary Committee and the armed forces" (Doc. 5, p. 11).

The attack began at dawn on the 15th. By nightfall much of the commercial section was in flames and the Merchants' Corps had been defeated. Troops looted freely until the next day, when the government threatened looters with immediate execution. The corpsmen were disarmed and their leaders fled to Hong Kong or surrendered. Property losses due to fires and looting were extensive; somewhere between 600 and 1,100 buildings were destroyed. This brief battle settled the power struggle between the merchant leaders and the Nationalists.[201]

Sun Yat-sen's Decision to Go to Peking

Barely a week after the liquidation of the Canton Merchants' Corps and during the height of the Second Chihli-Fengtien War, General Feng Yü-hsiang, commander of the Third Route Army under Wu P'ei-fu, betrayed Wu by seizing Peking on the night of October 22-23. This coup, which has been treated in detail by Professor James Sheridan in his biography of Feng Yu-hsiang, not only brought about the collapse of the Chihli forces fighting against Chang Tso-lin's armies, but also ushered in a new era in Peking politics. The principal plotters of the coup organized a new military force, the Kuominchun (KMC, or National People's Army). Feng assumed the post of commander-in-chief and was concurrently commander of the First Kuominchun. Hu Ching-i and Sun Yueh became deputy commanders-in-chief and commanders respectively of the Second and Third Kuominchun. Tuan Ch'i-jui, who had taken an active role in the plot, was soon brought forward as provisional chief executive, to serve as a balance between the two power combinations in the North, the Kuominchun under Feng and the Fengtien Army under Chang Tso-lin. Japanese had been deeply involved in the plan, and Tuan must also have been acceptable to the Japanese government.[202]

The "Brief History" professes some bafflement as to the causes of the coup, but it concludes that Feng would not have attempted what he did had the revolutionary consciousness of the masses not been highly developed. For the first time in the recent history of Chinese militarism, it asserts, military men appeared who oriented themselves toward the people and called themselves the Kuominchun—the People's Army. This would have been impossible without the proper objective revolutionary conditions (Doc. 1, p. 39).

It is not certain whether Dr. Sun was informed in advance of the planned coup, but on the very day it occurred, Dr. C. T. Wang (Wang Cheng-t'ing), who had participated in the planning, informed the American chargé d'affaires at Peking that a new government would invite Chang Tso-lin, Sun Yat-sen, Tuan Ch'i-jui, and other prominent leaders to a roundtable conference, with the objective of unifying China.[203] Dr. Sun's first recorded response to the coup of October 23 was in two telegrams of the 27th, addressed to Feng Yü-hsiang and the other commanders of the Kuominchun, and to Tuan Ch'i-jui, expressing his interest—apparently on his own initiative—in going north to enter into discussions with them. On October 30 he left Shao-kuan and returned to Canton, and by November 4 Dr. Sun made public his in-

tention to proceed northward. By then he had been urged to do so by Feng Yü-hsiang and his allied generals.[204]

Sun Yat-sen's decision to leave Canton and proceed northward was opposed by some leaders of the Kuomintang and apparently by the Communist Party initially. Borodin's position on the matter is not known to us.[205]

On November 10, Dr. Sun issued a manifesto which stated his hopes in going north. The manifesto reaffirmed the Three Principles of the People as the sole basis for solution of the nation's problems. The program adopted at the First Kuomintang Congress constituted a maximum objective, but the minimum program for the present should include rescinding all Unequal Treaties and agreements imposed on China by the imperialist Powers and a clear definition of authority as between the central and provincial governments. After describing the benefits that would accrue through a series of reforms, all of which had been stated before, the manifesto called for a National Assembly whose main task would be unification and reconstruction of the country. But first there should be a preliminary conference made up of representatives of modern industrial bodies, merchants' associations, educational associations, universities, the alliance of provincial students' associations, trade unions, farmers' associations, military forces that had participated in the struggle against Ts'ao and Wu, and political parties. This conference should be kept small and meet soon. To this conference the Kuomintang would submit its minimum program. Representatives of the National Assembly should be elected directly by the membership of the listed types of organizations.[206] The demand for a National Assembly elected by occupational organizations became the next great propaganda effort of the Kuomintang, and of the Communist Party, which had proposed it more than a year before.

Before departing, Sun Yat-sen made various appointments. He left Hu Han-min to guard Canton as acting Generalissimo; Hu had already been appointed governor of Kwangtung. T'an Yen-k'ai was left in charge of the Northern Expeditionary forces. T'an P'ing-shan was allowed to resign from the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and from his post as head of the Organization Department; Yang P'ao-an, another Cantonese Communist, who had been secretary of the department, replaced him as acting head. The Farmers Department was put under the charge of Liao Chung-k'ai, while Lo Ch'i-yüan, a Communist, became its secretary, replacing P'eng Pai, who was transferred to the Organization Department together with Juan Hsiao-hsien. These appointments seemed to confirm Dr. Sun's practice of giving Communists in the Kuomintang some important positions in his Party's apparatus. In the military sphere, he named the force being created at Whampoa as the Party Army and appointed Liao Chung-k'ai as Party representative. He appointed General Hsü Ch'ung-chih head of the Party's Military Affairs Department, with Chiang Kai-shek as secretary.[207] Wang Ching-wei told the Second Kuomintang Congress that Dr. Sun asked Borodin to accompany him to Tientsin and Peking. Apparently they traveled separately.[208]

The Northward Journey

Dr. Sun said his last farewells to supporters in Canton on November 12 and 13. He departed Canton aboard the gunboat *Yung Feng*, stopping at Whampoa for a final visit with the officers and cadets of the Military Academy. On the 14th he boarded the Japanese steamer *Shinyo Maru* in Hong Kong, bound for Shanghai. His party, in addition to Madame Sun, consisted of eighteen persons, the best known of whom were Wang Ching-wei, Shao Yuan-ch'ung, Huang Ch'ang-ku, Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen), Li Lieh-chün, and Ma Ch'ao-chün.[209]

Dr. Sun arrived in Shanghai on November 17 and spent four busy days meeting the press, conferring with Kuomintang leaders, and meeting representatives of Tuan

Ch'i-jui, Ch'i Hsieh-yüan, Feng Yü-hsiang, and Hu Ching-i. He was sizing up the situation in Peking and making his intentions known. On the 21st he sailed for Japan, where he made several speeches in which he stressed the importance of Sino-Japanese cooperation but also argued for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, of which Japan was a beneficiary. It appears that he left Japan empty-handed.[210]

By the time Dr. Sun arrived in Tientsin on December 4 he was ill. He was met by representatives of Tuan Ch'i-jui and the Kuominchun and conferred briefly with Chang Tso-lin. By this time, Tuan had taken up the position in Peking of acting chief executive and had announced his intention of calling a reconstruction conference, to begin on February 1, with a membership quite different from the type Dr. Sun was proposing. By the end of the month, Dr. Sun's health had so deteriorated that his associates decided to take him to Peking for medical treatment. His arrival on a special train on December 31 was his last public appearance. Although attended by several physicians, his condition grew steadily worse. On January 26, he entered the hospital of Peking Union Medical College and underwent an exploratory operation. It was discovered that cancer had entered the liver and was incurable. The next day, his physicians announced the verdict, "malignant tumor."[211]

Policies of the CCP and Its Fourth Party Congress

In November 1924, when Sun left Canton for Peking, the Communist Party restated the belief that only a National Assembly could serve the country's needs. The Party proposed that the preparatory conference for a National Assembly serve as a provisional government prior to the establishment of a formal, legal government.[212] While supporting Sun's plans for a National Assembly, the Communists were critical of his negotiations with Tuan Ch'i-jui. According to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's political report to the Fifth CCP Congress, held in late April 1927, the Central Committee had opposed Sun's decision to journey to Peking, believing that he should remain in Canton to exterminate the counterrevolutionary forces and consolidate the revolution in Kwangtung province.[213] On January 7, 1925, the *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* published an article, "The Question of Dr. Sun's Attitude," by P'eng Shu-chih, a close follower of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. He accused Sun of weakness and ambiguity in dealing with Tuan and urged him to stand firm for a preparatory conference or risk losing the people's confidence.[214] Furthermore, at the Party's Fourth Congress, held in January 1925, the Communist Party denounced Feng Yü-hsiang and Tuan for playing "the same old game of militarist politics" and fighting for power.[215]

Twenty delegates met in Shanghai about January 20, 1925 for the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, representing a membership still less than 1,000.[216] According to the "Brief History," one of the most important problems confronting the Congress was policy for coping with the situation in the North, particularly the question of convoking a National Assembly as against Tuan Ch'i-jui's scheme for a reconstruction conference with limited representation or, as the "Brief History" put it, a "conference of representatives of the bourgeoisie only." Although the Congress formulated concrete plans and noted weak points in the Party's work, it did not pass new regulations that altered the resolutions of previous congresses, according to the "Brief History" (Doc. 1, pp. 39-40).

P'eng Shu-chih, who had recently returned from Moscow and attended the Fourth Congress, asserts in a memoir that "whereas the Third Congress determined the 'leader of the national revolution' to be the representative of the bourgeoisie, the KMT, the Fourth Congress finally resolved that the proletariat was the leader of the national revolution and that all work should be concentrated on developing the workers' movement. The congress marked the return of the CCP to Bolshevism and the setting of conditions for the second Chinese revolution."[217] This assertion is borne

out in the wording of the Fourth Congress's Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement, which proclaims the proletariat to be the most revolutionary of China's social classes and destined to lead the movement.[218]

Voitinsky appears to have played an important role both in planning the Congress and in steering its resolutions. On December 19, 1924, he wrote to "Petrov" (F. F. Raskolnikov) in Moscow outlining the main thrust of the strategy to be adopted by the Congress—still a month away—and his letter was shown to Stalin and other Comintern leaders.[219] The center of attention, wrote Voitinsky, was to be on penetration of the Party into the masses of city workers. Though relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang were strained, Voitinsky hoped to avoid this issue "in all its magnitude" for, he believed, "We should still help the Kuomintang" in order to sway the anti-imperialist movement and the movement against *tuchuns* as widely as possible. "This should manifest itself, first, in our greater penetration into the worker-peasant masses, in our more open struggle against the right wing of the Kuomintang. . . . These are the main questions to be taken up by the Congress."[220]

M. F. Yuriev, using the resolutions of the Fourth Congress, clarifies its main thrusts.[221] The Communist leadership planned to intensify work in the mass movements, to radicalize them, and to prevent them from falling under Kuomintang control; to continue working within the Kuomintang in the national liberation movement but to try to prevent tendencies of compromise toward imperialism, capitalism, and militarism by supporting the KMT Left Wing in attack against its Right; and to expand the Communist Party all over China.

The Congress asserted that "the workers movement is the basis of the national movement in China," and that class struggle was conducive to the national movement which, in turn, was conducive to intensifying class struggle. Party organizations were to develop all sorts of mass movements and struggle to win over the masses and expand Party ranks among them. As sole leader of the working class, the Party would achieve leadership in the National Revolution only if it had solid and independent mass organizations. Hence it should create and strengthen CP cells among workers and prevent trade unions from being subordinated to the Kuomintang. The Congress condemned efforts of the bourgeoisie to create "yellow" trade unions and also the work of Communists who organized unions without due attention to political work. In agitating workers for the National Revolution, it was necessary to proceed from the concrete political and economic interests of the working class, to make clear the difference in aims of the bourgeoisie and the workers, and to struggle against bureaucratization, opportunism, and syndicalism. The Congress emphasized the necessity of striving for freedom of trade union activity as well as freedom of speech, assembly, and organization. It stressed the need for a unified trade union movement; hence the Party should not create its own unions paralleling those of other parties, but rather join in their work and win over the masses in day-to-day struggle. Organizers were warned against raising "extraordinary slogans" which would allow reactionaries to blame the Communists for failure.

While participating in the national revolutionary movement, the working class should simultaneously struggle with capitalists whether foreign or Chinese, private or state, reactionary or progressive. This would help expose reactionary groups in trade unions, particularly Right Wing Kuomintang members, by revealing their inability to represent the interest of the workers.[222]

In the Resolution on the Peasant Movement, peasants were singled out as the most important ally of the working class. That class and its Party—the CCP—should lead the peasantry and systematically organize its economic and political struggle. Otherwise, it would be impossible to achieve the leading position in the national movement and the victory of the Chinese revolution. However, an item in the resolution warned that "the peasant unions ought not thoughtlessly adopt decisions on

organizing the movement for lowering rents."[223] Evidently the Communist Party felt it prudent to restrain class struggle in the countryside at this time. The Congress decided only to organize peasants' associations and self-defense units to counter the political power and armed strength of the landlords.[224]

The Resolution "On the National Revolutionary Movement" first analyzed the dual character of bourgeois nationalism—opposing imperialism on one hand and, on the other hand, "suppressing the proletariat of its own country under the pretext of defending national interests, and suppressing comparatively weaker nations under the pretext of defending national honor."[225] Hence, the proletariat, while participating in the national movement, should in no case lose its peculiar class position and its international character.

On the issue of relations with the Kuomintang, the resolution identified three groups in that Party: the Right Wing, representing the military, bureaucrats, politicians, and capitalists; the Left (including Communists), representing the workers, peasants, and the progressive part of the intelligentsia; and the center group, which included many leaders of the Kuomintang, representing the urban petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. This was one of many Communist efforts to define the Kuomintang in class terms. The resolution charged the Right Wing members in Kwangtung with cooperating with compradores and landlords, attempting to suppress workers and peasants, and opposing the Communists and Left Wing Kuomintang members and also the center group. In this situation, the Congress defined six tasks for Communists in relation to the Kuomintang, as summarized by Yuriev.[226]

1. To expose the idea of class peace, and achieve participation of the most efficient class forces in national campaigns.

2. Within the Kuomintang and in social organizations, to propagandize against imperialism, militaristic governments, and the compradore class, and to defend the interest of the workers, peasants, and all toilers. Expose counterrevolutionary actions of Right Wing members and correct the mistakes of the center group in the Kuomintang.

3. Strive to expand the Left Wing in both an ideological and organizational respect, and particularly to realize propaganda among the masses.[227]

4. To support the organizational strengthening of the Kuomintang and its carrying out of various movements, but to fight against obstructions to the economic struggle of workers and peasants. Where the Kuomintang held power, the Communist Party should act openly, explaining to the toilers its position on all political questions and exposing the Kuomintang's mistakes.

5. To demand that the Kuomintang support the organizations of workers and peasants and defend their interests, but not permit these organizations to dissolve themselves within the Kuomintang.

6. Kuomintang committees at all levels that were led by Communists should strive by propaganda to bring the members to clearcut Leftist views.

With respect to their own Party, the Communist leadership decided to create organizations throughout the country and to increase the number of cells by decreasing the minimum membership from five to three. Communists and non-Communist sympathizers among industrial workers should not join the Kuomintang except when the interests of the cause demanded.[228] Opposition to membership in the Kuomintang had continued among some Communist leaders, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu.[229] The decision to permit Communists and sympathetic proletarians not to join the Kuomintang seems to have been a compromise.

Within the Central Committee there were created an Organization Department, Womens Department, and a Committee on the Trade Union Movement within the Worker-Peasant Department, according to Yuriev.[230] The delegates criticized the mistakes and shortcomings of the Central Committee and insisted that the newly elected

committee have much closer ties with the Communist International.[231] The new Central Committee, as recollected by Chang Kuo-t'ao, who did not attend the Congress, included Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, T'an P'ing-shan, P'eng Shu-chih, Lo Chang-lung, Hsiang Ying, Wang Ho-po, and himself. There also emerged, he says, a prototype Political Bureau made up of Ch'en, Ts'ai, Chang, Ch'ü, and perhaps P'eng.[232]

Another decision taken by the Congress was to change the name of the Socialist Youth Corps to Communist Youth Corps. The Corps held its Third Congress in February 1925, also in Shanghai, and officially changed its name. It also elected a new Central Committee.[233]

The Death of Sun Yat-sen, March 12, 1925

While these meetings were going on in Shanghai, Dr. Sun was dying in Peking. An Emergency Political Council was organized, made up of those members of the Kuomintang Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees then in Peking, to formulate policy in this emergency.[234] On February 14, Borodin reported from Peking to Moscow that great discussions were going on within the Kuomintang concerning the future of the Party. Judging by the heat and vigor of the discussion, he predicted it would hardly be possible to avoid a split within the Kuomintang.[235]

The Emergency Political Council decided to ask Dr. Sun for a final testament. Wang Ching-wei drafted a testament, and it was discussed in the council before being read to Dr. Sun on February 24. He is said to have approved it but deferred signing it. The signing occurred on March 11, the day before his death, with Dr. Sun's young wife guiding his hand.[236] The document soon became a sacred legacy for the Kuomintang.

Another document was brought to Dr. Sun's bedside on March 11, a letter of farewell to Soviet Russia. According to later Kuomintang accounts, the letter was prepared by Eugene Chen in consultation with Borodin. It was read to Dr. Sun, and he was asked to sign it. No one signed as witness, and the letter was not distributed to the press immediately after Dr. Sun's death, as were the Testament and a private will. Apparently it was first published in *Pravda* on March 14 and distributed in China by Rosta News Agency on the 17th. In this letter, addressed to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet government, Dr. Sun was made to say that on his deathbed his thoughts turned to Russia as well as to the future destiny of the Kuomintang and China. The Soviet leaders were at the head of the union of free republics, a heritage left by the immortal Lenin to all suppressed peoples of the world. By means of this heritage, the victims of imperialism would inevitably win their emancipation. The letter then stated: "I leave behind me a party which, as I always hoped, will be allied with you in its historical task of liberating China and other suppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism. My charge to the Kuomintang party before all is that it shall continue to promote the cause of the national revolutionary movement for the emancipation of China, which has been degraded by imperialism into a semicolonial country. I therefore charge my party to maintain permanent contact with you. I cherish the firm belief that your support of my country will remain unaltered. In taking my last leave of you, dear comrades, I express the hope that the day is approaching when the Soviet Union will greet in a free and strong China its friend and ally, and that the two states will proceed hand in hand as allies in the great fight for the emancipation of the whole world."[237]

The Kuomintang's Soviet orientation was certified by a series of messages exchanged between the Kuomintang, the Russian Communist Party, and the Comintern. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party sent a telegram, signed by Stalin, extending condolences to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

and expressing the conviction that the Party would continue to fight for liberation from imperialism under Sun Yat-sen's banner. In a wire addressed to Stalin and Zinoviev, the KMT Central Executive Committee vowed to continue the work of Sun Yat-sen. The CEC was convinced, it said, that the Russian Communists, as true disciples of Lenin, would fight along with the heirs of Sun Yat-sen.

In reply, Zinoviev wired the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in the name of the Comintern. The Comintern, he said, was following the struggle of the Chinese people with great attention and, true to Lenin's charge, was teaching the workers of all countries to support the national revolutionary movements of the Eastern peoples, especially the people of China. The ECCI would do all in its power to make clear to all workers of all countries the significance of Sun Yat-sen's work. The Comintern was convinced that all its sections would render support to the Kuomintang, which would lead Sun Yat-sen's cause to victory. Zinoviev added that the ECCI did not doubt that the Chinese Communist Party, which was cooperating with the Kuomintang, would also prove equal to the great historical tasks confronting it. For its part, the Chinese Communist Central Committee, in a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, pledged full support to the KMT on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese workers and peasants, the proletariat of the world, and all friendly parties associated with the Comintern.[238]

Notes

1. Accounts of the coup are in Tsou Lu, *Chung-kuo Kuomintang shih kao*, pp. 1071-72, and Teng Tse-ju, *Chung-kuo Kuomintang erh-shih nien shih chi*, pp. 274-75, as condensed in KFNP, pp. 949-50.

2. The Hong Kong interlude is discussed in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 143-44.

3. Sun's initial problems are discussed in C. Martin Wilbur, "Problems of Starting a Revolutionary Base: Sun Yat-sen in Canton, 1923." On Canton financial contributions see Canton, Municipal Government, *Kwang-chow Shih Shih Cheng pao-kao hui-k'an, 1923*, chart following, p. 102, for $6.2 million "loans out," almost certainly for the Generalissimo's Headquarters, and much of it raised by sale of public property. Published accounts of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the period April to September 1923 show that the Canton Municipal Finance Office gave it $3,975,465.94. *Lu Hai Chün Ta-yuan-shuai Ta-pen-ying kung-pao*, V, 2291-2307. Other amounts were turned over in October and November.

4. Both telegrams are in the Sneevliet archives and were made available by Dr. Tony Saich. Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff made for us a separate translation. Dr. Sun's telegram is cited by Dr. Saich in "Hank Sneevliet and the Origins of the First United Front (1921-1923)," note 95. S. I. Vilde, a vice-consul in Shanghai and an important Comintern agent there, apparently was the transmission point for the telegrams. Sun's first response is dated "Shanghai, May 15, 1923." See Sun Yat-sen, "From Sun Yat-sen's Correspondence." The May 24 telegram in Sneevliet's archives bears Dr. Sun's signature. His advice to the delegates in Mukden concerned Sino-Russian negotiations over future management—indeed, control—of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

5. The following general accounts are useful in reconstructing the situation: J. C. Huston, "The Labor Situation in China During the Latter Part of 1922 and Beginning of 1923, with a Partial Analysis of Some of Its Underlying Causes"; Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-t'i*, which is the unacknowledged source for much of the factual information in the next items; Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien-shih*, written in Moscow from 1928 to 1930; Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 274-75; *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, I (this work is strongly anti-Communist. Teng and Chang were Communist participants). See also Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 206-10.

6. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 66. He provides the text of the constitution.

7. Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, p. 230, and Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 71-72. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 278-91, for a personal account.

8. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, I, 239-41, which names the delegates and purports to quote General Wu's explanation that he suspected the next step would be a general strike. Pao Hui-seng blames "British imperialists" for setting Wu P'ei-fu on the workers and purports to give the conversation between the delegation that went to Loyang and General Wu. *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, p. 101. This was called to our attention by Professor Li Yu-ning.

9. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, I, 241-43, blames two Communists, Wang Kung and Li Chien-ying, with inciting the delegates to hold the meeting as planned, and the latter with leading the procession and provoking the police. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 279, confirms Li's provocative role and pictures himself as urging moderation. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 72, implies unanimous determination to hold the meeting. J. C. Huston, "The Labor Situation in China," p. 44, describes police efforts to prevent the meeting but depicts troops and police as restrained.

10. The escalation theory seems to be adopted by Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 207-209. General Wu's alleged reasons are given in NA, USDS 893.5054/31, Dispatch, Heintzleman, Hankow, February 8, 1923. Odoric Wou, *Militarism in Modern China*, pp. 224-27, gives a careful account of Wu P'ei-fu's probable reasons.

11. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 284-86; Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 77-78; NA, USDS 893.5054/31, Dispatch, Heintzleman, February 4; Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, p. 232, for the Hankow story. For the Peking end, *idem.*, and *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, I, 245; Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 76-79; and Huston, "The Labor Situation," p. 61.

12. Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, p. 105.

13. Ibid., pp. 234-36; NCH, February 17, 1923, p. 429; Chang, *The Rise*, I, 292-93.

14. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 298-99; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 220. Chesneaux pictures 1923-24 as two years of retreat for the labor movement in most areas.

15. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 258.

16. Li Yün-han, *Tsung jung Kung tao ch'ing tang*, pp. 158-60.

17. The article was entitled, "The Bourgeois Revolution and the Revolutionary Bourgeoisie." Thomas C. Kuo, *Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) and the Chinese Communist Movement*, pp. 110-11, analyzes this article more fully.

18. In 1935, Sneevliet recalled addressing a May Day rally in Canton. Isaacs, "Documents on the Comintern," p. 108. Muntjewerf, who had access to the Sneevliet archives, cites documents from Canton dated May 7, 1923 and onward in June. A. C. Muntjewerf, "Was There a 'Sneevlietian Strategy'?" pp. 165-66.

19. Kartunova, "The Comintern," pp. 304-305.

20. Ibid., p. 305. KFNP makes no mention of Sun's meeting with Sneevliet and Chinese Communist leaders at this time.

21. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 258.

22. Chang's extended account of the Congress is in *The Rise*, I, 296-316. Two anti-Communist reconstructions are Wang Chien-min, *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang*, I, 79-84 (the late Professor Wang says there were 27 delegates representing 423 members); and Kuo, *Analytical History of Chinese Communist Party*, I, 82-101.

23. Excerpts reprinted in Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang liang ta yao an*, pp. 15-16, and reprint in KMWH, IX, 1279-80. The entire resolution is published in *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an-k'ao tzu-*

liao, I, 421-22. The section quoted is paragraph 6.

24. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 311-12. In her doctoral dissertation, Bernadette Li analyzed the positions and arguments of several participants. *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai*, pp. 119-27. Glunin, "The Comintern," pp. 258-59, also discusses the debate. Mao, he says, took a centrist position, then joined the majority.

25. Saich, "Hank Sneevliet and the Origins of the First United Front."

26. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 312.

27. "Manifesto of the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 228. Translated in Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 135-36, and in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 71-72.

28. Kartunova, "The Comintern," pp. 303-304.

29. Saich, "Hank Sneevliet and the Origins."

30. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, pp. 344-46; Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943*, II, 25-26, extracts. The date comes from Glunin, "Comintern," p. 262. He says the resolutions reached Shanghai on July 18, a month after the Congress.

31. A. I. Cherepanov, *Zapiski Veonnogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, 6-7, 11; Draft Translation, pp. 3-10; *As Military Adviser in China*, pp. 15-18.

32. NCH, July 28, 1923, p. 235; Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China*, pp. 208-210. Professor Whiting devotes a chapter to Karakhan's mission, until the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty on May 31, 1924.

33. Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang*, in KMWH, IX, quotation, p. 1279. There are elipses in the quotation.

34. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 157-63. Most of these leaders of the Corps were in their mid-twenties and were members of the CCP as well. Another important Youth Corps leader was Yün Tai-ying, elected to its Central Committee at the Second Congress. He soon became active in Kuomintang work in Shanghai.

35. Details in Pichon P. Y. Loh, *The Early Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 85-87.

36. Details of the trip come from Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih Hsien-sheng*, often referred to as Chiang's "Diary." A scholarly account, based on both Chinese and Russian sources, is in Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 212-19. For Shen and Chang, see Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*. Wang, whose alternate name was Tsung-shan, had been editor of a Chinese newspaper in Canada, according to an informant in Taiwan. After the trip to Russia he served as a Western language secretary in the Whampoa Military Academy and briefly as Party representative in the First Training Regiment. KMWH, X, 1466, 1468.

37. Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 243, copied from Louis Fischer's copy of the original, shown him by Karakhan.

38. Kartunova, "Sun Yat-sen and Russian Advisers," pp. 176-80. Skliansky told Chiang that several persons had already been sent to South China, but the shortage of officers studying Chinese precluded sending any large number. Sun's "Northwest Plan" is discussed in more detail in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 116, 151-53.

39. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for that date. According to Kartunova, "The Comintern," p. 306, Chiang painted things in much too rosy a color, stating, for example, that the Kuomintang had 600,000 members.

40. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, October 26, 1923.

41. Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China*, p. 22; date from Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

42. "Resolution, Presidium, Communist International Executive Committee, On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Kuomintang Party." In the following abstract all items underlined or placed in quotation marks were so given in the text.

43. The reasons for Borodin's selection, an appraisal of his personality, and his presumed instructions based on prior high-level Russian decisions, are ably presented in Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 220-45. Before her work appeared, Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*, pp. 166-80, covered the same ground in less detail and is the basis for much of the discussion herein.

45. The text is in Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 244, copied from Louis Fischer's file.

46. N. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 130-31. The authenticity of this document is assured by information that could not be known by a would-be forger more than three years later: that early in October 1923 Dr. Sun still had hopes for the northward movement of his troops, i.e., T'an Yen-k'ai's invasion of Hunan, which collapsed a few weeks later; that he was waiting for word of the negotiations of this representative in Moscow, Chiang Kai-shek; and that he hoped to develop a base in Mongolia.

47. KFNP, pp. 1018, 1020. The Provisional Executive Committee consisted of Hu Han-min, Teng Tse-ju, Lin Sen, Liao Chung-k'ai, T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Shu-jen, Sun Fo, Wu T'ieh-cheng, and Yang Shu-k'an; the alternates were Wang Ching-wei, Li Ta-chao, Hsieh Ying-pai, Ku Ying-fen, and Hsü Ch'ung-ch'ing. For a detailed account of Borodin's advice on Party reorganization, see the account in Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 273-91.

48. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 132-33. T'an P'ing-shan was a leading Communist in Canton. Juan Hsiao-hsien joined the Socialist Youth Corps in Canton in January 1921. He was later important in the Kwangtung farmers' movement. We have been unable to identify Fu Yun-yu. Mention of German and Poliak shows the reliability of Mitarevsky's quotation. Their presence in Canton at this time was reported by the British consul general in PRO (FO F3569/650/10). A Shanghai sailing list reports the departure of "Mr. Pollak" on Str. Yinchow for Canton on October 2. NCH, October 6, 1923, p. 71.

49. KFNP, pp. 1014-16. Mitarevsky is thus confirmed.

50. PRO (FO F3569/650/10), Dispatch, Macleay, Peking, October 30, 1923, enclosing Dispatch from Jamieson, Canton, October 20, which contains an article from the *Canton Daily News* of that date, quoting Borodin's interview with a Chinese reporter. The date of the interview is not given. The Shanghai *Shang pao* reported from Canton, October 19, Borodin's answers to a Chinese reporter's questions, which may be the same interview. This was reprinted in HTCP, no. 45, November 7, 1923, and is presented in translation in Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 105-106.

51. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 133.

52. Discussed in more detail in Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 175-77; also KFNP, pp. 1016-34.

53. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 137-38, misdated November 13, 1924, rather than 1923, which shows that Mitarevsky was not closely familiar with events in Canton. The report is confirmed by Borodin's account of Canton events in Louis Fischer, *The Soviet in World Affairs*, pp. 636-38, apparently based on Borodin's diary; and by Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 37-43; Draft Translation, pp. 45-49; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 34-35, which has a sketch of the speech. The emergency meeting is confirmed in KFNP, p. 1027.

54. Fischer, *The Soviets*, pp. 637-38. Cherepanov gives a more extended account. KFNP does not mention Borodin's meeting with Sun on the 16th, but both mention Sun's letter to Inukai urging Japan to recognize Soviet Russia, which Sun showed to Borodin at their meeting, according to Cherepanov.

55. "Petition to Impeach the Communist Party, Presented by the Kwangtung Branch of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang and Tsung-li's Criticisms and Explanations." Among the signers, Teng Tse-jue had been a Party leader since 1907 and was one of

the most effective fund raisers overseas. Lin Chih-mien had been an active revolutionary since 1909; he had assisted Sun in his escape from the presidential mansion on the night of June 15-16, 1922, and had raised money to effect his return to Canton in 1923. Huang Lung-sheng, Teng Mu-han, and Chao Shih-chin were section heads of the Kwangtung branch office, and Mr. Chao was Sun's appointee as head of the southern government's Supreme Court. Three others had been Overseas Chinese supporters of the revolution as early as 1906.

56. Sun's handwritten reply to "Petition to Impeach the Communist Party." Summarized in KFNP, p. 1037, and translated in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 72-73.

57. Dr. Eugene Wu, director of the Harvard-Yenching Library, kindly gave us a reproduction. The draft constitution was reprinted in HTCP, no. 50, December 29, 1923.

58. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement*, pp. 131-35, appendix 5.

59. KMWH, VIII, 1136-48. This has eighty-six articles in thirteen chapters.

60. Ibid., pp. 1138-39, chapter 4, articles 19-24. While Sun was *Tsung-li* of predecessor organizations, no previous constitution had specified him as Leader.

61. In May 1922, Sun gave Serge Dalin an incredibly large figure for Kuomintang membership, explaining that a recent congress of Chinese students in Shanghai had endorsed him and that his army of 100,000 recognized all the principles of the Kuomintang. Dalin, "The Great Turn," p. 274. In a speech to the Kuomintang Fraternal Conference on October 15, 1923, Sun stated that there were more than 300,000 members. KFCC, III, 264 and 267.

62. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 9, February 24, 1924, p. 9.

63. Ibid., p. 12, for Teng Tse-ju's report that there were about 40,000 new entrants into the Kuomintang in 1921-22, the majority being workers and most of them seamen. Liao Chung-k'ai spoke against incorporating military units into the Party. KMWH, VIII, 1085, minutes of a meeting in Shanghai, December 9, 1923.

64. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 6, December 30, 1923, p. 4 (a telegram from Liao Chung-k'ai in Shanghai); no. 10, March 2, 1924, p. 11 (for Hunan); no. 9, pp. 6, 9, 12 (for other figures).

65. KFNP, pp. 1020-50, for meetings one to fifteen between October 28 and December 8, 1923.

66. KMWH, VIII, 1078-79. Much of the detail was published in the eight issues of *Kuomintang chou-k'an* before the Congress met. The Committee published a Proclamation on the Reorganization of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang in November 1923, reprinted in KMWH, VIII, 1079-80, and translated in Shieh, *The Kuomintang*, pp. 73-74. It also published a Draft of the Party Principles of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang, which emphasized that the basic objective of the Party was to carry out the Three Principles of the People and the Five-Power Constitution of the Leader, Sun Yat-sen, and it briefly elaborated on these. The draft was published on November 20, 1923, reprinted in KMWH, VIII, 1080-84.

67. KMWH, VIII, 1084-87, for minutes of the tenth meeting of the KMT Central Cadre Council, held in Shanghai on December 9, 1923.

68. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 48-53; Draft Translation, pp. 60-66; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 42-45. The quotation is a translation from the Russian, made for us by the late Mrs. Lydia Holubnychy. Cherepanov's information presumably came from a report by Borodin.

69. Kartunova, "The Comintern," p. 308. Translated by Mrs. Holubnychy and discussed in *Michael Borodin*, p. 321.

70. From the minutes of the meeting in the Kuomintang Archives in Taipei.

71. KFNP, p. 1031; also reported by Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 47; Draft Translation, p. 59; *As Military Adviser*, p. 41.

72. KMWH, VIII, 1086.

73. Of the eight commanders mentioned in the early part of the account, Ch'eng Ch'ien and Hsü Ch'ung-chih were graduates from the Shikan Gakko in Tokyo; Fan Shih-sheng was a graduate of the Yunnan Military Academy, as Yang Hsi-min probably was also. T'an Yen-k'ai and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng did not have a military education but certainly were not ex-bandits. Liu Chen-huan, whose early history is obscure, might fit the description. If their "Fan Shi-ming" is Fan Chung-hsiu (T. Hsing-min), he once was a bandit leader in Honan.

74. NA, USDS 893.00/5318, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, November 24, 1923, gives a total of 38,000 troops available to Sun against Ch'en Chiung-ming, "but may be exaggerated." The same figure is in CWR, December 15, p. 113, a Reuters dispatch quoting "well informed sources in Canton." On December 11, Hin Wong listed nine units of allied armies in Canton, said to total 90,000. CWR, December 29, 1923, p. 184.

75. Different reasons have been advanced for Chiang's departure: disagreement with Russian advisers and suspicion of Russia's motives, lack of full authority, uncertainty about finances, and general dissatisfaction with the political trends in Canton. Pao Hui-seng gives the reason as being that Chiang refused to serve under Ch'eng Ch'ien, who was Dr. Sun's first choice to head the new academy. Chang Ching-chiang, according to Pao, went to Canton to persuade Sun to appoint Chiang head of the cacademy. *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, p. 151. Called to our attention by Professor Li Yu-ning.

76. KFNP, p. 1059 for Chiang's appointment and the names of committee members; pp. 1073-74, for the first meeting and preliminary plans; p. 1075, for Chiang's resignation. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 9, February 24, pp. 7-8, for recruitment policy. See Ch'en Hsün-cheng, "Founding of the Party Army," in KMWH, X, 1429-36.

77. Ch'ien Ta-chün, "The Organization of Whampoa Military Academy in Its Initial Period," in KMWH, X, 1465-70. This provides names of principal officers.

78. A general account of the founding of the academy in KMWH, VIII, 1167-68, based on material in the Kuomintang Archives, states that Sun appointed himself leader of the academy, with Chiang Kai-shek as principal. Cherepanov confirms that Sun Yat-sen would be head of the school and Chiang Kai-shek presumably would be deputy director. His statement may be dated sometime in the first three weeks in February 1924. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 85; Draft Translation, p. 110; *As Military Adviser*, p. 70. Cherepanov's account is interlarded with statements hostile to Chiang, probably retrospectively. Scholars in Taiwan and on the mainland both produced volumes of papers on the Whampoa Military Academy in commemoration of the sixty years since its founding: *Huang-p'u chien-hsiao liu-shih chou-nien lun-wen chi*, and *Huang-p'u Chün-hsiao shih-liao*. Both are valuable, but most of our text was completed before they were available. Another recent work is A. Yukevich, "The Huangpu Military School and the Chinese Revolution."

79. KFNP, p. 1086.

80. Ibid., p. 1074, taken from Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo* for February 10, 1924.

81. *Chung-kuo Kuomintang chou-k'an*, nos. 9 and 10.

82. From minutes of a meeting on March 13, 1924, of Shanghai KMT CEC members, read by Professor Li Yu-ning in the Kuomintang Archives. Later recruitment was carried on in four centers, Canton, Shanghai, Peking, and Hankow, according to Ch'en Kuo-fu, "A Page in the History of the Founding of the Army," in KMWH, X, 1455-64.

83. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo* for April 3. Loh, *The Early Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 92-96, for an analysis of the correspondence between Chiang and his colleagues in Canton while Chiang was holding out in Chekiang.

84. Fischer, *The Soviets*, II, 640. This would have amounted to about Chinese $2,700,000. However, the money was passed out in installments. Fischer interviewed Borodin ten times between February 26 and June 4, 1929, as recounted in his autobiography, *Men and Politics*, p. 138.

85. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 412-13, citing several Russian studies, the most important being Kartunova, "V. K. Bliukher in China," pp. 54-55, which is based on Bliukher's diary.

86. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. The Provincial Finance Office, Canton Municipal Finance Office, and the Army Estimates Office were each to provide $5,000 monthly, and the Public Safety Bureau—the Canton police—was to contribute $15,000. See also Wang Cheng-hwa, "A Preliminary Estimate of the Initial Expenses of Whampoa Academy."

87. KMWH, VIII, 1100-1103. Not all the listed delegates actually attended. There is much information about the Congress. *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui hui-i-lu*, "Minutes of the National Congress of the Kuomintang of China"; and "Proceedings of the First Congress," in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ti-i Erh San-tz'u Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui hui-i-k'an*, pp. 3-18. A special issue of *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, January 30, 1924. KMWH, VIII, 1100-60, for list of delegates, election of central committees, Sun Yat-sen's opening speech, main decisions, manifesto, constitution as passed, telegrams, and daily agenda. Eight speeches by Sun Yat-sen to the Congress are in KFCC, III, 340-63; KFNP, 1052-70 for an overview.

88. KFCC, III, 340-44; "Proceedings of the First Congress," pp. 6-9.

89. "Manifesto of the First Congress of Delegates of the Kuomintang of China," KMWH, VIII, 1125-36; and "Manifesto of the First Congress," in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ti-I*, pp. 33-48. Translated in Woo, *The Kuomintang*, pp. 258-69; Li Chien-nung, *Political History*, pp. 450-58; Shieh, *The Kuomintang*, pp. 75-85; Leonard Shihlien Hsu, *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, pp. 120-41.

90. "Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 13.

91. KFCC, IV, 32-35.

92. KMWH, VIII, 1044-47.

93. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 67-71; Draft Translation, pp. 85-92; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 55-58. Cherepanov states that his account is based on Borodin's notes, presumably written at the time.

94. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 176-78. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 78-79; Draft Translation, pp. 99-100; *As Military Adviser*, p. 64.

95. The earliest printed version may be that in *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 10, March 2, 1924, p. 5. The text in Li's handwriting and a printed version are in KMWH, IX, 1243-54; partially translated in Chiang, *Soviet Russia and China*, pp. 26-28, and in Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 109-10.

96. Accounts of the debate, based on minutes of the Congress, are in Chiang Yung-ching, "Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng nien p'u kao," p. 200, and Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 176-82. Also, Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 79-81; Draft Translation, pp. 102-104; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 64-65. These and other sources have been used by Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 341-46.

97. KMWH, VIII, 1105. Among them T'an, Shen, and Lin had worked with Sun Yat-sen before joining the Communist Party. Chang Kuo-t'ao later wrote that he left the Congress early because he opposed Communist joining. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 329-33.

98. KMWH, VIII, 1160-62.

99. Ibid., VIII, 1161-66. The regional groups also had members of the CSC, none of whom were Communists. Chang Kuo-t'ao discusses the work of the Peking Executive Headquarters of the Kuomintang. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 337-38. *Chung-kuo Kuomintang chou-k'an* for February through April 1924 contains much on this devel-

opmental work.

100. Glunin, "Comintern," pp. 266-67, which quotes the resolutions in part.

101. Summarized from the first six of eight resolutions quoted from the Socialist Youth Corps journal, *Ch'ing-nien T'uan t'uan-kan*, no. 7, April 11, 1924, in Su-ch'ing (pseudonym), *Kung-ch'an Tang chih yin-mou ta pao-lu*, pp. 9-13.

102. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Abstracted in Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 17, and KMWH, IX, 1282; translation of the abstract in Kuo, *Analytical History*, I, 395.

103. Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, pp. 6-14. Reprinted from the above-cited Youth Corps Journal in Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang*, pp. 16-17, and KMWH, IX, 1281.

104. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 267, and Glunin, "Grigorii Voitinsky," p. 78.

105. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 267, quoting Voitinsky's letter to Petrov—F. F. Raskolnikov. Translated by Mrs. Lydia Holubnychy.

106. Ibid., pp. 268-69, quoting from *Tang pao*, no. 3, May 20, 1924. Presumably this was the CCP's internal journal. Chang Kuo-t'ao provides a reminiscent account of the Third Plenum in *The Rise*, I, 340-44.

107. Glunin and Chang, as cited.

107a. K. Shevelyov, "Materials on Li Dazhao's Visit to the USSR," pp. 163 and 164, a stenographic report of Li's speech. In an article published on September 13, 1924, Li added: "The task of the Chinese Communist Party is to explain the causes and significance of the civil war to the masses of workers and peasants. Giving its complete support to the revolutionary Southern government in its struggle against foreign imperialism and Chinese counterrevolution, the Chinese Communist Party will organize these masses for class and national battles." Ibid., p. 165.

108. Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 25.

109. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 344-46. The confrontation is also reported in Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 15.

110. KFNP, p. 1092.

111. Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 15.

112. Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang*; also found in Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, pp. 413-21.

113. "Records of the Questions of Central Supervisory Committee Members," pp. 25-30; reprinted in KMWH, IX, 1286-91. Abstracted in KFNP, p. 1099.

114. Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, *T'an-ho Kung-ch'an Tang*, pp. 22-23; KMWH, IX, 1286. KFNP, p. 1101, based on minutes of the fortieth meeting of the CEC.

115. KFNP, p. 1102.

116. The council held its first meeting on July 11, and its initial members were Sun, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, T'an P'ing-shan, Wu Ch'ao-shu, and Shao Yuan-ch'ung. At the second meeting on July 16, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, a Communist close to Borodin, replaced T'an. KFNP, pp. 1103, 1105. Cherepanov stated that Borodin advised Sun to set up the Political Council. *Zapiski*, p. 98; Draft Translation, p. 128; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 87-88. (An account hostile to Hu and Wang.)

117. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 271.

118. Ibid., pp. 271-73.

119. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 324-31; KFNP, pp. 1117-19.

120. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 327-28, based on a secret text in the Kuomintang Archives. Those attending the Political Council meeting were Dr. Sun, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Wu Ch'ao-shu, and Borodin. KFNP, p. 1118.

121. Reprinted in KMWH, XVI, 2773-76, and quoted in part by Li Yün-han,

Ts'ung jung Kung, 330-31. The Resolution on the Problem of Communists within the Party is not given in KMWH, but it may be the one quoted a year later in "Instructions of the Kuomintang of China on the Admission of Communists into Our Party," pp. 81-82. A translation is given in Woo, *The Kuomintang*, pp. 165-66.

122. See Jean Chesneaux, *Les Syndicats Chinois 1919-1927*, pp. 27-35, for list of Canton and Kwangtung labor organizations formed prior to 1927. See also Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 163-67. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, I, has much information on Canton labor up to 1924.

123. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 203, 246; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 273-74. According to Chow, *Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement*, p. 15, Feng was a contributor to a number of student and labor journals in Canton between 1920 and 1925.

124. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 286-87.

125. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 13, March 23, 1924, reporting a meeting of March 1.

126. Ibid., no. 14, March 30, reporting a CEC meeting of March 8.

127. Ibid., no. 17, April 20, reporting meeting of March 27. Propaganda themes are detailed.

128. Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 6, quoting from *Ch'ing-nien T'uan t'uan-k'an*, no. 7, April 11, 1924. We have not identified the *Chi-hsien Kung Hui* (Worthy Workers' Union). ZY was a Communist code for the Socialist Youth Corps.

129. Sun's speech in KFCC, III, 418-25, and in *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 290-97; abstracted in Hsu, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 21-22. Accounts of the celebration in *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 289-90, and Wieger, *Chine Moderne*, V (1924), 267-70. It is not mentioned in KFNP.

130. *Kwang-chow Shih Kung-jen Tai-piao Hui chüeh-i-an*. There are sixteen resolutions and the speech given by Dr. Sun on May Day. Pictures dated May 1 and 8 indicate the dates of the conference. Seen in the Kuomintang Archives. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 286-89, emphasizes the domination of this organization by the Communist Party. Communist domination of the labor movement through Feng Chü-p'o's manipulation is the burden of Tsou Lu's more general account. See Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, pp. 406-407.

131. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 249. According to NCH, September 6, 1924, p. 376, the first battalion of this corps was formally organized on August 26 under KMT auspices with Sze Bok as commander. This was Shih Pu, a labor boss, called a Communist by Su-ch'ing, *Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 23.

132. *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 299-300. Other accounts in Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 95; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 246-47; McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 217 and notes.

133. NYT, June 20, 1924, p. 1 and June 21, p. 15; NCH, June 28, p. 486 and July 5, p. 6.

134. There is much contemporary information on the strike in NYT, NCH, and CWR during July and August. Also NA, USDS 893.5054/39-46, telegrams and dispatches from the American consul general in Canton, dated July 14 to August 19, 1924. PRO (FO 371 F3481/19/10), "Report by Commodore, Hong Kong, for July 1924," dated August 7; and a large file from the Foreign Office, PRO (F259/259/10) sent to the Colonial Office and filed under 129/490 CO 4303. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 247-48; Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 94-95; and *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, II, 317. Chinese accounts stress the anti-imperialist character of the strike.

135. Some details on the Strike Committee are given in NCH, August 9, p. 206, but we have not seen a list of its members.

136. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 251-53.

137. Ch'en, *The Communist Movement*, pp. 117-30, Appendix 4.

138. Holubnychy, *The Comintern and China*, pp. 84-85, translated from Kara-Murza and Mif, *Strategiia i Taktika Kominterna*, p. 47.

139. *Kwangtung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao*, p. 124.

140. See his biography in Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*, II, 720-24; also Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, III, 71-73. On his organizing work, Eto Shinkichi, "Hai-lu-feng—The First Chinese Soviet Government," I, 168-75; and P'eng's own account, "Report on the Haifeng Peasant Movement," translated by Donald Holoch. As an important Communist leader and martyr, P'eng is much celebrated in Chinese works. Two Western books that focus on his work in Hai-feng are Roy Hofheinz, Jr., *The Broken Wave*, and Robert B. Marks, *Rural Revolution in South China*.

141. KFNP, pp. 1070, 1084, for appointments of Lin and P'eng Su-min. P'eng died before August 11, 1924, and was replaced by Li Chang-ta, who was succeeded on October 20 by Huang Chü-su. On November 11, Dr. Sun appointed the overburdened Liao Chung-k'ai to the post. Ibid., pp. 1113, 1141, and 1152; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 174.

142. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 11, March 9, 1924, p. 6. Also in Lo Ch'i-yüan, "Short Report of the Work of This [Farmers] Bureau," pp. 155-56.

143. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 16, April 13, 1924, pp. 4-5. Also in Lo, "Short Report," pp. 156-57.

144. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 257. Probably P'eng took up the post late in March 1924, according to Eto, "Hai-lu-feng," I, 180.

145. "First Proclamation of the Revolutionary Government on the Farmers' Movement."

146. Lo Ch'i-yüan, "Short Report," pp. 158-59, for decisions of the CEC on June 30, 1924.

147. Ibid., pp. 174-76, for details on the first class. Sun's speech in *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 36, August 31, 1924; reprinted in KFCC, III, 460-64, but dated August 23.

148. Lo Ch'i-yuan, "Short Report," pp. 177-87. There is considerable detail on this class. The Third Class did not begin until January 1, 1925.

149. *Kwangtung nung-min*, p. 124. This uses the Communist code word *min* to refer to the Kuomintang.

150. Ibid., p. 53. A map discovered in the Russian consulate after the "Canton Commune" of December 1927 listed regions where peasant unions had been established as of about April 1925, and where some fifty Communists were working. See J. F. Brenan, "A Report on the Results," enclosure 2.

151. Chou Fu-hai, "I Escaped from the Red Capital Wuhan," p. 150. Chou was a member of the Communist Party in 1924. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, p. 407.

152. T. C. Chang, *The Farmers Movement in Kwangtung*, p. 23.

153. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 42.

154. See Brenan, "A Report on the Results," enclosure 2. We deduce the date, April 1925, on the basis of other evidence on the progress of the farmers' movement until then.

155. Ts'ai Ho-shen, "The Kwangtung Farmers Movement on May First This Year," pp. 1034-36; *Kwangtung nung-min*, pp. 64-83, 98-100; "Experiences in the Rent Reduction Movement of the Kwang-ning Farmers."

156. Brenan, "A Report on the Results," enclosure 2.

157. A letter from P'eng Pai is quoted in Ts'ai Ho-shen, "The Kwangtung Farmers Movement," p. 1031, written shortly after P'eng's return to Haifeng.

158. Brenan, "A Report on the Results," enclosure 2. This map gives a total membership in Kwangtung of 169,692 (correct addition 172,182) in 556 associations (correct total 557). This compares with Ts'ai Ho-shen's total of 160,000 as of the time

of his writing, in April 1925. Ts'ai, "The Kwangtung Farmers Movement," p. 1030.

159. Juan Hsiao-hsien devoted much space to these struggles, counting 170 martyrs during the period before May 1926. Juan, "An Outline Report on the Farmers' Struggles," pp. 611-25 and Supplement, pp. 627-28. The KMT journal *Chung-kuo nung-min* has many such items for the same period.

160. KMWH, VIII, 1105. Several other military men were in the first CEC: Generals Li Lieh-chün, Po Wen-wei, Shih Ch'ing-yang, and Hsiung K'o-wu. Li and Po were in Kwangtung but did not then command troops. Shih and Hsiung were in Szechwan. Ibid., pp. 1161-62.

161. *Kuomintang chou-k'an*, no. 15, April 6, 1924. Chu's unit was termed the Centrally Controlled First Corps. Lu was from Szechwan, but whether his troops were mainly from that province is uncertain.

162. KFNP, pp. 1074, 1078, based on Li Chien-nung, *Political History*, p. 459.

163. *Lu Hai Chün Ta-yüan-shuai Ta-pen-ying kung-pao*, reprinted in twelve volumes from June 1922 to June 1925, contains hundreds of pages of accounts of the Generalissimo's Headquarters. When Sun Fo gave up the office of mayor on September 15, 1924, he stated that between April 1923 and June 1924 Canton municipality had contributed not less than $10,000,000 to support of the military. NA, USDS 893.00/5729, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, September 17, 1924. In an interview with George Sokolsky near the end of September, Sun Fo stated that in the eighteen months since April 1923, "we have been forced to contribute $12,000,000 of municipal money to military expenditures." NA, USDS 893.00/5176, Dispatch, Cunningham, Shanghai, October 1, 1924, with clipping from *North China Daily News*, September 29.

164. *The China Year Book, 1923*, p. 594, and NA, USDS 893.00/5445, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, April 26, 1924.

165. NCH, June 7 and 28, 1924, pp. 366, 486; CWR, July 12, p. 202, from Hin Wong in Hong Kong, June 28.

166. NCH, July 19, p. 89; CWR, May 10, p. 396, and July 19, p. 232.

167. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for that date. Chang Ch'i-yün, *Tang shih kai-yao*, I, 349, is the source for the class figures. Two very useful studies of Whampoa Military Academy are by Richard B. Landis, *Institutional Trends at the Whampoa Military School: 1924-1926*, and "Training and Indoctrination at the Whampoa Academy." The book by F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China*, devotes a chapter to the establishment and history of the academy.

168. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for May 9-13, 1924. Ch'ien Ta-chün, one of the original instructors, gives a chart showing top staff, based on his memory, checked by two comrades, in KMWH, X, 1465-67. See also Ch'en Hsün-cheng, "Founding of the Party Army," in KMWH, X, 1429-36.

169. Digests of Chiang's speeches are scattered through his "diary"; more complete texts are found in Chiang Kai-shek, *Chiang Tsung-t'ung chi*, I, 391-451. See Landis, "Training and Indoctrination."

170. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for July 30, 1924, for Chiang's speech and the incident that brought it on.

171. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 90-103; Draft Translation, pp. 115-32; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 73-87.

172. Ibid., pp. 96-97; Draft, pp. 124, 127.

173. A brief biography of Pavel Andreevich Pavlov is in A. V. Blagodatov, *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi Revolutsii 1925-1927 gg*, p. 120. See also Visnyakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vosstavshem Kitae*, pp. 181-82, and Steven I. Levine, trans., *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 159.

174. NCH, June 21, 1924, p. 480, lists Mr. Govoroff and Mr. and Mrs. Borodin and child sailing from Shanghai for Canton on SS Linan on June 15. KFNP, p. 1104,

lists the Russian "Kao-ho-lo-fu" as adviser to the Military Council, appointed by Sun on July 11.

175. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*; KFNP, p. 1104.

176. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 105-106; Draft Translation, pp. 138-39; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 90-91.

177. The drowning was reported in NCH, July 26, 1924, p. 129, and in CWR, August 9, p. 338, where Pavlov's name was revealed. Dr. Sun and many officials attended the funeral service, though this is not mentioned in KFNP. A memorial service for General Pavlov and two Chinese cadets was held at the Military Academy on August 4. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

178. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for August 11.

179. Ibid., summary for July, and September 3; and Ch'en Kuo-fu, "A Page in the History of the Founding of the Army," KMWH, X, 1455-64.

180. According to a recent Soviet scholarly work, the first shipment of Russian arms on the *Vorovsky*, delivered at Whampoa on October 8, 1924, consisted of eight thousand rifles and five hundred cartridges per rifle. A. Yurkevich, "The Huangpu Military School."

181. NA, USDS 893.00/5417, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, March 21, 1924; CWR, June 21, 1924, pp. 82, 100; June 28, p. 134; July 12, p. 179; July 26, p. 278.

182. Accounts of the *Hav* incident are given in Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, pp. 1158-59; Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*; KMWH, X, 1470-71; KFNP, pp. 1111 ff; Li Chien-nung, *Political History*, pp. 464-65; and CYB, 1925-26, pp. 849-50. A series of telegrams and dispatches from the American consul general in Canton concerning the incident are in NA, USDS 893.113H29/1-5. List of arms seized in NCH, August 23, 1924, p. 284, and CWR, September 6, p. 27.

183. Li Chien-nung, *Political History*, pp. 468-70; James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*, pp. 130-32.

184. KFNP, pp. 1124-29.

185. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*; abbreviated in KFNP, p. 1127.

186. KMWH, X, 1489-91; NA, USDS 893.00/5764, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, September 22, 1924, containing clipping from *Canton Gazette* with English version of the proclamation.

187. Accounts of the expedition in KMWH, X, 1484-98 and KFNP, pp. 1128-45.

188. Suggestive are the resignation of Liao Chung-k'ai as minister of finance and the one in charge of supplies on September 23, on the grounds that he was unable to unify finances (KFNP, 1133), and Chiang Kai-shek's request to resign as head of Whampoa Military Academy on September 16 (Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*). Chiang refused to send more than one company of cadets for the expedition. Borodin's stand is uncertain. See Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin*, pp. 449-50. According to Kartunova, "Vasily Bliukher," pp. 46-47, Bliukher believed the first task was to finish off Ch'en Chiung-ming and secure the rear. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai reported the opposition of the CCP in his monograph, *Chung-kuo Ko-ming chung chih cheng-lun wen-t'i*, p. 165. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 274, quotes part of Ch'en's letter to Voitinksy. This is within the framework of Glunin's discussion of continued opposition among the Chinese Communist leadership to working within the Kuomintang. Quotation from Teng's article, on "The Workers' and Peasants Army and the Northern Expedition" in *Chung-kuo kung-jen*, October 1924, from Jean Chesneaux, *Le mouvement ouvrier chinois*, p. 357 n. 5. Also quoted in Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 57. Yuriev discusses Communist opposition to the expedition, pp. 55-58. HTCP, no. 83, September 17, 1924.

189. See Dr. Sun's handwritten instructions to Chiang Kai-shek of October 3, when Sun learned the Russian vessel was nearing Canton, in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*; KMWH, X, 1481-82; KFCC, V, 571. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 110-11; Draft Translation, 145-46; *As Military Adviser*, p. 94. This lists the nine advisers.

190. The name Chia-lun, by which Bliukher was known in Chinese, first appears in Chiang Kai-shek's diary under the date October 8, in a letter from Sun to Chiang in which Sun asked that Galen come to Shao-kuan.

191. *Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Hsien-sheng hui-i-lu*, p. 75. Mr. Wu says he escorted the Russian party back to Canton.

192. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, October 7; KFCC, IV, 343, and V, 571-74.

193. Terms for return of arms are given in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, October 9. For the government's statement, NCH, November 1, p. 186.

194. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, October 9; Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 546-47.

195. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

196. Ibid., October 11.

197. NA, USDS 893.00/5776, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, October 13, 1924. The government presented its case concerning the entire conflict on October 19; account republished in NCH, November 1, p. 186. Also Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, and KMWH, X, 1471.

198. NA, USDS 893.00/5620 Telegram, Bell, Peking, October 16, transmitting Jenkins's telegram from Canton, October 14.

199. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

200. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 115-16; Draft Translation, 151-54; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 97-100.

201. Accounts of the battle from the Nationalist side: Ch'en Hsün-cheng in KMWH, X, 1470-73, and Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, pp. 1159-60. The following cables and dispatches from the American consul general in Canton give on-the-spot reports: NA, USDS 893.00/5620, 5623, 5777, 5798, dating October 15 through 23. Jenkins gave convincing details concerning incendiarism by government troops and looting, and transmitted an estimate of 600 buildings (later revised to 1,100) burned, at a value of HK $30 million. Press accounts in NCH, October 18, p. 107, October 25, pp. 143-44. The Canton government's official account, dated October 19, in NCH, November 1, p. 186.

202. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*, pp. 133-45; Li Chien-nung, *Political History*, pp. 471-75. Julie How's chapter on *Russian Advisers with the Kuominchun, 1925-1926* has been published separately.

203. NA, USDS 893.00/5673, telegram, Gauss, Tientsin, October 24, transmitting radio message from American chargé d'affaires at Peking, October 23, 1924.

204. KFNP, pp. 1144-46; KMWH, X, 1056. On October 27 Chiang Kai-shek received a letter from Sun requesting him to send his new arms to Shao-kuan and laying out strategic plans to strengthen Sun's military position. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

205. Tsou Lu records that "not a few" Party officials opposed Sun's departure. Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, p. 1161. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 345-47, on opposition by some of Dr. Sun's colleagues in North China. Consul General Jenkins learned from a "reliable source" about October 29 that Hu Han-min thought it inadvisable for Sun to go to Peking; he heard rumors on November 3 that "some of Sun's advisers still strongly opposed his going north." NA, USDS 893.00/5812, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, October 29, and 893.00/5709, Telegram, Peking, November 6, transmitting Canton telegram of November 3.

Chinese Communists seem to have been divided on the issue. Ts'ai Ho-shen, editor of the Party's journal, *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, expressed opposition in the issue of October 29, but two weeks later had changed his position. The Communist Party endorsed the trip on November 21. HTCP, nos. 89, 91, and 92, October 29, November 14 and 21, pp. 736, 757, 765-67. However, by November 13 Sun had already departed from Canton. The late Mrs. Holubnychy, making full use of Russian scholarship, found no direct evidence of Borodin's position on Sun's plan to go north. Holub-

nychy, *Michael Borodin*, p. 460.

206. KFCC, IV, 50-54, dated November 10 and signed Sun Wen. Abstracted in KFNP, pp. 1150-51. English version published in *Canton Gazette*, November 13, 1925, and found in NA, USDS 893.00/5845, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, November 15.

207. KFNP, pp. 1146-52.

208. *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ti-erh-tz'u Ch'uan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui hui-i chi-lu*, p. 18; Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, p. 368 n. 25.

209. KFNP, p. 1153.

210. Jerome Ch'en, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Trip to Peking, 1924-25."

211. KFNP, pp. 1166-72.

212. "Fourth Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation."

213. Mif, *Chin-chi shih-chi*, p. 24.

214. P'eng Shu-shih, "The Question of Dr. Sun's Attitude." Pao Hui-seng remarks that Tuan Ch'i-jui had already organized his provisional government and was making arrangements to call a reconstruction conference. Tuan and Feng simply shelved Sun's proposal to call a National Assembly. Their invitation to him to come north to discuss national affairs was to put him at their disposal. He found himself in a position in which he could neither proceed nor retreat. *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, pp. 167-68. Called to our attention by Professor Li Yu-ning.

215. "Manifesto of the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party."

216. The "Brief History" states that Party membership was between 900 and 1,000 and Youth Corps membership was 2,000. Document 1, p. 39. Mif, *Chin-chi shih-chi*, p. 37, gives 994 and 2,365 for Party and Youth Corps membership in January 1925. Kuo, *Analytical History*, p. 150 n. 13. The late Mr. Kuo has an interesting account of the Fourth Congress, reconstructed from secondary sources, pp. 136-39, 147-51.

217. P'eng Shu-chih, "Introduction," p. 48.

218. *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an k'ao tzu-liao*, II, 72-81.

219. Glunin, "Comintern," p. 275.

220. Ibid., pp. 275-76.

221. M. F. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, pp. 99-105.

222. Ibid., pp. 99, 103, based on Resolutions of the Congress.

223. Ibid., p. 104. Yuriev condemns this point as a serious mistake.

224. Kuo, *Analytical History*, p. 138.

225. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 100.

226. Ibid., pp. 101-102. *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*, II, 80-81.

227. Since Communists at this period considered themselves part of the KMT Left Wing, the reference to ideology and propaganda presumably refers to their own; expansion of the Left Wing organizationally presumably referred to both the Communist and the non-Communist Left.

228. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 102.

229. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan Tang t'ung-chih shu*, p. 3. Ch'en says he was unanimously opposed by the Comintern's representative and comrades in the Central Committee.

230. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 104, apparently based on secondary sources. According to Doc. 14, p. 2, which dates from October 1925, relations between the departments of the Central Committee were unsatisfactory, and committees on the labor, peasant, and military movements were still to be established.

231. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 100, apparently based on a resolution.

232. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 705 n. 2.

233. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang chih t'ou-shih*, pp. 61-62. This Kuomintang intelligence source lists the following as the new Central Committee of the CY: Chang

T'ai-lei, Yün Tai-ying, Jen Pi-shih, Ho Ch'ang, Chang Ch'iu-jen, Liu Po-chuang, Liu Erh-sung, Hsia Hsi, and Hsü Cheng-t'ing, and the following alternates: Chang Po-chien, Lin Yü-nan, Li I, Liu Ch'ang-ch'ün, and Ch'en Chiao-nien. Document 2, on the Youth Corps, says nothing about this Congress or change of name.

234. KFNP, p. 1178, lists the members in late January as Wang Ching-wei, Yü Yu-jen, Wu Ching-heng (Wu Chih-hui), Li Yü-ying (Li Shih-tseng), Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen), and Li Ta-chao. Mr. Chen was not a member of either committee. Chang Kuo-t'ao, an alternate member of the Central Executive Commitee, recalls that he was a member of the Emergency Political Council, and that it met twice a week. He adds the names of Ting Wei-fen and Wang Fa-ch'in and states that Borodin attended the meetings. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 387.

235. Glunin, "Comintern", p. 280.

236. KFNP, pp. 1196-97, and Jerome Ch'en, "The Left Wing Kuomintang—A Definition." A photographic reproduction of the Testament appears as a frontispiece in *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, vol. 2, no. 9 (March 15, 1925); it is also reproduced in volume 2 of KFNP. For the text, see Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, p. 278, and many other sources.

237. "Sun Yat-sen's Farewell Messages." The Chinese text of Sun's letter is given in several editions of his collected works and in Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo hsin min-chu-chu-i ko-ming shih*, pp. 55-56. For the Rosta version, which differs somewhat from the Moscow English version, see NA, USDS 893/6198.00, Dispatch, Ferdinand Mayer, Peking, April 11, 1925, containing a clipping from *The Far Eastern Times*, March 18. A polished version appeared in *The New York Times*, May 24, 1925.

238. "Sun Yat-sen's Farewell Messages," and Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, "Letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang," March 15, 1925.

Chapter 3

The Revolution Heats Up

Sun Yat-sen left no instructions regarding a successor as leader of the Kuomintang, and the Party's recently adopted constitution had no provision for choosing one. With Dr. Sun's approaching death, and after his passing, the problem of succession and of basic policies became crucial.

Discord in the Kuomintang

As early as February 15, 1925, Voitinsky wrote to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that "in case of the death of Sun it is necessary that you prepare a Manifesto not only to the masses in general but also to the CC of the Kuomintang, in which you will call for rallying around the platform adopted at the I Congress of the Kuomintang. Now it is necessary for us to adhere to the line of strengthening the left-wing Kuomintang members since the rightists are speedily and energetically organizing themselves and are rallying around themselves the anti-nationalist elements outside the Kuomintang. The next plenum of the Kuomintang might force us to resort to a split with the right wing. We should be prepared for that."[1]

Conservative leaders in the Kuomintang were indeed attempting to reverse some of the radical tendencies in the party during Dr. Sun's last year in Canton. Feng Tzu-yu, an influential leader among overseas Chinese and a long-time revolutionary associate of Dr. Sun, but an opponent of the policy of admitting Communists into the Kuomintang, journeyed to Peking and in January rallied anti-Communist members into an "Alliance to Protect the Kuomintang." In Shanghai a group of Kuomintang leaders started a movement to promote the venerable politician, T'ang Shao-yi, as Dr. Sun's successor. They were hoping to expel Communists from the Kuomintang. On March 8, Feng Tzu-yu and some other veterans organized in Peking a Kuomintang Comrades Club and on April 1 issued a manifesto opposing the Central Executive Committee, the Kwangtung government, and the Chinese Communist faction.[2]

These activities evoked a strong reaction from Kuomintang leaders in Canton as well as from the Chinese Communist Party. The seventieth meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, but including few of its members, voted on April 14 to expel Feng Tzu-yu, Ma Su, and Chiang Wei-fan and to warn Peking that the Kuomintang Comrades Club had no relation to the Kuomintang of China. Three articles in the Communist journal, *Hsiang-tao*, denounced the "counterrevolutionary" movement of Feng and his associates.[3] Later the group was labeled by its opponents as the "old right wing," or simply "reactionaries," to distinguish its members from a "new right wing" that emerged in the later months of 1925. Our Document 15, dating in October 1925, is a Communist Party Central Committee resolution on dealing with such opposition groups in the Kuomintang.

Late in March Borodin expressed to the ECCI his desire for a split in the Kuomintang in order to drive away the rightists, and he wanted this done as soon as possible, according to Glunin, who apparently had access to original files. Borodin explained that after the split the correlation of forces in the Kuomintang "will favor us." He discounted the Right Wing as "completely incapable of undertaking any sort

of organized actions" since they were torn by contradictions. Comintern policy, however, called for a united anti-imperialist front in China. Borodin asked for instructions: "For the centrists it is still an undecided question whether the moment has already arrived when imperialism may seem to this bourgeoisie less dangerous for its interests than the growing class struggle of the workers. To me personally it seems that the Chinese bourgeoisie has been spoiled by its cooperation with foreign capital, that it is more an instrument of imperialism in China than a possible instrument of national liberation of China. The Chinese bourgeoisie was engendered within the compradore system, and till now it has not ridden itself of this character. Precisely because of this, the right-wing Kuomintang members representing the interests of Chinese bourgeoisie have always been against our anti-imperialist policy line and against class struggle of the workers. In connection with this a question of tremendous importance arises—should we adopt a policy of struggle also against the Chinese bourgeoisie (I mean the struggle by the Kuomintang, not by the Chinese Communist Party; for the latter, of course, the question is solved), that is, should we crush the centrists' illusions—their hopes that the Chinese bourgeoisie will support the national revolutionary movement? On this question we request your directives."[4]

Apparently no reply was forthcoming until late May, and then only in the form of two ambiguous speeches by Stalin on the national and colonial question made on May 9 and 18, 1925. Voitinsky was apparently less optimistic than Borodin about the outcome of a struggle within the Kuomintang. He cautioned against the strength of the Right Wing and advised that at first only the most ardent rightists be expelled.[5]

Chinese Communists in Moscow and Canton

The University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow enrolled hundreds of Chinese students after its establishment in late 1921. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai taught there, and at least twenty other leaders of the Chinese Communist movement studied there, including Chang T'ai-lei, Ch'en Yen-nien, Jen Pi-shih, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lo I-nung, and Wang I-fei. This was before the Soviet government set up Sun Yat-sen University in the autumn of 1925. Chinese students were frequently enrolled in the Socialist Youth Corps or the Chinese Communist Party branch in Moscow. Document 13 is a guide for training such enrollees, probably dating before February 1925, when the name of the junior organization in China was changed from Socialist to Communist Youth Corps. It is a remarkably interesting and early example of this form of CCP indoctrination. The spirit emanating from the documents seems very similar to that in the final decisions relating to the Communist Party Constitution passed at the Second Congress of the Party in July 1922, discussed in chapter 1. Constant indoctrination of youthful recruits to the Youth Corps and the Communist Party was an essential element in the discipline and dedication that marked many of the members during the next several years.

The guide is a set of thirty-four hortatory maxims arranged under four headings. No doubt the Chinese students memorized them, as their earlier education had taught them to do. The first heading, "Systematize Thought and Study—Oppose Romanticism," urged the neophytes to convert themselves, to "cultivate a pure revolutionary philosophy of life and self-conscious training." For, they were told, they came from a Chinese petty bourgeois background and had inherited old concepts from their patriarchal society. Now they must stand firmly on class grounds and destroy family, local, and national concepts, for the proletariat has no family, no local or national limitations. The second group of exhortations called for personal and party discipline, elimination of the bad habits of the intelligentsia, students, and the entire petty bourgeoisie. The students must become "thorough proletarian revolutionaries." They were at all times to correct each other's errors of thought and action and

cultivate close relations with comrades in order to achieve solidarity. They must cultivate perseverence in order to struggle for the interests of the proletariat, be constant propagandists, yet be extremely cautious in action outside the organization, never divulging the Party's secrets. The third group of maxims urged the students to oppose individualism and the concept of private property. The organization's interest must be theirs, they must trust the organization completely and absolutely collectivize and adapt their own lives and will to the masses. Furthermore, they must reform themselves of all personality defects, such as craftiness, dishonesty, pride, and love of glory. They must be calm and composed and observe facts with a cool head, be firm and positive in spirit and skillful in tactics in carrying out their work. The last group concerned service to their cause. "Aside from revolution, Communist members have no other profession—we are professional revolutionaries."

In Canton, many young Communists were admitted to the early classes of the Whampoa Military Academy or were recruited there. A report by the Kwangtung Regional Socialist Youth Corps' Organization Bureau stated that the Corps numbered 240 members as of January 1, 1925, of whom 31 were at Whampoa. Presumably these were younger cadets. They were organized into five small groups and met once a week; the heads of the small group also met weekly. These leaders reported only to the Communist Party, because the military movement was under the control of the Party, not the Corps. Estimates of the total number of Communists among the Whampoa cadets vary widely, but a scholar in Taiwan using a variety of Kuomintang and Communist sources has been able to name forty in the First Class, nineteen in the Second, and twelve in the Third, which was enrolled on January 1, 1925. These seventy-one are ones who left some mark.[6] Among members of the First Class were such later important Communist commanders or political officers as Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Chiang Hsien-yün, Chou Shih-ti, Li Chih-lung, Ch'en Keng, Tso Ch'üan, Wang I-ch'ang, and Yang Ch'i-kang. In the Second were Chou I-ch'ün, Wu Chen-min, Lu Te-ming, and Wang I-fei.

Several important Communists became political instructors or middle-level commanders at Whampoa and in the training regiments by early 1925. The most influential of them was Chou En-lai, a student leader in the May Fourth period, who came to Canton from nearly four years in France and Germany, where he had been a leader in the Chinese Communist Party branch in France but had also joined the Kuomintang. He was then twenty-six years old. Exactly when he joined the staff of Whampoa is unclear. We know from Document 5, Borodin's Report on the Revolutionary Committee dated October 14, 1924, that by then Chou had so well established himself in Canton as to be included in a powerful committee set up to suppress the Merchants' Corps. About this time he became deputy to Tai Chi-t'ao, head of the Political Department of the academy. In November he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Kwangtung Regional Committee and its Military Committee. By March 1925, during the Eastern Expedition (discussed below), Chou was head of the academy's Political Department, and head of East River affairs, that is, Kuomintang affairs in eastern Kwangtung.[7]

The academy had a Kuomintang branch among the students almost from its inception. Communists were active in it. Under Chou En-lai's leadership, Communist students in the academy also organized a Communist Party branch. Its secretary was Chiang Hsien-yün, who had been a labor organizer at Anyuan together with Liu Shao-ch'i before becoming, at age twenty-three, a cadet. In October 1924, the Kuomintang created another organization, the Young Men's Military Society, to recruit promising members of other armies around Canton. After a slow start, Communists began to dominate the society.[8] Toward the end of 1924, Communists organized the Spark Society to recruit Whampoa cadets. Many from the Second Class, which entered on August 1, joined it.[9] On February 1, 1925, the Young Men's Mili-

tary Society was reorganized with four convenors, Chiang Hsien-yün (a Communist), Tseng K'uo-ch'ing and Ho Chung-han (KMT), and Ho Wei-neng (uncertain). Now named the League of Chinese Military Youth, it began publishing *Chung-kuo chün jen* (The Chinese Soldier) and *Ch'ing-nien chün-jen* (Military Youth). By then eight graduates of the first two classes, Communists, were members of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang branch in the academy and directed the League. Pao Hui-seng remembered that the League developed very quickly under Communist leadership. Nearly every unit in Kwangtung was directly or indirectly influenced, and the League played an important role in the battles to crush the Yunnan and Kwangsi troops in 1925. According to another Chinese Communist source, by April 1925 the League had a membership of over two thousand.[10] It soon came into conflict with conservatives in the Kuomintang and its army.

A. I. Cherepanov was an instructor at Whampoa and remembers working with many Communists there. He recalled, "The Communists worked at Whampoa energetically, and yet guardedly, taking into account the political mood of the majority of the students. The result of their activity became noticeable right away. Nikolai Tereshatov liked to repeat, 'A phantom is stalking Whampoa—the phantom of Communism.' " Late in 1924 some Communist cadets organized a "Spark" society in the academy, and it came to have sixty members. In February 1925 a branch of the League of Chinese Military Youth was opened there. The first issue of its journal, *Ch'ing-nien chün*, was published on February 7. Members of the Communist Party dominated the league.[11]

Cherepanov also recalled vividly the revolutionary atmosphere in Canton in 1925, on the first anniversary of the death of Lenin, January 21, with mass meetings in the evening. Liao Chung-k'ai and General Bliukher spoke in praise of Lenin and revolution, leaders of the Kwangtung farmers' movement told of six propagandists who had lost their lives, a student at Whampoa recounted the deeds of the executed leaders of the striking workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway, and delegations of worker's unions, sailors, and peasants carrying signs and banners ascended the podium and laid wreaths by Lenin's portrait. Those present received photographs of Lenin, Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and Sun Yat-sen, and a Chinese translation of the "International."[12] Clearly, preparations for the memorial meetings had not been neglected.

The First Eastern Expedition and Establishment of the Party Army, February-April 1925

In the winter of 1924-25, after Dr. Sun's departure from Canton, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming began to prepare a comeback. He headed a coalition of generals and military units in eastern Kwangtung, allegedly numbering some 50,000 men. The principal commanders were Yeh Chü, Yang K'un-ju, Hung Chao-lin, and Lin Hu.[13] Ch'en may have been supported financially by merchants of Canton after their defeat by Dr. Sun's forces in mid-October. He assigned three fronts: Yeh Chü commanding the center, Hung Chao-lin the left (south), and Lin Hu the right. Yang K'un-ju garrisoned the fortress of Hui-chow.

In January, the forces available to the Canton government were formed into an "Allied Army" under the titular command of General Yang Hsi-min. General Bliukher also envisaged three fronts: on the north, two Yunnanese corps under Fan Shih-sheng, facing Lin Hu; in the center, the Kwangsi army of Liu Chen-huan to attempt to capture Hui-chow; and on the south, several units of the Kwangtung Army and the two Whampoa training regiments, under the command of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih. The latter force was to clear the Canton-Kowloon railway and then advance on a route near the southern coast to seize Ch'ao-chow and Swatow. The Yunnan and Kwangsi armies did little fighting, but the southern wing carried through its mission

in about six weeks. This group numbered something over 10,000 men when all were committed, of which the Whampoa contingents commanded by Chiang Kai-shek probably were fewer than 3,000 and without battle experience. Document 3 gives a brief account of the campaign: "Toward the beginning of the eastern campaign . . . Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in bringing to the front two regiments, well supplied, disciplined, and so thoroughly trained in the political sense that they could hold firmly enough at the front, and did not loot the population. . . . The 'Party troops' became at once very popular with the local population. The Cantonese army of Hsü Ch'ung-chih and the 'Party troops' acquired the fame of being conquerors of Ch'en Chiung-ming" (Doc. 3, p. 6).

The first phase of the Eastern Expedition, which began early in February 1925, was the successful clearing of the railway that runs to Kowloon, and the drive eastward through T'an-shui to Hai-feng, and thence on to Ch'ao-chow and Swatow, which were captured March 5-7. Ch'en Ch'iung-ming fled to Hong Kong. On March 1, however, General Fan Shih-sheng withdrew his troops facing Lin Hu, taking them off to Kwangsi to block an attack on Canton from forces sent by the Yunnan governor, T'ang Chi-yao.

The second phase of the Eastern Expedition saw the defeat of Lin Hu's forces, which threatened the rear of the troops that had pushed rapidly to Swatow. Part of these troops wheeled back and met and defeated Lin's forces at Mien-hu in a fierce and costly battle in which the First Regiment of the Academy Army distinguished itself. The victors then pursued their enemies northeastward, taking Wu-hua and Hsing-ning on March 18-20, while the Kwangtung Second Division captured Mei Hsien on the 22d. Most of the remnants of Lin Hu's army retreated to the Kiangsi border while troops of Hung Chao-lin and Yeh Chü found haven in Fukien. About April 20, Yang K'un-ju surrendered the Hui-chow fortress to the Yunnan Army on the promise of his troops being incorporated into it. Thus the area under sway of the Canton government was extended into eastern Kwangtung.

The Soviet military advisers played an important part in this campaign, according to Cherepanov's detailed and vivid account. Twenty of them participated.[14] General Bliukher devised the general strategy and persuaded the Chinese generals to adopt it; he accompanied the field commander, General Hsü Ch'ung-chih, and offered day-to-day tactical advice. General V. A. Stepanov was adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek, a difficult assignment. (The ranks of the Russian officers probably were elevated to add to their prestige.) Cherepanov accompanied General Ho Ying-ch'in, commander of the First Infantry Regiment, the former First Training Regiment at Whampoa. He was assisted by artillery expert General Timothy A. Beschastnov and cavalryman Colonel Nikulin. Colonel Pallo (or Pollo) advised General Wang Ma-yu, commander of the Second Infantry Regiment from Whampoa, assisted by Colonel N. G. Vasillev. General I. Zil'bert served as adviser to General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, commander of a brigade of gendarmes. General Chang Ming-ta, commanding an infantry division of the Kwangtung army, had Shneider as his civilian political adviser. General E. A. Yakovlev and Colonel Vasillev were engineering experts; Colonel M. I. Dratvin was the communications specialist. Admiral Smirnov advised the commanders of a river gunboat flotilla, which proved ineffective. These and other advisers marched with the troops, some covering 750 kilometers, and fought in some of the battles, at considerable danger. Cherepanov contracted dissentary. Before the campaign was over it was steaming hot in eastern Kwangtung.

The high morale and good discipline of the Academy Army showed the effects of political indoctrination and training under Russian advisers. Good relations between the Academy Army and the populace was another important feature of the campaign. The troops were strictly forbidden to loot, to requisition food and housing, to impress porters, or to force military script upon merchants. Party representatives

attached to each unit down to company level tried to uphold these ideals. Before the campaign began, hundreds of thousands of proclamations and leaflets were prepared for distribution by propaganda squads that went forth in advance of the troops or accompanied them. Their job was to win the people's support through rallies, speeches, and distribution of posters and other propaganda. The effort to create unity between troops and the people paid off, as farmers acted as guides, message carriers, spies, and porters. Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary" contains lively vignettes of the work of the Propaganda Corps and the popular response.[15] An impartial student of the farmers' movement in Kwangtung reports that in the area of Hai-feng, Lu-feng, and Wu-hua, organizers directed a farmers' corps to help the revolutionary troops in transport, secret service, and labor. They attacked the rear of Ch'en's armies, interrupted communications, and seized enemy supplies. P'eng Pai had arrived back in Hai-feng, where he had previously developed a farmers movement, on February 28, the day after the city had been taken by the revolutionary army. He worked to restore his shattered movement.[16]

Three of the six Party representatives in the battalions of the First and Second Regiments were Communists. The Propaganda Corps had a mixture of members, but the Communist Party sent its own cadres into conquered areas to organize farmers associations and labor unions.[17] Competition soon broke out between activists in both camps—"pure Kuomintang members" and those "straddling" both parties. Cherepanov relates that the commissar of the First Regiment, Miao Pin, organized within his unit "a department of a so-called Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, which perverted the revolutionary character of the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, and came out against the unity of the national front." Li Chih-lung, a Communist commissar of the 2d Battalion, came out in opposition to Miao. On this, Chiang Kai-shek immediately transferred Li to Whampoa. Miao then tried to organize a department of the Society in the Second Regiment, but he "received a due rebuff from the regiment's commissar," as Cherepanov put it.[18] The most probable date for this emergence of an anti-Communist organization within the army seems to be between April 12 and 24, according to the deductions of Professor Li Yün-han. This was an early sign of a very bitter conflict between two factions in the emerging revolutionary army. Chiang Kai-shek's position in this conflict seems ambiguous. According to Pao Hui-seng, Chiang made a speech at a banquet held in Ch'ao-chou in honor of officers who participated in the campaign, in which he said: "Although counter-revolutionary forces are very powerful, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party are cooperating and we have the support of the people of the whole country. The Leader is dead, but there still is Adviser Borodin to lead us." Therefore, Kuomintang rightists accused Chiang of joining the Communist Party, according to Pao.[19]

The units fighting in eastern Kwangtung captured large stocks of equipment, which helped in the later expansion of the National Revolutionary Army. Cherepanov lists 12-13,000 rifles, 110 machine guns, 30 ancient cannons, 6 modern mountain guns, 8 million cartridges of various guages, and 1,500 shells. Of this booty, the Academy Army got about one-third. These arms would be useful, for Moscow had just given General Bliukher 450,000 roubles for the formation of new units.[20] The officers and troops of the two regiments gained valuable battle experience, and Chiang Kai-shek's prestige grew. On April 13, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee resolved to reorganize the Academy Army as the Party Army, and on May 1 it appointed Chiang Kai-shek its commander.

The campaign revealed many defects. The command situation was confused, participating units were not organized on a common basis, communications were poor, and there was a deficiency of maps and geographical information.[21] Document 6 is a letter from Bliukher to Chiang Kai-shek written on April 6, 1925, pointing out the weakness of the system of communications between units of the army and between

commanders and their troops. He proposed that a special class be set up at Whampoa to train communications specialists, and he offered the services of Colonel Dratvin as chief instructor for the course. "According to this plan, a sufficient number of officers trained for military communications work should definitely be available within two or three months. They are indispensable in organizing a new army and in modern military operations," he wrote (Doc. 6, p. 28).

General Bliukher became convinced that the revolutionary army must be reorganized. Document 3 states that "The National Revolutionary Government, having become considerably stronger on account of the victories in the eastern part of the province (spring 1925), at last felt itself in a strong enough position to enter upon the execution of first measures in connection with the reorganization of the 'allied armies.' . . . The final goal of the Government was the creation of a unified National Revolutionary Army" (Doc. 3, p. 6).

The Eastern Expedition weakened the position of the Kuomintang leaders in Canton, since the most loyal troops were off in the newly conquered territories. This left Canton and its neighboring towns more firmly under the control of the Yunnan and Kwangsi forces. Hu Han-min headed a government that had little power to govern. The Yunnan and Kwangsi commanders tended to monopolize tax revenues. They were thought to be conspiring to overthrow the Leftist leaders.

Creation of a Provincial Farmers' Association and a National Labor Union

Communists were very active in Canton. The first week in May saw two important congresses in the city—the National Labor Congress and a Congress of Delegates of Farmers' Associations in Kwangtung. They were preceded by a rally on April 28, organized by the League of Chinese Military Youth, and by May Day parades of labor unions, local farmers, and Whampoa cadets. Goals are clear in the May Day Proclamation issued by the Kwangtung Regional Committee of the CCP and the Regional Committee of the Communist Youth Corps (whose name had recently been changed from Socialist Youth Corps). The proclamation demanded freedom to organize labor and farmers, and their freedom of speech and publication; freedom for strikes and rent reduction efforts; the organization of farmers' guards; unlimited right of workers and farmers to elect for, and be elected to, the National Assembly; workers to have the eight-hour day and farmers to have ceilings on rent; and control over workplaces and farmlands, forests, and waste lands established by foreigners in China. The slogans contained the familiar chants—overthrow imperialism and its running dogs, the warlords, officials, capitalists, landlords, bullies, and labor thieves—now adding to these enemies the Kuomintang Right Wing. Workers and farmers unitedly arise! Workers and farmers should join their own party—the Chinese Communist Party! Support the Kuomintang, the Kwangtung Revolutionary Government, and the genuine revolutionary army! *Wan-sui* for the Second National Labor Congress, the Kwangtung Farmers' Association, and the great unity of workers and farmers! The opening ceremonies for the two congresses were held jointly with "revolutionary students" and representatives of the League of Chinese Military Youth as guests. This show of unity was a manifestation of a theme pressed by the Communist Party for unity of workers, peasants, and soldiers, a theme stressed in the resolutions of both congresses. The League had elected a delegate to the committee that drafted the resolutions to be adopted at the Labor Congress.[22]

Some 117 delegates attended the First Congress of Representatives of Kwangtung Farmers, said to represent 160,000 to 210,000 farmers organized into associations in twenty-two *hsien* in Kwangtung.[23] The delegates passed resolutions and adopted a constitution. The resolutions stressed the themes of unity with Soviet Russia against

imperialism and warlordism; leadership of the revolution by the proletariat in alliance with poor peasants and soldiers; and entrance of farmers into the Kuomintang to struggle against counterrevolutionary cliques within it. The ills of farmers were attributed to oppression by imperialism, warlords, capitalists, landlords, and gentry. To alleviate the lot of hired farm laborers, tenants, and owner-farmers, oppressive rents and the high cost of borrowing should be eliminated. But "true liberation" could only come after the revolution. The Congress also adopted a constitution for a province-wide organization as a step toward a National Farmers' Association. The organization was to be independent of all outside control. The constitution described a four-level structure from *hsiang* to province, each controlled by an executive committee subordinate to the committee at the next higher level. Membership was open to owner cultivators, part-owners, tenants, hired farm hands, and village workers, but it excluded landlords owning 100 or more *mou* of land and other specified undesirables such as "those whose position was in conflict with the interests of farmers." A General Outline for Organizing Farmers' Self-Defense Forces envisaged two types of corps. "Vigilent Corps" stayed in their localities to protect their respective farmers' associations, while "Virtuous Brave Corps" could be sent to assist neighboring *ch'ü* and county associations. These forces were to be under the control of the local association's executive committee, but countywide corps would be directed by a Military Affairs Bureau of the provincial association. The Congress announced its joining the Red International of Peasants (Krestintern).[24]

The Second National Labor Congress met from May 2 to 8 and laid the basis for the Chinese National General Labor Union (Chung-hua Ch'üan-kuo Tsung Kung Hui). The meeting was an effort to unite modern unions into a single federation. The "Brief History" (Doc. 1, p. 41) mentions "the fact that the Chinese labor movement had left the embryonic phase and was becoming a definite force with an important role to play in the future," although it provides little information about the meeting, which it entitles the "First National Labor Congress." According to Teng Chung-hsia and Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Congress was organized by the Communist Party.[25] Invitations were issued in the names of the National General Railway Union, the Federation of Chinese Seamen's Unions, the General Union of Han-Yeh-P'ing, and the Canton Conference of Labor Delegates. Communist organizers were influential in each. Approximately 280 delegates attended, representing 166 unions with a membership of 540,000 workers, but these figures may have been inflated. Several strong labor organizations in Canton and other cities declined to send delegates, fearing that the Congress would be dominated by radicals. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the important resolutions and the constitution had been prepared in advance by the Labor Movement Committee of the Communist Party's Central Committee.[26]

Teng Chung-hsia presented a basic policy statement, and the resolutions adopted gave effect to the policies he enunciated. Labor must be organized as a class to fight capitalism. Teng advocated organization by industry on a local, regional, and national basis, and the reorganization of craft unions into industrial unions. Such unions should include all workers in a single industry, irrespective of their particular occupational roles. He described a structure beginning with cells within part of a factory which elect management committees; these in turn organize factorywide unions, which organize citywide federations of unions in the particular industry, and such federations unite nationally. All national unions unite in one class organization to overthrow the capitalist enemy. The final goal of all economic struggles should be the overthrow of capitalism and "true liberation." The chief immediate necessity was freedom to organize; hence Teng proposed that labor demand repeal of all antistrike regulations and peace preservation laws, and oppose government regulation of unions. He argued that the proletariat must join the National Revolution for its own ends: overthrow of capitalist imperialism and its instruments, the feudal militarists. The

proletariat must restrict the power of the capitalist class in the National Revolution so that in the future labor may establish a workers' government. "Therefore, we join the National Revolution to take political power." Teng linked the domestic political struggle with the worldwide struggle of the proletariat against capitalism and of the colonial and semicolonial peoples against imperialism. The Congress passed a resolution on "The Alliance of Workers and Farmers" and resolved to join the Red International of Workers.[27]

The Congress adopted a constitution for a National General Labor Union designed to unify all organized labor into a single national confederation. According to the constitution, the highest organ was the National Congress, which elected a twenty-five-man Executive Committee, supreme after the Congress closed. The Executive Committee had functional offices to direct aspects of the labor movement, and could set up Special Management Offices elsewhere to oversee unionization in localities. One article stated: "All unions should carry out the decisions and orders of the National Congress and Executive Committee." Each union was to make a monthly financial contribution, and the Executive Committee was to lay special levies when necessary. The National Union could appeal for funds from outside supporters.[28] The Congress also passed a resolution "expelling labor thieves" and named nineteen of them; they were to be attacked by propaganda distributed by all unions, and each union should organize a guard to oppose "thieves" by force.[29]

The Congress elected the twenty-five-man Executive Committee; twenty-three were Communists, according to a hostile source.[30] The Executive Committee chose Lin Wei-min of the Seamen's Union as president, Liu Shao-ch'i of the Han-Yeh-P'ing General Union and Liu Wen-sung of the General Railway Union as vice presidents. It appointed Teng Chung-hsia as secretary and head of the Propaganda Bureau, Li Shen (Li Ch'i-han) as head of the Organization Bureau, and Sun Yün-peng as head of the Economic Bureau. All were members of the Communist Party. The National General Labor Union was formally established on May 18, 1925 with its headquarters in Canton.[31] Almost immediately the leadership was drawn into a struggle to direct the great anti-imperialist movement in Shanghai, resulting from the May 30th Incident.

The League of Chinese Military Youth also held a congress, its first, on May 17, 1925. On June 3 the League's Executive Committee held its tenth meeting, where Standing Committee member Wang I-fei stated that bureaus of the League had been set up in Manchuria, North China, the Yangtze provinces, and the Southwest. Li Chih-lung was appointed to the Standing Committee.[32] The League, too, aspired to become nationwide.

Third Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee

During May 1925 some Kuomintang leaders in Swatow were laying plans to bring troops back from eastern Kwangtung to drive out the Yunnanese Army of General Yang Hsi-min and the Kwangsi troops of General Liu Chen-huan. The political situation in Canton became tense, and by May 22 Hu Han-min and other members of the civil government had withdrawn to Honam Island under the protection of Li Fu-lin and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. It was during this critical period that some members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee met for the Third Plenum, from May 18 to 25. A manifesto announced the acceptance of Sun Yat-sen's Will as the Kuomintang's guide, and the CEC declared that all who accepted it would be considered comrades. The Party would continue its revolutionary struggle against imperialism and warlords, and continue to aid the masses of farmers and workers. The plenum confirmed the policy of admission of Communists to the Kuomintang and affirmed the intention to fight imperialism hand in hand with Soviet Russia. It cited Sun Yat-sen's letter to

Soviet Russia (read to him and signed the day before his death) as the basis for the Manifesto on the Current Situation. In this, the CEC declared that Soviet Russia had abolished the unequal treaties between Russia and China on the one hand, and, on the other hand, had supported the struggle of the Chinese people in the movement for abolition of the unequal treaties. The Third Plenum also adopted resolutions on reorganization of the army with the warning that all who opposed would be dealt with severely. According to Wang Ching-wei, the plenum also decided to keep the Political Council.[33]

The radical tone of the manifestos, the reaffirmation of admission of Communists into the Kuomintang, and the reassertion of close relations with Soviet Russia mark the reassemblage of a Leftist leadership in Canton and their defiance of the Party's conservatives.

Effects of the May 30 Incident on the National Revolution

On Saturday, May 30, hundreds of Chinese students from several colleges in Shanghai paraded into the commercial center of the International Settlement to protest the shooting of rioting Chinese workers in a Japanese textile factory about two weeks before, in which a worker had been slain. The students were also protesting against four proposed changes in the bylaws of the Settlement, which, if passed by a vote of the foreign rate-payers, would increase the Municipal Council's authority over Chinese activities in the Settlement. The student demonstration had been carefully planned and had been advocated at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on May 28, yet the students articulated a broadly shared nationalist and anti-imperialistic sentiment.[34] They passed out handbills and harangued on street corners near the Louza police station on Nanking Road. The British police inspector in charge of the station received an order to stop the demonstrations, which contravened Settlement regulations, and he sent out a few Chinese, British, and Sikh police to do so. The police arrested some students and brought them to the Louza station; they were followed by groups of students demanding to be arrested also. More arrests led to clashes between the police and Chinese students and spectators. Soon a large Chinese crowd had assembled on Nanking Road and was pressing toward the station against the efforts of police to hold it back.

As the angry crowd approached the entrance, Inspector Everson ordered it to stop, and then almost immediately he commanded his squad of Chinese and Sikh police to fire. Four Chinese in the front ranks were killed instantly, and at least eight more died of their wounds subsequently. Five or six of the slain were students, ranging in age from fourteen to twenty-three; one was a leader of the Communist Youth Corps in Shanghai University, a radical institution operated by the Kuomintang but having many Communists on its faculty.[35]

In the following weeks student groups in many Chinese cities played a decisive role in stimulating nationalistic sentiment by street demonstrations, agitation among workers and merchants, and fiery propaganda. The anti-imperialist movement of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party achieved national proportions; anti-imperialist demonstrations occurred in at least twenty-eight cities in the following weeks, and the Chinese press was filled with resolutions by Chinese in all walks of life supporting the students and the general strike in Shanghai that began on June 1. Similar expressions of sympathy abroad exercised some influence upon governments of countries having special rights in China, causing reassessment of policies.[36] The prestige of the Kuomintang, as the leading nationalist party in China, was much enhanced. The Chinese Communist Party found its membership growing rapidly, and it was also able to organize a large labor union structure in Shanghai unified under the Shanghai General Labor Union, which the Party controlled through such leaders as Li Li-san,

Liu Shao-ch'i, Li Ch'i-han, Liu Hua, and other labor specialists.

The "Brief History" provides a retrospective and generalized account of the May 30 Movement, emphasizing the Communist Party's leadership of the general strike and the response of the masses. It states that in May 1925 the Party's membership was only 1,000, and the Communist Youth Corps membership was 2,000. "The Party began to grow rapidly from that time on. Within half a year, Party and CY membership jumped to 10,000 each. Thus the Party grew tenfold, a phenomenal advance exceeding all expectations!" (Doc. 1, p. 43).

As word of the shooting on Nanking Road spread, various groups of Chinese—among them the leaders of the Kuomintang in Shanghai, the local Students' Association, and Chinese Communist leaders—met to decide how to respond to the killing. Soon plans for a general strike were being formulated. Sunday afternoon, some 1,500 persons representing many organizations met at the offices of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and agreed to call a general strike and closure of business the following day. They also formulated a set of demands for settlement of the incident, improvement of labor's relations with foreign management, and settlement of Chinese grievances against the Shanghai Municipal Council. On Monday, June 1, most Chinese shops, banks, and schools in Shanghai were closed. Some Chinese attempted to prevent vehicular traffic by violence or to enforce closure of shops. Municipal police fired upon one defiant group, killing four and wounding many; and there were other scattered shootings and arrests, bringing on a high state of tension. The Municipal Council declared a state of emergency and mobilized the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. Further conflicts led to the landing of marines from warships of five Powers. By the end of the first week, violence had subsided but Chinese banks and shops continued closed, and the strike had spread against all aspects of foreign business and municipal services of the International Settlement.

The protest movement was not under unified leadership. During the first week in June, the Kuomintang Headquarters in Shanghai and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party separately issued manifestos that showed disagreement on policy. The Kuomintang statement concentrated its attack upon Great Britain and Japan, demanding abrogation of the unequal treaties with them and the severing of economic relations with Great Britain. The Communist Party statement broadened the attack to include the United States and France, demanding that all unequal treaties be abolished and all imperialist prerogatives in China be overthrown. It also warned against compromising tendencies of the Chinese bourgeoisie and denounced attempts to place responsibility for disorders upon Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party. It demanded unity among all classes and a united front against imperialism.[37] The Communist Party Central Committee published its own strike journal, *Je hsieh jih-pao* (Hot Blood Daily) to press its views and keep strike fever high. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, one of the Party's most gifted writers, was editor and chief producer of the twenty-four numbers that came out during June and July.

Anti-Communist Chinese groups circulated pamphlets that charged several Communist leaders by name as being tools of Soviet Russia and acting on Russian instructions "while mingling with our patriotic movement." The pamphlet named Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Yün Tai-ying, Shen Tse-min, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, Teng Chung-hsia, Liu I-ch'ing, and Han Chüeh-min. "The scheme of the Communists," the pamphlets charged, "is to spread its members among all commercial and educational organizations and to take charge of all affairs therein."[38] Many Chinese leaders in Shanghai tried to keep further demonstrations peaceful, discouraged students from agitating in the International Settlement, disassociated themselves from antiforeignism, and searched for ways to mediate the conflict.

Communists in Shanghai tried to create a united front movement with their Party as its leader. As the "Brief History" puts it, "At the initial stage of the movement

following May Thirtieth, the active revolutionary forces, the workers and students, were isolated from each other and they acted independently. The Chinese Communist Party immediately moved to correct this. . . . Under Communist Party guidance, a central organ of the labor movement was established to guide the workers and an organ of the student movement was organized to guide the students. The petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia also participated in the national revolutionary movement, however. Thus, it was necessary to centralize the entire movement. The Chinese Communist Party created under its direction an organ consisting of representatives of labor unions, students, small shopkeepers and merchants (the petty bourgeoisie). Since the Communist Party held the power of direction of the labor and students movements and since labor and students were the most active elements and formed the majority of this organ, the Communist Party succeeded in centralizing in itself the power of directing the revolutionary movement" (Doc. 1, p. 41).

Centralization of direction was not so simple a matter. Some student groups, some unions, and other organizations resisted Communist direction and disassociated themselves from the charge of "Bolshevism." The organ that the Communist leaders created was named "Joint Committee of Workers, Merchants, and Students" (Kung Shang Hsüeh Lien-ho Hui) which was formalized on Sunday, June 7. The Communist Central Committee maintained that a united front was to be formed not as a union of political parties but as an alliance of "separate mass organizations of various classes."[39] The component bodies of the Joint Committee illustrate this. These were the Shanghai General Labor Union, the Federation of Street Merchants' Associations, the National Federation of Students' Associations, and the Shanghai Federation of Students' Associations. Each body had an equal number of delegates in the Joint Committee, but since the Shanghai General Labor Union was a Communist creation, and since the Communist Youth Corps was influential in the two student associations, it seems likely, as the "Brief History" says, that the Joint Committee was dominated by the Party. "Needless to say," according to the Communist historian of the labor movement, Teng Chung-hsia, "the Shanghai General Labour Union was the soul of this Committee."

The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce refused to join. A few days later it set up a committee of twenty-three prominent citizens, headed by Yü Hsia-ch'ing (Yu Ya-ch'ing) and Fang Chiao-pai, chairman and vice-chairman of the Chamber, "for the purpose of effecting a just settlement" of the May Thirtieth Incident. Differences are illustrated by their disagreement over terms for settlement of the general strike, their separate efforts to raise and administer funds, and their dispute over how long Chinese business in the International Settlement should remain suspended.[40]

Money to support the strike poured in from all the major cities of China, gathered by a great variety of Chinese organizations and patriotic contributors. During June a relief committee organized by the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce distributed Mex $470,000, and after the strike was over the Chamber announced that it had received $2,200,000. The Communist-controlled Shanghai General Labor Union distributed $350,000 in June, and apparently it administered large sums raised by the Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern). In mid-July the Joint Committee thanked the Russian Central Council of Trade Unions for a gift that came to nearly $63,000.[41] Advising the Communist Party and the General Labor Union were Gregory Voitinsky for the Comintern and L. Geller (Leo Heller) for the Profintern.[42]

Toward the end of June—shortly after the Shakee Massacre (discussed below)—Chinese merchants resumed their businesses and the burden of the protest fell upon laborers, who were being organized into unions under the control of the Shanghai General Labor Union.[43] On July 10, the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration accusing the big bourgeoisie of compromise. It drew a line of demarcation between the national revolutionary forces—workers, students, and the petty

bourgeoisie—and the big bourgeoisie.[44] According to Teng Chung-hsia, this was the beginning of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the right to lead the petty bourgeoisie. On July 28, the Shanghai General Labor Union announced that it had 117 constituent unions and 217,804 members; it gave other details which suggest that by then it had considerable control over organized labor.[45]

Nevertheless, the strike wave began to ebb due to many interrelated factors—declining revenues with which to pay striking workers; economic disruption, which adversely affected Chinese businessmen and exerted pressures for a resumption of Shanghai's shipping and trade; conciliatory policies of the Japanese government and Japanese factory owners; increasingly repressive measures of the Fengtien general, Hsing Shih-lien, in control of the Chinese parts of the city; conflicts within the labor movement; growing hostility between some Kuomintang leaders and the Communist Party; and subsiding of patriotic fervor as the impact of the incident receded. In August the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided on a policy of retreat, as it was urged to do by the Executive Committee of the Comintern.[46] Perhaps the decision was influenced by the advice of a delegation of labor union officers from Moscow, who arrived in Shanghai from Peking on July 31. Furthermore, funds for strike pay were running out, and both the Joint Committee and the Shanghai Student Association seemed to be losing vigor.[47] Under the policy of retreat, anti-imperialist national revolutionary slogans were replaced by minimum economic demands for workers and political demands of a purely local nature. The Party justified this retreat in order to preserve whatever gains had been made, to prevent complete smashing of the labor movement, and to maintain the goodwill of the petty bourgeoisie. The CC rejected the course of armed insurrection advocated by certain members and workers. Such a Left-deviationist course was born of moods of despair, the CC said, and signified not the will to victory but the seeking of a "noble" way out of a difficult situation.[48]

In the latter part of August and during September, the various strikes against foreign businesses in Shanghai were settled by negotiations, with compromises concerning economic demands and questions of authority over workers. The terms did not include international political issues, even those related specifically to Shanghai. Workers received some increases in pay and small "compassionate grants" for losses of pay during the strike. The unions were to be recognized as bargaining agents, but only after they had been registered with, and recognized by, the Peking Government when it had produced a labor union law.

Thus, the great strike failed to achieve a number of objectives formulated by its leaders early in June. It did, however, lead to extensive unionization and to the initial solidification of the Shanghai General Labor Union. It heightened anti-imperialist sentiment among nearly all sectors of the Chinese population in Shanghai and elsewhere in urban China. The movement also brought more clearly into the open the economic conflicts among Chinese groups and classes, and political rivalries among various leadership groups.

Shortly after most of the strikes had been settled, General Hsing Shih-lien suppressed the General Labor Union and some other groups that were attempting to revivify the anti-imperialist movement. He had been under pressure from members of the consular body and the Municipal Council to do this for some time, but another factor was the emergence of a new power configuration in Central China. Members of the Chihli Clique were mobilizing to challenge the Fengtien Clique, which had extended its influence into Anhui and Kiangsu. General Hsing, with a force of some 6,000 Manchurian troops in Shanghai, was at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communications and amid a potentially hostile population. General Sun Ch'uan-fang of the Chihli Clique, who was based in Chekiang, was preparing to wrest Shanghai from Fengtien's control. In this situation, the Railway Union could disrupt General

Hsing's line of communication. General Hsiang needed what support he could get from the Chinese and foreign business communities in Shanghai.

On the night of September 18, Fengtien troops and local police surrounded the headquarters of the Shanghai General Labor Union, arrested two officials, and sealed the doors and posted guards. General Hsing charged the union with many illegal acts, such as intimidation, arresting and punishing laborers for returning, and charging its head, Li Li-san, with using the name of the union "to cheat and collect money and advocate Bolshevism." Li Li-san disappeared, every unregistered union removed its signboard and other evidence, and union leaders went into hiding. The Shanghai Students' Association and other groups petitioned the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Kuomintang to persuade General Hsing to reopen the General Labor Union, but apparently the petitioners got no support. The Federation of Street Merchants' Associations decided to dissolve the Joint Committee of Workers, Merchants, and Students, and on September 22 the committee announced that it was winding up its affairs. Soon the Chinese-administered sections of Shanghai were dangerous places for student activists and labor leaders.[49]

General Hsing's days in Shanghai were numbered, however. He announced on October 14 that he would evacuate Shanghai and left the next day, followed by his troops. The vanguard of Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces reached Lunghua on the 16th and were soon in control of Shanghai.[50] For the next seventeen months, his troops occupied the area.

The Battle for Canton, and Beginnings of Government Reorganization

The May 30 Incident did not have immediate repercussions in Canton because Nationalist leaders there were absorbed with the problem of suppressing the extraprovincial forces of Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan. Through a well-planned, brief military campaign during the first two weeks of June 1925, the Nationalist leaders in the South solidified their control over the Canton area. Propaganda again played an important role in mobilizing civilian support. The victory boosted the influence of the more radical leaders of the Kuomintang and enhanced Chiang Kai-shek's position particularly. It now became possible for the Kuomintang Leftists, together with their Communist colleagues and Russian mentors, to start afresh with their plans to create a strong government supported by indoctrinated troops and organized masses.

The battle for Canton lasted from June 6 through June 12. Propagandists from among the Whampoa cadets under the leadership of Li Chih-lung, a Communist "commissar," had been sent into Canton to win support of labor unions and sympathy from the Canton population, and to drive out scattered troops, prevent looting, relieve Bliukher had arranged for workers to tie up all three railways, Cherepanov relates, quoting a Bliukher order. Major fighting was along the Kowloon-Canton Railway. Nationalist forces, which had marched back from eastern Kwangtung, took Shih-lung, a town on the approach to Canton, on June 8. Another element of the Kwangtung Army marched on Canton from San-shui to the city's western outskirts. The Hunan and *Chien-kuo* armies descended the Canton-Hankow Railway and were north of the city. The ring was closed. On June 11, the Nationalists started a drive in two columns toward the high ground north and east of Canton, where the Yunnan and Kwangsi armies had prepared defenses. At dawn the next day, the main Nationalist force attacked the enemy's emplacements, while Whampoa cadets wearing red scarves crossed the river from Ch'ang-chow Island and landed east of Canton at Tung-shan. The battle raged from Tung-shan to the White Cloud Mountains, northwest of the city. At

noon, Cantonese troops began crossing the river from Honam Island, and by 3 p.m. the Nationalists were victorious.[51] Chiang Kai-shek became garrison commander of Canton and soon brought disorders in the city under control.

A Russian general, N. V. Kiubyshev, who used the name "Kisan'ka" in China and who took command of the South China group of Russian military advisers on November 1, 1925, claimed for the Russians chief credit for the ousting of the Yunnan and Kwangsi armies (Doc. 22, p. 32). The detailed account of the campaign by A. I. Cherepanov, who apparently had access to the Soviet archives, portrays General Bliukher as author of the attack strategy and being in charge of all operations. He quotes several Bliukher directives. The Russian military advisers with the scattered Nationalist units served as a communications net and tried to assure that the directives were executed exactly. Of the 960 Whampoa cadets who joined the attack, practically all were members of the Kuomintang, and 115 were Communists according to Cherepanov, who fought along with them. The victors captured 17,000 prisoners, including 500 officers, some 16,600 rifles, 120 machine guns, and 20 cannons, as well as 6 river gunboats.[52]

The day after victory, the Kwangtung Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a proclamation directed nominally to workers, farmers, revolutionary soldiers, and all oppressed people. After denouncing warlords, imperialists, and reactionaries, it offered an ambitious list of nine reforms that a truly revolutionary government should institute: protection of the basic rights of free speech, publication, assembly and association; unified government administration, and prohibition of local rule by military; unified finances, reformed taxation, and prevention of armies from usurping tax-collecting organs; unified military administration and prohibiting armies from harming the people; prohibition of [opium] smoking and gambling; regulation of commerce, opening riverine communications, and road building; increase in educational opportunities, teachers, and expenditures; extermination of bandits; and reduction of the numbers of defense forces. The proclamation also listed eleven specific reforms required by workers, farmers, and soldiers, such as protection of the right to organize and to strike, workers' insurance, a minimum income law for farmers and protection against rack rents, guaranteed wage for soldiers, etc.[53]

For its part, the Nationalist leadership took steps to establish a "National Government" in South China. On June 14, the Political Council, which had met only once since Sun Yat-sen's departure for the North, resolved that the government should have nine ministries whose heads would form a council and elect a chairman. Governmental policies would be decided by the Kuomintang Political Council but executed in the name of the government. The men who made this decision were Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, Wu Ch'ao-shu (C. C. Wu), and Michael Borodin as adviser.[54] The next day, according to Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary," the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee passed four resolutions: The Kuomintang Central Executive Committee shall be the supreme organ; the Generalissimo's Headquarters shall be reorganized as the National Government; the *Chien-kuo* armies and the Party Army shall be renamed the National Revolutionary Army; and military administration and fiscal administration shall be reformed. During the next two weeks the small group of men began to implement these resolutions by selecting officials, writing regulations, and issuing pronouncements. Their work was scarcely interrupted by the Shakee-Shameen Incident of June 23 (discussed below). On July 1 they formally established the National Government of the Chinese Republic; on the third they announced a new Kwangtung Provincial Government, and a new Canton Municipal Government the next day. The Central Executive Committee appointed a new National Government Military Council and proclaimed its regulations on July 5. On July 24 regulations for the National Government's Ministry of Finance, a key organ in the effort to centralize revenues, were announced.[55]

Fifteen men in Canton held all the positions of importance in these various organs, but among them six stood out: Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, T'an Yen-k'ai, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, and Wu Ch'ao-shu. Wang Ching-wei, however, was chairman of the National Government Council and of its five-man Standing Committee (hence "chairman" of the government), chairman of the Military Council, and early in July had become chairman of the Kuomintang Political Council.[56] Anti-Communist sources charge that Borodin and the members of the Kuomintang Political Council engineered Wang Ching-wei's election as chairman of the National Government. Previously, Hu Han-min had been acting generalissimo and governor of Kwangtung province. In the reorganization, the latter position was left vacant and the province was to be governed by a council of seven. Hu Han-min's new position was foreign minister of the new National Government, which had no international status. Clearly he had been demoted by his colleagues, probably on Borodin's insistence.[57] Liao Chung-k'ai, the Left leader who most firmly supported Sun Yat-sen's Russian orientation, was named minister of finance, a key position because the Kuomintang was determined to centralize in its own hands the financial resources controlled by army generals. In addition, Liao kept his posts as party representative to the Whampoa Academy and the Party Army and remained chief of the Kuomintang Labor Department and of its Farmers Department, and minister of finance in the Kwangtung Provincial Government.

According to its charter, the Military Council of the Government of the Chinese Republic was to be directed and supervised by the Kuomintang and would control all military, naval, and air forces and all military organs within the territory of the government. One of its members was to be the minister of military affairs. The Military Council was conceived of as a body coordinate to the Government Council. Both received their orders "from the Kuomintang," and the Military Council was to have various functional offices in charge of military matters, just as the government had ministries in charge of civil affairs.[58] As matters evolved, both councils came under the authority of the Kuomintang Political Council. Party control of the Military Council is confirmed by Document 10, with notes on several meetings of the council after its establishment. Four of the original eight members--Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Wu Ch'ao-shu--were civilian party members, all with seats on the Political Council. The others were commanders of troops, T'an Yen-k'ai, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Chiang K'ai-shek, and Chu P'ei-te. T'an and Hsü had recently been added to the Kuomintang Political Council. As chairman of the Military Council, Wang held the power of final decision on all questions (Doc. 10, p. 4). In a letter to all officers and men, the Military Council summed up the principle of Party control of the military. The Kuomintang, it said, should direct and supervise all political and military organs of the government.[59] According to Document 3, the Military Council had the functions of the supreme command, with a General Staff directly subordinate to it (Doc. 3, p. 6).

The Hong Kong Strike and the Shakee-Shameen Incident

The leaders in Canton had not been able to respond immediately to the May 30 Incident in Shanghai and subsequent nationalistic outbursts along the Yangtze because their own position was insecure. This is confirmed by Document 25, a history of the strike. After the suppression of the Yunnan and Kwangsi armies, however, action began. Labor leaders in Canton planned to call a general strike both in Hong Kong and in the British and French concessions on Shameen. The "Brief History" records that it was the Chinese Communist Party that organized the Hong Kong strike, in spite of opposition by the Kuomintang Right Wing (Doc. 1, p. 42). According to Teng Chung-hsia, a delegation from the newly organized National General Labor Union went to

Hong Kong to persuade labor leaders there to call their unions out. The Communist Party induced the Kwangtung government to support the strike financially so that workers leaving Hong Kong would be provided for.[60] Document 25 makes no mention of the Communists' role in the strike, perhaps because this already was well known to the Soviet authorities in Peking and Moscow.

Contemporary reports show that by June 14 the Hong Kong government feared an impending strike, and that in Canton it was known by the 18th that there would be a strike there.[61] By Sunday, June 21, Chinese workers were quitting in Hong Kong and Shameen and coming to Canton by thousands. The Hong Kong government declared a "state of emergency," prohibited the export of food in order to preserve stocks, and forbade the export of gold, silver coins, and banknotes to try to prevent runs on banks. The conservative Chinese Mechanics Union did not join the strike, which assured a continuation of Hong Kong's water and electricity, and foreigners manned other essential services. Yet the British colony was badly hit, with shipping tied up and most business at a standstill.

Canton was burdened with housing and feeding thousands of unemployed workers. The Kuomintang Central Labor Bureau tried to arrange for their reception, the government pressed Chinese merchants to contribute funds, and workers unaffected by the Shameen strike were asked to contribute part of the their wages. Shameen began to look like a fortress. Foreign women and children were evacuated to Hong Kong, and approaches via two bridges that connected the island with the Shakee Bund were sandbagged and manned by machine-gun crews. The British and French authorities feared a repetition of violence that had accompanied anti-imperialist demonstrations during the previous three weeks in Shanghai, Chinkiang, Hankow, and Kiukiang.

The Canton political leaders planned a great rally for noon on Tuesday, June 23, after which there would be a patriotic parade through the city. The route was policed to maintain order, particularly along the Shakee Bund facing Shameen. Many Kuomintang leaders addressed the rally. Then several thousand Cantonese marched in more than one hundred contingents, with workmen in the lead, followed by farmers, merchants, boys and girls from many schools and colleges, armed cadets from Whampoa Military Academy, and units from several other armies.

As the parade passed along the Shakee Bund opposite the British concession on Shameen, a few isolated shots suddenly rang out. From which side these first shots came is a matter of absolute dispute between the Chinese and the Western official and reportorial accounts. Almost immediately, Whampoa cadets on one side and British and French marines on the other were heavily engaged in firing across the narrow strip of water. On the Shameen side one French civilian was killed and several Japanese and European civilians were wounded as well as one British naval rating. On the Chinese side of the water, the carnage was frightful. An official investigation conducted by a distinguished group of Chinese citizens learned of 52 killed, half of them civilians, and 117 wounded, but the number of casualties probably was greater. This incident, known to Chinese as the "Shakee Massacre," stirred antiforeign, and particularly anti-British, sentiment to fever pitch in South China.[62]

Faced with this crisis, the Kuomintang Political Council met that evening in a Special Conference with enlarged membership. They feared that foreign governments might attack Canton or Whampoa and resolved to plan for defense. They particularly blamed Britain, France, and Portugal for the tragedy.[63] They tried to calm the atmosphere. The Central Executive Committee issued manifestos to the Party and the nation which, while blaming the British and French for the incident, cautioned against indiscriminate antiforeignism, and stated that the Kuomintang had decided "not to resort to armed force . . . but to use only peaceful and legitimate means to reach our original objectives, the abolition of the unequal treaties." Hu Han-min, still acting

generalissimo and provincial governor, issued instructions to the Canton citizenry not to resort to acts of violence. He ordered Chinese troops to stay away from the vicinity of Shameen. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, head of the Public Security Bureau, ordered the police to prevent any disorders and not to allow citizens to loiter near the scene of the disaster. The provincial government sent communications to the British, French, and Portuguese consuls general, placing the blame on their side, but announcing that the Chinese would seek a peaceful solution. These documents, as published, were dated June 23. As early as June 26, the Chinese tried to separate the French from the British and to pin responsibility for the massacre upon the latter.[64]

Some Chinese groups advocated war. For example, Whampoa cadets, who had lost some twenty killed, met on the evening of the tragedy and passed resolutions which they submitted to Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Chung-k'ai. They asked to be in the front ranks in an effort to recover Shameen by force and to prevent foreign gunboats from entering the port. The Political Council, however, decided to institute an economic blockade against the imperialists.[65]

General Bliukher wrote a report concerning the situation during the first ten days after the incident, which adds new dimensions to available information (Doc. 8). The day after the shooting, he recounts, the indignation of the populace and troops was so intense that at all meetings there was a demand to attack Shameen at once. Tens of thousands paraded the streets, clamoring for vengeance. Shops refused to sell foreign goods, all shipping between Hong Kong and Canton ceased, and the strike in Hong Kong spread rapidly. Chinese strikers arrived in Canton by the thousands, heightening the revolutionary atmosphere. "The population of Canton was so excited and infuriated that one heedless word would have been sufficient" to cause a mass attack on Shameen.

The Russian advisers discussed the taking of Shameen by force and an attack on Hong Kong, according to Bliukher. A minority believed a declaration of war against imperialism would swell the national revolutionary movement and lead to a general attack against foreigners, which the minority favored even at the risk of losing Canton. The majority opposed, believing that Canton was isolated and that its struggle would not create a national movement; however, they did not exclude the possibility of a declaration of war against England should the Shameen Incident create a strong national outburst. When rumors arrived that the British planned to send troops, ships, and airplanes to Hong Kong and to transfer the greater part of the colony's garrison to Shameen, a Council of Defense was formed consisting of Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Chiang Kai-shek, and the chief adviser--presumably Borodin--and the council prepared defense measures. It even planned for a retreat to Shao-kuan, if necessary. By early July, however, the danger of British intervention seemed to have passed and the council was dissolved (Doc. 8).

It was in this atmosphere that Chiang Kai-shek sent a letter to "Galin," dated June 26, our Document 7. Chiang declared that in addition to using a boycott of British goods and other means of struggle, the Kuomintang should start military preparations, to be completed in half a year, for an extended period of war against the British. This might last from three to five years. Chiang enclosed detailed plans for reorganizing the military establishment. Although he had drafted plans on fighting the British before the Shameen Incident, he said, the current situation required the immediate execution of some of these plans (Doc. 7, pp. 15, 19).

In another set of plans presented on July 7, 1925, Chiang declared that British imperialism must be recognized as the greatest and most immediate enemy. The British government had conspired with and rendered support to the Kuomintang's enemies in every crisis in Kwangtung. The Hong Kong Government was responsible for and had guided Ch'en Ch'iung-min's coup d'etat of June 16, [1922], the Merchant Corps rebellion, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's disturbance in the East River districts, and the

rebellion of Liu Chen-huan and Yang Hsi-min, he wrote. Chiang asserted that there could be no more room for compromise after the Shameen Incident. The Canton Government must call upon the masses to cooperate with it in a war to the death against Britain. However, Chiang pointed out that since Britain was sure to help Ch'en Ch'iung-ming and other enemies of the KMT in Kwangtung, the Party must first clear all Kwangtung province of enemy troops. The Party should then launch a Northern Expedition. Finally, to strengthen its position, the Party must reorganize the army and centralize finances. Document 11, Chiang's speech to the Military Council on July 26, 1925, accused imperialist countries, particularly Britain, of backing Chinese militarists and other enemies of the Kuomintang. "How can we tolerate this?" he asked; "We must resolutely attack them until they are all eliminated." Chiang declared that the military man's divine duty was to subdue imperialist countries.[66]

The "Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party" claims the Communists in Canton had to struggle against the Left Wing of the Kuomintang, which advocated a declaration of war against Great Britain. "In terms of the relative balance of forces at that time, it was utterly impossible to have declared war against Britain. Only silly idealists could have suggested such an absurd idea." Therefore, the account concludes, the Chinese Communist Party "advocated prudence and cautioned against forcing events or being provoked by the British" (Doc. 1, p. 42). Despite this statement, the official Kuomintang position also favored caution with respect to Great Britain. Responsible leaders tried to prevent the incident from getting out of hand.

On the diplomatic front, the authorities at Canton achieved little from a series of demands addressed to the British and French consuls general on June 26. The note demanded an official apology for the shooting, punishment of the senior officers involved, withdrawal from Kwangtung waters of all warships of the governments concerned, return of the foreign concessions on Shameen to the Kwangtung government's administration, and compensation for Chinese killed and wounded.[67] The British and French consuls general rejected these demands as a basis for negotiations since they considered the Chinese to blame, and within a few days both sides had adopted rigid positions that left little room for accommodation.

Plans for Military Reorganization

Document 7, Chiang Kai-shek's letter to General "Galin" (Bliukher), dated June 26, 1925, outlines military reorganization. A few days later, Chiang presented the same plans to the Military Council.[68] He urged that now, because of the Shameen Incident, it was important to carry them through speedily.

He believed that Kwangtung could produce from 35 to 40 million dollars in revenue annually, which would allow from 18 to 20 million to be used for military purposes. He presented a detailed budget which called for regular annual expenses of $19,860,000 for a standing army of 65,000 men, a small navy, forts, and military schools, and $5,300,000 in extraordinary expenses for the repair of military installations and creation of new military industries. He also specified which units of the armies should be reorganized to bring the total to 65,000. The force would need to be increased to 80-100,000 by the end of 1926 or early 1927 if a Northern Expedition were to be carried out. He listed the technical military schools he believed should be established, and a number of inspectional and supervisory organs that should be set up under the Military Council to assure unified control. Political departments should be established in all corps, brigades, divisions, and regiments, to instruct officers and soldiers in political knowledge. Every soldier should be paid at least $10 per month. Chiang also thought that the organization and training of peasant and student armies of 100,000 men should be completed by the end of 1926. In his covering letter,

Chiang urged that, in view of the coming protracted struggle with Great Britain and in order to centralize responsibility, a special department or committee be established within the Military Council to distribute work and to study plans. He stated, in our text of Document 7, that a large number of Russian advisers should be appointed to the committee, although this point does not appear in the extant *printed* version of Chiang's letter to the Military Council itself.

Most of Chiang's proposals were carried out during the subsequent year. They probably reflected the plans being proposed by the top Russian military advisers.

Document 9 is a remarkably perceptive report by General Bliukher, presenting his ideas for a necessary reorganization of the Nationalist armies in order to make possible a military campaign into Central China during the second half of 1926. Bliukher left Canton about the middle of July 1925, and his appraisal of the various units under the Nationalist banner depicts the situation before extensive reorganization. Writing in Kalgan before his return to Russia, Bliukher laid down his plan for reorganization. He specified the units that should be formed into corps, and others to be disbanded or disarmed by the end of 1925, and named the men who, in his opinion, should command the reorganized corps and divisions: Chiang Kai-shek, Li Chi-shen or Ch'en Ming-shu, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chu P'ei-te, Ch'eng Ch'ien, and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. He also outlined a system of schools for retraining officers at various levels, for military-political workers--i.e., political commissars--and for various technical military services, each to be subordinated to the Military Council. All armed forces were to be organized along "Whampoa" lines, that is, with political training for military units. "The forces are to have their political organizations, and political commissars will be introduced" (Doc. 9, p. 29).

Bliukher had his doubts about Generals Hsü Ch'ung-chih and Chu P'ei-te, who were members of the Military Council, and apparently was unsure about Chiang Kai-shek. In an illuminating sentence, he said, "For the same political reason it may turn out that it will be necessary to forgo any considerable increase of the troops under the command of Chiang Kai-shek or some other general, but rather at this time [i.e., about the middle of 1926] create new alliances which would allow free manipulation between these power elements and would keep them more reliably under the command of, and subordinate to, the party" (Doc. 9, p. 29).

Bliukher made this statement in connection with his planning for a military campaign northward to the Yangtze sometime in the second half of 1926. The main purpose of his report was to persuade his superiors in Moscow to provide material support for this campaign to which he had given the name "The Great Kuomintang Military Plan." He had presented the plan, he wrote, before selected Chinese civil and military leaders after the capture of Swatow in March, and on two occasions in June, after the defeat of Generals Yang and Liu (Doc. 9, p. 43).

General Bliukher anticipated an annual income from Kwangtung taxes of 30 million dollars, or 2.5 million a month. From this, 22 million a year could be assigned military expenses; but, to be cautious, he chose the figure of 20 million, which meant $1,666,000 a month. This, he calculated, would be more than enough to maintain an army of 80,000 men, leaving $391,000 a month to maintain military schools, the air force, and the navy. "The funds necessary to initiate the campaign (the Great Northern March) can be obtained by borrowing from merchants" (Doc. 9, pp. 26–27). His figures were close to those of Chiang Kai-shek.

A major feature of the planned military reorganization was the intent to apply the system of Party representatives to all military organs and units. The Kuomintang Central Executive Committee issued an order in July which instructed that all orders and regulations in the Party Academy and the army were to be considered valid only when countersigned by the appropriate Party representative.[69]

The beginnings of reorganization must have been extraordinarily difficult, for it

struck at the basis of power in the province. We may take the navy as an example. In July, the American and British consuls general both learned of Chinese officers and crews trying to prevent their ships being put under control of Russian officers.[70] This brief resistance was suppressed and, according to a report by Kuibyshev, "All unstable officers of the gunboats" were discharged after a Russian became chief of the Navy Department (Doc. 22, p. 58).

The Soviet Mission in Mid-1925

The Soviet military group in South China earned great prestige because of its valuable assistance during the First Eastern Expedition and the battle against Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan. General Bliukher was especially esteemed. However, he left Canton because of friction with Borodin, which could not be resolved, according to Document 12, a report by A. Khmelev, who was sent by the Russian Embassy in Peking to inspect conditions in Canton during the summer of 1925. Since no replacement could be found among the Russian officers in Canton, a Military Council of Russian Advisers was set up. Its members were Borodin and six senior Russian officers. Khmelev may not have known of another document in the Soviet Embassy files, "Instructions from Moscow to Borodin on the problem of establishing a Military Affairs Council to direct military affairs in Kwangtung." Borodin had written to Moscow providing a plan, and he was now directed to establish the Military Affairs Council within the Russian military mission in Canton. The council had authority to decide "all our important military problems," such as distribution of funds and munitions within the Chinese army, and it should promulgate orders to various organs, which the director of the Military Affairs Bureau (a different body) would carry out. In point 3, Moscow's instructions stated that the chief political director--Borodin--should join the council, and after "deliberating prevailing political conditions, he is to issue orders which will serve as the basic policy for progress of the Military Affairs Bureau." Although the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was to have direct control of all Soviet Russian military personnel in all matters, a note adds that "Matters of a political nature are under the direct control of the responsible political director."[71] How this arrangement worked out is reported by Khmelev in Document 12.

General Bliukher attended a meeting of the Military Affairs Council on July 1, but after his departure, Borodin made it clear at the next meeting that the new institution was merely an advisory body attached to him. None of the Russian officers seems to have objected, and after two more meetings the council ceased to exist. As a result, reported Khmelev, Borodin became dictator in both the political and military fields. He kept a tight grip on the Military Department and did not permit the Russian military workers any initiative in settling questions without his knowledge. This applied even to the chief of the group, General V. P. Rogachev. Borodin also decided what documents should be sent to Peking. Khmelev describes the irritation of many of the Russian military men with Borodin's dictatorial ways (Doc. 12). The minutes of the meeting of the Soviet mission's Military Affairs Council on July 1, 1925 was among the documents found in the Russian military attaché's offices and was among the first of the documents published.[72] Those attending were Comrade Borodin, Galin (Bliukher), Rogachev, Nilov (Sakhnovskii), Cherepanov, Stepanov 1st—there were two Stepanovs in the mission—Remi (Uger), Zil'bert, and Tereshatov. General Bliukher was to postpone his departure for a fortnight "in consequence of the state of things existing at Canton." This was a week after the Shakee-Shameen Incident, when it was still uncertain whether more conflict would erupt. Bliukher would turn over all records of the Office of the Military Section to Comrade Rogachev.

The council made or confirmed assignments for most of the members of the military mission, as shown in the following chart. Several others were to be returned to

Russia either because of poor health or to continue their military education.

Assignments of Principal Russian Military Advisers, July 1, 1925*

Assumed Name	Real Name	Assignment
		In General Staff, NRA
	Victor P. Rogachev	Chief of Staff
	Nikolai Terechatov	Deputy, Chief of Staff Office
Komi	V. N. Paniukov	Adviser, Administrative Dept.
Remi	D. Uger	Adviser, Supply Dept.
	Stepanov (II)	Inspector of Infantry
		Service Branches
Remi	D. Uger	Adviser, Aviation (continuation)
	P. I. Smirnov	Adviser, Navy (temporary)
	A. I. Cherepanov	Adviser, Whampoa Academy
		To Major Unit Commanders
	V. A. Stepanov	Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (temporary continuation) [became 1st Corps]
	I. Zil'bert	Adviser, Hunan Army (transfer) [became 2d Corps]
	F. G. Matseilik	Adviser to Chu P'ei-te (continuation) [became 3d Corps]
Nilov	Sakhnovskii	Adviser to Ch'en Ming-shu or Li Chi-shen [became 4th Corps]
Tereshchenko	E. V. Teslenko	Adviser to Wu T'ieh-ch'eng (new appointment) Independent Division

*Basic information from "Plan of Employment of Personnel, Etc." Amplified from Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, and Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years*.

Document 10 gives notes on several meetings of the National Government Military Council. On July 18 the use of Russian advisers was discussed. Borodin attended, as did Rogachev, as chief of the Chinese General Staff. One item of business was appointment of Chinese heads of departments in the General Staff and distribution of Russian personnel among the departments, though details are not given in the minutes. Another item was a decision on the need for the General Staff to determine *under Russian direction* the army's size and finances (our emphasis). Chinese military officers were to be summoned before the council to explain to them the reorganization of the army. All military funds should be met by government revenues, of which four-fifths should be appropriated for military purposes. Rogachev was also listed as currently supervising naval and aviation affairs, but Wang Ching-wei was appointed chief of the aviation squadron. A Navy Department was to be established to centralize and organize the navy.

The Russian military mission had its own office or "section" in Canton. With Bliukher's departure, Rogachev was to be its chief; Tereshatov, inspector of the office; Mira Chubereva Sakhnovskaia, a woman hero of the Russian Revolution, chief of the Information and Intelligence Department; I. K. Mamaev, chief, Intelligence Department, and secretary of the section; and I. Guerman, temporarily in charge of the Financial Department.[73] In addition, there were at least the following Russian military personnel in Kwangtung who stayed as advisers during the next campaign: T. A. Beschastnov and G. I. Gilev, artillery advisers; E. A. Yakovlev, engineer; Pollo, N. A. Shevaldin, and Shalfeev, infantry officers. There were five aviators, the pilots Vassilli Sergeev, Alexander Kravtsov, and Christo Pakov, and navigators Oscar Bazhinavu and John Talberg.

The minutes of the Soviet mission's Military Affairs Council permit a glance into personnel problems of the mission. Several members were in ill health. Two would not be allowed to bring their large families to Canton, and one luckless comrade was to be sent to Comrade Borodin "for a personal conversation." Living conditions were to be improved. "In view of the expensiveness and other conditions of living in Canton," the wages of each member would be augmented "by 0.5 of the coefficient" on July 1. Each who had served at Canton for no less than a year was entitled to one month leave and a nonrefundable grant of 500 Hong Kong dollars. Because only half of the daily allowances for the two campaigns had been paid, an urgent request should be sent to Peking on this subject, and if it were not settled within two weeks, Comrade Borodin "takes it upon himself to solve this question." Personal property lost at the front should be compensated for up to 75 percent of its value, and the department should work out the questions of local traveling expenses and provision of clothing for a year. Finally, the department should arrange for the Soviet government to pay the expenses of families of mission members traveling from the USSR to Canton.

The minutes were signed "*Approved Borodin.*" On the page where financial matters were discussed, Borodin signed with the date 20/VII—that is, almost three weeks after the meeting. The military attaché of the Soviet Embassy, A. I. Egorov, returned to these minutes in February 1926, when he commented on them in a directive to "Seifulin" (A. I. Lapin) with a copy to Ambassador Karakhan. In this form they were seized in the Peking raid.[74]

Development of the Strike and Boycott Against Hong Kong

In addition to supporting thousands of Chinese workers who came to Canton, the nationalist leaders undertook a boycott of British goods and prohibited British shipping from coming to Canton. These policies required an extensive organization to carry out. By the end of June practically all British coastal and river ships based in Hong Kong were paralyzed by the strike of their Chinese crews. At first a boycott was instituted against British, Japanese, and American goods, but after the Shakee Incident, trade in French items also was prohibited. Students visited shops to prevent the sale of proscribed goods. With practically no ships running between Canton and Hong Kong, export business—Chinese as well as foreign—virtually ended. Thus the boycott cut both ways: Chinese merchants probably lost as much as did foreigners. Furthermore, Kwangtung normally imported large amounts of rice from French Indo-China and Thailand. The shipping strike endangered Canton's rice supply.

The strike and boycott created both financial and political problems for the leaders in Canton. The government paid from five to ten thousand dollars a day during the weeks when the largest number of strikers were concentrated in Canton. Money also came from local contributions and from Chinese overseas. Enforcers of the boycott soon began to levy fines on merchants who did not cooperate. Who would

control these funds and oversee their use? Who was to direct the strike and boycott, and decide the conditions under which it might be terminated? These issues created conflict between labor leaders and between Communists and non-Communists within the Kuomintang.

The "Brief History" asserts that the strike was directed by the Communist Party and claims that without the guidance of the Kwangtung Regional Committee it "would not have become a political factor on a national scale or assumed international significance." It credits the Communist Party for the strike's organized character and long endurance (Doc. 1, p. 47). Another Communist source, a secret Party "Notification" issued about two months after the strike began, states that at the beginning the Party intended to direct the strike by itself, with no interference from the Kuomintang. Soon, however, this policy was seen to be a mistake. Therefore, the Kuomintang was allowed a place of leadership, with Liao Chung-k'ai and Wang Ching-wei being made advisers to the Strike Committee. An immediate result was that more than 400,000 dollars in a special tax, as well as contributions from the wealthy, became available for maintenance of the strikers. Thereafter, the Kuomintang Political Council gave direction to the Strike Committee, according to this Communist inner-party document.[75] It was in error, however. We know from the minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council that the Council set policy for the strike and boycott from the beginning.

The Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee (Sheng-Hsiang Pa-kung Wei-yuan-hui), organized apparently early in July, directly *supervised* the strike and boycott. A leader of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union, Su Chao-cheng, a veteran of the Kuomintang who had recently joined the Communist Party, was chairman of the Strike Committee. The names of only a few of the other twelve members are known. Apparently there was conflict among leaders of striking Hong Kong unions over its composition. Several Communist labor leaders are reported to have formed a faction within it, directed by Teng Chung-hsia, an adviser to the committee.[76]

Standing above the committee on an organizational chart was a Congress of Workers' Delegates, each member representing fifty strikers. The congress served as a two-way communications channel between the committee and the strikers. Above the congress, again on the organizational chart, stood the Communist-controlled National General Labor Union, with its headquarters in Canton. The Strike Committee supervised various organs and committees attending to finances, reception, feeding and housing of strikers, propaganda, liaison, etc., grouped together under a Management Office.

The Strike Committee's military arm was the Workers' Inspection Corps, the strike pickets. This became a paramilitary body with an initial authorized strength of one thousand men belonging to unions under the General Labor Union. It soon grew to over two thousand, organized in squads, platoons, companies, and battalions, drilled and armed. An Inspection Corps Committee under the Strike Committee controlled this corps. One of its members was deputized by the Government Military Council while six were "elected" by the Congress of Delegates. The duties of the Inspection Corps, as specified in a charter, were to maintain order, guard provisions, arrest "running dogs" and "labor thieves," inspect enemy goods, and maintain the blockade of Hong Kong, Macao, and Shameen. The Strike Committee set up its own prisons and courts to deal with persons arrested by the Inspection Corps.[77]

The Kuomintang leadership in Canton apparently hoped to force the Powers to relinquish some aspects of the "unequal treaties" and, more specifically, to force Great Britain to comply with the five demands of June 26. Late in July, however, the government at Canton considered putting treaty issues in the hands of the Peking government or some newly created body that would represent both the South and the North. How long should the strike and boycott continue, and under what terms might

they be ended? How should the instruments of economic warfare be shaped so as to cause minimum harm to Canton's economy and exert maximum pressure upon the enemy without evoking dangerous retaliation?

Documents seized in the raid in Peking throw only a little light on these issues, although Document 25 gives a general account from the vantage point of March 1926. Aside from the defensive plans against a possible British land and sea attack, which Bliukher reported early in July, but which were called off when the danger passed (Doc. 8), there is one document that shows conclusively the role of the Kuomintang and of the government in directing the economic warfare strategy. In its public stance, the government disclaimed any responsibility for the strike and boycott. The Notes on Several Meetings of the Nationalist Government's Military Council show that the Political Council had decided on July 18 to continue the strike, "in view of deteriorating Anglo-Russian relations." The Military Council decided that its General Staff should work out plans to enforce a blockade of Hong Kong and stop all shipment of goods there; to do so it should send the armored car battalion but instruct it "absolutely to avoid precipitating any conflict with British forces" (Doc. 10, pp. 5,6). Minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council are preserved in the KMT Archives in Taiwan. Thus we know that on July 17, Borodin had reported to the 36th meeting on the state of Anglo-Russian relations, and that the 37th meeting on July 20 decided on the blockade question, which had been turned over to the Military Council to manage. The Political Council minutes thus clarify some details in Document 10 and confirm its authenticity.

The decision of July 20 regarding the blockade was part of a general strategy to concentrate economic warfare against Great Britain and exempt other Powers, with a view to dividing them, and also to improve Canton's economic situation by permitting trade with other nations. By early August a policy began to crystallize to welcome shipping at Canton under any flag except British or Japanese, provided the ships did not stop at Hong Kong and provided they allowed their cargoes to be inspected against Japanese and British merchandise. In September, regulations issued in the name of the Strike Committee were revised and directed against British ships and goods alone; but they still forbade any ships to come to Canton if they stopped at Hong Kong.[78]

Emergence of Tai Chi-t'ao's Theories and the Communist Response

While the Left Wing leaders of the Kuomintang were consolidating their position in Canton, a new tendency began to appear among leftist leaders in Shanghai—disenchantment with Chinese Communists in their midst. This is illustrated by the cases of Tai Chi-t'ao and Shen Ting-i. Tai was a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and a leader in the Shanghai Executive Headquarters. Not long after Dr. Sun's death, Tai began to formulate a new interpretation of Sun's historical position and ideology. While in Canton in May 1925 for the third plenum of the Central Executive Committee, he proposed that the "pure and orthodox" Three Principles of the People be made the "highest principles" of the Kuomintang, that all members should "really believe in and follow" those principles, and that those who failed to follow them should be disciplined. His proposal was aimed to restrain Communists in the Kuomintang, and it was passed by the Plenum.[79]

Tai Chi-t'ao returned to Shanghai in June at the height of the protests against the May 30 shootings, and in July he published what became an influential theoretical work, *The National Revolution and the Kuomintang*. This was, in effect, a repudiation of the concept of centralizing all revolutionaries in the Kuomintang.

Tai's basic propositions were: (1) The success of the National Revolution required the efforts of those who really believed in the principles of national revolution and

were determined to work for the salvation of the country; (2) The Three Principles of the People were the only principles and the Kuomintang the only party that really worked for the salvation of the country; (3) All who had real determination to save the country should sacrifice their own selfish interests and utopian ideas, sever relations with all other political parties and cliques, and become "pure" Kuomintang members. There should be consistency in the way they think, speak, and act; and (4) If Communists did not really believe in the Three Principles of the People as the only principles, and in the Kuomintang as the only political party that worked for the salvation of the country, they should come out into the open. They should either organize a labor party or work openly in the name of the Chinese Communist Party.

The admission of an organized and tightly disciplined body into a larger group was abnormal, Tai argued. The Kuomintang had its own policies, organization, and principles. When necessary, it could form an alliance with the Communist Party, but it should not allow Communists to maintain a parasitic existence within its framework. Communists did not regard the National Revolution as their true objective, Tai declared, nor did they really believe in the Three Principles. They merely utilized the Kuomintang to expand their own organization and influence. Why did the Communists not bring the name of their own party out into the open?

Tai also maintained that the National Revolution of China was one in which all classes should be united; it was not a revolution of one class—the proletariat. Class struggle was not necessary in China, where class antagonisms had not arisen. He recalled Sun Yat-sen's emphasis upon benevolence and love, and his desire to unite all classes by awakening the ruling class and benefiting the ruled. According to Tai, any organization had a certain "exclusiveness." With the admission of Communists to the Kuomintang there were two centers, and "mutual exclusiveness" made it difficult for both parties to coexist and develop. Hence, he held that the Communists should withdraw so that a "pure" Kuomintang could be created.

Tai Chi-t'ao made a number of specific complaints against the Communists—they sought to oust non-Communist elements from Kuomintang posts; they absorbed Kuomintang members into the Communist Party and Youth Corps; they criticized the Kuomintang with a view to destroying confidence in it. Tai particularly denounced the Communists for stirring up trouble between Kuomintang leaders to advance their own interests. As examples, Tai complained that Communists were promoting conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Hsü Ch'ung-chih, and that they were spreading rumors that Hu Han-min wished to attack Wang Ching-wei and Hsü Ch'ung-chih.

Although Tai declared that it was necessary for China to ally itself closely with Soviet Russia to achieve national independence and freedom and to participate in the World Revolution, he warned that China must not abandon its independence and rely completely on Soviet Russia. China must not forget its own needs and blindly follow Russia.[80] *The National Revolution and the Kuomintang* soon became a support for a growing anti-Communist tide in Shanghai.

Tai Chi-t'ao influenced Shen Ting-i (alt.: Hsuan-lu), an alternate member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Shen had been an influential Kuomintang leader at the time of the May Fourth Movement; in June 1919 he became coeditor with Tai Chi-t'ao of the *Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun*, a weekly review. He was one of the group of intellectuals in Shanghai who had organized the Communist Party in 1920 and, unlike his friend, Tai, he had stayed with it. In the fall of 1923 he accompanied Chiang Kai-shek on the mission sent by Sun Yat-sen to Moscow. Shen Ting-i was a leader of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in Chekiang. On July 5, 1925, he called a meeting of the Kuomintang's Chekiang Provincial Committee, which issued a manifesto to all provincial Kuomintang members. This announced that the *San Min Chu I* was actually based on the traditional Chinese moral code, and that the difference between revolution and counter-revolution did not reside in class at-

tributes. Class struggle arose from social pathology which the Kuomintang should correct by actualizing the Three Principles of the People. This could be done, the Chekiang Kuomintang Headquarters announced in an Instruction, by restricting private capitalism, uniting the oppressed races of the world for their liberation, arousing the consciousness of farmers and workers, and bringing forth the originally benevolent nature of capitalists and landlords. Where class struggle had already arisen, it could be settled peacefully by assisting farmers and workers to win their demands, and by correcting the errors of capitalists and landlords. Shanghai Executive Headquarters had these documents printed and distributed, forbidding Kuomintang members to advocate class struggle. Shen resigned from the Communist Party. Early in August, Tai Chi-t'ao sent a long letter to his close friend, Chiang Kai-shek, bitterly criticizing the Communist Party.[81]

In August 1925 the Communist Party and the Communist Youth Corps issued a joint statement calling on all oppressed classes in China to unite under the banner of the CCP—workers, youth, and general masses. The announcement did not mention the Kuomintang. Who was to lead the revolution? Yet, according to Professor Li Yuning, an authority on Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, the Chinese Communist leadership was slow in responding to Tai Chi-t'ao's attack, perhaps for fear of jeopardizing the "united front" policy on which the Comintern insisted. Not until September did Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai respond with an article and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the form of a letter to Tai, probably meant only for circulation within the two parties. Ch'ü charged Tai with "Confucian idealism" in interpreting the Three Principles of the People. It was "pure utopianism" to hope that the "benevolent and loving nature" of the bourgeoisie could replace a mass revolution of the proletariat and the peasantry. He argued that the class struggle of the peasantry and proletariat had helped the development of the National Revolution. According to Ch'ü, "the Three Principles of the People represent the political and economic demands of the people in general, peasants and workers. They have no need for Confucian orthodoxy or philosophical ideas."[82]

In Canton, the struggle between the Communist-led League of Chinese Military Men and the anti-Communist groups in the academy and the Party Army heated up, probably under the influence of Tai's theories. Opponents of the League asked permission of Liao Chung-k'ai, the Kuomintang's representative in the academy, to start an organization devoted to the study of Sun Yat-sen's theories, according to the reminiscence of one of them, Wang Po-ling. A Communist leader in the academy, Pao Hui-seng, remembers that Liao urged him to accept the position of head of the academy's Political Department and to use his influence to quiet the conflict between the rival factions.[83] Thus, it seems probable that before August 20, 1925, the date of Liao's assassination, the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had been established in the academy and in Kwangtung University. Its public and formal organization in Canton came at the end of the year. Other societies of the same name, all with the purpose of exalting Sun Yat-sen and his theories, were organized in other cities during the winter of 1925-26.

As strikes against foreign business dragged on in Shanghai, Communist leaders were becoming isolated from Chinese public opinion. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was aware of the influence of Tai Chi-t'ao's theories and published an open letter addressed to Tai in which he sought to defend Communist motives in joining the Kuomintang. He warned Tai that his book was being used by reactionaries as propaganda, and he pointed out that very few KMT members had joined the Communist Party, compared with Communists who had joined the KMT. "Your basic mistake," Ch'en told Tai, "is that you see only the need for national struggle but not the need for class struggle." "You say that you are for the interest of workers, peasants, and the masses, and that you do not necessarily take the form of struggle, but use a benevolent heart to move and influence the bourgeoisie and to make them respect the interests of the

workers, peasants, and masses. This is sheer nonsense!"[84] Communist concern was shown about a month later in a Resolution of the Central Committee on Relations Between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which identified "a small portion of bourgeois elements (such as Tai Chi-t'ao, etc.)" as a faction that had formed itself into the Kuomintang Right Wing (Doc. 15).

The Assassination of Liao Chung-kai and Its Aftermath in Canton

During the early part of August 1925 several sources of resentment against policies of the Kuomintang Left Wing leaders in Canton converged toward an attempted coup d'etat to overthrow the radicals. There was resentment against the economic disruption brought on by the anti-British strike and boycott, the power of Communists in the Strike Committee and its organs, and the pickets' enforcement of a blockade against shipment of goods to Hong Kong in regions that normally traded with the colony. Hostility focused on the Leftist leaders, their Russian advisers, and the Communists in Canton. Their opponents charged them with trying to Bolshevize Kwangtung. A power struggle was emerging between those who saw their economic and social positions threatened and those who were determined to create a new, revolutionary social and political structure. The main targets of the conservatives apparently were Liao Chung-k'ai, Wang Ching-wei, and Chiang Kai-shek.

During July and early August the press was full of rumors of growing opposition to the radical wing of the Kuomintang. General Li Fu-lin and Wei Pang-p'ing on Honam Island, and Liang Hung-k'ai and Cheng Jun-ch'i in the delta west and southeast of Canton, were thought to be opposed to the Leftists. In eastern Kwangtung Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's generals were expanding their areas of control, while General Teng Pen-yin in the southwest was hostile to Canton. There was also the specter of "British imperialism." British and Chinese merchants in Hong Kong were suffering serious losses due to the strike and boycott. Would some alliance of external and internal foes of the radical Kuomintang emerge? By mid-August Canton was filled with apprehension and expectation. The government began to send troops to various potential danger spots, and the Military Council imposed censorship on all reports of troop movements except those put out by itself. Friends urged Liao Chung-k'ai never to go out without his bodyguard; someone had tried to shoot him at a meeting.[85]

The tense political situation erupted on the morning of August 20, 1925, when three assassins shot and killed Liao Chung-k'ai on his way to a meeting of the Central Executive Committee. Mme Liao escaped unharmed, but another companion, Ch'en Ch'iu-lin, editor of *Min-kuo jih-pao*, was wounded and died three days later. Borodin lost his most valuable supporter when Liao left the scene. The Kuomintang Political Council met in emergency session with members of the National Government Council and the Military Council and appointed a Special Committee—Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Wang Ching-wei, and Chiang Kai-shek—with full political, military, and police powers to deal with the crisis. The Special Committee declared martial law in Canton. Michael Borodin, who had proposed the committee, became its adviser. Until September 2, the Special Committee met almost daily.[86]

Evidence began to point suspicion toward a group of conservative Kuomintang veterans and toward some higher officers in the Kwangtung Army. It was suspected that Chu Cho-wen, Hu I-sheng, Lin Chih-mien, and other members of a conservative political club under Hu Han-min's patronage, the Wen Hua Tang, had plotted the assassination in conspiracy with generals Wei Pang-p'ing and Liang Hung-k'ai. The Special Committee ordered their arrest. At dawn on the 25th Chiang's Whampoa forces began their roundup. Of the initial suspects, only Lin Chih-mien and Liang Hung-k'ai were captured; Chu Cho-wen, Hu I-sheng, and Wei Pang-p'ing escaped, as did another suspect, Lin Shu-wei, a brigade commander in the Kwangtung Army.

Several other generals and higher officers were taken, and their troops in Canton and the nearer sections of the West River were disarmed. Early reports mention about a hundred officials or officers arrested.[87]

After the initial arrests the positions of Hu Han-min and Hsü Ch'ung-chih became precarious. Lin Chih-mien was one of Hu's followers and Hu I-sheng was his younger cousin; another cousin had been arrested but released through personal intercession. Chiang placed Hu Han-min in detention at Whampoa. Most of those charged with the military plot were General Hsü's subordinates, and some were close to him. General Hsü, though a member of the Special Committee, was kept under surveillance.[88] Confessions of some of the men arrested pointed to the existence of a plan in Hong Kong for financial support of a coup; it was even charged that the colonial government was offering support. British archives reveal that the governor, Sir Reginald E. Stubbs, did request permission from H. M. Government to give financial assistance to a Cantonese project "to suppress the Reds and reopen normal relations," but that the government in London would not countenance this. Nevertheless, rumors of financial support from "the British" became a conviction that entered the Chinese historical record as fact.[89] Document 3 is more circumspect. It says "Hong Kong" was provoked to "take some active measures. Influenced by Hong Kong, the anti-Government groups were encouraged" (Doc. 3, p. 6).

According to Document 20, which concerns the creation of a counter-espionage apparatus in Canton, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, head of the "so-called 'Department of Public Safety,' " knew of the plan to assassinate Liao long before it happened, but took no measures to prevent it. However, the unsigned Russian writer adds that "This has not been proved *officially*, but there are some data which point in his [i.e., Gen. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's] direction." Yet "we cannot raise the question as to the abolition of this department or even as to some 'cleaning' of it, because it could not be replaced by anything else." The assassination and several cases of treason among the generals provided exactly the impetus necessary to set the counter-espionage apparatus into motion (Doc. 20, pp. 1-2).

On August 26, the day after the first arrests, the Military Council decided to organize the National Revolutionary Army. There were to be five main corps. The Party Army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek was to become the First Corps. The Hunan Army commanded by T'an Yen-k'ai was designated the Second Corps. The Third Corps would be created from the Yunnan Army commanded by Chu P'ei-te. The Kwangtung Army would become the Fourth Corps, commanded by Li Chi-shen. The Fu Army commanded by Li Fu-lin was designated as the Fifth Corps. Other, smaller units were left aside for the time being, but their administration was to be unified.[90]

Li Chi-shen was commander of the First Division of the Kwangtung Army, numbering some 6,000 men. His connection went back to 1921 when Teng Keng appointed him chief of staff of the First Division.[91] General Bliukher, in outlining his plans for reorganization of the Nationalist military forces, and basing his information on the situation in July 1925, identified General Li and the First Division as reliable (Doc. 9, p. 28.)

The power alignment in Canton shifted dramatically between September 19 and 23, 1925. Chiang Kai-shek disarmed the remaining unreliable units of the Kwangtung Army and sent Hsü Ch'ung-chih into exile. A "Diplomatic Delegation," which included two conservative Kuomintang stalwarts, Lin Shen and Tsou Lu, left for the North, and Hu Han-min departed for Russia.

General Chiang's overt thrust against his rivals began on September 19, with the approval of Wang Ching-wei. Chiang sent the now powerful First Division of the NRA to guard the capital against any internal revolt, and on September 19 he secretly mobilized other units to disarm the forces of Cheng Jun-ch'i and Mo Hsiung east of

the city. Next day Chiang sent Brigadier Ch'en Ming-shu to escort General Hsü onto a vessel bound for Shanghai. The Political Council resolved to "permit" Hsü to relinquish his posts as minister of war and commander in chief of the Kwangtung Army.[92]

After his visit to Canton, A. Khmelev reported to the Russian Embassy in Peking on this event, using it to illustrate Borodin's dominance of the Russian military advisers and all military decisions: "When it had been decided to disarm the troops of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih just before his deportation, Com. Rogachev learned of this matter only a few minutes before the time when this question was brought before the Military Council for discussion and consequently only some hours before the time when the disarming actually took place (see conversation between Com. Rogachev and Gen. Chiang Kai-shek on 18th Sept. 1925)."

Nikolai Tereshatov, an important member of the military advisory group, independently confirmed this fact to Khmelev and stated that Rogachev had not been sufficiently informed concerning the government's intention to disarm the troops of General Hsü. Khmelev found one more point worth mentioning: "The part which Gen. Chiang Kai-shek played in this question . . . is not clear enough. As far as can be ascertained from available data, Chiang Kai-shek knew perfectly well of the intentions of the government to disarm the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih, but did not tell Com. Rogachev anything about it until the last moment, whereas at the same time he was moving "Whampoa" troops for the purposes of disarming." Khmelev concluded that "this matter requires more thorough investigation" (Doc. 12, pp. 2-3).

The "Diplomatic Delegation" also left Canton about September 20. Its ostensible purpose was to try to create a united front with the Peking Government on foreign policy in connection with the forthcoming Tariff Conference and also to isolate Great Britain from the rest of the Powers. It was first planned that Hu Han-min, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, should head the delegation, but when he became entangled in the assassination case, the Political Council decided to ask Sun Fo to lead it. Sun was then in Shanghai and declined, so the Council decided on September 7 to appoint Lin Shen and Tsou Lu as the government's representatives. According to a contemporary report by Wang Ching-wei, they were chosen to add luster to the Diplomatic Delegation, yet he added that they were only to lead the group to Peking and then to return to Canton for the Second Kuomintang Congress, turning the matter over to Hsü Ch'ien.[93]

Lin and Tsou were Party veterans and members of the five-man Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, which managed day-to-day affairs of the Party, Lin having replaced the late Liao Chung-k'ai on September 3. Actually, only three members of the Standing Committee were in Canton at the time, the other being Wang Ching-wei. Lin headed the Overseas Bureau, while Tsou was head of the Youth Bureau and president of Kwangtung University, renamed Chung-shan University. Under his administration, Kwangtung University was not as radical an institution as Borodin and some of the Leftists in the Kuomintang wish to make it. Some Communists even charged the university with being counter-revolutionary, according to Tsou, and had mounted a campaign to drive him from Canton. Borodin and Tsou had been engaged in a bitter contest over the financial independence of the university, which Tsou tried to protect. Two reports from the Soviet advisory mission make the charge that he had instigated an antigovernment movement in the university (Doc. 3, p. 6 and Doc. 22, p. 33). In a heated letter to Ch'en Fu-mu, editor of the *Kuo-min jih-pao*, written on September 19, the very day of his departure from Canton, Tsou attacked Borodin, defended his own administration of the university, outlined the controversy over its financial independence, refuted the charge that the students were not revolutionary, and denounced the Communists.[94] He soon became a leader of opposition to the Canton KMT policies.

Hu Han-min was sent to Russia to get him out of Canton. The suspicion that his cousin, Hu I-sheng, had been involved in the plot to kill Liao Chung-k'ai provided a reason. Borodin later told Louis Fischer that he believed Hu Han-min was directly implicated in Liao's assassination and that Chiang Kai-shek also was convinced of Hu's guilt. So "shortly after, he was exiled to Moscow."[95] According to Chiang's "Diary," the decision to send Hu abroad was made by the Special Committee on September 1. At that time Hu was in detention at Whampoa. Hu Han-min's own reminiscent account says that General Chiang came and told him that Borodin proposed that he go to Russia "for a rest." Borodin had undertaken to make the necessary arrangements for Hu's visit. Later Borodin called upon Hu and assured him that he would be received in Russia with the courtesies extended to an ambassador, but that he would have to travel on a Russian vessel and would not be able to stop at Shanghai for fear that counter-revolutionaries might try to use his name to harm the revolution.[96] Hu sailed on the Russian ship *Mongolia* about September 23, accompanied by his daughter, Mu-lan, and by Li Wen-fan, Chu Ho-chung, and Tu Sung.[97]

Thus, as an aftermath of the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, the political configuration in Kwangtung turned leftward. A number of conservative Party veterans fled, were arrested, or were sent away. Units of the Kwangtung Army whose commanders were suspected of being implicated in the plot were disarmed, their commanders arrested, and the commander in chief sent to Shanghai. By the end of September, power was concentrated in the hands of three men, Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Michael Borodin.

Wang was one of two remaining members of the CEC Standing Committee in Canton, the other being Lin Tsu-han. Lin was a dual member of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, appointed on Wang's nomination to replace Lin Shen. The Political Council had been reduced to three, Wang, T'an Yen-k'ai, and Wu Ch'ao-shu, with Borodin as adviser. Wang was also chairman of the National Government Council and the National Government Military Council. The original eleven-man Government Council had lost five members, and the original eight-man Military Council three, although replacements were made with men willing to work with the regime.[98]

The appointment of Chiang Kai-shek to the Special Committee was a turning point in his career. He had previously held no important political post in party or government; he was not a member of the CEC, the Political Council, or the National Government Council. Chiang's military power was also considerably strengthened when portions of Hsü Ch'ung-chih's Kwangtung Army were incorporated into his First Corps. The forces under his command were more powerful than any other group in Kwangtung. Most of the officers in the First Corps had been selected by Chiang. He had also chosen most of the staff of Whampoa Military Academy, and he regularly gave inspirational lectures to the cadets to infuse them with revolutionary spirit. He was their commandant and teacher—a significant bond between them. Chiang had used the cadets on several critical occasions to support the regime against enemies. The cadets numbered some 2,000 at this time and were an important prop for the Left Wing because of their indoctrination.

What was Borodin's role in the expulsion of veteran Kuomintang leaders from Canton and the swing to the left? His Chinese detractors assert that he masterminded the counter-coup. Unfortunately, the documents captured in the Peking raid throw little light on the question, although Borodin's American biographer, Professor Dan Jacobs, pictures Borodin as a virtual political dictator in Canton at this time. Until evidence from Borodin's archives becomes available, it will not be easy to prove the role he actually played in the expulsions. Borodin told Louis Fischer that he proposed the Special Committee, and this is confirmed by Hu Han-min, who signed the order for its establishment.[99] At least two meetings of the committee were held at the Russian hostel at Tung-shan, possibly in Borodin's residence.[100] When the Special Com-

mittee decided to send Hu Han-min abroad, Borodin arranged his trip to Russia.

Tsou Lu charged that Borodin, on the day after Liao Chung-k'ai's assassination, presented the Special Committee with a list of names of Kuomintang leaders who should be arrested and tried. These were Tsou Lu, Hu Han-min, Teng Tse-ju, and Hsieh Ch'ih. When the members of the committee asked how this could be done in the absence of evidence against them, Borodin is alleged by Tsou to have replied, "In politics one only asks whether another's opinions conform, not whether there is evidence." Tsou's charge is based upon hearsay and probably came from Hsü Ch'ung-chih.[101] Hu Han-min made similar charges against Borodin. He attributed to Hsü the report that Borodin told the Special Committee, "The political circumstances are such that we do not discuss evidence. When political policies differ can we still show mutual courtesy?"[102] In another account, Hu related that each of the three members of the Special Committee told him later, and separately, how the narrator had saved Hu's life; Hsü Ch'ung-chih and Chiang Kai-shek both spoke of Borodin's advocating a trial of Hu and getting rid of him.[103] This, too, is hearsay information. The American consul general in Canton, Douglas Jenkins, reported on September 9 that Hu Han-min's name had been stricken from the list of commissioners of the National Government, and that Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek were "persuaded by the Russians" to get rid of him and other leaders working with him. He doubted, however, that the radicals would have the courage to execute Hu because of his prominence in the Kuomintang. Mr. Jenkins also heard that "the cowardly Hsü Ch'ung-chih," after wavering between the Cantonese moderates and radicals, finally joined the radicals. He was nominally a member of the inner circle of Wang, Chiang, and Borodin, but was said not to be trusted by them and could not leave the city if he tried to.[104]

The position of the Left Wing was defined by Wang Ching-wei in a speech eulogizing Liao Chung-k'ai two days after the assassination. Those who wanted to oppose imperialism should turn to the Left, Wang declared. Those who wanted to continue to live under imperialist oppression should turn to the Right. There was no need to create the issue of communism vs. anticommunism; the only issue was imperialism vs. anti-imperialism.[105] On August 31, Chiang Kai-shek, speaking at a meeting held to commemorate Liao Chung-k'ai, said that Liao was a victim in the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. Liao was definitely not a victim of the so-called struggle between communism and anticommunism, Chiang declared.[106] In short, the Left Wing defined itself as anti-imperialist and revolutionary, and it defined the Right Wing as counter-revolutionary and subservient to imperialist interests. Communism must not be an issue.

Preparations for the Second Eastern Expedition and the First Attempt to Settle the Hong Kong Strike

A document captured in Peking was a Russian version of minutes of a joint meeting of the Kuomintang Political Council and the National Government Military Council dated September 22, 1925.[107] This date makes the minutes particularly interesting because the meeting was held just after the expulsions discussed above. The attendance is revealing: Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, T'an Yen-k'ai, Li Chi-shen, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chu P'ei-te, Wu Ch'ao-shu (C. C. Wu), and Borodin, as adviser; in addition, Rogachev, Yueh Shen, Kan Nai-kuang, Sung Tze-wen (T. V. Soong), Ku Ying-fen, and Tereshatov.[108]

Military financing was the main subject. Wang Ching-wei called upon the new minister of finance, T. V. Soong, for a report and then asked each commander to present his financial statement. From the replies it is evident that the effort to centralize tax collection and military payments had not progressed far, and that revenues

lagged behind expenses so that every major component of the National Revolutionary Army was short, and payment of troops was seriously in arrears. General Ch'eng Ch'ien had had to sell rifles in order to feed his men. Thus, the plan to create five corps and to rationalize the army's structure was still far from realization.

According to Russian minutes, T. V. Soong reported that the ministry collected between 1.9 and 2 million dollars a month, and that for the next month the figure would be 2.2 million. Monthly expenditures, however, were $2,420,000, of which $1,870,000 was required for troops and military installations, not including the Whampoa Military Academy. He presented estimates from which we may calculate that 93 percent of the ministry's current revenue and 83 percent of the projected income at the least would go for routine military purposes. These figures did not take into account the costs of the projected Eastern Expedition, which Rogachev estimated at $700,000. Li Fu-lin's army was receiving nothing from the ministry.

The meeting also discussed what needed to be done to improve various army units in preparation for the Eastern Expedition. Wang Ching-wei proposed that Chiang, Ch'eng Ch'ien (the Chinese minutes say T. V. Soong), and Rogachev form a commission to study the question of necessary funds, and that the General Staff clarify the situation in those units that Rogachev recommended for use in the expedition. This inconclusive discussion took place less than a week before Chiang Kai-shek was appointed its commander in chief and two weeks before the expedition actually took off.

Borodin spoke to the suggestion of the Strike Committee that the strike be ended. If the Political Council agreed, he suggested a campaign be opened in this direction and proposed that Wang Ching-wei assemble the representatives of the Hong Kong and Shameen strikers and give them all necessary explanations. Wang and Borodin explained why the strike should be terminated, but what they said is not recorded in the minutes, except for Wang's concluding statement that the end of the strike would be opportune because it would help the National Revolution. He proposed that the Strike Committee propose the terms under which the strike might be ended.[109]

Two days later, September 24, a conference of political and labor leaders was scheduled to discuss the terms for settlement. Canton newspapers called for a great demonstration of unity between merchants and laborers in support of the Revolutionary Government; schools, government offices, and businesses were to observe the day as a holiday. The conference and the show of unity presumably were the outcome of Borodin's proposals at the joint meeting of the two councils. Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, and T'an P'ing-shan represented the political leadership at the conference which, according to one Chinese account, was attended by the Strike Committee, five representatives of striking Hong Kong unions, and two from the Canton Alliance of Workers for Foreigners. After discussing the terms for ending the strike, the workers chose T'an P'ing-shan and Teng Chung-hsia to put the conditions into draft form. After a meeting the next day, the terms were further discussed and the text agreed upon. The text was published in the Chinese press by the 27th. One reason for this speedy execution was that a delegation of Chinese merchants in Hong Kong was coming to Canton for exploratory discussions. On September 28 the terms were conveyed to the unofficial Hong Kong delegation.[110]

This first attempt to settle the strike through negotiations did not succeed. The British consul general in Canton considered the terms unacceptable. The Chinese merchant delegation recognized that some of the items were outside their competency to discuss since they demanded changes in the governance of Hong Kong; they concluded that they could only transmit them to the colonial government. But the Strike Committee would not begin to discuss the restoration of relations with Hong Kong until their demands were accepted. This brought the first round to an end, for the colonial government would not even consider the terms as a basis for discussion.[111]

The Second Eastern Expedition and the Unification of Kwantung, October-December 1925

According to Document 3, Canton was seriously threatened by the forces of Ch'en Ch'iung-ming on the east, supported by Hong Kong; by the Szechwan general, Hsiung K'o-wu, on the north; and by Teng Pen-yin and Wei Pang-p'ing on the south. Furthermore, Wu P'ei-fu had supplied gunboats to Ch'en Ch'iung-ming to blockade Canton. Faced with this coalition, the government decided to put down the rebellion of Ch'en Ch'iung-ming first, since he was the most dangerous and the most closely connected with Hong Kong. In case of necessity, Hsiung K'o-wu would be disarmed. Thereafter the rebellions in the south would be suppressed. By great effort and in spite of all difficulties, according to Document 3, the government was able to form several army corps out of reliable units although they were extremely heterogeneous in numerical strength and armament. The document gives the following organization for the NRA by the beginning of October 1925. First Corps, formerly Whampoa "Party Army"; Second Corps, the former Hunan Army of T'an Yen-k'ai; Third Corps, the former Yunnan detachment of Chu P'ei-te; Fourth Corps, the best units of the Cantonese Army under Li Chi-shen; two independent divisions under Wu T'ieh-ch'eng and Ch'eng Ch'ien; the 3d Canton Division; the Tanshui group, a Cantonese detachment under Feng Chiu-p'ei [Tieh-p'ei]; and several smaller units (Doc. 3, pp. 6-7).

Document 22 presents a general picture of military developments in Kwangtung in the last three months of 1925 as understood by the new head of the Russian military mission in the south, N. V. Kuibyshev. In his report to Peking, written in January 1926, he emphasized the dangerous threat to Canton posed in September 1925 by its enemies. The government faced total destruction but was able "by swift and determined measures" to resist internal opponents and the enemy armies, "thereby acquiring a strong and firm position by November 1925" (Doc. 22, p. 33). Kuibyshev's account of the campaigns, written largely on the basis of reports by Russian officers advising various nationalist units, is an important primary source.

According to information from Eastern Route Headquarters, Kuibyshev wrote, the eastern enemy had approximately 30,000 men, plus machine gun and artillery forces, and began its advance from Hai-feng, Ho-p'u, and Mei Hsien on October 1. There was danger that the enemy might overrun the government forces and take Canton.[112] To counter this threat, the Military Council assigned to the eastern front some 21,000 men. The assigned units were the 1st and 3d divisions of the First Corps (6,000); the Fourth Corps, minus the 10th Division (6,000); a T'an-shui Front made up of two brigades and two independent regiments of the former Kwangtung Army (3,000); seven battalions of the Independent Division under Wu Chung-hsin; four regiments under Ch'eng Ch'ien (1,500); and a miscellany of extraprovincial units from Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupei (2,500-3,000). Canton was guarded by part of the 2d Division of the First Corps, students in the schools of the First, Second, and Third Corps, and the navy (Doc. 22, p. 34).[113]

The first important objective was Hui-chow, a nearly impregnable fortress, garrisoned by Yang K'un-ju. The battle for Hui-chow, one of the more famous in modern Chinese military annals, is described by Kuibyshev in the battle accounts omitted in our translation. After attack units had been brought into position the fortress was subjected to many hours of artillery bombardment on October 13. In spite of this, specially selected units of braves who tried to rush the walls with scaling ladders were driven back with heavy losses. Not until the afternoon of the next day, after another intensive bombardment, did the attackers succeed in mounting the walls and capturing the city. The casualties of the 4th Regiment, which led the attack, numbered some 400. The regimental commander, Liu Yao-chen, was killed. Russian advisers re

corded the great courage of the 4th Regiment. The Nationalists captured 5 cannons, 1,500 rifles, 10 machine guns, and 1,500 prisoners, according to Kuibyshev.

In his memoirs, A. I. Cherepanov, adviser to General Ho Ying-ch'in, who commanded the First Column, gives a vivid and detailed account of the battle, which he witnessed at close range. Hui-chow city was protected by high walls and water on all sides except for a land approach to the north gate and a narrow causeway leading through a lake to the west gate. He describes the assault by hastily organized teams which, though covered by an artillery bombardment, were mowed down as they tried to rush the north wall or were pinned into a ditch some fifty meters away. Snipers picked off the officers and political commissars, who wore khaki uniforms that distinguished them from the troops in blue. The second assault was better prepared and was led by Communist commissars. The Russian engineer, E. A. Yakovlev, was among the first wave of attackers to scale the wall. The fortress of Hui-chow was actually taken by Communists, says Cherepanov, who disparages Chiang Kai-shek's role in this battle.[114]

With Hui-chow captured, the Nationalists now faced the enemy's main forces, but intelligence concerning his concentrations was poor, according to Kuibyshev. Understanding that its main strength was in the Ho-p'o-Hai-feng region, the Nationalists decided to send the First Corps (minus the 2d Division), the Fourth Corps (minus the 10th Division), and the T'an-shui Group against the enemy's main force around Hai-feng. General Ch'eng Ch'ien, with reinforcements and the extraprovincial units, was sent to take Ho-yuan and Lao-lung in the northeast to cut off the enemy's escape routes to Kiangsi and Fukien. In this march he was advised by N. I. Konchits. His diary account is a very useful source.[115]

Because the situation south and west of Canton had become critical, the Military Council had to withdraw the Fourth Corps from the East River area and send it to assist the campaign against Teng Pen-yin. In spite of this weakening, the 1st Division and the T'an-shui group each defeated strong enemy units under Lin Hu and Hung Chao-lin, opening the way for the recapture of Swatow. The T'an-shui group is given credit in Kuibyshev's account for a major victory, taking 5,000 prisoners, 5,000 rifles, 15 cannons, and 50 machine guns.[116] With the recapture of Hai-feng and Lu-feng, the Communist peasant organizer P'eng Pai was able to return and start rebuilding the shattered farmers' movement.

Kuibyshev drew two conclusions concerning the Eastern Campaign. First, that the capture of Hui-chow fortress discouraged Hong Kong so much that "they delayed their contributions to Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, causing a decline in the fighting power of Ch'en's army." Second, he concluded that in spite of the deficiencies of the NRA—shortage of intelligence from spies, poor liaison among units, and lack of skill in supply work—and although the enemy was "helped by imperialism," the National Revolutionary Army displayed enough fighting ability that the enemy's hope to recapture Canton failed completely. He believed there was no possibility of the enemy's doing so in the near future.

Kuibyshev also described the fighting in the North River region to disarm and drive off the Szechwan forces of Hsiung K'o-wu, an old revolutionary and a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Hsiung had brought his Szechwanese troops into northern Kwangtung in August 1925. According to Wang Ching-wei's report to the Second Kuomintang Congress, the Nationalist Government assigned General Hsiung four counties in the extreme northwest of Kwangtung as his source of income. General Hsiung came to Canton. On October 1, according to Wang, a representative of Ch'en Ch'iung-ming came to see Chu P'ei-te, telling him that Ch'en and Hsiung had long had an agreement and proposing that Chu join the plan; he even offered Chu $300,000 to join them. This led to the discovery of much evidence and to the arrest of Hsiung K'o-wu and some of his staff on October 3. Hence,

it was necessary to send the Second and Third Corps of the NRA to disarm the Szechwan Army.[117]

Kuibyshev's account of the pacification of southern Kwangtung is difficult to follow because most of the place names he mentioned were mistranslated by the Peking commission. By reference to other sources it becomes intelligible.[118] Enemy action apparently began about October 24, and Ch'en Ming-shu's force was compelled to retreat westward to T'an-shui-k'o, which Ch'en was determined to hold because of an important railway bridge (on the Sunning Railway).[119] The enemy attacked around T'an-shui-k'o until the 29th, when rescuing forces arrived. These were Kwangsi troops from Wu-chow,[120] and units from the Second and Third Corps, redeployed after their attack on the Szechwan Army. General Chu P'ei-te was put in command of the campaign about the end of October. He drove the enemy south and west, and from this date on, according to accounts by Kuibyshev and other writers, Nationalist forces made steady progress in clearing southwestern Kwangtung of bandits and Teng Pen-yin's armies. By mid-December the Fourth Corps under Li Chi-shen had been assembled around Kao-chow; Li replaced Chu P'ei-te as general commander of the southern campaign, and the Second and Third Corps units were sent back north. About December 20, when Kuibyshev's battle account ends, the Fourth Corps was preparing to assault Hainan Island where Teng Pen-yin had retreated.

Workers and farmers reportedly assisted in the Eastern and Southern campaigns. According to Teng Chung-hsia, striking workers organized a transportation corps to move supplies to the fighting front, a propaganda corps to work among the people, and a medical corps to rescue wounded from the battlefield. The strikers' picket corps petitioned to be allowed to join the Eastern Campaign, but the government assigned the corps to stabilize the rear. Teng says that several tens of workers died during the campaign and many hundreds fell ill from overwork.[121] Lo Ch'i-yuan asserted that more than 500 farmers lost their lives during the East River campaign while assisting the revolutionary army, and that the quick defeat of Teng Pen-yin owed much to the help given by the farmers.[122]

Political Work During the Campaigns

Political work was an important feature of these campaigns. Shortly after the establishment of the Military Council early in July 1925, a Political Training Department was set up within it. On July 27 the Kuomintang Political Council appointed Ch'en Kung-po, a founder of the Chinese Communist Party but now no longer a member, as director.[123] He had only recently returned from the United States and had joined the Kuomintang, apparently as a protégé of Liao Chung-k'ai. On September 28 the KMT Central Executive Committee appointed Chou En-lai as Party representative in the First Corps and other men as Party representatives in each of its eight regiments. At least three of the eight were Communists.[124]

As in the previous Eastern Campaign, political work took two forms, among the troops and among the populace. Political workers in battle were expected to be exemplars of valor. In his description of the battle for Hui-chow city, Cherepanov reports that the "commissar" of the Fourth Regiment, which was to lead the attack, called together the political workers and instructed them to serve as examples to the soldiers during the assault. In the second assault, it was Communist company commissars who led the three-man teams with ladders to the city walls. Cherepanov saw one of them right under the wall waving the company flag before the ladders were set up. Summing up the victories of the East River campaign, Cherepanov gives great credit to the commissars in the First Corps at regiment, battalion, and company level, the majority of whom, he says, were Communists, and who rapidly won the confidence of the soldiers.[125]

A Propaganda Corps of 237 persons, all of whom could speak local dialects, was organized by October 2. Its members were distributed among General Headquarters and the three columns making up the expedition.[126] N. I. Konchits describes several meetings organized in newly captured villages and towns to explain the purpose of the National Revolutionary Army and its fundamental difference from warlord armies. He also observed several demonstrations of welcome as General Ch'eng Ch'ien's troops entered towns on its march toward the Fukien border. Some were of large scale and had been carefully prepared.[127]

Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary" records a series of triumphal entries into captured places during the Eastern Campaign where carefully organized welcoming crowds were on hand with banners, slogans, and songs for his entry. For example, after elements of the First Corps had taken Swatow, Chiang entered the city by boat on November 6. A huge gathering was at the dock, and the next day, Saturday, there was an even larger welcoming meeting followed by a parade.[128] Chou En-lai, Ho Ying-ch'in, Chiang Kai-shek, and his adviser, General Rogachev, addressed the meeting. Chiang praised the cooperation of the people and the troops which, he said, had made the victory possible. He proclaimed his program: to restore the labor unions and self-governing organizations of all classes, to abolish unequal treaties, control the maritime customs, and prohibit gambling and opium smoking. He ended with praise for the Russian Revolution and slogans of support for the World Revolution. A few days later, on reading the report of the Propaganda Corps, Chiang was favorably impressed by the effects of the propaganda upon the discipline and morale of the troops as well as by the help it elicited from the public.[129]

Kuibyshev, however, considered the political work in the army poor in many respects and saw it as still in its initial stage, a conclusion presumably based on observations of his Russian staff (Doc. 22, p. 50). Konchits recorded his observations of political work in the Fourth Corps' 10th Division, commanded by Ch'en Ming-shu, which he joined at Lien-chow near Pakhoi early in January 1926. The division's Political Department, which had been organized three months before, had a staff of only twenty, although he was told it had had sixty workers when the division began its march southwestward. Political workers had been left behind at various captured towns, and some had been transferred to work with Kwangsi troops, which had recently joined the campaign. Now each of the division's three regiments had a single propagandist. The Political Department's budget had been reduced from three thousand to two thousand dollars a month. The small staff was attempting to register Kuomintang members in Lien-chow and Pakhoi, to assist in the peasant movement, to organize strikes, and particularly to extend to Pakhoi the boycott against Hong Kong. It was planning a propaganda campaign against gambling, prostitution, and opium smoking. The assistant to the head of the Political Department had recently been appointed chief of the Lien-chow district—i.e., magistrate—and one of his first acts had been to proclaim the right of women to work on a basis of equality with men; he also had attempted to improve the worker's lot. Konchits, as adviser, suggested greater concentration on certain types of political work directed toward the public and toward the troops, but the small staff was inadequate for the task.[130]

Document 26 offers revealing information about a special purpose of political work, and about the changing attitude of the generals toward the introduction of political training in their units. Until June 1925 only Whampoa troops were being indoctrinated; in other units there were only occasional lectures. This was because of resistance by the generals, who feared the loss of their independence. To counteract this attitude, "it was necessary to shape the minds of the generals, to prove to them that the political work did not threaten them with diminution of their authority but, on the contrary, would increase it; that, in connection with the growth of political consciousness, the fighting capacity of their units was growing also" (Doc. 26, p. 42).

The fighting capacity of the Whampoa troops was always cited as an example of the advantage of carrying out political work.

The special purpose was stated in an aside. "Our leaders wanted, of course, quite the contrary, i.e., to undermine the authority of several independent generals and to disorganize their units. The subsequent events confirmed the soundness of our line of conduct—the destruction of Yunnanese and other troops, the dismissal of counter-revolutionary generals" (Doc. 26, p. 42).

These events, the report adds, forced the generals to acknowledge, in principle, the necessity of political work and they began to request the Soviet mission and the government to assign instructors and political workers to their units. This change of attitude took place toward the end of 1925, but due to shortage of personnel it was possible only to organize political sections at the corps level. An exception was the 10th Division of the Fourth Corps, in which political work had been introduced much earlier (Doc. 26, p. 48). This was the division to which Konchits was adviser; his disparaging view of the quality of its political work was described above.

Beginnings of a Chinese Communist Counter-Espionage Organization

The first systematic effort to develop an espionage and counter-espionage apparatus in Canton, staffed by members of the Chinese Communist Party, began in September 1925, according to the anonymous Russian reporting to Peking in December, in our Document 20. Evidently he was a member of the Soviet Secret Police (G.P.U.) and was sent to Canton with the mission of creating an agency to protect the revolution after the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai. He arrived on October 25, 1925, reported to Borodin, and then set to work "to create an organization which would be able to secure the safety of the province." Building upon a nucleus that had been created after a secret meeting between the Russian advisers and Chinese Communists in Canton in mid-September, he started a quick training course for twenty-four carefully chosen Chinese Communists who were already working as military commissars or in other political work. Some of these men were then sent back to their units while others were retained for work in the central apparatus. This group would "form the basis of the future Chinese G.P.U." The apparatus was directed by a collegiate of five, T'an P'ing-shan being the president, who coordinated the whole work. Three other Chinese comrades headed various sections of the apparatus, while the Russian writer was the fifth member of the collegiate and its adviser.

One of the three was Fu Li, who had been in the USSR and was "well developed politically." Since he did not know the Cantonese dialect, however, he was unable to carry on the work directly. The second was a Cantonese, somewhat inferior to Fu but an excellent organizer of minor work, in the Russian writer's estimation. Hence he was charged with all organizing work among the lower strata of the population. His name is given as Yang Ying, and we deduce that he was Yang Yin, a seaman from Hsiang-shan county who had participated in the Hong Kong seamen's strike in 1922, joined the Communist Party the next year, and in 1925 was one of the leaders of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. The third, who had not yet joined the collegiate, was Comrade Ch'eng, assistant chief of the political section of the 3d Corps and a member of the Communist Party.

The writer estimated that sixty Chinese Communists in the apparatus was the maximum possible. At the time of writing, a shortage of personnel, both Chinese and Russian, limited what could be done. First priority had been assigned to gathering information about the army, for "Nobody here knows anything about the army. Even the numerical strength of most units is unknown. . . . As a result, unexpected treasons take place constantly." Due to personnel shortages, the fight against embezzlement of public funds by Chinese officials had to be postponed, though the writer averred that

"95 percent of officials here are guilty of embezzlement of government funds." Some intelligence was being gathered in Hong Kong and Kwangsi, and there were plans to recruit and train spies among striking workmen to become agents in Hong Kong and Macao. Some espionage was being carried on among foreigners in Canton also.

At the time of writing, early in December 1925, the small apparatus was costing $5,000 a month, entirely at Russian expense. The monthly cost was expected to become $20,000, and the writer saw no chance of this money coming from the Nationalist Government, at least for some time. He requested a separate sum of gold $1,000 to be accounted for directly to Peking, thus assuring "a certain independence in the work." The independence he sought was from Borodin. Although the Russian comrades in Canton and the Chinese Communist Party had cooperated excellently in getting the work started, the writer was outraged by the delay that had occurred since he left Peking in sending two G.P.U. agents from Moscow and an interpreter from Peking. Without these, it would scarcely be possible to go on with the work, he complained. For the present he was getting the full-time assistance of "Nikitin" (real name V. E. Gorev) and Mikhailov, and the part-time help of Fred Borodin.[131]

The work was to be designated officially as "Bureau of Detectives Attached to the 1st Army Corps" but it was planned that in its final form the organization would be called "Commission for the Defense of the Revolution." Special troops were to be organized for the commission. The writer adds an interesting point that Wang Ching-wei had drawn up a project for a Political Investigation Bureau to be organized by the Kuomintang Political Bureau (Council). This, he observed, "will prove to be entirely 'ours' because T'an P'ing-shan is designated as its chief." If this plan worked out, the writer assumed that "our work" would have a quite legal character; otherwise, it would be carried on in a semi-legal manner "until our organization becomes powerful enough" (Doc. 20, pp. 1-6).

Further information on the planned counter-espionage organization comes from a document published by the Peking commission and dated December 14, 1925, number 5 in a series[132] of which our Document 20 was number 3. According to this "very secret" plan, the aim was to create an organization "along the lines of our G.P.U.," which could protect the country from counter-revolution, espionage, and banditry, and secondarily "from serious malfeasances in office, etc." Another aim was to prepare a cadre of workers to organize the same work in neighboring provinces into which the Kuomintang spread its influence. The plan called for 360 men to be distributed among the central apparatus, Canton city, all army corps and divisions, the navy, and the six prefectures and nearly 100 counties of Kwangtung. All "must pass through our school." They would take three-month courses and graduate in batches on March 15, July 1, and October 15, 1926. Thus, concluded the writer, by the beginning of 1927 "provided great efforts are made, we will be able to carry through our program." However, he was sure it would not be possible to create as efficient an agency as the G.P.U. because of the great disparity in the size of populations in the two countries and because China had no comparable cadre of party men as Russia had in 1918. They would have to "start in a primitive manner," dealing from case to case according to urgency.

The author of Document 20 was planning an Intelligence Service to parallel the counter-espionage agency. The Peking commission published a "Plan for Organizing Intelligence Work in South China," number 4 in the series, and also dated December 14. The aim of the Intelligence Service was "to set in a proper light" conditions in South China—that is, the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupei, Kiangsi, and Fukien—and in the contiguous regions of Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indo-China. The service was to furnish materials necessary "for our work in Kwangtung" as well as information of interest to the USSR. The Intelligence Service should send "Residents" to the capitals of the above-named provinces and to a few

other cities therein, as well as to Hong Kong, Macao, Hanoi, and Haiphong, in all, eighteen persons. At present only persons of "indifferent quality" could be secured, but the graduates of a planned intelligence school, having completed their course by March 15, 1926, would remedy the situation.

The author of Document 20 sent in a "Report Relating to Intelligence Work in Kwangtung during November 1925." This is number 7 in the series. He had learned that individual Chinese generals had their personal intelligence systems but that the General Staff had almost none. Generals acquired information through friends who regularly sent reports on more important matters, but only the general knew who his agents were. Therefore, after General Hsü Ch'ung-chih was dismissed—i.e., forced to retire to Shanghai on September 20—his "most extensive" intelligence service "was lost to us." The Russian writer believed it would be impossible for the Chinese director of the planned Intelligence Service to obtain the information acquired by Chinese generals; but he hoped somehow to consolidate into a single apparatus the now scattered organizations and to supplement its work by appointing some popular member of the Kuomintang to gather information through his network of friends and acquaintances.

During November, two Residencies had been established in Kwangsi, staffed by Communists who were natives of the province and had completed the short training course. A Residency in Kiangsi was staffed by workers supplied by the Chinese General Staff, but their reliability had not yet been ascertained. In Hong Kong a Residency was "organized through our counter-espionage service." Information was being gathered from the English press of Hong Kong; and Chinese newspapers were on order from the South China provinces. Yet because of the shortage of personnel, particularly of translators, it was possible only to follow military matters; political and economic intelligence had to be neglected. The writer planned to establish more Residencies and expected that the end of the Hong Kong strike—which apparently he expected soon—"will give us great possibilities." Suitable men could be recruited from among the strikers, trained, and then sent back to form "a good net of agents in Hong Kong." The writer also expected soon to engage a Resident for Indo-China "to throw light on the French." Until a suitable chief had been selected to head the guiding apparatus, intelligence work was to be directed by the collegiate that had operated the counter-espionage agency. Later the two functions would be separated. If the work must embrace South China, Hong Kong, and Macao, warned the writer, expenses on a large scale would have to be met—"Then of course $1,000 a month (as Comrade Khmelev promised) will be just like nothing."

The Russian agent had not yet gotten from Peking his promised interpreter, Li, and he remarked sarcastically, "Probably my work here is considered to be of secondary importance."

The second part of Document 20 (number 10 in the series) is a plan for a "School of Counter-Espionage and Intelligence Service in Kwangtung," which, according to a note, had been approved by the collegiate on November 25, 1925. Beginning about mid-December the school should open with sixty students, forty-eight to be trained for counter-espionage and twelve for intelligence, in separate sections. Students should be middle and junior grade officers, members of trade unions and peasant associations, strikers, etc., but would be admitted only after careful selection and checking for political reliability. This must mean they should be Communists. Entering students must also pass an examination to test their general education in Chinese, their knowledge of European languages, and their memory and intelligence. The dialects of Kwangtung were to be represented in the student body. All students would be considered as being in military service and "at the absolute disposal" of the school. The plan outlines two curricula—for intelligence and for counter-espionage—and lists required Russian and Chinese faculty. It proposed "Nikitin" as

director of the school, and Tereshatov as director of the intelligence section. A director for the counter-espionage section was needed. Mikhailov and Fred Borodin could teach special subjects, but three others were needed to teach Russian language. Chinese instructors, especially for political work, must be selected (Doc. 20, "Draft Project").

Military Reorganization to January 1926

By the end of 1925, the Nationalist military forces had disarmed or dispersed most of the actively hostile enemy units in Kwangtung except for Hainan, against which an attack was soon to be launched. The National Revolutionary Army, however, was far from being a unified force, and much work remained to train and equip it, to finance and politicize it, as Document 22 reveals. It shows the difficulties faced by the Kuomintang, its accomplishments, and its failures.[133]

Kuibyshev noted among the Chinese generals a strong undercurrent of resentment against the system of Party representatives. Part of the difficulty was the lack of precise regulations on the functions of Party commissars and consequent disagreement between army officers and Party commissars on the latter's functions. Such regulations had just been drafted and were awaiting the Military Council's approval (Doc. 22, pp. 32, 50).

Document 38, probably the regulations referred to by Kuibyshev, confirmed the CEC's instructions, which were that all orders not countersigned by the appropriate Party representative were void. The regulations, applicable from the platoon level to the General Staff, stated in detail the functions and prerogatives of Party commissars. They had the power to impose penalties to be carried out by the military commander. Article 10 instructed the Party commissar to report to his superior any of the commander's orders that in his opinion endangered the National Revolution. In the event of possible rebellion, the Party commissar had authority to act on his own discretion.[134]

Kuibyshev stressed the importance of a unified Party commissar system and suggested that it be carried out first by the First Corps and then gradually by the other armies (Doc. 22, p. 50). Thus it appears the Party representative system had not yet been firmly established even in the First Corps and had yet to make appreciable headway in the others. He harshly criticized the quality of political training and seemed particularly critical of the Whampoa cadets, who were "indifferent" to political problems. He must have been referring to the Third Class, which was about to graduate. As a partial remedy, Kuibyshev recommended a complete change of Whampoa instructors and greater emphasis on political training. He also suggested centralizing all existing schools in one military academy (Doc. 22, pp. 56, 60).[135]

The National Government encountered determined opposition to financial centralization. According to Kuibyshev, individual generals were still appointing their own tax collectors and refusing to turn in revenue to the National Government. In short, he concluded in January 1926 that the task of financial unification had only begun (Doc. 22, p. 54).

The government had difficulty, too, in centralizing supplies. Its Military Council had appointed a supervisor at the main Canton arsenal, and later a central commissariat was organized to control the distribution of supplies. However, the generals did not respect the Military Council's instructions, and some of them even hired their own people to manufacture ammunition. The Party's failure effectively to control distribution aggravated the already serious shortage of supplies. Furthermore, a large percentage of the weapons available were obsolete (Doc. 22, pp. 53-54).

The Soviet Union continued to transport supplies to Canton from Vladivostok following the first shipment in October 1924. According to the draft of a telegram to

"Galin" from the Soviet military attaché in Peking, dated July 4, 1926, the total cost of supplies shipped on credit to Canton up to December 1 [1925] amounted to 2,500,000 rubles.[136] These shipments fell far short of meeting the needs of an expanding military establishment.

Difficulties in the attempt to centralize military organization are illustrated by Kuibyshev's discussion of Li Fu-lin's attitude. Li was commander of the Fifth Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. However, neither the government's Military Council nor the chief of the General Staff had received any report from Li. Kuibyshev predicted that conflict between Li and the National Revolutionary Army was inevitable and that Li would sooner or later display violent opposition to the reorganization (Doc. 22, p. 52).

How the Military Council planned to carry out the reorganization is shown in Document 21, "Instructions to the Commissions for Reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army," drawn up before mid-November 1925. Three-man commissions were to consist of the chief of the General Staff (at that time, V. P. Rogachev), the commander of the corps or separate division, and the Russian adviser to the corps or division. These commissions were to study minutely the actual condition of the corps or division and then find the means for its support and its reorganization in accordance with a predetermined budget and table of organization. All separate units must be brought into the five corps and two division system or be abolished. The chief of staff was to submit to the Military Council a plan for disbandment of units that would not incorporate themselves into the system. The commissions were also to supervise the organization of a proper staff in each corps or division and make it report regularly the actual effective force of the unit. They were immediately to organize sections of supply service in the corps and divisions and insist that these offices keep exact accounts of all supplies. The commissions were urged to work quickly, be thorough, and carry out reforms immediately through the unit commander. Disagreements within a commission should be submitted to the Military Council, but the rest of the work should go ahead uninterruptedly. January 30 was the deadline for completing reorganization.

The commissions did not fulfill their deadline. Document 3 reports that during the period from December 1925 to March 1926, they completed their work in two corps (Doc. 3, p. 8).

One reason was the desire of commanders to conceal the real facts about the size of their units and to put in exaggerated claims in order to receive more money from the government, according to the writer of Document 26. It was difficult to check the numbers of troops because units were either scattered or taking the field. The stated figures had to be cut down, but not too much, so as not to offend the generals. The writer cites Chiang Kai-shek as an example. He informed the government that his corps, the First, numbered 40,000 men, but the Russians knew very well that there were not more than 20,000, and among them only 12,000 combatants (Doc. 26, p. 41).

Document 26 then provides approximate figures for the entire army as of December 1925, counting only combatants. It was thought to number about 65,000, but the figure would need to be raised by about 50 percent for various officials, clerks, and workers serving in the army. The estimated combat force of the National Revolutionary Army by units in the last month of 1925 was stated as follows:

First Corps	About 12,000
Fourth Corps	About 11,000
Third Corps	About 10,000
Second Corps	About 10,000
Fifth Corps	About 8,000
Sixth Corps	About 9,000

Separate Div. About 3,500
Schools About 2,500
Several small units About 2,000

Document 26 also provides an appraisal of the military effectiveness of each corps, and of the political reliability of the commanders. Since this appraisal probably dates from about February 1926, we reserve discussion, but here note that the document informs us that the Sixth Corps of Ch'eng Ch'ien had been formed only in mid-November out of several detachments and regiments from northern provinces and was very poorly equipped, and that the Second Corps of T'an Yen-k'ai was still resisting until the end of December in having its eight separate regiments formed into three divisions, the standard system for a corps (Doc. 26, pp. 37, 48, 51).

The Soviet Position in the Military Establishment to January 1926

At a banquet at the Swatow headquarters of the Eastern Expeditionary Forces on December 11, 1925, Commander in Chief Chiang Kai-shek made generous acknowledgment of the Russians' services. He asked rhetorically why the National Revolutionary Army had not earlier been organized or the East River districts pacified. He answered that these accomplishments were all due to execution of Sun Yat-sen's policy of alliance with Soviet Russia. Chiang said that the KMT should accept Russian direction of the Chinese Revolution and compared this to the Allied command under Marshal Foch in the World War. He quoted Sun Yat-sen to the effect that Borodin's views represented Sun's own views. He referred to Sun's will calling on the KMT to unite with all peoples in the world who treated the Chinese as equals.[137]

As of early January 1926, according to Document 23, which lists the current assignments of the Soviet military personnel in South China,[138] V. P. Rogachev was chief of staff of the National Revolutionary Army, and five others acted as advisers to functional divisions: artillery (T. A. Beshastnov), communications (M. I. Dratvin), sanitation (Mrs. Tereshatov), engineering (E. A. Yakovlev), and administration (F. G. Matseilik). The Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army had two Russian advisers (I. K. Mamaev, I. Ya. Razgon), and the General Supply Department had two (G. I. Gilev and T. A. Beshastnov). The latter also advised at the arsenal. P. I. Smirnov headed the Coastal Defense Bureau, although he was soon to go to Russia on a purchasing mission, and "Remi" (real name Uger) was chief of the Aviation Management Office, though he was off on a mission. The Military Academy had five advisers, one to the head of the academy, another a political adviser, and the others for matters of supply, communications, and engineering. Of the six corps that had been designated by the end of 1925, only the first four had advisers. The head of the First Corps had an adviser, as did its 2d and 3d divisions, and the corps had an artillery expert. The Second Corps had an adviser for T'an Yen-k'ai, though we presume the Russian worked with the field commander, General Lu Ti-p'ing. The corps was being pushed toward an organization by divisions, and there was an adviser to an office called the "Division Department." The corps still had a separate school, with an adviser. The only Russian listed for the Third Corps, commanded by Chu P'ei-tei, was assigned temporarily to its school. The Fourth Corps, which was actively campaigning in the South when the report was written, had advisers to its commander, Li Chi-shen, and to each of its divisions, the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Finally, the First Independent Division, that of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, had an adviser.

In all, thirty-one persons were named, but only twenty-four were in Kwangtung with the Chinese military services. Several of them had to fulfill more than one job. At the end of 1925 the Russian military mission in South China was still too small for the task of modernizing and politicizing the National Revolutionary Army rapidly.[139]

Most of the group was concentrated in the General Staff, Political Department, and Military Academy. These were the most important organs for unification and politicization. Kuibyshev sought to strengthen the General Staff's authority. He believed it should not be merely the secretariat of the government's Military Council, but the actual administrative organ of the National Revolutionary Army. There was a Russian adviser in each of the departments of the General Staff, except for the Communications Department, which Dratvin actually headed (Doc. 22, pp. 50, 60). Kuibyshev displayed a mixture of satisfaction with accomplishments and sense of frustration. He complained that despite the good positions the Russians had been able to secure in various departments of the National Revolutionary Army, it was not yet possible for them to penetrate further to obtain *complete control* because of the shortage of advisers and interpreters (Doc. 22, p. 59; our emphasis).

Document 23 contains a draft of statutes for the South China Group of Military-Political Workers, which gives its fundamental aims as expressed by a commission of the leading members and then passed by a general meeting of the group. In forwarding the draft to "Comrade Suvaroff"—actually Military Attaché A. I. Egorov— as "Very secret" on January 13, 1926, General Kuibyshev explained the need to bring "clearness as to the problems which are before the Group as well as to its organization." One of the main points in his covering letter was the absolute necessity of the *penetration of the workers of the Group*, by which he clearly meant penetration into the command of the NRA. Why? "Because in the nearest future we will have no chance to get and to prepare a commanding personnel which could be satisfactory in a military respect; still less we can hope that it will be satisfactory in a political respect." He further explained that "Chinese generals and officers are not only completely ignorant as regards the art of war but also most unbalanced in all other respects. Even their common routine work can yield desirable results only with Russian advisers. The popularity of the Russian advisers is so great that their enormous political, military, and moral influence on any general or officer of the ranks . . . is beyond doubt. However, on account of their inconsistency, only occasional meetings and conferences with them are absolutely insufficient" (Doc. 23, "Report," p. 42).

Section I of the statutes sets forth, in translation, the "Task of the Group":

1. To organize and instruct a National Revolutionary army in the south of China for national liberation from the yoke of Imperialism and for unification into one independent democratic republic.
2. To give every assistance to the government by working in the army and among the population in order to promote its democratic principles.
3. To make popular the doctrine of communism and of Sovietism and to work toward bringing about a complete rapprochement and (mutual) support between (China and) the USSR, and to create in the army, and in the labour organizations and in the peasantry the desire (pledge) for a further revolutionary movement.
4. To keep informed about the counter-revolutionary forces of China and the people oppressed by them, or about the people of adjacent countries.
5. To make an exhaustive study of China and, chiefly, of its southern part. (Doc. 23, Statutes, p. 1)

The manner of organizing the group and the duties of the holders of each office in it are spelled out, as are administrative details and amenities to be provided. Kuibyshev asked Egorov for his approval.

* * * * *

We now turn to events taking place in Central and North China in the latter months of 1925 as they affected relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Com-

munist Party. In terms of chronology, we pick up the thread with Communist reactions to the emergence of Tai Chi-t'ao's theories.

Policies of the Chinese Communist Party, October 1925

As a result of the May Thirtieth Movement, Communist Party membership increased tenfold, from 1,000 in May 1925 to about 10,000 six months later (Doc. 1, p. 43). The membership of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps had jumped to 9,000 by September 1925.[140] The Communist Party had become an effective force in an increasingly powerful national revolutionary movement, as seen in its important role in the May Thirtieth Movement and the Hong Kong-Canton Strike. Early in October 1925, an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee met in Peking to take stock of the situation and to reevaluate policies. Three sets of resolutions emanating from this plenum were among the documents discovered in the Peking raid.

A major question confronting the Communist Party leaders was the recurrent problem of relations with the Kuomintang. The need to reexamine these relations was accentuated by the growing influence of Tai Chi-t'ao's views, which argued that Communists were utilizing the Kuomintang to develop their own organization and influence.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu later asserted that he submitted a proposal to the Political Resolution Committee at the plenum, stating that Tai's pamphlets were not random expressions but indicated the bourgeoisie's attempt to strengthen their own power for the purpose of checking the proletariat and going over to counter-revolution. He then proposed that "we should prepare ourselves immediately to withdraw from the Kuomintang and become independent." The party should maintain its political independence and lead the masses without being checked by the KMT's policies. According to Ch'en, the Comintern's representative and responsible members of the Central Committee unanimously opposed his proposal on the ground that it would be equivalent to opposing the Kuomintang. Ch'en wrote that he did not insist, out of respect for Comintern discipline and the majority opinion of the Central Committee.[141]

Document 15 is the Resolutions on Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which we believe resulted from the debates at this October plenum. After identifying Kuomintang leaders positively opposed to the CCP, the CY, and the Canton government, the plenum called attention to another phenomenon—the effect of the revolutionary dynamism of the proletariat on the Chinese bourgeoisie. In the Kuomintang the petty bourgeoisie were attempting to define their ideology and consolidate themselves organizationally. People like Tai Chi-t'ao, the CC said, were utilizing the signboard "The Real Three Principles of the People" to oppose class struggle, the KMT Left Wing, and the Communists. "It becomes increasingly clear every day that this faction has formed itself into the KMT Right Wing." Since this group opposed the Left Wing in the Kuomintang as well as the Communists, their acts were "objectively equivalent" to aiding counter-revolutionaries and imperialists (Doc. 15, pp. 1-2).

The plenum noted another result of the revolutionary movement, the growth of the Kuomintang, particularly in South China, where it was becoming a real political party of the National Revolution and of the masses—that is, peasants, workers, and urban petty bourgeoisie. In view of this development, the plenum resolved that the Communist Party should continue cooperation with the Kuomintang government and do its utmost to assist the KMT Left to develop the revolutionary movement.

This approach was summed up as follows: "We oppose its Right Wing and unite with its Left Wing by contracting a close alliance with it and helping it in every way possible to fight against the Right." To execute this strategy, the Communist Party should itself expand everywhere, especially where the Kuomintang had influence; it

should "actively enter the political arena and carry out our ideological strategy and struggle everywhere" (Doc. 15, p. 3). In effect, this was a decision to compete with the Kuomintang politically while supporting its Left Wing in its internal struggles. Yet the resolution exposes the dilemma that the Communist leaders were caught in—torn between the intention, on the one hand, to lead the mass movements independently, together with the belief in class struggle as essential to the National Revolution; and the realization, on the other hand, that such polices could only increase conflict with the Kuomintang, to which the Comintern bound them. While eager to draw out of the "bloc within," the Communist leaders meeting in Peking could only devise an even more fractious policy while remaining in the senior party.

The resolutions specified how this dual strategy was to be carried out. The Communist Party's organization and propaganda should be independent, particularly in Kwangtung. The Party should win over the masses of workers and peasants. New comrades should not join the Kuomintang nor engage in its work, particularly at a high level, except in such KMT Headquarters as were absolutely under Communist influence. Where the Communist Party itself had no masses, it should not assist the Kuomintang to develop its organization. Yet where the KMT Left and the Communists were influential, particularly in Kwangtung, "we should cooperate earnestly with the KMT and impel it to take an active part in the national movement to the best of its ability. . . . At the same time, we must not yield one inch of ground to the KMT in terms of the theory and practice of class struggle in all movements" (Doc. 15, p. 3).

What was the KMT Left? The resolutions warned against the danger of confusing Communists with the Left Wing. This erroneous tendency, said the CC, had led Communists to neglect their own position and to misunderstand the respective positions of the Communists and the Left Wing. The CC declared that it was incorrect to classify the Kuomintang into Right, Left, and Center. There were in fact only the Right and Left Wings in the KMT; members of the Center had either joined the Right or Left, while former Right Wing members, such as Feng Tzu-yu, had become openly reactionary. The low opinion which the Central Committee held for the Kuomintang Left as a political force was summed up in a sentence. "At the moment, however, the so-called Left is mere talk" (Doc. 15, p. 4).

According to the Kuomintang's two top Left leaders themselves, Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, speaking after the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, the Left was anti-imperialist and revolutionary, and the Right was subservient to imperialists and counter-revolutionary. The Communist Party's Peking plenum sought to establish a more precise definition of the Left Wing in accordance with political policies. The Right and Left, it declared, should be classified according to their attitude toward: (1) imperialism; (2) the labor and peasant movements; (3) militarism; (4) Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party; and (5) reactionary policies. The Left Wing should oppose all reactionaries, imperialists, and militarists, and it should assist the labor and peasant movements and cooperate with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party. The resolution provided a chart to guide propagandists in differentiating elements in the KMT (Doc. 15, p. 5).

The rising tide of revolution and the growth of the Communist Party required the leaders in Peking to refine policies of internal organization. Document 14, "Resolutions on the Question of Organization," is, we believe, another product of the October Enlarged Plenum. It begins by stressing the remarkable upsurge of proletarian movements and the necessity for the Communist Party to lead them. But the resolution criticizes the work of the comrades both in North China and in the South. Some found it difficult to strike a correct balance between executing the tasks of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party, it points out. This was particularly true of persons who joined the parties almost simultaneously. In 1925, ac-

cording to "What Party Members Should Know," Right-deviationist tendencies were even more dangerous and prevalent among Communist Party members than Left-deviationist tendencies. While Left-inclined members insisted on conducting an independent proletarian revolutionary movement to establish proletarian dictatorship, Right-inclined Communists neglected the Communists' own organizations.[142] Such Rightist tendencies were severely criticized in Document 14. Party members were apt to work as individuals in labor unions, in the Kuomintang, and among the masses, the CC said. Such persons appeared to be representatives of the various mass movements in the Chinese Communist Party, rather than executors of the Party's policies among the masses (Doc. 14, p. 5).

Communists in Canton were particularly exposed to the pitfalls of dual membership, since many leaders of the Kwangtung Regional Committee held posts in the Kuomintang. Kwangtung Communists had failed to utilize the revolutionary tide to consolidate and develop the Party, the CC complained. Although they were able to influence the workers and peasants ideologically, they had failed to consolidate this influence organizationally. The Kwangtung comrades worked individually in the KMT, the labor unions, and the peasant associations and ignored the interests of the Communist Party as a whole. They had failed to make use of the Hong Kong-Canton strike to absorb workers and peasants into the Communist Party (Doc. 14, p. 4).

The plenum declared that the Party was in a period of transition from a small organization to a mass party and that the transitional phase should end as soon as possible. The building of a mass party required improvement of the Party's social composition, which had been predominantly intellectual.[143] In line with this objective, the CC denounced as erroneous the idea of many local Communists that every Party member must understand Marxism and possess a high degree of working capacity. It ordered the elimination of "cumbersome formalities" in enlisting workers, peasants, and students. It set the probation period for intellectuals at three months, and the period for workers and peasants at only one month (Doc. 14, p. 4).

The CC stressed the need to win over the masses of workers and peasants, declaring, "It is absolutely true that the future destiny of the Chinese revolutionary movement depends entirely upon whether or not the Chinese Communist Party will be able to organize and lead the masses" (Doc. 14, p. 2). The Enlarged Plenum paid special attention to organization of farmers on a national scale. Its letter to the peasantry dated October 10, 1925 outlined demands for the peasantry and the method of organizing peasant associations. Although some people might say that the peasants in Kwangtung were able to organize because of the assistance of the National Government, the letter says such a statement was only half true. The National Government in Kwangtung had unquestionably helped the peasants, yet there had been instances of collaboration between the Kuomintang Right Wing, landlords, the merchant corps, and the army with the aim of destroying peasant associations and oppressing the peasantry. About these the National Government could do nothing. Thus, it was up to the peasants themselves to struggle for their own organization. The Enlarged Plenum pledged Communist support to the peasantry of the entire country.[144]

Because of the reactionary and repressive policy of the militarists and capitalists, it was necessary for the Communist Party still to work secretly in certain places, the plenum admitted. But it cautioned that the Party must not revert to its previous condition of exclusively underground work among laborers and intelligentsia. "We should simultaneously build up a clandestine organization and exert every effort to engage openly in the political movement. At all times, we must fix firmly in mind the fact that our Party cannot become a party of the masses through secret work alone" (Doc. 14, p. 6).

In the fall of 1925, beginning with the Peking Enlarged Plenum, the Central Committee began to centralize authority in its own hands. The committee declared

that it had done very little directing work in many localities. It now decided to increase the number of special commissioners authorized to direct the regional and local committees in the execution of their tasks (Doc. 14, p. 2).[145] The reason this was necessary is suggested by the document itself, and by what is known of the regional committees as of this time.

Apparently there had been no strict regulation on the jurisdiction and authority of the regional committees. When first organized, the Hunan Regional Committee had jurisdiction over the local committees of Pinghsiang and Anyuan in Kiangsi in addition to the province of Hunan.[146] The Northern Regional Committee supervised Party work in Chihli, Shansi, and Manchuria, but the Peking Local Committee was not subordinate to it (Doc. 14, p. 3).

The Kwangtung Regional Committee, with authority over Party work in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, was by far the largest. With headquarters at Canton, this committee exerted direct influence on Communists working in KMT organs and the army. By mid-1925, the Kwangtung Regional Committee had a fully developed organization headed by Ch'en Yen-nien, the eldest son of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, with six departments concerned respectively with organization, propaganda, and the military, labor, farmers', and women's movements. The committee ran its own training classes, its own newspaper, the *Jen-min chou-k'an*, and its own Party School.[147]

The Central Committee in Shanghai, on the other hand, apparently had only four departments: the organization and propaganda departments set up in 1921, and the women's and publications departments. It was only in October 1925 that the CC decided to establish at Party Headquarters committees on the farmers' movement, the labor movement, and the military movement (Doc. 14, p. 2). Probably the Central Committee was concerned about the relative independence of the Kwangtung Committee, which tended to make its own policy under the guidance of Borodin.

The third document from the October Plenum is "Resolutions on the Question of Propaganda" (Doc. 16). This established guidelines for propaganda work among various classes and discussed effective techniques. It also stressed the importance of educating new members of the rapidly growing Party. Special attention should be paid to agitation within the Party to "encourage the entire membership from the bottom up to participate in positive political life."

The Party should open two kinds of schools. With its present strength it could not do more. General schools under local committees would train laborers to be agitators among the masses. The training period would be two weeks, or at most one month. Comrades destined to become directing personnel were to be trained in advanced Party schools set up under regional committees. The training period in such schools should be three months. The Central Committee emphasized that Party members attending such schools must not become separated from the masses; they were required simultaneously to work among them in order to acquire true proletarian ideas (Doc. 16, p. 59). The curricula for the two types of schools are found in another document, number 17, seized in the Peking raid, though it is undated.

Communists in all phases of propaganda work were told to adjust the language and content of propaganda to the level of those to whom it was directed. "To be effective in our work of agitation," the CC declared, "we must enable the masses, even the most backward workers and ricksha coolies, to understand our propaganda. . . . It is best to point out the Party's accomplishments and the fact that the Party has already fought for and obtained concrete benefits for the working class and the peasantry. Such accomplishments are our point of departure in getting hold of the masses" (Doc. 16, pp. 56-57).

The CC outlined two principal methods of mass agitation: propaganda mobilization and the establishment of workers' clubs. Propaganda mobilization was to focus the attention of all classes on certain specific events or problems, and should be well

planned in advance. The CC stated that workers' clubs had served an important purpose even before the Party was established. The Party should further develop them by making use of their good points and introducing certain changes to suit the Party's needs. Especially important were the "self-study groups" of the clubs, which were charged with absorbing non-Party members. The CC instructed Communists to carry on discussion of newspaper articles and interpretation of current events (Doc. 16, pp. 57-59).

Party cells, particularly the small units in party cells, should take special responsibility for propaganda work among the masses. The duty of small units was to enable labor comrades to know and understand every detail of the daily struggle (Doc. 16, p. 58).

A document issued about two months later by the Northern Regional Committee illustrates the importance of the cell as the Party's organ of contact with the masses. "Plans on the Organization and Development of Party Cells" states, "The Cell is the kernel of the Party among the masses . . . the Party's ears, eyes, arms, and legs among the masses" (Doc. 19, pp. 31-32). Members of Party cells were indoctrinated with Bolshevik principles of centralization and discipline. They were instructed to "collectivize life; oppose individualism; have absolute confidence in the Party; oppose all subjective points of view" (Doc. 19, p. 33). Part of this document has a similar ring to that of the training manual or policy guide developed for young Chinese Communists in Moscow, our Document 13, discussed above.

The Party should subject every member of every cell to a continuous program of training and education. This was the special responsibility of the "educational propagandists,' who were regarded as the central elements of party cells. Their duty was to carry out the Party's political and ideological propaganda, help cell members analyze current problems from the theoretical point of view, help them understand the Party's policies, and improve their political interest and working capacity. Document 19 emphasizes the importance of the discussion method to stimulate interest and participation of cell members, and it cautions educational propagandists against using "injection-type" lectures (Doc. 19, pp. 36-38).

The Western Hills Conference and the Communist Party's Reaction

Communist fears of the emergence of a new Right Wing in the Kuomintang were confirmed on November 23, 1925, when a group of Nationalist leaders convened what they called the "Fourth CEC Plenum" before Sun Yat-sen's bier in the Western Hills near Peking. The conference was but another eruption of the discontent felt by many Kuomintang elders with the activities of the Communists within their Party. Tsou Lu, Lin Shen, and Hsieh Ch'ih were the main organizers of this anti-Communist movement. Lin and Tsou were ostensibly the leaders of the Diplomatic Delegation that left Canton about September 20 bound for Peking. In Shanghai they quickly formed a coalition with Hsieh Ch'ih, Tai Chi-t'ao, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, and Shao Yuan-ch'ung and decided to call a plenary meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in Peking.[148] There the conservative leaders immediately ran into opposition from Yü Shu-te, the Communist member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, who was a power in the KMT Executive Headquarters in Peking. After a probe to see whether the CEC Plenum could be held in Kalgan under the protection of Feng Yü-hsiang, a telegram was issued on November 16 using the names of ten regular members of the Central Executive Committee, two alternate members, and three members of the Central Supervisory Committee, calling for the plenum to begin on November 23.[149]

Seven of the alleged signers—Lin Shen, Tsou Lu, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Tai Chi-t'ao,

Shao Yuan-ch'ung, Shen T'ing-i, and Wu Chih-hui—held a preparatory meeting on the 18th to discuss basic policy. It was agreed at this meeting, according to Tai Chi-t'ao, to accept Wu Chih-hui's conception—a warning to Wang Ching-wei rather than an impeachment of him, and an invitation to Li Ta-chao and other Communists for sincere negotiations rather than a movement for a unilateral split.[150] On the next day, however, Tai and Shen were attacked by a band of ruffians, who accused them of being Communists and dragged them off to the Kuomintang Comrades Club where they were further denounced. Tai felt so insulted that he left Peking on the 20th, before the plenum began. Reportedly, he issued a written statement in support of the decisions of the conference before leaving.[151]

How many persons actually attended the Western Hills Conference on its opening day or its subsequent meetings became a matter of controversy. At no meeting was there a quorum of the Central Executive Committee—thirteen regular members. Nevertheless, the conclave was a most serious challenge to the authority of the Kuomintang leadership in Canton. The Peking group mustered at least as many Central Executive Committee members as Canton could have mustered at that time.[152] The heart of the opposition was a group of Sun Yat-sen's old comrades, Lin Sen and Tsou Lu from Canton, Hsieh Ch'ih, Chang Chi, Chü Cheng, and T'an Chen. Chang Chi had initially supported Dr. Sun's Soviet orientation.

On the first day of the conference, when most of the basic decisions seem to have been made, there may have been eight regular CEC members, two alternates, and two members of the Supervisory Committee.[153] The conference discussed a number of important resolutions such as to move the Central Executive Committee to Shanghai, to appoint a new Standing Committee made up of five attending the conference, to abolish the Political Council, to dismiss Borodin from his post as adviser, and to impeach Wang Ching-wei. The main decision at this session was to annul membership of Communists in the Kuomintang. The other resolutions, and many more, were refined and elaborated, and passed at various dates thereafter, for the conference held twenty-two meetings and only closed formally on January 4, 1926.[154] Its decisions were not the moderate ones envisaged by the preparatory meeting.

"A Manifesto to Strike the Communist Faction from the Party Register" was issued on the first day, November 23, in the name of the Fourth Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. It denounced the Communists for utilizing the Kuomintang to expand the influence of their own party and to support Soviet Russia. The plenum had therefore decided to annul the membership of all Communists in the Nationalist Party. It declared, however, that the two parties could still cooperate in the interests of the National Revolution. The Kuomintang was dedicated to the overthrow of imperialism of all kinds in order to obtain national independence. Although the Communist Party and the Kuomintang shared a common determination to work for the National Revolution, China and Russia had different historical backgrounds and social conditions. The National Revolution and class revolution could not go forward together, the manifesto stated. It added, however, that the Kuomintang should cooperate with anti-imperialist Russia whenever necessary in the course of revolutionary work.[155]

The second session of the conference was held on the 24th, but then because of the disturbed political situation in Peking, no meetings were held until December 1. The immediate reaction of the Chinese Communists is revealed in Document 18, drafted by the Peking Local Committee and dated November 25.

The Peking Local Committee identified Tai Chi-t'ao as the leader of the "New Right Wing" and labeled his theories "Taichitaoism." Despite its assertion that the Right Wing was gathering in Peking because that was the only place it could "maintain its dying life," the Peking Local Committee betrayed its nervousness. The Right Wing had allied itself with the reactionaries, it said, and the Communists were

seeking an alliance with the Left to counteract the reactionary conduct of the Right. However, there were hardly any Kuomintang Leftists in Peking, the Local Committee said, and all KMT members were inclined toward Taichitaoism. Under such circumstances, "It is extremely dangerous for the Communists to fight singlehandedly against the Right within the Kuomintang." An isolated struggle by the Communists not only could not overthrow the Right but could enhance its strength for, in such an event, "many shortsighted and wavering elements who cannot see clearly that this is a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution would mistake it for a struggle between communism and anticommunism" (Doc. 18, p. 149).

The Peking Local Committee declared that the northern Communists must attempt to form a Left Wing of the masses and, under the united front of the Left and the Communists, from the bottom level of the masses up to high-level organs, oppose the Right and the reactionaries. It outlined point-by-point rebuttals of the arguments of the Right Wing (or New Right Wing) under three propaganda headings: (1) Taichitaoism is not Sunyatsenism; (2) The Right Wing and the reactionaries are conspiring to destroy the organization of the KMT and to violate Party discipline; and (3) it is necessary to continue cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (Doc. 18, p. 150).

The document brought forth arguments to convince the masses that class struggle was not harmful to the National Revolution but necessary, and that there was absolutely no possibility of the Communist Party destroying the Kuomintang since each represented a social force with a separate historical mission. It counterattacked Tsou Lu and Lin Shen, charging them with insulting the Kwangtung Revolutionary Government and of trying with Hsieh Ch'ih to seize the Executive Headquarters of the Kuomintang in Peking and use it to call an illegal meeting of the CEC. It defended the alliance with Soviet Russia and charged the Right Wing with serving the interests of imperialism by fabricating rumors against Russia. It defended the Kuomintang Political Council and asserted that even the CEC could not dissolve it at will; in proposing to dissolve it, the Right Wing was trying to destroy the Kuomintang. Finally, the document outlined a series of points to refute the contention that the Communist Party conspired against the Kuomintang, was weakening it, or was responsible for splits within the Party. On the contrary, the Peking Local Committee argued, the Kuomintang had been revitalized by the Communists' work. The Left-Right struggle was not a contest between communism and anticommunism but a struggle between revolution and counterrevolution (Doc. 18, pp. 150-56).

In an article, "What are the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang?" published in the December 3 issue of *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, Ch'en Tu-hsiu came out in support of the Left against the Right. Tai Chi-t'ao's clique was the final development of the KMT Right Wing, he said. What was the difference between the Right and Left? Around the time of the First KMT Congress, he answered, the Left favored, and the Right opposed, anti-imperialist and anti-militarist policies; the Left believed in, and the Right denied, the Three Principles of the People. Now, however, it was not enough merely to believe in principles. Those who believed only in principles were merely ideologists, not revolutionaries. The Left Wing knew that it was useless merely to disseminate propaganda on the Three Principles without defining concrete policies for their realization. The Left could not but support the policies calling for the Russian alliance, cooperation with the Communists, and nonopposition to the class struggle, which were policies demanded by the actual situation. Ch'en concluded: "In the Chinese national revolutionary movement, we must support the Kuomintang Left Wing and oppose its Right Wing."[156]

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's definition of the Left's platform was echoed in a circular notice to Kuomintang members issued in Canton in the name of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on December 4. If the KMT did not ally with Soviet Russia,

base itself on the peasantry and labor which constitute the majority of the people, and admit Communist elements who stood for the interests of the peasants and workers, then the revolutionary force would fall into isolation and the revolution would never be accomplished. Under the circumstances, the CEC was made to say, not to be revolutionary was to be counter-revolutionary. There was absolutely no room for neutrality. The notice announced that the CEC protested against the Western Hills Conference.[157]

Meantime, on December 2, the Western Hills Group adopted resolutions for the expulsion of Communist CEC members—T'an P'ing-shan, Yü Shu-te, Li Ta-chao, and Lin Tsu-han—and alternate members—Mao Tse-tung, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Han Lin-fu, Yü Fang-chou, and Chang Kuo-t'ao. On December 4, the Peking group terminated Borodin's contract as adviser to the KMT and dissolved the Political Council. The next day it decided to expel Wang Ching-wei from Party membership for a period of six months.[158] The charges against Wang, issued in a declaration to Party comrades sometime in December, accused him of three great crimes: of opposing the suppression of Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan but claiming credit afterwards; of being a tool of the Communist Party in disrupting the Kuomintang; and of being the instrument through which Borodin dominated the Kuomintang in Canton and the Nationalist Government.[159]

In retaliation, the CEC in Canton issued a manifesto on December 12 denouncing Tsou Lu and Hsieh Ch'ih as the principal leaders of the Western Hills group, and calling for the opening of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang.[160] Formal action against the Western Hills group was postponed until the congress. Chiang Kai-shek, who had not been attacked by the Western Hills group, issued a sharp denunciation of it and a defense of Wang Ching-wei, Borodin, and the Chinese Communists in an open letter, dated December 25, to all offices and members of the Kuomintang.[161]

Before the Western Hills Conference was over, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and Shao Yuan-ch'ung left for Shanghai to set up a new Party Headquarters in the name of the Central Executive Committee. Yeh was the leader of this move; he set up the office on December 14 and the Shanghai *Min-kuo jih-pao* became the mouthpiece of the new headquarters. The Western Hills group planned to call its own Second Congress of the Kuomintang.[162]

Shanghai was also the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party. Chang Kuo-t'ao relates that Ch'en Tu-hsiu, with the assistance of Voitinsky, arranged a private meeting in the Soviet consulate with three of the more moderate Western Hills leaders—Sun Fo, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, and Shao Yuan-ch'ung. For the Communist side, Ts'ai Ho-shen and Chang himself also attended. The meeting must have been about mid-December. In a frank and conciliatory discussion, Ch'en maintained that the Communist Party had no intention of dominating the Kuomintang, that it had already instructed its various local headquarters to vote for the Kuomintang notables as delegates to the forthcoming Kuomintang Congress, and that the Party did not want an increase in the number of Communists on the new Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The Communist Party's Central Committee advocated that Kuomintang work be carried out by Kuomintang members, and hoped that Sun, Yeh, and Shao would go to Kwangtung and take up Party and government posts. The result of the talk, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao's recollection, was a seven-point agreement signed by both sides, although he could recall only two points in rather general terms. Chang was then sent to Canton to attend the Second Kuomintang Congress and to carry the new policy of the Central Committee to the Communist leaders there.[163] A letter by Chang Kuo-t'ao addressed to Kuomintang members and published on December 24 was conciliatory in tone and sought to quiet the controversy with the Western Hills group, although refuting their arguments.[164]

Cross Currents in Canton

Two developments in Canton illustrate the conflicting pressures exerted by Communists and anti-Communists to win supporters in the Whampoa Military Academy and other schools, with the conservative Society for the Study of Sun Wenism gaining in influence; and a seemingly contrary enthusiasm for study in the Soviet Union.

In Canton, under the influence of Tai Chi-t'ao and of propaganda from the Western Hills Conference, the conflict between the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the Communist-controlled League of Chinese Military Youth grew more intense. Each side attempted to mobilize support among groups outside the academy and the First Corps. The conflict reached the level of Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, and on December 8 Chiang called a meeting of political workers in the First Corps and Party representatives of various levels to discuss harmonization. He proposed the following solution: (1) Agitation by Communists in the academy should be carried out openly. (2) If Kuomintang members in the academy wished to join the Communist Party they should announce their intention and seek permission from the Special Kuomintang Branch in the Academy.[165]

According to Hsu Kai-yu, who interviewed many former Whampoa cadets and instructors, Rightist agitators obtained authorization and financial support from Wang Ching-wei in December 1925 to inaugurate the Sun Yat-sen Society, as he calls it. Chou En-lai enlisted the support of Borodin, who threatened Wang with the withdrawal of all Russian aid if the organizers of the society could not be stopped. Wang then led a delegation, which included Ch'en Ch'eng, Ho Chung-han, Huang Chen-wu, and P'an Yu-ch'iang to plead with Borodin who, according to this account, yielded but warned Wang to beware of the consequences.[166] Cherepanov has a different version: the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism planned a mass rally for December 29, at which it would express its wish that the forthcoming Second National Congress of the Kuomintang should pass a resolution supporting the Western Hills Conference resolutions against the Soviet military advisers. "However, the Soviet advisers in Canton decisively declared that if such a resolution were passed, all of them would quit their posts and leave. The society backed down and sent their representatives to the Left-Wing Kuomintang and Soviet advisers with assurances that they would not use counterrevolutionary slogans at the rally." Apparently Wang Ching-wei was worried, for on December 28 he sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, telling him that the next day the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism planned a great demonstration at which they would pass out handbills with Western Hills propaganda. Chiang sent a stern telegram back, telling Wang to prevent it.[167]

The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism held its rally and was formally inaugurated at a congress on December 29 and issued its inaugural Manifesto. According to Cherepanov, the demonstration took on a different character from that originally planned, coming out in support for the planned Second Congress. He writes that the society was unable to rally many people or to win the participation of many important organizations in Canton.[168] A contemporary Communist Report confirms Cherepanov. It states that the society hoped by a show of strength to exclude Communists from the coming Second Kuomintang Congress, but "when we heard this, we negotiated with Old Wang to add five slogans," which, quoted, all supported the position of the Kuomintang Leftists—opposing the Western Hills Conference and the new Shanghai Central, supporting the Kuomintang's Kwangtung Central and its Second Congress, and (more important to the local Communists) upholding the Hong Kong-Canton Strike. The Communists organized a counter parade for New Year's Day and persuaded many organizations not to attend the society's inaugural ceremony, so that only about 1,000 persons attended, the report says. It also states that after Chiang

Kai-shek returned to Canton, he "severely rebuked them [the society's leaders], but nevertheless their intention to exclude Communists [from the Congress] is still not dead, and they still propose a resolution that party straddlers may not be elected."[169] Presumably this meant to exclude Communists from positions in the Kuomintang hierarchy.

Concerning the society's inaugural ceremony, Li Yün-han, basing himself on reports in the Canton *Min-kuo jih-pao* of December 30, says Wang Ching-wei addressed a great gathering on the parade ground of Chungshan University in support of society, after which the Canton Students League paraded and issued a public letter upholding the Sun Wen Chu-i Hsueh Hui. According to Ch'en Kung-po, who was acting president of the university, the student body was torn with conflict between Leftists and Rightists.[170]

The other current attracting notice was enthusiasm for study in Russia. The Communist Party had been sending students to the University of the Toilers of the East, but after Sun Yat-sen's death the Russian leadership decided to set up a college in Moscow named for him, with an exclusively Chinese student body. Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow opened its doors in November 1925 and gradually built up a student body with recruits drawn from Peking-Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton. Karl Radek was its first rector, and the course of study was to be two years. According to Yüeh Sheng, who studied there in 1926, most of the students selected in Peking-Tientsin and Shanghai were Communists, but those from Canton were nearly all members of the Kuomintang. Mr. Sheng asserts that Borodin had a quota of thirty and selected mostly relatives of influential Kuomintang members.[171]

The Canton leadership learned of the school on October 7, 1925, when Borodin announced to the Political Council that Moscow requested that students be sent to enroll. The council set up a committee to plan for the matter, appointing Tan Yen-k'ai, Ku Ying-fen, and Wang Ching-wei, with Borodin as adviser. Shortly thereafter, the council set quotas for military students: fifteen to be sent from Whampoa and ten each from the military schools of the 2d and 3d Corps. Later the 5th Corps was permitted to send five. Examination of candidates was scheduled for October 28, and by November 19 a meeting of students going to Russia was to be held at the Party's Central Headquarters. On December 23 the Political Council decided that military men should make up one-third of the 100 to be sent, presumably the initial quota from Canton.[172]

The prospect of studying in Moscow, the headquarters of world revolution, must have been exciting, for many students applied and many army units asked for increased numbers. Those chosen would have their expenses paid by their schools. The first group of twenty-two departed on December 5, and the second group left on the 17th.[173] One of the earliest to go was Chiang Kai-shek's fifteen-year-old son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had been involved in anti-imperialist demonstrations in Shanghai and Peking, and who petitioned his father on October 19 to be allowed to go. According to one account, young Chiang went in October on a Russian vessel along with others on the same venture.[174] Probably all the candidates from Canton travelled on Russian ships that by then were plying between Vladivostok and Canton bringing military supplies. The fortunate ones marched proudly through the streets of Canton to board their ships.[175] On December 7, the Political Council learned that the office for sending students to Russia had worked out its plan, and the council appointed Borodin and Ch'en Kung-po to be responsible for the program. During the next six months the office had many problems to bring to the Political Council, as more and more students were assembled, examined, and then left waiting their turn to go.[176] To keep them busy, some of the wives of the Soviet advisers gave them instruction in Russian.[177]

* * * * *

As 1926 began, the Kuomintang leaders in Canton looked back upon successful campaigns to unify their province, with the help of Soviet military advisers and the Chinese Communist Party. They had formed a National Government and were trying to reorganize the newly named National Revolutionary Army. Neighboring Kwangsi province was under the control of three young commanders who would soon ally with the Nationalists, and the threat from Yunnan had been turned back decisively. In North China, however, the Kuomintang, Communist Party, Soviet Embassy, and a large group of military advisers had little to show for their effort to build up a revolutionary Kuominchun and to weaken Chang Tso-lin—the subject of our companion volume by Julie Lien-ying How. Kuo Sung-lin's rebellion against Chang Tso-lin had just been crushed, though Feng Yü-hsiang's thrust to Tientsin had not yet foundered. In Central China, Wu P'ei-fu had reemerged with some strength in Hupeh and Sun Ch'uan-fang headed an alliance of the lower Yangtze provinces. In short, the Chihli Clique was reviving after its defeat in October 1924. Such was the configuration of China's military chessboard.

The anti-imperialist movement gained great momentum in 1925. Virtually all public-spirited Chinese wanted to "save China." Foreign violence in defense of concession areas outraged Chinese opinion. The May 30th Incident in Shanghai and the Shakee Massacre in Canton aroused Chinese hatred everywhere. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party both grew greatly in membership and prestige because of their nationalistic leadership. Furthermore, the Communist Party had strengthened its influence in the labor movement in Shanghai (only to fall back temporarily), and in Canton, where the great strike dragged on. Communist organizing of farmers associations in Kwangtung continued. By the end of the year some 620,000 farmers in 37 counties were organized, as reported to the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang. Rent reduction struggles in several counties became bloody battles, arousing unyielding opposition from Kwangtung's rural elite.

The old Kuomintang leadership was deeply divided. Party headquarters in Shanghai and Hankow were controlled by men opposed to the leaders in Canton over issues arising from Sun Yat-sen's decision to admit Communists and rely for aid on Russia. In Peking, Communists had considerable influence within the Kuomintang organization, but most of the older Kuomintang members opposed them. They struggled for influence among intellectuals and students. Several prestigious veterans had been forced from Canton—Hu Han-min, Lin Sen, Tsou Lu, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, as well as those who had fled after the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai—and now Wang Ching-wei led the Party center and Chiang Kai-shek commanded the most powerful military force. Aside from long-standing factional rivalries, the central point of conflict in Sun Yat-sen's party was the activity of Communists, which most senior members considered destructive. They feared "Bolshevism" and wanted Communists expelled. But Soviet Russian advice, money, and equipment were at risk: Communist participation in Kuomintang work was a nonnegotiable part of the deal for Russian assistance.

A few leaders of the Communist Party wanted to end the internal tie and develop their party independently, but Comintern representatives vetoed this, as did Borodin particularly. The majority of the Communist Party Central Committee went along. The advantages of working in the Kuomintang were especially evident in South China. This basic policy led to tortuously ambiguous decisions, such as to demand complete independence in managing mass movements, competing with the Kuomintang in them, but insisting on freedom to work within the senior party in hopes of strengthening its Left Wing (if there really was one) against the Right. Such a double-faced policy could not be concealed. Tai Chi-t'ao exposed it, as did competition in mass movements.

Behind the conflict within and between the two parties lay traditional Marxist ideology and Lenin's strategy for world revolution—class struggle and a two-stage revolutionary strategy. Communists must cooperate during the National Revolution in a "united front" against imperialism and militarism while building a mass base of workers and peasants. The Comintern had worked out the main tactics and pressed them on the CCP. The second stage would see a socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie and capitalism, and Communist seizure of power. The Kuomintang considered itself a revolutionary party, but its ideology was essentially reformist. Sun Yat-sen had preached interclass harmony and opposed class struggle to the end of his career. Tai Chi-t'ao and many other KMT members clung to this concept of interclass harmony as an ideological weapon against communism. It continues even today as a point of conflict between the two parties. Chinese history showed many examples of interclass civil war, and by the end of 1925 there was a gathering storm, with local conflicts constantly erupting.

Soviet military advisers in the South had proved their technical competency and bravery in three campaigns. General Bliukher, a man of tact, won great fame for his guidance of the First Eastern Expedition and the recovery of Canton, but he had returned to Russia, a victim of his old wounds and conflict with Borodin. His replacement, General Kuibyshev, determinedly pushed forward the centralization and politicization of the National Revolutionary Army, which antagonized formerly independent commanders—men whose ability he scorned. He sought to increase the authority of the Russian advisers in the General Staff and the corps and divisions.

Some thirty or more advisers lived in an isolated community in Canton's eastern suburbs, where some had brought their wives and small children. They tried to recreate life as in their homeland, just as most foreigners in China did. Borodin made local political decisions for the group and controlled communications with the Soviet Embassy in Peking. He tried to steer the revolutionary process through the local Kuomintang and Communist party leaders, by advice in the Political Council, in small committees during emergencies, and by private conferences. He controlled the Russian funds. A few trusted Chinese Communists advised him, but we know little about directives that came to him from Moscow or Peking in 1925. Soviet Russia's basic policy lines for the Chinese revolution had been laid down in 1923 and 1924.

In retrospect, the "bloc within" arrangement of the Communist Party—or, to use its terminology, the "united front"—had inherent difficulties for both parties. They had different ideologies and goals; both claimed to have the correct long-term plan for a better China. Their uncomfortable union had been imposed by Sun Yat-sen and the Comintern for practical reasons. Sun's death left a vacant position of leadership, which became a bone of contention within the Kuomintang. His ideological legacy was such a patchwork that various factions could easily select and emphasize elements suitable to their purposes. Both parties grew in size and influence in 1925, which led each to desire to lead the revolution independently. Each was apprehensive of the other partner. By early 1926, the relationship seemed almost to have reached the flash point. Yet who could tell whether conflicts might be smoothed over or some catalyst might cause an eruption?

Notes

1. Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China," p. 281. Voitinsky sent a copy of this letter to Borodin, according to Glunin, who thinks it probable that Borodin and Voitinsky coordinated their opinions on the split and carried out the same policy line.

2. NA: USDS 893.00B/141, Dispatch, Schurman, Peking, January 27, 1925; 893.00/6106 and /6123, Dispatches, Cunningham, Shanghai, February 24 and March

7, 1925; KMWH, IX, 1421; Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 355; Kuo Ting-yee, *Chung-hua Min-kuo shih-shih jih-chih*, March 8 and April 1, 1925.

3. "Circular Notice No. 135: Do Not Recognize the Peking Kuomintang Club," and NA: USDS 893.00/6223, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, April 25, 1925, containing enclosures from *Canton Gazette* of April 15, which report the 70th meeting of the CEC. Of those listed as attending only Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai, and T'an P'ing-shan were members of the CEC. HTCP no. 110 (April 12, 1925), pp. 1009-10; no. 111 (April 19), pp. 1016-18; no. 115 (May 17), pp. 1060-62. Persons identified in this source as part of the counter-revolutionary movement are Feng Tzu-yu, P'eng Yang-kuang, Chiao I-t'ang, Liu Kuei-i, Ma Su, Chiang Wei-fan, Shih Ying (a CEC member), and T'ang Shao-i. Another person associated with the Peking Comrades Club was Ma Chün-wu.

4. Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China," pp. 281-82.

5. Ibid., p. 284. Glunin's source for Voitinsky's ideas on this point is not stated.

6. Report in *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao*, pp. 129-34. Ch'en Lung-chih, "Penetration Activities of Chinese Communists in the Initial Period of Whampoa," pp. 162-69. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 92; *As Military Adviser in China*, p. 83; Draft Translation, p. 119, says there were thirty-nine Communists in the First Class—close to Ch'en Lung-chih's number.

7. *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, X, 1464, shows Chou as deputy chief of the Political Department during the First Period, and the *Whampoa Alumni First Class Directory* cited in *Huang-p'u Chün-Hsiao shih-liao*, p. 506, shows him as one of three heads of the department, the others being Tai and Shao Yuan-ch'ung. Page 178, in an article on the changing personnel, has Chou appointed head of the Political Department in November 1924. See also reminiscences by Wang I-ch'ang and Liu T'ien, pp. 116-21, and 180. On p. 262 there is an order of the KMT CEC, published on March 1, 1925 in the *Chien Kuo Yüeh Chün yüeh-k'an*, which appoints Chou, "the head of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy," as head of East River Party Affairs. On March 29, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chou head of the Martial Law Office. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. Two of Chou's biographers, Li Tien-min and Kai-yu Hsu, are uncertain of the date of his first appointment at the academy. Professor Li Yu-ning pointed out to us that the biography of Chiang Hsien-yün in *Chung Kung Tang shih jen-wu chuan*, vol. 1, p. 215, states: "In October 1924, after Chou En-lai had become head of the Political Department, Chiang Hsien-yün became the secretary of the Department." Is that date too early? Chou had arrived in September.

8. On the two Party branches, see *Huang-p'u Chün-Hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 108-13 and 114-21, respectively. A report in the Kuomintang Archives (#11681) by Sun Jen-tao, dated 5 December [1924], tells of meetings of the Young Military Men's Society. The meeting of November 16 had eighteen in attendance from seven or eight different units. Sun was the KMT CEC's representative as manager of the society.

9. On the Spark Society, see Ch'en Lung-chih, "Penetration," pp. 168, 180; and *Huang-p'u Chün-Hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 114-15.

10. Ch'en Lung-chih, "Penetration," p. 178, naming eight Communist leaders and citing a short history of the Society/League in the first issue of its journal, dated February 1925. *Huang-p'u Chün-Hsiao shih liao* shows a picture of the First Conference of Delegates of the League of Chinese Military Youth on p. 7. There seem to be twenty-three delegates. Pao, *Hui-i lu*, p. 154. *Chung Kung Tang shih jen-wu chuan*, vol. 1, pp. 215-17, as reported to us by Professor Li Yu-ning. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 245, has useful information on the League.

11. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 100; Draft Translation, p. 130; *As Military Adviser*, p. 89. On the "Spark" society and the league, see Yurkevich, "The Huangpu Military

School," p. 103.

12. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 142-45; Draft Translation, pp. 187-89; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 115-16.

13. A list of forces under Ch'en Chiung-ming's direction is given by V. K. Ting in CYB 1925-26, pp. 1186-87; also KMWH, X, 1525-27 and *Pei Fa chan shih*, I, 140-41 (hereafter PFCS). Full accounts of the First Eastern Expedition are Ch'en Hsün-cheng, *Kuo-min Ko-ming Chün chan shih ch'u kao*, in KMWH, X and XI, 1523-1677; Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, pp. 403-37; PFCS, I, 137-276.

14. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 138-202, with twelve maps, translated for us by Mrs. L. Kisselgoff; Draft Translation, pp. 183-263; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 114-37. "List of Soviet officers who participated in the Eastern Expedition," in SLYM, III, "Canton," pp. 104-106, lists nineteen persons in Chinese. It is dated May 2 [1925] and probably was prepared by Bliukher at the request of Hsü Ch'ung-chih. The list is translated in Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militärberater*, pp. 212-13.

15. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 152 and 172; Draft Translation, pp. 196, 223; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 118, 131, for propaganda pamphlets being prepared and distributed. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo* for February 11, 13, and 27, and March 16 and 17, for rallies. Eto Shinkichi, "Hai-lu-feng," pp. 151-52, quoting the diary of Liu Ping-ts'ui, then chief of staff for the First Regiment, about the extraordinary welcome for the troops in Haifeng and ways in which the populace aided them.

16. T. C. Chang, *The Farmers Movement in Kwangtung*, pp. 9 and 31. P'eng Pai reported his work in HTCP, no. 112, special issue for May 1 [1925], in an article by Ts'ai Ho-shen, pp. 1030-36.

17. Ch'en Lung-chih, "Penetration," pp. 182-84 and notes.

18. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, p. 289; omitted from *As Military Adviser*.

19. Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism and the Early Anti-Communist Movement," p. 83. See also Professor Li's more comprehensive study, "On the Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism and Related Documents." Pao, *Hui-i lu*, pp. 171-72. According to Pao, this passage appeared in early editions of Chiang's speeches and was well known. Professor Li Yu-ning pointed this out to us.

20. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 200; Draft Translation, p. 262; *As Military Adviser*, p. 137. A letter dated March 17, 1925, from Moscow to the Soviet Military Attaché informed him of this allocation, and also of 100,000 rubles for the upkeep of the Whampoa school for two months. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 39.

21. Ibid., p. 152; Draft Translation, p. 198; *As Military Adviser*, p. 119. Cherepanov gives an example of the map available to the Russian advisers; it showed only telegraph lines between various towns, with no information about terrain.

22. Proclamation in *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao*, pp. 140-42. Ts'ai Ho-shen, writing in April for the May Day issue of HTCP, no. 112, p. 1030, stressed this unity theme. The opening joint meeting unanimously passed a "Resolution on the Union of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers," according to Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 118. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 247, tells of the meeting on April 26 of the League to elect the delegation to the resolution-drafting committee, citing *Chung-kuo chün-jen*.

23. The smaller figure was given by Ts'ai Ho-shen, op. cit., shortly before the congress, and by Teng in a report to the Second All-China Labor Congress, reprinted in *Ti-i-tz'u . . . kung-jen*, p. 45. The official figure became 210,000.

24. *Kwangtung Sheng Nung-min Hsieh-hui Ti-i-tz'u Tai-piao Ta-hui i-chüeh-an chi hsüan-yen*. A digest of the constitution is in Jefferson D. H. Lamb, *The Development of the Agrarian Movement and Agrarian Legislation in China*, pp. 169-77.

25. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 117; Chang, *The Rise*, I, 415. Both helped to plan the congress.

26. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 415.

27. Teng Chung-hsia, "Several Important Questions in the Period of the Revival of the Labor Movement." Four resolutions passed by the Congress are given by Teng in *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 120-30. These resolutions are reproduced and translated in Chesneaux, *Les syndicats chinois*, pp. 186-96.

28. The constitution is available in Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 131-34; Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-t'i*, pp. 124-28; *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 270-72.

29. The text of the resolution seems unavailable, but the nineteen "thieves" are named in *Ti-i-tz'u . . . kung-jen*, p. 52 and in *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 360. Teng Chung-hsia names seventeen, censoring two, but identifies them by locality: Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 130. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 506, n. 190, identifies six of them.

30. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang chih t'ou-shih*, p. 65. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 130-31, gives the following list and comments; persons starred apparently were Communists. *Seamen*: *Lin Wei-min, *Su Chao-cheng, Tan (unknown); *Railways*: *Teng P'ei, *Wang Ho-po, *Liu Wen-sung (removed from Party); *Han-Yeh-P'ing*: *Li Li-san, *Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu x x; *Shanghai*: *Teng Chung-hsia, *Liu Hua, *Chang Tso-ch'en, *Li Shen (Li Ch'i-han); *Wu-Han*: *Hsiang Ying, *Hsü Po-hao, xxx; *Hunan*: *Kuo Liang, *T'an Ying-chu [T'an Chu-ying?] (revolted against the Party); *Kwangtung*: *Liu Erh-sung, xxx, xxx; *Hong Kong*: Ho Yao-ch'uan (negative), Kuan x x, Cheng x x.

If Sun Yün-peng, who became head of the Economic Bureau, were added to Teng's list, there would be twenty-five, of whom seventeen were probably members of the Communist Party.

31. Sources as in immediately preceding note.

32. Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism," p. 88, citing *Chung-kuo chün-jen*, no. 6.

33. "Manifesto of the Kuomintang of China on the Acceptance of *Tsung-li's* Will," "Manifesto of the Kuomintang of China on the Current Situation," "Resolutions of the Kuomintang on Reorganization of the Army," all in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang chung-yao hsüan-yen hsün-ling chi*, pp. 41, 60, 61-64. Minutes of the Second Kuomintang Congress, p. 19, for Wang's statement. See also Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 364-67. The meetings were reported by the American consul general, Douglas Jenkins, in NA: USDS 893.00/6307, Canton, May 27, 1925 and 893.00/6226, Telegram, Mayer, Peking (repeating Canton), May 29.

34. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 165. The proposal for a demonstration on May 30 in the International Settlement was made by Ts'ai Ho-sen, but opposed by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, according to the reminiscence of Li Li-san.

35. This brief account of the incident is based on *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, vol. 2, no. 21 (June 7, 1925), pp. 6-19, and no. 22 (June 14), pp. 1-3 and 6-31; *Tung-fang tsa-chih*, special issue (July 1925); HTCP, no. 117 (June 6, 1925); "Extracts from Police Reports," in NA: USDS 893.5045/112, Enclosure 1, Dispatch from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consulate General, Shanghai, June 10, 1925; Inquest of June 1, which is Enclosure 2 of the same Dispatch; Trial Proceedings of June 2 and 9-12, Enclosure 5 of the same Dispatch; and 893.5045/147, forwarded by the American Consulate General, Shanghai, apparently without date.

36. Professor Li Yu-ning informs us that the activities of students in Shanghai were recorded in *Wu-san hou chih Shanghai hsüeh-sheng* [Shanghai Students after May Thirtieth], compiled by the Shanghai Students Association and published early in 1926. Reprinted in *Chin-tai shih tzu-liao*, vol. 1, pp. 34-81 (Peking: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of History, February 1958). Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 20-46 for the immediate Chinese and foreign

response; also Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp. 57-71. Nicholas R. Clifford, *Shanghai, 1925: Urban Nationalism and the Defense of Foreign Privilege.*

37. Kuomintang Manifesto dated June 4 in KMWH, XVIII, 3281; Manifesto of the Communist Party in HTCP, no. 117 (June 6, 1925), pp. 1075-77.

38. NA: USDS 893.5045/147 "Extract from Mixed Court Register for Tuesday, June 9, 1925, Exhibit 6."

39. V. Glunin and M. Yuryev, "The Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927," p. 123, citing *Hsiang-tao*, no. 117, June 6, 1925, p. 1076. Ch'en Tu-hsiu elaborated this concept in the next two issues of *Hsiang-tao.*

40. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 145, 160. Teng says it was the general strategy of the proletariat and its party to make the Joint Committee the focal point of the United Front; to have the General Labor Union make connections with the left wing of the Students' Association to repress its right wing; to use the Students' Association to make connections with the left wing of the Federation of Street Merchants' Associations to repress its right wing; and to use the federation to make connections with the left wing of the General Chamber of Commerce to repress its right wing. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 439-42; CYB, 1926-27, p. 928; NA: USDS 893.5045/125, Dispatch, Cunningham, Shanghai, June 17, 1925. The chamber appointed its committee on June 10.

41. Figures on Chinese contributions in clippings gathered in NA USDS 893.5045/125, 132, 139, 142, dispatches from Shanghai and Peking; NCH, June 13, 1925, pp. 444-45. Profintern contributions and others funnelled through it are reported in 893.00B/156 from Riga, Latvia, June 17, 1925, citing Moscow press, and NYT, June 13, p. 15:4 and June 17, p. 1:1. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 266 and 508, notes 41-45.

42. Glunin and Yuryev, "The Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927," p. 122. In 1932, Heller wrote a book on the subject.

43. For an account of the protracted strike, see Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 262-80. Ch'en Yün, a worker in the Commercial Press, helped Liu Shao-ch'i to organize a printers' union and himself joined the CCP.

44. Central Committees of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, "Statement to the People Who Fought for National Independence during May Thirtieth," p. 93. Communists later also accused the petty bourgeoisie of vacillation and held it partly responsible for decline in strikes. Heller, "The Labour Movement in China," pp. 14-15; "National Revolutionary Movement in China and Tactics of the Chinese Communist Party," pp. 18-21; Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 211-27.

45. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 269, based on Police Report for August 7, 1925, and Wang Ch'ing-pin and others, *Ti-i-tz'u Chung-kuo lao-tung nien-chien*, vol. 2, pp. 63-65, and T'ang Hai, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-t'i*, pp. 510-20. Chesneaux, *Les syndicats chinois*, pp. 53-67, lists scores of unions organized in Shanghai by July 1925 with exact number of members reported in many cases.

46. Glunin and Yuryev, "The Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927," pp. 126-27.

47. NCH, August 8, 1925, pp. 122, 123.

48. HTCP, no. 125, August 18, 1925, pp. 1143-44. Also "National Revolutionary Movement in China and Tactics of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 21; Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 216; "X," "The Revolutionary Movement in the East—Questions at the Coming Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI," p. 103.

49. NCH, September 26, 1925, pp. 419-20, 430-31.

50. According to Primakov, who headed the Russian advisory group with Feng Yü-hsiang's army, in a report to Ambassador Karakhan in December 1925, Sun Ch'uan-fang's drive on Shanghai had been planned in negotiation with Feng. See Julie Lien-ying How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, Document F, p. 12.

51. Ch'en Hsün-cheng wrote a general account of the campaign, reprinted in KMWH, XI, pp. 1704-06. This is the basis for a similar account in PFCS, I, 280-87, and two maps. Also, Chiang, *Min-kuo*, June 1-14, 1925; *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, pp. 170-78; NA: USDS 893.00/6396 and /6458, Dispatches, Jenkins, Canton, June 12 and 17, 1925; NYT, June 7-13, 1925.

52. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, I, 201-38; Draft Translation, pp. 291-314; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 146-54. The account systematically denigrates Chiang Kai-shek. Cherepanov names eleven military advisers and five airmen.

53. *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao*, pp. 144-48.

54. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 373, quoting minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the Political Council. At the June 21 meeting the members voted to add Hsü Ch'ung-chih and T'an Yen-k'ai to the Political Council. Fook-lam Gilbert Chan, *A Chinese Revolutionary: The Career of Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925)*, p. 398. He read the minutes of the Political Council.

55. Many documents pertaining to this governmental reorganization are reprinted in KMWH, XX, 3801-20. A photograph of the eleven members of the new Government Council in Canton on July 1 is printed at the front of this volume of KMWH.

56. Lists of officials in Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 374-75, and KMWH, XX, 3808 and 3814. Wang's chairmanship of the Political Council is mentioned in Document 10, p. 4, probably dated July 18.

57. According to Ch'en Kung-po, Hsü Ch'ung-chih had a long feud with Hu Han-min, and T'an Yen-k'ai and Chu P'ei-te also disliked him. *K'u hsiao lu*, pp. 28-29. Hu Han-min remembered the circumstances of the appointment with great bitterness. See Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng nien-p'u kao*, pp. 232-37, which discusses the electoral process.

58. See statutes in KMWH, XX, 3805-06, 3818-19.

59. "Letter from the Military Council of the National Government to All Officers and Men," dated July 6, 1925, in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang chung-yao hsüan-yen hsün-ling chi*, pp. 48-50. Chiang Kai-shek is not listed in Document 10. However, his "Diary" for July 3 says that he was one of the eight members. Chiang, *Min-kuo*.

60. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih kung*, pp. 170-72. Teng emphasizes the weakness of the Communist Party in Hong Kong, the factionalism among organized labor there, and the difficulty in persuading old-style labor leaders to unite in a general strike.

61. PRO: FO 371/10942/F2266 [F2266/194/10] Telegram, C.O.C. Hong Kong to War Office, 14 June 1925, and NA: USDS 893.00/6451 Paraphrase of Telegram, CINC Asiatic to OPNAV [June 18?]. News dispatches from Canton, dated June 19, predicted the strike: NCH, June 27, 1925, p. 483.

62. The most detailed source from the Chinese side is Ch'ien I-chang, ed., *Sha-chi t'ung shih*, partially reprinted in KMWH, XVIII, 3330-58. Also *June Twenty-third: The Report of the Commission for the Investigation of the Shakee Massacre June 23, 1925. Canton, China. Huang-p'u Chün-hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 281-85, for a proclamation on the event by Chiang Hsien-yün; and p. 501 for a list of Whampoa recruits, officers, and soldiers killed.

For the British side, see Great Britain Foreign Office. Cmd. 2636, China No. 1 (1926). *Papers Respecting the First Firing in the Shameen Affair on June 23, 1925.* Also CYB, 1926-27, pp. 967-68.

American Consul General Jenkins's reports in NA: USDS 893.00/6314 Telegram, Shameen, June 24 noon; and /6464, Dispatch, Canton, June 26. U.S. naval reports from CINC Asiatic to OPNAV in 893.00/6352 and /6395, both sent June 27.

63. Chan, *A Chinese Revolutionary*, pp. 444-45, based on minutes of the meeting. Regular members who attended were Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai, T'an Yen-k'ai, Wang Ching-wei, C. C. Wu, and the adviser, Borodin; in addition, Ku Ying-fen, Tsou Lu, and General Bliukher attended. Next day generals

Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chu P'ei-te, and Ho Ying-ch'in were invited as well as Lin Sen, Lin Yun-kai, and Sun Fo. Chiang Kai-shek did not attend the two Special Conferences of the Political Council.

64. KMWH, XVIII, 3359-60, 3363-64; and many pages thereafter for exchanges over the issue of responsibility.

65. Ibid., 3346-47; Chan, *A Chinese Revolutionary*, p. 445, based on Minutes of the Council.

66. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, July 7. Doc. 11 is confirmed in the same for July 26, 1925.

67. KMWH, XVIII, 3379-81; CYB, 1926-27, p. 978 for an English version.

68. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, July 1, 1925. Chiang's proposals were discussed in the Political Council on July 17.

69. "Instructions from the Kuomintang of China to the Party Military Academy and the Army" in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang chung-yao hsüan-yen hsün-ling chi*, pp. 77-78.

70. NA: USDS 893.00/7001, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, July 23, 1925, reporting that Liao Chung-k'ai was trying to place the *Wong Fong* [*Yung-feng*] and other gunboats under control of Russians, and that Chinese officers and crews were threatening to strike. PRO: FO 371/10902 [F4258/2/10] Dispatch, Jamieson, Canton, July 24, reporting that the Military Commission had installed Smirnov as chief of the naval bureau and commander in chief of the navy. "All Chinese naval officers are said to have resigned in consequence." C. J. B. Hellstrom, acting Swedish vice consul in Canton, stated in a speech on August 17 that at the end of July, Smirnov was placed in charge of the whole fleet in Canton as admiral, while on all the bigger gunboats there were Russian officers. When the officers and crews attempted a strike, the ships were taken to Whampoa and discipline beaten into the mutinous sailors. The ships remained under Russian command, except for a few launches which escaped to Kongmoon. NCH, August 22, 1925, p. 199, "Canton at Moscow's Mercy," datelined Hong Kong, August 17.

71. SLYM, III, "Canton," pp. 13-14. Undated, but probably July 1925.

72. "Plan of Employment of Personnel, etc."

73. Ibid. The two persons in charge of intelligence probably oversaw different functional divisions.

74. Egorov became military attaché in December 1925, and Lapin began to work in the attaché's office in about October 1925, as an intelligence specialist. These facts substantiate the date, 7-II-1926.

75. Quoted in Tsou Lu, *Kuomintang*, p. 391, n. 11. Teng Chung-hsia, who was himself active in directing the strike, confirms this change of Communist policy, saying that without the financial help of the Kuomintang "the strike would have collapsed in a week." Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 183.

76. Ibid., pp. 174-75, gives an account of the formation of the Strike Committee, while Teng Chung-hsia's biography, appended to his history, pp. 197, discusses his role and names other Communists actively connected with the committee, Lo Teng-hsien and Hsiang Ying. Chesneaux adds Ch'en Ch'üan and Liu Shao-ch'i. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 292.

77. An organizational chart appears in *Ti-i-tz'u . . . kung jen*, p. 123, taken from an article by Chang Ch'iu-jen published in April 1926. The date makes it uncertain which of the many offices listed were in existence during the early phase of the strike. Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 175, describes the Congress of Workers' Delegates and its functions. Information on the Workers' Inspection Corps in Taiwan Dotoku Kanbo Chosaka, *Shina no kokumin kakumei to kokumin seifu*, pp. 92-95.

78. NYT, July 10 and 11, 1925, for decisions to cut off shipping from Hong Kong to Canton; NCH, August 22, p. 198, for "Shipping Regulations" of mid-August. For new trade regulations announced September 25, see Remer, *A Study of*

Chinese Boycotts, pp. 103–104.

79. This was pointed out to us by Professor Li Yu-ning. The quotations come from *Chung-kuo ke-ming shih kao* [Draft History of the Chinese Revolution], edited by Hsiao Ch'ao-jan and Sha Chien-sun (Peking: Peking University Press, 1984), p. 88.

80. Tai Chi-t'ao, *Kuo-min Ko-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuomintang*, pp. 50-64, 70-72. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 401-408. Tai's writings are well analyzed in Herman Mast III and William G. Saywell, "Revolution Out of Tradition," pp. 88-95.

81. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 411-12, based on a copy of the Chekiang KMT Executive Committee's Instructions preserved in the KMT Archives. See *Tai Chi-t'ao Hsien-sheng wen ts'un*, III, 997-98 for Shen's reasons for leaving the CCP. Shen was assassinated in 1927. Chiang, *Min-kuo* for August 10, 1925, for Tai's letter.

82. HTCP no. 126 (August 23, 1925), pp. 1151-53. Apparently, the responses by Ch'ü and Ch'en to Tai-Chi-t'ao were not published at the time, but are now included in a collection of CCP documents entitled *Liu Ta i-ch'ien* [Before the Sixth Congress], edited by the Secretariat of the CCP CC (Peking: People's Press, 1980), pp. 337-52. Information from Professor Li Yu-ning.

83. Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism and the Early Anti-Communist Movement," p. 84, for Wang Po-ling's account; and *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, pp. 156-57.

84. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Letter to Tai Chi-t'ao," dated August 30, in HTCP, nos. 129, 130 (September 11 and 18, 1925). Quotation from Professor Li Yu-ning.

85. Many items in NCH, CWR, and the dispatches of the American consul general at Canton, Douglas Jenkins, report suspicions concerning the military commanders mentioned. They were named by General Bliukher in his report on conditions in Kwangtung in July as "reactionaries" who would inevitably bring about a new political and military conflict in Kwangtung. (Document 9, p. 24.) He did not name Cheng Jun-ch'i, commander of the Kwangtung 3d Division, but suspected that force. An estimate of the strength of units of the Kwangtung Army is in an article completed about three months earlier by Dr. V. K. Ting, in CYB, 1925-26, p. 1180. On the attempt against Liao, see NCH, August 29, pp. 238, 242.

86. Sources for this section are Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 375-92, based partly upon Kuomintang Archives; Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report Made to the Second Congress of the Kuomintang of China," January 6, 1926; Chiang Kai-shek, "Military Report to the Second Congress of the Kuomintang of China," January 1, 1926, pp. 1758-63; Chiang, *Min-kuo*, for the period August 15-September 23, 1925. Professor Gilbert Chan made a careful study of the assassination and its aftermath in *A Chinese Revolutionary*, pp. 403-23.

87. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, August 23-25, and Wang Ching-wei's "Political Report Made to the Second Congress." Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 382-84 gives information on the political activities of the Wen Hua T'ang and names an eminent group of its members and sympathizers.

88. Chiang Yung-ching's chronological biography of Hu Han-min describes how Liao's assassination led to Hu's departure for Russia, *Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng nien p'u*, pp. 337-50. Hu published an account of these events in December 1933: Hu Han-min, "From Acting Generalissimo to Being Expelled to Russia." He tends to blur Chiang Kai-shek's responsibility and to blame Wang Ching-wei, an appropriate stance for the date at which the article was written.

89. Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report Made to the Second Congress," pp. 3865-66, has extracts allegedly taken from Lin Chih-mien's deposition in which Lin reportedly revealed knowledge that if the plan to overthrow Liao were successful, "the Hong Kong side" would offer $2,000,000; but he asserted that he withdrew from the business on learning this. According to Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary," evidence was discovered at the Headquarters of the Kwangtung Army of a plot of "the Hong Kong

British" to overthrow the Canton government, with Liang Hung-k'ai to become commander in chief and Wei Pang-p'ing provincial governor. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, August 25. In his report to the Second Kuomintang Congress, Chiang charged that Wei Pang-p'ing received a $2,000,000 bribe "from the Hong Kong Government" to plan the overthrow of the Revolutionary Government. Chiang Kai-shek, "Military Report to the Second Congress," p. 1762.

The information on the British government's position comes from CMW's perusal of Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Cabinet archives in the Public Records Office.

90. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, August 26, 1925.

91. Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, II, 292-95.

92. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, September 18-22; Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report Made to the Second Congress," p. 3868. Also on September 19, 1925, Chiang nominated Chou En-lai to be chairman of the Political Department of the First Corps, according to the "Diary."

93. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 392, 413-14, on the Kuomintang Political Council's decision of August 19 to send the Diplomatic Delegation, and of September 7 to appoint Lin and Tsou; also for Wang Ching-wei's explanation to the CEC on September 15 concerning their appointment. Based on minutes in the Kuomintang Archives.

94. Ibid., p. 413. For the controversy between Borodin and Tsou Lu over Kwangtung University, see Tsou Lu, "Notification to [Ch'en] Fu-mu" and Tsou, *Hui-ku-lu*, pp. 169-76.

95. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, pp. 645-46.

96. Chiang, *Min-kuo*.

97. Hu Han-min, "From Acting Generalissimo to being Expelled to Russia." There are discrepancies among sources as to the date of the ship's departure from Canton. Chiang, *Hu Han-min*, pp. 350-52.

98. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 414, on Wang's nomination of Lin Tsu-han. On September 28, Wang nominated T'an P'ing-shan to replace Tsou Lu. Members lost from the Political Council were Liao, Hu, and Hsü, who also were gone from the Government Council and the Military Council. In addition, the Government Council lost the services of Lin Shen and Sun Fo.

99. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, II, 645. Hu Han-min, "From Acting Generalissimo to Being Expelled to Russia." Hu says that Wang Ching-wei and Hsü Ch'ung-chih appointed Borodin as adviser to the Special Committee—thus inferentially absolving Chiang Kai-shek. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 382, quotes the resolution of the enlarged Political Council meeting of August 20 that set up the Special Committee, but he does not say whether Borodin attended the meeting.

100. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, August 22 and 24. Chiang does not specify the location of five of the nine meetings he records attending.

101. Tsou made this charge in his letter to Ch'en Fu-mu. Tsou, "Notification to [Ch'en] Fu-mu," p. 23. There he did not list Hsieh Ch'ih as one of the intended victims. Actually Hsieh was in Shanghai. Tsou elaborated the charge in his reminiscences (*Hui-ku-lu*, p. 174), where he said that Hsü and Chiang did their best to oppose Borodin so that the four "escaped from the tiger's mouth." The inference is left that Wang Ching-wei did not oppose. Liu Lu-yin had a similar account in "Ko-ming yü fan-ko-ming." He added the name of Ku Ying-fen to the list and attributed to Hsü the refusal to comply which led, within a month, to Hsü's own expulsion from Canton.

102. Hu Han-min, "In Commemoration of Liao Chung-k'ai."

103. Hu Han-min, "From Acting Generalissimo to Being Expelled to Russia." Hsü pictured himself as protecting Hu from Borodin and Wang. Wang pictured himself as protecting Hu from Hsü. Chiang pictured himself as protecting Hu from

Borodin, Wang, and Hsü, which explained Hu's detention at Whampoa.

104. NA: USDS 893.00/7002, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, September 9, 1925.

105. Wang Ching-wei, "Eulogizing Liao Chung-k'ai to Inspire My Comrades."

106. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, August 31, 1925.

107. Photographs of the Russian original and an English translation in *Chinese Government White Book: "Soviet Plot in China,"* vol. 3, document 8; translations in SLYM, XI, 45-53, and CSPSR, vol. 11 (1927), 197-207. A Chinese version of the minutes is retained in the Kuomintang Archives. The lists of attendants, topics discussed, and details are the same in most respects, but differences suggest that two sets of minutes were made separately. In our discussion, both sets are used.

108. Attendance by combining the minutes.

109. The Chinese minutes merely mention Borodin's proposed letter to the Strike Committee, which was said to be appended. It was not found with the minutes in the Kuomintang Archives, which state that the letter was approved. Document 25, a history of the strike, does not mention this first effort to end the strike by negotiations.

110. Based on T'ang Hai, *Chung-kuo lao-tung wen-t'i*, p. 506; *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 454-56; PRO: FO 371/10924/F5332 [F5332/2/10], Dispatch, Jamieson, Canton, September 27, 1925.

111. Jamieson's opinion is stated in a comprehensive memorandum concerning Canton prepared in the British Foreign Office by Ashton Gwatkin, which mentions that on September 28, Sir James Jamieson telegraphed that he considered the terms impossible. PRO: FO 405/250 Confidential (13103) *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, Part XCIV, January-March 1926, no. 41. *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 456 on the failure of the negotiations. The compilers apparently had access to some Nationalist archives from the period.

The terms as they appeared in the Chinese press are found in Jamieson's dispatch of September 27, cited; and in NA: USDS 893.00/6739, Dispatch, Jenkins, Canton, September 28, 1925, both in translation. Chinese texts, somewhat lengthier, in Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, pp. 246-47, and in *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 454-56. Terms of the Hong Kong workers in Teng Chung-hsia, "Experiences of the Kwangtung-Hong Kong Strike in the Past Year," pp. 134-35. The Chinese versions do not agree with each other nor with the version seen by Governor Stubbs of Hong Kong and transmitted by him to the Colonial Office. PRO: CO 129/489 49489, Dispatch, Stubbs, Hong Kong, October 2, 1925. The differences may have been due to refinements in drafting at various stages and to revisions of demands.

Teng, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 131, was incorrect in stating that "Chin-wen-t'ai"—i.e., Cecil Clementi—opposed settling the strike because of hopes that Ch'en Ch'iung-ming and Teng Pen-yin would succeed in overthrowing the Canton government. Clementi had not yet taken up the post of governor of Hong Kong.

112. The following account is taken from SLYM, III, "Canton," pp. 34-48, omitted in our translation of Document 22. The account of the Second Eastern Expedition by Ch'en Hsün-cheng, KMWH, XI, 1733-41, p. 1733, itemizes the enemy units under various commanders and gives the same total. It adds, as separate forces, two to three thousand under Yang K'un-ju, and several hundred under Mo Hsiung, garrisoning Hui-chou. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, p. 334; *As Military Adviser*, p. 162, says there were actually only 20-22,000 enemy troops.

113. Ch'en Hsün-cheng, cited, p. 1734, gives a more detailed list of units. Cherepanov's figures are close to those of Kuibyshev.

114. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, pp. 334-54; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 162-66. He quotes his eulogy to Regimental Commander Liu, which was printed in the Russian journal *Kanton*. For other accounts: Ch'en Hsün-cheng, cited, pp. 1736-38; Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army of China," pp. 30-32. Konchits did not witness the battle, since he was at the headquarters of the 1st

Division at Polo. His work was abstracted for us by Lydia Holubnychy.

115. Konchits, "In the Ranks," pp. 37-62. His diary account follows the campaign from October 17 to November 16, from its start at Hui-chow to its drive against enemy remnants on the Kwangtung-Fukien border.

116. There is considerable difference between Russian and Chinese accounts as to the importance of the T'an-shui group. Ch'en Hsün-cheng, cited, pp. 1740-41, credits Feng Tieh-p'ei's force with a useful cooperative role in a battle of October 28, but gives greatest credit to the Nationalist 1st Division. On the other hand, Ye. V. Teslenko credits the group of General Feng Tieh-p'ei with the main role in defeating the enemy. It penetrated deep into the enemy's rear, closing off its retreat. Thus, when the 1st Whampoa Division and the 1st Kwangchow Division began to attack, the enemy started to surrender to the T'an-shui group; 10,000 soldiers were taken prisoner, and 8,000 rifles. Teslenko, "From Canton to Wuhan," pp. 107 and 111. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, p. 359; *As Military Adviser*, p. 168, also has the enemy surrender to the "San-shui" group, but mentions 6,000 prisoners and 15 cannons, 50 machine guns, and 6-7,000 rifles captured.

117. Wang Ching-wei, "Political Report Made to the Second Congress," pp. 3868-69. Also, Chiang Kai-shek, "Military Report to the Second Congress," p. 1762.

118. Ch'en Hsün-cheng, cited, pp. 1753-54, and PFCS, I, 310-12.

119. According to Ch'en Hsün-cheng, the 12th Division revolted at Chiang-men, forcing Ch'en Ming-shu's retreat. It was at this time that the Military Council decided to redeploy elements of the Fourth Corps from the East River Campaign back to Southern Kwangtung, the 34th Regiment of the 12th Division and the Independent 1st Brigade, with the 11th Division standing by. They were to be led to the rescue by Li Chi-shen. KMWH, XI, 1740.

120. Participation of Kwangsi troops was preceded by a conference at Wu-chow on October 12. There Wang Ching-wei and T'an Yen-k'ai met with Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung, according to Chiang's "Diary." PFCS, I, 311 adds Ch'en Ming-shu. The Kwangsi commander who participated with Ch'en Ming-shu in clearing southwest Kwangtung was Yü Tsu-po. Hu Tsung-to entered the campaign at a late stage to seize Ch'in-chow in extreme southwestern Kwangtung.

121. Teng, "Experiences in the Kwangtung-Hong Kong Strike in the Past Year," p. 132. The British consul general learned that "compulsory enlistment" in the Army Transportation Service caused many strikers to return to their homes in the country. PRO: FO 371/10950/F5539, Dispatch, Jamieson, Canton, October 12, 1925. According to *Hankow Herald*, February 5, 1926 (dated Canton, January 30), 3,800 strikers were awarded badges by the First Corps for services rendered in the East River War in carrying military supplies.

122. Lo Ch'i-yuan, "General Report on [Farmers'] Association Business," p. 660. Vague claims of farmers' assistance are also found in *Kwangtung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao*, p. 59; Juan Hsiao-hsien, "An Outline Report on Farmers' Struggles in Kwangtung Province during the Past Year," p. 621; and T. C. Chang, *The Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung*, p. 32. According to Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, p. 359; *As Military Adviser*, p. 168, farmers' guards received over 1,000 rifles captured from the enemy after the battle against Lin Hu and Hung Chao-lin.

123. Minutes of the 40th meeting of the Political Council.

124. *Kuo Chün cheng kung shih kao*, pp. 157-67, for information on political work during the Second Eastern Expedition, including a chart which shows political departments in all major units comprising the three columns in the expedition, all linked together under the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief. For appointments, Chiang, *Min-kuo*, September 19 and 28; and Minutes of the CEC for September 28, 1925. The three who, in addition to Chou, can be identified as Communists are Pao Hui-seng, Chiang Hsien-yün, and Chang Chi-ch'ün, though it is not certain

when the latter joined the CCP.

125. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, Draft Translation, pp. 339 and 360; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 165 and 169.

126. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, October 2, 1925.

127. Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army of China," pp. 29, 39, 44, 45 (October 10, 21, 27, 28) and 49, 52 (November 3, 6). Cherepanov, advising Ho Ying-ch'in, observed similar demonstrations.

128. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, November 6 and 7.

129. Digest of speeches in Dispatch, Cecil Kirke to Ronald Macleay, Swatow, November 15, 1925, in PRO: FO 405/250 Confidential 13103, no. 30, Enc. 2. (From the series *Further Correspondence Respecting China.*) The speeches were extracted from the Chinese press of Swatow. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, November 15.

130. Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army of China," pp. 71-74, January 8-11, 1926.

131. Mme. Vishniakova-Akimova identifies Nikitin as Gorev, a young military man, age twenty-six, who had studied in the Eastern Department of the Military Academy. "A List of Names and Positions of Members of the Soviet Group in South China," about January 1926, shows Nikitin as head of Information and Spies Office of the [Russian] Intelligence Staff. Fred Borodin, the son of Michael and Fanny Borodin, was then about sixteen years old and knew English better than Russian. A young officer in the Red Army, Mikhailov, is mentioned as being in Peking early in November 1925. However, there was a person with the same name in the Soviet military mission in Canton in July 1925. He was in bad health, and it was uncertain whether he should be kept in Canton. Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 94, 220, 178. Also, "Plan for the Employment of Personnel, etc."

132. "Plan for Organizing Counter-Espionage in Kwangtung."

133. Blagadatov in his memoirs depends to a considerable extent on our documents 3, 22, and 26, presumably versions in the files in Moscow, for his account of the "Situation in South China," and "The advisers in the south of China and the reorganization of the NRA." Blagadatov, *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi Revolutsii 1925-1927 gg*, pp. 122-40. Blagadatov arrived in Canton in mid-1926, after serving with the Kuominchun and in the Soviet military attaché's office.

134. KMWH, XII, 44-45 has a slightly different version of these regulations, promulgated by the Military Council of the National Government, March 19, 1926.

135. On January 12, 1926, the Military Council voted to establish a Central Military and Political Academy, combining the schools of various corps. Chiang, *Min-kuo*. The revamped academy, located at Whampoa, was opened in March.

136. "Draft of Telegram, dated July 4th, 1926, to Galen, Canton," *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 60. Bliukher had returned to Canton for a second tour in May 1926.

137. Chiang Kai-shek, "The Meaning of the Soviet Alliance," pp. 9-10, 13. The passage quoting Sun Yat-sen on Borodin is omitted in Chiang's "Diary." Chiang, *Min-kuo*, December 11, 1925. Modern Communist historians consider that, at the time, Chiang was a "double-dealer," collaborating with the Communists while at the same time restricting them: on the one hand using the people's power to enhance his strength and influence, on the other, checking the independent and full development of the people's power. *Chung-kuo ke-ming shih-kao*, p. 98. Professor Li Yu-ning remarks, "While Tai Chi-t'ao, Chiang's closest personal friend, was making trouble for the CCP, Chiang himself posed as a leftist. People cannot help thinking that the two friends were playing a political game together." Letter to C.M.W., May 15, 1986.

138. For the Chinese version, see "A List of Names and Positions of Members of the Soviet Group in South China."

139. Among the thirty-one, two were on leave and two away on assignment. Three were listed as working exclusively in the Russians' own intelligence service, and others had both intelligence and advisory functions.

140. "Report of the Young Communist International at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International," p. 84.

141. Ch'en, "Kao Ch'üan Tang," p. 3; full translation, pp. 227-28. Voitinsky attended the plenum according to V. I. Glunin's biography of him. Presumably, Ch'en referred to him as the Comintern's representative.

142. Quoted by Liu Lu-yin, "Revolution and Counterrevolution," p. 468.

143. Prior to May 30, 1925, 90 percent of the members of the Youth Corps were students. By September 1925, only 49 percent were students. See "Report of the Young Communist International at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International," p. 84.

144. Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, Enlarged Plenum, "Letter to the Peasantry," pp. 137-38. Gerald Barkley elaborates on the CC resolutions on the peasantry at the October Plenum in "The Evolution of a Peasant Movement Policy within the Chinese Communist Party," pp. 47-48.

145. Chang Kuo-t'ao and, later, Ts'ai Ho-shen and Peng Shu-chih, were sent by the CC as special commissioners to the Kwangtung Regional Committee toward the end of 1925 and during the spring of 1926. See Chou Fu-chen, "The Golden Age of the Kwangtung Regional Committee," HTSL, II, 315. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 466 and 494; Ch'en Pi-lan, "Introduction," p. 18.

146. Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo Hsin Min-chu-chu-i Ko-ming shih*, p. 31. Mao Tse-tung was secretary of the Hunan Regional Committee from 1921 to 1923.

147. Chou Fu-chen, "The Golden Age of the Kwangtung Regional Committee."

148. Li Yün-han presents a detailed and convincing account of the preparations for the conference, its membership and decisions, as well as an analysis of the claims of the participants and of their opponents in Canton as to the legality of the plenum. Li, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 413-34. His account is documented with primary materials in the Kuomintang Archives. Tsou Lu has left an interesting account with some documentation in his *Hui-ku-lu*, pp. 180-89.

149. "Important Documents of the Western Hills Conference Expelling Communists from the KMT," p. 15. The names used were: Lin Shen, T'an Chen, Shih Ying, Chü Cheng, Shih Ch'ing-yang, Tsou Lu, Tai Chi-t'ao, Shao Yuan-ch'ung, Yeh Ch'u-cheng, and Shen Ting-i (the regular CEC members, Shao and Shen having been promoted from alternate status); Mao Tsu-ch'üan and Fu Ju-lin (alternates); Chang Chi, Hsieh Ch'ih, and Wu Chih-hui (Control Committee). Li Yün-han, quoting this telegram from an original copy, leaves out T'an Chen and Shen Ting-i, but his reproduction of Wang Ching-wei's reply indicates that all fifteen names were attached to the telegram of November 16. Li, cited, pp. 417, 426.

150. From Tai Chi-t'ao's letter to Chiang Kai-shek dated December 13, 1925. *Tai Chi-t'ao Hsien-sheng wen ts'un*, III, 985; Li, cited, p. 417.

151. Tai's account of this incident is in an article dated November 1925, and also in his letter to Chiang Kai-shek. *Tai Chi-t'ao Hsien-sheng wen ts'un*, III, 975-78, 985. Ch'en T'ien-hsi, the compiler of a chronological biography of Tai, reports that Tai issued such a statement but it does not appear in Ch'en's edition of Tai's collected works. Ch'en T'ien-hsi, *Tai Chi-t'ao Hsien-sheng pien nien chuan chi*, p. 41.

152. Li Yün-han has examined both the legality of the "Fourth Plenum" and the lineup on each side and among neutrals. Li, cited, pp. 426-34.

153. Tai Chi-t'ao had left, Wu Chih-hui did not attend, and Chü Cheng had not yet arrived in Peking. We do not find a list of actual attendants at various meetings, so it is a deduction that twelve persons attended the first session.

154. Minutes of the conference are used by Li Yün-han. On resolutions discussed the first day, Li, cited, pp. 418-19.

155. "Important Documents of the Western Hills Conference Expelling Communists from the KMT," pp. 15-16; Li, cited, pp. 419-21.

156. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "What Are the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang?"

HTCP, no. 137 (December 3, 1925), pp. 1247–48. Ch'en emphasized that Chinese Communists did not constitute the KMT Left Wing and went to great lengths to prove this point. He asserted that not one of the KMT Left leaders was a Communist. Among the twelve leaders he mentioned was Hu Han-min, a principal target in the anti-Right coup a few months earlier.

157. Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, "Circular Notice from the Kuomintang of China Explaining Its Revolutionary Strategy to all Party Members in the Country and Abroad."

158. "Important Documents of the Western Hills Conference Expelling Communists from the KMT," p. 15. Lin Tsu-han had been elevated to the CEC from the status of an alternate CEC member.

159. Li, cited, pp. 424–25.

160. Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, "Manifesto of the Kuomintang of China Convening the Second Congress," p. 103.

161. Chiang Kai-shek, "A Circular Letter to KMT Comrades," translated by Ellsworth Tien-wei Wu, *The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Alliance, 1923–1927*, pp. 760–68. The letter is reproduced in Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary," with the defense of Borodin omitted. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, December 25, 1925.

162. Li, cited, pp. 419, 421, based on the original records of the Shanghai CEC. Professor Li discusses the activities of this rival headquarters during early 1926 on pp. 434–50.

163. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 464–65.

164. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "An Open Letter to All Kuomintang Members." HTCP, no. 139 (December 24, 1925), pp. 1269–70.

165. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, December 8, 1925. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 481.

166. Hsu Kai-yu, *Chou En-lai*, pp. 55 and 243, n.28. He treats the conflict between the League and the Society on pp. 52–55.

167. A. I. Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, pp. 73–74. (Translated for us by Mrs. Holubnychy.) This is the second volume of Cherepanov's memoirs, translated in *As Military Adviser*, p. 205. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, December 28. Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 170–72, for a hostile account.

168. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 74 (not found in *As Military Adviser*). Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism," p. 86.

169. "State of the Activities of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism in Canton. Special Report #10. The Parade of December 29 at Its Founding," in *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao (1921–1926)*, pp. 206–207. This is a report from the Kwangtung Regional Committee of the Communist Youth Corps, and it is signed by one Kuan Tung-ch'ü and dated January 4 [1926]. Kuan Tung-ch'ü signed several other reports for the same committee in this valuable documentary collection.

170. Li, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism," p. 86; Ch'en, *K'u hsiao lu*, pp. 52–53.

171. Sheng Yueh, *Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account*, pp. 16–19.

172. Seen in the Minutes of the Political Council for no. 66, 73, 76, 77, 82, 91, and 99, October 7 through December 23. Mr. Sheng apparently saw the same minutes or was given the information. There are many more items concerning sending students to Russia during 1926, from February on.

173. Wieger, *Chine moderne*, tome VI, 1925, p. 66.

174. Chiang, *Min-kuo*, October 19, 1925; Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary* I: 307.

175. Sheng, *Sun Yat-sen University*, p. 21.

176. Political Council Minutes.

177. Sheng, *Sun Yat-sen University*, p. 21.

Chapter 4

Conflict among the Revolutionaries amid Preparations for a Northern Expedition

According to its statutes, the Kuomintang should convene a national congress every year. Many complicating factors, such as Dr. Sun's illness and death, the anti-imperialist storms in the middle of 1925, disruption of party unity over the issue of Communists within the Kuomintang, and disputes over where the congress should be held, led to several postponements. By the end of December, some 180 delegates had reported to the Secretariat and it was possible to begin.[1] Wu Yü-chang, a long-time revolutionary and now a member of the Communist Party, was head of the Secretariat of the Preparatory Committee and of the congress itself. He could determine, in matters of dispute, who would be accepted as delegates, and he could shape the agenda.

The Second Kuomintang Congress

Four preliminary meetings were held between December 23 and 31, and a ceremonial opening on Friday, January 1, with a review of the troops and a banquet tendered by the Nationalist Government. The first business meeting was on January 4, and the congress met in twenty-six morning and afternoon sessions. The published minutes run to more than 200 closely printed pages, including reports on the state of the Party and its principal branches in China and overseas, the military situation, movements among laborers, farmers, merchants, youth, and women, and many debates and resolutions. Here we touch upon only a few important matters.[2]

Several sensitive issues arose early in the congress. The first concerned Sun Yat-sen's Testament. The Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees placed a joint motion before the congress that "The Second National Congress should respectfully and with utmost sincerity accept the Leader's Testament and strive to carry it out."[3] Wang Ching-wei then gave a detailed account of reasons why an emergency Political Council, appointed by Dr. Sun in Peking before he entered the hospital, had decided to seek a final testament from the Leader and how the draft had been read to him on February 24, receiving his approval. He then recounted the sad circumstances of Dr. Sun's signing the Testament on the morning of March 11, as well as a personal Will, and a farewell letter to Soviet Russian comrades drafted by Ch'en Yu-jen and read to Dr. Sun by T. V. Soong. Apparently Wang considered it necessary to present this account because of the charge that he had concocted the Testament, and because of continuing opposition within the Party to accepting it as binding upon the members. According to the minutes, the resolution was accepted unanimously.

A second sensitive issue was the authority of the Kuomintang Political Council and the role of Borodin in its decisions. Both had been attacked by the Western Hills faction. The issue arose on the afternoon of the 6th on a motion by Ch'eng Ch'ien that the congress address a letter of thanks to Borodin for all his help. The Western Hills faction had accused the Political Council of usurping the powers of the Central Executive Committee, and Borodin of dominating the council. Wang explained the formation of the council by the Leader, and its successive changes of membership, particularly after Dr. Sun's death. Various persons representing the provincial govern-

ment, the National Government, the Military Council, and the Control Yuan had been invited to attend meetings; thus, most of the important government organs in Canton were represented. The council, Wang asserted, was merely an advisory body, not an executive one; after full discussion, matters were passed on to the appropriate government organs to carry out. Wang praised Borodin's help to Dr. Sun to the very end of his life, and his continued detailed planning for the council thereafter. But, said Wang, when the council was about to decide a matter, Borodin did not vote. The charge by the Western Hills group that Borodin controlled the Political Council was thus an affront not only to Borodin, but to the entire council, Wang said. After this explanation, the delegates agreed without dissent that a letter of thanks should be sent to Borodin, together with a silver vessel inscribed with the words "United Struggle."[4]

The next important item on the agenda was a Report on Party Affairs, delivered by T'an P'ing-shan, head of the Organization Bureau in Party Headquarters. T'an detailed developments within the Party since the First Congress two years before. The creation of five regional Executive Headquarters to foster the establishment of provincial and local branches of the Kuomintang had brought substantial results only from the Peking and Shanghai Headquarters; those for Szechwan and Harbin had never been set up and the Hankow Headquarters, after a promising beginning, had simply faded away. A number of leaders in Shanghai Municipal Party Headquarters had participated in the Western Hills Conference and then had tried to dissolve the Shanghai City Branch and district branches, and had used the name of the Chekiang Party Branch to issue illegal orders. Central had suspended its power and, T'an asserted, this headquarters no longer existed. Provincial branches had been formally set up in twelve provinces, however, and preparatory work was underway in nine others.

The total number of members on record, T'an stated, was less than 200,000, which was much too small; it should be increased to two million. As evidence that the masses could be brought into the Party, he reported that more than half of the work of the Kwangtung Provincial Party Office was for the farmers' movement and that 80 percent of the members in the provincial branch were farmers. In Canton, 60 percent of 12,000 new registrants were workers. T'an then gave figures, all in round numbers, for the membership in eleven formally organized provinces and for five out of eight provinces being organized, and for three special municipalities. These figures total 183,700. But T'an could not include figures for several provinces, and for Shanghai and Hankow, nor did he include enrollments in army corps, vessels of the navy, and the Canton police, each of which had special Party branches.[5] Later in his report, T'an spoke of half a million members in China and overseas, apparently a gross exaggeration, for a report on the Kuomintang's overseas work gave 87,065 as the number of registered overseas members.[6]

Finally, T'an raised the issue of the relative guilt of various participants in the Western Hills Conference and of other dissident Kuomintang leaders. The main debate on punishing dissidents came on January 13 on a motion regarding the Western Hills faction, presented by Lu Yu-yü on behalf of an investigating committee.[7] This motion recommended punishments on a descending scale of severity. Hsieh Ch'ih and Tsou Lu, considered to be the instigators of this violation of Party discipline, should be expelled. Another group actively engaged in the conference should be suspended for a year—Chü Cheng, Shih Ch'ing-yang, Shih Ying, Mao Tsü-ch'uan, T'an Chen, Fu Ju-lin, and Shen Ting-i. Written warnings should be sent to Chang Chi, Lin Shen, Shao Yuan-ch'ung, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, and Chang Chih-pen, who were accessories. As to Tai Chi-t'ao, who had not attended the conference but whose book, *National Revolution and the Kuomintang of China*, was schismatic, the congress should urge him to repent.[8]

Wang Ching-wei spoke first on the motion. He recommended that the chief instigators, Tsou Lu and Hsieh Ch'ih, be expelled, but that all the others simply be

given written warnings. He argued for this leniency on the basis of several reports that many who attended the conference had not realized that it was posing as a meeting of the Central Committees. Some had left Peking before Tsou Lu sent out a circular telegram opposing Sun Yat-sen's policy of allying with Soviet Russia and accepting Communists into the Kuomintang. Their names had been attached to the telegram, for which they were not responsible. Hence, all those who had participated in the conference should not be lumped together and treated harshly. Rather, they should be given a chance to reform. Persons who had sabotaged Party work in Peking, Hankow, Chekiang, and elsewhere should be dealt with as separate offenders.

The debate that ensued showed sharply divided opinions. Six speakers came out for stern treatment of the Western Hills culprits. Chu Chi-hsün, T'ang Chi-sheng, Kao Yü-han, Fang Wei-hsia, Hsieh Chin, and Chiang Tung-ch'in wanted more of them expelled. Five other speakers—Hsü Cho-jan, Liu Hou-wu, Ch'en Chi-po, T'an P'ing-shan, and Shao Li-tzu—favored leniency. Give them a way out and do not further split the Party were the principal arguments. A vote taken by show of hands showed the great majority supporting Wang's proposal of leniency.[9]

Since one of the principal demands of the Western Hills group was expulsion of Communists from the Kuomintang, it is not surprising that three of those favoring harsh penalties were Communists attending the Second Congress as members of the Kuomintang. Kao Yü-han was particularly vehement in objecting to communism being made an issue once more; the real issue, he said, was revolution. Kao frankly identified himself as a Communist. For him, all revolutionaries were comrades, but those who opposed revolution had no place in the Kuomintang. Communism was something far in the future. Why squabble over the question of communism now?[10]

The issue could not be so easily settled; it runs like a thread through the minutes of the congress. On January 7 both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Kao Yü-han had explained the Communist Party's decision to work within the Nationalist Party for the sake of national revolution, and then had defended its actions as entirely ethical. The issue was aired again on January 18 during a discussion of Resolutions on the Report of the Work of the Central Party Apparatus.[11] One of the resolutions had the sentence, "Wherefore we acknowledge our late Leader's admission of Communist Party members into this Party for our common endeavor." Two speakers wished to strengthen the statement but a third felt that doing so would favor one side of the controversy too much. Yuan T'ung-chow made a speech that laid bare a part of the problem of having members of one party work within another. Yuan, an academy delegate, was a protégé of Shao Li-tzu, a secretary in the Whampoa Military Academy. Yuan stated that on the basis of his experience in the academy, where conflicts existed among cadets, the source of friction was not over principles, since all subscribed to the Three Principles of the People, which embraced communism. The real problem arose from the fact that Communist Party members carried on their work secretly, causing deep suspicions. Yuan proposed to solve the problem at its roots by three regulations. Communists who join the Kuomintang must declare their membership in the Communist Party. They must disclose their activities within the Kuomintang. And Kuomintang members wishing to join the Communist Party must secure permission to do so from the local Kuomintang office.

Yuan's proposal raised a storm. Several speakers, in good Chinese fashion, praised his suggestions and then demolished them. Chang Kuo-t'ao pointed out that in many areas Communists had to work in secret for fear of their lives. The Kuomintang should trust members of the Communist Party, just as Sun Yat-sen did, the test being whether they obeyed Kuomintang discipline. Members of either party should be free to join the other; the only question should be whether the member was a true revolutionary. In fact, said Chang, less than 3 percent of the Communist Party's members had joined from the Kuomintang. Mao Tse-tung spoke next, but he appears to have

done no more than reiterate Chang's points.

Kao Yü-han said the factor underlying Yuan's proposal was fear. But why should Kuomintang members fear Communists? The Kuomintang had a membership of half a million while the Communist Party numbered less than 5,000, he averred. Communists joined the Kuomintang to work for the national revolution, a necessary stage toward world revolution. They were entirely loyal to the Kuomintang and hoped for its success in leading the national revolution. But its success was still far in the future. The Communist Party had led many farmers and workers into the Kuomintang; they made up at least 30 percent of its membership. By contrast, only 3 percent of the Communist Party had been recruited from the Kuomintang, as remarked by Comrade Chang.[12]

Several speakers advocated a continuation of Dr. Sun's method of handling the problem, that is, the test to be whether a Communist in the Kuomintang obeyed the discipline of the Nationalist Party. Ch'en Kung-po, a former Communist, saw the problem of secret Communists being members in the Kuomintang as the real cause of disputes and misunderstanding. It must be solved, but it could not be solved in open discussion. He proposed that the highest levels of the two parties meet to seek a joint solution. This proposal won the immediate support of several speakers. Wang Ching-wei asked for a vote on the proposition that the Central Executive Committees of the two parties meet to work out a complete solution jointly. It was carried by a majority vote.[13]

Election of New Central Committees of the Kuomintang

An important function of the congress was to elect a new Central Executive Committee and a new Central Supervisory Committee, and alternate members for each. On January 12, Wang Ching-wei announced the rules for voting, prepared by the Presidium. This group consisted of Wang himself, T'an Yen-k'ai, Teng Tse-ju, Ting Wei-fen, T'an P'ing-shan, and En-k'o-pa-t'u.[14] The Presidium had decided that there should be thirty-six members of the new Central Executive Committee with twenty-four reserve members, and twelve members of the Central Supervisory Committee with eight in reserve. Election should be in two steps. Each delegate with voting rights might nominate up to ten persons. Any Party member in good standing could be nominated; they did not have to be delegates to the congress. The Presidium would make up the list of nominees to appear on the ballots. Each delegate with voting rights would then receive four ballots, each being a list of nominees for one of the committees or one of the reserve groups. No names might be added to the ballots.[15]

Voting occurred on the afternoon of January 16, with Wang Ching-wei again in the chair. He reminded the electors that each ballot must be signed by the voter or bear his seal. Each ballot showed the number of persons to be voted for; any ballot returned with votes for more than the fixed number would be invalid. Wang also announced that various lists of recommended candidates put out by different delegations were merely advisory. No one should feel obligated to follow such lists in his voting.[16]

This account of the electoral procedure shows that the composition of the Central Committees was largely predetermined by the Presidium and whoever advised it. Once the ballots were drawn up, voters could only register their preferences. Apparently the lists included more names than the numbers to be elected, so some would lose. In the case of the two reserve groups, the vote would be significant since the ranking of the winners would determine which individuals would fill vacancies that might occur on the Central Committees. Yet even if persons on the reserve list received more votes than some on the regular committee, they would not win regular seats because the system had prearranged the separate compositions of each main

committee and its group in reserve.

Chang Kuo-t'ao recounts in his reminiscences that Wang Ching-wei consulted him in the presence of Borodin on the composition of the ballot for the Central Executive Committee. Chang studied Wang's proposed list and noted that so-called leftists and members of Wang's faction made up the majority, and that the only centrist on the list was Sun Fo, though the Communist Party's Central Committee desired that such centrists as Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and Shao Yuan-ch'ung should be selected. All Communist members of the First CEC had been carried over and four others prominent in the Kuomintang—Wu Yü-chang, Tung Pi-wu, Yün Tai-ying, and Yang P'ao-an—had been added. (In fact, Tung was in the reserve group.) Chang expressed no opinion about the Kuomintang names but, on the basis of the decision of the Central Committee of the CCP, he suggested that Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and he, himself, had not been active in Kuomintang work and, therefore, need not be reelected to the CEC, and that some other Communists might be taken off since the Central Committee did not wish its Party members to occupy many places on central committees of the Kuomintang. Throughout the conversation, Borodin remained silent. Chang concludes, "Thus the candidates for the central committees elected by the Second Congress were considered to have been selected after consultation." He implies that Wang made up the ballots in consultation with Borodin.[17]

For the election 253 sets of ballots were issued and 252 returned. Three sets were considered invalid, for reasons not stated. Hence, 249 valid votes were cast.[18]

The announced result of the vote was as follows:

Central Executive Committee (36)

Wang Ching-wei	248	Ku Meng-yü	222	Kan Nai-kuang	188
T'an Yen-k'ai	248	Ching Heng-i	218	Wu Yü-chang	186
Hu Han-min	248	Sung Tse-wen	211	Ch'en Yu-jen	184
Chiang Kai-shek	248	Pai Wen-wei	201	Li Lieh-chün	184
T'an P'ing-shan	246	Ho Hsiang-ning	200	Wang Fa-ch'in	179
Sung Ch'ing-ling	245	Wu Ch'ao-shu	200	Yang P'ao-an	176
Ch'en Kung-po	242	Ting Wei-fen	197	Yün Tai-ying	173
En-k'o-pa-t'u	237	Tai Chi-t'ao	196	P'eng Tse-min	170
Yü Yu-jen	234	Li Chi-shen	196	Chu Chi-hsün	166
Ch'eng Ch'ien	234	Lin Tsu-han	196	Liu Shou-chung	159
Chu P'ei-te	231	Li Ta-chao	192	Hsiao Fu-ch'eng	149
Hsü Ch'ien	224	Yü Shu-te	190	Sun Fo	142

Reserve Members of CEC (24)

Pai Yün-t'i	201	Huang Shih	163	Ting Ch'ao-wu	155
Mao Tse-tung	173	Tung Yung-wei [Pi-wu]	162	Ho Ying-ch'in	151
Hsü Su-hun	172	Ch'ü Wu	162	Ch'en Shu-jen	142
Chou Ch'i-kang	170	Teng Ying-ch'ao	159	Ch'u Min-i	142
Hsia Hsi	168	Wang Lo-p'ing	158	Miao Pin	133
Teng Yen-ta	167	Ch'en Chia-yu	158	Wu T'ieh-ch'eng	111
Han Lin-fu	165	Ch'en Ch'i-yuan	158	Chan Ta-pei	84
Lu Yu-yü	165	Chu Chi-ch'ing	157	Sun Fo*	58

*Error. Next day this was changed to Ch'en Chao-ying 48

Central Supervisory Committee (12)

Wu Chih-hui	226	Wang Ch'ung-hui	179	Kao Yü-han	167
Chang Ching-chiang	223	Li Shih-tseng	179	Ch'en Kuo-fu	157
Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei	204	Liu Ta-tzu	158	Ch'en Pi-chün	155
Ku Ying-fen	203	[sic. 178?]		Shao Li-tzu	173
				Teng Tse-ju	135

Reserve Members of CSC (8)

Huang Shao-hsiung	176	Kuo Ch'un-t'ao	158	Teng Mou-hsiu	148
Li Tsung-jen	167	Li Fu-lin	153	Hsieh Chin	130
Chiang Hao	159	P'an Yün-ch'ao	149		

Comparing the new Central Executive Committee with the twenty-four-man group elected at the First Congress, we find only thirteen carried forward (listed in their 1924 sequence): Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Li Lieh-chün, Tai Chi-t'ao, Pai Wen-wei, Ting Wei-fen, T'an Yen-k'ai, T'an P'ing-shan, Li Ta-chao, En-k'o-pa-t'u, Wang Fa-ch'in, Yü Yu-jen, and Yü Shu-te. All were Kuomintang veterans except for two of the three Communists on the list—Li Ta-chao and Yü Shu-te.

There were twenty-two new members of the CEC. Two were women—Sung Ch'ing-ling and Ho Hsiang-ning, the widows of Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai. Four generals who had gained prominence in the wars in Kwangtung were now elevated to the CEC—Chiang Kai-shek, Chu P'ei-te, Li Chi-shen, and Ch'eng Ch'ien, commanders of the First, Third, Fourth, and later, the Sixth Corps of the National Revolutionary Army.

Three Communists were added. Wu Yü-chang had been an early member of the T'ung-meng Hui and had distinguished himself in the revolutionary movement to overthrow the Manchus; he had later served in governments under Sun Yat-sen. Wu's credentials for membership in the Kuomintang CEC were on a par with any. Yang P'ao-an and Yün Tai-ying had slighter claims. Yang was from Sun Yat-sen's native county and seems to have been an understudy for T'an P'ing-shan in the Kuomintang Organization Department. He had been very active in Kuomintang work in Canton. Yün was an important youth leader and was on the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Corps. He had joined the Kuomintang in about 1923, had been a teacher at Shanghai University, and had been a secretary in the Shanghai KMT Headquarters. Now he was a political instructor in Whampoa Military Academy.

Three rising politicians in Canton were among the newcomers—Ch'en Kung-po, Kan Nai-kuang, and T. V. Soong. Ch'en and Kan might be regarded as protégés of Wang Ching-wei. Soong had proved himself an outstanding administrator of government finances. Wu Ch'ao-shu was an important member of the Canton administration and had long served on the Political Council.

The Left Wing was strengthened by the addition of Hsü Ch'ien and Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen), both of whom had worked closely with Sun Yat-sen, and by Ku Meng-yü, P'eng Tse-min, and Chu Chi-hsün. Ku was a well-known professor of economics at Peking University who had been active in the May Fourth Movement but apparently was a latecomer to the Kuomintang circle. P'eng was an overseas Chinese from Malaya who had worked in the T'ung-meng Hui there; now, for about a year, he was to be very active in Kuomintang politics. Chu Chi-hsün had attended the first Kuomintang Congress as an elected delegate from Kiangsu, which he again represented at the Second Congress; he was very close to the Communist Party, if not actually a member.[19]

Of the rest, Hsiao Fo-ch'eng was a veteran revolutionary and a leader among

overseas Chinese; he had attended both Kuomintang congresses as a delegate from Siam. Ching Heng-i was a T'ung-meng Hui veteran and a well-known educationist from Chekiang. About Liu Shou-chung, we can say very little.

Sun Fo was last on the list. By error his name had appeared also on the ballot for reserve members and he was last on that body also. (After the error was discovered, another person was found for the reserve list.) Sun led a Cantonese faction that included Wu Ch'ao-shu and Wu T'ieh-cheng. However, he had been absent from Canton during the latter part of 1925, apparently at odds with radical leadership of the Party and government. He must have been rather unpopular with the delegates, for 43 percent of the voters chose not to include him as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

The announced tally has some other interesting features. Four men were said to have received equal and virtually unanimous endorsement. Wang Ching-wei, T'an Yen-k'ai, and Chiang Kai-shek fell one vote shy of unanimous election; but they could scarcely have turned in signed ballots showing votes for themselves. It seems astonishing that Hu Han-min, who had been sent off to Russia only four months before because of his alleged complicity in the plot against Liao Chung-k'ai, and whose personality did not make him popular, was only one vote short of unanimity. The outcome seems prearranged.[20] The rest of the list seems credible as the result of a vote in which delegates showed their preferences. For example, the thirteen members of the First CEC who were reelected, came out in quite a different sequence from that which they held in the 1924 election. The spread of 106 votes between first and last places seems randomly spaced.

The reelection of Tai Chi-t'ao with 196 votes seems surprising. Tai had been identified by the Communist Party's Central Committee as the leader of the New Right Wing; he was author of the recent work that opposed class struggle and, in effect, repudiated the concept of centering all revolutionaries in the Kuomintang. He had at least flirted with the Western Hills faction even if he did not attend the formal conference. Tai's reelection may have been due to Chiang Kai-shek's support.[21] If it is correct that there was a group of about ninety Communist Party members among the delegates, Tai must have received a good many votes from Communists.[22]

As a result of the voting, Communists won seven (possibly eight) places on the thirty-six-member CEC—T'an P'ing-shan, Lin Tsu-han, Li Ta-chao, Yü Shu-te, Wu Yü-chang, Yang P'ao-an, Yün Tai-ying, and Chu Chi-hsün (?). They won six places on the reserve group of twenty-four—Mao Tse-tung, Hsü Su-hun, Hsia Hsi, Han Lin-fu, Tung Yung-wei (Pi-wu), and Teng Ying-ch'ao (wife of Chou En-lai). The high positions held by Mao and Hsü put them in position to become regular members of the CEC in the event of deaths or expulsions. On the Supervisory Committee, however, there was only one Communist, Kao Yü-han, and among the alternates, Chiang Hao. Ch'en Pi-chün was the wife of Wang Ching-wei.

The new Central Executive Committee elected its nine-member Standing Committee on January 22. The outcome of that vote was:[23] Wang Ching-wei, 24; T'an Yen-k'ai, 24; T'an P'ing-shan, 24; Chiang Kai-shek, 24; Lin Tsu-han, 22; Hu Han-min, 21; Ch'en Kung-po, 20; Kan Nai-kuang, 20; and Yang P'ao-an, 13. We deduce that twenty-five regular members of the CEC voted for the Standing Committee, very likely on a prearranged ballot. At least nine regular members were absent. Thus the working group that, in theory, would direct the Kuomintang was made up of Wang Ching-wei and two leftist protégés, three Communists, and three independents, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hu Han-min. But Hu was off in Moscow. He would not get a chance to serve until mid-1927 and then under very different circumstances. Wang Ching-wei, the most prominent individual at the congress, seemed the top political leader in the Kuomintang, but Chiang Kai-shek had moved into the highest ranks of the Party.

On February 1, the Political Council reappointed Wang Ching-wei its chairman, the other members being T'an Yen-k'ai, Hu Han-min, Chiang Kai-shek, Wu Ch'ao-shu, Sun Fo, T'an P'ing-shan, Chu P'ei-te, and T. V. Soong. Reserve members were Ch'en Kung-po, Kan Nai-kuang, Lin Tsu-han, and Shao Li-tzu. The Canton leaders also appointed a Branch Political Council in Peking, consisting of Hsü Ch'ien, Yü Yu-jen, Li Ta-chao, Ting Wei-fen, Yü Shu-te, Wang Fa-ch'in, Ku Meng-yü, Ch'en Yu-jen, Liu Shou-chung, Wu Ching-heng, and Li Yü-ying, a prestigious group of intellectuals. The council also nominated Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung of Kwangsi to the National Government Council. It selected Chou En-lai, Li Fu-ch'un, and Chu K'e-ching as deputy Party representatives respectively to the First, Second, and Third Corps of the NRA; they were Communist members of the Kuomintang.

Soviet Advisers Report to the Bubnov Commission

Borodin and three of the most experienced military advisers in Canton, Tereshatov, Cherepanov, and Sakhnovsky ("Nilov") went to Peking to report to the Bubnov Commission, which arrived there early in February 1926. Andrey Sergeyevich Bubnov, who used the pseudonym "Ivanovsky" in China, was an "old Bolshevik" who had been an important political commissar in the Red army during the civil war in Russia, and had been appointed head of the Central Political Administration of the army in 1924. The secret mission that he headed was to study the work of the Soviet aid missions in China and to recommend policy for the future. All members of the commission were members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. They were I. I. Lepse, representative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Profintern, N. A. Kubyak, secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party/Bolshevik, and R. V. Longva, an officer with a distinguished military career, who later became the military attaché in Peking.[25]

Bubnov first interviewed Soviet Military Attaché A. I. Egerov on February 11, and V. M. Primakov on the 15th. Primakov reported on the advisers' work with Feng Yü-hsiang and the First Kuominchun, and his report is discussed in our companion volume by the late Julie How.[26] Later the commission travelled to Kalgan, and on to Paotow, where they met General Feng. On February 14, the three southern military advisers met with the Bubnov Commission. Sakhnovsky, who had been in Canton since June 1924, stated his belief that within two or three months the NRA could launch a successful campaign into Central China, and then could liberate Peking. Nikolai Tereshetov, one of the first military advisers to reach Canton, believed a year of political preparation in Kwangtung and neighboring provinces, as well as an accumulation of weapons and supplies, would be needed first. A. I. Cherepanov, the source for this report on the Bubnov inquiry, stated that a northward campaign must be accompanied by an uprising of the peasantry, but that the national revolutionary united front, as he called it, lacked a precise agrarian program to bring on such an uprising.[27]

Cherepanov also describes Borodin's views, for Borodin allowed him to see the report he intended to give to the commission. It is still retained in an archive in Moscow, and both Cherepanov and the modern Russian scholar, R. A. Mirovitskaia, studied it.[28] According to these accounts, Borodin believed it necessary first to promote an agrarian revolution, for, in his opinion, "the chief bulwark of imperialism in China, and particularly in Kwangtung, was the medieval land-owning system, and not the warlords." He fully realized the tremendous difficulties he would face in persuading the Kuomintang to support such a revolution; to do so it might be necessary to split the party and drive out its conservatives. Yet he argued in favor of a northward campaign on two grounds. First, if Wu P'ei-fu were victorious in his wars in the North, the British would be sure to try to set him on Canton; and second, the eco-

nomic situation in Kwangtung had so improved as a result of recent military campaigns, strengthening of the government, and stabilization of finances, that many Kuomintang members had concluded that now was "a time for resting." They were ready to forget the National Revolution for the sake of enriching themselves; hence, it was necessary to get the Kuomintang out of Kwangtung. In his report to Bubnov on the necessity of an agrarian revolution to accompany the Northern Expedition, Borodin wrote: "It is necessary to pursue a policy to ensure that along its entire route of advance the army would carry out measures that would bring the peasantry to its feet and attract it to our side. And here once again we come face to face with the agrarian question. It will be up to the expedition either to solve this question, or at least begin to tackle it. . . . It is one thing to smash the generals, but to start changing land relations and the system of taxes is incomparably more difficult. . . . Here one may encounter the resistance of whole classes." He planned that after his return to Canton he would work out a program for agrarian revolution that would differentiate the coming Northern Expedition from Sun Yat-sen's previous campaigns. His projected program also included strengthening the Left Wing in the Kuomintang and in the army; work among the peasants; strengthening the trade unions and infiltrating them with Communists; the growth and improvement of the Communist Party; and concentrating that party's efforts on its main tasks, one of which would be participation in the organization and carrying through of the Northern Expedition.[29] Clearly, this agenda would take much time to execute; it was not an argument for haste in launching a great military campaign.

Cherepanov tells that all the work of the Bubnov Commission in Peking centered on the idea of a northern campaign from Kwangtung. Bubnov's final conclusion, he states, was that conditions for it had so ripened that it was necessary to prepare for a move to the north in six months. Karakhan thought the move should begin after a year or more. But first, the troops must be trained for action under field conditions. Cherepanov had no doubt that the commission's recommendations would be approved by Moscow.[30] According to Mirovitskaia, Bubnov's report recommended to Moscow that it satisfy all of Canton's requests.[31]

Bubnov and his fellow commissioners then moved to Shanghai where they met with Ch'en Tu-hsiu on March 2. Much of their discussion concerned Ch'en's evaluation of the class forces that would support the coming revolution. The commission was disturbed to find how little importance Ch'en seemed to place on the work among the peasantry, and the restrained agrarian program being advanced by the Communist Party. Ch'en did inform the commission, however, that some three hundred Communists worked among the peasants in Kwangtung, and more than two hundred in Hunan. In discussing the prospects for a northward campaign from Kwangtung, they found Ch'en eager that it be started soon, but on a very limited basis, merely for the purpose of defeating Wu P'ei-fu, primarily as a defensive measure. This could be accomplished, Ch'en thought, with about twenty thousand troops, say two divisions of Hunanese and Yunnanese. His analysis of the general political-military scene and the correlation of social forces did not satisfy the commission, according to Cherepanov.[32]

Arranging Alliances in the South

Meanwhile, in Canton political preparations for a northward campaign were moving ahead. One effort was to bring neighboring Kwangsi province into the fold, and another was to find supporters in Hunan province to the north. The elections of Huang Shao-hsiung and Li Tsung-jen as reserve members of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee and to the National Government Council signified an intraprovincial alliance in the making, for Generals Huang and Li, together with General Pai

Ch'ung-hsi, had recently established their authority over Kwangsi. On January 26, after the close of the Kuomintang Congress, a high-level delegation from the National Government, escorted by General Pai, arrived in Wuchow on the border between the two provinces to confer with the triumvars about bringing Kwangsi into the National Government system. Then General Pai returned with the delegates to Canton, and on February 17 the Political Council appointed him, together with Wang Ching-wei, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, and Li Chi-shen, as members of a commission to work out details of political, financial, and military unification of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. What resulted was an alliance but not a merger.[33]

Delegates from other military leaders visited Canton: from Sun Ch'uan-fang of the Chihli Clique, who headed a coalition of five east-central provinces, including two that abutted Kwangtung on the north and east; and a delegate from T'ang Sheng-chih, the military powerholder in southern Hunan, probably Liu Wen-tao, who served as a bridge between the Canton group and General T'ang.[34]

The Soviet Mission in Canton, March 1926

The number of Russian advisers gradually grew as some who had worked in the North were transferred to the more fertile ground in Kwangtung. Cherepanov lists eleven who arrived in Canton when he was away.[35] One was M. G. Efremov, a twenty-nine-year-old hero of the Russian civil war, who used the pseudonym "Abnold." Other newly arrived military men were I. Vassilevich ("Yanovsky"), N. Kohneev, N. Nefedov ("Pavlov"), F. Katiushin-Kotov, P. Lunev, and V. Akimov. Several interpreters were among the newcomers to fill an urgent need. M. M. Abramson ("Mazurin") had grown up in Manchuria, knew Chinese from childhood, joined the Communist Party in 1918, and been a member of Yurin's unsuccessful mission to Peking in 1921. He had then gone to Moscow and taught in the University of the Toilers of the East, and next studied at the Leningrad Institute of Oriental Studies. He served with the Second Kuominchun in Honan before his transfer.[36] Another scholar-interpreter sent south from Honan was Y. S. Yolk, a graduate of the Leningrad Institute. Soon after Borodin returned at the end of April, he put Yolk to work with two others, M. Volin and O. S. Tarkanov ("Erdberg"), to study agrarian relations in Kwangtung. Two female language officers also joined the group, Galina Kolchugina and Vera Vishnayakova, then about twenty-one years old, who had served during the past winter in Kalgan. Her reminiscence, written forty years later, is our principal basis for knowing about the life of the Soviet group in Kwangtung. When she arrived at the end of February 1926, the group already numbered about forty.

By then a number of wives of the Soviet officers, at least ten, had joined their men in Canton, and there were a few children, some born there.[37] The families lived in Tung-shan, a mile or so east of Canton city, in rather open country near a canal. There were five or six streets in this little suburb with well-built European- or Chinese-style houses of stone, which had been converted into apartments with one family or group of single officers on each floor. Windows were screened and rooms had ceiling fans. From the balconies or balustraded roofs, one looked upon rice fields or the canal with its sedately passing craft. Three houses surrounded by a common fence were occupied by the headquarters of the military group, and by the club. This compound was guarded by Chinese soldiers. Borodin lived elsewhere. The club had reception rooms, a dining room, billiard room, and library. Maria Mikhaylovna, the pretty young wife of artillery adviser G. I. Gilev, managed the dining room, while wives of other advisers made the club a center of social activities, with receptions for newcomers and farewell parties for those departing. Nadia Tsorn, a typist, played the piano for several men who had fine voices. Wall newspapers posted in the lobby and

a monthly magazine, *Kanton*, printed by lithography, kept the group informed.

When the men were off with the troops they wore smart khaki gabardine uniforms and cork helmets against the hot southern sun—perhaps much like British colonial officers in Hong Kong—but when off duty they wore civies. Some of the women gave Russian lessons to Chinese youths planning to attend Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. The group studied English with an elderly American woman married to a Chinese professor. All enjoyed trips to Canton to take in the fascinating street life; there were excursions to White Cloud Mountain; and there were a number of romances and marriages.

The main occupation of almost everyone was military: advising corps and some division commanders; training cadets at Whampoa; providing technical information and training in engineering, communications, artillery, etc.; intelligence gathering, translating, or interpreting; and both high-level and routine staff work. One important job was supervising the unloading and storage of arms and other military equipment, for now six Russian vessels plied between Vladivostok and Canton bringing needed arms and supplies. General N. V. Kuibyshev headed the military group, with General V. P. Rogachev as his deputy. Mira Chubereva, wife of adviser Pavel Sakhnovsky ("Nilov"), was chief of staff for the mission itself. She was a colorful character, who affected masculinity, a trait she may have acquired during the Russian civil war and while studying at the Frunze Military Academy, from which she was the only woman graduate at her time. She and her husband had been in Canton since July or October 1924. In addition to the military officers there were four airmen and two mechanics for the minuscule air force—Dzh. Talberg, V. Sergeev, Remizyuk ("Veri"), A. M. Kravtsov; and Bazenau and Kobyakov. There was also a recently arrived naval officer, L. Grey, unless that was a pseudonym.

About the middle of March, Vera Vishnyakova was called to General Kuibyshev's office to serve as interpreter. She immediately recognized Wang Ching-wei, dressed nattily in European clothes and his sleek hair glistening with pomade, "a humbler of female hearts." N. V. Kuibyshev, "stubborn with a broad forehead, was sitting across from Wang Ching-wei and coolly looking at him with his big blue eyes." Miss Vishnyakova explained the reason for the conference: "Everyone knew that a hidden struggle for power was going on between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, that on one side was political prestige and on the other side was a military force. Since Chiang Kai-shek with remarkable shamelessness was misappropriating money designed for the building of the National Revolutionary Army, Kuibyshev ignored him and dealt with Wang Ching-wei on all military matters. Chiang Kai-shek came to hate him."[38]

Trying to End the Hong Kong Strike and Boycott

Vera Vishnyakova saw many evidences of revolutionary spirit and activity when she went into Canton in early March 1926. Placards and handbills plastered the walls; banners with revolutionary slogans stretched overhead across the narrow streets. Pioneers dressed in khaki outfits, white caps, and red scarves marched by. At the sound of a trumpet a picket of the Strike Committee appeared in a semi-military uniform, carrying a rifle. The caps of the strike pickets bore the twelve-pointed star of the Kuomintang, but, she wrote, everyone knew that the Strike Committee was under Communist Party influence "and was even jokingly called 'the second CCP municipal committee.' " The anti-British boycott was strictly observed. Pickets walked the streets with clubs and rifles, and the masses jealously enforced the boycott so that British imperialism suffered material losses, Miss Vishnyakova observed.[39]

It seems she was not aware that the Kuomintang leadership and much of the citizenry were very tired of the Strike Committee's continued activity, nor that the

Nationalist leaders and the authorities in Hong Kong were trying to find a means to bring the strike and boycott to an end. Both sides had taken rigid positions that were far apart, and neither side was a free agent. The governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi, took his orders from the British prime minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and advice from the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. The Kuomintang Political Council made decisions for the Nationalist Government but was somewhat in hostage to the Strike Committee, which, though strongly influenced by the Communist Party's Kwangtung Regional Committee, had developed power of its own in southern Kwangtung. The committee and the strike pickets wanted the boycott continued indefinitely, for its enforcement gave them legitimacy, power, and money.

Our Document 25 presents the situation through the eyes of a Soviet member of the aid mission. He seems poorly informed about back-stage developments. When Borodin was in Canton he could report more fully, for he always sat with the Political Council. According to Document 25, apparently written in March 1926, the number of strikers still in Canton in December had dwindled to forty thousand, but cost six thousand Canton dollars a day in support, this being provided partly by the government and partly subscribed throughout China and abroad among Chinese "and the proletariat." In December representatives of the Strike Committee said they had sufficient funds for two or three more months. The strike was costing Hong Kong a loss of four million dollars a day, the writer asserted, and a 60 percent reduction in its imports and exports. Banknotes of the Canton Government had gradually supplanted notes of Hong Kong banks, English prestige had declined throughout China, and the strike had increased the influence of the Revolutionary Government. In fact, he wrote, "only owing to the strike" had the government suppressed so easily the counterrevolutionary conspiracies and revolts that followed the defeat of the Yunnan militarists—i.e., in June 1925. With the most serious danger over after Ch'en Chiung-ming's defeat in November, the Revolutionary Government recommended to the Strike Committee that it consider calling off the strike. Yet at meetings of the strikers' delegates and at mass meetings as well, the overwhelming majority voted against terminating the strike until Hong Kong accepted all demands put forth after the Shameen firing (Doc. 25, p. 3).

The principle demands of December were: (1) that England must accept responsibility for the Shameen firing and indemnify the families of those killed; (2) that political rights should be granted the Chinese in Hong Kong; and (3) that all strikers be taken back to work with full back wages paid to them. Negotiations with Hong Kong were conducted through merchant guilds because the Hong Kong Government refused to negotiate with the Strike Committee and the Canton Government declared the strike did not concern it at all. The negotiations failed, as did several attempts thereafter to reach an understanding. Hong Kong, in the meantime, had replaced "a considerable number of the strikers" by workmen from other provinces and Singapore. However, stated the writer, "it is very important to Hong Kong to find a way to get out of the existing situation," that is, the boycott of British goods and shipping. Yet Canton, too, had suffered, as its trade was still only 70 percent of what it had been before the conflict. The writer believed that now, after nine months of the strike, the workers felt some discontent and indifference, and the Right Wing of the Kuomintang would try to use this discontent for its own ends. The time to call off the strike had already come in December, because its negative influence on the economy of Canton and on the government's budget would increase more and more. "It is probable that both the Strike Committee and the Revolutionary Government will be obliged to make some concessions." Still, the writer predicted, "something may be obtained from Hong Kong too" (Doc. 25, p. 4).

This Soviet report may be supplemented by information from British and Chinese sources. The three "principal demands" of the strikers in December were exactly

what the Government of Hong Kong would never concede. Hong Kong had no interest in taking back the strikers—they had long since been replaced—nor would it pay any financial compensation. But compensation was precisely what the strikers wanted. (Actually, Governor Clementi told T. V. Soong early in January that his government would not stand in the way of some lump sum payment from the Hong Kong merchants.)[40] The British wanted an end to the boycott but the committee kept this weapon in reserve. According to the *Canton Gazette* of January 5, 1926, when the Strike Committee learned that the Chinese merchant group from Hong Kong had no authority to negotiate political matters, it broke off discussions on January 4.[41]

A Communist leader of the strike, Teng Chung-hsia, informs us that from January the Left Wing of the Kuomintang "became a bit icy toward the strikers." After Kwangtung was unified they did not need the strikers, while the Right Wing slandered the strike as illegal. A wavering spirit developed among the petty bourgeoisie, and they became increasingly separated from the workers.[42] In fact, on January 5, Canton's political leaders promulgated regulations to rectify relations between the merchant community and organized labor. Workers and their unions were forbidden to arrest merchants or other workers, to appropriate goods from factory or firm, or to blockade them to prevent business. No armed labor parades were allowed, and persons with arms meeting for the purpose of warfare would be arrested and punished.[43] Though these regulations were directed at unions, they could equally well apply to the Strike Committee, which had its two-thousand-man armed force, confiscated goods, arrested and imprisoned persons, and extorted money and goods from merchants.

Early in January, Governor Clementi tried to persuade Ch'en Kung-po, T. V. Soong, and Sun Fo to use their influence to help end the stalemate. He dangled the prospect of a low-interest loan to be used for railway building, which might have the advantage of providing employment for idle strikers. On the Chinese side, the *Canton Gazette* carried a statement dated January 26, insisting that while it had no part in the strike or boycott, "the Government is still animated by the same sincere desire to see an early settlement and is ready to continue its efforts to assist the two sides."[44]

As private talks seemed to bring no results, the British authorities considered alternatives. On January 25, the governor of Hong Kong, the British acting consul general in Canton, James Jamieson, Admiral Sinclair, General Luard, and Owen O'Malley (for the British Legation in Peking) debated possible action in Moscow to obtain the removal of Bolsheviks from Kwangtung, or a joint blockade of Canton by the treaty powers. If neither were practical—and they were quickly rejected by London—then the conferees considered that a trade loan to Hong Kong (to bolster the merchant community) was the only weapon: Hong Kong must hold out until the Canton Government fell from within or was overthrown by a hostile Chinese general. They were thinking primarily of Wu P'ei-fu. The British Foreign Office also reviewed various methods for exercising pressure on Canton: force, blockade, assistance to anti-Communist leaders, pressure on Moscow, and conciliation. It urged on the British minister in Peking: "We *must* have some solution as soon as possible."[45] Thus by the end of January, there had been little yielding on either side.

In February, the Strike Committee tried to organize a walk-out in Hong Kong to tie up business before "settlement day" for Chinese New Year, February 13. This attempt failed because the committee had virtually no influence in Hong Kong, and the powerful Hong Kong Guild of Engineers and Mechanics and the Chinese police stood fast with the government, which was fully prepared. In mid-February the British consulate in Canton telegraphed that it was rumored the Strike Committee planned to extend the boycott to Japan but was paid to end the threat. A Japanese steamer had been seized by strike pickets in mid-January and was still being held because the owners refused to pay its ransom. A Russian ship that brought British girders and

other steel from Shanghai was also condemned, but a settlement "is believed to have been reached." The strikers were becoming increasingly unpopular and collisions with the police more frequent, the consul general reported.[46] Pickets began to seize cargo from lighters en route to customs for examination and to sell that which they declared enemy property. German and American consignees were the losers. Commissioner of Customs F. Haley Bell proposed to close the port unless such action was stopped. On February 21 he did officially halt customs inspection until the stolen goods were returned. Within five days, Minister of Finance T. V. Soong, presumably after much negotiation, announced that the Strike Committee must surrender all confiscated cargoes to the Customs House; and that the Canton Government guaranteed the Strike Committee shall not interfere with imported cargo until after it has passed the customs. On February 28, the Canton Government issued a proclamation supporting the authority of the Maritime Customs: "The public is therefore to note that there is to be no interference with the import or export of cargo."[47]

During this anxious period, Wang Ching-wei wrote a personal letter to Sir Shouson Chou, a member of Governor Clementi's Advisory Council, and to Dr. Kotewell, suggesting they meet in Macao with Fu Ping-chang, the Canton commissioner of foreign affairs. With the governor's agreement, Chow and Kotewell did meet and talk with Commissioner Fu on March 2 and 3. "It was learned": (1) It would be to the advantage of the Canton Government to have the boycott settled as it was costing $8,000 a day to feed the strikers, and having some forty thousand unemployed men in Canton was "very inconvenient and undesirable." (2) The Strike Committee estimates its total claim against Hong Kong to be fourteen million dollars for strike pay and compensation in lieu of reinstatement. (3) That the Canton Government showed by the recent Customs incident that it could put the strikers under control when it wished. (4) There were no surplus funds in Canton, and the strikers depended entirely upon government grants. Reporting to Austen Chamberlain, the governor inferred that at Chinese New Year the Strike Committee was short of funds and so began to seize cargoes. This, he believed, alarmed Wang Ching-wei and led to his letter to Chow and Kotewell. He deduced that Wang was making another effort to persuade Hong Kong to find the money to buy off—and so to disband—the strike organization, and to this end was inclined to take up the proposed loan for railway construction, hoping to apply part of it to pay off the strikers. Governor Clementi had Chow and Kotewell write to Commissioner Fu on March 5, saying the governor would be pleased to see him personally to discuss the proposed loan. However, Clementi reported to the prime minister that if the Canton Government agreed to begin formal negotiations and if the proposed loan were discussed, he would insist that ending the boycott and disbanding the Strike Committee be an antecedent condition to a loan. Nor would he agree to any part of the loan being used to pay off the strikers.[48]

Commissioner Fu replied on March 12, that Wang Ching-wei would like Chow and Kotewell to come to Canton to see him informally. From this, Clementi deduced that the Canton Government had finally decided to negotiate directly with the Hong Kong Government. The governor also received a telegram from the consul general in Canton stating that the strike leaders had let him know through a third party "that they were prepared to give in, if sufficiently remunerated." Jamieson suggested that a capable Chinese negotiator be sent to conduct the conversations, with authority to go to a limit of $300,000 for the final settlement. He seemed to believe all demands would then be abandoned. He added, "The political situation is most obscure and there are signs of a breakup of the Government." His telegram was dated March 16.[49] Interestingly, on about the same day, Chang T'ai-lei told the Bubnov Commission, which arrived in Canton on March 13, that "today the situation resembles the one existing on the eve of Liao Chung-k'ai's murder."[50]

A Chinese intermediary from Hong Kong, Tu Yin-k'un, saw Wang Ching-wei on

March 20, and other important officials in Canton the next day. Wang was confined to his sick bed, and Chiang Kai-shek was with him. On March 22, Wang replied with a personal letter to Governor Clementi, agreeing to appoint T. V. Soong, C. C. Wu, and Ch'en Kung-po as officials to negotiate with three Hong Kong officials in Canton.[51] This decision is confirmed by the minutes of the Political Council. These exchanges occurred precisely at the time of the March 20 Incident, which changed Canton's political climate and led to Wang's withdrawal from the Canton scene, as discussed below. His letter to Governor Clementi was virtually his last official act.

Plans to Modernize the Nationalists' Armed Forces

By good fortune there is a series of documents dating from February and the first half of March 1926, which reveal—through the eyes of Russian military men on the spot—the condition of the forces associated with the revolutionary government. Together, they give the most comprehensive and detailed view available of the National Revolutionary Army, the navy, and a minuscule air force, four months before the Northern Expedition commenced. They also allow us to see very clearly the main thrust of military reform. These are our documents 26–49.

Three terms epitomize this thrust: centralization, modernization, and politicization. The armed forces were to be under the control of a single agency, the Military Council, which was directed by the Political Council, and which worked through a General Staff and other organs. These organs were to operate within each main unit of the armed forces, as for example in the matter of pay or munitions supply, thus reinforcing control from the center. The forces were to be further trained and, to the extent possible, equipped with better arms; and they were to be provided with improved technical services, such as communications or engineering, as quickly as Chinese specialists could be trained. This modernization was viewed by the Russian mission as a long process, but a necessary one to prepare the National Revolutionary Army for its encounter with the better equipped armies in Central and North China. The crucial difference between the NRA and its opponents, however, was predicted to lie in the politicization of its younger officers and the troops. Systematic indoctrination would provide the forces with a morale and elan that could overcome the enemy's advantages in equipment, the Russian mission believed.

It was in relation to this program that several members of the Russian mission in Canton undertook studies of the actual conditions of the southern armed forces and wrote the series of reports and recommendations here being discussed. They may have been undertaken also because of the expected arrival in Canton of the Bubnov Commission.

Decision-making and Central Military Organs

Two of the documents reveal where important military decisions were made—in the Kuomintang Political Council. "All questions of principle, of a military character, are first discussed by Political Bureau"; in fact, until the end of 1925 even technical questions of army administration were discussed there in order to protect the government from excessive demands of the generals (Doc. 26, p. 35). Within a report by L. Grey[52] (Document 27), there is embedded what appear to be statutes of the Political Council in its military capacity. The council ("bureau" in the English translation made in Peking) is described as the supreme organ of the National Revolutionary Army. It determines the political character of the army, fixes its budget and numerical strength, and decides questions of peace and war. It appoints the chairman of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war, and confirms the appointments of members of the Military Council, corps commanders, chief of the cen-

tral administration of the army, chief of the Naval Bureau, of the army air service, and of the Central Military and Political Academy.

Who constituted the Political Council is not stated in these statutes, but the membership of the Military Council is specified by office. By March 1926 it had eighteen statutory members of whom three—the chairman, the chief inspector (or inspector general of the National Revolutionary Army), and the minister of war—formed a Presidium. Next were the heads of the three central organs under the Military Council—the General Staff, the Political Department, and the Administration of Supplies. The six corps commanders, the heads of the navy, army air service, and Central Military and Political Academy were also members of the council, and finally three ministers in the government—foreign affairs, internal affairs (i.e., internal security?), and finance. It appears from Document 27 that the Military Council had become unwieldy and that most issues were settled by the Presidium, which met twice a week, before decisions were presented to the weekly council meetings.[53] Nevertheless, the Military Council had achieved considerable authority, since it was made up of men of the highest command and administrative responsibility.[54]

The first of the central organs under the Military Council was the General Staff, on which, according to Document 28, the burden of centralization rested. However, it had not yet won popularity in the army, nor could it get in touch with the military units; still less had it been able to direct their administration. Document 3 states that, to enhance the authority of the General Staff and create a closer connection between it and the army units, General Li Chi-shen was appointed chief of the General Staff (Doc. 3, p. 7). This was done on February 23, 1926.[55]

The functions of the second central organ, the Political Department, are discussed later. The third was the Administration of Supplies. The writer of Document 28, who was pessimistic about the General Staff, seemed impressed by a "gradual departure from the most characteristic features of the Chinese militarism." He pointed to the "adoption by the whole army of a plan of regular supply of finances, artillery, materiel, etc., through the central military organs" (Doc. 28, p. 3). Presumably he referred to the work of this administration. A document that we have not reproduced[56] describes in considerable detail how the Department of Supply (as the term was translated) had succeeded in becoming the actual paymaster of the National Revolutionary Army. If true, this was indeed a measure of the success of centralization in the financial realm. The department also had begun to supervise the work of Canton's arsenals, and from the first their entire production was to be at its disposal. This was another crucial element of centralized control. By the end of March, the department expected to have enough data on the armament of the NRA to develop a general plan of procurement for reequipping the forces. Several of these documents describe the deplorable condition of existing weapons. The department also had a plan, and a budget allocation of Canton $200,000 per month, to produce 100,000 uniforms. Despite many defects in the work of the Department of Supply, the writer was much encouraged by the progress made since the beginning of the year.

Centralization of Military Education

On January 12, Wang Ching-wei formally proposed to the Military Council that military and political training be united and that all academies established by the several armies and all separate officer training units be brought together at Whampoa. The new school should be called The Central Military and Political Academy. This resolution was unanimously adopted, but it would take some time to carry out. The academy opened officially March 1.[57] Document 24 is a fairly detailed prospectus for the new academy, but we do not know whether it is a draft or the finally approved statutes. The objectives in setting up the academy were to provide the best possible

political and military training for officers, to overcome their provincial separatist tendencies, and by centralizing funds to supply the best possible equipment and provisions for the students. The objectives were to be accomplished by abolishing all other military schools and concentrating the best instructors and equipment in the new academy.[58]

The structure of the academy seems complicated, with a chief (or commandant), a deputy, two councils, three main departments, and five major instructional programs, each under a section chief. Chiang Kai-shek was commandant. It was intended that the academy should train all the junior officers needed by all corps of the National Revolutionary Army, the number of admissions being determined by expected requirements for squad and platoon leaders. Most of the training programs had two sections, one for noncoms brought in from the ranks, and the other for potential officers recruited from students, cadets in other corps' schools, and enlisted men of great promise. When the academy opened under its new title, there were more than 2,650 students, including those of the Fourth Whampoa class and cadets from the other military schools.[59]

The political complexion of the academy is suggested by the careful screening process, described in Document 24. Students not considered politically reliable were not to be given entrance examinations. Reliability was to be determined by ability to answer thirty-six questions, some of which were: "Who are the chief enemies of China?" "What is the attitude of the Kuomintang toward the peasantry?" "Who is Lenin?" "What is Hong Kong? Who wields power there?" "Can the national revolutionary movement gain a victory without being supported by the world revolution?" "Who carries on the principal fight for the world revolution?" (Doc. 24, pp. 14, 15).

Once in the academy, cadets received political training on the basis of ten theses, which are spelled out in the document, as are the eight major subjects of the political curriculum. The stated purpose of political study was "to give the cadets a theoretical political education which is necessary for revolutionary military men, and to inculcate into them the radical standpoint which will help them to comprehend the contradictions of modern society and to make clear the puzzled [puzzling] modern situation" (Doc. 24, pp. 19-20). Political training, both theoretical and through work experience, was given to all, but the academy also trained a group of about 450 young men to be political officers.[60]

Most of the students were being trained as infantry officers, but in addition there were to be small classes in artillery, engineering, communications, and supply work (quartermaster). In each case, the chief instructor was responsible both to the head of the Education Department of the academy and to the relevant inspector in the General Staff or to the Administration of Supply.

Clearly the plan for the new academy combined centralization, politicization, and modernization at the level of the cadets.

Army Structure and Actual Conditions

We have, through Russian eyes, several frank appraisals of the Nationalist military forces in March 1926. Document 32, "Organization of an Army Corps and Its Component Units," provides a description of the structural goal toward which the reorganization pointed. The corps was the largest unit within the NRA and must be capable of carrying out an independent military mission or warfare on a large sector of the front. The corps should have three divisions, each made up of three regiments, each regiment of three battalions, and so on through company to platoon. However, some of the corps had only two divisions, others three, still others four, and their numerical strength varied from twelve thousand to twenty-three thousand. Subordinate to the corps commander were the divisions, the Corps Staff, a Political Sec-

tion, and a Gendarmerie Battalion. Subordinate to the chief of staff were an Administration of Supplies; Engineering, Communications, and Sanitary sections; and an Artillery Battalion. Artillery strength varied greatly among the corps, and it seemed impossible to transfer guns from one corps to another. The document continues to describe divisions and regiments, observing that their organization was more definite and uniform than that of the corps.

Document 33, "Organization and Functions of Army Staffs," makes clear that staffs in a modern sense had only been introduced about two months before, except in the First Corps, which had had a staff since the summer of 1925. Previously, staffs had merely been clerical organizations. Even at the time of writing, probably in March 1926, the author believed there were no properly trained chiefs of staff or staff officers. He went on to describe the staff organization at corps, division, and regiment level, which were in the process of being created and which he considered quite simple with only minimal duties. These were: to keep elementary personnel records; to introduce some system into military preparations; to systematize intelligence data; to utilize auxiliary troops effectively; and, most important, to direct lower units as fully as possible and maintain close liaison with the higher-unit staff. Even these "most simple duties" could not yet be done properly since the work was so new, there were no trained personnel, and there was no habit of executing orders exactly. "Provided, however, that the work of the General Staff is carried out properly and the support of the advisers is given, this work must in the near future yield results" (Doc. 33, p. 4).

What were the characteristics of the officers of the National Revolutionary Army? Document 30 sought to answer this question. It emphasized the diversity of their educational backgrounds. The writer observed that the best military school in China had been Paoting Military Academy. About three hundred Paoting alumni served in the South, making up the majority of the regimental commanders and general officers. They had their separate association and club. There were also graduates of the provincial military academies, such as Kiangsu and Yunnan, this latter being considered the best of the provincial schools. A few higher officers had been trained in Japan. About eight hundred junior officers were graduates of the Whampoa school. They were mostly platoon, company, and battalion commanders, and they were in the majority in the First Corps and in the independent 2d and 20th divisions. "By having revolutionary spirit, energy, and impetus, they greatly differ from the rest of the officers," said the writer, who estimated that 6 percent of the Whampoa graduates were Communists (Doc. 30, p. 2). Junior officers in other corps apparently were graduates of the six-month courses given in separate schools which those armies had maintained until about the time of writing.

The material conditions of the officers were unsatisfactory. Salaries were seldom paid in full or on time. The average officer received no more than $30 to $40 per month, which "inevitably drives officers to embezzlement of public funds." There were no prescribed rules for promotion, support of families, pensions, etc., though plans were being drafted. Document 30 also provides the monthly pay scale of officers in the First Corps, which ranged from $40 to $50 for a second lieutenant, upward to $216 to $240 for a colonel. The implication appears to be that officers in the First Corps actually received such pay in contrast to those in other corps.

The troops of the National Revolutionary Army were the product of past militarist practices and of the current recruitment system, about which the writer of Document 31 gave some interesting details. During the earlier wars in Kwangtung, generals of extra-provincial armies always preferred to recruit soldiers from their native provinces because such troops, unfamiliar with a Kwangtung dialect, could not desert with their rifles. They could scarcely exist outside their military units. Officers were also recruited from the general's home province and were closely linked to the men.

Such officers usually "followed their 'boss,' the fellow countryman-general." The influence of this system persisted to some extent in four of the corps, and some generals were still incorporating into their units officers and men who had surrendered or been taken prisoner.

Recruitment was not managed centrally; each corps commander, and even some commanders of divisions, arranged for the recruits he needed by sending agents with funds to specific regions north of Canton. In Hunan, Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Anhui recruitment had to be done secretly. The agent would bring or send his recruits to Canton in parties of one or two hundred, at a cost of fifteen or twenty dollars per man. In the opinion of the majority of higher and middle rank officers, Kwangtung men made poor soldiers and were so provincial in outlook that they would fight only to defend their province. Hence, most generals thought it best to use northern troops for the prospective northern campaign, according to the writer of Document 31. This turned out to be a gross miscalculation of Kwangtung men's fighting ability.

The writer deplored the results of this system. Agents hired men unselectively so that "there are many men in the army who are sick, physically weak, and unfitted for military service." Previously professional soldiers had been recruited but now "workmen, peasants, unemployed coolies and also brigands are being enlisted." Criminal and depraved elements were getting into the armies. Another document, 34, on medical conditions in the National Revolutionary Army, gave considerable information on the health of the troops. About 5 percent suffered from beriberi as a result of their poor diet, while about 2 percent had malaria and 1 percent suffered from dysentery. The writer listed many other diseases that had been discovered. The only groups that had been carefully examined were the students of the Whampoa school. Out of 5,790 men examined, 15 percent were found fit only for inactive duty, and 153 had to be dismissed altogether. Considering that the students were in better condition than the troops, the author of Document 34, apparently a Russian physician, believed a greater percentage of the troops would be found unfit for military service.

The First Corps was made up largely of men from Chekiang (General Chiang's home province, as noted by the writer of Document 31) and from Kiangsu, Anhui, and Shantung. Yet there were differences among the divisions. The 1st Division—that is, the one formed from the original Training Regiment at Whampoa—was composed mainly of Chekiang and Kiangsu men.[61] The 3d Division was a mixture of natives of Hunan, Kwangtung, and Anhui, while the 14th Division was Cantonese. The Second Corps was made up entirely of men from Hunan, General T'an Yen-k'ai's province, and recruitment was continuing there. The Third Corps was largely Yunnanese, reflecting General Chu P'ei-te's nativity. The Fourth Corps consisted of natives of Kwangtung, though its commander, Li Chi-shen, was a native of Wuchow, Kwangsi. General Li Fu-lin's Fifth Corps was Cantonese, while the Sixth Corps under the Hunan general, Ch'eng Ch'ien, had a mixture of Hunan, Kwangtung, and Hupei troops, a result of its history.

The pay scale for soldiers in the First Corps ranged from $10 a month for a second class private to $20 for a sergeant. In several other corps the pay scale was lower. A soldier receiving $8 a month would have $5 or $6 deducted for his maintenance. Nevertheless, "for many of them two or three bowls of rice a day and clothing is, in comparison with their former conditions of living, a very alluring prospect." Yet the author of Document 31 found that, "Although the food and equipment of the soldiers are comparatively sufficient, the lodging conditions and especially regularity in giving them the pay are far from satisfactory" (Doc. 31, p. 3).

The training of the troops was completely unsatisfactory, according to the author of Document 29. This was due to "the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of the old officer personnel and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior

officers," who had graduated from the various southern academies. Drill regulations and textbooks on tactics had been compiled from German and Japanese materials dating from the beginning of the century. Each corps trained its troops according to its own program, but left the work to the junior officers, resulting in an "irrational waste of time" (Doc. 29, p. 2). Too much time was spent on drill for the parade ground or on lectures to the illiterate Chinese soldiers, in the Russian writer's opinion. He delivered a scorching criticism of rifle drill and the low standard of marksmanship, which resulted in paltry losses inflicted on the enemy. A battle lasting two hours in which 10-11,000 cartridges were fired might result in ten to twenty casualties or even less! The writer cited statistics on the results of target practice: at one hundred meters only 10 percent hit the target; at seventy meters, 50 percent miss. This was due to improper instruction but also to the bad condition of the rifles (Doc. 29, pp. 4-5). Worst of all, in the writer's opinion, was the neglect of training for actual combat. Troops were not taught to reconnoiter properly so that a commander was never exactly informed about the enemy. Communications between units was very inefficient and mutual support between units inadequate. Soldiers were not taught to adapt themselves to terrain. Tactical exercises were carried out in a routine and careless manner (Doc. 29, pp. 5-6).

The writer predicted that it would be most difficult to improve the training for war. It was not merely a matter of issuing new programs and instructions, but of retraining the officers. There is almost a note of despair in the conclusion that, as a result of two years' work by the group of Soviet instructors, "very little has been accomplished as regards the results that might be expected from the training." Yet the writer explained this by the fact that much of the time had been spent in campaigning, and only since the end of the last Eastern Campaign had it been possible "to take this matter systematically in hand" (Doc. 29, p. 7). Now regulations were being prepared and a plan of exercises with necessary instructions was almost completed. The writer cautioned, however, that unless there were "at least one adviser to a division no substantial results can be expected from this work" (Doc. 29, p. 8).

L. Grey made a technical report of the arms possessed by the NRA as of mid-March 1926, a document we do not reproduce. He stated bluntly that they "do not answer even the most elementary requirements of a regular army." The major problems were the great variety of makes and models, and the deteriorated condition of equipment. This was an inheritance of the lack of any system of arms procurement. Each commander in the past had bought whatever was available through "obliging foreigners," who "most willingly delivered to China antiquated arms, which they could not use themselves." Grey then presented an inventory based on information supplied by the various military units since the first of February, supplemented by what the advisers themselves had observed.

There were some 65,000 rifles of seven different makes and a variety of calibers. About 36 percent of the existing stock, or 23,000, must be replaced and 20,000 new rifles were needed for units that were short. Half the rifles had no bayonets. The variety of models and calibers created great difficulties in supply of cartridges. The report lists the average number of cartridges of various types available, ranging from 250 to 100 in the hands of a soldier, with only small numbers in reserve. The entire army had only 360 machine guns, again of a variety of makes, but only 110 of them were serviceable. Therefore, Grey believed the army must acquire 350 additional machine guns in order that each division might have a full complement of 18, with 10 percent in reserve. Spare parts were totally lacking except for the machine guns of Russian make, about 15 percent of the existing stocks.

The National Revolutionary Army possessed ninety-two artillery guns, but Grey considered that all were "without exception antiquated and [would] have been withdrawn long ago from other armies and are at present of no value whatever." Some

had been useful enough in the fighting in Kwangtung, but Grey believed that as soon as the army began its northern advance the artillery would be inadequate, "even if the struggle continues to be against Chinese militarists exclusively." He therefore recommended reequipping the army with eighty-four mountain guns, because they were light enough for transport by coolies. In a second report, Grey went into greater detail about the artillery as a branch of the service. Besides providing information about the six types of guns possessed by the various corps and by the forts guarding Canton, he discussed ammunition supply. Some corps had fifty to sixty shells per gun, but in others there were only ten to twenty. The Canton arsenal was not yet capable of supplying artillery ammunition in necessary quantity.

Grey's second report also goes into the reorganization of artillery. Each corps was to have an artillery regiment, or a battalion if it had too few guns. Each such unit would be directly subordinated to the corps commander so that divisional and regimental commanders would cease to consider the guns their personal property. The corps commander would thus use his artillery with greater flexibility in time of battle. Most of the artillery officers were inadequately trained, in Grey's opinion, and were only interested in their careers, taking no interest in artillery matters. The enlisted personnel, however, "are excellently disciplined, drilled, and trained for field service but their knowledge of artillery matters is very poor." Many of them were illiterate.

A new artillery training program had just been inaugurated under the Artillery Inspectorate of the General Staff. Furthermore, the new Central Military and Political Academy had a course for prospective artillery officers and noncoms, who were to be trained by Russians. Grey was optimistic that these programs would begin to produce adequate gunnery specialists for the forthcoming northern campaign. Nor was he quite so sweeping in his condemnation of the artillery in hand as in the first report. About half the guns were still serviceable. He recommended that for the northern campaign the "Krupp" mountain gun of 77 mm caliber be chosen because of the easy portability of its parts, its range, and the fact that the Canton arsenal was able to manufacture shells for it.

The Canton arsenals were the subject of another report by L. Grey, on "Supplies." The Big Arsenal, about sixteen kilometers outside the city, was considered to be the third largest in China. The Small Arsenal in the northern part of the city had been taken over after the defeat of the Yunnan Army. Grey described the production sections of these arsenals and summarized their combined monthly capacity—1,100,000 cartridges, 800 rifles, 4 machine guns, and 400 artillery shells. They could repair 300 rifles, 6 machine guns, and 2 cannons a month. The capacity was to be increased by installing machinery that had been purchased previously and by other machinery taken over from Ch'en Chiung-ming's arsenal at Swabue.[62] It is evident from Grey's estimates of the number of new rifles and machine guns required that the arsenals at Canton simply could not meet the need within several years, even with a somewhat enlarged capacity.

The Army's Technical Services

Four reports show how far the National Revolutionary Army needed to go to develop moderately adequate medical, communications, transport, and engineering services. All were to be improved according to a general plan worked out early in 1926. Inspectorates for sanitation, communications, and engineering had been set up in the General Staff to oversee the actual work of these services in the corps. In March 1926, when the four reports apparently were written, only a start had been made on modernization. (We reproduce only the report on sanitation.)

Document 34 is a medical report. It describes the deplorable state of medical ser-

vices in the army. Troops had gone to the front without medical supplies, with occasionally hired doctors, and only primitive first aid in battle. Most hospitals in Canton or other towns in Kwangtung where troops were stationed were scarcely worthy of the name. Physicians were inadequately trained. A recent examination of nineteen physicians in the Second Corps showed only two to be satisfactory; the others were to be sent for a year's study at a newly opened school for physicians at the Central Hospital. The situation in other corps was better, but a preliminary report of the inspectorate indicated that about 60 percent of the physicians in four corps were unfit. In the First Corps, however, nearly all physicians were found qualified for army medical work.

The report provides information on hospitals and dispensaries being used by various corps, with great disparity between them, and a rational system that was being worked out. It gives cost estimates for establishing a division hospital and a regimental dispensary, and the monthly upkeep of each in peacetime and during war. The Sanitary Inspectorate planned to have a central depot to provide the army with medical supplies, and there is a close estimate of the monthly costs of such supplies for a regiment. To improve the health of the troops would require a great deal of work. It was planned to give physical examinations to the whole personnel of the army and navy. The work of improving the medical and sanitary service in the army had been making good progress, the report concluded. "In a near future when the plan for providing the army with medical supplies and a competent medical staff is carried out, it will no doubt be easier to raise the sanitary conditions of the army to a proper level than it was before" (Doc. 34, p. 7).

An Inspectorate of Communications had been established in the General Staff of the NRA from the day of its creation in June 1925. It was intended to direct communications work in all units of the army. Yet, because of the lack of equipment and trained personnel, the organization of communication units in corps, divisions, and regiments was still in an embryonic state in early 1926. The inspectorate was still headed by a Russian adviser, probably M. I. Dratvin, who may have provided the information in the report.[63] The majority of the Chinese in the staff of the inspectorate were not military men and had had no experience in military communications.

A few units had "communications detachments" equipped with six or seven telephones and twenty *li* of wire, but the normal practice at the front was to hire a local farmer, give him a letter, and send him off to find the command of the unit to be communicated with. Thus did commanders of regiments and brigades inform their divisional commanders of their actions, intentions, or the state of their units, and thus did divisional commanders send them combat orders. The writer or his Russian colleagues had observed this primitive system of liaison and, after the First Eastern Expedition, General Bliukher had pointed out to Chiang Kai-shek in a letter dated April 16, 1925 (our Document 6) the need to train communication specialists.

It was now planned to train officers as communications specialists in the Central Military and Political Academy. Graduates would be appointed commanders of communication companies and platoons, and chiefs of radio stations. Enlisted specialists were to be trained in a Communications Battalion of the General Staff to become telegraph and telephone inspectors, repairmen, and operators. There was so little equipment, however, and it was so difficult to procure in Canton, that little had been accomplished. Only in the First Corps was there a course for two hundred enlisted men. A plan to purchase much signal equipment abroad had not yet been approved by the Military Council because of the expense involved.

Under these conditions, the inspectorate had been "compelled to follow the line of least resistance" and adapt to military purposes whatever commercial means of communications existed in the province. It had taken control of eight radio stations in major centers, though they were badly in need of repairs because their staffs had em-

bezzled the funds allocated for the technical needs of the stations, according to the writer. The inspectorate had taken over the Telephone Central of the provincial government and adapted it to the needs of the General Staff. It had also "extended its control over" the commercial telegraph system in Kwangtung and was attempting to improve the equipment, which was in a state of major disrepair.

The Inspectorate of Communications also had the job of handling transport of men and supplies. Previously individual militarists seized the means of transportation and used it as long as needed. The report describes the transport system since the formation of the NRA. The five railways of Kwangtung were all government-owned, and therefore troops and military supplies were transported free, but no military unit had the right to commandeer equipment. Shipping in Kwangtung was privately owned. When a military unit was to be transported by river, it applied through the inspectorate to a union of shipping lines, which requisitioned a ship of appropriate tonnage. Since the military usually paid less than the commercial rate, the steamship union distributed military orders among the companies by turn.

During campaigns in Kwangtung all road transport was done by hired coolies. No unit in the NRA had mechanical or animal transport, because most roads in the province were mere paths. In principle, only coolies who volunteered were hired, but the writer admitted that coolies might also be impressed.

The last of the technical branches for which there is a report was Military Engineers. This gives considerable detail and many dates concerning earlier efforts to create engineering units in the army. Familiar problems beset the Russian advisers—shortages of equipment and lack of qualified Chinese personnel. Armies in southern China had not customarily had engineering units; only the Hunan Army, now making up the Second Corps, had an engineering detachment of three companies with twelve officers. As the writer of the report wryly commented, Chinese generals "even now . . . very willingly form machine gun units and very reluctantly engineer units." But things were moving off dead-point. An Engineering Inspectorate had been set up in the General Staff under a competent chief who had been trained in America, and on the staff were five men who had been trained in military engineering at the Paoting Academy or the Yunnan Officers' School. The first Engineer Conference of representatives from corps had been held on March 2 and proved very useful. The standard scheme of organization for corps and divisions had provisions for engineering units.

The crux of the matter, however, was that not enough engineering officers had been trained. The engineering class at Whampoa had thirty graduates in August 1925, but only five had been assigned to the Sappers' Company of the First Division, the rest being dispersed among the various units of the Whampoa troops. The other divisions of the First Corps had no Sappers' Company, partly because of the shortage of equipment. The Central Military and Political Academy was to have a special engineer class. The course was expected to take one year, though it might be shortened to eight months. The writer made a strong point of the need for a two- or three-year engineering course and wanted it started at once.

The supply of engineering equipment was still unsolved. At the end of December, a report had been presented concerning equipment that must be acquired. It was expected to be sent from the USSR, since only an insignificant part of the tools could be made locally or ordered from Shanghai. One might summarize, as the writer seemed to be doing in his conclusions, that plans were good but progress so far was unsatisfactory.

A Summary of the Russian Appraisal of the Army in March 1926

Despite the disparaging tone of much of this comment, the Russian advisers seemed

not to be discouraged. They had only to compare the situation as it had been before the establishment of Whampoa Military Academy in the spring of 1924 with the situation in early 1926 to derive great satisfaction. This is the main theme of Document 3, a history of the National Revolutionary Army. The Russians counted on political training to make up for the deficiency in arms and military training, which still existed as the northern campaign loomed ahead.

Document 26 appraises the quality of the six corps as of about February 1926. The First Corps was, of course, the darling of the Russians. It was the largest, the best trained and equipped, and the most thoroughly indoctrinated. This corps was "a loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government" and would be the "shock troops" of an anti-North expedition. A peculiar feature of the First Corps was its extensive political work among the population while campaigning. It never indulged in looting. The writer predicted that as word of this unusual behavior spread among the populace, the Whampoa troops would be welcomed, as they had been during the expeditions against Ch'en Chiung-ming. Chiang Kai-shek had been commander of the corps until January 1926. According to the writer, Chiang was regarded as one of the most loyal followers of Sun Yat-sen and one of the best revolutionaries. From his speeches, he might be regarded as a Communist, "but looking more deeply at his convictions, one sees that he belongs to typical 'intelligentsia' of the radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins." By character, the writer asserts, Chiang was irresolute but stubborn, and because of his irresolution he could not have obtained much success as a leader of troops in battle without the aid of the Russian instructors. Chiang's rapid advancement "with our aid" began after the opening of the Whampoa Academy. "He is so connected with us that the possibility of a rupture on his part can hardly be admitted" (Doc. 26, p. 47). This prediction, which evinces some anxiety, was written about two weeks before Chiang's coup of March 20.

The Fourth Corps was considered next to the First in fighting quality, but only one of its divisions was well known to the Russian advisers. Until political work had taken solid root in this corps, its reliability would depend upon its commander, Li Chi-shen. Trained in the Peiyang Military Academy in Peking, he was considered as "a good enough general," but the revolutionary government did not have much confidence in him politically. It was rumored that he would try to use his influence to change the trend of government policy, which he regarded as too radical (Doc. 26, p. 48).

The regiments of the Second Corps, Hunanese, were considered to have fighting capacity, the troops being properly trained and sufficiently supplied. Political work had not yet accomplished much in this corps, due to a shortage of political workers. T'an Yen-k'ai was regarded as a revolutionary, "though not of very radical type." The Revolutionary Government and "our leaders" regarded him as trustworthy and as a loyal partisan. Since he was not a military man, he left actual command of the troops to General Lu Ti-p'ing, "of whose personal devotion he did not doubt" (Doc. 26, p. 49).

The Third Corps, made up largely of Yunnanese, considered the best troops in South China, was trustworthy because of its commander, Chu P'ei-te. It was very poorly equipped, however, and the government had lacked the resources to give it much support. Provided its equipment and supplies were improved, this corps "could become a trustworthy and loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government," second only to Whampoa troops. This was so because its higher officers were always ready to cooperate with the government. General Chu, "always a loyal adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Government," did not take part in politics; "he just executes orders" (Doc. 26, p. 49).

Quite different was the appraisal of the Fifth Corps of General Li Fu-lin. Most of the troops were former bandits, and they were exclusively used in fighting bandits

and pirates in the delta. They were poorly trained but relatively well equipped because General Li was supported by merchants and shippers in exchange for protection from pirates. The army had a small flotilla of launches and junks armed with cannons for its antipiracy work. Neither the government nor the Russians had any faith in the former bandit, General Li, but since he was supported by the merchants and too cunning to give cause for a move against himself, the government had not dared to attack him. At the end of 1925, the government did prevail upon him to allow political work in his corps, and we infer from another part of this document that this was a tactic to undermine him from within (Doc. 26, pp. 50 and 42).

The Sixth Corps was understrength and badly equipped, but it had some potential value since it was made up largely of soldiers from northern provinces, who might be useful in the anti-North expedition. The commander, Ch'eng Ch'ien, was considered a loyal follower of Dr. Sun and a good member of the Kuomintang, but conservative. The government "and our leaders" thought he would accomplish all tasks assigned him and "will not play traitor" (Doc. 26, p. 51).

The Independent Division of General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng was considered loyal to the Revolutionary Government. It was well equipped and supplied, and political work had been carried on in it according to the Whampoa standard, though not so intensively. Its fighting capacity, of only middling quality, was expected to increase as more Whampoa graduates were placed in command positions.

The Whampoa School "was and is the best military unit of the Revolutionary Government." Instruction at the academy was conducted under the supervision of the Russian advisers "according to the Red Army's standard, but in conformity with Chinese conditions." The number of cadets had fluctuated from 1,000 to 2,000, and from 10 to 20 percent of them belonged to the Communist Party and Communist Youth Corps, "depending on the proportional number of men who were sent to the School by the Central Committee or the local Committee of the Communist Party" (Doc. 26, p. 52). The advisers and the government counted on the young graduates of the academy to make the National Revolutionary Army a unique fighting force.

Civil and Military Aviation

Document 35 provides an unusual account of aviation in Kwangtung as of March 1926. L. Grey first gave an account of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's efforts since 1916 to organize an aviation service in the South, and his many frustrations. By the time the Russian advisers arrived in 1924, they found a confused situation. After a fire had destroyed all the equipment, four German instructors had been engaged and steps had been taken to purchase some machines. A tiny squadron of two Curtis trainers and one hydroplane was created. Outfitted with bombs, which were "mostly of no use," the planes took part in all campaigns during the previous two years, demonstrating to the Chinese generals "the boundless possibilities afforded by this branch of the service." Yet we learn from another document written a few weeks earlier that only two of the four available planes could fly, and their range was no more than 10 to 15 kilometers (Doc. 26, p. 45).

In June 1925, when the Kuomintang Political Council confirmed the fundamental plan for the armed forces, Document 35 continues, it decided to apportion half a million dollars from the military budget for the organization of the air service, and to send a commission to the USSR to seek support for the purchase of machines and for training. The council also decided to create a commercial aviation service between Canton and Swatow and Canton and Wuchow. The "Friends of Aviation" Society was organized to raise money; it succeeded in gathering about $25,000, which was used to constuct an aerodrome.[64] A Junker 13 passenger plane was purchased in the Soviet Union and was "quite suitable for flying in Kwangtung province for propaganda pur-

poses." Grey expected that with the province's improved financial situation, it would be possible to establish civil air lines in the near future (Doc. 35, p. 2).

The work of military aviation was proceeding in two directions: training of personnel and purchase of machines. Six men had been sent to Russia for training in September 1925. A preparatory training school had been set up in Canton with the "modest task" of training pilots for the Curtis machines. Two German officers were giving the instruction, and a mixed Russo-Chinese squadron had been started. It was to be under the command of a Russian aviator and to consist of Russian fliers and instructors, with Chinese doing auxiliary service.[65] Six planes were on order for this squadron.

Grey stressed the great potential importance of aviation for the coming northern military campaign—to provide liaison between corps and divisions, to photograph enemy locations and provide photographic substitutes for maps, to demoralize the enemy and heighten the morale of the Nationalist troops, to bomb and strafe the enemy, protect lines of communication, suppress counterrevolutionary movements in the rear, etc. He then recommended the purchase of forty-six planes of three types to be formed into three squadrons, and the sending of thirty to forty students to Russia immediately for training, especially in the auxiliary services (Doc. 35, pp. 2–5).

The Navy and the Revolutionary Government

After forty-eight days of work within the southern navy, L. Grey wrote a devastating report on the condition of the ships, their guns, and the officers and crews. In his own words, "As it is at present, with its worthless ships, its rotten machinery, and its incompetent personnel, the whole Chinese fleet is an obsolete thing, capable only of political blackmailing, of opium traffic, and of extorting money by all means from the population and the merchants. It is unable to give battle . . . because of the condition of its armament and the moral character of its personnel" (Doc. 36, p. 16).

Document 36 gives details about the southern fleet as it was early in 1926, which probably cannot be found in any other source. There were forty-four vessels in the active fleet, eleven of them sea-going. Most had not been repaired in drydock for a decade, but now this work was being done as finances and political conditions permitted. As in the army, there was a great variety of cannons and machine guns, some of the cannons being completely obsolete. Only half the shells and three-fourths of the machine-gun cartridges were good for firing. Machinery and ship bodies had not been repaired since the ships were built and were falling into decay. It would take a year and cost $20,000 to put them into shape. This fleet, nevertheless, was carrying out several missions. Some gunboats were assigned to corps commanders in distant parts of the province. Some, under the direct command of the Military Council, were suppressing pirates in the delta and on the high seas. Other gunboats were blockading Hong Kong in conjunction with the Strike Committee, and guarding the sea approaches to Canton. The remainder were under repair or waiting their turn.

N. I. Konchits nearly lost his life on one of those decrepit vessels. His diary account tells how he and several other advisers sailed from Canton on December 22, 1925 to southwestern Kwangtung to join the 10th Division, commanded by Ch'en Ming-shu. One of the two tiny river gunboats had its boilers in disrepair and its stern broken, but it proceeded anyway. In a heavy wind it rocked and pitched wildly. Again on February 11, their tiny vessel nearly sank. On March 4, as Konchits and companions were about to sail back to Canton, their gunboat suddenly keeled over and sank in the harbor. On the 6th, he and Commander Ch'en Ming-shu boarded another river gunboat, which, as soon as it reached open sea, "was flung in all directions to such an extent that it almost fell apart. . . . It is insane to sail in an open sea on ships for which even small waves were dangerous." Nevertheless, their vessel did

make it to Canton on March 10, where Konchits learned that preparations for the Northern Expedition were underway, and that he was assigned to be an adviser to Ch'eng Ch'ien's Sixth Corps.[66]

Grey had developed the greatest contempt for the Chinese naval officers. "In general it may be said none of the officers knows his business theoretically or practically and, as a matter of fact, none of them deserves to be called a naval officer, not only in regard to ability, but also with respect to his moral character" (Doc. 36, p. 9). They were opium smokers and grafters, he charged, and were counterrevolutionaries not for political but for material reasons. He thought they knew absolutely nothing of tactics, astronomy, navigation, artillery, mines, shipbuilding, mechanics, and other naval sciences. These special functions were performed by senior noncommissioned officers of long experience. The officers received good salaries and knew they could not find employment in the commercial fleet because of their ignorance, so they "stick to the navy like a louse to the skin." It was not easy to dismiss an officer. But Grey believed they must be replaced as soon as a new contingent could be trained in a naval academy that was soon to open (Doc. 36, pp. 10–11, 13).

Document 36 is a little less harsh with the sailors and noncommissioned officers. About 40 percent had been formally trained in some special duties in the northern Chinese fleet. The majority were former pirates, bandits, or soldiers and had been "well schooled in all sorts of civil wars and adventures of Chinese generals." Their physical condition was poor: about 27 percent had dysentery, malaria, venereal disease, and so forth, and 15 percent had tuberculosis. Yet, "in the whole fleet there is not a single ship surgeon or other medical man and no trace of a dispensary; there are not even bandages or iodine." The one surgeon for the fleet mostly confined himself to registering and burying the dead. As in the army, many of the crewmen had joined the navy merely for board and bed and a few dollars in the pocket (Doc. 36, pp. 12–13).

Grey hoped that a strong nucleus of a navy could be created in the South around which, in the future, the rest of the Chinese fleet could be formed. In this he seems to have had in mind the manner in which the Whampoa Academy and its training regiments had been the nucleus from which the First Corps of the National Revolutionary Army had grown. Schools for officers and training courses for sailors must be arranged at Canton and Whampoa. The alternative, he felt, was to wait until bases of the fleet in North China had been taken by land, and it is clear he was not recommending this, for already training classes were being started.

A class for 100 signalmen was to open on March 25, and classes for artillerymen and engineers would begin at the end of June. These were for sailors from the ranks or recruits from the Seamen's Union. But educational work faced familiar difficulties: lack of textbooks on naval subjects in Chinese, and prospective teachers who had studied in a variety of naval academies abroad but had no practice in teaching. Still, Grey was hopeful that some results would be achieved to form the basis of educational work in the future navy (Doc. 36, p. 14).

The report contains a great deal of other information about the naval staff, a small marine detachment, and plans for reconditioning and rearming the ships. As for accomplishments, the southern fleet, which not long before had consisted of seven groups under seven commanders, had been united. Commissars had been appointed to the principal ships. Things had been prepared for strikers and Communists to replace part of the crews, though so far the only Communist in the fleet was the chief of the Political Bureau.[67] (Actually there were seventeen Communist political workers in the navy, according to Document 43.) The staff had been organized according to European standards, and higher officers were being trained for staff work. Budgets and plans had been prepared for schools and training courses, and a schedule for repairs of seagoing vessels had been made. A special commission was examining enlisted per-

sonnel, and a vigorous campaign had been mounted against graft and theft. It was now possible to keep the work of some sections of the staff secret. A Political Section had been organized, most of its work being done on the gunboats, and a club for officers had been organized by the Political Section (Doc. 36, pp. 15-18).

Grey predicted many difficulties in the future attempt to revive the fleet and its efficiency. "The difficulties are not only of a financial character but they result also from the incompetence of the staff and of the government as a whole in naval matters, and I will have to work with them for a long time" (Doc. 36, p. 18).

Politicization of the National Revolutionary Army

The most distinctive feature of the National Revolutionary Army was the purposeful and systematic effort to politicize it. Under Russian tutelage, a system was developed, based on that of the Red Army during the civil war period, for indoctrination and for Party control. The system consisted of Party representatives and other political workers within units of the line and in higher organs, linked together under a central agency—the Political Training Department—which stood directly under the National Government Military Council, at the same level as the General Staff and the Supply Administration. The Political Training Department was modeled after the Soviet Central Political Administration (PUR), and Party representatives were equivalent to the political commissars in the Red Army.

The underlying purpose of this system may be summarized by the words politicization, reformation, and control. To be effective revolutionary instruments, the officers and troops in the NRA must be infused with the Kuomintang's ideology. It was the duty of the Party representatives to indoctrinate them. Politicization was also to be a partial substitute for technical modernization and a support for centralization. Another purpose of the system was to provide the Kuomintang with an instrument for control over commanding officers. The Kuomintang faced a problem similar to that of the Russian Communist Party during the civil war days, an officer corps inherited from and trained under a previous regime and not necessarily trustworthy. Party representatives should prevent revolt. In addition, as some of the documents we introduce make clear, the Chinese Communist Party was using the system to gain influence in the Kuomintang's armed forces and was being assisted in this by the Russian advisory mission.

These statements are substantiated and amplified by a remarkable document entitled "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army." Apparently this report has never been published. Together with its annexes, Document 37 provides a short history of political work in the NRA, a comprehensive view of its accomplishments as of about mid-March 1926, and also an intimate account of Communist penetration of the army's political apparatus—all through Russian eyes.

Political Training Department—Structure and Work

According to Document 37, the "Political Directorate (PUR)" was created almost simultaneously with the Military Council—early in July 1925. It had very little influence, however, partly because the various armies had little understanding of its functions, while in the First Corps, where political work had been carried on from the beginning, almost all political workers had been appointed by the KMT Central Executive Committee without reference to the Political Directorate (or "Political Department," as it is also called). There was friction between the department and the independently appointed Party representatives in the First Corps. The perennial problem of shortage of funds and lack of trained personnel made it difficult to extend political work into the other corps. By October 1925, according to Document 3, the

Directorate had begun to function, although Document 22, Kiubyshev's report of January 1926, states that the Political Training Department had been established only recently, and that political work in the army was still in an initial stage.

The Political Training Department operated directly under the Military Council. Its head was appointed by the council and his appointment was confirmed by the Kuomintang Political Council. He was a regular member of the Military Council (Doc. 27, p. 2). According to its regulations, our Document 38, the function of the department was to guide Party work, political work, and cultural work in the National Revolutionary Army on the basis of plans approved by the Military Council.[68] The chairman of that council directed the department in its daily business, and orders issued by the department to higher-level Party representatives had to bear his signature as well as that of the head of the department. The actual work of the Political Training Department within the armed forces was to be carried out indirectly, through Party representatives and political sections, yet the department was said to control directly all Party representatives in the corps, independent divisions, bureaus of the navy and air force, Central Political and Military Academy, and General Staff and Administration of Supplies (Doc. 38, p. 1).

The department had certain monopolistic rights: all Party, political, and cultural work in the armed forces was to be done under its instructions; all social or political organizations in the armed forces, such as the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the League of Chinese Military Youth, were to work under its guidance; and no organization could operate in the armed forces outside its control. All Party workers and political workers in the armed forces were under its sole direction, nor could such workers be transferred without permission of the department. It controlled the selection and appointment of political personnel in the armed forces (Doc. 38, p. 2). There were special regulations concerning Party representatives: those at the regimental level and below were appointed by the Political Training Department, while those at a higher level were nominated by the department, approved by the Central Executive Committee, and appointed by the Military Council.[69] The Military Tribunal, discussed below, was attached to the Political Training Department.

The Regulations of the Political Training Department, Document 38, also specified the internal structure of the agency and how duties were allocated among its divisions and sections. It was not large: a table of organization showed some twenty-nine officers aside from clerks and coolies. There was a General Affairs Office to manage the department's own affairs; a Propaganda Office which produced propaganda and educational materials and planned indoctrination campaigns; and a Party Affairs Office in charge of Kuomintang work and Party education in the armed forces.

Document 37, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army," gives considerable detail. For example, the department had planned a three-month program of political instruction for the troops and another for officers; the outlines of these are given in documents 39 and 40. The department set up a commission to prepare a textbook for reading and writing, which political workers could use to teach illiterate soldiers; this was soon to be published and would be unique in being written in a style comprehensible to soldiers. The publication section issued a daily newspaper, *Political Work*, which was being distributed in 18,000 copies, mostly to officers and political workers in the armed forces. An effort was being made to give the newspaper mass appeal. Its editor was a Communist, and its feature articles were written by the local committee of the Chinese Communist Party as a means of instructing political personnel and, through them, the officers and troops. To coordinate the publishing efforts of the political sections of various corps and divisions, a committee was formed of representatives from these units. The committee planned to issue sixteen pamphlets in three series. Five were already in press, with such titles as "What and

How to Teach Soldiers," "The History of the Kuomintang," "What Are the Unequal Treaties?" The department was trying to make an inventory of the pamphlets, leaflets, books, journals, and wall newspapers being published by various organs, and the writer of Document 37 gives interesting examples from the work of the political section of the navy. Twenty-five issues of an illustrated wall newspaper made up of biting political cartoons had been issued. "The main defect of this newspaper," the writer wryly remarked, "is the monotony of colors (blue)"!

Ch'en Kung-po was head of the Political Training Department. The writer characterized him as young, very ambitious, and well developed in a political sense. Formerly a member of the Chinese Communist Party, he was described as having no fixed political convictions, only a melange of anarchism, Sunyatsenism, and socialism. Since his prestige was not very high among the heads of the political departments in the army corps, he was to be replaced. This statement apparently reflected a tension that continued between the department and Party representatives.

Document 37 informs us that there were 430 students in a special class at Whampoa being trained as political officers for the army (Doc. 37, p. 15). This was the fourth class, admitted officially on March 8, 1926. S. N. Naumov ("Kalachev") gives an interesting account of how these political officers were trained. At the end of 1925, he writes, "the Chinese Communists brought up the question of the establishment of a political class at the Whampoa in especially acute manner. . . . In working out the program of study and the regulations of the political class, an active part was taken by Chou En-lai and Soviet military advisers: I. Ya. Razgon, A. I. Cherepanov, Stepanov, V. P. Rogachev, I. K. Mamaev." In February 1926, 500 students started their course of political training; "the best and most literate students made up the political class." The students had to master political sciences—such subjects as "the three principles of Sun Yat-sen; the national revolution in China; the international political and economic situation; the political and economic situation of China and the USSR; the history and theory of socialism; the history of the world revolutionary movement." Other topics were the peasant movement, the trade union movement, and the youth movement in China; and questions of agitation, propaganda, and political work in the army. After A. S. Bubnov arrived in Canton on March 13, he lectured on Soviet military thought. The program also provided practical training, and the students had to learn military science.[70]

The System of Party Representatives

Political watchdogs and official propagandists for the Kuomintang within army units were the Party's representatives (*Tang tai-piao*). The system was predicted in our Document 4, and had been instituted at Whampoa Military Academy and in the training regiments from the beginning. By March 1926, it was gradually being spread into all corps and into the navy, as well as into central military administrative organs.

This was the Soviet commissar system, modified to some extent, as is clear from Document 41, "Regulations Governing Party Representatives in the National Revolutionary Army." The first article announces the purpose of the system—to educate the army in the national revolutionary spirit, heighten its combat value, strengthen discipline, and inculcate the fundamental spirit of Sun Yat-senism among the troops. The Party representative is responsible for the political and moral condition of his unit, sees to the execution of Party instructions, guides the Party nucleus, and carries out all political and cultural work. He must be well acquainted with the officers and men of his unit, study their state of mind, and try to remedy all defects. He is an officer with the right to command all men in his unit; his orders must be obeyed just as those of the unit commander. In battle he is to be an exemplar of bravery, and at all times he attends to the well-being of the troops. He also must protect the civilian

population from the army during campaigns, and should establish connections with farmers' associations or labor unions in localities where the troops are quartered. He should rely on the Kuomintang nucleus in his unit, which he should try to strengthen; but he could suspend the decisions of the nucleus if he disagreed with them, reporting the situation to his superiors.

These officers were part of a separate chain of command, parallel but not subordinate to the military chain. Conflict was inevitable between officers of the same rank within the same unit but from the separate chains, especially since the Party representatives were observers of the loyalty of the military officers. The Regulations Governing Party Representatives draw a distinction between lower- and higher-level commissars. Those in units of the line—regiment, battalion, company, warship, etc.—were not co-equal with their opposite numbers in the military command. The lower-level Party representative was not to interfere with the administrative orders of the unit commander, but if he perceived in them some danger to the National Revolution he should report to his superior Party representative. In cases of obvious treason, he should act to frustrate the order and should immediately report to his superior, and to the chairman of the Military Council.[71]

Higher-level Party representatives had much greater authority. They were appointed by the Military Council to the headquarters of the corps and divisions, to the Navy Bureau, General Staff, Supply Administration, Sanitary Inspectorate, Arsenal, etc. They were to have the same powers as the commanders and chiefs to whom they were attached. They had the right to superintend military, political, and supply matters in the unit. Jointly with the commander they received reports and petitions from all lower officers and together reached decisions; they signed all orders and other documents jointly with the commander, and without their signature such orders were invalid. In case the Party representative disagreed with the commander, he must sign the order but report to his superior Party representative; but if the commander committed some illegal act, the Party representative should frustrate it and immediately report to his superior and to the chairman of the Military Council (Doc. 41, p. 2). The handwritten appendix to our Document 4 spelled out the same powers for the assistant chief of the planned academy.

When this set of regulations was promulgated, the Political Training Department issued a letter to all Party representatives in the army to explain and clarify; this is Document 42, a most interesting letter. It seemed to strengthen the authority of lower-level Party representatives by requiring that all orders be given in the joint name of the commander and the commissar, which is not stated for this level in the regulations. By establishing such a procedure, the letter explained, it would be possible to prevent misunderstandings, the military officer might be induced to take part in political work, and the commissar would be kept informed about all affairs in the unit. The letter also explains how the commissar should frustrate a counterrevolutionary action of a commander: he was to rely on the Kuomintang nucleus of officers and men in the unit. The nucleus must obey him absolutely. At the higher level, neither the commissar without the chief nor the chief without the commissar had the right to give any orders: they must do it jointly after joint deliberation. In case of disagreement, rather than "endless altercations," the commissar should give way and sign, leaving it to the superior commissar to decide which person was right. The letter explained the reason for this difficult system of dual command: "It is necessary that the commander and the political commissary, being one and an indivisible whole, should always and everywhere work together trying to attain one common aim: the unification of China under the banner of the Kuomintang party" (Doc. 42, p. 3). The Political Training Department advised the commissars to take the initiative in establishing good relations; it depended entirely on their ability and desire, the letter assured them.

Political Sections and Kuomintang Nuclei

Document 26, dating from early March 1926, informs us how political work in the First Corps was organized: there was a political section (department) of the corps, whose chief was also Party representative, and there were similar sections and representatives at division and regiment level. At battalion and company level, however, the Party representatives were political guides; no political sections are mentioned (Doc. 26, p. 43).

The History of the National Revolutionary Army, in summing up accomplishments as of about March 1926, stated that political sections had been established and the system of political commissars instituted in almost all army units. Nuclei of the Kuomintang had been organized in most units (Doc. 3, p. 8). According to Document 37, this was a recent innovation, and regulations for Party organizations in the army had just been drawn up. Unfortunately, these regulations are a missing annex. The letter sent out by the Political Training Department to all commissars, however, explains the relations between the Party representatives and the Kuomintang nucleus (Doc. 42, pp. 1-2). Not only does the representative guide the nucleus, he derives his strength from it. At its meeting he is just like an ordinary member, equal to everyone present. He controls the Party members by his prestige and authority, and influences all resolutions passed by the meeting through his clear reasoning, convincing arguments and definite suggestions. As representative of the Party in the military unit, his prestige and authority must stand very high in the eyes of every military man; and they must be upheld by all members of the Party. Therefore, no Party member had the right to speak against the Party representative at non-Party meetings. Even in Party meetings if the nucleus considered that the commissar had taken the wrong line of conduct, the matter should not be discussed. The Party committee must gather all materials and send them to the superior commissar to take necessary measures.

Adviser Konchits recorded his observations of Kuomintang cells in the 10th Division of the Fourth Corps. The basic cell was in the company, from which three members are elected to a "bureau." The company cell is directly subordinate to that of the regiment. Cells were organized in battalion and regimental headquarters, in the commandant's detachment, the medical detachment, and the regiment bureau—that is, the Political Department. In the 11th Division, also, Kuomintang cells had been set up in division headquarters and in the three regimental headquarters as of early March 1926.[72]

Characteristics of Political Personnel and the Moral Condition of the NRA

According to Document 37, the Political Training Department was trying to gather information on all political workers and Party members in the army, but its information was not yet exact. The idea of sending regular reports to the department had not penetrated into all the corps. According to available information, however, there were 876 political workers in the NRA (Doc. 37, p. 8). This was only a small leaven for an army that then numbered about 65,000 combatants.

Most of the political personnel were members of the "intelligentsia." The proletariat constituted no more than 10 percent. The writer then categorized the political workers into four groups: (1) Communists; (2) members of the Kuomintang belonging to the Left Wing, who worked together with the Communists; (3) officials of no principles, mere careerists; and (4) Right-Wing Kuomintang men, who were extremely hostile toward the first two groups. The Right Wingers numbered only about 5 percent, and the careerists about 20 percent (Doc. 37, p. 9). A chart showing the number of Communists in the various components of the National Revolutionary

Army gave 241 Communists as political workers (Doc. 43).

The majority of political workers, according to the writer, were quite inexperienced and needed strong guidance. Nevertheless, they had attained great prestige among the enlisted men, who looked on them as protectors. Some of the older officers were very hostile and regarded them as undermining the army. Recently the antagonism between the officers and political personnel "began to be somewhat allayed" (Doc. 37, p. 9).

The writer then went on to appraise the "politico-moral condition" of the several corps. He believed this depended on the number of Communists in the unit, the duration of political work, and the condition of the political apparatus. Naturally the First Corps was best. All units had political organs and commissars, and the relations between officers, political workers, and enlisted men were good. The attitude of the corps toward the populace was good and was reciprocated by the people. The corps possessed a great offensive spirit, and the entire organization was keen for the Northern Expedition.

The Fourth Corps stood next, with good relations between officers, political staff, and enlisted men. The 11th Division was an exception because its political personnel did not have the proper qualifications. Elements from other units that had been absorbed by the Fourth Corps in its recent fighting in the South needed thorough political training, but this was not possible at present because of the shortage of trained political workers (Doc. 37, p. 12).

Adviser Konchits was told there were no Communists in the 10th Division, but one arrived about January 5. He learned that there were several in other divisions, and in the 12th Division's 34th Regiment "the commissars, beginning with the political workers, are all Communists." A few days later, another Communist was sent to the 10th Division. Konchits learned that others in the Political Department were suspicious of them and wanted them to go back to the Fourth Corps' Political Department. They refused unless they received a written order from the Fourth Corps' Political Department, yet they had been given no money when sent.[73] The commander of the 12th Division, General Chang Fa-k'uei, reminisced about the valuable work of this division's Political Department in "arming our brains." He admired the Communists who worked among the troops.[74]

Returning to Document 37 and its estimate of the politico-moral condition of the major components of the NRA: The Second Corps came next, but there was a peculiar situation. Previously the commanders in this Hunanese army robbed the enlisted men without pity; the troops saw in the political workers their only defenders. Communists among the political workers tried to carry on Communist propaganda among the soldier masses and as a result some units were in a state of near revolt. There were cases of officers being beaten and orders not executed. "The soldiers' masses turned left too prematurely" (Doc. 37, p. 13). The other corps were merely ranked Third Corps, Fifth Corps, and Sixth Corps.

The politico-moral position of the navy left very much to be desired. The officers were embezzlers of the public funds, ignorant of their profession. A club had been started and commissars appointed for the warships, but their political training was unsatisfactory. It was a different story in the arsenal. Because of political work, "The Arsenal may now be considered as being entirely devoted to the National Revolutionary Government." There was a time when all the 1,800 workmen were under the influence of the counterrevolutionary Mechanics' Union, but a Kuomintang nucleus of three hundred members, a commissar working in the arsenal together with a member of the Kuomintang CEC, and fifteen Communists carrying on their work in the arsenal were changing the situation (Doc. 37, p. 13).

The writer of Document 37 made an interesting observation about the personnel of the Central Military Administration, that is, the departments under the Military

Council. Most of the staff members were non-Party men who did their work "just as ordinary officials." Very few among them "work 'for the idea.' " "The greatest evil of all these organs is nepotism. All those who are holding the higher posts strive by all means to find positions for their relatives and friends. This is the greatest evil of the Chinese Army and it will take a long and persistent struggle to eradicate it." The means to overcome this greatest evil was to have all appointments confirmed by the Military Council, "for that reason it is now, of course, much more difficult to place 'one's own men' " (Doc. 37, p. 13).

Establishment of a Military Tribunal

We learn from Document 37 that a Military Tribunal had been formed, and it was attached to the Political Training Department. Regulations governing this tribunal had been approved by the Military Council. It is interesting to note that when the Military Council, on March 19, 1926, promulgated the Regulations of the Political Training Department and the Regulations Governing Party Representatives, it also listed the Regulations of the Military Tribunal. Yet those regulations were not included in the Government Gazette.[75] Whether the Regulations of the Tribunal were withheld as too secret or whether they were merely being revised is unknown. The version that the writer of Document 37 believed the Military Council had approved is found in Document 47. These regulations, together with "Directives to the Military Tribunal Relating to Penalties" (Doc. 48), make grim reading.

The tribunal was established to maintain revolutionary lawfulness, discipline, and order in the ranks of the NRA; to fight against economic crimes, espionage, and treason; and to prevent crimes against the government and army command. It must inflict "unmerciful penalties" on all enemies of the National Revolution, the government, and the army. The tribunal was to be guided by governmental regulations and the directives of the chief of the PUR. After describing the make-up of the tribunal, the members of which were to be appointed by the Kuomintang Political Council, the regulations discuss the Court-Martial, which actually conducted trials. In pronouncing judgments the court was to be "guided solely by the considerations of revolutionary expediency, taking into consideration the interests of the National Revolution" (Doc. 47, p. 1). The tribunal was provided with its own investigation section, its own jail, and its special detachment of guards.

The Directives to the Tribunal, which the writer of Document 48 said had also been approved by the Military Council, listed three types of offenses. Counterrevolutionary offenses included attempts on the life of, or plots against, the government, the army command, and "revolutionary organizations which aim at the suppression of militarism and imperialism"; destruction of arsenals, storehouses, railways, and other strategic properties; formation of counterrevolutionary groups; open or secret struggle against the government, the army, and the National Revolution with arms in hand; or treason through desertion to the enemy or sale of secrets. Conviction of such crimes required imprisonment of from four to ten years or death by shooting. The second type was offenses committed by officials in connection with their duties, such as "intentional or unintentional 'sabotage,' " the negligent carrying out of duties, or the failure to execute orders of the government; appropriation or embezzlement of government property or money, or "the negligent handling of them," and similar economic crimes; and unlawful extortions, requisitions or confiscations, the occupation of houses and other buildings without permission of competent authorities, etc. Conviction of such malfeasance required imprisonment for two or three years, but might result in execution. Finally there were various offenses such as insulting members of the government, military men, officials, or political workers while performing their duties or while off duty, or undermining the authority of the government or of the

army command; abuse by a public official of his authority, unwarranted assumption of authority, or even inaction, done with the intent of self-gain; failure to confess an offense committed, as well as concealment of other offenders. Conviction ranged from a few months up to five years (Doc. 48, pp. 1-2).

This Military Tribunal was not a court only for military men, but a Court Martial directed against all citizens and foreigners. Soldiers, workers, and peasants who committed crimes against the National Revolution out of ignorance were to be treated leniently, but not to be excused from any punishment. The death penalty must be reported at once to the chairman of the Kuomintang Political Council, who had the right to suspend the penalty (Doc. 48, pp. 2-3).

According to the writer of "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army," the Military Tribunal had not yet started its activities because the personnel were just then being selected. However, an old member of the Kuomintang, Li Chang-ta,[76] had already been selected president of the tribunal, while the deputy president was Yang P'ao-an, a Communist. The senior examining magistrate and the governor of the prison were also Communists, the writer remarked.

Communists Working in the Political Apparatus and Military

A very unusual chart, Document 43, shows the number of Communists in the National Revolutionary Army, broken down by major unit and classified by rank or occupation. This was a result of a survey conducted by the Military Section of the CCP Provincial Committee and was reportedly accurate for corps and divisions. Apparently the chart only gave estimates of the number of Communists in the Central Military and Political Academy and a school attached to the Second Corps. The total number, including the estimates, was 887. Of these, more than a quarter (227) were in the First Corps. The estimate for the Central Military and Political Academy was 250, of whom 30 were political workers and 20 officers. When classified by occupation or rank, there were 241 Communists among the political workers, 98 among the officers, 412 among the students.

This was not a large number compared to the numbers in most of the categories listed. For example, there must have been several thousand officers in the NRA, yet less than a hundred were Communists. Among political workers, however, the Communists numbered about 27 percent, an important leaven, considering the opportunity political workers had to influence the troops. The author of Document 37 states that, as the activity of Communists in the army increased, friction rose between them and the Kuomintang Rightists. At one time, the friction reached such an extreme that "our Chief Political Adviser at Canton raised the question of the exclusion of Communists from the army." However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party objected strongly to this in a letter sent to the representative of the Comintern in Peking (Doc. 37, p. 10).[77]

A. I. Cherepanov, who investigated the situation in Canton leading up to the March 20th Incident after his return to Canton in May, writes that Communists were chiefs of the political departments in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Corps and also made up the majority of the political apparatus. "They paid little attention to the Kuomintang and were mainly worrying about the growth of their own organization. Instead of conducting political-educational work, they, as V. K. Bliukher put it, 'were working as commissars and as a result they failed to acquire due influence with the commanding staff.' "[78]

The Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party had a special Military Section at Canton to direct the work of Communists in the army. This organization set to work to enumerate them, verify their qualifications, and set up a Party school for those needing further training. In each corps the Military Section appointed

a three-man commission, one being the corps' Russian adviser, to examine the Communists in the corps. (Document 45 is the list of topics on which they were examined.) Then the Communists were divided into four groups: commanders and political workers who were permitted to carry out Communist propaganda in their units; a second group permitted to retain their posts but not to do propaganda work; a batch to be sent to the Party school; and finally a group to be permanently excluded from the National Revolutionary Army. Two schools had been organized, one at Swatow for Communists in the First Corps, and the other at Canton (Doc. 37, pp. 10-11).

In addition, the Military Section established a definite method for the work of the Party's military nuclei and began to provide real guidance for Communists working in the army, says the writer. The Military Section chose one representative in each corps and division. Party nuclei were organized at the regimental level and above, but this was without legal authorization. Presumably the existence of Communist nuclei in the army was being kept secret from the higher authorities of the Kuomintang. "All Communists received directives to penetrate into the Kuomintang organizations and to gain influence therein. The present-day slogan for Communists is the following: 'A good Communist is a good member of the Kuomintang nucleus' " (Doc. 37, p. 11).

Document 44 details the aims, functions, and organization of the Military Section attached to the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the CCP. This is followed by Statutes of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Both were printed in English translation in *Soviet Plot in China*, but taken out of context they could not be fully understood or dated. The first part describes the unauthorized organization of Communist nuclei in the army, which must operate in the most secret manner under the guidance of the Military Section. The section also organizes detachments of workmen and peasants and seeks to secure guidance over existing armed detachments of workers and peasants. The sections should establish illegal nuclei in secret societies, landowners' detachments, and other armed groups; also organize nuclei on trunk railways and waterways to disrupt the enemy's rear and put down counterrevolutionary uprisings. Communists who, in the guise of Kuomintang members, penetrate clubs and societies in the army, such as the League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun Wen-ism, must follow the directives of the Military Section. Since the party apparatus in the army requires strict centralization, the Military Section is in charge of appointments and transfers of all Communists in the army.

The Military Section, attached as it was to the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party, was a very small body, only three men, all supposedly from the Central Committee. To preserve secrecy the members were not to be known to the mass of Party comrades. They should not even keep the Party Committee, as a body, informed of their work (Doc. 44, p. 8). Several historical studies have Chou En-lai as head of the Military Section of the CCP's Kwangtung Regional Committee, though he was not a member of the Central Committee.

The second part of Document 44 outlines a very secret, central military apparatus, the Military Section of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It does not specifically refer to the National Revolutionary Army, nor to any particular time or place. It is a blueprint. The Military Section was to organize and guide all military work of the Party and inform the Central Committee on military affairs. Its major aim was to prepare the Communist Party for the day of revolt. As soon as armed revolt began, the Military Section would become the General Staff and direct the revolt. Against that day it was to gather intelligence about the enemy armies, plant cells in military units in preparation for seizing arms and munitions stores, and prepare to weaken the enemy by destroying its rear. Besides work in army units—those of both friend and foe, it appears—the Communist Party's Military Sec-

tion was to organize, train, and equip fighting detachments among workmen and peasants. It should study the conditions of peasant life and use its knowledge of rural grievances to aid in organizing peasant military cells and partisan bands. It should coordinate all military work among military units, workmen, and peasants so as to ensure their entire cooperation at the moment of revolt.

We lack independent historical information to know how much, if any, of this design was being carried through in a centralized and coordinated way. The document lacks dating clues except for its attachment to the report on Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army.

Document 37 and its annexes create the impression of a well-functioning system for politicizing the National Revolutionary Army, and of extensive Communist activity within this system. However, only a few days later, Chiang Kai-shek's actions on March 20, discussed below, curtailed Communist influence.

The League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism

The League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism both aspired to become national organizations. By June 1925 the League claimed to have set up bureaus for North China, Manchuria, the Yangtze valley, and the Southwest, but we know little about their work. If they tried to recruit promising younger officers and cadets in northern military academies,[79] it must have been secret and dangerous work. The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had an easier role. Local units were organized in Shanghai in November and in Peking in December 1925, while units were founded in Nanking, Wuhan, Wuhu, and Changte early in 1926. Apparently Sun Fo and Tai Chi-t'ao acted behind the scenes as did members of the Western Hills Faction. Members were mainly middle school and college students. Just as in Canton, the Society opposed the Communist Party and its Youth Corps everywhere. They preached conflicting ideologies.[80]

In Canton the conflict between the two organizations raged on. Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei called a joint meeting of officers of the two bodies on February 2, 1926 at the Whampoa Military Academy to hammer out a truce. Representing the League were Li Chih-lung, Chou I-chün, and Chang Ch'i-hsiang; for the Society, P'an Yu-ch'iang, Ko Wu-ch'i, Yang Yao-t'ang, and Miao Pin. (We are unclear about Chu Hui-yuan and Chang Ching-yü.) Li Chih-lung was soon to be appointed head of the Political Department of the Southern Navy and become a principal in the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident of March 20. Miao Pin had recently been elected a reserve member of the Kuomintang CEC. The chairman of the Society among Whampoa graduates, Ho Chung-han, had left for Moscow to enter the Frunze Military Academy. The way of solving the intraparty conflict as announced was: (1) the officers (*kan-pu*) of each society should be allowed to join the other; (2) within the academy and the First Corps, the two organizations should accept the direction of the commandant and Party representative—i.e., Chiang and Wang; (3) military officers of the rank of regimental commander and above, except for Party representatives, may not join the two societies; (4) if members of the societies had occasion to mistrust each other, they might appeal to the commandant and academy Party representative for a solution.[81]

The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism held an assembly on February 28—presumably of members among academy graduates, the First Corps, and Canton students, or their delegates—and accepted this decision, but the League of Chinese Military Youth would not consent, according to Professor Li Yün-han. The assembled Society members also elected an Executive Committee. Chosen were Leng Hsin, Yang Yin-chih, Ch'en Ch'eng, Miao Pin, Ko Wu-ch'i, P'an Yu-ch'iang, Hsieh Ying-chou,

Ni Pi, and Shao Hsi-sheng, as well as five in reserve. Their organization was patterned after the Kuomintang.[82]

Naturally, the Russian military advisers were hostile to the Society. According to S. N. Naumov, "the rightist Kuomintang member Tai Chi-t'ao" became a frequent visitor to Whampoa as a guest of Chiang Kai-shek "on the eve of March 20." He implies that the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism resulted from these visits, which is incorrect, and that due to his influence part of the student body and a considerable number of instructors joined the Society. Cherepanov, who had an intimate knowledge of the Whampoa scene, says that "Right-wing members of the Kuomintang for the purpose of ideological struggle with the Communists among the troops" had created the Society, which was made up primarily of anti-Communist youth. The Second Division became their main stronghold. Borodin, says Cherepanov, understood the danger and mapped out measures against it: to purge the army of part of the counterrevolutionary officers, and to impart to the Society the character of educational circles. He felt that the young Chinese Communist Party committed a serious error by not doing organizational work in the Society.[83]

Document 37 provides interesting contemporary information on the struggle between the two societies. The account begins with a short history of the "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism." Members of the Chinese Communist Party working in the army made the error of declaring its work counterrevolutionary and opposing it, instead of taking an active part and thereby gaining influence in it. Thus the Rightist elements in the Kuomintang acquired a strong influence in the Society and converted it into a tool for their struggle against the Left. The conflict reached such an acute form that "some comrades even raised the question of the total elimination of Communists from the army." Apparently Borodin was one of these comrades, for earlier in the document he is referred to as "our Chief Political Adviser," who raised the question of the exclusion of Communists from the army. The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism "played the part of a 'fig leaf' for the national counterrevolution" (Doc. 37, p. 11). The influence of the Right KMT increased until the Society fell definitely under their influence. They put forward the slogan, "The Communists must be excluded from the Kuomintang." To put an end to this state of affairs, "measures of a decisive character" were undertaken. "The leaders of this Society after undergoing individually a proper 'schooling,' made public denial of their program, acknowledged their activity to be erroneous, and accepted the platform of the Left." They made a public declaration of the necessity to struggle against imperialism to the end, to work jointly with the Communists, to organize peasants, workers, and students, and to tighten discipline in the Kuomintang, according to the writer. Perhaps this "schooling" may be dated by references in Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary." On January 1, Chiang "harshly warned" Hui Tung-sheng and others about the affairs of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.[84] Or the "schooling" may have been at the meeting of the academy leaders of the two rival societies on February 2, mentioned above.

Now, says the writer of Document 37, the Military Section—of the Communist Party's Provincial Committee—instructs Communists to take an active part in the affairs of the Society. The PUR now directly controls and guides the work of the Society in the army, but a tendency was discernible to make this Society "proceed to its own liquidation." The writer anticipated that "in the near future this question will totally dwindle away from the army" (Doc. 37, p. 12).

The writer of Document 37 has less to say about the League of Chinese Military Youth, or "Young Men's Military Association," as it is named in translation. He states that it had been started only recently, which seems erroneous, and that its work had not yet been extended to all corps. The League tries to unite officers and cadets to "struggle for the new methods of constructive work in the army and gradually to get rid of . . . militaristic habits and customs, which still exist in the army." It is under

the influence of the Communists and the Left Kuomintang (Doc. 37, p. 12). Document 43 lists six Communists as political workers in the "Young Men's Military Association." Presumably this categorized persons whose major identification was with the association, not those who were merely members.

Document 46 appears to be a charter of the League of Chinese Military Youth, which is presented as a moral endeavor society among the officers, cadets, and troops. They are to study the latest principles of the science of war and convert the National Revolutionary Army into a force capable of serving the interests of the Chinese masses. The League unites all those who have definitely decided to break off from their militaristic past and who understand the necessity for the Chinese people to possess an army educated in the spirit of revolutionary discipline and possessed of a good knowledge of military art. After stating these general goals, the charter describes a simple organizational pattern. "Initiative Groups" should be formed in each division, ideally consisting of the divisional commander, the chief of the political section, and the adviser. This group calls together the division's officers and political workers, explains the aims of the League, and enrolls those who wish to join. These in turn elect three officers of the branch in the division. A general conference of divisional branches elects a Corps Executive Board, and a General Conference of these boards elects an Executive Board for the entire army.

Members set an example of discipline and duty. They refuse to play games of chance, smoke opium, or visit gambling houses or other "public haunts." They are polite and persevering with their subordinates, do not permit the troops to oppress the civilian population, and educate the people in the aims of the National Revolutionary Army. They protect government property, keep their arms in good order, and prevent theft of the property of their units. Members contribute 1 percent of their pay to the League and proudly bear its ensign, which reads, "The Young Men's Military Association: I am a friend of the People, but the enemy of militarists" (Doc. 46, pp. 1-3).

Russian Appraisals of Their Chinese Colleagues

The Russian advisers, working with a few prominent military and political figures in Canton, tried to deduce their real convictions and estimate their reliability. Document 49 contains interesting personality sketches, which some Russian officers provided the Soviet military attaché in Peking. They probably were composed before March 20, 1926.

The characterization of Chiang Kai-shek is made up of three separate appraisals. The first probably was written by A. I. Cherepanov, perhaps in Peking after he arrived there in late January.[85] The writer characterizes Chiang as conceited, self-loving, reserved, and ambitious, with some ideas of European progress but still tied to "his Chinese prejudices." Much could be obtained from Chiang if he be praised in a delicate manner and in correct form, but always on a basis of equality and never showing "that one wants to usurp even a particle of his power." In the writer's opinion, Chiang's sojourn in Moscow and his knowledge of the Red Army and its leaders had made him willing to introduce military reforms at Whampoa and political training of the cadets, as well as political sections and commissars in the army. Apparently Chiang thought of the Russian advisers as an organ of control to weld units together, and probably for the same reason, the writer deduced, Chiang let Communists carry on their work and even assisted them. Though ambitious, he "knows how to curb his temper and how to feel the pulse of the masses." Yet he was "hardly different from other Chinese leaders of medium quality," being volatile and not knowing how to take a middle course. Chiang's "timidity in making definite decisions in military operations" could be explained, the writer thought, by his fear of making fatal mistakes, "which would cause his downfall before he becomes powerful enough

to afford making them." His subordinate generals felt a peculiar antipathy toward him, yet stood in awe of him because of the growth of Whampoa that resulted from some force incomprehensible to them. The writer cautioned that it was difficult to foretell whether Chiang "will turn an ordinary Tuchün and cease playing with left principles, or if he will go farther in the same direction."

The second writer, by contrast, stated that Chiang was now rising above the narrow views of a corps commander, was quick in taking decisions, but often took them rashly. He "is stubborn and likes to have his own way against everybody's will." A strict disciplinarian, he knew, when off duty, how to establish friendly relations with officers under his command. The third writer, whose account was abbreviated in Document 49, remarked that Chiang was one of the first Chinese generals to work seriously with the USSR, knew how to choose people who showed him absolute obedience, and readily agreed to innovations when convinced of their necessity (Doc. 49, pp. 1-3).

A Russian colleague observed of Wang Ching-wei that he had been a revolutionary bomb-thrower during the anti-Manchu movement, was intimate with Sun Yat-sen during his last two years, and was the author of many Kuomintang resolutions and declarations. One of the most popular men in the Party, and enjoying much prestige therein, he was nevertheless "charged by right elements with having sold himself to the Russians. His relations with the Russians are good, and he follows their advice." Wang was capable of resolute and energetic actions when "certain of having behind him power and support."

Ch'en Kung-po, the chief of the Political Department of the NRA, was a former Communist who left the Party for reasons unknown. He "has some tendency for anarchism and does not like to obey orders given by his superiors." Politically, he was a well-instructed man, being one of the foremost men in the South in that respect. He had neglected work in the Political Department because of too many other positions, but having been relieved of some other duties, he now devoted more time to work there.

Ho Ying-ch'in, commander of the First Corps, had been involved with the Whampoa troops since their formation and had risen rapidly from regimental to corps commander. Devoted to Chiang Kai-shek, he would do nothing without Chiang's knowledge. As a commander, "he is good enough," but being young did not enjoy much prestige among higher officers except those in the 1st Division, his old command. The writer of this sketch stated of General Ho, "He is devoted to the revolutionary cause; he is working in complete agreement with Russian advisers and is following their advice."

General Ch'en Ming-shu, commander of the 10th Division, was "one of the best fighting generals." An energetic and ambitious man, he "belongs to the extreme left elements, and is almost a Communist." Clever, reserved, and well-developed politically, he was also a good organizer, easily consented to innovations, and persevered in the study of new materials. Surrounding himself with relatives and acquaintances, he "considers himself a superior authority and behaves accordingly."[86]

Dangers in Centralization and Politicization of the Army

Most of the work of creating a structure for centralized control over the National Revolutionary Army and for its politicization was carried out under the direction of General N. V. Kuibyshev, who used the pseudonym "Kisan'ka" (meaning pussy-cat) and who arrived in Canton on October 29, 1925. In his Report on Military Developments in Kwangtung, Document 22, which probably dates from the end of December or early January 1926, Kuibyshev concluded with a series of thirteen recommendations for improving the Nationalists' military forces, which should constitute the tasks

of the South China Group of Russian Military Advisers. These recommendations are practically an agenda for the organizational work reported in documents 24 and 26 through 36, dating from February through the first half of March 1926. His recommendations regarding political work (Doc. 22, p. 50) forecast the results announced in Document 37, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army," and its several annexes.

In the previous chapter we quoted from Document 23, Kuibyshev's secret report of January 13, 1926 to the Russian military attaché in Peking, in which he wrote that it was not yet possible "to obtain complete control" of the NRA; and we noted his scornful appraisal of Chinese generals and officers as being "completely ignorant" of the art of war. The statutes drawn up by the Soviet military mission in Canton in the same document represented Soviet political and strategic designs. Some of them corresponded to the hopes of Chinese Nationalist leaders, yet certain of the specific assignments, if executed, could not fail to cause conflict. For example, one of the items describing the work of the chief of the group, that is, Kuibyshev himself, says, "Exerting the maximum of his influence he directs the work of the commander-in-chief in conformity with the aims of the group." If this item was meant to describe a relationship between Kuibyshev and Chiang, it could only spell trouble. Again, the assistant chief of the group for political matters "directs the whole political work in the units of the National Revolutionary Army." Probably the man in this position was I. Ia. Razgon, who used the name "Ol'gin" while in China. If he attempted to direct the whole political work in the army, it would take much tact to avoid abrasive problems, considering the conflicts between radicals and conservatives in the Kuomintang and the jealousy of military commanders for their authority, not to mention the aspirations of Communists in the army (Doc. 23, pp. 3, 4).

Kuibyshev's disdain for his Chinese military colleagues was notable with respect to Chiang Kai-shek, described as "irresolute, but stubborn" and who "could not have obtained much success, as leader of troops on the battlefield, without the aid of our instructors." But, the writer added, "The same . . . may be said with reference to almost all other Chinese generals in the South" (Doc. 26, p. 47). Could such attitudes escape the notice of the Chinese colleagues?

In discussing the creation of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army, the writer of Document 26 stated that General Rogachev "acts, in reality, as chief of the General Staff," though his official position was that of adviser to the chief. Russian advisers were, "in fact, at the head of" all departments of the General Staff, though officially called advisers to the Chinese heads. At the end of December, Russians "even officially held the posts of commander of the navy and chief of the Aviation Bureau." However, they soon became advisers again, since "it is politically inconvenient for our instructors to hold official posts, whereas our influence does not suffer in the least from their transformation into advisers again" (Doc. 26, p. 35).

The writer of Document 26 pointed to a danger. Analyzing the weak points of the Revolutionary Government, he called attention to the lack of unity and stability of the center of the Kuomintang, which was "subject to constant vacillations." Although he believed that the overwhelming majority of the Party center was under the influence of and in alliance with the Left Wing (by which he meant the Communist Party and the Communist Youth Corps) and was "under our political leadership," he was apprehensive: "But in case that we make mistakes in our guidance and the Left Wing becomes too enthusiastic about our plans, which are too radical for the present time, then the possibility is not excluded that a split will occur in the center and a considerable part will go over to the side of the right elements, who, notwithstanding a series of defeats, do not cease the struggle against the radical policy of the Kuomintang and the Revolutionary Government at Canton" (Doc. 26, p. 56). The writer was particularly concerned with the possibility of a revolt by generals against

the Revolutionary Government. He predicted that "If our leaders become enthused for measures too radical for China's real conditions, the government will begin to carry them through and provoke the discontent of a part of the population." This discontent would immediately be exploited by the Right Wing in order to draw over to their side the majority of the Kuomintang belonging to the petty bourgeoisie, under the slogan "struggle against Bolshevism." Until recently, he said, all guidance with regard to the Party and government had been carried on "with the closest participation of our political director." There had not yet been a case when measures "proposed by us" were not accepted and put into effect by the government (Doc. 26, p. 57).

The political director to whom the writer referred must have been Borodin, who left Canton about February 5, 1926. The writer seemed to express a fear that "our leaders" might not now be so skillful and restrained as he had been.

According to the January 13 draft Statutes of the South China Group, Document 23, the chief of the group coordinates his decisions in questions of a political character with those of the chief political adviser of the Canton Government—that is, Borodin. Yet Kuibyshev found his relationship with Borodin irksome, and he asked the Soviet military attaché in Peking to send him the military code so he would not be dependent on Borodin. "If I had the code for direct communication with you, it would prove extremely beneficial" (Doc. 22, p. 62).

A. I. Cherepanov, writing long after the event but on the basis, evidently, of both memory and documents, appraised Kuibyshev as somewhat more "straightforward" than Borodin, and of being in too much of a hurry to centralize the southern army. The general considered that the time had come to carry out a rigid centralization and to subject the army to a centralized military organ with clearcut tasks, uniform organization, and unified discipline. Clearly, Cherepanov believed Kuibyshev mistaken. On the other hand, he praised Borodin's approach highly.[87] Mme. Vishnyakova-Akimova, who served briefly as General Kuibyshev's interpreter about the middle of March 1926, describes him as stubborn and cool. He posed the questions of centralized army administration and equitable division of funds in an especially sharp form and was supported in meetings of the Military Council by V. P. Rogachev and Razgon, as well as by Wang Ching-wei. Since Chiang Kai-shek was the principal one appropriating the bulk of military funds for his purposes, according to Mme. Vishnyakova-Akimova, Kuibyshev ignored Chiang and dealt with Wang on all military matters. Thus Chiang came to hate him.[88]

Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet Advisers, and Wang Ching-wei

Chiang Kai-shek was dissatisfied with the situation in Canton after his return from the Second Eastern Expedition, as evidenced by his resignations from various military posts. He gave up command of the First Corps on January 15, and on February 8 he declined to become inspector general of the National Revolutionary Army, a position to which the Military Council appointed him on February 1. On February 9 he offered his resignation from the Military Council and his position as garrison commander for Canton, indicating that he wished to retain only his place on the Political Council and command of the Whampoa Military Academy.[89]

Critical references to the Russian advisers begin to appear in Chiang's "diary" early in 1926. The entry for January 19, the last day of the Second Congress, states that Chiang was unhappy about the policies of Rogachev, who acted as chief of staff of the National Revolutionary Army, and Kuibyshev (called "*Chi-shan-chia*"—i.e., Kisan'ka), head of the Soviet Group. Chiang said: "I treat them with sincerity but they reciprocate with deceit. It is impossible to work with them!" On February 7, according to the "diary," Kuibyshev ridiculed him. On February 11, Chiang recorded

the following: "My Russian associates are suspicious and envious of me. They deceive me. Perhaps they do so unintentionally. In view of the circumstances, the only course for me is to be guided by sincerity."[90]

Chiang moved to restrict Russian influence on February 16 when he proposed the reorganization of the General Staff and removal of Russians from administrative posts.[91] The diary entry for February 19 states that Chiang was considering making another visit to Soviet Russia because of the unfavorable circumstances at Canton caused by poor relations with his associates and differences of opinion among his subordinates. He considered Russia the key to success or failure of the revolution. The diary adds that when "Kisan'ka" learned of this plan he showed signs of great unease.

Chiang and the Soviet military advisers disagreed on the timing of a Northern Expedition. On January 27, 1926, Wang Ching-wei had proposed to the Political Council that the Northern Expedition be launched. The resolution was adopted but no specific date was set. Later, Chiang charged Wang with having reversed himself because "Kisan'ka" opposed the expedition. On February 22, according to Chiang's "diary," most of the Russian advisers counseled Chiang to "go slow" on plans for the expedition. On February 24, Chiang formally proposed an early decision on launching the Northern Expedition in order to rescue Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun, which had been defeated in North China. Coincidentally, on that day Chao Heng-ti, governor of Hunan and an ally of Wu P'ei-fu, was driven from Changsha by T'ang Sheng-chih, who was negotiating with the Canton leaders to effect an alliance.[93] As we have seen in the discussion of the Bubnov Commission in Peking, the various Russians concerned with revolutionary Canton differed in their views about the timing of a northern military campaign, depending on their opinions as to necessary preparations, political as well as military.

Filled with suspicions and animosity toward "Kisan'ka," Chiang Kai-shek made a decisive move on February 26 by arresting Wang Mao-kung, commander of the Second Division of the First Corps, which garrisoned the Canton area. Pao Hui-seng recollects that Wang Mao-kung worked closely with Wang Ching-wei and "Kisan'ka" and was intensely disliked by Wang Po-ling, who was very close to Chiang, and by Commander of the Humen Fort Ch'en Chao-ying, Canton Police Chief Wu T'ieh-cheng, and several others who were all sponsors of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.[94] According to Chiang, Kuibyshev and the other Russians were alarmed by his dismissal of Wang Mao-kung, for it frustrated their plan to use General Wang to overturn the Kuomintang's revolutionary power. This statement must have meant overturning Chiang himself. The next day Chiang sent Wang Mao-kung off to Shanghai and had a discussion with Wang Ching-wei on dealing with Kuibyshev. He told Wang that the Russian's dictatorial and contradictory behavior was a danger to the Party and country and would adversely affect Sino-Russian relations. Chiang made it plain, however, that he regarded such behavior as an individual matter and not that of the Soviet authorities.[95] He followed this up on March 8 by telling Wang that revolutionary power must not fall into the hands of foreigners, and that certain limits must be fixed in relations with the Third International in order to safeguard the Party's independence. According to Chiang's "diary," Wang agreed with him.[96]

Early in March an anti-Chiang movement seemed to be taking shape. On March 7 Liu Chih, the new commander of the Second Division, and Teng Yen-ta, dean of the Military Academy, warned Chiang that some persons were printing and distributing anti-Chiang propaganda. Two days later, Chiang became perturbed about Communist activities within the Kuomintang. On the 11th he heard many unpleasant rumors and remarked on the variety of anti-Chiang handbills that attacked and slandered him.[97] It was perhaps about this time that Kao Yü-han, a prominent Communist who had been appointed a political instructor at Whampoa Academy, publicly

criticized the academy as being nonrevolutionary and reportedly said, "We have a Tuan Ch'i-jui in our midst. If we wish to overthrow the Tuan Ch'i-jui of the North, we must first overthrow the Tuan Ch'i-jui here."[98]

Chiang may have contemplated leaving Canton about this time. The diary for the period March 9-15 mentions uncertainty about whether he should advance or retreat. Wang Ching-wei is said to have hinted that he should leave, but Chiang decided to stay on for a decisive fight, "to seek life in death."[99] Wang seems to have shared with Kuibyshev a growing place in Chiang's hostility before the March 20th Incident. A letter that Chiang wrote to Wang, probably early in April, lists ten points of Chiang's dissatisfaction with Wang before the incident.[100] While it would be very difficult to substantiate Chiang's charges on the basis of independent evidence, the list indicates his suspicion of collusion between Kuibyshev and Wang to eliminate him from the political scene in Canton or greatly reduce his power. Chiang's tenth point charged that early in March, in an address to a meeting of members of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the League of Chinese Military Youth, Wang referred to the killing of Communists in Turkey after its revolution, and asked whether there was to be killing of Communists in China even before the success of its revolution. This question, Chiang charged, had aroused suspicions between Communists and army officers, causing each to make defensive preparations and resulting in the conflict of March 20.

March 20th Coup d'Etat

Much of the information available on the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident comes from three public accounts by Chiang Kai-shek on March 22 and 23 and on April 20.[101] According to Chiang, the acting chief of the Naval Bureau, Li Chih-lung, ordered the gunboats *Chung-shan* and *Pao-pi* to Whampoa on the evening of March 18. Li Chih-lung was a graduate of the Naval Academy at Chefoo, and also a graduate of the first Whampoa Academy class. He was also a member of the Communist Party.[102] The vessels stood off the Military Academy all night with steam up and arms at the ready. Chiang Kai-shek was in Canton and much surprised when he heard of this, since he had not ordered the vessels to Whampoa. Between 9 and 10 a.m. on the 19th, a person who Chiang declined to name phoned to ask when Chiang was leaving for Whampoa. When the person phoned a third time, Chiang became suspicious and replied that he had not decided whether to return or not. Within an hour, Li Chih-lung phoned to ask whether he might return the *Chung-shan* to Canton to be ready for an inspection by the visiting team (the Bubnov Commission). Chiang professed that since he had not given the order for the vessel to move to Whampoa, it was not up to him to give the order for its return. He then demanded to know who had given the order to move the vessel, and Li is stated to have replied that it was a telephone order from Teng Yen-ta, which he understood to have come from Chiang Kai-shek. The *Chung-shan* returned to Canton on the evening of March 19, arriving after dark, but again with steam up and arms at the ready. Under these circumstances, according to Chiang, he became even more suspicious and at dawn sent the deputy commandant of the Naval Academy, Ou-yang Ko, with troops to board the vessel and put it under guard. He had Li Chih-lung arrested. In addition Chiang put Canton under martial law.[103] This was Saturday, March 20. There is evidence, however, of a quite different schedule of the vessel's movements.[104]

Liu Chih, recently appointed commander of the Second Division, the main garrison force for Canton, had all Communist Party representatives and political workers in the division arrested.[105] Chinese guards at the residences of the Russian advisers and at the headquarters of the Strike Committee were disarmed, and many Communists were arrested. The consternation and indignation at the Russian residences at

Tung-shan is vividly described by Mme. Vishnyakova-Akimova.[106]

To attempt to untangle and analyze the various factors that underlay the incident is beyond the scope of this essay. Two divergent lines of interpretation have emerged since the incident. The first pictures a Russian and Chinese Communist plot to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek aboard the *Chung-shan* and force him to go to Vladivostok; then the government would be overthrown and replaced by a workers' government. Wang Ching-wei may have been privy to the plot. A variant is hinted at in Document 52, which summarizes reports from Borodin after his return to Canton on April 29. It refers to "measures taken by Wang Ching-wei" around March 20, to form an anti-Chiang alliance and to force Chiang not to yield to the demands of the anti-Communist faction in the Kuomintang (Doc. 52, p. 57). Whatever the details, Chiang Kai-shek is pictured in this line of explanation as having discovered a plot against himself and taken the actions of March 20 to smash it.[107]

Professor Li Yu-ning called our attention to information that supports this interpretation and points the blame for the Incident most specifically at Wang Ching-wei. This account comes from Ch'en Chieh-ju, a legal consort of Chiang Kai-shek and his constant companion from 1920 to 1927. She bore Chiang a daughter. After their separation, Ch'en Chieh-ju lived in retirement in the United States, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, where she wrote an account of their life together. This was suppressed by the Kuomintang, but apparently a copy came into the hands of her grandson, Ch'en Chung-jen. He quoted parts of it in an article that has a section on the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident. Chieh-ju's essential points were that Wang planned to have Li Chih-lung kill Chiang and, learning that Chiang was going to Whampoa, faked an order in Teng Yen-ta's name for the *Chung-shan* to proceed there. Wang asked his wife, Ch'en Pi-chun, to telephone Chieh-ju to learn when Chiang planned to depart on the gunboat, on the pretext that Wang was to accompany him. She telephoned five times, arousing Chieh-ju's suspicions. She reported this strange telephoning to Chiang, who, realizing the seriousness of the situation, investigated, and then took the actions he did on March 20 to seize the gunboat and Li Chih-lung. He also put Wang under house arrest, but declined to reveal that the suspicious telephoner was Wang Ching-wei's wife. Thus, Chieh-ju's account elaborates on Chiang's contention that Wang plotted against him.[108] This line, with variations, was consistently advanced by Chiang himself. For example, about six months after the event, he reportedly told Ch'en Kung-po that Wang Ching-wei had plotted to have Chiang inspect a visiting Russian vessel where he would be seized and taken off to Vladivostok and Moscow.

A diametrically opposite line was that Kuomintang Rightists, particularly leaders of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, planned a coup against the Communists and the Russians. Chiang Kai-shek, was either part of the plot or tricked into believing that the Communists intended to oust him, and hence played into the hands of the Society. This is the line, with variations, taken by three Russian advisers—Cherepanov, Konchits, and Vishnyakova-Akimova—and by Yuriev, who studied many contemporary newspaper accounts.[109] The interpretation that the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism plotted a coup was hinted at by Chih Chung in the official Communist publication, *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, as early as April 3, 1926.[110] A year later, Chou En-lai commented on a statement by P'eng Shu-chih, which named four members of the Society who allegedly forged an order by Chiang that tricked Li Chih-lung, and who also allegedly told Chiang of a plot to deport him to Russia. Chou stated that the correct list of names of the principal plotters was Wang Po-ling (commander of the 1st Division, First Corps), Ou-yang Ko, Ch'en Chao-ying, and Hui Tung-shen, but it should not include Miao Pin. Communist historians have consistently blamed Chiang, and usually point to Rightist plotting.[111]

Possibly each side was planning action against the other. Kuibyshev was certainly hostile to Chiang Kai-shek, who was an obstacle to his plan for a "rigid centraliza-

tion" of the National Revolutionary Army and its subordination to the central military organ. Wang Ching-wei apparently was close to Kuibyshev and may have intimated to Chiang that he should take a trip to Russia. Apparently there were signs of an anti-Chiang movement in Canton before March 20, if we are to accept entries in Chiang's "Diary." Hua Kang has a most intriguing statement: "About this incident, the Kwangtung [Communist] Party and Central also had differences of opinion. First, in discussing the origins of the Incident the Kwangtung Party believed it was a result of 'not pressing the attack when the attack should have been pressed,' while Central believed the opposite, that it was the result of 'not yielding when we should have yielded.' "[112]

As we shall see shortly, General V. A. Stepanov, who succeeded Kuibyshev, reported to a meeting of the Soviet advisers about the incident about two weeks later. In recounting the movements of the gunboat *Chung-shan*, he said, "Our advisers seemed to have been aware of the inside story and ordered the gunboat to return and it returned to the city around midnight. Next morning, Li and other Communists were arrested by order of Chiang" (Doc. 50, p. 68). The "inside story" could equally well have been a plot against Chiang as one by him, or by leaders of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism to trick him into action.

Early Responses to the Incident—Russian and Chinese

Two of the Russian documents seized in Peking provide an inside view of the March 20th Incident and the reaction of the Soviet military mission. Apparently they date from early in April; hence, before discussing them it will be useful to describe some of the major developments immediately after the incident.

With respect to the Russians, Chiang became conciliatory toward the advisers as a group but insisted that "Kisan'ka" (Kuibyshev), Rogachev, and "Ol'gin" (Razgon) be sent away. According to his "diary," an adviser and "Ivanovsky"—i.e., Bubnov—called on the evening of March 20 to complain about the troops surrounding their quarters and the disarming of their guards. Chiang apologized. Shortly afterward the troops were withdrawn and the guards restored.[113] On the morning of the 22d, the councillor of the Soviet Embassy called on Chiang, inquiring whether the problem concerned particular individuals or Russia itself. When Chiang said it concerned only individuals, the councillor said that "Kisan'ka" and Rogachev would be sent back to Russia.[114] Solovyev, the councillor, then attended a meeting of the Kuomintang Political Council where decisions were taken on ways to settle the incident. The first of three resolutions stated, "Our Party should continue cooperation with the Soviet Russian comrades and increase our intimate relations. Those Soviet comrades whose opinions concerning the work did not conform should immediately leave Canton, but the rest should be invited to stay as advisers." The other resolutions granted Wang Ching-wei a leave because of his illness and determined to investigate and try the chief suspect, Li Chih-lung.[115]

Ch'en Kung-po, who gives an extended account of his efforts to learn what had happened and of his consultations with Wang Ching-wei and other political and military leaders, remembered this meeting of the Political Council on March 22, held at Wang Ching-wei's bedside. He mentions three points of discussion. One concerned methods to restrict Communist Party activities; another was the decision to request the Russians to recall "Kisan'ka," with whom, Ch'en heard, Chiang Kai-shek had constant disagreements; and the third had to do with settling the Hong Kong-Canton Strike. Eugene Chen, T. V. Soong, and he were appointed as a committee to negotiate with the Hong Kong Government. (Eugene Chen had not yet returned to Canton. C. C. Wu was the third member appointed.) Kung-po also recalls that on the next day Wang Ching-wei would not receive visitors, and a few days later Ch'en learned that

he was no longer at his residence.[116] Wang did, in fact, disappear.

The Russians moved rapidly to carry out their side of Solovyev's agreement with Chiang. On the evening of March 24, Kuibyshev, Rogachev, and Razgon sailed from Canton on the Soviet vessel *Lenin's Memory*, together with members of the Bubnov Commission.[117] Bubnov had a farewell discussion with Chiang, in which they exchanged their conflicting opinions concerning revolution.[118]

Before departing, Bubnov held a meeting of the Soviet advisers in Canton on March 24 at which he analyzed the social roots of the incident, gave a critique of the performance of the Soviet mission and the work of the Chinese Communists, and recommended a new line of procedure.[119] He assessed the events of March 20 as a "small semi-uprising, directed against the Russian advisers and Chinese commissars." In his opinion, it reflected the conflict between centralized state power and militarism; between the petty urban bourgeoisie and the proletariat; and finally between the Left and Right wings of the Kuomintang. He equated the Right Wing members with the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Bubnov pointed out the major mistakes in military work and in general political leadership which had directly provoked the incident. There was an overestimation of the strength and unity of the Canton leadership and failure to foresee the conflict within the national government and army. Another shortcoming—the import of which is unclear—was in not "exposing and liquidating those tremendous extremes in military work which were clearly revealed during the course of March events."[120] Bubnov put his finger on several specific points, which also appear in Stepanov's report (Doc. 50, pp. 70-71). Centralization of the army through the General Staff, Supply Department, and the P.U.R. had gone on too quickly, without adequate account of the psychology and habits of Chinese generals. Furthermore, they were under too great control from the commissars and the Soviet advisers. In fact, Bubnov said, "five dog-collars were put upon the Chinese generals"—the General Staff, Supply Department, P.U.R., commissar, and adviser.

Bubnov then cautioned the Russian workers (of whom there were about fifty-eight) to be more sensitive to the nationalism of the Chinese military and not to provoke their displeasure by pressuring them. Nor should they step out of their role as adviser and take direct command of Chinese troops; to do so would, he predicted, have a series of disastrous consequences. It would frighten away the rich bourgeoisie, cause the middle bourgeoisie to vacillate, revitalize the practices of Chinese militarism, strengthen and inflame the contradictions between the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang, raise a wave of anti-Communist sentiment, and create a crisis in the National Government. Bubnov tied all subsequent work to the northern campaign, but he cautioned against its being regarded as a purely military venture. "To launch the Northern Expedition without precise and definite slogans and to contemplate . . . [it] without touching the peasant masses—this means to commit a complete mistake," Bubnov said.

In the political field, Bubnov urged the advisers to work with the Left Wing of the Kuomintang, which he regarded as still weak, disunited, and out of touch with the masses. Such work should be aimed at directly strengthening the Kuomintang itself. "I admit that this work . . . will demand from the Chinese Communist Party flexible, very calm, and very restrained tactics," he said. Though praising some aspects of the Communist Party's recent development, he criticized the Chinese comrades for insufficient connection with the proletariat, for sectarian tendencies, and for excessive attention to military work.

Before leaving, Bubnov also gave an interview to a correspondent of the Communist journal, *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, in which he emphasized that, although Li Chih-lung and some fifty others had been arrested, none had been killed; that Chiang said he was not anti-Russian nor anti-Communist; and that he seemed to understand that the Communists did not plot to overthrow the government or himself. The storm,

therefore, already had been calmed and only the disruptive incitements of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had not been stopped. He warned against this danger to the Chinese revolution.[121]

It appears, in short, that within a few days of the incident the Russians on the scene had set to work to placate Chiang, to criticize their own errors, and to develop a modified strategy.

We turn now to responses of the Chinese leadership to the incident. On March 20 and the two days thereafter, there seems to have been a continuous round of discussions between Chiang and other leading figures in Canton, and they among themselves. Wang Ching-wei, who was ill, reportedly was furious at Chiang's unilateral actions. The meeting of the Political Council on March 22 was probably the last time Chiang and Wang saw one another for more than a year, for Wang reportedly went into a hospital on the 23d, and then disappeared.[122]

Chiang's attitude toward the Chinese Communists appeared to be equivocal. While he implied that they had instigated the *Chung-shan* Incident to overthrow him, he did not publicly accuse them of conspiracy. Most Communists were released. In his speech to the cadets of the Central Military and Political Academy on March 22, Chiang declared that the question of guilt for the suspicious behavior of the *Chung-shan* was not yet clear. He added that even if Li Chih-lung were guilty, it was an individual matter and not one involving the entire organization (that is, the Communist Party).[123].

According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, who arrived in Canton about ten days after the incident and made a personal investigation, members of the Wang Ching-wei clique demanded that Chiang Kai-shek be suppressed. All the corps making up the National Revolutionary Army except the First felt dissatisfaction toward Chiang because he favored the First Corps at the expense of the others. However, Wang's withdrawal left them leaderless.[124]

During Wang Ching-wei's seclusion, T'an Yen-k'ai acted as chairman of the National Government and played the role of intermediary between various factions to stabilize the situation, according to Chang, who pictures T'an as very close to Chiang at the time.[125] Chang Jen-chieh (Ching-chiang) arrived in Canton on March 23 and became Chiang's adviser in settling matters. Chiang formally petitioned the Military Council to punish him for his actions on March 20—which, however, he defended as necessary. He wrote on March 26 to Wang to ask for leave. Wang had already indicated his own intention to resign. Chiang also wrote individually to T'an Yen-k'ai, Chu P'ei-te, Li Chi-shen, and other generals, as well as to T. V. Soong, minister of finance, telling them he was retiring and urging the return of Wang. He then went off to Hu-men, the fortifications some thirty miles south of Canton. T. V. Soong pursued him there and at 3 a.m. pleaded with him, on behalf of all the comrades, not to depart. Chiang consented.[126] However, he absented himself until April 1, using his time to inspect the 20th Division, located in the Tung-wan region, and preparing policy documents to put before the leadership.

On April 3, Chiang introduced a proposal to "Central" on readjusting the army, tranquilizing the Party, and setting a date for the Northern Expedition.[127] On the matter of Kuomintang-Communist relations, he proposed the following: (1) A plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee be convened to regulate discipline and investigate certain elements in the Party and army. (2) Communists must not criticize Sun Yat-sen's character; they must be devoted to the Three Principles of the People in their work, abolish all secret organizations and activities within the KMT, notify KMT authorities about all policies and instructions of the Communist Party, and register all Communist members of the KMT with the proper KMT authorities. Furthermore, they must not occupy more than a third of the membership of the CEC. (3) A joint KMT-KCT conference was to be called to settle all difficulties.

On the specific issue of Communists who were KMT representatives in the army, Chiang's attitude was hazy. He proposed the temporary withdrawal of *all* Party representatives for further training on the ground that conflict between Communists and non-Communists in the First Corps had assumed dangerous proportions. He also said that Communist and anarchist elements should be withdrawn because the National Revolutionary Army was predicated on the Three Principles of the People. Yet, he declared that the system of Party representatives should not be abolished.

In the proposals of April 3, Chiang suggested that the Russians should not hold administrative posts of any type, but should serve strictly as advisers. They should not, said Chiang, exceed the limits of their position without obtaining permission from their respective superior officers—that is, Chinese officers. However, he reaffirmed the policy of cooperation with the Russians as well as with the Chinese Communists.

Chiang had made strong protestations of friendship with the Russians in an interview with a reporter of the *Min-kuo jih-pao*, a KMT organ. He expressed profound regret that the Russians had been inconvenienced on March 20 due to a misunderstanding of his orders by subordinates. Chiang denounced reports of his hostility toward the Russians and Communists as fabrications of the "running dogs of imperialists," who wished to overthrow the government. He emphasized that there was definitely no change in the policy of alliance with Soviet Russia.[128]

On the same day that he introduced proposals that would limit the role of Communists in the Kuomintang and its army, and which would restrict the Russians to their advisory role, Chiang issued a public telegram blasting the Western Hills faction for holding a congress in Shanghai, which they called the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang.[129] According to his diary, he was distressed at the thought of the Right Wing's alliance with imperialists aiming to destroy the Kuomintang and the government. He continued in subsequent speeches to denounce the Right Wing in no uncertain terms.

The above account may serve to illustrate the complicated situation that faced the Russian advisers after the March 20 Incident.

The Incident and Its Aftermath Through Russian Eyes

Document 50 provides a vivid description of the movements of the gunboat *Chungshan*, and of the initial stages of the coup. Stepanov, who temporarily succeeded Kuibyshev as head of the military mission, said that after Li Chih-lung had ordered the gunboat to Whampoa on the night of the 18th, on the basis of a telephone call which he took as an order from Chiang, "our advisers seem to have been aware of the inside story and ordered the gunboat to return and it returned to the city around midnight"—i.e., on the night of 19/20. Who these advisers were, and what inside knowledge they had, is not revealed; but it appears Stepanov believed the gunboat returned under Russian orders. His account of Chiang's suspicions of a plot against himself reads as though it came directly from Chiang. Many of Stepanov's details of the negotiations between the Russians and Chiang match Chiang's diary account day for day. Stepanov adds a new dimension, however, in revealing that many of Chiang's colleagues were critical of his actions, at least in speaking to the Russians. "In short," said Stepanov, "everyone expressed opposition to Chiang." Some of the Chinese generals expressed the belief that Chiang had been preparing for the incident for more than a month (Doc. 50, pp. 67-69).

Stepanov analyzed the causes of the incident, which had come as a "lightning shock," in terms of the errors of the Russian advisers and the Chinese Communists, and the personal characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Russian advisers, said Stepanov, pursued erroneous tactics by pushing the

centralization of military organs too rapidly and by grabbing too much direct control over various organizations. This, combined with their excessive supervision of the Chinese generals and neglect of Chinese etiquette, aroused resentment among the Chinese military officers. Another error of the advisers was "inappropriate radical propaganda in the army on the problems of imperialism, the peasantry, and communism." Stepanov also criticized the Chinese Communists for similar errors. In his opinion, they failed to understand the tactic of organizing and then secretly transforming the Kuomintang, but concentrated instead on openly seizing control of Kuomintang organs. Thus, he said, they aroused envy among Kuomintang members. He blamed this also on the advisers for their insufficient directive capacity and inadequate liaison (Doc. 50, pp. 70-71).

In Document 51, the second report of a meeting of the Soviet Advisory Group, "Nilov" (Sakhnovskii) was more specific in describing the operational errors of the Chinese Communists in their relations with the Kuomintang. They aimed only at expanding their own influence under its cover, without attempting to build the Kuomintang or paying any attention to the KMT Left, "Nilov" said. They took control of the highest administrative and political organs in the army and monopolized the labor and peasant movements. They seemed to have "the same habit of monopolizing power typical of Chinese officials and generals," who appointed members of their own cliques as soon as they obtained high office, as did Li Chih-lung in the navy. In the army, Communist political workers manned the most important posts,[180] appointed members of their own cliques to other posts, and carried on secret tasks unknown to the commanders of the units in which they worked. Such actions aroused the jealousy and indignation of the military officers. Many officers squeezed out of good positions became actively anti-Communist members of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. The Communist Party now realized the great mistakes they had committed, "Nilov" stated (Doc. 51, pp. 80-81).

The "chief culprit" in the incident, in Stepanov's words, was Chiang Kai-shek, whose character he undertook to analyze. According to Stepanov, Chiang was an unusually egoistic and ambitious man. His entire personality was dominated by a lust for glory and power, to attain which he would utilize the Russians, the Chinese Communists, and the masses. These characteristics, in Stepanov's view, represented an opportunity for the Russians to regain his friendship. "We are trying to make Chiang cooperate with us again by satisfying his desire for glory and enabling him to achieve greater power and strength than he now enjoys. . . . It is permissible to make a few concessions to Chiang's political demands as the price we pay." In his opinion, Chiang was wavering between the Right Wing and the Communists. Hence, the Russians should surround him with Left influences and inject into him a strong dose of revolutionary ideology (Doc. 50, pp. 71-73).

Stepanov's conciliatory policy was put into stronger terms in Document 51, a report he presented at a meeting of the Russian advisers in Canton shortly after April 10. It was necessary, he said, to continue to utilize Chiang for the National Revolution and cooperate with him as far as possible *to the very end* (emphasis ours), although he was not certain whether Chiang sincerely desired to cooperate with the Left or merely wished to deceive his enemies in preparation for a second coup (Doc. 51, p. 76).

In addition, he advocated the following policies: (1) strengthen the Kuomintang's unity; (2) strengthen in particular the KMT Left Wing; (3) eliminate the counterrevolutionary Right; and (4) strengthen the alliance of the Communists with the KMT and the government (Doc. 51, p. 78).

In short, Stepanov's policy was two-pronged. Communists were to placate Chiang and draw him to the Left. At the same time, they were to strengthen the KMT Left and eliminate the counterrevolutionary Right.

The second part of Document 51 records the Russian advisers' discussion of Stepanov's report at the meeting. Considerable disagreement existed among the Russians. One Soviet adviser believed that Chiang would definitely be persuaded to lean to the Left. Another was disturbed by Chiang's assumption of power and pessimistic about the possibility of genuine cooperation with him. While Stepanov himself was apparently optimistic about Chiang's further political orientation, he emphasized that it was impossible to guarantee that Chiang would always be allied with the Russians (Doc. 51, pp. 84, 86-87).

Despite misgivings, the actual policy the Russians pursued was conciliatory almost from the first day of the coup. The departure of several objectionable Russians symbolized the Soviet policy of conciliation. On April 3, Chiang had outlined steps to be taken to make a Northern Expedition possible and successful. Under certain assumptions, he believed that Kwangtung and Kwangsi could jointly mount the campaign by the end of June. Stepanov, in his second report, declared that the situation in North China was favorable to the launching of the Northern Expedition. He stressed the need for all Russians to study data pertaining to the Expedition and added that the army might be moving north in two or three months (Doc. 51, pp. 77-79).

The official Chinese Communist policy following the coup was likewise conciliatory. According to Stepanov, Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed with his analysis of Chiang's character. Stepanov further asserted that the Central Committee, as well as the Kwangtung Communists, shared his belief that Chiang should be conciliated by satisfying his personal ambition. Ch'en had informed him that the CC had passed a resolution to the effect that Chiang must be used by all means. The Kwangtung Regional Committee voluntarily withdrew all Communist representatives from the First Corps. The Communist-controlled League of Chinese Military Youth was to be disbanded (Doc. 50, pp. 71, 73; Doc. 51, pp. 76, 82). Trotsky later charged that Bubnov, "one of Stalin's agents . . . made the Chinese Communists submit and keep quiet."[131]

Ambiguities of Russian and Chinese Communist Policy

Actually there was more confusion and uncertainty over the proper policies to follow after the coup than these reports by Stepanov imply, nor could he have been aware of various contradictory currents.

The policy of conciliation was based on the premise that it was necessary to maintain the Kuomintang-Communist entente. This was the premise underlying the "Resolutions on the China Question," which had been adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the ECCI on March 13, 1926, only one week before the coup. Hu Han-min was an honored guest at the plenum and gave an address.

The ECCI, now under the leadership of its principal theoretician, N. I. Bukharin, defined the Kuomintang as "a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and urban democracy on the basis of a community of the class interests of these strata in the struggle against the imperialists and the whole militaristic-feudal order for the independence of the country and for a single revolutionary-democratic government." It praised the Canton Government as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic order and called upon the Chinese Communists to work together with the Kuomintang to democratize the country. The ECCI reaffirmed the necessity for a single national revolutionary front and warned the Chinese Communist Party against the harmful tendency of rightist liquidationism, which ignored the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and led to a "formless merging with the general democratic national movement." At the same time, it warned against "Left moods which try to skip over the revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement

straight to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, forgetting all about the peasantry, which is the most important and decisive factor of the Chinese national-liberation movement."[132]

The international Communist press even denied that a coup had taken place. An article published in the *International Press Correspondence* on April 8 asserted that a "lying report" had been circulated by Reuters to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek had carried out a coup d'etat. The Kuomintang, it stated, was not a tiny group of people but a mass party in the true sense of the word. It was of course impossible to carry out a coup overnight. One month later, Voitinsky declared that news of a coup was merely "an invention of the imperialists."[133]

In April 1926, according to Stalin, the ECCI sent instructions to the Chinese Communist Party ordering it to exert every effort to compel the KMT Right Wing to withdraw, or expel it from the Party.[134] Communists were instructed to organize and strengthen the Left Wing as their central task. These tactics had been outlined by Stepanov at the meeting of Soviet advisers shortly after April 10 (Doc. 51, pp. 78, 81).

Stalin, however, was opposed to a northern campaign. On March 25, 1926, he added a sentence to a resolution drawn up by a special Politburo commission charged with preparing recommendations for Soviet foreign policy in the Far East: "The Government at Canton should in the present period decisively reject the thought of military expeditions of an offensive character, and generally any such actions as may provoke the imperialists to embark on military intervention."[135]

The central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kwangtung Communist leaders had serious disagreements after the March 20 coup. Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls in his memoirs that news of the March 18 disaster in Peking (see below) and confirmation of the March 20 coup in Canton caused the Central Committee members in Shanghai to set aside their differences and face up to the dangerous situation. They decided to adopt an attitude of concession and compromise in order to stabilize the situation in Canton; more specifically, the Communist Party should try to preserve Chiang-Wang cooperation, continue a friendly attitude toward Chiang, and rectify the leftist mistakes of the Canton comrades. "We had no choice but to adopt a delaying policy of compromise." His account implies the Central Committee reached this decision independently of the Comintern. The committee sent Chang to Canton with full authority to handle affairs.[136] In an article published in *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* on April 23, 1926, Ch'en Tu-hsiu denied charges that the Communists had been involved in a conspiracy to overthrow Chiang on March 20. He emphasized the Chinese Communist Party's desire to continue cooperating with the Kuomintang.[137]

Members of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party, closer to the scene than the leadership in Shanghai, were not united on the policy of reconciliation with Chiang and alliance with the Left, which hinged on cooperation with the Left leaders. The March 20 coup had resulted in complete uncertainty, since Chiang and Wang were the principal Left leaders and they were deeply divided. To paraphrase Sakhnovskii, the Left Wing was absolutely empty; it had neither leaders nor masses (Doc. 51, p. 81). Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai declared in his report to the Sixth Party Congress in 1928 that members of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee believed the Left nonexistent and that Communists should seize leadership of the Kuomintang. They believed the Kuomintang should eliminate the Right Wing and fill the Party with the masses, thus converting it into a pure Left organization. According to another later source, certain members of the committee wanted Borodin to force Wang Ching-wei to dismiss Chiang. They advocated calling a workers' strike and planned a counteroffensive to be conducted by Communists in the army.[138]

Arriving in Canton about the end of March, Chang Kuo-t'ao found the Communist comrades there indignant over the incident and quarreling over blame for past

policy mistakes. Again there was dissatisfaction with "the bankruptcy of the CCP policy of cooperation with the KMT," yet no one could suggest a viable alternative. Many, he recalls, advocated an effort to get forces on various sides to deal a counterblow to Chiang; others blamed the Communist Kwangtung Committee for supporting Chiang exclusively and neglecting the balanced development of all the armies. However, most comrades felt no one was capable of assuming leadership of an anti-Chiang movement, and certainly the Communist Party lacked the capacity to do so. Furthermore, the Soviet military advisers in Canton had already adopted a policy of granting concessions to Chiang. They were waiting for Borodin's return to devise measures to remedy the situation, according to what Chou En-lai and Chang T'ai-lei told Chang Kuo-t'ao. He reported to a meeting of the Communists' Kwangtung Provincial Committee that, on the basis of national considerations, the Central Committee had decided on a policy of compromise. He demanded that all comrades abide by this decision. Then, accompanied by Chou En-lai, he called on Chiang Kai-shek and promised him "sincere cooperation." Chiang's "diary" mentions a visit by Chou En-lai and a Russian adviser on April 3.[139]

It seems clear that the March 20 Incident confronted the Comintern leadership in Moscow, the Russians in Canton, and the Chinese Communist leaders with difficult decisions. Among the Chinese Communists there were divergent answers: ally with the Left, conciliate Chiang, and drive out the Right Wing of the Kuomintang; withdraw from the Kuomintang and form an alliance with it in pursuit of the National Revolution; and counterattack Chiang in alliance with whatever power could be mustered.

Background for a Modus Vivendi

Before Borodin's return, the Nationalist leaders in Canton had taken a number of steps to settle their internal conflicts. Many Communist cadres withdrew from positions in the Military Academy and the First Corps. On April 16, the League of Chinese Military Youth announced its dissolution, and on the 20th the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism formally dispersed.[140] These actions could only have been brought about with great pressure, and clearly Chiang was the principal one who applied the pressure.[141] It seems unlikely that the activities of the League and Society actually ended, for both organizations had their roots outside the National Revolutionary Army. For example, Document 52 recounts that two students were beaten half to death on May 7, China's "National Humiliation Day," at demonstrations staged by the rival factions in Canton. The victims were P'an Yu-ch'iang and Yang Yin-chih, members of the Executive Committee of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.

General Chiang also made some rearrangements in the Military Academy, nominating Li Chi-shen to be deputy commandant, and instructing Ho Ying-ch'in to be the dean concurrently with his post as commander of the First Corps. General Teng Yen-ta, with whom Chiang had quarreled as a result of the incident, was sent to be dean of the academy branch in Ch'ao-chow and was also made head of the Political Department of the First Corps, replacing Chou En-lai.[142] Teng was a Kuomintang Leftist.

Wang Ching-wei had withdrawn from the Canton scene, and by April 7 indicated in a letter to Chang Jen-chieh (Chang Ching-chiang) that he intended to give up his posts and leave. Chang Jen-chieh, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chu P'ei-te, T. V. Soong, and Chiang Kai-shek met the next day and decided to beg him to return, but this may have been a formality. By the 15th they were discussing the distribution of his posts. On April 16 at a joint meeting of members of the Kuomintang Central Party Headquarters and the National Government Council, T'an Yen-k'ai was elected chairman of the Political Council and Chiang Kai-shek chairman of the Military Council.[143]

Chiang Kai-shek also made some moves against the Right Wing in Canton. On

April 5 he had ordered Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to prevent a demonstration planned under the auspices of the conservative Canton Municipal Headquarters of the Kuomintang. According to Stepanov's second report, Chiang ordered the arrest of Ou-yang Ko and demanded his dismissal by the Military Council (Doc. 51, p. 75). Ou-yang was none other than the naval officer Chiang had used to take over the *Chung-shan* and to effect the arrest of Li Chih-lung. According to another of the captured documents, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng himself was dismissed on April 24 (Doc. 52, p. 2). This was from his position of Canton's chief of police, in which he was responsible to C. C. Wu, the mayor. Chiang had no authority over the police; his act was an arrogation of power. However, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng still commanded the 17th Division—for a few more weeks.[144]

Discussions and preparations for the Northern Expedition were going on. On March 24, the Military Council appointed Li Tsung-jen commander of the Seventh Corps, a formation of Kwangsi troops. Huang Shao-hsiung became Kuomintang Party representative to the Corps.[145] In his proposals to "Central" of April 3, Chiang recommended six steps to prepare for the Northern Expedition: (1) affiliate with the Kuominchun and get it to retreat to the Northwest to consolidate its strength; (2) affiliate with Soviet Russia to increase the power of the revolution; (3) send delegates to Szechwan and Kweichow to persuade them to entangle the armies of Hupei and Yunnan; (4) unite with Hunan and Kiangsi for an offensive-defensive alliance and contract for a date before which they would jointly send troops to hamper a southern move by Wu P'ei-fu's army (5) affiliate with Sun Ch'uan-fang so he would take a neutral rather than a hostile stand; and (6) decide that within three months Kwangtung and Kwangsi will actually launch a Northern Expedition if preparations have been completed.[146]

The immediate background for this set of proposals was the defeat of the First Kuominchun near Tientsin and the reemergence of Wu P'ei-fu as a power in Central China. Wu P'ei-fu's comeback after his defeat in October 1924 had been a slow process. However, with the death of General Hsiao Yao-nan, Wu's former subordinate and his protector in Hupei, on February 14, 1926, Wu acquired Hsiao's resources. He allied himself with Chang Tso-lin for a combined drive against their mutual enemy, the Kuominchun. Based in Hupei, Wu P'ei-fu also took a hand in the politics of neighboring Hunan and Kiangsi. On March 13, Wu offered assistance to the governor of Hunan, Chao Heng-t'i, who had been driven out by T'ang Sheng-chih. T'ang for his part, was seeking assistance from the National Government in Canton. By March 25, the Nationalist delegates, Ch'en Ming-shu and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, had arrived in Changsha to negotiate with T'ang. By the end of the month he had driven Yeh K'ai-hsin, across the border into Hupeh, but this immediately brought on Wu's counteraction. As for Kiangsi, Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang agreed to upset Fang Pen-jen, the military governor, who may have had a quasi-alliance with Canton. By April 1, Fang had left Nanchang for Shanghai, and Teng Ju-cho, the protégé of Wu and Sun, announced that he was commander in chief of the Kiangsi army.[147]

Before the end of April, the Nationalists' quasi-allies had suffered serious reverses. With Wu's support, Yeh K'ai-hsin had driven T'ang Sheng-chih back to his base in Heng-yang, in southern Hunan, and T'ang was calling for help from the Nationalists in Canton.

In North China things had gone badly for the Kuomintang and Communist leadership and their potentially revolutionary allies, the Kuominchun. Soviet advisers had been working with these forces for nearly a year. By the end of December 1925, Kuo Sung-lin's revolt against Chang Tso-lin had been crushed, but Feng Yü-hsiang's First Kuominchun had succeeded in capturing Tientsin. Then Feng announced his retirement on January 1, 1926, probably in the face of the alliance between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu against him. During February, the Second and Third Kuominchun,

only nominally under Feng's command, simply collapsed under attack by the Wu and Chang forces. In March, the First Kuominchun found itself in an impossible military situation in Tientsin and had to evacuate, retreating through Peking and on to Feng's headquarters at Kalgan on the Great Wall. Details are given in Julie How's study, *Soviet Advisers and the Kuominchun, 1925-1926.*

On March 18, a few days before the First Kuominchun withdrew from Tientsin, a tragedy occurred in Peking. In the course of the fighting, the First Kuominchun had placed artillery at Taku, the port of entry for Tientsin, and had mined the harbor. This contravened the terms of the Boxer Protocol of September 1901, which guaranteed that the route between Peking and the sea would never be blocked. On March 16 some of the signatory Powers sent an ultimatum to the Chinese government threatening action unless assurances were given within forty-eight hours that the obstacles to communication would be removed. This action raised a storm of protest in Peking. On March 17, the Joint Council of Peking Organizations petitioned the government to reject the ultimatum, but Tuan Ch'i-jui's guards drove the petitioners away, injuring many. Kuomintang and Communist leaders in Peking had organized the patriotic protest, and the government issued a warrant for the arrest of Hsü Ch'ien, Li Shih-tseng, Ku Meng-yü, I P'ei-chi, and Li Ta-chao.

The next morning a mass meeting at T'ien-an Men Square adopted resolutions demanding abrogation of the Boxer Protocol and all unequal treaties. About two thousand demonstrators, most of them students, then marched toward the cabinet offices where they were surrounded and attacked by government guards. Forty-seven demonstrators were killed and many more wounded.[148] The Kuomintang leaders went into hiding. Then came news of the March 20 Incident in Canton.

Borodin was in Peking when this news reached there the next day. Apparently he decided almost immediately to return to Canton, but it was unsafe to return by the shortest route via Tientsin because of the defeat of the First Kuominchun and because he was to escort a group of Chinese fugitives. He and his party had to take the long and arduous route by train to Kalgan, then across Mongolia to Urga and Verkhneudinsk, and thence by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. Borodin put Cherepanov in charge of the mission,[149] which consisted of Borodin and his wife and youngest son; Hsü Ch'ien, Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen), Chu Chia-hua, Shao Li-tzu, and Ku Meng-yü of the Kuomintang; and Ch'en Ch'i-hsiu, T'an P'ing-shan, Yü Shu-te, An T'i-ch'eng, and some other Chinese Communists who were members of both parties. Five of the group had recently been elected to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, and one of them to the Supervisory Committee. The party left Peking by special train just ahead of the retreating Kuominchun troops. In Urga, Borodin and Yü Yu-jen met Feng Yü-hsiang, who was on his way to Moscow, and tried to persuade him to cast his lot with the Kuomintang. Hsü Ch'ien accompanied General Feng to Moscow. In Vladivostok the group was joined by Hu Han-min, who had been detained there on his way home from Russia. Their vessel sailed on April 20 and arrived in Canton on April 29, 1926.[150]

Developments in the Kwangtung Farmers Movement[151]

On May 1, two days after Borodin's return, the Third Congress of the Chinese National General Labor Union and the Second Congress of the Kwangtung Provincial Farmers Association met in Canton. In a show of worker-farmer solidarity they held a joint opening ceremony. The labor congress met in the wake of the protracted Shanghai strikes of mid-1925 and the even more protracted Hong Kong strike and boycott. These resulted in a great growth of organized labor—the total membership of organizations represented was said to be 1.2 million—but they had also revealed the extreme difficulty of conducting politically radical strikes under conditions of urban

China's complex power structure. The main purpose of the labor congress was again to unite China's scattered and rivaling labor organizations within the Communist-led Chinese National General Labor Union. The leaders took a conciliatory attitude toward Canton labor organizations outside the fold, the Kwangtung Federation of Labor Unions and the conservative Mechanics Union. The political resolutions stressed support for the Nationalist Government and for the Northern Expedition that was soon to set forth. Elections for the expanded Executive Committee kept the leadership of the Chinese National General Union still tightly under Communist control, with all the most active Communist labor organizers included.[152]

Borodin regarded rural revolution as one key to a successful Northern Expedition. The Communist-led farmers' movement in Kwangtung was the prototype instrument for setting that rural upheaval in motion. In the Soviet mission's discussion of the causes of the March 20 Incident, Pavel Sakhnovskii criticized the Communist Party for only attempting to expand its own influence under the cover of the Kuomintang. To illustrate this failing he remarked: "Currently, in setting up a preparatory committee for the National Peasant Congress, the Communists tried to place a few KMT members on the committee for the sake of appearances. They failed, for there are no KMT members working among the peasantry" (Doc. 50, p. 80).

Assembled at the farmers' movement congress were 214 delegates from farmers' associations in forty-nine Kwangtung counties, with seventeen other counties having associations but no delegates. The announced number of farmers enrolled was 626,457, a threefold increase from the membership announced the year before. Eleven other provinces were said to have sent representatives, giving the congress the appearance of a national organization, which was the goal for the movement a year or so hence. The assembled farmer delegates heard reports by important Communist leaders of the movement, Lo Ch'i-yüan, Juan Hsiao-hsien, and Lin Tsu-han; speeches by Ch'en Kung-po, T'an Yen-k'ai, T'an P'ing-shan (just back from Moscow), and by Chiang Kai-shek, who discoursed on farmer-worker-soldier solidarity. Li Li-san reported on the Red International of Labor Unions; apparently he had visited Moscow as a representative of Chinese labor and his address probably was given before a joint session of the two congresses. This may have been true also of Borodin's speech on the world revolutionary movement, in which he placed considerable emphasis on the British General Strike, which had just broken out. The congress issued a prepared manifesto and fourteen resolutions, and closed on May 15. The reports on the progress of the farmers' movement are very detailed.[153]

A map marked to show the number of farmers' association members among Kwangtung's ninety-five counties would display many empty counties in the north and west, and a heavy concentration in a few regions—the delta counties near Canton; Hai-feng and its neighbors, Lu-feng and Wu-hua, in the southeast; and Kwang-ning county in the northwest. The explanation for the disparity lay partly in fundamental conditions of the local economies and of societal relations, partly in the gradual extension of the Nationalists' reach through the military campaigns of 1925, and partly in idiosyncratic circumstances, such as the vigorous organizing of dedicated activists, P'eng Pai and his colleagues particularly. The threefold increase in membership since the May 1925 congress was also partly to be explained by a much improved organizational system.

Lo Ch'i-yüan's detailed report to the Second Provincial Farmers Congress explains that in December a three-man committee of himself, Juan Hsiao-hsien, and P'eng Pai, supported by a special grant, took charge of the movement's headquarters and developed a staff of twelve persons, including an editor for a new journal, *The Plough*, an organ of internal communication. In January 1926 an excellent magazine, *Chung-kuo nung-min* (The Chinese Farmer) began publication under the auspices of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee's Farmers Bureau, for a wider

audience. But the farmers' movement was no longer dependent upon the Kuomintang Farmers Bureau, which provided only 100 to 200 dollars a month. Now there was a budget of $1,500 a month—presumably provided by Borodin—which paid modest salaries and printing bills for pamphlets and posters. "It is still not much. But after all, ours is a poor man's organization!" Another organizational advance was the creation of six regional offices run by appointed three-man committees responsible for work in clusters of counties, with the seventeen counties near Canton directly managed by the central office.[154]

The actual organizers, the men in the field, were special deputies (*t'e p'ai yuan*), most of them schooled in the Farmers Movement Training Institute, which had graduated five classes with a total of 545 graduates, though not all of them had gone into organizational work. The 114 graduates of the Fifth Class had been divided in December 1925 into two groups: the first, numbering 55, were mostly sent to the East River and the Southern Route counties that had recently been conquered by the Nationalist forces; most of the other graduates were dispatched to Hunan, from which province 44 had been recruited. Mao Tse-min, a brother of Mao Tse-tung, is listed as one of these. Mao Tse-tung was soon selected to be director of the institute's Sixth Class. A few other graduates were sent to Kwangsi and Fukien, Anhui, Honan, and Shantung.[155] The Hunan contingent evidently had been recruited in anticipation of the coming northward campaign. Lin Tsu-han reported to the congress that one hundred and some tens of special deputies had been sent into the field. Lo Ch'i-yüan asserted that 99 percent of the special deputies were "our comrades, actually doing the farmers' movement work and giving the honor to the Kuomintang." Their work was difficult, they were poorly paid, and some of them had lost their lives in the struggles between farmers and rural Kwangtung power-holders.[156]

There is a great deal of information about these struggles in Kwangtung between organized farmers and their oppressors. Juan Hsiao-hsien gave a special twelve-page report to the Second Provincial Farmers Congress on the subject, which also takes up sections of Lo Ch'i-yüan's broader report. Both men emphasized ways in which farmers assisted the several Nationalist military campaigns to win control of Kwangtung—for example, the assertion that more than five hundred farmers lost their lives helping the revolutionary army in the Second Eastern Expedition. Most of the conflicts on which the writers provided information concerned the farmers' livelihood, such as rent-reduction struggles with landlords, sometimes as interlineage battles; or resistance to paying exorbitant levies in support of *min-t'uan*, so-called militia, which were often used to uphold the existing rural order—just what the farmers' associations and their ideological guides were attempting to change. Other conflicts were generated by refusal to pay government taxes, and most often they were battles against "evil gentry and local bullies." Counties most frequently mentioned as trouble spots were Kwang-ning and Kao-yao in northwestern Kwangtung, Chung-shan and Shun-te in the delta, and Pao-an, P'u-ning, Hai-feng, Lu-feng, and Wu-hua in the east, though farmers' guards battled landlords and *min-t'uan* in many places, often requiring the government to send troops to quell disorders. Juan Hsiao-hsien gave an analysis of 170 instances of martyred farmers, tabulated by county and by cause. Hai-feng and Lu-feng led with 53 and 38 farmer deaths in struggle; Shun-te and Kwang-ning followed with 20 each. Over 100 lost their lives opposing warlords on behalf of the revolution, 30 opposing *min-t'uan*, and 20 in rent-reduction struggles.[157] These rural conflicts, mostly between poor and tenant farmers on one side and landlords and other rural power-holders on the other, naturally aroused hostility and fear among the wealthy and conservative in political circles. They fueled the "New Right Wing" opposition to Communist activities under the banner of the Kuomintang. Minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council during the spring of 1926 contain many entries on these conflicts. Document 52, which summarizes reports from Borodin in May, mentions

"bloody fights [that] broke out at various places between peasants and small landlords" (Doc. 52, p. 4).

Lo Ch'i-yüan and Juan Hsiao-hsien frankly criticized the farmers' movement in their reports to the congress, pointing to poor organization and faulty behavior.[158] The whole organization was much too loose, with poor local leadership. Local associations failed to report to the center and did not obey its orders. Farmers were not properly trained in discipline; members did not pay dues. Most serious, local associations were being infiltrated by class enemies. "The present suspicion of farmers' asso ciations arises from this," Juan asserted. There was too much struggle during the past year, excessive demands and reckless action, attributes of "pro-Leftist naiveté," according to Lo, who urged, "We must have allies." The best allies were the workers, youth, and emancipated women. Farmers' associations meddled too much in local government, arrested on their own, and conducted "inopportune executions." "Be cautious," he enjoined. Local associations must not be used for personal purposes; farmers' guards should be used only for defense and must include association members only—that is, no hired fighters. Try to convert the *min-t'uan* rather than fight them, go slow in trying to overthrow landlords and gentry, and get public support first. Propaganda to win public support and gain allies must be improved, both Juan and Lo demanded. It was a time for interclass cooperation in the interests of the revolution, and for the united front with the Kuomintang. Liberation would come after world revolution.

Yet cooperation with the Kuomintang presented a particularly difficult problem for farmers' associations, since the gentry often dominated local Kuomintang organizations, which demanded the right to control local farmers' associations. This was a persistent difficulty arising from the double chain of command—inherent in each party's self-concept derived from the Leninist system of one-party control of government and all other systems. From the beginning the Communist Party demanded that farmers' associations be independent, but in fact under CCP control. Lo's answer to the situation of attempted KMT control over local associations was, "unite under the banner of the real Kuomintang, drive out the spurious Kuomintang."

The main thrust of the Congress clearly was: time to draw back, for the cautious approach, and concentration on economic reforms in the countryside. Resolutions attached to Juan Hsiao-hsien's report emphasize this: tighten organization, take a long-range view after careful study of the real rural situation, no struggles without permission from the top, interclass cooperation, support for the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government, and unity among the masses.[159] In mid-July, the Communist Party's Central Committee Plenum attempted to define more precisely its policy toward the peasant movement, as presented in our Document 58 in chapter 5.

Political Difficulties in Canton after Borodin's Return

Document 52 is a summation of reports from Borodin after his return to Canton; it covers developments during May, a period of intense political and military activity in the Nationalist camp. The summation was prepared in Peking by "Seifulin," the name used by A. Ia. Lapin, who served as Soviet military attaché for a few months in 1926. The report begins with an account of an attempt by the Right Wing in Canton to draw Chiang Kai-shek to their side, and, that failing, to win over Li Chi-shen and other generals. Apparently, Hu Han-min, after his return on April 29, was for a brief period the "chief advance commander" of the Right. Hu met secretly with Wu Ch'ao-shu, Sun Fo, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Ku Ying-fen, "and other reactionaries" and brought Li Chi-shen, Ch'en Ming-shu, and other Canton generals to his side. He urged Chiang Kai-shek to arrest Borodin. Hu Han-min's efforts ended in failure, however, when Chiang refused to see him on May 8. The next day, according to Borodin's

report, Hu left Canton for Shanghai (Doc. 52, pp. 2-3).

Some of these details can be confirmed from other sources. It is known that Hu and Borodin had separate consultations with Chiang the day after their return, but that Borodin got the lion's share of Chiang's attention.[160] Hu Han-min was asked to address the Political Council on his experiences in Russia, and in the first few days in May he met with many other groups. Apparently his statements about Russian policy toward China and Chinese Communist policies toward the Kuomintang were highly critical.[161]

If Hu Han-min, supported by his followers and others of the Right Wing, made a bid for power in the Nationalist regime, he was unsuccessful. On May 10 Chiang learned that Hu had departed for Hong Kong the day before, and that a fellow passenger was Wang Ching-wei.[162].

Document 52 also reported much local conflict in Canton and the vicinity. This is confirmed by minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council. Looting by armed unemployed workers and looting of ships caused constant friction with consular officials. There were frequent strikes and bitter conflict in the student movement. The Whampoa Army took hostile actions against the Communist faction and threatened Chiang Kai-shek unless he purged Communists within the Kuomintang (Doc. 52, p. 4).

A report dated April 26 by the British consul general in Canton to the minister in Peking told of the tightening of the boycott of Hong Kong which resulted in warfare between strike pickets, who attacked boats selling fish to the Colony, and the fishing guild, which armed its vessels; of pickets forcibly removing a northern Chinese strike-breaking crew from a Japanese vessel in port and holding the crewmen captive; of an attack by pickets on the commissioner of customs, Mr. Hayley Bell, in which he was wounded; and of labor troubles in the Postal Department, which prompted the postal commissioner, Mr. Richie, to seek aid from the Canton police (this was before Chiang deposed Wu T'ieh-ch'eng).[163] On May Day, the enmity between Communist and Rightist leaders among labor unions rose to such a pitch that Chiang warned them and sent troops into the city to maintain order. The rival federations of labor unions held separate parades.[164]

The first week in May was the time for many memorial days, during which conflicts arose. On May 7, when Chiang went to address a meeting commemorating Japan's humiliation of China in 1915, the fight broke out between members of the League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism in which P'an Yu-ch'iang and Yang Yin-chih were among the gravely wounded. Yet in a bid for interclass harmony a meeting was held on May 15 with representatives of the Farmers Congress, the Labor Congress, the Sixth Provincial Students Association Congress, and several commercial organizations. Besides shouting slogans of support for the Nationalist Government and the national revolution, the meeting petitioned the government to end the kerosene oil monopoly, solve the Hong Kong strike, expel bandits and create peace, set up a labor-owner arbitration mechanism, severely punish corrupt and avaricious officials, prevent rebels from spreading rumors, build the highway to develop Whampoa [as a port], complete the Canton-Hankow Railway, and increase the education budget. Some of these reforms were soon put into effect.[165]

Chiang, Borodin, and Modus Vivendi

Such was part of the background against which Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin negotiated. According to Document 52, Chiang demanded that restrictions be placed on the duties of Communists in the Kuomintang. This faced Borodin with two alternatives, either to accept his demands "to avoid a catastrophe" or to form an anti-Chiang alliance and force Chiang not to yield to the demands of the anti-Communist

faction in the Kuomintang. "The problem was solved," in the report's words, "by adopting a policy to satisfy Chiang and yield to his demands." Chiang insisted that (1) Communists should not head departments of the Kuomintang's central headquarters; (2) a list of Communist members of the Kuomintang should be turned over to the chairman of the Central Executive Committee; and (3) Kuomintang members were not to become members of the Communist Party. Further, a joint council consisting of five Kuomintang members, three Communists, and one representative of the Communist International should be formed to solve all problems (Doc. 52, pp. 5-6).

An agreement, we may judge from entries in Chiang Kai-shek's "diary," was the result of long and acrimonious bargaining. Chiang conferred with Borodin on May 1, 7, 12, 13, and 14, and the subjects mentioned were the Northern Expedition, Party affairs, and an agreement on Kuomintang-Communist relations.[166] Chiang's "diary" records their disagreement in their first long discussion concerning the Northern Expedition. According to a biographer close to Chiang, Borodin had to yield on the question in exchange for continued cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists.[167] An agreement on Kuomintang-Communist relations was to be proposed and discussed, and then passed upon, by a plenary meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, which would open on May 15. Though Chiang was under pressure from Rightists within his army and among civilian groups in Canton[168]—and, we speculate, he made use of these groups in his negotiations—Borodin was not without cards. Probably the main one was the prospect of Russian arms for the forthcoming campaign. One shipment arrived on May 6, much to Chiang's satisfaction.[169] Wu P'ei-fu's success in pressing T'ang Sheng-chih back to southern Hunan raised the danger of an invasion of Kwangtung.

From the minutes of the Central Executive Committee Plenum and notations in Chiang's "diary," we can trace the terms of the agreement in greater detail. Chiang made four major proposals.[170] The first concerned "Rectification of Party Affairs," which Chiang raised on May 14 at a meeting of the Political Council. The council passed it and proposed it in their own names as a Resolution of the CEC Plenum,[171] which adopted it on May 17. The main provision was to establish a Kuomintang-Communist Joint Council, with the following specifications:

> (1) The Council is to consist of five Kuomintang and three Communist Party delegates. (2) The scope of its deliberations shall be to investigate actions or words of members of the two parties which create obstacles to interparty cooperation and other problems causing discord between members of the two parties, and it shall settle important matters in the joint relations of the parties. (3) If members of either party have points of suspicion or dissatisfaction concerning the other, they should present a complaint or report to the Central Executive Committee of their own party, which will transmit it to the Council for investigation, after which the matter shall be transmitted back to the respective Central Executive Committees for execution, separately. (4) The members of the Council shall have complete authority to represent their respective parties. (5) The Council shall invite a representative of the Third International to be its adviser. (6) If the Central Executive Committee of either party shall be dissatisfied with a decision of the Council, the matter shall be referred back to the Council for further deliberation. (7) The members' term of office shall be for one year. (8) The Council does not have the power to revise the terms of the "Rectification of Party Affairs."[172]

On May 20, the plenum elected the following as the Kuomintang's delegates to the Joint Council: Chang Jen-chieh, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, Wu Ching-heng (Wu Chih-hui), and Ku Meng-yü, with Li Chi-shen, Ho Hsiang-ning, and Ching

Heng-i in reserve. All were members of the Central Executive Committee save Chang and Wu, who were members of the Central Supervisory Committee. None of the eight held dual membership, as far as is known.

Chiang introduced his second proposal in his own name alone. Its essential purpose was to curtail activity of Communists in the Kuomintang. After discussion, and revision of wording by the Central Supervisory Committee, it was passed as the "Second Resolution on Rectification of Party Affairs."

> (1) When members of another party join our Party, the other party should instruct its members to understand that the foundation of the Kuomintang is the Three Principles of the People created by its Leader, and that they may not doubt nor criticize the Leader or the Three Principles. (2) The other party shall hand over to the Chairman of the Kuomintang CEC for safe-keeping a list of its members who have joined our Party. (3) When members from another party occupy positions on executive committees of high-level headquarters of our Party (central, provincial, and special municipal headquarters) their number may not exceed one-third of the executive committee members of that headquarters. (4) Members of another party who have joined our Party may not serve as heads of bureaus in our Party's central organ. (5) Members of the Kuomintang are not permitted to call meetings in the name of the Kuomintang without permission of a party headquarters. (6) Without permission of the highest level party headquarters, members of the Kuomintang may not start other political organizations or engage in other political activities. (7) All orders from another party to its members in our Party must first be submitted to and passed by the Joint Council; in a special emergency when the matter cannot wait to be proposed and passed, the order still should be brought to the Joint Council with a request for retrospective approval. (8) Members of our Party who have not yet received permission to resign may not enter another party; those who do resign from our Party and join another may not rejoin our Party. Party members violating the above conditions should immediately be expelled or, depending upon the gravity of the offense, receive additional penalties.[173]

Chiang had seven other sponsors for his Third Resolution, to elect a chairman of the Central Executive Committee or, as the actual wording has it, of the CEC Standing Committee. The resolution was passed by a majority and then referred to a special committee to determine how the election should be conducted. In an election held on May 19, Chiang Jen-chieh, a member of the Central Supervisory Committee and a close associate of Chiang Kai-shek, was elected chairman of the CEC Standing Committee, receiving nineteen votes out of approximately twenty-four cast.[174]

The Fourth Resolution proposed a reregistration of all Kuomintang members and the abolishing of all Party headquarters not authorized by Central. Another special committee was appointed to study the resolution, and with its modifications and blessing, it became the Fourth Resolution on Rectification of Party Affairs. Its main points were that all Kuomintang members must be reregistered within three months in headquarters organized by the Party's central offices. The standard for reregistration shall be special knowledge of and a pledge to uphold Sun Yat-sen's Plan for National Construction, the Outline of National Construction, and the Three Principles of the People, as well as the Manifestoes and Resolutions of the First and Second National Congresses of the Kuomintang. Persons who had joined political bodies not recognized by the Kuomintang must resign from those organizations.

The plenum closed on May 22 after having approved, jointly with the Central Supervisory Committee, a Manifesto and Instructions to Party Members, and passed a

resolution on the Northern Expedition.

This was one outcome of the intensive negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin. Communists within the Kuomintang were to restrain themselves, and their freedom of action within the parent party was curtailed; a mechanism was designed to adjudicate interparty conflict; the Kuomintang was somewhat further centralized; and the Canton Kuomintang leadership planned a checkup of the membership.

Borodin had to deal with the Chinese Communist leaders in Canton as well as with Chiang. According to reminiscent accounts of Chang Kuo-t'ao, P'eng Shu-chih, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, after the March 20 Incident, the Central Committee in Shanghai decided to send Chang Kuo-t'ao to Canton to investigate, as described above. According to P'eng, when the Central Committee received a detailed report from the Kwangtung Provincial Committee, it decided on a policy toward Chiang, the essentials of which were to unite with the Left Wing of the Kuomintang and their military forces to oppose Chiang Kai-shek; to expand the military forces under Yeh T'ing; and to furnish arms to the workers and peasants. The Central Committee sent P'eng to Canton to organize a special committee consisting of himself, T'an P'ing-shan, and Chang Kuo-t'ao of the Central Committee, and Ch'en Yen-nien, Chou En-lai, and Chang T'ai-lei of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee to discuss with the Comintern representative, Borodin, concrete measures for dealing with Chiang. P'eng arrived in Canton toward the end of April, but Borodin, he says, refused to discuss any of the Central Committee's resolutions. Borodin insisted that the policy of KMT-CCP collaboration must continue, the Communist Party should accept the situation which had resulted from the coup, recognize Chiang's military dictatorship, accept his "Resolutions on Adjusting Party Affairs," and assist Chiang in the Northern Expedition. P'eng asserts that all members of the special committee except himself gave their approval to Borodin's views. Thus the policy of opposition to Chiang was turned into a policy of surrender.[175]

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "Letter to All Comrades of the Party" of December 1929 substantiates P'eng Shu-chih to some extent. He appears to refer to happenings a little later, however. Ch'en relates, of the CCP Central Committee, that "we accepted" all the decisions of the Kuomintang CEC concerning Communists in their Party—i.e., the decisions of the plenum—but held the view that "we should prepare our independent military forces in order to withstand Chiang Kai-shek." Comrade P'eng Shu-chih was sent to Canton as representative of the Central Committee to consult with "the Comintern representative" about our plan. (Ch'en does not refer to Borodin by name.) He disapproved it, and made every effort to continue arming Chiang Kai-shek. He urged that "we exhaust all our strength to support the military dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek in order to strengthen the Canton government and to carry out the Northern Expedition." When he was asked to take 5,000 rifles to arm the peasants of Kwangtung, he refused. Ch'en Tu-hsiu continued that after the March 20 coup—he does not say how long after—he gave his personal opinion in a report to the Comintern that intraparty cooperation with the Kuomintang should be changed to an extraparty alliance, so that the Communist Party could carry out an independent policy and gain the confidence of the masses. This opinion, Ch'en asserts, was criticized by Bukharin in an article in *Pravda*, and Voitinsky was sent back to China to correct the tendency to withdraw from the Kuomintang.[176]

In his political report to the Fifth Congress in April-May 1927, Ch'en Tu-hsiu confirmed that the CC had adopted a policy of retreat following the coup d'etat in the belief that the combined strength of the Communists and the KMT Left was insufficient to suppress Chiang. The CC, said Ch'en, took into consideration the fact that Chiang had not yet openly betrayed his counterrevolutionary leanings. Ch'en chastised himself for having proposed withdrawal from the Kuomintang: "I myself have been guilty of this error."[177]

Communist Party acceptance of the decisions of the KMT-CEC Plenum was formally announced in a letter to the Kuomintang from the CCP-CC on June 4. Since the plenum's resolutions were an internal KMT matter, the CC stated that it had no right to express approval or disapproval, but it ended the letter with the hope that the Kuomintang would purge reactionaries more energetically in order to strengthen the internal situation.[178]

A great change in personnel took place in Kuomintang Central Headquarters in accordance with the decision that Communists might not head any of the bureaus. Chiang Kai-shek replaced T'an P'ing-shan as head of the powerful Organization Department, with his protégé, Ch'en Kuo-fu, as secretary. Ku Meng-yü took over the Propaganda Department from the deputy chief, Mao Tse-tung, while Kan Nai-kuang replaced Lin Tsu-han as head of the Farmers Bureau. At the Secretariat, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang replaced Liu Fen. All those replaced were eminent dual party members. Their replacements seemed to be balanced between Centrists and Leftists among the Kuomintang notables.

The Right Wing was also to be subdued, however. As Borodin reported to his superiors, it was agreed that upon the CEC's acceptance of Chiang's three demands, which would also satisfy the Whampoa commanders and the KMT Center, Chiang "would take action to arrest, purge, and otherwise bring pressure against the Right" (Doc. 52, p. 6). In the subsequent ten days, the report continues, the Right Wing lost a great deal. Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen) was appointed minister of foreign affairs, replacing Wu Ch'ao-shu, who was forced to go to Shanghai. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, who had already lost his command of an Independent Division, was arrested on May 30. Furthermore, Chiang planned to send Sun Fo to Moscow, and Fu Ping-ch'ang probably would be dismissed (Doc. 52, p. 7).

Most conveniently, there is a report from Fu Ping-ch'ang just after his dismissal.[179] According to Fu, the dismissal of Wu Ch'ao-shu and himself was engineered by the Russians, and the appointment of Eugene Chen as foreign minister was arranged by T. V. Soong as a form of revenge against Wu. Behind all this, Fu understood that a bargain was struck between Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang needed Russian money and arms because of the danger from Wu P'ei-fu. Borodin's first condition was that Chiang should immediately arrest Wu T'ieh-ch'eng; he also insisted that C. C. Wu (Wu Ch'ao-shu) and all those closely associated with him be dismissed. Fu believed that Chiang accepted these conditions because of the promise of Russian arms and money. As soon as Wu T'ieh-ch'eng had been detained the Russians turned over 8,000 rifles and eight million rounds of ammunition, and Fu understood that more arms and ammunition were on the way.

This is, of course, the view of a man dismissed from office, and it may have been interlarded with hearsay. Yet it is a fact that Wu T'ieh-ch'eng was arrested and was held in prison for three months, and that Chiang Kai-shek's "diary" mentions, on the day of the arrest, a meeting of the Military Council at which the distribution of 8,000 rifles was decided upon.[180] A list of the arms and ammunition sent from Vladivostok to Canton during May and June included 13,694 rifles and 11 million cartridges.[181]

Document 52 is valuable for several other bits of information. A number of reforms were to be made to win over the populace in Kwangtung. Sincere negotiations would be held with Hong Kong to settle the strike. The government's petroleum monopoly had been abolished. And it had been decided to establish an arbitration court that would attempt to settle disputes between peasants and landlords and between capital and labor. As a result of the measures already taken, Canton had become peaceful and all the business associations were expressing their loyalty to the government, according to Borodin.

Most of the remainder of Document 52 deals with negotiations with other milita-

ry groups—Sun Ch'uan-fang in the lower Yangtze region, Yang Shen in Szechwan, and Yang Tsu-ming in Kweichow—and with a military force sent from Kwangsi to rescue T'ang Sheng-chih, the movement of the 24th Regiment (commanded by Yeh T'ing) across the border into Hunan, and preparations to move two divisions of the Fourth Corps up from southern Kwangtung. But apparently Borodin did not suggest in this report that such activity was the prelude to the long-awaited Northern Expedition.

Although Borodin had agreed to Chiang Kai-shek's demand for Russian support of the planned Northern Expedition, and General Bliukher had returned to Canton toward the end of May and was soon involved in detailed planning for the campaign, it seems there was no unified Russian position with respect to its timing. Borodin still believed a long period of political preparation was necessary before the campaign should be launched.[182] Ambassador Karakhan was opposed to immediate movement. In a report of June 12 he expressed apprehension that the clamor in Kwangtung for aid to T'ang Sheng-chih went under the slogan of the Northern Expedition; he feared it would be extremely difficult for the Canton Government and the Kuomintang's CEC to cut this short.[183] Yet sometime in May the Soviet government had made a decision to aid Canton during the period of the Northern Expedition, which it believed would be conducted in the near future. It decided to satisfy requests already made for matériel, and to hasten the transfer to Canton of stocks of arms concentrated at Vladivostok.[184] Due to inadequate information, the leadership in Moscow apparently did not know of the Nationalists' intention to move north immediately.[185] As late as August 4, long after the campaign was underway, the Soviet Commission for Chinese Affairs in Moscow advocated stopping the further movement of troops out of Kwangtung. (Moscow's position is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.)

But it was in Canton, not in Moscow, that a series of decisions and actions by Nationalist leaders brought Sun Yat-sen's dream of a northward campaign toward actualization. At the end of May, the Nationalist Government decided to send units of the Seventh Corps to Hunan to rescue T'ang Sheng-chih, and on June 2, T'ang was appointed commander of the Eighth Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. An emergency session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee resolved on June 4 to launch the Northern Expedition and to appoint Chiang Kai-shek commander in chief; the National Government Council made the appointment the next day. The Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters soon replaced the Military Council. On June 11, Chiang assumed his duties as head of the Central Committee's Organization Department, with Ch'en Kuo-fu as his deputy. On July 5, he was appointed chief of the Kuomintang's Military Personnel Department, which had the power to appoint and dismiss all Party representatives in the NRA and other military organs. Finally, on July 6, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee formally elected him chairman of its Standing Committee during the period of the Northern Expedition and asked Chang Jen-chieh to be his deputy.[186] Thus did Chiang Kai-shek gain control over the Party's key administrative and military organs on the eve of the Northern Expedition.

The Communist Party's central leadership had accepted, in the interest of a continued "united front," the obligation of cooperation within the Kuomintang; and apparently the local leaders had accepted, perhaps reluctantly, the need to cool revolutionary activism in Kwangtung, the revolutionary base. These men and a few women, mostly intellectuals, were urged by their doctrine as well as by the Comintern to organize the Chinese masses, essentially urban workers and peasants.[187] Their doctrine also told them that class struggle was a key to successful revolution. Experience had shown that controlling labor unions was very difficult; there were too few cadres and the workers had grievances of their own to settle—wages, working conditions, old-style labor bosses, unremitting toil. Often they attempted to settle these grievances with wild-cat strikes and interunion battles.

The soil for conflict was fertile in South China. Most rural folk in Kwangtung, and in neighboring Hunan, had scores to settle, and one reason for organizing was to gain the power to redress felt wrongs. Once a group of tenant farmers was united in an association they might start a rent-reduction movement on their own, or with only a little encouragement. Interlineage strife was endemic and very difficult to hold in check. While farmers' associations had some great triumphs, as in Kwang-ning and Hai-feng, there had been bloody defeats, too. Could interclass strife be leashed and unleashed, be fine-tuned for larger policy reasons?

Chinese Communist leaders, like all groups of political persons, differed among themselves in age, experience, temperament, and commitment. Some worked with peasants, some with factory workers, others with soldiers or students. Some were article-writers, while others led strikes or harangued in rural markets. They must have disagreed deeply among themselves on the fundamental question of how much radical activism and interclass strife should be encouraged or restrained, assuming that these could be controlled at the working level. How much restraint should or could be imposed in the interest of orderly government in Kwangtung and a united front during the Northern Expedition? In short, how much social revolution should be promoted during the Northern Expedition? "Class struggle" was a fundamental doctrine of Marxism—the engine of societal transformation. Since early in 1925 some Chinese Communist writers, particularly Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and Ts'ai Ho-sheng, and even Ch'en Tu-hsiu, had been calling for class struggle as an indispensable part of the National Revolution.

Notes

1. T'an P'ing-shan explained the postponements from June to September 15 and then to mid-November in a report to delegates on December 23, 1925. See printed minutes of the congress, *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ti-erh-tz'u Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui Hui-i chi-lu*, pp. 227-28 (hereafter *Minutes of the 2d Congress*). Wu Yü-chang, chief secretary of the congress, explained on January 4, 1926 that by the end of November only thirty or forty delegates had arrived in Canton, including those from overseas. Ibid., pp. 8-9. The Manifesto of the Second Congress, dated January 1, 1926, is translated in Milton J. T. Shieh, *The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969*, pp. 110-26. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, I, 479, the first section of the Manifesto was taken over from a telegram sent by Moscow [the ECCI?] to Borodin in late December 1925. The Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the CCP issued a manifesto on January 1 to the KMT Congress, denouncing Rightist attempts to restrict worker and peasant movements and purge Communists from the Kuomintang. Teng Chung-hsia made a speech of welcome to the Congress on January 3 at the offices of the General Labor Union. Reprinted in *Chung Kung Tang shih ts'an-kao shih-liao*, II, 192-201.

2. Chiang Kai-shek's "Military Report" to the congress is printed in *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, XI, 1756-63; Wang Ching-wei's "Political Report" and Sung Tze-wen's "Financial Report" are in KMWH, XX, 3851-78. Manifestoes and resolutions of the congress are reproduced in U.S. Department of State, *Records Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929*, National Archives Microfilm M329, Reel 56, item no. 8. See also Li Yün-han, "The Second National Congress of the Kuomintang of China"; and C. Martin Wilbur, "The Second National Congress of the Kuomintang."

3. *Minutes of the 2d Congress*, p. 10.

4. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

5. Ibid., pp. 28-35 for T'an's entire report; specific statements of membership, pp. 29-31. The disparity between twelve as against eleven formally organized provinces and nine as against eight being organized is not explained in the text.

6. Report by Chan Chü-ch'u, ibid., p. 46.

7. The committee had been appointed by the Presidium on January 7 to study the report by T'an P'ing-shan on party affairs. It contained sixteen members, of whom nine were Communists in the KMT. Ibid., p. 35.

8. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

9. Ibid., pp. 88-94 for the debate and final vote. A formal resolution specifying expulsion for Hsieh Ch'ih and Tsou Lu, letters of warning to the twelve other persons attending the conference, and an exhortation to Tai Chi-t'ao to repent was introduced and passed on January 16. Ibid., p. 134. The debate is discussed in Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 466-69.

According to Professor Li Yu-ning, a recent history published in Peking asserts that Chiang Kai-shek made a speech at the congress denouncing the Western Hills Conference, "and shouted at the top of his voice that he wanted to maintain the three great policies of Sun Yat-sen. As a result, he won a great deal of praise which he did not deserve." (*Chung-kuo ke-ming shih kao*, edited by Hsiao Ch'ao-jan and Sha Chien-sun [Peking: Peking University Press, 1984], p. 98.) However, the official minutes of the congress show no record of Chiang making such a speech, and it is doubtful that he would have mentioned "the three great policies of Sun Yat-sen," a term not yet invented in January 1926. In his study of the second congress, Li Yün-han states that Chiang called a meeting of academy delegates to the congress on January 12—the eve of the debate over the Western Hills conferees—and the delegates resolved to propose a lenient policy for handling the impeachments. They asked Wang Ching-wei to explain their view. This is based on Chiang's "Diary," a not infallible source. Li, "The Second National Congress of the Kuomintang of China," pp. 47-48.

10. Since T'an P'ing-shan favored leniency, the Communist speakers were not united on this issue. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 480, Kao Yü-han was the major spokesman for the CCP at the Congress.

11. *Minutes of the 2d Congress*, pp. 163-69.

12. Using Kao's membership figures for the CCP and accepting Chang's statement, less than 150 Kuomintang members had joined the Communist Party.

13. Ibid., pp. 165-69 for the entire debate.

14. Ibid., p. 9. Ching Heng-i had been selected for the Presidium but apparently did not attend. After Mme. Sun arrived, she was elected on January 7 to replace him, but she did not serve as chairman of any session as the other six did.

15. Ibid., pp. 73-76.

16. Ibid., p. 143.

17. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 481-82. Sun Yat-sen had made up the ballot for the first central committees after consulting groups of delegates at the First Congress. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao had been elected reserve members, not regular members of the First CEC.

18. *Minutes of the 2d Congress*, p. 145.

19. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 473, identifies Chu Chi-hsün as a Communist at this time. However, Chiang Yung-ching does not identify him among the Communists elected. *Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wuhan cheng ch'üan*, p. 10. His name does not appear on the purge list drawn up in April 1927 by some members of the Central Control Committee (KMWH, XVII, 3091-92).

20. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 482. Chang asserts that Hu Han-min received 249 votes but that Wu Yü-chang, chief secretary for the congress, reduced Hu's vote by one and listed him third instead of first, with the approval of Wang Ching-wei.

21. Wang Wei-lien, "Election of the CEC at the Second Congress," p. 97. Wang asserts that Ch'en Tu-hsiu approved Tai's election when queried by telegraph.

22. Ibid., pp. 94-98. Wang Wei-lien asserts that the Communist Party fraction was directly supervised by the Communist Central Political Bureau—probably an

anachronism. He says there were eleven officers: T'an P'ing-shan, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Kao Yü-han, Yün Tai-ying, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Tsu-han, Wu Yü-chang, Yang P'ao-an, Han Lin-fu, Hsia Hsi, and Yü Shu-te. Members of the fraction met at least every two days. The officers met daily to discuss problems of the Second Kuomintang Congress, including persons to be supported for election. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, 1, 480, remembered that about one-third of the delegates were members of the Communist Party and he was in charge of steering the group. Tung Pi-wu, who attended the congress, later recalled that the Communist Party only permitted a few of its members to be elected to the CEC, which implies either a veto in the nominating process or control of the votes of its delegate members. Nym Wales, *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists*, p. 41.

Professor Li Yu-ning called our attention to a recent article about Borodin's activities in Kwangtung, which alleges that he, Chou En-lai, and Ch'en Yen-nien planned to use the KMT Congress as a means to attack the Right Wing, to isolate the central faction, and to expand the Left Wing, and even to expel Tai Chi-t'ao and Sun Fo from the Kuomintang. The plan was to elect Communists to one-third of the seats in the CEC, a few Centralists, and many Leftists, so that the Left Wing could attain absolute superiority. However, the account continues, the Communist Party Central Committee disagreed with the plan and even held talks with Sun Fo, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, and Shao Yuan-ch'ung. It telegraphed the Kwangtung Communists to receive these Rightists when they arrived in Canton. Borodin was very dissatisfied, believing that the KMT Leftists and Communists should continue attacking the Rightists; they definitely should not retreat now. Believing that the telegram represented Voitinsky's policy, supported by the Comintern, he had to execute the policy, and "made great concessions to the Rightists in the elections" at the congress, "resulting in the situation in which the Rightists were powerful, the Centralists were encouraged, and the Leftists were isolated." From Yuan Pang-chien, "Pao-lo-t'ing tsai Kwangtung ti chi-ko wen-t'i" in *Chin-tai-shih yen-chiu*, no. 4 (July 1984), Peking, pp. 141-42. Yuan cites the reminiscences of Chou En-lai and Chang Kuo-t'ao on the planning, and a speech by Borodin printed in *Cheng-chih chou-pao*, no 2 (date not specified) for the quoted conclusion about the ill effects of the election. Though it is plausible that Borodin would be particularly hostile to Tai Chi-t'ao and Sun Fo at that time, the results of the election are difficult to square with his supposed gloomy assessment.

23. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 473 and 519 n. 33, based on the Minutes of the First Plenum of the Second Central Executive Committee preserved in the Kuomintang Archives.

24. Report of the British consul general in Canton, James Jamieson, in PRO (FO 13103) Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 405/250, for January-March 1926, no. 119. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 486, cites the Minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council for February 3, when Borodin requested a month's leave. He did not attend meetings thereafter until April 30, 1926. For Political Council appointments, see Kuo Ting-yee, *Chung-hua Min-kuo*, for February 1, 1926.

25. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 16; *As Military Adviser*, p. 175; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 239; Jacobs, *Borodin*, p. 193.

26. *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, pp. 64-66. The stenographic record of Primakov's report is kept in the archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and is reproduced as an annex to Primakov, *Zapiski*, pp. 201-204.

27. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 16-21; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 181-82.

28. Ibid., pp. 24-30. R. A. Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin," pp. 33-37, and Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 38.

29. Quotations in Mirovitskaia, *Soviet Volunteers in China*, p. 45. Also reports in Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 28-30; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 183-86.

30. Ibid., p. 43.

31. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 50.

32. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 87-93; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 213-16. There may also have been a meeting of some Chinese Communist CC members in Peking with the Bubnov Commission, but we are uninformed about it.

33. Kuo Ting-yee, *Chung-hua Min-kuo*, II, for January 26 and February 17, 1926. Li Tsung-jen devotes a chapter in his *Memoirs* to the evolving alliance. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen.

34. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, February 2, 4, and 18. There is a biography of Liu Wen-tao in BDRC.

35. Cherepanov, *As Military Adviser in China*, p. 170.

36. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 134.

37. The following description is based on Vishnyakova-Akomova, *Two Years*, pp. 178-208.

38. Ibid., pp. 209-10 and 167-68.

39. Ibid., pp. 191, 195.

40. PRO (FO 13103). Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 405/250, January-March 1926, no. 79, enc. 1. Clementi to Chamberlain, January 7, 1926. Secret. There is a vast amount of detail on the negotiations to end the strike in *Further Correspondence*.

41. Ibid., no. 45, quoting *Canton Gazette*.

42. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien shih*, p. 185.

43. CYB, 1928, pp. 974-75.

44. PRO (FO 13103) as cited, no. 79, enc. 1; and no. 88, enc. 3, quoting *Canton Gazette*.

45. Ibid., no. 28, Weekly Summary of Events in China, February 1, 1926; and no. 41, annex xviii A, telegram FO Jan 26, 1926, Sir William Tyrrell to Sir Ronald Macleay, H.M. Minister to Peking. The urgency was the deplorable state of British trade and residents in South China, and the mounting criticism of apparent inactivity of the British government. Parliament was soon to convene, so a line of policy must be prepared.

46. PRO (FO 13114) Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China* 405/251, April-June 1926, no. 24, enc. 1, transmitting Clementi to Chamberlain of February 23, describing unsuccessful attempt to foment a new strike in Hong Kong; and same, 13103, cited, no. 119, enc. telegram of February 15.

47. Ibid., no. 125; nos. 70, 80, and 84, Weekly Summary, February 19, 26, and March 5, 1926; and CYB, 1928, p. 662.

48. PRO (FO 13114), cited, no. 26. CO to FO, April 27, 1926, a series of papers sent by Clementi to Colonial Office describing revived discussions.

49. Ibid.

50. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 95; *As Military Adviser*, p. 216.

51. PRO (FO 13114) no. 46, enc. 1. Clementi to Chamberlain, March 24, 1926; Minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council for March 22, a special meeting.

52. Whether Grey is the true or assumed name, we do not know. From the concluding paragraphs of Document 36, a report on the Canton Navy, signed by Grey on March 15, 1926, we know that he had worked for forty-eight days in the navy and expected to work with it for a long time. Information secured from French sources by the British consul general in Canton, J. Brenan, in July 1927, showed Grey as "Conseiller pour les affaires de la marine" until shortly after April 15, 1927, when all "Soviet Agents" except consular personnel left Canton. PRO (FO 405/254), no. 78, enc. 3. This is *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 13315, July-September 1927.

53. The Presidium in mid-March would have consisted of Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and T'an Yen-k'ai.

54. In January 1926, a monthly journal began publication in the name of the

Military Council, entitled *Chün-shih Wei-yuan-hui chün-shih cheng-chih yüeh-k'an* (Monthly on military and political affairs of the Military Council). It is valuable as reflecting the revolutionary élan of the times. It is now reproduced in five microfilm reels by the Center for Chinese Research Materials, as reported in its *Newsletter*, no. 27, September 1979.

55. Chang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for that day.

56. We decided not to reproduce seven reports in this series because the substance of them was covered by other documents, particularly Document 26. They are "The Arms of the National Revolutionary Army"; "Artillery of the National Revolutionary Army of South China" (by L. Grey, dated 15 III, 1926, Canton); "Sources and Means of Supplying the Army with Arms and Munitions"; "Supplies"; "Organization and Means of Communication in the Armies of the Canton Government before Creation of the National Revolutionary Army"; "Military Transportation in the National Revolutionary Army"; and "The Military Engineering Organization in the National Revolutionary Army."

57. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for January 12 and March 1, 1926.

58. This sentence summarizes a section not found in the English version, but which appears to be the Chinese translation in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," p. 25.

59. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for March 8, 1926.

60. The distribution of graduates in October 1926 was: Officers' class, 800; non-commissioned officers' class, 850; political class, 450; and about 150 each in artillery, engineering, and supply classes (Doc. 70, p. 33).

61. Ch'en Kuo-fu gives a graphic account of recruitment in Chekiang, Anhwei, and Kiangsu for the two Training Regiments, of the need for secrecy, and of the difficulties in shipping recruits from Shanghai to Canton. Between the spring of 1925 and April 1926, when Mr. Ch'en turned over his responsibility to others, his organization had recruited more than 4,000 new troops at an average cost (including losses of men spirited away by other commanders) of a little more than $21. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "A Page in the History of the Founding of the Army," pp. 1458-61.

62. Document 26, p. 54, informs us that supplementary equipment for the arsenal had been ordered in 1923 and arrived in Canton by the end of 1924. Since the government lacked Ch $1,500,000 to pay for the equipment, it remained in warehouses until the end of 1925. The government had the intention to pay for the equipment and install it at the beginning of 1926.

63. Kuibyshev's Report of January 1926, Document 22, p. 50, states that no suitable Chinese had been found to be head of the Communications Department in the General Staff, so it was still headed by a Russian. He probably referred to Dratvin. See Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 232, and "A List of Names and Positions of Members of the Soviet Group in South China."

64. Chan Chü-ch'u's Report on Overseas Work, made to the Second Kuomintang Congress on January 9, states that overseas Chinese had contributed to the Aviation Society, HK $12,914, Canton $20,146, and Francs 32,895. *Minutes of the 2d Congress*, p. 46.

65. Ms. Vera Vishnyakova, who arrived in Canton about two weeks before this report was written, names four Russian pilots and two mechanics she met there. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 186.

66. Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army," entries for December 22, 25, 31 (1925), February 11, March 4 (1926).

67. This probably refers to the appointment of Li Chih-lung.

68. Document 38 is dated March 15, 1926, while the Regulations were promulgated by the Military Council on March 19, 1926. They are reprinted from the National Government Gazette (in Chinese) in *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, XII, 1814-18, thus confirming the authenticity of the text found in the Soviet Embassy.

69. This summarized articles 1-11 of the Regulations in Document 38, and articles 1-12 in KMWH, XII, 1814-16; and ch. III, articles 2 and 3 of Regulations Governing Party Representatives in the National Revolutionary Army, Document 41 and KMWH, XII, 1821.

70. Naumov, "The School at Whampoa," pp. 131-34. Naumov arrived in Canton in November 1925, having previously worked with Feng Yü-hsiang in the North.

71. Ch. I, article 10. The version in KMWH, which was that promulgated, had the report of treason go to the chairman of the Military Council rather than to the head of the Political Department and to the president of the Military Tribunal as in the version translated from Russian (Doc. 41). This was a substantive change.

72. Konchits, "In the Ranks," entries for February 19 and March 5, 1926.

73. Ibid. Entries for January 5, 9, and 11, 1926.

74. Chang Fa-k'uei, "The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei as told to Julie Lien-ying How," p. 168.

75. KMWH, XII, 1821, final note by compiler.

76. Li Chang-ta began his career as an instructor in the Canton military elementary school. In 1921 he visited Russian Siberia, perhaps on commission from Sun Yat-sen, and in 1923-24 he held a variety of offices in Sun's Canton administration. He was considered a radical. In late April 1926 (a month after the appointment reported) he became Canton police commissioner, replacing Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. Toward the end of his life, Chang held a number of titular posts under the Chinese People's Republic. He died in Canton on December 9, 1953 and was given a state funeral.

77. A copy of the letter was listed as Annex 9, but the translator of Document 37 noted that no such letter was in the file. Alas! According to N. Mitarevsky, "There is a very interesting mass of correspondence of the Chief of the Canton group Kisanka and some other persons with the Peking Military Center in which they complain of the actions of Borodin who insists on the removal of the Communist workers from the Canton Army." Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 36.

78. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 99. These statements are not in the official translation, *As Military Adviser*.

79. Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the Early Anti-Communist Movement," p. 88, citing a statement by Wang I-fei reported in *Chung-kuo chün-jen*, no. 6.

80. Ibid., pp. 91-103.

81. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for February 2, 1926; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 482; and "The Society," p. 90.

82. Li Yün-han, "The Society," p. 78, and *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 482. Reserve members elected were Tu Hsin-shu, Wei T'ing-ho, Ts'ao Jun-chün, Ho Chung-han, and Yang Yao-t'ang. Among the newly elected officers, Ch'en Ch'eng, Miao Pin, and Ho Chung-han gained fame in the future. See BDRC.

83. Naumov, "The School at Whampoa," p. 137; Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 14, 27; not found in *As Military Adviser*.

84. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for that date. This was just after the formal inauguration of the Society and the issuance of its Manifesto.

85. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 82; *As Military Adviser*, p. 211. The sketches are given much more fully than in our Document 49. Ibid., pp. 77-81; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 207-11.

86. We do not brief the sketch of T'ang Sheng-chih's career because it seems not to be based on observation by an adviser. Our Document 66 is such a report on T'ang.

87. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 15-16. This is omitted in the official translation.

88. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 210, 167.

89. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, under dates mentioned.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid. T'ang had secretly sent a delegate to Canton on February 18. The Nationalist Government sent Generals Ch'en Ming-shu and Pai Ch'ung-hsi to Changsha to negotiate further; they were there on March 25 when T'ang accepted the governorship of Hunan.

94. *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, p. 195.

95. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for February 26 and 27, 1926.

96. Ibid. In a more recent account of these events, Chiang states that this confidential conversation soon became known to "Kisan'ka," so he realized that Wang was in collusion with the Communists. Chiang, *Soviet Russia in China*, p. 38.

97. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for March 7, 9, and 11.

98. Chiang Kai-shek, "A Lecture on the Real Facts of the Chung-shan Gunboat Incident." Ibid. for April 20, 1926; also KMWH, IX, 1296. This was stated in a talk by Chiang on April 20 at a banquet for Party representatives and Communist officers withdrawing from the First Corps. Chiang was incensed by the charge that he was not a revolutionary and was a new militarist. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 488, dates the anti-Chiang speech of Kao Yü-han as occurring in the first ten days of March.

99. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. Ch'en Li-fu, who was Chiang's secretary at this time, has recounted that Chiang actually drove to the dock to board a vessel for Shanghai, but at the last minute he changed his mind. Cheng Tien-fong, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*, pp. 133, 363 n. 22. Cheng dates this event in February 1926. Ch'en Kung-po, who devotes a chapter to the March 20 Incident in his memoirs written in 1939, attributes the same story to a speech by Ch'en Li-fu given in 1928 at the Shanghai Municipal Headquarters of the Kuomintang, but Ch'en Kung-po dates the trip to the dock on March 19. Ch'en Kung-po, *K'u hsiao lu*, I, 75.

100. Chiang Kai-shek, "A Letter of Reply to Wang Ching-wei," pp. 248-52.

101. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, March 22, 1926, a talk to the officers and cadets of the Whampoa Academy on the evening of March 22; Chiang's written report to the Military Council of March 23; and Chiang's talk at a banquet on April 20 are reprinted in KMWH, IX, 1291-1300. Chiang's official statement was printed in HTCP, April 3, 1926, as part of an article by Chih Chung, "An Investigation of the Canton Incident." Chiang gave a simplified account in his *Soviet Russia and China*, pp. 39-40. Three scholarly reconstructions may be recommended: Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 489-94; Tien-wei Wu, "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926"; and Chiang Yung-ching, "Research on the March 20th Incident."

102. According to Hsu Kai-yu, Li was head of the Political Department of the Naval Bureau, but in the absence of Smirnov, who held the position of chief of the bureau, Wang Ching-wei had appointed Li as acting chief. Hsu Kai-yu, *Chou En-lai*, p. 242 n. 25.

103. According to Hsu Kai-yu, O-yang Ko was a brother of O-yang Lin, the chief of staff of the navy, who had been discovered in illegal dealings and had fled to Hong Kong. O-yang Ko is said to have "framed" Li Chih-lung in the incident. Idem. A public announcement of the Nationalist Government blamed O-yang Lin, the deputy chief of the Naval Bureau, for leaving his duty so that the naval squadron was without leadership and the *Chung-shan* acted illegally. The government had arrested and punished those responsible. Chih Chung, "An Investigation of the Canton Incident,' p. 1379.

104. *Huang-p'u Chün Hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 360-61, reprinted from a 1956 PRC publication, *Ti-i-tz'u Kuo-nei chan-cheng ti t'ung-i chan-hsien*. This refutes Chiang's account of the vessel's movements. This was brought to our attention by Dr. Wang Ke-wen.

105. Liu Chih, *Wo-ti hui-i*, pp. 36-37. General Liu makes a point of his cooperation with Ou-yang Ko, who was from his native county (Kian, Kiangsi).

106. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 210-12.

107. Ch'en Kung-po, *K'u hsiao lu*, I, 72. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 483-91, accepts this interpretation and provides documentation to support it. The most scholarly recent study is by Chiang Yung-ching, "Research on the March 20th Incident," who also accepts this interpretation. Tien-wei Wu explores various interpretations and concludes there probably was a conspiracy involving some Chinese Communists and Soviet advisers inspired by "Kisan'ka" and Wang Ching-wei. Wu, "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926," p. 612. See also Kai-yu Hsu, *Chou En-lai*, pp. 56-57, 243-45, for a sophisticated interpretation.

108. Professor Li provided a copy of the article by Ch'en Chung-jen entitled "Remembering Grandmother—Ch'en Chih-ju" in the Hong Kong journal *Pai-hsing* semi-monthly, no. 49 (June 1, 1983), and a translation of the part dealing with the March 20 Incident. The fact that Chiang's consort wrote an autobiography, which was suppressed, has been known to some scholars. An English translation was under consideration for publication in America. All copies of the Chinese and English versions were supposedly bought up and Ch'en Chih-ju was paid to keep silent. She died in 1971. From what is known of her account of life with Chiang, though he is not treated unkindly, he does not appear in the light in which Chinese hagiographers have cast him.

The theme of a Communist plot against Chiang was quickly picked up by the governor of Hong Kong, Cecil Clementi, and the British acting consul general in Canton, J. F. Brenan, and conveyed to London. See *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, PRO (FO 13114), no. 44, 46, 54, and 64, and Foreign Office, "Weekly Summary of Events in China," March 26, 1926, PRO (FO 13103), no. 120.

109. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 66-68; *As Soviet Adviser*, pp. 201-202. Konchits, "In the Ranks of the National Revolutionary Army of China," diary entry for April 5, recording what he was told by General Ch'eng Ch'ien; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 211; Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, pp. 310-14.

110. HTCP, no. 148 (April 3, 1926), p. 1381. This is reprinted in *Huang-p'u Chün Hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 361-67.

Professor Li Yu-ning drew our attention to a letter that Chiang Hsien-yün, a favorite student of Chiang Kai-shek, wrote to him on November 28, 1926, telling him that Ch'en Tu-hsiu had repeatedly asked Hsien-yün to convey a message to Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party held no grudge against him for his unfairness to the Communist Party during the March 20 Incident. The letter concluded, "But the CCP understands perfectly this incident, which definitely was not a conflict between you and the CP. . . . You removed Li Chih-lung, whom you distrusted; this causes no loss at all for the CP. You have not done anything unfair, and the CP has no reason to take revenge." The letter was published in *Hunan li-shih tzu-liao* (Changsha), no. 13 (1981), pp. 77-88.

111. HTCP, no 192 (March 18, 1927), p. 2076, and no. 193 (April 6, 1927), p. 2100. In an article written in 1980, Chou put the blame on Chiang. See *Huang-p'u Chün Hsiao shih-liao*, pp. 353-54. Pao Hui-seng's long and complex reminiscent account is an example: see *Pao Hui-seng hui-i-lu*, pp. 194-217.

112. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 499-500, quoting Hua Kang, *I-chiu-erh-wu—erh-ch'i nien ta ko-ming chih Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang*. Hua adds that the Kwangtung Communists were opposed to withdrawing from the Kuomintang, which would mean abandoning the broad masses, but advocated a temporary strategy of yielding in order to remain in the Kuomintang, "at the same time positively preparing new assaults in order to struggle to seize the right of leadership."

113. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. Stepanov reported to his colleages that

"Kisan'ka" sent "Ol'gin" to see Chiang, who apologized profusely. Later "Ivanovsky" and "Ol'gin" went to see Chiang, hoping to discuss problems of the future. Document 50, p. 68. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 211-12, gives the date as March 21, when the compound of the Russian military mission was invaded by troops. She mentions the return of the delegation which had gone to see Chiang, when it became known that he was demanding the immediate departure of Kuibyshev, Rogachev, and Razgon, and the return of Bliukher.

114. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

115. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 492, based on the minutes of an expanded Political Council meeting. Those attending the meeting were Wang Ching-wei, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, Wu Ch'ao-shu, Chu P'ei-te, Sung Tse-wen, Ch'en Kung-po, Kan Nai-kuang, and Lin Tsu-han, with Solovyev, Li Chi-shen, Chang Ch'un-mu (i.e., Chang T'ai-lei), and Pu Shih-ch'i as observers. (Pu Shih-ch'i may have been one of the first group of Chinese students who went to Moscow in the winter of 1920-21 with Liu Shao-ch'i, Jen Pi-shih, P'eng Shu-chih, and Lo I-nung. Information from Donald Klein.)

116. Ch'en Kung-po, *Ku hsiao lu*, I, 63. Ch'en interlards his account of the incident's aftermath with passages of purported coversation with various persons.

117. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 212-13. A letter of farewell to Rogachev from the chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff, dated March 24, 1926, and found in the Peking raid, expressed shock and grief at Rogachev's sudden departure. See "Letter of C. Ch'ao's to Comrade Rogacheff," in *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 54.

118. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. Stepanov mentioned the meeting as being at a farewell party given by the Canton Government on March 24. Document 50, p. 69.

119. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, PP. 82-86; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 211-13. Cherepanov was not in Canton at the time, but on his return there he made a special effort to gather information about the incident, including the reading of documents about it. When he wrote his memoirs he apparently had available a report on, or minutes of, the meeting at which Bubnov addressed the members of the Soviet mission. Our quotes within quotes signify Cherepanov's quotation of his source.

120. This sentence is not translated in the official version of Cherepanov's memoirs.

121. Chih Chung, "An Investigation of the Canton Incident," which includes "An Interview with Ivanovsky and Others." HTCP, no. 148, April 3, 1926.

122. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

123. Ibid., entry for March 22.

124. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, pp. 498-99.

125. Ibid., p. 501.

126. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for March 23-26.

127. Ibid., entry for April 3 for this important document.

128. Chiang Kai-shek, "Interview with a Reporter of the *Min-kuo jih-pao*. Following the S. S. 'Chung-shan' Incident at Canton," undated.

129. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for April 3, 1926.

130. Ch'en Lung-chih points out that during the Second Eastern Expedition, the political commissars of the Five Corps then established were all Communists except Li Lang-ju in the Fifth Corps. A chart of political officers in the First Corps shows two out of three Party representatives in the three divisions were Communists, as were seven of the nine at regimental level. Ch'en, "Penetration Activities of Chinese Communists," pp. 187-88.

131. Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, 2d ed., Paragon, p. 271; expanded ed., p. 446.

132. "Resolutions on the China Question," pp. 648-49. Also Degras, *The Com-*

munist International, 1919-1943: Documents, II, 277-79. Chinese translation in *Kung-ch'an Kuo-chi yu-kuan Chung-kuo Ko-ming ti wen-hsien tzu-liao*, pp. 136-40. Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China," p. 289, has an interesting reinterpretation of this resolution.

133. Tang Shin She, "The Canton Government and the Revolutionary Movement in China,' p. 415. G. Voitinsky, "The Situation in China and the Plans of the Imperialists," p. 600.

134. Stalin, "The International Situation," p. 237.

135. Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*, II, 276, quoting from the Politburo resolution in the Trotsky Archives, Houghton Library, Harvard University. The entire resolution is published in translation in Les Evans and Russel Block, eds., *Leon Trotsky on China*, pp. 102-10, and an abbreviated translation is in Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*, pp. 462-67. A marginal note on Trotsky's copy of the resolution says of this sentence, "Stalin's amendment—L. T., March 25, 1926." We discuss this formulation of Soviet Far Eastern policy for the Politburo in March 1926 in chapter 5.

136. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 493-94.

137. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "The Congress of the KMT New Right Wing," HTCP, no. 150, pp. 1413-15.

138. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo Ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an-tang*, p. 74. Huang Hao, "A True Picture of the S.S. 'Chung-shan' Incident," p. 102. Another source identifies Ch'en Yen-nien, Chang T'ai-lei, and Chou En-lai as the strongest proponents of a direct offensive. Fang Lu, "Liquidation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu," p. 71. Borodin did not return to Canton until April 29.

139. Chang, *The Rise*, I, 498-500; Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for that date.

140. Li Yün-han, "The Society for the Study of Sun Wen-sim," p. 91 and notes.

141. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for April 10, 14 (Chiang's letter to academy students), 16, 17, and 20.

142. Ibid., for April 11.

143. Ibid., for April 7, 8, 15, 16. The elections were settled in advance by agreement of the few principals mentioned, and Li Chi-shen.

144. This is not mentioned in Chiang's "Diary," but it was reported in the Canton press on April 25 that Chiang ordered Wu's dismissal and sent troops to take over police headquarters. He appointed Li Chang-ta as commander in charge. CWR, May 8, 1926, p. 276; and May 15, p. 298.

145. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

146. Ibid., entry for April 3.

147. Based on Kao Yin-tsu, *Chung-hua Min-kuo ta shih chi*, pp. 202-206.

148. How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, pp. 68-70.

149. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 60-64; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 199-200.

150. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng nien p'u*, p. 375.

151. *Chung-kuo nung-min* (The Chinese Farmer), January to July 1926, of which six issues were reprinted in Japan with continuous pagination (822 pages), is an indispensable source for information on the farmers' movement in Kwangtung in 1925 and the first half of 1926. The collection has been used to good effect by several specialists on the Kwangtung farmers' movement, including Yu. N. Chubarev, "The Organizational Work of the Chinese Communists Among the Peasantry on the Eve of the Northern Expedition (1921-1926)," abstracted for us by Lydia Holubnychy. In the following account of the Second Congress of the Kwangtung Farmers Association, we make no effort to deal with the farmers' movement in Kwangtung at large. There is a vast amount of primary material available.

152. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 301-303.

153. The entire issue of *Chung-kuo nung-min*, no. 6/7 (June/July 1926), pp. 583-822, is devoted to this congress, with pictures, speeches, and resolutions. The frontispiece shows the newly elected Executive Committee: of the twelve shown, seven clearly are intellectuals and five apparently are farmers.

154. Lo, "General Report on [Farmers] Association Business," pp. 642, 643-44, 646; 648-54 for geographical distribution of associations.. This forty-eight-page report is a mine of information. It was abstracted for us by Anthony Ma. A much more extensive report of 289 pages, which carries the account as far as July 22, 1926, is *Kwangtung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao*, apparently written by Lo Ch'i-yuan. *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao (1921-1926)*, pp. 270-341, reprints part of a long report on the Farmers Movement in Kwangtung, which may come from that item. Many of the details about the central organization were reported by Col. L'Estrange Malone, who visited Canton in May 1926: CYB, 1928, p. 1013.

155. Lo Ch'i-yuan, "Short Report on the Past Year's Work," pp. 174-207, for details on the five classes. Eto Shinkichi, "Hai-lu-feng: The First Chinese Soviet Government," I, 182.

156. Lin Tsu-han, "Two Years Work of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang Farmers Bureau," p. 699. Lo Ch'i-yuan, *Kwangtung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao*, p. 53, for the quotation. In his article, "Short Report of the Work of This [Farmers] Bureau," pp. 162-66, Lo gives the regulations for special deputies and names sixty-five of them, as of early 1926. For the Fifth Class, *Chung-kuo nung-min*, pp. 203-207; for Mao, p. 204.

157. Juan Hsiao-hsien, "An Outline Report on Farmers' Struggles in Kwangtung Province During the Past Year," tabulation, pp. 627-28; Lo Ch'i-yuan, "General Report," pp. 657-69. Lo also provides a table of frequency of conflicts requiring association intervention, and categorizes the causes (pp. 667-69). See also T. C. Chang, *The Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung*, pp. 24-30, for a similar analysis of conflicts.

158. The following three paragraphs synthesize similar criticisms and recommendations in Lo, "General Report on [Farmers] Association Business," pp. 670-87; and Juan, "An Outline Report on Farmers' Struggles," pp. 626-34. Direct quotations are, in sequence, on pp. 633, 674, 676, 679, 680.

159. Juan, cited, pp. 631-38, seven attached resolutions. See also resolutions attached to Lo's report, pp. 689-94. Gerald W. Barkley has abstracted an important resolution presented to the Second Provincial Peasant Congress in May 1926, which emphasizes reforms in the manner that "our comrades" had developed the Farmers Movement, in *Republican China*, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 46-56.

160. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for April 30-May 8, 1926. The meeting with Hu is described as a chat, that with Borodin as a discussion of Party affairs. Directly after, there was a meeting of the Political Council, but who attended besides Chiang is not stated. On the night of May 1, Borodin and Chiang had a four-hour discussion in which they strenuously disagreed over the Northern Expedition problem.

161. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng nien p'u*, p. 376.

162. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*. The actual date of Hu's departure is in question; Chiang Yung-ching, cited, makes it May 11.

163. PRO (FO 13114), *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, April-June 1926, 405/251, no. 70, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, April 26, 1926.

164. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927*, p. 306.

165. *Chung-kuo nung-min*, p. 609.

166. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for dates listed.

167. Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 59.

168. On May 14, delegates from various groups in Canton called on Chiang, begging him to control Communist agitators. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

169. Ibid.

170. On the May plenum, see KMWH, vol. 79, pp. 47-51.; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 504-509; Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, May 15-22. We have relied on the minutes used by Li Yün-han as most authoritative.

171. Those sponsoring the resolution were T'an Yen-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Fo, Chu P'ei-te, Sung Tzu-wen, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'en Kung-po, Lin Tsu-han, and Wu Ch'ao-shu.

172. The eight terms are omitted from Chiang's "Diary."

173. This differs from Chiang's original proposal mainly in not specifying the other party as the Communist Party, and in the addition of the third item. This resolution is found also in *Cheng-chih chou-pao*, no. 14, Canton, June 5, 1925, p. 4, under the date of May 25. This item is available in USDS Microfilm M 329, Reel 56, 893.000/7980.

174. Li Yün-han gives the tally but does not say how many voted. According to Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, twenty-four persons attended the plenum, at least on its first day. According to the British consul general, quoting the *Canton Gazette*, forty-two members were present at the meeting May 15. PRO (FO 13114), *Further Correspondence*, no. 91. Such a large number must have included reserve members, who could attend but not vote, and some members of the Central Supervisory Committee. Of the seventeen mentioned in Li's *Ts'ung jung Kung* as participating, one was a reserve member of the CEC, Chan Ta-p'ei, and one was a member of the CSC, Shao Li-tzu.

175. P'eng Shu-chih, "Introduction," pp. 53-54. In an interview with Professor Li Yu-ning on November 5, 1968, which she kindly shared with us, Mr. P'eng elaborated somewhat on the policy of combining with the Left to isolate Chiang, strengthening with supplies and manpower the Second and Third Corps, and expanding Yeh T'ing's troops, the strike pickets, and the farmers' guards, making them the basic revolutionary force. He mentions four meetings with Borodin, two in committee. In the end, all members of the Special Committee except P'eng accepted Borodin's decision, he said.

176. Ch'en, *Kao ch'uan Tang*, p. 3; Full Translation, pp. 228-29. According to Brandt, *Stalin's Failure*, p. 78, Voitinsky appeared before the Russian Communist Party's Politburo sometime after May 15 with a proposal for a partial separation of Communists from the Kuomintang, but they should not leave the Kuomintang now. This is based on an item by Zinoviev in the Trotsky archives dated July 19, 1926. Brandt states on p. 91 that Voitinsky left for China early in June. V. I. Glunin's biography of Voitinsky gives no date for his return to China, merely saying he was there in 1926-27 as a representative of the Far Eastern Bureau of the ECCI. Glunin, "Gregorii Voitinskii (1893-1935)," p. 68.

177. Quoted by Mif, *Chin-chi shih-chi*, pp. 25, 26. Ts'ai Ho-shen held Ch'en Tu-hsiu responsible for the "Right-opportunist" policy of capitulation to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, thus sabotaging the interests of the Party. Ts'ai Ho-shen, "On Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism," p. 22.

178. HTCP, no. 157 (June 9, 1926), pp. 1525-26. The first reaction of the Communist Party's Kwangtung Regional Committee was to issue a manifesto on May 23, the day after the CEC Plenum closed. The manifesto ended with four slogans: United revolutionary strength arise! Overthrow the counter-revolutionary splitting schemers! Victory for the National Revolution forever! Kuomintang and Kungch'antang cooperation forever! *Kwangtung ch'ü Tang, T'uan yen-chiu shih-liao (1921-1926), pp. 261-65.*

179. PRO (FO 13264), *Further Correspondence*, 405/251, no. 44, enc. 2. "Memorandum by R. H. Kotewell, June 4, 1926, on a conversation with Foo Ping-sheung." The conversation was held on the day of Fu's arrival in Hong Kong.

180. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for May 30. Chiang proposed distributing 7,000 equally among the seven corps to avoid misunderstandings.

181. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 50. Ms. Mirovitskaia based her information on the archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Other items shipped during those two months were sixty-five machine guns, twelve mountain guns, nine cannons, nineteen thousand shells, fifty bomb throwers, nine airplanes, and other weapons.

182. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 108; *As Military Adviser*, p. 223, relates that Borodin stated the prerequisites at a meeting of the Southern Bureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee: the internal situation in the Kuomintang should be stabilized; a favorable political situation be created; an agreement with the armies of Feng Yü-hsiang be reached; assurance of Sun Ch'uan-fang's neutrality; and agitation among the peasantry. Cherepanov does not date this meeting.

183. Idem.

184. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 50, quoting from the archives of the Ministry of Defense.

185. Cherepanov states this in *Severnyi*, p. 108; this is omitted in the official translation.

186. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for the dates mentioned. KMWH, XII, 1825-42, has a series of proclamations and Chiang's official messages regarding the planned campaign.

187. The ECCI held an enlarged plenum, February 17 to March 15, 1926, and adopted extensive resolutions on "Thesis on the Chinese Question" and "Problems of Tactics for United Front," which reiterated policy guidance for the Chinese Communist Party in its revolutionary capacity and its cooperation with the Kuomintang. See Academy of Sciences, USSR, Institute of the Far East, *Kommunisticheskii International i Kitaiskaia Revolutsiia: Documnty i Materialy*, pp. 67-83 and 58-63. These were translated for us by Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff.

Chapter 5

The Chinese Communist Party on the Eve of the Northern Expedition, May–July 1926

The National Government at Canton intensified preparations for the Northern Expedition following the Second Plenum of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee held in May 1926. As we have seen, the decision to launch the expedition was part of the modus vivendi worked out by Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet military advisers took an active part in preparing for operations.

On June 2, General T'ang Sheng-chih, who had aligned himself with the Kuomintang in his bid to wrest control of the neighboring province of Hunan, was appointed commander of the Eighth Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. T'ang had earlier been driven back to his base in Heng-yang by Yeh K'ai-hsin with support from Wu P'ei-fu, leader of the Chihli Clique. Aided by the vanguard of Seventh Corps units sent to his rescue from Kwangsi by the National Government, T'ang had established his positions around Heng-yang. The Independent Regiment of the Fourth Corps, just arrived from Kwangtung, fought to the east of Heng-yang and occupied Yu Hsien on June 5. The same day the National Government appointed Chiang Kai-shek commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army after an emergency plenum of the KMT CEC adopted a resolution to launch the Northern Expedition. Chiang ordered the dispatch of more troops to Hunan from Kwangtung: the Tenth and Twelfth divisions of the Fourth Corps.

Wu P'ei-fu was then in North China overseeing operations to dislodge the First Kuominchun from the Nankow Pass near Peking. The First Kuominchun, which also enjoyed Soviet support, had suffered a series of defeats and withdrawn from Peking on April 15, 1926, under the combined pressure of the forces of Wu and Chang Tso-lin, leader of the Fengtien Clique. The First Kuominchun's commander, the "Christian General" Feng Yü-hsiang, was in Moscow seeking additional Soviet aid. Though occupied with military operations in North China, Wu sent reinforcements to Yeh K'ai-hsin in Hunan. Fearing a counterattack, T'ang proposed advancing the date of a projected general offensive by the NRA. Chiang agreed and appointed him advance commander-in-chief. A general offensive against Changsha, capital of Hunan, was launched on July 5.

A manifesto issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang declared that developments during the past few years proved that imperialists and traitorous militarists were obstacles to peaceful national unification and enemies of revolutionary forces. Furthermore, their joint offensive threatened the revolutionary base itself. Hence it was necessary to eliminate militarist power in order to unify the government and strengthen the revolutionary base. On July 9 Chiang assumed the post of commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army at an oath-taking ceremony. Two days later, units of the NRA took Changsha. Thus the Northern Expedition, which had begun as an operation to rescue T'ang Sheng-chih, evolved into a full-scale campaign.[1]

At this juncture the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened its Second Enlarged Plenum in Shanghai. The CC deliberated for six days, from July 12 to 18. The Party had come a long way since the October Plenum of 1925.

Document 53, the CC's Political Report, and Document 55, Resolutions on the Question of Organization, state that in the nine months since October, Party membership had increased threefold (Doc. 53, p. 67; Doc. 55, p. 73). The number was apparently less than 30,000.[2] The Party had made impressive gains in its organizational work among workers and farmers. A manifesto issued on the opening day of the Enlarged Plenum declares that 1,220,000 workers had been organized by the time the third National Labor Congress met in May 1926. There were more than 800,000 organized farmers.[3] Another contemporary source claims a larger number of organized farmers: 981,442 as of June 3, 1926.[4] These figures compared favorably with those reported a year earlier: approximately 540,000 members of the Chinese National General Labor Union and some 200,000 organized farmers in Kwangtung.

A multitude of problems confronted the top leaders assembled at Shanghai, however. The Party was divided on its attitude toward the Northern Expedition and on policies toward the Kuomintang in the wake of Chiang Kai-shek's ascendancy. It faced serious problems of organization aggravated by rapid expansion. It had to reevaluate its policies on mass movements, particularly in Kwangtung, which was embroiled in conflicts. The Hong Kong-Canton Strike, then in its thirteenth month, had brought heavy losses for the British but had also exacerbated underlying tensions in the revolutionary base. Negotiations between the Canton authorities and British Hong Kong were scheduled to begin a few days after the plenum convened. What stand should the CC take? Time was of the essence. The NRA had taken Changsha on the eve of the plenum. Clearly, the CC had to resolve internal differences and establish policies before the NRA advanced farther, particularly since it was under Chiang's command.

By good fortune the Peking Raid papers include an apparently complete set of the original Chinese documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum of July 1926: the Central Committee's political report and twelve resolutions—on relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang; the question of organization; the work of the Propaganda Department; the labor movement; the farmers' movement; the Red Spears movement; the merchant movement; the women's movement; the student movement; the Chinese Communist Youth Corps; the relief movement; and the military movement. Together these thirteen documents elucidate the CCP's condition and policies at a critical stage of its development.

Policies on Imperialism

Document 53, the CC's Political Report, sets the tone and general direction of the resolutions. It surveys developments in the nine months since the October Plenum, classifying them into three periods. During the second period, from December 24, 1925, to April 15, 1926, it states, the imperialists attempted to suppress the high revolutionary tide by the formation of a military anti-Red united front of Britain, Japan, Wu P'ei-fu, and Chang Tso-lin and by the dissemination of anti-Red propaganda among the masses. The CCP's policy was destruction of the anti-Red united front. The third period, from April 15 to June 28, 1926, was marked by stabilization of militarist political regimes and intensification of secret rivalry between the Japanese and the British and between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu. During this period, the CCP's policy in the North was alliance with Chang against Wu; in the South, aid to Hunan to resist Wu's northern anti-Red army (Doc. 53, pp. 62-63).

The CC reemphasized opposition to Britain, which had characterized the policies of both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party for a year. The two most powerful imperialist countries were Britain and Japan, which shared the common objective of suppressing the Reds in both the North and South, it stated. Next came the United States, which might appear helpful to the Chinese in resisting the British and

Japanese, but whose real objective was to replace them through the huge capital provided by the Dawes plan. The CC explained that the British were militarily more ambitious, attempting to annex all of China. Their influence was deeply rooted and extended over great areas. The Japanese, on the other hand, concentrated their attention on Manchuria; their sphere of influence was limited. The Americans had no definite sphere at all. The CC called for opposition to Britain first, followed by opposition to Japan and then to the United States. It directed Communists to utilize their differences to destroy their alliance (Doc. 53, pp. 63-64).

A manifesto issued by the Enlarged Plenum accuses the British and Japanese imperialists of backing the Fengtien and Chihli cliques in their attacks on the Kuominchun, which was close to the people. The anti-Red armies had been victorious because of imperialist assistance, it states. They might extend their sway to the South. Despite differences between Britain and Japan and between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, they were united in their common desire to eliminate the northern and southern Communists.[5]

The CC's views bore a striking resemblance to the key elements of a report submitted by the Special Committee of the Politburo of the CPSU on March 25, 1926, and formally approved by the Politburo a week later. Under Trotsky's presidency the Special Commission had met in February and March, when Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun forces were defeated in North China. Titled "Problems of Our Policy with Respect to China and Japan," the document outlined Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Far East.

The report stated that the international situation had become far more difficult in light of Europe's well-recognized stabilization. China's leading revolutionary forces and, even more, the Soviet government must do everything possible to impede the formation of a united imperialist front against China. It was necessary to intensify contradictions between imperialist powers in the Far East.

The Special Commission identified Britain as the "main and implacable foe of Chinese independence," against whom an ongoing struggle must be waged. It was necessary to reach an accommodation with Japan, which at the present moment could become extremely dangerous to the Chinese revolution in view of both its geographic position and its vital economic and military interests in Manchuria. Hence it was necessary to be reconciled to the fact that southern Manchuria would remain in Japanese hands in the period ahead.

The Special Commission cautioned that this orientation must be submitted to the CCP and the KMT for their approval and warned that it would be difficult for Chinese revolutionary elements and broad public opinion to accept in view of the intense hostility toward Japan. But this orientation was necessitated by the needs of the Chinese revolution, which fully coincided in this case, as in others, with the interests of the Soviet Union, which needed an extended respite. The commission envisaged the possibility of a tripartite agreement among the USSR, Japan, and China that might call for Chinese concessions to Japan. These policies must be carefully prepared, so that they would not be interpreted as a sacrifice of China's interests for the purpose of a settlement of Soviet-Japanese political relations. The commission stated, "The possible joint negotiations should have as their aim, at the cost of some concessions, driving a wedge between Japan and Britain."[6] The report also called for Soviet negotiations with Chang Tso-lin.

At its plenum, the CC instructed Communists to exploit in particular the disagreement among Japan, Britain, and the United States over the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, convened the previous October. The conference had discussed the means of fulfilling the terms of the Washington Customs Treaty in which the Powers pledged to raise the duty on China's imports by a 5 percent surtax on luxuries and a 2.5 percent surtax on other goods. After the fall of Tuan Ch'i-jui's

regime in April 1926, the Powers did not recognize the Peking government and the Chinese delegates no longer took part in the conference. The Powers, however, continued to meet informally. Failing to reach agreement, they held their last meeting on July 3, 1926.[7]

Analyzing the Powers' differences, Iriye concludes that by April 1926, the British and Americans had lost interest in maintaining the fiction of the conference in view of the Peking government's impermanence. Britain showed the least eagerness to carry on discussions even informally with other countries. It had always opposed giving debt consolidation priority in the list of purposes for which increased revenues were to be used. With Japan insisting on this, Britain withdrew from further deliberation. Another reason was the fear of nationalist reaction to any undertaking that might give the impression that the powers were providing warlord regimes with revenues. While Japan opposed termination of the conference and immediate granting of the surtaxes, Britain and the United States were ready to sanction minimum surtaxes with due consideration given their distribution to regional governments, but they were unwilling to commit themselves to future eventualities by agreeing to resumption of the conference before they could ascertain China's political stability.[8] The surtax was to remain a major issue between the Chinese and the Powers as well as among the Powers themselves.

Policies on the Northern Expedition

The report of the Special Commission of the Politburo of March 25, 1926, contains an addition by Stalin that states, "The Canton government must at present decisively reject the idea of military expeditions of an offensive character and, in general, such actions that could impel the imperialists onto the path of military intervention."[9]

The CC's Political Report adopted at the July Plenum questions the National Government's decision to launch a full-scale Northern Expedition although it favors aiding T'ang Sheng-chih against Wu P'ei-fu's supporters. It states, "in the south, the dispatch of the forces of the National Government signifies nothing more than a defensive war against the anti-Red army's penetration into Hunan and Kwangtung. It does not signify a real revolutionary northern expedition" (Doc. 53, p. 43).[10] The CC's stand echoes Ch'en Tu-hsiu's article published a few days earlier in the Party organ, *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*. Judging by the National Government's political condition and its army's strength, fighting capabilities, and revolutionary understanding, the time had not arrived for a revolutionary northern expedition, Ch'en writes. The present problem was not how to carry on the Northern Expedition but how to defend against Wu P'ei-fu's southern expedition, the anti-Red armies' invasion of Kwangtung, and the anti-Red activities of compradors, local bullies, bureaucrats, and the Right Wing within Kwangtung.[11] At the Fifth Congress of the CCP in May 1927, Ch'en confirmed that the CC had been reluctant to support the Northern Expedition and had held a definitely negative attitude.[12]

The CC's attitude is reflected in the Enlarged Plenum's documents, which contain only one explicit reference to the Northern Expedition. Document 58 states that Communists must use various important events, such as May Thirtieth and the Northern Expedition, for propaganda tours in the countryside to organize farmers' associations and similar groups (Doc. 58, p. 104).

The CC's position evoked opposition from some of its leaders. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the majority of CC members at the plenum, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his protégé, P'eng Shu-chih, who headed the Propaganda Department, held a low estimate of the expedition and doubted that the NRA could reach Wuhan. However, Chang himself, T'an P'ing-shan, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai demanded positive participation in the campaign.[13] Ch'ü in fact believed that the CCP should strive for

hegemony during military operations.[14] T'an advocated using the expedition for the primary purpose of spreading agrarian revolution throughout China.[15] Communists in Canton also generally supported the campaign.[16] Mao Tse-tung called for organization of farmers during the expedition. At a meeting of the Kuomintang's Farmers' Movement Committee on March 30, 1926, he proposed a motion to devote careful attention to the farmers' movement in the provinces to be crossed by the NRA.[17] The "Brief History" confirms that at the beginning of the expedition there was no unanimous opinion among Party members. Certain organs and comrades opposed it. This situation, the writer added, would be detrimental to the Party's future if allowed to be prolonged (Doc. 1, p. 45).

Differences over the Kuomintang

The CC had more reasons than those advanced in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's article for opposing the Northern Expedition. A major factor was its realization of the CCP's weakness relative to the KMT Center led by Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek. The resolutions of the KMT's Second CEC Plenum in May 1926 restricting Communist activity in the Kuomintang had brought about sweeping changes at the KMT's Central Party Headquarters. The organizational outline of Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters published the next day placed all units of the army, navy, and air force under the commander-in-chief's command. Article 8 invested in him the power of direction over all military, civil, and financial organs of the National Government.[18]

Chang Kuo-t'ao's memoirs indicate that whatever Borodin thought of the matter, the CCP began to cultivate its own armed force after the March Twentieth Incident. The Party transferred more than forty Communists to the Independent Regiment of the Fourth Corps as junior and middle-ranking cadres. Yeh T'ing, the commander, was a Communist who kept his party affiliation secret. Before the regiment set out for Hunan in May, Chang instructed Communist members of the unit to establish contact with underground CCP organs in various localities and raised money for the purchase of weapons and ammunition for the regiment.[19] Soviet advisers also did whatever they could to strengthen the regiment.[20]

Communist withdrawal from the KMT had become an issue in the developing struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. Later, Trotsky asserted that around March 25, 1926, he had formally proposed that the CCP leave the Kuomintang immediately but that his view was unanimously rejected.[21] At a meeting of the CPSU Politburo in early April, Zinoviev reversed his earlier stand and associated himself with Trotsky's proposal. Stalin disagreed. Neither Trotsky nor Zinoviev seemed to have pressed his point.[22]

When news of the KMT CEC's May resolutions reached Moscow, Voitinsky, chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, reported to the Politburo, which met in special session. It decided unanimously that Communists should, in case of absolute necessity, try to discuss with the KMT the possibility of a certain separation of function; that the best-known Communists should withdraw from the KMT but those not known to the Kuomintang should not, or not yet, withdraw; and that a possible separation might, in case of emergency, require consideration. Voitinsky then left for China early in June to correct the separatist tendency of Chinese Communists.[23]

Certain Comintern agents in China shared this separatist tendency. In September 1926, Trotsky referred to a report on CCP tactics toward the Kuomintang prepared by unnamed Comintern leaders in China and received in Moscow after the KMT CEC's May resolutions. The report proposed that while remaining formally within the Kuomintang, Communists should make a division of labor that would give them the form of collaboration between two parties. In short, it proposed a gradual transition to contacts and consultations between allies. The proposal was rejected.[24]

Policies Toward the Kuomintang

According to P'eng Shu-chih's recent account, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and he felt all they could do was to call a plenum of the CC to discuss the situation and attempt to recover from the dangerous position in which the CCP found itself. At the Second Enlarged Plenum in July they put forth a resolution calling on all CCP members to leave the Kuomintang, cooperate with it outside the Party, and establish a united front with the KMT Left. Under pressure from the Comintern representative, a majority of the CC led by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai refused to accept the resolution, agreeing only to forward it to the Comintern for consideration. The Comintern finally rejected it.[25] Other sources confirm that Ch'en Tu-hsiu called for withdrawal from the KMT at this time.[26] Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who had opposed Ch'en's call for withdrawal at the October Plenum of 1925, contradicted Ch'en and P'eng on this issue as well as on the Northern Expedition and called for active Communist participation in the KMT.[27]

In line with Comintern policy, Document 54, the CC's Resolutions on Relations between the CCP and the KMT, repudiates the view that Communists should withdraw from the KMT. The reasoning behind the theory of immediate separation to be followed by mere cooperation was the same as that held by the KMT Right and New Right (Center) in demanding Communist withdrawal, it states. On the other hand, it denounces the views of Canton Communists, declaring that experience in Kwangtung proved erroneous the view that Communists should monopolize KMT organs and develop KMT work independently. Although these two views were diametrically opposed, they were equally incorrect in terms of policy and equally dangerous to the Chinese national liberation movement (Doc. 54, pp. 71-72).

The Central Committee's Political Report divides Chinese social forces into four categories: the anti-Red movement of militarists, compradors, bureaucrats, and the old and new gentry, a counterrevolutionary force allied with imperialism and represented by the KMT reactionary Right; the revolutionary movement of workers, peasants, and students, the only revolutionary force, represented by Communists; the resistance movement of middle and petty merchants, represented by the KMT Left; and the reform movement of the bourgeoisie represented by the KMT New Right or Center. The CC stated that workers and farmers must build up their own force, win over the middle and petty bourgeoisie to avoid isolation, and force the bourgeoisie to the Left. Translated into KMT terms, the CC's "united front" policy called for uniting with the Left and forcing the Center or New Right to attack the reactionary Right, while guarding against the Center's rise and forcing it to turn left against the Right (Doc. 53, pp. 64-66).

The Enlarged Plenum's manifesto attacks Right-inclined elements in the national movement who wanted workers and peasants to give up the class struggle. The Right Wing of the bourgeoisie was the guilty party in the Chinese national liberation movement; the May Thirtieth Movement had failed, it asserts, because the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce withdrew for its own class interests.[28]

The CC warned that the bourgeoisie was taking the revolutionary movement into its own hands and would become nonrevolutionary once it had secured concessions from imperialism. At this time, however, it was a force that could not be disregarded. Communists must use it for the time being because if attacked too severely, it would be drawn completely into the imperialist camp (Doc. 53, pp. 65-66).

A comparison of the CC's policy toward KMT factions in July 1926 with that of the previous October as outlined in Document 14 reveals significant differences. In October the CC had identified Tai Chi-t'ao's group as the "Real KMT Right" and had called for positive attack against it in alliance with the Left, arguing that the KMT comprised only the Right and Left, there being no Center. The CC now classified Chiang Kai-shek as a leader of the New Right along with Tai and referred to

the New Right interchangeably as the Center. Definition of the reactionary Right Wing was expanded to include leaders both of the old Right, such as Feng Tzu-yu and Ma Su, and of the Right at Canton who had been the target of Leftist attacks in the spring, such as Sun Fo and Ku Ying-fen (both of whom were called reactionaries in Document 52, pp. 3-4). The CC designated the reactionary Right rather than the New Right as the target of direct attack. The shift was, in effect, a retreat.

In view of the New Right's dominance, how was the CCP to force it to turn Left? The CC left the question unanswered while betraying apprehension over the bourgeoisie's power. The bourgeoisie had actually acquired considerable force for itself, it declared (Doc. 53, p. 66). Document 54 states that events such as the March Twentieth Incident were part of a persistent anti-Communist offensive. The armed Center was now in power in Kwangtung. The anti-Red movement of the Right prevailed throughout the country. They were all taking the offensive against the CCP (Doc. 54, p. 69).

The CC attributed the anti-Red attacks partly to the CCP's own errors. The Party had used an incorrect formula in directing the KMT under which the Left was unable to participate in Party activities and in the anti-Right fight. Communists themselves had created the situation of a KMT-CCP struggle, which overshadowed what was actually a Left-Right struggle. Other errors included failure to execute the October Plenum's resolutions calling on local Party headquarters to ally with the Left against the Right (Doc. 54, pp. 69-70).

To remedy the situation the CC placed renewed emphasis on alliance with the KMT Left. "We would be doomed to certain failure should the petty bourgeoisie be taken over by the big bourgeoisie for the reform movement," it warned (Doc. 53, p. 67). The CC called on Communists to organize the revolutionary tide of the petty bourgeoisie and concentrate it within the KMT to consolidate the Left Wing. Although it said the solution of the problem of KMT-CCP relations was a question for the next congress, it called for immediate execution of the decision on positive development of the Left. Communists should develop the Left's mass organizations outside the Party to expand the KMT's foundation and convince the Left that the KMT's organization should be more flexible in order to take in more members from the petty bourgeoisie and the revolutionary masses (Doc. 54, pp. 72-73).

This new stress on strengthening the KMT Left organizationally ran counter to the efforts of Chang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Kuo-fu in tightening the KMT and building the organizational base of Chiang Kai-shek's faction. Furthermore, the CCP's attempt to strengthen the Left was hampered by the latter's weak leadership. Document 53 identifies Wang Ching-wei, who was still abroad, and Kan Nai-kuang as the Left's leaders (Doc. 53, p. 66). A member of the nine-man Standing committee of the KMT CEC, Kan was one of three secretaries at the KMT Secretariat and the newly appointed head of the KMT Farmers Bureau.[29] In terms of prestige and position, he was scarcely able to fill the vacuum created by Wang's absence. A key Communist policy was therefore to recall Wang. In his report to the Sixth CCP Congress in 1928, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai stated that the "Movement to Welcome Wang" was initiated shortly after May 15, 1926; the Left began to be assembled around it.[30] The first official moves took place while the CC's Second Enlarged Plenum was still in session. Five Communist-dominated KMT provincial Party headquarters—those of Chekiang, Anhui, Hupei, Kiangsu, and Kiangsi—and the Special KMT Municipal party Headquarters of Hankow and Shanghai issued a telegram calling for Wang's return.[31] For the time being, however, Wang decided to remain abroad.

Policies on Party Organization and Propaganda

In addition to alliance with the KMT Left, the Central Committee of the CCP called

for greater efforts to achieve the Party's own political independence. The Party had failed to execute the October Plenum's resolutions on the need for even greater independence for local Communist Party headquarters, it said. Hence the Party had failed to lay a firm foundation among the masses and to rely on their revolutionary force to oppose the Right and the armed Center (Doc. 54, p. 70).

The CC laid renewed stress on the need for Bolshevik Party organization and Leninist principles in order to seize leadership of the National Revolution. Predicting the continued development of the revolutionary movement despite the stabilization of militarist political power, it stated that whether it was to be led by the bourgeoisie or the proletariat depended entirely on whether the latter's party was well organized (Doc. 53, pp. 68-69).

Documents of the plenum highlight the difficulties resulting from rapid expansion of Party membership. This expansion had been facilitated by the decision of the October Plenum to eliminate "cumbersome formalities" in enlisting workers, students, and peasants into the Party. While the CC's political report expresses gratification at the increase of Party membership, it warns that the members' quality had deteriorated. The CC even noted the tendency of some comrades toward corruption. Party headquarters of all levels lacked sufficient capacity for leadership and training. The organization of Party cells was unhealthy (Doc. 53, pp. 67-68). Yet the CC still called for Party expansion, explaining that if the Party failed to expand, the forces of the bourgeoisie and the counterrevolution would be daily strengthened. It restated the Party's slogans, "Expand the Party!" and "Enlist More Revolutionary Workers, Peasants, and Intellectuals!" (Doc. 55, p. 76).

Resolutions on the Question of Organization, Document 55, sums up the Party's achievements and defects. The Party had expanded, improved its social composition, absorbed progressive elements, and penetrated the proletarian masses. Thus it had secretly built a preliminary foundation and could absorb the masses and build its basic organizations among them. However, the Party was still extremely young organizationally and had many defects. The Party at all levels failed to understand the real meaning of organizational work. The majority of Party cells had lost their significance. Party fractions tended to become a second Party organization. Party organs were unhealthy. Some only had a name but no actual work. The most serious organizational problem was the weakness of the leadership, which would incur especially great losses in times of mass political action (Doc. 55, pp. 74-80).

The CC declared that the greater part of the October Plenum's decisions on definite organization of the CC's departments and establishment of committees on the labor and farmers' movements and a military department had not been carried out. The committee on the farmers' movement had yet to be set up. There was no responsible comrade in the Organization Department (Doc. 55, p. 80), which was headed concurrently by Party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu as acting director.[32]

The CCP's problems were aggravated by shortage of personnel. According to a statistical report of the CC's Organization Department, based on current needs alone the minimum requirements for nationwide directing personnel totalled 355 persons. Yet barely 120 persons were available. The CC stressed the need for training more personnel (Doc. 55, p. 80).

The CC reemphasized the importance of special commissioners and expanded their scope. It should frequently dispatch special commissioners to regional committees, which should in turn dispatch special commissioners to local committees, especially in times of crisis. It called for organization of a central secretariat to centralize its technical work and stressed the need for close relations between the CC, Party organs of all levels, and Party cells (Doc. 55, pp. 75, 80-81). These measures appear to have been designed to facilitate centralization of the Party under the CC's authority. The Northern and Kwangtung Regional Committees acted with considerable

independence.

Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls serious arguments over the question of organization. P'eng Shu-chih, a Russian returnee, and his group advocated centralization of authority and further strengthening of the CC. In Chang's opinion, they lacked practical work experience and repeatedly quoted Marxist-Leninist doctrines to support their views. Ch'en Tu-hsiu supported P'eng, as did most of the comrades who had returned from Russia and France, including Wang Jo-fei and Jen Pi-shih. Most of those who disagreed were practical workers, including CC members Ts'ai Ho-sen, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and Chang himself, regarded as the group's leader. Li Li-san, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Teng Chung-hsia, all active in the labor movement, and large numbers of Communists in local organs supported their views in varying degrees. Shanghai labor leader Li Li-san opposed P'eng most vigorously. While these differences did not lead to serious dispute, according to Chang, they formed the rudiments of trouble.[33]

Ts'ai Ho-sen alleges that P'eng and Lo I-nung practiced dictatorial organizational methods that they had invented at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow.[34] A love affair between P'eng and Hsiang Ching-yü, Ts'ai's wife, a Communist leader in women's work, further strained relations.[35] Lo I-nung, who had spent four years in the Soviet Union, was secretary of the CCP's Kiangsu-Chekiang Regional Committee.[36]

Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was apparently P'eng Shu-chih's main antagonist. Aside from differences over the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang, and Party centralization, personal conflicts marred their relations.[37] Ch'ü, who was editor of *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, asserts that he hoped his criticisms would stop Ch'en Tu-hsiu from listening to P'eng who, as head of the CC's Propaganda Department, allegedly limited his freedom of speech. But Ch'en Tu-hsiu shielded P'eng.[38]

Document 56, Resolutions on the Work of the Propaganda Department, raises an interesting question in light of the disputes revolving around P'eng Shu-chih. Up to the end of April 1926, the CC's Propaganda Department failed to carry out the department's duties, it states. The Enlarged Plenum believed that not even 1 or 2 percent of the resolutions on propaganda adopted at the last Enlarged Plenum had been carried out. It did not, however, hold the central and local propaganda departments responsible (Doc. 56, pp. 82, 87). Did P'eng Shu-chih in fact enjoy a measure of protection because of his close relations with Ch'en Tu-hsiu?

The CC's political report severely criticizes the Party's propaganda work. The Party seriously lacked theoretical propaganda while agitation among the masses was impractical and failed to penetrate the masses (Doc. 53, p. 69). The various resolutions on mass movements likewise emphasize the Party's weak propaganda.

Since the October Plenum's resolutions were still appropriate, the CC stated, it was only necessary to outline very concrete methods of execution by central and local departments. In view of the Party's lack of theoretical ability, whatever strength it did possess should be concentrated for the time being in *Hsin ch'ing-nien* (Doc. 56, pp. 87, 81). Shortly after, however, the periodical ceased publication. Its last issue appeared on July 25, 1926. Since April 1925, it had been published irregularly. Only five issues were published before it closed.[39] The CC called for establishment of a popular publication to provide workers and farmers with political guidance, further improvements in gathering data, and establishment of an editorial committee to exercise proper supervision of all local publications. It also outlined minimum measures for expanding the activities of the CC's Propaganda Department (Doc. 56, pp. 81-87).

Policies on the Chinese Communist Youth Corps

The Chinese Communist Youth Corps served the CCP in a unique capacity prior to May Thirtieth when its membership was two or three times greater than the Party's.

After May Thirtieth, however, Party membership caught up with that of the Corps. By November 1925, membership in both organizations stood at about 10,000 (Doc. 1, p. 43). Shortly afterward, Corps membership increased to 12,500, organized in 900 cells. Workers constituted 40 percent of the membership; students, 35 percent; peasants, 5 percent; the remaining 20 percent belonging to other classes. Document 2 states that the CCP was compelled to work in a more secret way because it had been driven "underground." It was reserved and less numerous than the Corps but its quality was better (Doc. 2, pp. 11, 10).

As we have seen, the Youth Corps played an active role in the labor, farmer, and student movements. There was a tendency to transform the Corps into another party along lines different from the CCP. This tendency was favored by the fact that the Youth Corps had many adult members due to its regulations admitting persons between 18 and 28. Hence it was decided that Corps members over 26 years of age must leave and join the CCP (Doc. 2, p. 11).

Circular Notice on Relations Between the Youth Corps and the party, Document 81, apparently issued by the Northern Regional Committee on March 26, 1927, indicates that this decision was not easily enforced and contributed to strained relations between the Youth Corps and the Party even eight months later.

At the July Plenum, the CC appraised the performance of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps. Document 63, Resolutions on the CY, states that through the struggles of the past year, the CY was gradually getting close to the masses of young workers. It had absorbed a portion of young and revolutionary workers and proved its ability to lead students, workers, and the masses of youths. It had failed, however, to become genuinely popular by adapting itself to the characteristics and demands of the masses of youths (Doc. 63, pp. 114-15).

Although the CY worked actively among students, the CC resolved to transfer leadership of the student movement from the CY to the Party. The function of students in the national revolutionary movement would continue to expand, the CC said. If the student movement could be expanded under the Party's direction, this would be of great benefit to the Party in the farmer and urban petty bourgeoisie movements (Doc. 63, p. 115). The "Brief History" states that mistakes had been made in the student movement because the CY held the power of direction. The situation would definitely improve as soon as the CC took over control, it asserts (Doc. 1, p. 44).

The CC called for reform of CP-CY relations. Although it had been decided that membership should be determined on the basis of age, Party organization was still lacking in many places. At certain places it was more convenient and suitable to organize the CY first. The two organizations should help each other to organize. The Party must preserve the CY's independent spirit and refrain from excessive interference in its activities. Those who belonged to both organizations should positively participate in the CY's work and lead its members to positive action (Doc. 63, p. 116).

The Communist Position in the Farmers' and Labor Movement

Developments after May Thirtieth underscored the importance the CCP had consistently attached to mass movements. As discussed in other parts of this volume, workers and farmers contributed to the success of the Canton Government's Second Eastern Expedition and the Southern Expedition in Kwangtung from late 1925 to early 1926. Railway workers in North China aided Feng Yu-hsiang's First Kuominchun in the winter of 1925. In Honan the uprising of the Red Spears, a secret peasant society, facilitated Wu P'ei-fu's victory over the Second Kuominchun in 1926. The CC paid tribute to workers, farmers, and Red Spears for their achievements (Doc. 57, p. 87; Doc. 58, p. 97; Doc. 59, p. 105; Doc. 65, p. 120).

A principal reason for the CCP's decision to remain within the KMT was reten-

tion of the chance to work among the masses under the latter's cover. As the "Brief History" puts it, should the CCP break off relations with the KMT as some comrades advocated, it would lose the means of legally carrying out work among the masses, a factor of great importance (Doc. 1, p. 45). Document 54 stipulates that maintaining the CCP's own policy of supporting the interests of the laboring masses was the condition of the Party's continued support of the National Government and the KMT's CEC in their current struggles against counterrevolutionary forces within and without Kwangtung, even though they were directed by the KMT Center. The CCP should establish its own force among workers and farmers (Doc. 54, pp. 73, 70).

The CC expressed gratification at the Party's position among the masses. It claimed the Party had become a political nucleus and had assumed in many respects a position of leadership in local mass movements. It had gained close contact with the great masses and developed mass organizations (Doc. 55, pp. 73-74). The Political Report states that although the Party had not been able to exert complete control of the petty bourgeoisie organizationally, it had been able to lead the national mass movement after a fashion, particularly in Peking, Shanghai, Kwangtung, and Hunan. Its influence during political upheavals had been very great. During each political crisis its slogans and policies had been able to guide the masses' demands. The same document confesses, however, that due to impractical agitation the Party had failed to penetrate the masses (Doc. 53, pp. 67-68). The CC warned that because of the Party's errors it had failed to lay a firm foundation among the masses (unions, farmers' associations, student federations, and so forth) (Doc. 54, p. 70).

Resolutions on the Peasant Movement states that the Party had not devoted much time to the peasant movement. With the exception of Kwangtung it had only just begun this work (Doc. 58, p. 103). This is borne out by statistics on membership of farmers' associations in twelve provinces as of June 3, 1926. Out of a total of 981,442 organized farmers, more than two-thirds, 647,766, were in Kwangtung. Next came Honan with 270,000. Lagging far behind was Hunan with 38,000. In fourth place was Szechwan, with 6,683 members.[40]

The "Brief History" asserts that the CCP's ability to accomplish good work among farmers was proved by its record in Kwangtung. Although the KMT's influence was stronger there than anywhere else, the CCP was able to direct the farmers' movement with such success that it almost completely monopolized the work (Doc. 1, p. 44). It neglects to mention that it was precisely because Kwangtung was under the KMT's jurisdiction that Communists could work so effectively among farmers under that party's auspices. Although the Communist Lin Tsu-han had to relinquish his post as head of the Kuomintang's Farmers Bureau after the CEC's May resolutions, in the same month Mao Tse-tung became principal of the Peasant Movement Training Institute, which trained organizers for work among farmers. He remained in that post until October 1926. Like his predecessors, Mao emphasized military training. He gave lectures on the peasant question in China and on methods of organizing in the countryside.[41] By then Mao already had done some work among peasants in Hunan. A decade later, he told Edgar Snow that prior to May Thirtieth he had not fully realized the degree of class struggle among the peasantry. But Hunanese peasants became very militant during and after May Thirtieth. Mao, then resting at home in Hsiang-t'an, Hunan, began a rural organizational campaign. In a few months more than twenty farmers' associations were formed. His efforts were cut short when Governor Chao Heng-t'i sent troops after him and he fled to Canton.[42]

The documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum provide valuable inside information on the actual situation in the labor movement as the CCP's leaders understood it. The CC's evaluation of its position appeared far from optimistic. Its political report warns of labor's instability and declares that at the moment it was even possible that a segment of labor would lean to the Right (Doc. 53, p. 67). Resolutions on the Labor

Movement, Document 57, reveals the extent of repression of labor activities in areas under militarist control, which had expanded since the Kuominchun's reverses in the spring. The three most important industries in the national labor movement, the CC said, were railroads, seamen (shipping), and mines, an emphasis consistent with the early Communist policy of bringing seamen and railway workers under the Party's control. With the exception of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway Union, however, railway unions in North China were suppressed. The seamen's union had built a foundation only among a group of seamen on ocean liners. The miners' movement in Anyuan, Kiangsi, had been totally destroyed. The CC stressed development of Party cells on railways and enlistment of seamen of inland steamers in the seamen's union. The CC considered Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin, and Tsingtao as the most important places in the labor movement. But the majority of workers were not organized in Hankow, Tientsin, and Tsingtao (Doc. 57, p. 93), all cities under militarist rule.

The CC expressed satisfaction only with the labor movement in Shanghai and Kwangtung. The Party's direction of the labor movement was reflected most strongly during the Shanghai and Hong Kong strikes, after May Thirtieth, it said. With the exception of Shanghai during May Thirtieth and Kwangtung at present, Party policy had failed to produce practical action (Doc. 57, pp. 88-89).

Although the Shanghai General Labor Union had gone underground after its closure in September 1925, it had remained active. A wave of economic strikes began at the end of spring 1926, prolonged and amplified during the summer. The summer strikes were organized by the General Labor Union.[43] The CC declared that the labor movement had become bureaucratic and lacked mass substance with the exception of the Shanghai General Labor Union, which was actually turning toward the masses. The Shanghai labor movement had been gradually strengthened. Yet the CC conceded that the later stage of the May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai had been led by the General Chamber of Commerce and not the General Labor Union. It warned that filled with patriarchal ideas, the backward workers were easily drawn into the bourgeoisie's ranks (Doc. 53, pp. 68, 66).

The document states that the General Labor Union's foundation was built only on a portion of printers and textile workers and calls for organization of seamen, longshoremen, and railway, postal, telephone and telegraph, and transportation workers. It warns that Shanghai workers were most apt to stage unorganized strikes and riots. The Party must fight for the open existence of Shanghai labor unions and disseminate widespread propaganda on their demands (Doc. 57, pp. 94-95).

The CC declared that in the year since its inception, the Chinese National General Labor Union, headquartered in Canton, had gained the confidence of labor unions in Kwangtung, especially among workers engaged in the Canton-Hong Kong strike. But it had not been able to influence workers throughout the country. It claimed, however, that with the exception of a minority of Canton unions, all labor unions in the country that had masses had joined the Chinese National General Labor Union.

Document 57 points to two shortcomings of the labor movement in Kwangtung: the influence of a small number of reactionary leaders over a portion of industrial workers and the strength of the guilds' long-standing traditions. The CC called for primary attention to enlistment of support from the masses of workers in arsenals, railways, the post and telegraph, and waterworks. It instructed Communists to establish a small number of model unions free of the guilds' traditions rather than pay attention only to the "so-called" unification of unions, and it called for revival of the labor movement in Hong Kong (Doc. 57, p. 95).

The document thus indicates the continued strength of rival non-Communist unions in Kwangtung, some of which were affiliated with the Kuomintang. In the wake of March Twentieth, Soviet advisers had expressed concern over the influence

of KMT Right Wing leaders in labor unions (Doc. 51, p. 83). It is significant that the CC ordered Communists not to concentrate on the "so-called" unification of unions, which had been the Party's goal, no doubt because of the hostility it had encountered.

Tension in Kwangtung: The Canton-Hong Kong Strike

The strike and boycott adversely affected social and political conditions in Kwangtung. The Strike Committee, under the chairmanship of the Communist Su Chao-cheng, organized its own prisons and courts and exercised its will through pickets. The CCP claimed control of 120,000 strikers of Canton and Hong Kong in 1926. Armed pickets of the Strike Committee arrested, judged, and fined shopkeepers, or detained them and confiscated what they considered as contraband from Hong Kong. They implemented strikes called by the Communist-dominated Chinese National General Labor Union in its attempt to unionize all workers. Even small shops and crafts were hit by strikes. Pickets blockaded shops and demanded benefits for newly organized workers. The union claimed 170,000 members.[44] In the words of Teng Chung-hsia, a Communist adviser to the Strike Committee, the committee's power was no less than the government's. It had absolute power to settle all matters concerning the strike. The government was powerless to interfere. Hence Hong Kong imperialist propaganda called it the "second government." Teng boasts, "The Strike Committee held all kinds of power save that of killing people."[45]

The Strike Committee's activities aggravated the long-standing conflicts between Communist-dominated and rival unions. On June 14 a new non-Communist alliance of KMT-influenced unions, farmers' associations, and merchant groups was inaugurated to provide the KMT with a mass organ that could influence various elements. It became a convenient sounding board for the KMT. A few days later the Strike Committee held a counterdemonstration celebrating the first anniversary of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. Strikers in propaganda units called for continuance of the strike.[46]

As complaints against armed pickets and their activities increased, Canton's leaders pressed for a settlement of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. In March Chiang Kai-shek proposed bringing strikers under control by putting them on public works projects. On May Day Chiang called on workers and farmers to support the Northern Expedition and appealed to the Strike Committee to send strikers to serve as carriers for the NRA. On June 4, Minister of Finance T. V. Soong, who had the responsibility of providing strikers with a daily subsidy, warned that the government might not be able to continue this payment if the strike were not settled soon. Leaders of the National Revolutionary Army also pressed for a settlement so that they could purchase the necessary war materiel.[47]

A Soviet document summarizing Borodin's reports from Canton, dated June 3, 1926, paints a vivid picture of the general disorder in Kwangtung. As one of the measures to win over the people, it states, sincere negotiations on the Canton-Hong Kong Strike would be held with the Hong Kong authorities. Since the Right Wing had failed, it expresses the belief that Hong Kong would probably not delay the negotiations unnecessarily (Doc. 52, p. 8).

On June 6 the Canton government proposed to the Hong Kong government discussion of methods of settlement of the strike. According to Teng Chung-hsia, the Strike Committee agreed with the National Government's proposal because of the Northern Expedition.[48] In the first week of July it named a subcommittee to work with the Supply Corps of the NRA and agreed to help fill the need for carriers. The first batch of 2,000 strikers boarded trains for the front on July 5. Nevertheless, Communists continued to agitate among workers of Shih-ching Arsenal and postal communication workers to strike. A strike on the Canton-Shaokuan railway line dis-

rupted troop movements for two weeks.[49] On July 9 the Communist-controlled Canton Workers Delegates Conference attacked the KMT-dominated Kwangtung General Labor union and the Mechanics Union, kidnapping the latter's president and killing six members of the union and twenty-six railway workers.[50]

On July 16 Canton's military authorities took action to control labor organizations. They published a list of those that were authorized, prohibited all strikes "in the public interest," ordered the disarming of the Strike Committee's pickets, and declared that any further attempt to make trouble at home during the Northern Expedition would be considered an act of counterrevolution and treason against the KMT in Canton.[51]

The day before, negotiations between three representatives each from the Hong Kong government and the National Government began in Canton. Five meetings were held, the last on July 23. The Chinese delegation proposed organization of a third-party court; an undertaking meanwhile by both sides that there would be no repetition of the "Shakee Massacre"; compensation to the families of victims of the "massacre"; and a large sum to settle the unemployment question resulting from the breaking of relations. The British replied that they needed to consult their government about the third-party court but rejected the other three proposals.[52] Thus the negotiations once again failed to produce results.

At the Second Enlarged Plenum, which ended while the negotiations were still in progress, the CC gave unqualified support to the government's effort to negotiate a settlement of the strike despite its call for continued concentration on opposition to Britain. The CC declared, "An urgent solution to the Canton-Hong Kong Strike must be found" (Doc. 57, p. 95). The statement was consistent with Ch'en Tu-hsiu's stand. Two months earlier, according to Teng Chung-hsia, Ch'en and Wei Ch'in [Voitinsky?] had reprimanded the CCP's Kwangtung Regional Committee for being too leftist, reckless, and "devoid of even half an intention to end the strike" following an unsuccessful attempt to arrange negotiations with Hong Kong.[53]

The United Front Policy in Mass Movements

The CC applied its "united front" strategy to the mass movement in its resolutions on organization of workers, farmers, Red Spears, students, merchants, and women, and on the relief movement. The documents are in effect blueprints for executing among various groups and classes the Communist policy of simultaneously supporting the national revolutionary movement and winning influence among the masses for the CCP. Document 55 clearly states the latter objective: one of the CCP's chief tasks is work among the nonpartisan and unorganized masses to develop under many different forms and organizations masses sympathetic to the CCP. The Party had already accomplished a great deal through its work in relief associations, it declares, and should further activate such organizations as relief associations and athletic, educational, and cultural organizations (Doc. 55, p. 76).

The Relief Association was established after May Thirtieth for the declared purpose of saving all "victims of the liberation movement" and developing the spirit of unity of the world's oppressed peoples.[54] The Central Committee's Resolutions on the Relief Movement states that it was a tool for realizing the united front since it could directly unite all classes and parties. The CC called on Party headquarters at all levels and all Party members to take part in the Relief Association and its branches (Doc. 64, pp. 117-18). It defined other means of promoting a united front, such as joint conferences of workers, farmers, and merchants (Doc. 58, p. 101). According to Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, the CC's first circular issued after the Second Enlarged Plenum introduced the slogan, "All political power to conferences of mass organizations!" The Party's objective, he alleges, was to use the revolutionary masses to expand the KMT's party

power into the people's political power.[55]

The Communist policy of a united front of all groups and classes was supplemented by united fronts with certain groups such as students, labor, women, and Red Spears. In each case the CC spelled out the reasons for a united front, the methods of work, and the Party's objectives. Like the labor movement, the student movement was divided into conflicting factions. The CC's Resolutions on the Student Movement states that a student united front was necessary to centralize all available strength so that students, the most important group in the national revolutionary movement after workers and farmers, could become an organized, powerful force. The CC emphasized unification of student federations. The Party had gained considerable results in this work in Peking and Shanghai, it stated, but elsewhere it had either failed to adopt this policy or had endorsed it only on the surface (Doc. 62, p. 113).

The CC stressed unification of action rather than ideology. While Communists should present to the student masses minimum revolutionary slogans and policies acceptable to the majority, they should as far as possible disseminate propaganda for their own revolutionary doctrines. "It is necessary to influence the thinking of the masses of students in order to obtain political leadership," the CC declared (Doc. 62, pp. 113-14).

Applying the policy of cooperation with the KMT Left to the student movement, the CC called for close cooperation with students of the KMT Left. Communists should earnestly invite the cooperation of KMT Right students, Christian students, and members of the Nationalistic Clique, but only to expose their leaders' incompetence and encourage them toward the Left (Doc. 62, p. 114).

The Nationalistic Clique referred to members of the Young China Party and its Chinese Nationalist Youth Corps. The Young China Party had opposed the CCP from the start. In fact, it had been founded in Paris in December 1923 by Tseng Ch'i, Li Huang, and others after clashes with Chou En-lai and other Communists. The party stood for national interests above all. Its manifesto states that a special cause of the party's birth was the Kuomintang's admission of Communists. Returning to China, Young China Party leaders began activities with publication of the influential *Hsin-shih chou pao* in September 1924.[56]

The CC advocated a different type of "united front" in its Resolutions on the Merchants Movement, with the objective of splitting rather than uniting merchants. It divided merchants into three groups: compradors; rising industrialists; and middle and petty merchants, the only group that was revolutionary or at least not counterrevolutionary. It called for organizing the masses of middle and petty merchants in such organizations as merchant associations in order to transform and not merely to unite with the existing chambers of commerce; and to struggle against the compromising and traitorous actions of big merchants and compradors in the national movement. In line with the Party's policy toward the KMT, Communists were instructed to steer the middle and petty merchants toward the KMT Left. The CC stated that middle and petty merchants "should be the masses of the KMT Right" (Doc. 60, pp. 108-109). In its political report, however, it identified them as the masses of the KMT Left (Doc. 53, p. 66)—an instance of self-contradiction or carelessness?

The Agrarian United Front Policy

Resolutions on the Peasant Movement outlines yet another form of united front which aligned one group with segments of another by differentiation of the latter. This was the agrarian united front, to be composed of self-cultivators, hired farm laborers, tenant farmers, and small and middle landlords. The CC called for concentrating attacks against very reactionary big landlords. Big landlords who were not actively engaged in oppressing farmers were to be neutralized. As for big landlords who were

members of the bad gentry and local bullies, Communists should not simply propose the slogan, "Down with landlords," since slogans attacking the bad gentry and local bullies in reality worked toward the overthrow of big landlords also (Doc. 58, p. 100). The CC's policy clearly signaled retreat. In its letter to the First National Farmers' Congress dated April 20, 1926, the CC had stated that landlords oppressed farmers without distinguishing between various groups of landlords.[67]

The agrarian united front policy was intended to cope with conditions in the farmers' movement in Kwangtung. The 647,766 organized farmers belonged to 4,527 village farmers' associations, 177 *ch'ü* (district) associations, and 23 formally organized *hsien* associations under the Provincial Farmers' Associations. Self-defense units comprising 30,000 men were set up. Special brigades sent to the villages by the Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee played a considerable role in organizing farmers.

As the political activity of the poorest farmers increased during the winter of 1925-26, farmers' associations more and more frequently attempted to remove landlords, local bullies, and the bad gentry from positions of power. Fighting between farmers and landlords occurred on a large scale, especially in the districts of Kao-yao, Shun-te, Kuang-ning, Pao-an, and P'u-ning. In May and June 1926, thirty-three clashes took place between the *min-t'uan* and farmers' associations.[58] In dealing with these struggles, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao, *hsien* governments usually sided with landlords. Ku Ying-feng, commissioner of civil affairs of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, he charges, openly and secretly supported landlords and the militia.[59]

The activities of farmers' associations also led to confrontation with the National Revolutionary Army. For instance, in eastern Kwangtung, farmers' associations cooperated with the Strike Committee's Swatow branch in blocking trade between local rice merchants and Hong Kong. When a farmers' association near Swatow announced the imposition of a new rent system, complaints poured into the headquarters of Ho Ying-ch'in, commander of the NRA first Corp, concurrently chairman of the East River Kuomintang Committee. In early June 1926, Ho ordered troops into the countryside and prohibited unions from trying outsiders in their courts and farmers' associations from seizing arms from the *min-t'uan*.[60].

Confronted with the militancy in the countryside, the CC exclaimed, "The farmers' movement has developed the disease of Left deviation everywhere. Either the slogans are extreme or action is excessively Left-inclined. Consequently, the farmers themselves often suffer great damage before the enemy has been hit" (Doc. 53, p. 68).

The CC declared that it was not necessary to bring up the term "farmer class" in propaganda, which should be based on opposition of all farmers to the bad gentry and local bullies. Farmers' associations should not yet have a distinct class color. Communists should not exclude persons merely because they owned a certain amount of land but could only place a relatively general limitation, disqualifying those who owned a large amount of land but did not till it and those who practiced usury (Doc. 58, pp. 98-100). The extent of the CC's retreat may be seen in the fact that the Kuomintang's proclamation on plans for farmers' associations issued on June 19, 1924, had excluded all those who owned 100 or more *mou*. The same standard had been used in the constitution of the Kwangtung Provincial Farmers' Association adopted in May 1925.

Document 58 differentiates between honest and bad gentry, as exemplified in its policy toward the *min-t'uan*. Although the *min-t'uan* was an instrument used by landlords, bad gentry, and local bullies to oppress farmers, it was impossible to hope that the *min-t'uan* could be destroyed at the present time. Hence the Party's objective was transfer of its leadership from bad gentry to honest gentry. Bandits were similarly differentiated. Communists should firmly oppose those bandits who oppressed farmers, and neutralize those who did not (Doc. 58, pp. 100, 102).

Caution likewise characterized the CC's policy toward the Christian church. The CC declared that while it was necessary to carry out propaganda against the church as the vanguard of imperialism, it was imperative not to create opportunities of actual conflict because the church was backed by imperialist and militarist power (Doc. 58, pp. 101-102).

The CC's agrarian policy best illustrates its attempt to preserve the national revolutionary united front with the KMT by curbing the mass movement where it showed signs of excessive radicalism. Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls it evoked strong opposition from members of the Kwangtung Regional Committee, who held that cooperation with the KMT must not be allowed to obstruct the farmers' struggle, which should be developed, regardless of anything, to the higher stage of solving the land problem. Borodin, then no longer optimistic over the future of KMT-CCP cooperation, supported their views, Chang asserts.[61]

Policies on the Red Spears

At the July plenum, the CC stated that the Party had not begun systematic work with reference to armed peasant organizations such as the Red Spears (Doc. 65, pp. 120-21).

The main reason for the peasant movement's rapid advance in Honan was the use of the Red Spears, an influential secret society known for their superstition and aversion to soldiers.[62] Organizational work among farmers began in August 1925 with special attention paid to the Red Spears. While some Red Spears groups included bandits among their members, the majority reportedly were true peasant organizations that resisted soldiers and bandits. Many farmers' associations were transformed from Red Spears groups.[63] By the end of 1925, farmers' associations had been organized in Honan. They elected executive committees of five members and formed their own armed self-defense detachments, chiefly made up of Red Spears. Some farmers' associations conducted political and military training.[64]

As in Kwangtung, Kuomintang and CCP members were able to begin work among farmers in Honan because the province had come under the rule of a friendly regime, the Second Kuominchun, in the spring of 1925. Commanded by Yüeh Wei-chun and nominally subordinated to Feng Yü-hsiang, the Second Kuominchun received Soviet advisory and material support. (This is discussed in Ms. How's companion volume, *Soviet Advisers and the Kuominchun, 1925-1926.*)

The CCP's membership in Honan grew rapidly, from between 160 and 170 in August 1925 to 300 members and 100 candidate members in December 1925. The increase was largely due to the lowering of the maximum age limit of CY members and the transfer of a portion of corps members to the Party. The CY's membership increased even more markedly, from 250 in August 1925 to more than 700 in early February 1926. In their organizational work Communists exploited the hostility of the majority of Honanese peasants to the Second Kuominchun.[65]

Close identification of the farmers' movement with the Red Spears had its disadvantages, however. A Soviet report dated February 2, 1926, states that opposition to the Second KMC by bandits and some Red Spears led Yüeh Wei-chun, Second Kuominchun commander and tupan of Honan, to ban all farmers' organizations, including those organized by the Communists. The latter, however, hoped that Yüeh would recognize farmers' associations as legitimate organizations. The associations publicized the slogan, "Help the Second Kuominchun against Wu P'ei-fu," although in reality the associations were not averse to cooperating with the Red Spears. Communists planned to open in the near future, in the name of the Kuomintang Propaganda Team, accelerated classes at Chengchow and Kaifeng to train between forty and sixty peasants for propaganda work in the villages.[66] Soon after the report

was written, the Second Kuominchun collapsed under pressure from Wu P'ei-fu and the Red Spears.

By April 1926, farmers' associations had been established in more than 200 villages, 32 *ch'ü* or districts, and 4 *hsien*, with a total membership of 270,000. A congress of farmers' delegates held that month officially established the Honan Provincial Farmers' Association. Reportedly, 100,000 were enrolled in its self-defense corps.[67] A Peking raid document states that fourteen or fifteen persons, all Communists, attended the April meeting to organize a provincial executive committee. A Communist was elected to the provincial committee. It was decided to organize peasant self-defense groups to be attached to farmers' associations with their central organ at Kaifeng. The document concludes that armed peasant organization for self-defense was but another name for the Red Spears; the peasant movement was identical with the Red Spears.[68]

After March 1926, Li Ta-chao, the Communist leader in North China, increasingly placed his revolutionary hopes in peasant revolt. He saw the possibility of mass peasant uprisings through armed peasant secret societies such as the Red Spears.[69] Communists working among the Red Spears included Yü Shu-te, a member of the Kuomintang CEC.[70] Despite their hard work, Communist leadership over the Red Spears was confined to the district of Ch'i-hsiang [Chi Hsien], where 3,000 Red Spears were organized. In other districts Communist attempts to lead the Red Spears ended tragically. In Loyang district, where the Red Spears were especially numerous, two out of seven Communists sent there during the uprising against the Second Kuominchun were killed. One died in the hospital and the rest were seriously wounded.[71]

In May 1926, Wu P'ei-fu changed his attitude toward the Red Spears and attacked their headquarters, reportedly killing 5,000. Twenty villages were burned and 2,000 Red Spears executed.[72]

Although Document 59, Resolutions on the Red Spears, hails them as the real armed force of the people and an important antimilitarist force, it calls them products of militarist political regimes, primitive self-defense organizations of middle and small peasants. In view of their loose organization and addiction to superstition, they could not stand the test of battle and were full of destructive tendencies. Nevertheless, the CC recognized their usefulness to the Party's organizational work among peasants in Honan, Shantung, and Chihli. The CC's policy was to use the Red Spears in the immediate future to develop peasant associations. When the latter had become widespread and fully developed, the Red Spears should become their armed force. The CC called for a united front of Red Spears regardless of their character: genuine Red Spears of associations of peasants, those with bandit characteristics, and those used by local bullies, on the grounds that they all opposed militarists Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Wu P'ei-fu. Communists should strengthen the first group and begin to gain control through formation of a communications organ that should gradually become a powerful directing organ. Should they fail to bring Red Spears with bandit characteristics under the banner of opposition to local militarists, they should try to take over their masses (Doc. 59, pp. 105–108).

Policies on Mass Organization

The CC clearly recognized the dilemma it faced in executing the united front policy in mass movements. Weaknesses were often likely to develop, it said. Either labor's interests were overlooked for fear of splitting the united front or the slogans and demands of class struggle were extreme, thus obstructing the united front (Doc. 57, p. 89).

The CC maintained the policy decided the previous summer to focus on local,

minimum economic demands in the labor movement. It noted with approval the increased number of economic strikes and predicted the strike wave would grow stronger as the economic crisis worsened. It warned, however, that weakly organized economic strikes were easily suppressed and called on the Party not to lose any opportunity for leadership (Doc. 57, pp. 87-88).[73]

With the exception of Kwangtung, the CC said, labor's demand was to obtain its rights and freedom. The Party should formulate minimum demands such as improved treatment on the basis of actual local conditions and carry out propaganda for the maximum ten-hour working day and one holiday a week (Doc. 57, p. 92). These demands were considerably more moderate than those formulated at the Third National Labor Congress two months earlier, calling for the maximum eight-hour day and paid holidays on Sundays as well as public holidays.[74] The CC did not spell out demands for Kwangtung workers.

In similar fashion, the CC separated Kwangtung from the rest of the country in discussing farmers' demands. Kwangtung was already in need of a minimum political platform, it said, but again this was not defined. The CC stated that it was premature to formulate a national farmers' political platform, which must await the Fifth Party Congress. It only pointed out the most pressing economic and political demands requiring immediate action (Doc. 58, pp. 97-98).

The CC's policies on mass movements shared a number of common characteristics. First, flexibility was the cornerstone of its approach to organization. It declared that two mistakes had been made in union organization: emphasis on bureaucratic organizational forms and failure correctly to use basic organizations. It warned against excessively strict and mechanical use of Party cells and small units. Communists should use all kinds of open or secret formulae to set up workers' organizations and basic organizations of labor unions. Where union organization was illegal, it was unnecessary to stick to the name or formal organization of labor unions. The Party should use all types of organizations, such as schools, clubs, and various types of associations (Doc. 57, pp. 91, 95). In short, where it was not possible for Communists directly to organize the masses, the task was to be performed indirectly or in the name of other groups.

The CC outlined methods of infiltrating and making use of organizations where Communist influence was weak, and for strengthening the Party's leadership where its position had already been established. Organizations that truly represented the masses of farmers and which could not be easily transformed should not be forced to change into farmers' associations but be allowed to join *hsien* farmers' associations. However, the Party's farmers' associations should control and absorb old, established organizations as far as possible (Doc. 58, p. 99).

The CC also outlined methods of using the KMT to organize the masses. Farmers' organizations need not reflect the coloring of any political party, it said. Communists should cooperate with the KMT where the farmers' movement had been initiated by that party, but farmers' associations must be kept organizationally independent of, and not become an appendage of, the KMT (Doc. 58, p. 103). Likewise, where the KMT Left had already gained influence among merchants, it should direct their organizations and activities, but Communist Party fractions must attempt to realize the Party's political policy whenever there were Communists in merchant associations (Doc. 60, p. 109).

Second, the CC laid down strict rules for Communist behavior. It warned Party members against monopolizing positions in mass organizations. Document 61, Resolutions on the Women's Movement, states that the Party had failed to penetrate the masses of women. Communists working in the women's movement used the Kuomintang's Women's Bureau and women's associations to such an extent that they frequently controlled these organs and neglected the masses, thus creating fear and

suspicion among them and placing the CCP in an increasingly isolated position. Although the number of female members had increased considerably since the October plenum, the CC said, it was still negligible and members were confined to Shanghai and Hunan. The Party had organized local women's departments and committees on the women's movement but they were for the most part ineffective. The CC called for special attention to the development of female membership everywhere (Doc. 61, pp. 110-12).

The CC specified that Communists and Left KMT students together should hold no more than the majority of posts in student federations (Doc. 62, p. 114). Communists in relief associations should shoulder the actual work but avoid holding the highest positions. Together with Leftists, they should hold the majority of posts. Communists should hold no more than a third (Doc. 64, p. 118).

The CC instructed Communists to be friendly to other groups. Those working in the student movement must not lightly brand anyone as reactionary or counterrevolutionary. They should maintain a friendly attitude at all times to avoid unpleasant feelings among nonpartisans. They should attack only religious education but not the entire student body of mission schools. In any given school they should do their utmost not to deviate from the student masses, in order to establish leadership (Doc. 62, p. 114).

Third, the CC called for using local resources in organization and propaganda. Where there had been no farmers' movement work, the CC said, Communists should use village primary school teachers, Party members, and city workers who were natives and students returning on holiday to initiate organizational work. They should use and adapt to their propaganda the fairy tales and legends of the villages (Doc. 58, pp. 104, 100).

Fourth, the CC emphasized local, practical issues in propaganda. As we have seen, it blamed impractical agitation for the Party's failure to penetrate the masses. Document 57 states that excessive emphasis on superficial and abstract national political slogans had accounted for the Party's failure to produce practical action in the labor movement except in Shanghai during May Thirtieth and Kwangtung at present. The Party should begin with the acute problems of daily life of the masses, and local political and economic problems such as exorbitant taxes and irregular levies (Doc. 57, p. 89). The CC stressed the need for simple, realistic propaganda that highlighted the masses' own suffering. In the farmers' associations, propaganda should be based on farmers' actual suffering. Means of propaganda should include pictorial papers and magazines, slogans, folk songs, slides, and stories (Doc. 58, pp. 99-100).

Fifth, the CC stressed the need to get close to the lowest level of the masses. Communists should conduct frequent surveys on farmers' sufferings and bring up their demands. They should not oppose farmers' superstitions and clan relationships. To develop Party work they might lower their own standard of living and even follow for the time being the masses' superstitions. In short, the CC declared, "Persons working in the farmers' movement must first do as the farmers do in speech and action. Their living conditions and clothing must also be similar to those of the farmers. Only thus can they gain close contact with and disseminate propaganda among them" (Doc. 58, pp. 104-105, 99, 103).

Sixth, as a corollary the CC emphasized low-level organization work. It called for organization of Party cells in every single lowest-level farmers' association to be the nucleus in guiding its activity, and it instructed Communists to pay attention to lower-level labor union organizations (Doc. 58, p. 105; Doc. 57, p. 91).

Seventh, the CC stressed the importance of training. Documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum underscore the acute shortage of Party personnel. Responsible personnel of the CC's Committee on the Labor Movement were frequently dispatched to various places and thus were unable to attend to their regular duties, the CC said.

Henceforth the CC should designate a responsible committee member to exercise regular direction (Doc. 57, p. 96). The following month Chang Kuo-t'ao, chairman of the Committee on the Labor Movement, who had often travelled between Shanghai and Canton on emergency missions, turned over the committee to Li Li-san.[75] To cope with the grave shortage of personnel for the labor movement, particularly low-level cadres, the CC advocated the immediate establishment of labor movement training classes and an advanced class to train personnel for national high-level posts. It paid particular attention to the training of low-level union committee members and factory workers' representatives (Doc. 57, pp. 96, 92).

Policies on Military Work

Resolutions on the Military Movement takes note of the Red Spears uprisings, armed conflicts between workers and "labor thieves," and the function of railway workers in civil war in both the North and the South. Party members had largely neglected the military movement, the CC said. The Party appeared to be a study group. Although it had most recently paid attention to the military movement, after six months' work it had only succeeded in creating central and local working organs and their mutual relations, promoted workers' self-defense corps, and conducted political propaganda in progressive armies. In enemy armies it had emphasized maneuvering of high-ranking officers and failed to establish contact with low-ranking officers and the masses of soldiers. It had not begun systematic work with armed farmers' organizations such as the Red Spears. The Party should participate in armed struggles, the CC said, to help strengthen progressive military forces, smash reactionary militarist power, and gradually expand the armed force of the masses of workers and farmers. Such tasks provided the experience of systematically preparing for armed uprisings (Doc. 65, pp. 119-21).

The armed pickets of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee and farmers' self-defense corps in Kwangtung had amply demonstrated not only the power such paramilitary groups could wield but also its consequences. Caution therefore characterized the CC's approach. It emphasized military and political training of the firm central elements of workers self-defense corps rather than numerical increase, and political training of low-level leaders of armed farmers' organizations (Doc. 65, p. 121).

The Resolutions on the Peasant Movement calls for revolts or internal splits with government in areas under militarist rule (Doc. 58, p. 100). The CC, however, stressed that the Red Spears' actions should be limited to those of self-defense organizations. While it was permissible to demand participation in local self-government, seizure of local political power by force was absolutely not allowed (Doc. 59, p. 107). How, then, were revolts to be carried out? The CC did not address itself to this question.

In dealing with local government in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Government, the CC advocated stressing the masses' demands for their rights and interests. It warned, however, that farmers' self-defense organizations must not be of a permanent nature for fear of possible conflict with other groups. Political training was more important than military training because, once armed, the totally disorganized and untrained farmers could easily exceed the limits imposed by the objective situation (Doc. 58, pp. 100-102).

The CC's policies on work in the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuominchun were similarly circumspect. The CC called for continuing the emphasis on political propaganda work. Should someone sent by the CCP become an officer in the NRA or the Kuominchun, his duty would be to see that the army became gradually more consolidated and revolutionary. He must studiously avoid premature differentia-

tion of revolutionary armies. While advocating organization of Party cells among soldiers in reactionary armies and cells in arsenals and ordnance bureaus to cut supplies to militarists (Doc. 65, pp. 119, 121), the CC refrained from calling for organization of Communist cells in units of the NRA and the Kuominchun.

In August Chang Kuo-t'ao assumed direction of the CC's newly established Military Department. Chang remembers it as an obscure organ with only two Communists engaged in collecting information from newspapers. He was then the only CC member responsible for mobilizing Party members to participate in the Northern Expedition. The Military Department started to transfer a small number of Communists with military knowledge to areas where they were needed and made some preliminary plans for mobilizing workers and farmers.[76]

Conclusion

By the time the National Government officially launched the Northern Expedition, the Chinese Communist Party had become a major political force with nearly 30,000 members exerting an influence over segments of the population that was out of proportion to its size. But as the documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum indicate, the Central Committee was apprehensive about the Party's weakness vis-à-vis the Kuomintang faction led by Chiang Kai-shek. The party faced enormous obstacles in its program of organizing and controlling the masses in view of the shortage of personnel and the unsatisfactory state of Party organization. The CC considered the weakness of the Party leadership as the most serious organizational problem. It expressed concern over shortcomings in the Party's position among the masses, even among workers and farmers, the two groups it had tried hardest to penetrate.

The decisions adopted at the plenum served only to deepen intra-Party conflicts over a wide spectrum of issues. The decisions were molded by the need, imposed by Moscow, to continue what the Chinese Communist Party considered its "united front" with the Kuomintang by remaining within that Party. This led to caution, compromise, and retreat in the Party's attitude toward the KMT and mass organization, illustrated most dramatically by its agrarian policy. At the same time, the CC displayed impressive ingenuity in devising means of infiltrating the masses within the framework of its concept of a "united front." Some of its key policies, such as the emphasis on closeness to the masses and low-level work, help to explain the Party's effectiveness in mass organization.

Notes

1. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng*, diary entries for dates mentioned; in *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, pp. 60-63; Chang Chün-ku, *Wu P'ei-fu chuan*, II, 592-94; *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, XII, 1849-63, 1970-71, 1825-28. Divisional Commander Li P'in-hsien of the Eighth Corps reported in a telegram dated July 12 that Changsha had been occupied at 10 A.M. the day before. See KMWH, XII, 1862.

2. Document 1, prepared in November 1926, states that Party membership was 10,000 in November 1925. In 1926 it increased to approximately 30,000. See pp. 43, 2.

3. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang tui-yü shih-chü ti chu-chang*, p. 24. The document became known as the CCP's Fifth Manifesto. The figure for organized workers is close to the more than 1,241,000 members of the Communist-oriented Chinese National General Labor Union given in Lo Sheng, "Proceedings and Results of the Third [Labor] Congress," HTCP, no. 155 (May 3, 1926), p. 1499.

4. "Statistics of Membership of the National Farmers' Association in 1926 and 1927," *Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti nung-min yün-tung*, pp. 17-

18. Reprinted from *Nung-min yün-tung*, August 1, 1926.

5. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang tui-yu shih-chu ti chu-chang*, p. 11.

6. "Problems of Our Policy with Respect to China and Japan," pp. 103-107. The report comprises three sections. The first, titled "The International Orientation of the Chinese Revolution and the USSR," contains the passages cited. The two other sections are titled "Railroad Problems in Manchuria" and "On Japanese Immigration."

7. Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928*, pp. 95, 110-19, citing documents in *Foreign Relations (1926)*.

8. Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*, pp. 82-85.

9. "Problems of Our Policy with Respect to China and Japan," p. 107.

10. Li Yün-han refers to the document as Ch'en Tu-hsiu's political report in *Ts'ung jung Kung tao ch'ing Tang*, II, 599.

11. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "On the National Government's Northern Expedition," HTCP, no. 161 (July 7, 1926), pp. 1584-85.

12. Mif, *Chin-chi shih-ch'i chung ti Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 72.

13. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, I, 526.

14. Bernadette Yu-ning Li, *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928)*, p. 178, citing Ch'ü's *Chung-kuo ko-ming chung chih cheng-lun wen-t'i*, first edition, April 1927, pp. 112, 170.

15. North and Eudin, ed., *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 35, Roy's interview with Robert North in 1951.

16. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 526. See also Cherepanov, *Severnyi pokhod natsional'no-revoliutsionnoi armii Kitaia*, p. 143. Omitted from *As Military Adviser*.

17. Schram, *Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century: Mao Tse-tung*, p. 88.

18. KMWH, XII, 1801-02.

19. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 526-27. Chou Shih-ti, a Communist officer of the Independent Regiment, states that after its establishment in the winter of 1925, all new soldiers and many cadres above company level were Communists. See Chou Shih-ti, "Recalling Comrade Yeh T'ing," p. 177.

20. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, 181. Not found in *As Military Adviser*.

21. Trotsky made this assertion in a letter to Max Schachtman dated December 10, 1930, quoted in Schachtman, "Introduction," August 7, 1931, Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 13. Trotsky stated that the proposal was made simultaneously with the thesis on the Chinese Eastern Railway of 1925. The latter is dated March 25, 1926. See "Editors' Preface," Evans, *Leon Trotsky on China*, pp. 22-23.

22. Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*, pp. 415-16.

23. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*, p. 78.

24. Postscript dated September 30, 1926, to Trotsky's resolution, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang," September 27, 1926, in Evans, *Leon Trotsky on China*, p. 120.

25. P'eng Shu-tse [P'eng Shu-chih], "Introduction," p. 55. Trotsky referred to Ch'en and P'eng's resolution as the "June Plenum's" decision calling for an independent CCP organization. See "Class Relations in the Chinese Revolution," April 3, 1927, in Evans, *Leon Trotsky on China*, p. 138.

26. Vishnyakova-Akimova, in *Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927*, p. 246, states that Ch'en Tu-hsiu believed around July 1926 that it was time for Communists to leave the KMT. Yakhontoff, citing Borodin as his source, states that Ch'en advocated withdrawal long before Communists were expelled by the KMT. Ch'en's view was condemned by the CI, which accused him of "following, and on certain points even going ahead of, Trotsky." Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets*, pp. 123-24.

27. Bernadette Yu-ning Li, *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai*, pp. 166, 170-71, 176.

28. *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang tui-yü shih-chü ti chu-chang*, pp. 7-10, 24.

29. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 473, 512.

30. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 39. Mandalyan, a representative of the Russian Communist Party in China, states that Wang's retirement provided the first opportunity for uniting the Left's forces. See Mandalyan, *Wei-shen-mo Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang ti ling-tao p'o-ch'an*, p. 4.

31. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wuhan Cheng-ch'uan*, p. 75, citing minutes of the Standing Committee of the KMT of July 13 and 17 and August 28, 1926. See also Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 526.

32. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 408.

33. Ibid., 410-12.

34. Bernadette Yu-ning Li, *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai*, pp. 171-72, citing Ts'ai Ho-shen, "History of Opportunism," pp. 604-607.

35. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 487-88.

36. Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965*, I, 639-40.

37. Ibid., 242. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai returned to China from Moscow with Ch'en Tu-hsiu after Ch'en had attended the Fourth Comintern Congress in November-December 1922. Ch'ü had high hopes but Ch'en preferred P'eng Shu-chih, once Ch'ü's student at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, and gave him the post of chief of the CC's Propaganda Department.

38. Bernadette Yu-ning Li, *A Biography of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai*, p. 177, citing Ch'ü's "Superfluous Words," *I-ching*, XXV, 21.

39. Chow Tse-tung, *Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement*, p. 29.

40. "Statistics of the National Farmers' Association in 1926 and 1927," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, pp. 17-18; see also Chubarev, "Organizational Work of the Chinese Communists among the Peasantry on the Eve of the Northern Expedition," pp. 27-31; Iliushechkin, "Peasant Movement in Kwangtung in 1924-1927," pp. 65-72.

41. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 89-90. Mao had been appointed to the post on March 16, 1926.

42. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 160.

43. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 338-39.

44. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 51-52, 185, 60, 215, based mainly on contemporary Hong Kong press accounts. The membership figure is in SCMP, August 4, 1926.

45. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien shih*, pp. 174-75.

46. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 59-60, based on the contemporary Hong Kong press.

47. Ibid., pp. 214, 184, 57-59, 53.

48. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung*, p. 189.

49. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 192, 52, 62, 54.

50. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 564, citing Ma Chao-chün's article in *Chung-yang pan-yüeh k'an*, no. 115.

51. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 332, 524, note 107, citing CWR, August 14 and 21, 1926.

52. Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, pp. 210-11. See also Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, pp. 189-90; [T'an] P'ing-shan, "The Anti-British Movement and Ending of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike," HTCP, no. 166 (August 6, 1926), p. 1675.

53. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung*, p. 192. In early May 1926, the four chambers of commerce in Canton welcomed delegates to the Third National Labor Congress, the Second Kwangtung Farmers' Congress, and the Sixth Kwangtung Edu-

cation Congress. The meeting advocated organization of a committee comprising representatives of Canton and Hong Kong merchants, the National Government, the Hong Kong government, and striking workers to discuss a settlement. However, the Hong Kong government was cool toward these proposals. See Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, pp. 209-10.

54. "Resolutions of the First Hunan Farmers' Congress," December 1926, *Ti-i-tz'u nung min*, p. 377.

55. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 42.

56. The Party's manifesto was issued in September 1929, when the Young China Party openly proclaimed its name. Hitherto it had kept its organization secret, using the Chinese Nationalist Youth Corps, established in October 1925, to publicize its views. See Liu Hsia, *Chung-kuo shih-pa nien lai chih Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Tang*, pp. 5-18.

57. Central Committee of the CCP, "Letter to the First National Farmers' Congress," HTCP, no. 151 (May 1, 1926), p. 1438.

58. "The Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 39, reprint from *Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i*, January 1927; Chubarev, "Organizational Work of the Chinese Communists among the Peasantry on the Eve of the Northern Expedition," pp. 26-31; Iliushechkin, "Peasant Movement in Kwangtung in 1924-1927," pp. 65-73.

59. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 472-73.

60. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 61-62, 186, citing SCMP, June 14, 1926, and *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, July 25, 1926.

61. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 529, 600-601.

62. Klimov, a Soviet adviser with the Second Kuominchun, described an attack by a group of Red Spears on a detachment of the Second Kuominchun south of Loyang. They sat completely naked on unsaddled horses, smeared from head to foot with red clay and wearing headgear similar to those of fierce guardians at entrances to Chinese temples. See Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 119. The Red Spears derived their name from the tradition of carrying long spears with red tassels. See Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*, p. 91, footnote.

63. "The Peasant Movement in Honan," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 422, reprint of an article in *Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i*, January 1927.

64. Blagodatov, *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi Revolutsii 1925-1927 gg*, p. 54.

65. "Sinani's [Skalov's] Report on a Conversation with 'Wei-k'o-ch'ia-pu-erh-szu-chi,' a member of the Honan Provincial Committee of the CCP," February 2, 1926, SLYM, III, "KMC," pp. 41-42.

66. Ibid.

67. "The Peasant Movement in Honan," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 422.

68. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 92. Mitarevsky dates the document the end of 1926. Internal evidence indicates it is dated 1927.

69. Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, p. 248.

70. "A Honanese," "Early Activities of the Chinese Communist Party in Honan," p. 292.

71. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 119-20.

72. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, p. 225.

73. Ch'en Ta states that strikes in the eight years from 1918 through 1925 totalled 698, while strikes in 1926 alone numbered 535. The causes of strikes were: economic oppression in 331 cases; questions of treatment, 111; and mass movements, 198. In 1926 the figures were: economic oppression, 250; questions of treatment, 172; mass movements, 19. See Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung*, pp. 164-65.

74. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 301.

75. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, I, 530.

76. Idem.

Chapter 6

First Months of the Northern Expedition, Spring-December 1926

When the Kuomintang officially lunched the Northern Expedition in the first part of July 1926, units of the National Revolutionary Army were already engaged in operations against Wu P'ei-fu's supporters in Hunan. Faced with the prospect of fighting the forces of Wu's Chihli Clique in Hunan, Hupei, and Honan, the Kuomintang hoped to avoid or delay operations against the two other principal militarist groupings—the Allied Armies of Five Provinces (Kiangsu, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Anhui, and Fukien) led by Commander-in-Chief Sun Ch'uan-fang and the Fengtien Clique led by Chang Tso-lin, which dominated Manchuria, Shantung, and much of Chihli. While negotiating with representatives of Sun and Chang for an understanding, KMT members simultaneously held talks with some of their subordinates to induce them to defect.

Late in August NRA Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the Northern Expeditionary forces effect a juncture with the First Kuominchun of Feng Yü-hsiang, who had finally thrown in his lot with the KMT. His army's fortunes were at a low ebb, however; his troops had just withdrawn from Nankow, near Peking, and from Kalgan, Chahar.

Moscow continued to supply both the NRA and the First Kuominchun with advisers and weapons. Although it had agreed to furnish arms for the Northern Expedition, Moscow was caught by surprise by the launching of the campaign. Nine days after Chiang left for the front, accompanied by Bliukher and other Soviet military advisers, Moscow tried to halt the further movement of troops from Kwangtung. Its advice went unheeded as the NRA prepared to advance further northward.

Moscow's lack of up-to-date information on developments in Canton reflects the independence enjoyed by the Soviet military advisers in South China, who played an active role in planning the Northern Expedition. What was the nature of their relations with, and attitude toward, Chiang and other NRA commanders during the first few months of the campaign? A revealing light is shed on this question by several reports of Soviet military advisers seized in the Peking raid, supplemented by other contemporary Soviet documents and reminiscences of some of the advisers. The raid documents presented below also provide invaluable information on a variety of other subjects, such as conditions in Wuhan after its occupation by the National Revolutionary Army, the situation in Kwangtung following the departure of most NRA units for the front, Soviet efforts to develop aviation for the Kuomintang, and Soviet military espionage.

Like Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party's leadership opposed the National Government's decision to launch the Northern Expedition, but it soon changed course and directed Party members to arouse farmers to support the campaign. Communists played an active role in political work among the troops and populace. One of the documents in this chapter outlines the Central Committee's views on military strategy. The CCP's relations with the KMT center led by Chiang, already fragile when the expedition began, were to become even more strained in the ensuing months.

Soviet Advisers' Role in Preparations for the Northern Expedition, Spring-July 1926

One result of the decision to launch the Northern Expedition was the opportunity it provided for Soviet advisers to expand their work. Their activity had been sharply curtailed after the March Twentieth Incident—as senior artillery adviser Borodin put it, "They almost did not let us work" at Whampoa Academy.[1] The advisers took part in the work of the commission appointed to draw up plans for the Northern Expedition. The commission's members included Chiang Kai-shek and Li Chi-shen, chief of staff of the NRA and commander of the Fourth Corps. By the time Bliukher returned to Canton in May, two versions of a strategic plan had been worked out. The plan called for occupation of Hunan and Kiangsi and an advance into Hupei. Three NRA corps were to invade Kiangsi, four to take Hunan. This meant fighting Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang at the same time. Bliukher proposed fighting militarist groupings one by one. His report, dated July 5, states that from the first days of his return, he sought to change the strategic plan to confine operations to Hunan. After numerous conferences he dictated a new plan to Li Chi-shen calling for taking Hunan and Wuhan and then uniting with Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun. NRA units were to concentrate on July 13 at various designated points. The new plan was approved at a meeting of the Military Council on June 23.[2]

On July 1 Chiang Kai-shek issued mobilization orders stating that the Northern Expeditionary Army would take Hunan and the Wuhan cities and then join with the Kuominchun to unify the country.[3] Thus, in accordance with Bliukher's proposals, the NRA was to tackle Wu P'ei-fu in Hunan and Wuhan and leave Sun Ch'uan-fang alone for the time being.[4] This was undoubtedly a wise decision because each of the three militarist groupings outnumbered the NRA in troop strength. Official KMT sources estimate Wu P'ei-fu's and Sun Ch'uan-fang's strength at more than 200,000 each; Chang Tso-lin's at more than 350,000.[5] Cherepanov, Soviet adviser to the First Corps of the NRA, gives a similar estimate for Wu's forces but far lower estimates for those of Sun and Chang.[6]

The National Revolutionary Army may have been between 100,000 and 150,000 men, organized in eight corps and six regiments.[7] Several regiments were manned by cadets of the Central Military and Political Academy, or Whampoa. The size of NRA corps varied widely. While the Fifth Corps under Li Fu-lin had only two divisions, organized in eight regiments and one battalion, the First Corps commanded by Ho Ying-ch'in comprised five divisions, with a total strength of nineteen regiments.[8]

Chiang's diary indicates that Bliukher helped organize his Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters in June.[9] On his return Bliukher had formed an unfavorable impression of the NRA and had questioned whether it was possible for a petty bourgeois party like the KMT to create a disciplined army. He had been particularly critical of the NRA's political work. Led by Bliukher, Soviet advisers worked out plans on operations and concentration of troops, and the tasks of various units. They helped draw up plans for food supply and prepared maps on the sources of supplies and means of communications. They also set up courses for Chinese Communists on work in the enemy's rear and trained them in organizing armed detachments of workers and peasants, handling weapons, shooting, and political subjects.[10]

A small apparatus was created around Bliukher. Mikhail Snegov, who had served as chief of staff of a Red Army Corps, became chief of staff. Two newly appointed advisers, N. T. Rogov ("Lodzinskii"), adviser on the rear, and G. Gilev, adviser on artillery supplies, played significant roles. Bliukher assigned various advisers to work out specific questions and sent others to evaluate personally the condition of NRA troops. Ivan Mamaev, who had lived in Manchuria, knew Chinese, and was good in politics, was sent to the Seventh Corps in Kwangsi to evaluate the general situation as

well as the intention of Kwangsi's leaders. Bliukher sent Nefedov ("Pavlov") to Hunan to establish connections with the Eighth Corps commander, T'ang Sheng-chih. He sent Cherepanov to Swatow on the northeastern coast of Kwangtung, where First Corps commander Ho Ying-ch'in was stationed with the Third and Fourteenth divisions. Having become familiar with Ho and the two division during the Eastern Expeditions the previous year, Cherepanov was instructed to "take a look and see what they were like after the March Twentieth Incident."[11] The Third and Fourteenth divisions guarded Kwangtung against the neighboring province of Fukien, which fell into Sun Ch'uan-fang's sphere. The Twentieth Division was also assigned guard duty in Kwangtung, while the First and Second divisions were slated to take part in the Northern Expedition.

Bliukher and other advisers accompanied Chiang when he left Canton for the front on July 27. The party proceeded by train to Shaokuan and then marched to Hunan. An account by Katiushin-Kotov, communications adviser, describes the terrible heat and difficult conditions of the march. Death and sickness took their toll among the porters. However, NRA units received an enthusiastic greeting from the population. "Colossal political work" was done along the way, it states. Everywhere meetings were arranged and leaflets distributed. The Soviet advisers enjoyed great prestige and were greeted everywhere with applause.[12]

According to a contemporary report by Bliukher, Chiang was extremely friendly, acted as though he were advertising his close friendship with Bliukher in front of the commanding staff, and showed him too much attention. Bliukher cautioned, however, that it was difficult to tell whether a real change had occurred in their relations or whether Chiang was engaging in some kind of politics. Chiang accepted his advice on basic questions of training and organization. Leaving operations questions almost entirely to him, Chiang did not make a single decision without Bliukher's prior approval, and he often signed without correction the orders that Chief of Staff Li Chi-shen had written after obtaining Bliukher's opinion. Bliukher noted, however, that the nature of Chiang's conversations with him and requests for advice differed considerably from before. Now Chiang either tried not to raise or avoided questions concerning his units' internal situation, especially appointments of higher commanders, as though he considered these his own affair. Chiang's divisional commanders were outwardly attentive and respectful, but Bliukher had doubts about their real feelings.[13] Cherepanov confirms that after March Twentieth, Bliukher's initiative was very much narrowed. All Chiang wanted was his assistance in guiding operations. Although Bliukher proposed plans for the army's structure and regulation of its budget, they were accepted only in words while in practice something contrary was done.[14]

Chiang was hostile toward Borodin. On July 3, according to Chiang's diary, he had a talk with Borodin and disagreed with his views on the Kuomintang. Chiang exclaimed later that the KMT had its own history and ideology; it could not be deceived.[15]

Borodin, who stayed behind in Canton, assigned a group of young theoreticians to work on the most important social problems. The group included Tarkhanov, Volin, Yolk, and Skalov ("Sinani"), former head of the Kaifeng Soviet group.[16] The expenses of the Canton Soviet group in the month of October 1926 amounted to 14,800 gold dollars.[17]

Moscow's Policies, Spring to Mid-August 1926

Soviet Russia had continued to supply the KMT and its army. In February 1926, the Bubnov Commission recommended that Moscow satisfy all of Canton's requests. In May the Soviet government decided to aid Canton during the period of the Northern Expedition. Combat operations would inevitably be conducted in the near future, the

decision states, but the NRA's arms supplies were poor. It was therefore necessary to increase considerably Soviet material aid and to satisfy the requests already made. Supplies sent to Canton from Vladivostok in May and June included 13,694 rifles, 11 million cartridges, 65 machine guns, 12 mountain guns, 9 guns, and 9 airplanes. At that time, of the NRA's 65,000 rifles, 16 percent were obsolete, 20 percent partially useless.[18] The draft of a telegram to Borodin dated August 27, 1926, lists the supplies already concentrated or to be assembled in a week's time at Vladivostok. The cost amounted to 564,148 [U.S.?], payable on delivery. The supplies did not include spare parts for artillery and munitions.[19] Six Soviet ships regularly plied between Vladivostok and Canton loaded with oil, arms, and disassembled planes.[20]

Although Russia supplied the NRA for its Northern Expedition, some of the leadership disapproved of the timing of the campaign. The minutes of a meeting of the Soviet Commission for Chinese affairs in Moscow on August 4, 1926, state that lately information about Canton had not improved but had become much worse. The commission instructed Voitinsky, Karakhan, Borodin, and Bliukher to establish a proper information service. In view of insufficient information, it decided to put off the question of the "so-called Northern Expedition" until the next sitting. It pointed out once more, however, the real danger of the assistance extended by Canton to Hunan, which might develop into a great military operation, and it advocated stopping the further movement of troops out of Kwangtung.[21] Cherepanov recalls that due to inadequate information, Moscow knew nothing of the intention to move north in the immediate future.[22] A circular letter to all intelligence agents in China from the Intelligence Department in Moscow dated October 11, 1926, confirms Moscow's lack of up-to-date reports concerning the NRA, the Kuominchun, and political groups. It states that local agents should have foreseen the northern movement of Canton troops, which had been in preparation since the beginning of the year.[23]

At its August 4 meeting the Soviet commission confirmed a previous resolution calling for swift action to end the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. It ordered Borodin to report why the strike continued and the measures taken to call it off.[24]

The meeting dealt principally with the First Kuominchun of Feng Yü-hsiang, who was still in Moscow. His army was holding out at Nankow and Kalgan against repeated offensives by the troops of Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin. The commission decided that the KMC should hold the province of Chahar and negotiate with various groups to gain respite, renew negotiations with Fengtien in order to begin an active struggle against Chihli, negotiate with Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi and elements of Wu P'ei-fu's clique, and establish as close relations as possible with Second and Third KMC remnants which had retreated to Sian, Shensi.

The commission disapproved of the formation of a northwestern government. It adopted measures relating to political work in the Kuominchun and groups that adhered to it, but it stipulated that Feng Yü-hsiang's rights as First KMC commander should not be limited. The commission instructed Petrov and Gailis to pick between ten and twenty Chinese Communists well-trained in political matters for political work in Feng's army. Presumably they would be found in Moscow.

The commission decided to increase the number of Soviet military and political workers with the Kuominchun to twenty-five men. In view of Feng's proposal to have another military adviser appointed instead of M. V. Sangursky ("Usmanov"), the commission instructed Unshlict to find another military-political adviser.

It positively rejected Feng's proposal for an alliance between the Kuominchun and outer Mongolia and for the latter to support the KMC with men and supplies. Outer Mongolia was to continue assisting the Kuominchun in the same way as before.

The commission rejected Feng's request for increased assistance beyond the limit previously fixed by the Politburo and refused to grant him a loan. While it refused to supply airplanes, it decided to give him the necessary materials for repairing defec-

tive planes. The commission would request the Politburo to supply him with benzene, crude petroleum, and oil on long-term credit. Feng was to take strict measures at once to improve accounts and safeguarding of arms and munitions at Kalgan. It instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs immediately to work out with Longva the draft of Feng's obligation for the material assistance he had received. Finally, the commission took note of Unshlict's communication that in consequence of his conversation with Feng, the latter had decided to go to Kalgan "one of these days."[25]

On August 15 Feng signed an agreement pledging to pay the government of the USSR at its first demand for all supplies received. Attached were two receipts. One certified that 6,395,642 rubles were to be paid for supplies already delivered to the KMC; the other, 4,501,999 rubles for supplies to be delivered.[26]

Feng Yü-hsiang and the First Kuominchun, August-October 1926

Two days later Feng left Moscow for China. In his autobiography he recalls that he could no longer remain after news arrived of his army's withdrawal from Nankow and the departure of NRA units on the Northern Expedition. M. V. Sangursky ("Usmanov"), who accompanied Feng despite the Soviet commission's decision to replace him, handled preparations for his return in great secrecy. The party included a Soviet Party representative, another Soviet adviser, Liu Pai-chien (a Communist graduate of the Far Eastern University), interpreters, and guards.[27]

On August 22 Feng's envoys Liu Chi and Li Ming-chung arrived at Canton. The next day, Feng was appointed a member of the Military Council and the National Government Council and KMT party representative in the Kuominchun. The same day, Chiang Kai-shek wired from the front proposing that the KMC take Peking when the National Revolutionary Army took Wuhan and then effect a juncture.[28]

Feng received the news of his appointment at Urga. On September 14 he arrived at Wu-yüan, in western Suiyuan. He saw officers of the First Kuominchun, commanders of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Kuominchun, and a few officers of the Second Kuominchun, who unanimously elected him commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies of the Kuominchun. On assuming the post, Feng issued a manifesto stating that the KMC's duty was to awaken the masses, overthrow militarism and imperialism, and, in accordance with the KMT's principles, struggle for the independence and freedom of China and ally with all peoples willing to treat it as an equal. Feng declared that although he had undertaken revolutionary tasks, he lacked clear revolutionary policies and was unworthy to be known as a Chinese revolutionary or a Sun Yatsenist. He would be even more ashamed to be called a Marxist, Leninist, or world revolutionary, because he did not even understand the meaning of those terms. Then, having made a pointed denial of rumors that he had become "bolshevized," he confirmed his ties with Soviet Russia, the only country, he said, that had voluntarily abolished the unequal treaties and was willing to help all oppressed peoples in their struggle for liberation.[29]

Feng found Wu-yüan a desolate place, the First Kuominchun demoralized. Officers were discouraged, the men exhausted after the arduous withdrawal from Nankow and from Kalgan a few days later. His army lacked rifles, ammunition, men, and horses. Units often argued over a few dollars, Feng recalls. Both officers and men had lost luggage and clothing during the retreat, and they were hungry and cold. Feng concentrated on providing warm clothing for his men, then set about reorganizing his army and reestablishing the discipline for which his men had once been famous.[30]

Feng appointed Sangursky ("Usmanov") political and legal adviser.[31] The Soviet group comprised twelve advisers, including Sangursky and Lapin ("Seifulin"), and

fifteen interpreters, of whom about half were Chinese. There were also two drivers and sixteen guards.[32] The need for Soviet arms had become more desperate than ever. Feng wrote to the Soviet military attaché [Longva] on October 30, 1926, stating that the KMC was in urgent need of 400 machine guns, 12 planes of the largest, fastest military type, and 4 radio stations.[33]

Feng set up a political department headed by Shih Chin-t'ing with the Communist Liu Pai-chien as his deputy. Party and political workers served in army units and among the people to secure their cooperation. Students of the Kalgan school, which had provided military training, were reassembled and turned over to Liu for political training. Feng himself explained national revolutionary history to them. In his autobiography he praises Liu as a conscientious, hard worker who was trusted and respected by his subordinates and colleagues alike and credits Liu with the great results achieved through political work.[34] Many young Communists were assigned to work with the KMC, including Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had returned from Moscow about the same time as Feng, and Liu Chih-tan, chief of the political department in one of the KMC's units.[35]

Soviet Appraisal of NRA Units at the Start of the Northern Expedition

Reminiscences of Soviet advisers reveal their evaluation of NRA corps and the Whampoa Academy in terms of political orientation at the start of the Northern Expedition. Cherepanov recalls that they considered Chiang Kai-shek's grouping, the First Corps and Whampoa, as the KMT's centrist prop, although Chiang had greatly weakened Communist and Leftist influence at the academy after March Twentieth. The Russians were concerned about the embryo of a pro-Japanese clique led by First Corps commander Ho Ying-ch'in and his deputy, Wang Po-lin, a principal leader of the Rightist Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.[36] Blagodatov ("Rollan"), who was transferred to Canton after the Second Kuominchun's defeat in Honan in early 1926, estimates that the First Corps and Whampoa together comprised 20,000 men. Although Whampoa had begun evolving to the Right, Blagodatov cites the Political Department's estimates showing that 60–70 percent of Whampoa students belonged to the Left. The First Corps' political apparatus, however, was in the hands of members of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.[37] S. N. Naumov ("Kalachev"), appointed adviser to Whampoa in November 1925, asserts that Communists and Leftists still held the predominant position at Whampoa, where he says there were 400 Communists.[38]

The academy's graduates organized the Whampoa Alumni Association. Chiang attended the inaugural meeting and gave three speeches on June 27. Two days later he visited the association and commended it for its organizational plans.[39]

Soviet advisers regarded T'an Yen-k'ai's Second Corps, Chu P'ei-te's Third Corps, and Ch'eng Ch'ien's Sixth Corps as a Leftist grouping. Cherepanov recalls that these three corps held the most favorable attitude toward the advisers. The Second Corps was led according to relatively "democratic principles" of leadership. The Russians considered Third Corps commander Chu P'ei-te a Leftist; he had drastically changed his attitude toward Chiang after March Twentieth and spoken against him. Political work was expanded in the three corps. According to Cherepanov, T'an Yen-k'ai requested Communist political workers. Political workers in each of his regiments were increased from three to ten. The Thirds Corps' Political Department was staffed by forty to forty-five workers. Communists who had left the First Corps were assigned to Ch'eng Ch'ien's Sixth Corps at his request.[40] A Chinese Communist source confirms that many political workers in the Second Corps' Political Department headed by Li Fu-ch'un and the Sixth Corps's Political Department headed by Lin Tsu-han were Communists.[41] Both Li and Lin were leaders of the CCP.

Blagodatov estimates that this "so-called Leftist group" comprising the three corps, and led by T'an Yen-k'ai, totalled thirty thousand men, most of whom were not natives of Kwangtung. The group had connections with the Left KMT. Those who refused to accept Chiang's dictatorship leaned on it. The commanders of the three corps were connected through the Paoting Academy,[42] the prestigious military school in North China whose graduates held many of the senior posts in both the National Revolutionary Army and militarist armies during the Northern Expedition.

According to Cherepanov, Soviet advisers considered the Fourth and Fifth Corps, together with the two corps that had recently declared allegiance to Canton—the Seventh Corps of Kwangsi leader Li Tsung-jen and the Eighth Corps of Hunanese T'ang Sheng-chih—"more to the Right." However, they classified Pai Ch'ung-hsi, another Kwangsi leader who served as acting chief of staff of the National Revolutionary Army, as a Leftist. In their view, the fighting efficiency of the Fourth Corps under Li Chi-shen's command was second [only to the First Corps'].[43] The Fourth Corps resented the First Corps' privileges, Blagodatov recalls. Its commanders were hostile to the peasant and labor movement, he alleges. The Fourth and Seventh Corps were connected through Paoting ties and were joined by the Eighth Corps as well as the Ninth and Tenth Corps, which had just been incorporated into the National Revolutionary Army. In Blagodatov's view, this grouping lacked political leadership because Li Chi-shen was too colorless. The Fifth Corps joined none of these groupings. Its commander, Li Fu-lin, who did not hold a high Party post, joined the Right and had ties with local landlords and merchants.[44]

Evaluation of T'ang Sheng-chih by Nefedov, August 1926

Document 66, a report by Nefedov ("Pavlov") dated August 9, 1926, is of unusual interest, revealing anxiety about T'ang Sheng-chih's loyalty to the National Government barely two months after his appointment as Eighth Corps commander.

On July 30, less than three weeks after the occupation of Changsha, T'ang organized the Hunan provincial government and assumed the post of chairman, concurrently commissioner of military affairs.[45] Nefedov, whom Bliukher had sent to Hunan, described T'ang as lively, resolute, and radical in speech. He acted with great determination and promoted Buddhism in his army. Nefedov apparently conducted a thorough investigation, for he observed that while T'ang forbade smoking on the grounds that he himself did not smoke, he must have been hypocritical because two fingers on his right hand were "stained as dark as smoked sausages" (Doc. 66, pp. 88-89).

The Eighth Corps was swollen by the incorporation of defecting units. Nefedov reported that T'ang had carried out his policy of organizing and training twenty-eight regiments. Should the National Government fail to appoint him to the highest position, he would sever connections with it. This possibility depended on the reaction of parties opposed to him and on his ability to form alliances. He was already talking about the idea of separation, but barring unforeseen circumstances, Nefedov thought it unlikely that he would break away at Wuhan [after its occupation by the NRA], because the relative strength of all parties concerned did not favor such an eventuality (Doc. 66, pp. 89-90).

Nefedov was severely critical of Liu Wen-tao, KMT Party representative to the Eighth Corps and head of its Political Department. T'ang's former schoolmate at Paoting, Liu had played a significant role in gaining T'ang's adherence to the National Government. In late 1925, he had gone to Hunan to persuade T'ang to join forces with the National Revolution and in the following January had gone to Canton to serve as a bridge between T'ang's army and the NRA.[46] Shortly after, Ch'en Mingshu, commander of the Tenth Division of the Fourth Corps, and Kwangsinese Gener-

al Pai Ch'ung-hsi, both also T'ang's schoolmates at Paoting, had visited Hunan. Nefedov reported that there was actually no KMT work in the Eighth Corps. Liu Wen-tao engaged in other activities. He was not closely connected with the KMT and was extremely hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. He had no confidence in the Political Department and did not trust its personnel, suspecting many to be Communists. Nefedov identified him with a group of officials who had connections with compradors, were hostile to the CCP, and exercised an influence over T'ang. The various cliques within the Eight Corps, on the other hand, were unimportant because they were all obedient to T'ang and held moderate opinions (Doc. 66, pp. 87-89).

Nefedov observed that like other groups, the Paoting Clique was not a strong organization. Formed as a result of jealousy of Chiang, it might be divided into leaders and followers. The important elements were T'ang and his army and Ch'en Ming-shu. Nefedov warned that Soviet policy toward T'ang was not clear. The Russians should not miss any opportunity to defend their objectives (Doc. 66, pp. 89-90).

Soviet Praise of the Fourth Corps, August-September 1926

The second stage of the Hunan-Hupei campaign began in mid-August. Chiang arrived at Changsha on August 11. The next morning he conferred with T'ang Sheng-chih for four hours. A military conference was held in the evening to determine strategy and set a date for the general offensive.[47] The conference endorsed the strategy of taking Wuhan and then joining with the Kuominchun to unify the country. The mission of taking Wuhan was entrusted to the Central Army, which was placed under T'ang Sheng-chih and comprised units of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth corps. The Central Army was also to take Wu-sheng-kuan, on Hupei's northern border.

The conference decided that for the time being the NRA would assume a defensive posture toward Kiangsi, one of the five provinces under Sun Ch'uan-fang's jurisdiction. The Right Flank Army, under the command of Third Corps commander Chu P'ei-tei, was to comprise units of the Second and Third Corps, a regiment of the Fifth Corps, and the First Independent Division. It was to be stationed in eastern Hunan to watch developments in Kiangsi. Its ultimate targets were Nanchang and Kiukiang.

The Left Flank Army was placed under the command of Yüan Tsu-ming, who had come over to the NRA and had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Szechuan-Kweichow National Revolutionary Army. It comprised the Ninth and Tenth Corps, commanded by P'eng Han-chang, and Wang T'ien-p'ei, respectively. Followers of Yüan, P'eng, and Wang had just defected to the NRA. The Left Flank Army's targets were Ching-chiang, Shasi, and Hsiang-yang in western Hupei.[48]

The First and Second divisions of the First Corps, two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the Artillery Regiment were designated as general reserves.

A general offensive was scheduled for August 18, later postponed to the next day. The Central Army, which was to bear the brunt of the fighting, was divided into Right and Left columns. The Left Column under T'ang's concurrent command comprised five divisions of the Eighth Corps. The Right Column under Seventh Corps Commander Li Tsung-jen comprised the Fourth Corps' Tenth and Twelfth divisions and four brigades of the Seventh Corps. The Right Column, which was to eliminate the enemy to the south of the Huang-kai Lake area, was ordered to advance quickly. The Fourth Corps in particular was ordered to move with the utmost speed and ingenuity.[49]

The Fourth Corps, particularly its Twelfth Division commanded by Chang Fa-k'uei, won a series of brilliant victories in the Hunan-Hupei campaign. Contemporary accounts by Soviet advisers praise the Fourth Corps, which they had only shortly be-

fore classified as "more to the Right." The Fourth Corps captured P'ing-chiang in northern Hunan on August 19, the first day of the offensive.[50] The notes of Gorev ("Nikitin"), adviser to the Fourth Corps, state that the Fourth Corps surrounded and destroyed one of the best enemy brigades at P'ing-chiang. It dashed forward despite the lack of communications along mountain passes and gave the enemy no chance to rest.[51]

The Fourth Corps moved quickly and took T'ung-ch'eng and Ch'ung-yang, in southern Hupei. Its next target was Ting-ssu-ch'iao, a town situated at a Canton-Hankow Railway bridge, south of Hsien-ning. Ting-ssu-ch'iao's topography, with mountains at the back and lakes on three sides, served as a natural barrier. Its fall would open the National Revolutionary Army's way to Wuhan. Since the First Kuominchun had just withdrawn from Nankow, Wu P'ei-fu proceeded southward to take command and sent strong reinforcements to Ting-ssu-ch'iao. A decisive battle loomed.

A later account by Kuo Mo-jo, then head of the Propaganda Section of the Political Department, indicates that the Fourth Corps was already used by the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters to thwart T'ang Sheng-chih's ambition. Kuo asserts that the advance to Ting-ssu-ch'iao was designed to prevent a newly recruited general from seizing control of Hupei. The Fourth Corps was in effect entrusted with the mission of racing against this general. Thus, as Kuo puts it, the struggle for Wuchang was waged against Wu P'ei-fu on the military level and against the newly recruited general on the political.[52]

The Twelfth Division of the Fourth Corps launched an attack against Ting-ssu-ch'iao on August 26 and took it after heavy fighting the following morning. The division's Independent Regiment commanded by Communist Yeh T'ing occupied Hsien-ning at noon.[53] Gorev described the difficult battle of Ting-ssu-ch'iao, which lasted twenty-three hours.[54] Senior artillery adviser Borodin's report of December 2, 1926, states that the Fourth Corps and Russian guns took Ting-ssu-ch'iao. Enemy troops surrounded the left flank where the Seventh Corps was supposed to be moving but was not found. After the battle it was learned that Seventh and Eighth Corps units had intentionally stayed in their positions, being unwilling to engage in battle.[55]

The Twelfth Division moved along the railway to attack Ho-sheng-ch'iao, where Wu P'ei-fu personally commanded the defending forces. The division took Ho-sheng-ch'iao on August 30. The Tenth Division, commanded by Ch'en Ming-shu, then pursued the enemy.[56] Gorev's notes state that the Fourth Corps met Wu himself at Ho-sheng-ch'iao. Its task was not easy, but it broke through the enemy's fortified positions and headed straight for Wuhan.[57] Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin writes that the Fourth Corps alone fought at Ho-sheng-ch'iao. He concludes that in all the operations prior to the battle of Wuchang, there was evidence of cooperation between the Seventh and Eighth Corps, which attempted to strengthen themselves and to weaken the Fourth Corps to make it easier to influence the government in the future. Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters continually tried to break up their cooperation. They gave no support to the Fourth Corps, although Headquarters had ordered them to take part on the flanks. Thus they placed the Fourth Corps in a difficult position at both Ting-ssu-ch'iao and Ho-sheng-ch'iao.[58]

Soviet advisers were impressed not only by the Fourth Corps' fighting ability but also by the excellent work carried out by the Political Department of the Twelfth Division headed by a Communist [Liao Ch'ien-wu]. Gorev reported that it was the best political department in the National Revolutionary Army. Although its head was a native of Shensi [Hupei?], Twelfth Division men [a large majority of whom were natives of Kwangtung] considered him one of their own. Political workers were considered members of a military family. They did a great job educating soldiers and working among the populace. The division's men knew what they were fighting for.

The masses supported the division everywhere. In Gorev's view, however, things were not so good in the Tenth Division.[59]

On August 19, the day P'ing-chiang was taken, Liao Ch'ien-wu reported that the local people had effectively aided the army. Peasants had served as guides, provided information on enemy fortifications, and organized themselves in long-spear units and joined in the struggle.[60] A contemporary article claims that peasants killed no less than 300 enemy soldiers, and 20 peasants lost their lives. Led by peasant associations, they organized assault, transport, scouting, propaganda, guide, and comfort teams.[61] Soviet adviser Vaksov paid tribute to the people's contribution at P'ing-chiang.[62]

Chang Fa-k'uei, then Twelfth Division commander, recalls the role of the special contingent of local people organized by Yeh T'ing's Independent Regiment at P'ing-chiang. However, he was most impressed by the peasants who helped the Twelfth Division at Ting-ssu-ch'iao. Brought in by the Political Department, they indicated where it was possible to wade across a river that flowed into a lake, and they guided an entire regiment across the river. Thus they made it possible for his men to capture the enemy's central positions.[63]. The battles of P'ing-chiang and Ting-ssu-ch'iao illustrate the close collaboration between the Twelfth Division and the local populace during the Hunan-Hupei campaign.

Soviet Views on the Siege of Wuchang, September-October 1926

Soviet advisers had a vested interest, of course, in promoting Yeh T'ing's Independent Regiment with its strong Communist elements. By the time of the siege of Wuchang, however, they sought to strengthen not only the Independent Regiment but the entire Fourth Corps as a bulwark of Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government against T'ang Sheng-chih.

The Tenth Division of the Fourth Corps occupied Hung-shan, on the outskirts of Wuchang, on August 31, followed by other NRA units. On September 3, units of the First Corps' Second Division, ordered to the Hupei front, and the Fourth and Seventh Corps launched an assault on the strongly fortified walled city, sustaining heavy casualties. Chiang arrived that evening. Two days later units of the Second Division and the Fourth and Seventh Corps again assaulted the city without success. It was then decided to resort to other measures to take Wuchang, including a land and river blockade.[64]

According to Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin's account, Fourth Corps units arrived at Wuchang on the evening of August 31, but the Seventh Corps approached the city only the next day. Thus the Fourth Corps was restrained from attacking Wuchang immediately. During the first assault, in reality only the Fourth Corps was involved and as always suffered the greatest losses. The First Corps' First [Second] Division and the Fourth Corps fought energetically in the second assault. The Seventh Corps "almost did not take part in either assault." Borodin considered the vacillation of Seventh and Eight Corps commanders, who were competing to get to Hupei first, to be of a political character.[65]

A chart listing the respective losses of the Fourth and Seventh Corps during the assaults against Wuchang confirms that the Fourth Corps suffered most of the casualties: 44 officers killed, compared to 3 officers of the Seventh Corps; 432 warrant officers and men killed, compared to 31 from the Seventh Corps; 43 officers of the Fourth Corps wounded, against one of the Seventh; and 556 warrant officers and men of the Fourth Corps wounded, against 47 of the Seventh.[66]

Meanwhile, units of the Eighth Corps took Yüeh-chou on the northern Hunan border on August 22 and crossed the Yangtze River. They took Hanyang on September 6. Defending general Liu Tso-lung defected to the NRA and cooperated in disarming enemy units near Hankow, which fell the following day.[67] Thus two of the

three cities that were to be known as Wuhan fell to the Eighth Corps.

Document 69, a report by V. K. Tairov ("Teruni" or "Ter") written on October 30, 1926, throws a fascinating light on relations between Soviet advisers, Chiang Kai-shek, and NRA corps commanders. Tairov was chief adviser to the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army and Bliukher's assistant for political affairs. A prominent political worker from civil war days, he had previously served as staff commissar to Kuibyshev. Madame Vishnyakova-Akimova remembers him as a remarkably active and energetic man.[68] Kuo Mo-jo recalls that he was well versed in political affairs, a cultivated man who was particularly fond of poetry.[69]

Much of Document 69, written at Wuchang and addressed to Michael Borodin in Canton, concerns T'ang Sheng-chih. After meeting Chiang at Changsha, reported Tairov, T'ang considered Chiang to be of no political or military importance and took various measures to take over his post of commander-in-chief. T'ang made numerous requests to the Russians for advisers and aid. Tairov had been pursuing the policy of supporting Chiang and simultaneously manipulating T'ang, which had been approved by Karakhan. Tairov claimed that he had considerable power to exercise and could therefore "subdue" the generals (Doc. 69, pp. 9-11, 14, 22). Various sources confirm that friction quickly developed between Chiang and T'ang.[70]

Tairov's report states that considerable Chinese blood was shed over Wuchang, causing the Russians a good deal of concern. It was actually possible to have seized Wuchang earlier had the Russians been willing to ignore circumstances peculiar to China, he says. The fundamental problem was T'ang Sheng-chih's unwillingness to see the Kwangtung Army or the Fourth Corps occupy Wuchang because he regarded it as Chiang's army. He was most anxious to drive away the Fourth Corps, specifically the Twelfth Division, and he devised various measures to that end. But Ch'en Ming-shu, Tenth Division commander, ordered it to remain. Tairov was instrumental in keeping the Fourth Corps or some of its units at Wuchang on two occasions. The first occurred in relation to developments in Kiangsi (Doc. 69, pp. 2, 4).

After Sun Ch'uan-fang sent reinforcements to Kiangsi to threaten the NRA's rear early in September, Chiang prepared to leave Wuchang for the Kiangsi front. On the ninth he transferred the Seventh Corps to northern Kiangsi and ordered it to attack Kiukiang.[71] Soviet advisers interpreted the transfer as a move to separate the Seventh Corps from the Eighth. Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin's report states that Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters finally obtained the agreement of the Seventh Corps commander to go to Kiangsi.[72] According to Blagodatov, Bliukher demanded and obtained the Seventh Corps' transfer in order to split the Seventh and Eighth Corps.[73]

The Seventh Corps captured Jo-ch'i, in northern Kiangsi, on September 30. General Li Tsung-jen gives a vivid description of the victory, after which his army was sufficiently supplied with captured ammunition.[74] However, his army's rear was threatened by Sun Ch'uan-fang's men, who had landed at Ta-yeh in southeastern Hupei. T'ang Sheng-chih wired Chiang informing him of a decision to transfer the Fourth Corps to drive the enemy away from Ta-yeh and Kuang-shih-kang to relieve the Seventh Corps. At first Chiang agreed, but he changed his mind the following day.[75]

Document 69 implies that Tairov had something to do with Chiang's sudden change of mind. On October 2, when the Twelfth Division was moving toward Kiangsi, Tairov reported, "we informed Chiang of this and Chiang wired Teng Yen-ta, asking him for the condition of his agreement to dispatch the Twelfth Division." Subsequently Tairov obtained definite information that a demand had been made for the Twelfth Division's immediate return to Wuchang despite T'ang's disagreement. While it was true that the military situation had demanded the dispatch of the Fourth Corps to Kiangsi, Tairov stated, the action had also been taken for political reasons

(Doc. 69, p. 4).

In mid-September two Soviet aviators, Senior Aviation Adviser Sergeev, and Kravtsov, arrived at the Wuchang front. Sergeev's report, dated March 1, 1927, states that they left Shao-kuan on Bliukher's demand that they fly to the front as soon as possible, and they flew on assignment from headquarters. Their main tasks were throwing bombs, distributing leaflets, and firing with machine guns from an altitude of fifty meters to disperse enemy concentrations at city gates. In their effort to help the NRA break through, they boosted its morale and caused panic among enemy troops.[76] Other Soviet advisers praised the two pilots and emphasized the role of airplanes at Wuchang. Vaksov noted that not a single bomb was wasted.[77]

According to Document 71, Kostuchenko's report of November 12, 1926, although eight aviators were at the front they did not fly because of lack of planes and because they were not well enough instructed (Doc. 71, pp. 3, 7). Official KMT sources state that the Aviation Bureau moved to the outskirts of Wuchang on September 6. They credit the planes with positive achievements in bombing, reconnaissance, and distribution of leaflets but do not mention that the pilots were Russian.[78]

The defenders of Wuchang held out stubbornly for nearly six weeks. Finally, the NRA took the city on October 10 following negotiations with representatives of an enemy commander who agreed to open one of the city gates. Ch'en K'o-yu, deputy commander of the Fourth Corps, led his men into the city at dawn. Some resistance was encountered, but the enemy was soon disarmed.[79]

Document 69 states that the Tenth and Twelfth divisions and two regiments of the Eighth Corps entered Wuchang on the night of October 9-10. It was generally acknowledged that Wuchang was taken by the Fourth Corps and therefore came under the jurisdiction of the National Government (Doc. 69, pp. 3-4).

Soviet Advisers Forming an Intelligence Network

The rich information provided by the Russian advisers in their contemporary reports gives an intimate, third-party view of the Northern Expedition. In fact the advisers formed an intelligence network that was indispensable to General Bliukher in his work of strategic and even tactical planning. They also were part of Soviet Russia's extensive espionage program in China, which was centered in the Soviet military attaché's office in Peking. Many espionage documents were discovered in the Peking raid of April 6, 1927, and a sampling were printed in Chinese translation in SLYM, and in English translation in *Soviet Plot in China*, and various other collections (see our bibliography).[80]

Document 67, "Instructions to Soviet Advisers on Reporting Military Intelligence," dated September 6, 1926, sets down the duties of the Russian military advisers in both the National Revolutionary Army and the National People's Army (Kuominchun). The instructions may have been a response to Moscow's order, discussed above, for better information. Advisers should learn all about the military organization of the army to which they are attached and about the enemy army, according to the requirements of the "resident agent" of the Intelligence Department. They transmit this information through their superior Soviet officer, who turns it over to the resident "on the spot." These officers work in concert and exchange information. Although not usually doing the work of secret agents, the advisers should look for potential secret agents to recommend to the Intelligence Department.

The advisers must procure and transmit all official regulations, instructions, laws, budgets, books, and magazines of a military-political and military-economic character, maps, etc.; and they must keep informed on all military-technical inventions and improvements in military equipment and give their superior officers detailed descriptions with sketches, photographs, and examples, if possible.

Document 67 describes how an adviser should work. He must keep a detailed diary of everything he does, the people he meets, his conversations and impressions. He must compose short reports at least once a month about his own unit and those of the enemy, and about the general situation among military groups and their mutual relations and relations with foreigners. At least once every three months the adviser should write a report of a military-statistical and geographic character, including a detailed description of the region occupied by his unit and of the neighboring provinces, paying special attention to means of communication. His reports on the revolutionary movement of peasants, and opposition bourgeois organizations in his region, should be submitted at least once a month, and also separate reports on the organization of espionage and counterespionage in his army and that of the enemy. All such information sent to the superior officer is transmitted to the local "residency" for compilation or, if urgent, is sent directly to the military attaché in Peking. He is identified in Document 67 as the "Central Residency of the Intelligence Department in China."

Soviet Attitude Toward NRA Corps During the Kiangsi Campaign, September-November 1926

The NRA's Right Flank Army, stationed in eastern Hunan, advanced toward western Kiangsi early in September in response to Sun Ch'uan-fang's dispatch of reinforcements. In southern Kiangsi NRA units took Kan-chou on September 6.[81] According to A. Khmelev, who visited Nanchang headquarters in the last week of November to meet with General Bliukher, the Canton Government sent an order to Chiang Kai-shek that he should not invade Kiangsi. The advance was stopped. But when news arrived of the capture of the important southern city of Kan-chow by Lai Shih-huang, who had come over to the Nationalist side, Chiang Kai-shek and Bliukher decided to advance on Kiangsi on all fronts.[82] Lai Shih-huang was given the title of commander of the Fourteenth Corps, with Hsiung Shih-hui as Party representative.[83] Nevertheless, negotiations with Sun Ch'uan-fang continued.[84]

Document 69 indicates that T'ang Sheng-chih was encouraged in his bid against Chiang by the unsatisfactory condition of the First and Second divisions of the First Corps, regarded as Chiang's own army. Chiang expressed dissatisfaction with the divisions while they were still reserves on August 15, during an inspection at Chu-chou, Hunan. He reproached them for having occupied civilian homes and asked why desertion had increased. He said that the divisions' officers did not treat their men as human beings and spent all their free time fooling around with prostitutes and gambling. Chiang got so agitated that he lost his voice during the speech.[85] According to Cherepanov, Chiang felt the need for moral strengthening and therefore reinstituted commissars in companies. Chiang asked Teng Yen-ta, chairman of the General Political Department, for personnel. Twelve Communists were among the political workers sent to the First and Second divisions.[86]

The poor performance of the First Division in western Kiangsi weakened Chiang's position. On September 14, Chiang ordered Wang Po-lin, deputy commander of the First Corps, concurrently commander of the First Division, and Ch'eng Ch'ien, Sixth Corps commander, to advance quickly on T'ung-ku. A separate telegram to Wang Po-lin reprimanded him for failure to lead the First Division against T'ung-ku.[87]

After the occupation of T'ung-ku and Kao-an, the Third Corps was ordered to assist the Sixth Corps and the First Division to attack Nanchang. Sixth Corps commander Ch'eng Ch'ien led his men from Kao-an and entered Nanchang with the assistance of the city's students, workers, and the local garrison on September 19.[88] According to the operations plan, the Third Corps and the First Division were to

rendezvous at the Nanchang railway station to coordinate with the Sixth Corps. But neither arrived on time. Surrounded, Ch'eng Ch'ien had to withdraw from Nanchang on the 21st. His report states that the First Division and the Third Corps had not reached the railway station when he took Nanchang. The First Division arrived only on the night of September 20.[89] Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin reported on the serious discord between the Third and Sixth Corps. Despite orders to attack Nanchang, the Third Corps remained where it was and did not come near the city. Consequently, the Sixth Corps' Nineteenth Division was almost completely destroyed.[90]

Chiang left the Wuchang front on September 17 for Kiangsi via Changsha and P'ing-hsiang. By then units of the Eighth Corps had taken Wu-sheng-kuan and Chi-kung-shan, on the Hupei-Honan border, and were pursuing enemy forces toward Hsin-yang, in southern Honan. Chiang sent a reward of 30,000 dollars to the Eighth Corps and handed over command of operations in Hupei to T'ang Sheng-chih.[91]

On September 23, Chiang decided that the First Division of the First Corps and the Third Corps would take Nanchang.[92] Under Chiang's personal command, the second attempt to take Nanchang again ended in failure. Li Tsung-jen asserts that Chiang made the mistake of ordering a series of attacks on the city walls. The next night the enemy launched a surprise counterattack by passing through a sewer, placing the NRA units in a disastrous situation. Chiang was severely shaken. It was Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the Kwangsinese acting chief of staff of the NRA, who directed the withdrawal to safety.[93] A contemporary account by Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin, however, places the blame primarily on the Second Corps, which was "walking in one place" in the Lin-chien area all the time. It gave no support to the Third Corps, which had suffered heavy losses. Henceforth the NRA lost the initiative and started retreating to the Hunan border. Borodin also criticized the Seventh Corps for "walking in one place" in the Kuan-chi area and failing to move despite the lack of opposition.[94]

The enemy launched a counteroffensive against NRA units in western Kiangsi on September 30.[95] The morning of October 2 Chiang received a report from Bliukher informing him that the First Division had failed to hold Feng-hsing and retreated to Lo-fang. Deputy commander Wang Po-lin and Party representative Miao Pin had avoided meeting him. In an address to the First Division at Kao-an the next day, Chiang declared that Sun [Yüan-liang], commander of the First Regiment, should be shot for having retreated without orders. The First Division's defeat was the NRA's most shameful. However, he praised the commander of the Third Regiment [Hsüeh Yüeh] and exhorted the division to emulate his regiment and recover its former glory.[96]

A few days earlier, on September 30, Chiang wrote the dean of Whampoa Academy, severely criticizing the First and Second divisions. He said they had shown poor results due to their commanders' poor capacity, which had in turn resulted from their youth, too rapid promotion, and lack of strict control.[97] T'ang Sheng-chih openly criticized Wang Po-lin and Chiang.[98]

According to Tairov, when Chiang saw his two divisions completely disorganized, he became confused, took wrong measures, and became a mere shadow of his former self. He was only living in his memory of the past and on his vanity as a former dictator in Canton. T'ang devised all means to destroy Chiang and suggested to Tairov that he take over command from Chiang, who was tired and needed a rest. If he, T'ang, were in command, he would attack not only Kiangsi but Nanking. Tairov concluded that T'ang probably would have succeeded in his plans had the Russians not support Chiang. T'ang realized that Tairov was objectively opposing his expansion by withholding actual help because he was supporting Chiang. He finally stopped talking about his desire for a top Soviet adviser and began to negotiate with the Japanese in Hankow (Doc. 69, pp. 9, 6, 7, 13).

On October 13, Chiang decided to abandon the attempt to take Nanchang and instead to eliminate the enemy on the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway first.[99] A new operations plan was decided evening of October 14. The Fourth Corps and Ho Yao-tsu's division, which had defected to the NRA, were to be transferred to Kiangsi.[100] Bliukher's note written at Kao-an on October 16 reveals the importance he attached to the arrival of the Fourth Corps. It states, "The day when we are fully ready will be the day when the main units of the Fourth Corps arrive at Jo-ch'i, that is, October 30." Fourth Corps units could be thrown into fighting in the direction most favorable to the NRA. Bliukher's note contains detailed plans on communications, political work, increased rations, replenishment of ammunition, establishment of advance supply depots, supply of warm clothing, movement of the wounded and sick to Changsha, and setting up of advance medical stations.[101]

Tairov was instrumental in keeping part of the Fourth Corps in Wuhan for the second time. Had the entire Fourth Corps been sent to Kiangsi, Tairov stated, it would have been equivalent to losing Wuchang, "our only base in the Wuhan area." Hence he advised through Teng Yen-ta that only four and a half regiments be sent and that Fourth Corps headquarters under Ch'en Ming-shu remain in Wuchang. His advice was accepted (Doc. 69, p. 5).

Despite preparations for a new offensive, the NRA continued efforts to negotiate a settlement with Sun Ch'uan-fang. On October 23 Chiang wired Chang Ching-chiang, his deputy as chairman of the CEC Standing Committee, and T'an Yen-k'ai, chairman of the National Government Council, that a peaceful agreement might be made. Chekiang was the most important issue; the NRA must take it. However, Sun could be allowed to remain in Kiangsu and Anhui. The last attempt at a settlement took place on October 28 when Chiang met Sun's representative at Kao-an.[102] The negotiations were unsuccessful. Two days later Chiang ordered a general offensive against the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway.[103]

Tairov's report of October 30 betrays contempt for Chiang despite his policy of support, and it indicates that Tairov was misinformed on Chiang's position regarding Chekiang. Chiang had stopped fighting because of cowardice, Tairov alleged. To negotiate peace with Sun, Chiang was willing to let him remain in Chekiang and Anhui. T'ang Sheng-chih and Liu Tso-lung had been unwilling to send troops to the northern bank of the Yangtze and sweep the enemy at Wu-hsüeh, Tairov stated. They agreed to do so only after Sun's defeat appeared inevitable. Tairov believed T'ang's decision was significant because he could cut the route of retreat for Sun's army from Kiangsi to Anhui (Doc. 69, pp. 8-9).

Khmelev, then Soviet adviser to the Military Department of the CCP's Central Committee, visited Nanchang in late November. His report of December 5 states that Fourth Corps units, which were to serve as reserves, were ordered into battle on the Seventh Corps' demand. At the most difficult moment, the Seventh Corps declared that it would not undertake the offensive unless the Fourth Corps also took part. Thus the Fourth Corps became a striking group engaged in the Tsan [Te-an] breakthrough.[104] Cherepanov states that as a result, the Fourth Corps actually cleared the way for the Seventh Corps.[105]

The general offensive against the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway began on November 2. Chinese sources differ on the respective roles of the Fourth and Seventh Corps in the occupation of Te-an. General Li Tsung-jen, then Seventh Corps commander, contends that he captured Te-an with little resistance.[106] Chang Fa-k'uei, then commander of the Fourth Corps' Twelfth Division, and *Ti-ssu chun chi-shih* [Record of the Fourth Corps], on the other hand, assert that the division's regiment commanded by Huang Ch'i-hsiang took Te-an on November 3. On Chang Fa-k'uei's orders, Huang turned Te-an over to the Seventh Corps. After the Fourth Corps took Ma-hui-ling on November 4, enemy forces threatened Te-an. The Twelfth Division hurried to

relieve the Seventh Corps and retook Te-an.[107]

The NRA's victory at Ma-hui-ling broke Sun Ch'uan-fang's hold on Kiangsi. Although Chiang Kai-shek reported its capture by the Fourth Corps and the Second Independent Division under Ho Yao-tsu's command,[108] it was the Fourth Corps alone that took Ma-hui-ling after sustaining heavy casualties. Ho's division was assigned to attack enemy positions between Ma-hui-ling and Kiukiang.[109] After Ma-hui-ling fell the division advanced toward Kiukiang, virtually abandoned by the enemy, and occupied it on November 5.

At Nanchang enemy forces hoisted a white flag and the city finally came under KMT rule. Chiang entered Nanchang on November 9.[110] The Kiangsi campaign thus came to a successful conclusion.

Bliukher's telegram of November 15 credits the units from Kwangtung with victory in Kiangsi. The NRA inflicted final defeat on Sun Ch'uan-fang's army on November 5, it states. All the burden of the last days of fighting was carried by the main corps of Kwangtung. The Seventh Corps and Ho Yao-tsu's division avoided action and were active only while pursuing the defeated enemy, yet they got the bulk of the booty. The Seventh Corps showed no wish to continue fighting. Ho Yao-tsu's division was of indifferent ability. T'ang Sheng-chih was unsuccessful in conducting the campaign in eastern Hupei. His forces were considerably beaten up. The Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth corps were inferior. In short, Bliukher stated, the "Second group of the NRA," comprising the Seventh and Eighth Corps and other units that had later joined the NRA, used their connections with the KMT and the National Government as a means of achieving personal profit and high positions.[111]

Khmelev's report states that the final Kiangsi operations were conducted on the whole in accordance with Bliukher's plan. Deviations were made mainly by the Left Striking Group, particularly the Seventh Corps. T'ang Sheng-chih failed to follow the general directive from the very start. Operations were badly carried out, and his Eighth Corps suffered great losses. Brigade commanders deserted the front. It was difficult to tell whether such developments were due to deliberate betrayal or extreme lack of ability on the part of T'ang and his generals.[112]

Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin's report states that victory was due mainly to the Fourth Corps. The situation in Kiangsi improved only after the fall of Wuchang, which freed the Fourth Corps for the Kiangsi front. By a quick maneuver it reached the Kiukiang area, seized it, and by this means created a threat to the enemy's rear, thus enabling the NRA to liquidate the enemy quickly.[113]

Soviet pilots took part in the last stage of the Kiangsi campaign. Sergeev's report states that two Soviet planes arrived at the Kiangsi front on October 28 and performed a job never to be forgotten by the NRA and which would be studied by the Soviet army as well. Operations on the Kiangsi front proved the importance of aviation under Chinese conditions. As at Wuchang, the planes caused panic among the enemy and boosted the morale of NRA commanders.[114] According to Khmelev, apart from reconnaissance, Sergeev bombed large towns and machine-gunned enemy concentrations. In one instance an enemy armored train was completely terrorized.[115] Official KMT sources praise the pilots who attacked Nanchang and the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway, bombing the enemy. A senior commander exclaimed that one plane was better than 10,000 soldiers. Again there was no mention that the crews were Russian.[116]

Operations in Fukien and Military Plans, to October 1926

Meanwhile fighting broke out in Fukien. Chou Yin-jen, military governor of Fukien, concentrated troops on the border with Kwangtung in August. Chiang Kai-shek sought to preserve the peace through negotiations.[117] Although Sun Ch'uan-fang or-

dered Chou to attack Kwangtung, he delayed until late September when he sent troops to attack Swatow.[118] Early the next month Chiang ordered an offensive against Fukien. First Corps units took Yung-ting, Fukien, near the Kwangtung border and returned to Kwangtung and cleared Sung-k'o of enemy troops, and then advanced into central Fukien. On October 16 Chiang wired Ho Ying-ch'in, First Corps commander and garrison commander of Ch'ao-chou and Mei Hsien, appointing him commander-in-chief of the Eastern Route Army. Should his troops make headway, Chiang said, both Fukien and Chekiang could be taken. Three days later Chiang wired Ho stating his belief that the First Corps could take Fukien and open the way to the southeast.[119]

Proposals of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, dated October 13, 1926, outline its views on strategy. The CC noted that all the units fighting Sun Ch'uan-fang in Kiangsi were from Kwangtung. T'ang Sheng-chih took no part. Although it was hard to predict results, the CC thought Sun would be defeated because Wuchang had been taken and hence the Fourth Corps could be sent to the Kiangsi front, thus indicating it shared Bliukher's confidence in the Fourth Corps. Besides, the enemy's navy, Anhui, and Shanghai were wavering. With the occupation of Kiangsi and Fukien the first stage of the campaign could be considered closed. Thereafter attention should be paid to the internal situation, the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. The CC added that it had just received Borodin's letter on this subject (Doc. 68, p. 57).

The CC advocated that Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun take T'ung-kuan, the fortified pass on the border of Shensi and Shansi, where the Yellow River abruptly turns eastward, and then drive to the Peking-Hankow Railway to effect a juncture with the NRA (Doc. 68, p. 58). In his autobiography Feng Yü-hsiang recalls that as he pondered whether to attack Peking from Nankow or to attack Shensi and then take T'ung-kuan, Li Ta-chao, Communist leader in North China, sent a secret letter proposing that his army relieve the siege of Sian and then meet the NRA at Chengchow in Honan. Li Ta-chao and Li Shih-tseng sent him secret letters and operations plans centered on taking T'ung-kuan. After studying the plans, Feng and his subordinates gave their approval and decided that the Kuominchun would strengthen Kansu, aid Shensi, ally with Shansi, and take Honan.[120]

Meanwhile, the National Government conducted negotiations with Chang Tso-lin, leader of the Fengtien Clique, in accordance with the plan to eliminate the militarists one by one. On October 3 Chiang instructed T'ang Sheng-chih to open negotiations with Chang's representatives at Changsha. On the 16th Chiang wired Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai proposing that the Fengtien Clique be urged to send troops against Sun Ch'uan-fang at Nanking in coordination with the NRA.[121]

Document 68 reveals that the Central Committee of the CCP had a different plan. The CC considered it vital to destroy the alliance between Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang, the Shantung militarist. The only means was a quick compromise with Chang Tsung-ch'ang and alliance with his army to fight Sun Ch'uan-fang and to obstruct Fengtien's movements. As a condition of such a compromise, Chang Tsung-ch'ang could have Kiangsu, a part of Anhui, and the province of Honan except areas where the NRA and KMC would meet. The CC proposed that Li Shih-tseng, I P'ei-chi, and other KMT members in Peking should quickly negotiate with Chang Tsung-ch'ang and agitate between him and Chang Tso-lin. Should the latter take action in Anhui and Kiangsu, the NRA should render assistance to Chang Tsung-ch'ang (Doc. 68, p. 58).

In the absence of other documentation, it is unclear whether the Communist Party leaders in Shanghai made this proposal on military and political strategy independently, or in consultation with their Soviet military adviser, A. Khmelev. Khmelev probably was in telegraphic contact with Borodin and Bliukher. The plan to link up

the NRA and the KMC in Honan apparently was accepted by all on the Nationalist side. But the proposal to invite Chang Tsung-ch'ang's Shantungese into Kiangsu and Anhui even before Chiang Kai-shek's conquest of Nanchang did not agree with Chiang's strategy—certainly as it developed after the capture of Nanchang. By the following spring, the KMT and CCP leaders at Wuhan disagreed with Chiang Kai-shek whether the next major thrust should be northward for a union with Feng Yü-hsiang or eastward to capture Nanking and Shanghai. Each followed its own strategy.

The Chekiang Autonomy Movement and the First Shanghai Uprising, to Late October 1926

By October it appeared that Chekiang would come over to the National Government through the defection of its civil governor, Hsia Ch'ao. The KMT had used members who were natives of Chekiang to negotiate with Hsia and two leading Chekiangese divisional commanders, Chou Feng-ch'i and Ch'en I. They played on Hsia's dissatisfaction with his Shantungese superiors led by Sun Ch'uan-fang. Hsia remained outwardly neutral through the summer of 1926. As negotiations continued, the KMT promoted formation of the All Chekiang Society whose leaders spoke out in early September against Sun's war with the NRA and petitioned Hsia to accept a proposed peace settlement with his fellow Chekiangese, Chiang Kai-shek. The NRA needed distraction at Sun's rear to weaken him on the Kiangsi front. On October 16 Hsia called together Chekiang leaders including KMT activists and devised plans for expelling all northern officials from Chekiang and installation of a new provincial administration. He accepted appointment by the KMT and the National Government as provisional chairman of Chekiang and commander of the Eighteenth Corps. Then, with 2,500 men he marched on Shanghai.[122]

Hsia's bid to take Shanghai was undertaken in and agreement with Niu Yung-chien, the KMT's representative in Shanghai, which called for an insurrection to support Hsia's army. The CCP's leadership had earlier decided to stage an uprising in Shanghai when Sun Ch'uan-fang was defeated and Hsia Ch'ao had defected, to help the National Government occupy the city. The CCP organized 130 armed workers and 2,000 unarmed workers. Niu Yung-chien organized 3,600 members of the lumpen proletariat while Yü Hsia-ch'ing, president of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, commanded 500 unarmed members of the merchants corps. According to *Wu-chuang pao-tung*, a Communist analysis written in 1929 and attributed to Ch'en Shao-yü, each group decided to direct its own forces because of its unwillingness to accept others' direction. Hence there was no unified plan for the uprising. However, the date was to be set by Niu. Sun Ch'uan-fang had limited forces in the Shanghai area: one infantry regiment, more than 2,000 police, and the 76th Brigade under Li Pao-chang stationed on the bank of the Yangtze River.[123]

Sun Ch'uan-fang got word of Hsia Ch'ao's move and blocked his way. A clash took place on October 17, four miles from Lunghwa. Halted by Sun's troops, Hsia retreated to Chekiang.[124] Sun transferred some of his most trusted forces from Nanking to the Shanghai area and prepared for a counterattack into Chekiang. Yet under KMT leadership a meeting was held at Hangchow, capital of Chekiang, on October 18 to publicize a declaration of independence from Sun and to pledge support of the Canton Government. Hsia, however, backed down and sent word to Sun's subordinates that he had acted through misinformation. On October 20 Sun's troops crossed the Chekiang border and quickly smashed Hsia's defenses at Chia-hsiang. Hsia fled with his guards, while Sun's troops rounded up his men and machine-gunned them. While attempting to escape to the Chekiang hills, he was overtaken and shot. His severed head was put on display at Sun's Nanking headquarters.[125]

The author of *Wu-chuang pao-tung* states that the most advantageous time for an

uprising was October 17, when Hsia's men were thirty *li* from Shanghai, but the directing organ had not prepared thoroughly for an uprising. When the CCP's armed unit and Niu Yung-chien's men made preparations for an uprising on October 20, Hsia's situation had already become very precarious. On the morning of the 23d, Niu received an unconfirmed report that Hsia had defeated Sun Ch'uan-fang and therefore ordered the uprising to take place that night. The gunboat that had come over to Niu was to fire a shot as the signal for action, but it did not do so. Hence only a small number of workers clashed with the police and were quickly suppressed. The CCP ordered its men to stop on the morning of October 24.[126] More than ten workers were killed, including two labor leaders.[127] The incident became known as the "First Shanghai Uprising." A. Khmelev, Soviet adviser to the Military Department of the CC in Shanghai, reported shortly after that he had talked to Niu Yung-chien and found him not especially important. His actions could not be trusted, as evidenced in his issuing the order for the uprising on the 24th.[128]

Tairov's report on October 30, our Document 69, states that the Chekiang problem must be settled peacefully although the recent situation suggested that this would not be easy. Chekiang should ally itself with the National Government. A buffer zone should be created between Shanghai and the National Government's sphere of influence, perhaps in Anhui. Tairov thought that the Northern Expeditionary Army would have achieved its purpose if Sun Ch'uan-fang was defeated in Kiangsi. He believed it possible to take Anhui if the situation was favorable after Kiangsi's occupation. It was necessary to take decisive action to capture Fukien. Like the CC of the CCP, he believed that thereafter military operations should be ended because casualties were high and the troops exhausted (Doc. 69, p. 20).

Position of Soviet Military Advisers, July to November 1926

Contemporary accounts by Soviet military advisers speak in glowing terms of their own standing among the Chinese. Khmelev's report describes how Bliukher was greeted with shouts and applause when he entered Nanchang. Khmelev asserted that the same attitude existed toward other Russians. One could not wish for anything better, he said. The Russians had great prestige with the generals they worked with. Advisers at corps and divisional levels played a considerable role. However, the Russians labored under extremely difficult conditions. A considerable number were hospitalized at the Nanchang American Hospital, while others were resting in bed at home. The advisers were highly disciplined and unquestioningly implemented Bliukher's orders.[129]

Vaksov described Bliukher as a colorful figure who, with his skillful approach, had won the sympathy of NRA commanders. He claimed that Headquarters' orders were carried out without question because of trust in Bliukher.[130] Senior artillery adviser Borodin asserted that none of the units in which Soviet advisers served had suffered defeat except when the commanders had vacillated and acted contrary to Soviet advice. He, too, spoke of the Russians' personal prestige and their poor state of health. They all had stomach trouble and were "absolutely all suffering from neurotic disorder," he wrote.[131] Katiushin-Kotov reported that the advisers were always where they were needed without consideration for their own lives. If not for Bliukher and the other Russians, the Northern Expedition would not have enjoyed the successes it had.[132]

Chang Kuo-t'ao agrees with the contemporary Soviet evaluation of Bliukher. Bliukher had great prestige and influence and received sincere support from all quarters because he smoothed over difficult situations, Chang recalls. A report circulated in Wuhan to the effect that the real commander-in-chief was not Chiang but Bliukher.[133] General Li Tsung-jen remembered Bliukher as a good military strategist

who always spoke purely from a military point of view and seldom touched upon Chinese politics. On the whole the Russian advisers were good. But Li formed a poor impression of his own adviser, Mamaev, whom he considered unqualified. Lacking military knowledge, Mamaev was appointed only because he spoke Chinese.[134] General Chang Fa-k'uei held a favorable opinion of Bliukher and Fourth Corps adviser Gorev, and he liked his own adviser, Pollo, because he listened to Chang. Soviet advisers ate and lived as did the Chinese army. "To this day, I believe they were a good bunch," Chang reminisced.[135]

Chiang's diary shows he held frequent conferences with Bliukher. On November 7 he wired congratulations to Stalin and Kalinin on the ninth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, expressing the hope that the two countries would continue their alliance in the struggle for world revolution.[136] In an interview with a correspondent on November 19, Chiang acknowledged that a great number of Russian military advisers were almost constantly with him and declared that Feng Yü-hsiang would join the NRA in its offensive against Peking in the very near future.[137]

Contemporary Soviet documents suggest that while supporting Chiang, some of the senior military advisers did not hold a high opinion of him. As we have seen, Tairov expressed contempt for him. Khmelev's report of December 5, 1926 asserts that Bliukher spoke critically of Chiang. There had been cases, especially in the environs of Wuchang, Bliukher allegedly said, when Chiang, with tears in his eyes and in the darkness of a railway car, had whispered to him that all was lost and asked him to take charge. Bliukher had exerted much effort to prove that the situation was not so hopeless. Khmelev concluded that Chiang was not yet ready for the role of commander-in-chief, even less ready to lead a headquarters cut off from the National Government.[138]

Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communists, July-Fall 1926

While Chiang maintained cordial relations with Bliukher and other Soviet military advisers, his diary reveals increasing dissatisfaction with Chinese Communists. On July 3 he expressed displeasure with Communist propaganda. On August 24, he wired the KMT's CEC demanding that the CCP bear responsibility for Ch'en Tu-hsiu's article of July questioning the decision to launch the Northern Expedition. Chiang said the article showed that the CCP wished to break its cooperation with the KMT.[139]

Actually, the Central Committee of the CCP changed its attitude toward the Northern Expedition shortly after the July plenum. The "Brief History" states that the CC issued a directive to correct divisions within the Party regarding the campaign. It declared that unity was essential and that the peasantry should be aroused to support the expedition (Doc. 1, p. 45). Communist political workers were particularly zealous in rallying the people to support NRA units. We have seen how peasants aided the Fourth Corps' Twelfth Division. Hunanese peasants aided other NRA units in similar ways.[140] Workers organized transport, sabotage, scouting, comfort, and first aid contingents. Railway workers wrecked rails and cut wires to break enemy communications; their sabotage work was particularly effective. Miners cut telephone and telegraph wires.[141]

Chiang was disturbed by reports from Canton concerning Communist activities. On August 20 he received a wire informing him that Communists were conspiring to "welcome Wang Ching-wei to overthrow Chiang." Another telegram received shortly afterward alleged that Communist treachery had become daily more apparent. Chiang was particularly perturbed by reports of Communist agitation at Whampoa. In his farewell letter to the academy of July 26, 1926, he forbade Communists to criticize the Three People's Principles and forbade KMT members to reject the CCP. He emphasized the importance of unity and banned secret small organizations. On October

5, he wired graduates of the Fourth Class exhorting them to unite. A few weeks later he received a report from the Whampoa Alumni Association concerning the extent of Communist influence among members of the Fourth Class. Shortly afterward, he received a wire informing him that students in the rear were being used by others to overthrow him.[142]

A report by S. N. Naumov ("Kalachev"), Soviet adviser to the Whampoa Academy, dated November 15, 1926, confirms that the Fourth Class, which graduated in October, had a distinctly Leftist character. Naumov estimated that 500 out of its 3,500 [sic] members were Communists (Doc. 72, p. 1). He explains in an article published in 1961 that the Fourth Class was better than previous ones because local KMT organizations, particularly provincial committees, had selected its members in accordance with a decision of the CC of the CCP. Many Communists were thus enrolled.[143]

Ch'en Kuo-fu, who took over the KMT's Organization Bureau from Chiang early in July, pushed on with measures to weed out Communists. In two reminiscent accounts he recalls that Party regulations were amended to reduce the number of Communists and to increase "pure" KMT members. His subordinates carried out secret work. The "corrupt" Canton Municipal Party Headquarters, torn by KMT-CCP conflict, was reorganized. Ch'en sent men to Kiangsi, Chekiang, Shanghai, and the Northwest, where Communists were in control of Party affairs. He wired Party headquarters in the provinces to send men to Canton for training, and he established the Political Training Institute of the KMT.[144]

While Communists attacked Chang Ching-chiang as early as July 1926, Ch'en recalls, they were not clear about Ch'en himself, since he had never participated in conflicts at Party headquarters and had not been openly affiliated with any clique prior to his appointment to the Organization Bureau. To avoid friction he avoided using KMT members who were prominent anti-Communists.[145] Besides, before leaving Canton, Chiang had instructed him to avoid conflict with the CCP and to keep in touch with Borodin. Ch'en consulted Chang Ching-chiang on all important matters before reaching a decision.[146]

Ending of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott, October 10, 1926

Chiang was concerned about the effects of the prolonged Canton-Hong Kong Strike. Despite measures taken by Canton's military authorities to control the labor movement on July 16, 1926, labor unrest and violence had continued unabated in Kwangtung. Rival unions engaged in killings and armed battles. In the latter half of September Chiang wired the Canton government, ordering the immediate settlement of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. On September 23 Eugene Chen sent a note to the British consul proposing a settlement. KMT leaders rallied support for the government's efforts in meetings with union representatives and other groups.[147]

As we have seen, the CC of the CCP had supported the government's effort to negotiate a settlement in July. Early the next month T'an P'ing-shan argued for voluntary ending of the strike.[148] Moscow also called for swift action to terminate the strike. Teng Chung-hsia, a Communist leader of the Strike Committee, recalls that the committee proposed as a basic solution that the government levy the 2.5 percent surtax on customs receipts and use the revenues to end the strike. Each striker was to receive 100 dollars. On October 10 the Strike Committee called a meeting of masses of all circles and announced that it was calling off the blockade of Hong Kong. This decision was prompted by the need to placate farmers in coastal areas who had suffered heavy losses because of the ban on export of agricultural products. Clashes between farmers and pickets of the Strike Committee had frequently taken place after

May 1, 1926 at coastal ports.[149] A manifesto issued by the Strike Committee declared that it was necessary to change the old form of anti-British boycott to a new form of anti-imperialism. Some time was needed for preparation so that the entire country could unite in an anti-imperialist front.[150]

Chesneaux attributes the Strike Committee's decision to call off the strike and boycott to two factors: the international situation that had arisen following the NRA's entry into the traditional British sphere of influence in the mid-Yangtze region and the obvious unwillingness of the British to come to terms. Britain had become increasingly alarmed by the KMT's success and the growth of the revolutionary movement. In July British gunboats went into action against pickets conducting operations against smugglers, killing twenty-six of them. On September 3, British marines were landed right in the middle of the port of Canton, where they evicted pickets stationed at the docks of Jardine, Matheson.[151] Commenting on the incident, the "Brief History" states that the British attempted to provoke the National Government with a view to causing disturbances in the rear and undermining the Northern Expedition's success, but they failed to produce results. It claims credit for the Communists who restrained the Strike Committee from taking rash measures (Doc. 1, p. 42).

A more serious incident took place two days later at Wan Hsien, Szechuan, following militarist Yang Shen's seizure of two British steamers to transport troops. On September 5, when a British flotilla tried to release the ships, the Chinese responded with machine gun fire. The British then bombarded the city.[152] Seeking to avoid conflicts with foreign powers, Chiang served notice on September 20 to foreign naval vessels to move out of the war zone between Hankow and Wuchang.[153]

The incidents confirmed anxieties about the possibility of British armed intervention, which was openly called for in the British press at home and in China. The Comintern declared that the risk of intervention had assumed alarming proportions. The Strike Committee decided to call off the boycott and strike, since neither the National Government nor the revolutionary movement wanted to run such a risk.[154]

The British government also wanted the strike and boycott ended and therefore turned a blind eye to the 2.5 percent surtax collection by the Canton Government without it being written into a treaty. The surtax was part of the pay-off to the Strike Committee, Hong Kong having always refused to pay an indemnity for back wages.[155]

The Joint Conference of the Kuomintang, October 15-28, 1926

On September 9, only two days after the occupation of Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek wired Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai, informing them of his intention to leave soon for the Kiangsi front. Because Wuhan was the political center, he said, he was requesting members of the National Government Council's Standing Committee to proceed to Hupei to take charge of political affairs. Chiang expressed apprehension over the political effects of any delay. On September 18, the day after he left the Hupei front, he again wired them, saying he feared that Wuhan politics would be difficult to manage unless several members of the CEC and the National Government Council went there first.[156] When Chiang's telegrams arrived at Canton, the KMT's CEC had already decided to call a joint conference at Canton of delegates of the CEC, provincial, district, and special municipal Party headquarters, and overseas branches. It therefore turned the problem of a central political organ for Wuhan over to the conference for discussion.[157]

The Joint Conference met from October 15 to 28, 1926. Sixty delegates, the majority of whom were Leftists, attended the conference. The Presidium included T'an Yen-k'ai (Center), Chang Ching-chiang (Right), Sung Ch'ing-ling and Hsü Ch'ien (Left), and Wu Yu-chang (Communist).[158] Despite Ch'en Kuo-fu's efforts to wrest

control of the KMT Party apparatus, KMT Leftists and Communists still dominated the majority of Party headquarters. This was evident in some of the resolutions passed by the Joint Conference.

On October 15 the conference passed a resolution stating that the location of the National Government should be determined according to the location of its important work. The government's present important work was strengthening the foundation of revolutionary power in various provinces. Since it was most suitable to carry out such work first in Kwangtung, the government should remain temporarily in Canton.[159]

On hearing the news, Chiang tried to influence the delegates. On October 22 he wired Chang Ching-chiang, T'an Yen-k'ai, and Joint Conference delegates, stressing that the situation had changed after the occupation of Wuchang. The Party must quickly make plans for its development. While Central Party Headquarters and government organs might remain in Canton, the CEC should move to Wuchang, Chiang said. Alternatively, he suggested that the government remain in Kwangtung while Central Party Headquarters move to Hupei.[160] Chiang's appeal went unheeded.

On October 18, the Joint Conference passed a resolution to request Wang Ching-wei to terminate his leave and return to office. This was a significant gain for the CCP, which considered Wang's recall a major goal. Five days earlier, as we have seen, the CC of the CCP had stressed the need to pay attention to the Chiang-Wang conflict (Doc. 68, p. 57).

The Joint Conference passed a series of resolutions on the organization of, and relations between, the National Government and provincial governments, and relations between provincial governments and provincial Party organs.[161] On October 22 it adopted a KMT program that dealt with a wide range of problems, including the condition of workers and farmers, especially the latter. The program contained twenty articles advancing the interests of farmers. Article 1 called for a 25 percent reduction in rent or lease of land. Article 17 provided for a village council to carry out village self-government. Article 18 authorized the formation of farmers' associations, while Article 20 authorized them to organize local self-defense units. The program called for labor laws to ensure freedom of organization and the right to strike and provided for a maximum work week of fifty-four hours.[162]

The Joint Conference wired Chiang expressing its confidence and support on the last day of the conference.[163] Nevertheless, its resolutions constituted a triumph of the Left KMT and Communists and a setback for Chiang, whose prestige had been undermined by developments on the Kiangsi front. In mid-December, the Central Committee of the CCP adopted resolutions stating that, like most Kwangtung Communists, the Party's fraction at the Joint Conference denied the existence of a true Left Wing but admitted there was a so-called Quasi-left that had certain functions to perform in the National Revolution.[164] Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai reported to the Sixth CCP Congress in 1928 that following the Joint Conference the issue of Party power had begun to be a bone of contention between the Left and Chiang's faction.[165]

According to Ch'en Kuo-fu, Borodin instructed Communists to use the Joint Conference for their own purposes. He sought unsuccessfully to persuade Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai to seek Chiang's resignation from Party and political posts on the grounds that he lacked understanding of these matters. Borodin was equally unsuccessful in his efforts to influence Ch'en Kuo-fu. A few days after the close of the conference, Ch'en recalls, the CCP began to attack him and the Organization Bureau.[166]

Views of Tairov ("Teruni") on the Wuhan Situation, October 30, 1926

Tairov's report, dated October 30, 1926, reveals that he shared Chiang's concern over

the lack of a central political organ at Wuhan. He found it difficult to understand the Canton government's attitude, said Tairov. It was necessary for two or three CEC members to come to Wuhan and set up the committee there, as it was impossible to begin serious business or establish the Party's power without it (Doc. 69, p. 22).

Tairov's report indicates that his concern was motivated by T'ang Sheng-chih's power, and by his determination to continue the policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against T'ang. After the occupation of Wuchang, T'ang Sheng-chih replaced the Fourth Corps' Twelfth Division with two regiments of Fifteenth Corps Commander Liu Tso-lung, whom Tairov called a "scoundrel" who should one day be disarmed. T'ang tried to replace Wuchang's garrison commander, Tenth Division Commander Ch'en Ming-shu, with Liu, but Teng Yen-ta opposed this on Tairov's advice and Ch'en subsequently became aloof toward T'ang. This incident occurred after Soviet propaganda and maneuvers with Ch'en Ming-shu, according to Tairov. It helped to create friction between T'ang and Ch'en to some degree, and it drew the latter closer to the Russians (Doc. 88, pp. 4; 15-17). Independent sources confirm the development of strained relations between T'ang and Ch'en shortly after the occupation of Wuchang.[167]

Tairov reported that he had noticed symptoms of friction among Paoting Clique leaders T'ang Sheng-chih, Ch'en Ming-shu, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and Hu Tsung-to, a brigade commander of the Seventh Corps. Pai was discontented, feeling that T'ang monopolized authority. Prior to the occupation of Wuchang, these leaders had been in agreement, but it was clear now that unity was completely lacking. Tairov remarked that China's contradictions helped Soviet work a great deal (Doc. 69, pp. 14-16).

Tairov's maneuvers had the full support of Teng Yen-ta, the leftist who headed the General Political Department. After Chiang's departure for the Kiangsi front, Teng held a powerful position at Wuhan with his appointment as chairman of the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters at Hankow and of the Political Affairs Committee of the Hupei Provisional Political Affairs Council. Soviet advisers had formed an excellent impression of Teng in Canton when he was dean of Whampoa Academy. Naumov ("Kalachev") recalls that they were especially sympathetic to Teng, who in fact headed the progressively inclined group of KMT members at the academy.[168]

Teng was eminently suited to help Tairov in his dealings with Fourth Corps generals. Like most of them, he was a native of Kwangtung. He had served as an officer of the Kwangtung Army, reorganized as the Fourth Corps in 1925, and was therefore a former colleague of Ch'en Ming-shu, Twelfth Division commander Chang Fa-k'uei, and many of their subordinates. As a Paoting graduate he had school ties with Ch'en. He had also been a schoolmate of Chang Fa-k'uei at Kwangtung Primary Military School and Wuchang Preparatory Military School. His elder brother, Teng Yen-ts'un, was chief of staff of the Fourth Corps until his appointment as director of the Hanyang Arsenal in late October.[169]

Under Teng, the General Political Department actively supported mass organizations. A former subordinate recalls that when Teng assumed the chairmanship in the summer of 1926, he enlisted revolutionaries for the department. Teng emphasized the importance of the labor and peasant movements and encouraged formation of peasant associations and labor unions. Convinced that the peasant problem lay at the heart of the Chinese Revolution, he ordered all political workers to investigate and compile reports on peasants' living conditions and on land distribution.[170] Kuo Mo-jo recalls that the department dealt with "labor thieves," closed reactionary newspapers, organized a censorship committee, and received a constant stream of requests for political workers from newly incorporated units of the NRA.[171]

Encouraged by the General Political Department, labor unions in the Wuhan area, banned since the February Seventh Incident of 1923, were quickly revived and new ones organized. A center of heavy industry, Hupei province witnessed a vigorous

growth of labor organizations. By November 1926 there were 58 unions at Hankow with 46,000 members; 11 at Wuchang with 21,000; 4 at Hanyang with 15,000; and 6 at Ta-yeh, with 11,000, totaling 93,000. Most of the unions were established in September and October.[172] Communists Hsü Pai-hao and Liu Shao-ch'i were active in the labor movement, which had a more marked class character than at Canton during the Canton-Hankow Strike and Boycott. The power of Left unions practically prevented Rightist labor elements from activity.[173] On October 6, labor demonstrators attempted to enter the British Concession in Hankow but were kept out by landing parties.[174]

Despite Teng Yen-ta's powerful position, Tairov feared he was no match for T'ang Sheng-chih. Teng was a genuinely good Leftist, undoubtedly the leader of the Left, said Tairov, but he was overawed by T'ang, often lost prudence, and lacked authority. Aside from him there was virtually no one else. Tairov said he and Teng were very close and in fact lived together (Doc. 69, pp. 4, 21).

Tairov complained that although the Russians had insisted on a central political organ at Wuhan, nothing had been done. Wuhan residents seemed to show no significant change in their political views. "The responsibility should be borne by us," he said. T'ang Sheng-chih alone was in command of the situation with only Ch'en Kung-po, "a lazy fellow," and Teng to challenge him (Doc. 69, pp. 20-21). Ch'en was chairman of the Financial Affairs Committee of the Hupei Provisional Political Affairs Council and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. Earlier in his report, however, Tairov stated in a contradictory fashion that "we are still in a commanding position here in Wuchang," although T'ang Sheng-chih did not realize it (Doc. 69, p. 5).

Document 69 shows that in his bid for power T'ang courted not only Soviet advisers but Chinese Communists. He told Tairov of his desire to meet Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and he held a conference with CCP members on composition of the Hupei provincial government. But Tairov said he could not trust T'ang. He would await the arrival of Hsü Ch'ien and others and through certain Chinese persons try to delay a solution to the problem of the Hupei provincial government. He added that he was awaiting Borodin's instructions (Doc. 69, pp. 13, 23).

Chang Kuo-t'ao confirms T'ang's flirtation with Russians and Communists. Early in September the Central Committee of the CCP sent Chang to Hupei as its plenipotentiary envoy to assume responsibility for directing [Communist] affairs at the front. According to Chang, T'ang requested that CCP leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu go to Wuhan to help guide his work. T'ang was very courteous to Chang and solemnly asked to join the CCP. However, the CCP felt that his subordinates were conservative militarists and rejected his request for membership. T'ang used singularly ingenious measures to cultivate the CCP and was very courteous to Soviet advisers.[175] In March 1927 three Comintern agents reported that T'ang had proposed to the Wuhan Communists that he recruit volunteers and members of peasant associations for his army.[176] In a number of speeches in Wuhan and Changsha T'ang declared that anticommunism would be considered counterrevolution.[177]

Document 69 reveals that the Russians were not unanimously in favor of supporting Chiang. Some believed that Soviet support of Chiang should be withdrawn, Tairov said, but he could not agree because T'ang Sheng-chih was not a real revolutionary but only an ambitious opportunist. T'ang had begun cautiously to resume dealing with the Russians, but it was still difficult to say how sincere he was. He was like a beautiful woman who showed off her beauty to whomever gave her the most. However, Tairov thought the Russians should not sever all relations with T'ang. Tairov had just recommended a military adviser. A senior political adviser had been requested of Moscow and would arrive in the near future (Doc. 69, pp. 10-11, 13).

Soviet Role in the Development of Aviation, to November 1926

Kostuchenko's report dated November 12, 1926, our Document 71, discusses another aspect of Soviet activity: assistance to the Kuomintang in its efforts to develop military and civil aviation. Acting senior aviation adviser Kostuchenko had piloted a plane to the front along with Sergeev and Kravtsov in August, but Chiang had ordered one plane back to Canton and Sergeev had ordered him to return.[178] His report was written at Canton and addressed to his chief in Moscow.

The contribution of Soviet flyers to military operations amply justified the expectations of Grey, who had stressed the importance of aviation for the Northern Expedition (Doc. 35). A report by Sergeev states that aviation quickly became one of the main problems of reorganization. Every general could see its effectiveness. All commanders and specialists had a very good attitude toward Soviet planes and great interest was shown in aviation training.[179]

Written a few days after the close of the Kiangsi campaign, Document 71 states that the aircraft played a considerable role in the NRA's victory and destruction of enemy morale. But Kostuchenko was disappointed with what had been accomplished in Canton. Pointing to the lack of organization in the Aviation Bureau, he stressed the need for reorganization. He called the aviation school and workshop just "a bunch of men of all ranks." It was planned to create an instructors' committee and to invite teachers and instructors from the Soviet Union. The workshop was primitive, its chief and staff incompetent. Soviet engineers and specialists would be invited. A KMT nucleus organized early in November directed the workshop's political life under the supervision of a newly appointed commissar. The aircraft section worked on two de Havilland planes under Soviet supervision. Aerodromes were unsatisfactory (Doc. 71, pp. 2, 7-11, 1).

Kostuchenko considered conflicts between leaders in Chinese military aviation a major obstacle and said the period from March 20 to July 20 was the most difficult due to inner friction. Although the discord had partly abated, personal struggle might take place in the future. Kostuchenko said measures must be taken in time to forestall this (Doc. 71, pp. 2-4).

He reported that he had formed a commission comprising Chinese aviation leaders to work out general plans for the creation of an air force. The aim was to avoid confusion and unforeseen incidents and to develop initiative in the Chinese. The commission's plan sought to establish equilibrium among all sections. Its budget of two million dollars was the minimum needed (Doc. 71, pp. 5-6).

The commission's "General Plan for the Organization of the Air Service in the NRA," attached to Document 71 and dated September 22, 1926, states that the small air force played a decisive role at Wuchang. Aviation was particularly useful in China due to the lack of technical means to reinforce and supply armies. The NRA's foes were sure to employ planes, and they would be supplied by imperialists. Hence the NRA must not delay its own plans. The commission set a target of eight squadrons comprising six planes each by the end of 1928 and said that the NRA could get planes from Soviet Russia on credit. It drew up projects to enlarge the workshop so that it could produce planes and to expand the school with the goal of training twenty-five aviators, sixteen observers, and thirty specialists a year. It also outlined future air routes (General Plan, pp. 1-2).

Kostuchenko stressed the need to train Chinese in Soviet schools because the Russians would thereby educate sound cadres and adherents to their cause. He reported on plans to create a Chinese purchasing commission, which would visit Moscow to settle all questions concerning the dispatch of additional Soviet specialists and the purchase of planes and various building materials. The commission would carry out its work under the supervision of a Soviet adviser. Kostuchenko drew attention to

the advantage the commission would provide to Soviet industry. It could give orders to Soviet factories, thereby avoiding foreign competition. German and American firms had made offers to the Chinese, reported Kostuchenko. It was best to let Moscow have orders immediately to the full amount of the budget through the purchasing commission (Doc. 71, p. 6).

He emphasized the need for more Soviet workers and specialists in all sections of aviation. Present conditions were favorable, he said. No time should be lost in carrying out the commission's plans. In view of the friendly attitude toward Soviet advisers, their advice was readily accepted. They enjoyed very good personal relations with the Chinese and were trusted. Kostuchenko concluded that work in aviation was now proceeding more smoothly (Doc. 71, p. 13).

Chiang's diary confirms his interest in developing aviation with Soviet aid. On November 11 he ordered Li Chi-shen in Canton to find the means to buy planes from Soviet Russia. On the 30th he wired Li to ask whether he had found suitable people to send to Russia for training in aviation.[180]

The Central Military Political Academy at Whampoa, October 1926

During its first two years the Military Academy at Whampoa graduated fewer than 3,400 cadets in three classes. These young men had been strongly indoctrinated with the spirit of nationalism and sacrifice, and they suffered heavy casualty rates in the campaigns to pacify Kwangtung and during the first months of the Northern Expedition. In October the Fourth Class of about 2,500 graduated. They had been better trained than their predecessors, according to a report dated October 30, 1926, by F. M. Kumanin, who was deputy senior adviser to the Central Military Political School at Whampoa. Kumanin ("Zigon") took up this Canton job in the autumn of 1926.

He learned that the graduates of the Fourth Class included 800 officers, 850 noncommissioned officers, 450 political officers, and about 150 each of specialists in artillery, engineering, and supply service. Almost a third of the men were Hunanese; the rest were natives of Kwangtung, Szechwan, and the Yangtze Valley provinces. As to social origin, nearly half were reported to be peasants, 350 merchants, 347 students, and 63 workmen. Eighty percent were middle school graduates, 10 percent high school graduates, 8 percent graduates of military schools, and 2 percent had only a primary school education. They were soon to be assigned. Some 150 were to be sent to the First Corps, 100 to the training division of the school, 150 "to various provinces," and the remainder to be at the disposal of Chiang Kai-shek (Doc. 70, pp. 32-33). In a different report, Naumov ("Kalachev") stated that the graduates of the Fourth Class were of a pronounced Left disposition, and that almost 500 of them were Communists (Doc. 72, p. 1).

The Central Military Political Academy was not in very good shape when Kumanin inspected it after the graduation. Furniture and rubbish were scattered about, and there was a shortage of books and equipment for the incoming class. Russian rifles and machine guns were not kept clean. Officers and cadets seemed not to understand the use of sighting mechanism, Kumanin observed (Doc. 70, p. 4). He was particularly critical of the military training the Fourth Class displayed. Discipline among the cadets was poor, and he found much to criticize in mock battles he observed in connection with the graduation of the class. Planning for the contests was fairly satisfactory, but operations in terms of scouting, skirmishing, and rifle fire were poor. "The marksmen can produce only the effect of crackers, but by no means an effective fire." Commanders "act without thinking and only in order to do something and not remain inactive." He saw practically no communication between units, only bugling; and attack was effected very slowly—the two sides lying facing each

other at a distance of about 1,000 meters "and continuing to shoot to the last cartridge" (Doc. 70, pp. 30-31).

As had other Soviet advisers before him, Kumanin made a number of suggestions for improvement. All articles belonging to the school must be inventoried and properly distributed to storehouses. The men must be trained to handle and keep their arms properly. Classes must be supplied with textbooks and other requisites before the next term commenced. It was scheduled for November 1, two days after the report. The curriculum should be revised to place special attention upon shooting and training for field service. A shooting gallery and small target range must be constructed, and training be given in firing small caliber arms. Kumanin also advocated that a Military Scientific Society be organized in the school (Doc. 70, p. 32).

If conditions had deteriorated at Whampoa after the departure of Chiang Kai-shek and many instructors and advisers on the Northern Expedition, the political situation in Kwangtung also seems to have become worse from the Soviet viewpoint. S. N. Naumov, assistant chief of the Soviet South China Group for political affairs, addressed a "very secret" report, dated November 15, 1926, to Soviet Military Attaché Longva in Peking. His views on the general political situation in Kwangtung were based entirely on those of Borodin and the Canton Committee of the CCP, he said.

Observations on the Situation in Kwangtung, July-November 1926

Document 72, Naumov's report, illuminates the conditions in Kwangtung after the departure of most NRA units on the Northern Expedition. Analyzing the situation among the military forces remaining in Kwangtung, Naumov considered Li Chi-shen, Fourth Corps commander and chief of staff of the NRA, as a leader of the Right; and the Fourth Corps' Eleventh and Thirteenth divisions the least revolutionary units in Kwangtung (Doc. 72, p. 1). His opinion was in sharp contrast to other advisers' praise of the Fourth Corps' Tenth and Twelfth divisions. Naumov also criticized the First Corps' Twentieth Division. One regiment stationed in Canton was unreliable, another was fighting bandits. They had so strained relations with the population that it would be better not to have them at all (Doc. 72, p. 2).

Naumov believed that Paoting men, or rather Li Chi-shen, held 90 percent of the power in Kwangtung. He classified military forces in the province into three groups. The first, led by Li Chi-shen, comprised the Fourth Corps' two divisions and two divisions of the Fifth Corps. The second, Chiang's group, comprised the First Corps' Twentieth Division, the newly organized gendarmerie division, which was not a real force, and Whampoa, "the last not absolutely." The third group was neutral, comprising newly formed units of the Second and Third corps that could not be considered reliable, and units of the Sixth Corps. Naumov concluded that Li Chi-shen and Fifth Corps commander Li Fu-lin held military superiority. Their men were natives of Kwangtung. Although it was not possible to place them together in terms of their political convictions, they would always have common interests, especially with regard to the province. There was no possibility of military conflict in Kwangtung, he said (Doc. 72, p. 1).

In contrast to the Fourth Class, Whampoa's Fifth Class had only between 100 and 120 Communists out of a total of 2,500, Naumov reported. The best Whampoa officers had left for the front. Naumov considered the new commanders as very undesirable elements from militarist armies of various parts of the country (Doc. 72, p. 1).

Although the Strike Committee called off the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott in October, the committee's organs remained, as did the mess hall and dormitory for strikers.[181] In November the committee was still powerful enough to

detain eighty persons for strike breaking.[182] Written five weeks after the strike was called off, Document 72 discussed several plans for employing strike pickets, including the formation of a model military unit. Naumov believed there was danger that some of the pickets would become demoralized. Out of a total of 5,000, 3,000 remained in the barracks, he said, and political work was being carried out among them. Five hundred Communists were the main cementing element (Doc. 72, p. 6).

Naumov paints a vivid picture of violence on the labor scene in Kwangtung. The working masses were much more active and very exacting in economic questions, he said. Eighteen hundred cases of conflict awaited adjustment. Thirty percent concerned conflict among workers themselves, the rest concerned strife between workers and employers. Conflicts between workers and the government at the arsenal, where Communists had been of some weight until September, had led the government to declare a lockout. Struggles in the streets took place from time to time. Economic conditions were unsatisfactory. Workers' wages, which had decreased by 10 percent in the last ten to twelve years, were not paid regularly. Unemployment was a problem in some industries. The government was in a militant frame of mind toward labor. But, while non-Cantonese such as T'an Yen-k'ai were militant, the Cantonese were willing to make great concessions to workers. Naumov concluded that, while there was some Communist influence in the labor movement, it did not bear a monopoly character. The Mechanics Union was deeply opposed to the CCP (Doc. 72, pp. 5-6). In view of the bitter conflict between communist-oriented unions and rival organizations, that certainly was an understatement!

Farmers' associations had been organized in more than 60 percent of Kwangtung's districts, reported Naumov. Although it was generally considered that a million had been organized, he thought this number exaggerated, but he was confident that there were between 600,000 and 700,000 "really organized peasants."[183] Farmers' associations had acquired considerable force and had become the most pressing question in the province. They had developed to such an extent that in certain areas they imposed their will and policies (Doc. 72, p. 2).

Clashes between farmers and the gentry had continued to disturb the Kwangtung countryside. A three-day battle between the *min-t'uan* and peasant corps had occurred a few days before Naumov wrote his report. The *min-t'uan* was defeated and as a result 5,000 people—landlords and their families—were reported homeless, and 150 people killed.[184] Naumov reported that the gentry were carrying on an active struggle against farmers in some regions. Even some NRA units such as the Twentieth Division of Chiang Kai-shek very often struggled against farmers' associations and sometimes behaved worse than did bandits. They engaged in looting, violence, and murder, Naumov said. Li Fu-lin protected the gentry. However, Fourth Corps units treated peasants better. The peasantry, according to Naumov, was favorably disposed toward the Northern Expedition and even favored its extension, just to get rid of troops from other provinces (Doc. 72, pp. 2-3).

According to Naumov banditry, a persistent problem in Kwangtung, had remained on the same level almost all the time. A campaign ordered by Chiang Kai-shek had only resulted in abatement in some areas; it had proven impossible to disband bandit groups. Up to 90 percent of bandits were former soldiers whom the gentry often used to fight farmers' associations. Individual bandits, however, had begun to join farmers' associations to improve their material condition. Naumov estimated there were at least 25,000 bandits in the province (Doc. 72, pp. 3-4).

Borodin's group had made a thorough study of the peasant question, Naumov reported. The Special Peasant Commission of the CCP's Kwangtung Regional Committee was also studying the peasant question in the province, how to direct the peasant movement and fight banditry. Russians had taken part in the commission, which performed very productive work (Doc. 72, p. 4).

According to Naumov, the greater part of students in Kwangtung, mainly sons of the local gentry and merchants, were active in politics in a negative way, forming a reservoir for counterrevolutionary societies such as the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Communist influence among students was insignificant. Naumov thought the principal reason was that the revolution's real nature was more evident in Kwangtung than anywhere else. It was manifest that the real revolutionary foundation lay in the peasant question and then the labor question. Realizing the direct consequences for themselves, the students were already defending their own interests against the "deepening" of the revolution (Doc. 72, pp. 6-7).

Early in 1926 Kuibyshev had reported that the antigovernment agitation at Kwangtung University had been instigated by its president, Rightist leader Tsou Lu, with the aim of overthrowing the Canton government (Doc. 22, p. 33). Tsou was dismissed in November 1925, and he was succeeded by the Leftist Ch'en Kung-po the following January. In the summer of 1926, Tai Chi-t'ao, whom Communists regarded as the "New Right Wing's" ideologist, arrived at Canton and assumed the presidency. He expressed disagreement with those who advocated that the university's function was to train the revolutionary vanguard in a short period and asked the government and society not to hope that the university could produce significant political results.[185] Tai soon had to change his stand. In October, the university was reorganized as the National Sun Yat-sen University. A committee was set up under Tai and his deputy, Ku Meng-yü, the other members being Hsü Ch'ien, Ting Wei-fen, and Chu Chia-hua. On October 10 the government ordered the university to provide Party education and train the revolutionary vanguard, announced that all students must take examinations to qualify for readmission, and suspended all teachers. It ordered students and teachers to observe discipline and refrain from interfering in the university's reform.[186] Commenting on the move, Naumov stated that the government had finally been compelled to close Kwangtung University, dismiss all students and teachers, appoint a special commission to select a new staff of professors, and eliminate reactionaries among both students and faculty. While it was too early to speak of results, Naumov thought it quite probable that the reorganization would move both students and faculty to the left (Doc. 72, pp. 6-7).

Naumov reported that merchants were partisans of the Northern Expedition in order to rid Kwangtung of soldiers. They shared this attitude with Kwangtung army units. The end of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott promised good profits to certain merchants but things were moving slowly. A considerable portion of small and middle merchants, the least interested in politics, were indifferent to the NRA's victories. For them the only important thing was for Hupei instead of Kwangtung to become the revolutionary base. However, another group of merchants who headed chambers of commerce and other commercial organizations represented to a certain extent Kwangtung's commercial and financial capital. They were not indifferent to the NRA's victories because they had some perspectives regarding the future. The most conscious among them did not object to making concessions to peasants, but unanimity was lacking. Naumov said it was possible that the gentry and merchants would come to an agreement on warding off the real danger of the "encroaching revolution" (Doc. 72, p. 7).

Naumov said his analysis of the general political situation was based entirely on the views of Borodin and the CCP's Canton Committee, which he endorsed. A serious problem, he stated, was disagreement among the CCP's members in evaluating the KMT and its Left elements, which had resulted from the opposing Shanghai and Canton points of view. While the Shanghai view divided the KMT into Right, Left, and Center, Canton Communists did not support any KMT member simply because he belonged to the Left, but only those who by their action afforded the possibility of cooperation. But there was no current in Kwangtung that could be called the Left.

While Leftists were inconsistent and beat a retreat at the least movement of workers and peasants, the Center and Right, including Chiang Kai-shek, were meditating deeply on the agrarian question. The Left's attitude of wanting to benefit from the noise made by peasants and workers was particularly manifest in Kwangtung, where the latter not only made noise but took effective measures to improve their condition. Elsewhere such phenomena did not exist, and KMT members and Communists in the KMT were still on their honeymoon (Doc. 72, p. 8).

A report of the Kwangtung Regional Committee of the CCP dated November 23, 1926, seized in the Peking raid, offers further insight into the committee's outlook. It shows that Canton Communists had completely abandoned the hope of collaborating with the Left and were ready to prepare for an antigovernment uprising. The report states that the positions assumed by the National Government, especially Chiang, inspired the greatest apprehension. The period when the masses and the government must confront each other was already approaching. Communists must not allow the forces of workers and peasants to become isolated and must persuade students and merchants to join them in opposing the government. In view of the current political situation and considering that Communists did not yet have at their disposal sufficiently large forces, of course they must not heedlessly provoke clashes. Yet they could not say that absolutely no clashes should occur. They must strain every nerve to prepare a united force for a great uprising so that when this force was ready, the great rebellion against the government could be carried out.[187]

In conclusion, Naumov stated that although the Canton situation was very complicated, it was not an independent problem. Provided matters ran smoothly at the front, there would be no trouble in Kwangtung. But in case of the least hitch, some change would take place, quick as lightning. No matter how circumstances turned out, even should the principal base of the National Revolutionary Army and the Soviet base be moved to central China, Kwangtung would still remain one of the bases of Soviet work in China. Naumov said that thus far little had been done with regard to studying and summing up Soviet work there, which was very important. Much had been accomplished within the last three years. The experience gained could serve in the Russians' further work in other provinces (Doc. 72, p. 8).

Naumov's statement that he personally endorsed the views of Borodin and the CCP's Canton Committee is intriguing because the "Brief History," which he prepared around the same time, consistently upholds the Central Committee in Shanghai. His report is in effect an analysis of Kwangtung as a microcosm of the Chinese revolutionary process. Although it asserts that no other place witnessed the phenomena taking place in Kwangtung, many of these developments had already occurred in the provinces occupied by the NRA, especially Hunan and Hupei.

The Mass Movement in Hunan and Hupei, to December 1926

By the end of 1926, 200 unions with a total membership of 200,000 were registered with the authorities of the city of Wuhan alone.[188] On December 1, 1926, the First Hunan Provincial Labor Congress was convened, attended by 175 delegates, reported to represent 326,000 workers.[189]

Led by the left wing of the labor movement, the unions in Hupei and Hunan controlled large funds and maintained armed and trained pickets similar to those at Canton. They became a "workers' government" to an even greater extent than those of Canton during the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott and spearheaded the fight against big foreign interests in China. Because many of their members, such as seamen, factory workers in the Hankow Concessions, porters, and dockers, were employed by foreign firms, their economic struggle coincided with political struggle. Many of the strikes that took place were strongly antiforeign in tone. But the unions

also tackled Chinese enterprises. A general wage increase was obtained during the fall in both Chinese and foreign enterprises, in some cases by strike action, in others by negotiation. Unemployment became a serious problem as a number of foreign and Chinese enterprises slowed down production. The continuation of military operations further interfered with industry and commerce.[190]

The peasant movement grew by leaps and bounds. In Hupei, 287,000 peasants were reported to have been organized by the end of December, compared to only 7,200 five months earlier.[191] Under T'ang Sheng-chih's policy of promoting mass organizations, the peasant movement in Hunan made even more startling gains. As of the first of December, 1,200,000 peasants were said to have been organized,[192] compared to 37,000 six months earlier. As in Kwangtung, clashes broke out in the Hunanese countryside between peasants on the one hand and landlords, the *min-t'uan*, and army officers on the other.

The NRA's Plans on Strategy and Reorganization, November-Early December 1926

On November 16, the day after Naumov's report, a group of KMT leaders, Borodin, and other Russians left Canton for Wuhan. The KMT group included Foreign Minister Eugene Chen (Ch'en Yu-jen), Communications Minister Sun Fo, Finance Minister T. V. Soong, and Hsü Ch'ien, Feng Yü-hsiang's close adviser who had just been appointed justice minister.[193] The Russian group included financial adviser V. M. Shtein, M. G. Snegov, O. S. Tarkhanov ("Erberg"), M. F. Kumanin, S. A. Dalin, E. S. Yolk, and A. V. Blagodatov. Borodin's interpreter, the Communist Chang T'ai-lei, was in charge of the trip.[194] A statement issued by the Canton Information Bureau on December 1 declares that the Chinese leaders were on a mission to investigate the question of moving the Party and government to Wuhan.[195] On November 26 the second extraordinary meeting of the KMT's Central Political Conference in Canton decided to move the Party headquarters and the National Government to Wuchang.[196] The decision was reported to have been reached after Chiang Kai-shek sent Teng Yen-ta and Chang Fa-k'uei to Canton on November 23 to explain the need for the move.[197]

At his Nanchang headquarters, Chiang paused with Bliukher to take stock of the NRA's condition. Casualties in the Northern Expedition had been very high. According to Bliukher's telegram of November 15, 1926, more than 25,000 men were killed or wounded, 15,000 in Kiangsi alone. These figures did not include the sick and deserters. Losses suffered by the corps from Kwangtung were particularly high; 70 percent of their junior and middle-ranking commanders and half of the regimental commanders had been killed.[198]

Bliukher reported on the troop strength of NRA units engaged in the Northern Expedition. The main nucleus of the NRA and Lai Shih-huang's Fourteenth Corps, which was closer to it, totalled approximately 33,000 bayonets. The "Second Group of the NRA," comprising the Seventh and Eighth corps and other units that had joined the NRA, totalled between 55,000 and 60,000 bayonets, plus around 5,000 bayonets of the Seventeenth Corps in Fukien.[199]

Khmelev's report of December 5 states that prior to the third Kiangsi operation prisoners of war captured from Sun Ch'uan-fang were put to work in the rear. Now the men were being incorporated in small groups into various NRA units because Sun had been smashed. The NRA thus reinforced itself. Special political work was carried out among the prisoners and it was expected that they would not be inferior in any way to NRA men. Some prisoners captured from Wu P'ei-fu had already been used in the third Kiangsi operation. His artillery men's fighting exceeded all praise.[200]

Khmelev said there were more than 200 Communist commanders and many units

commanded by Communists in the NRA. There were already three Communist regimental commanders, many combat battalion and company commanders. In March 1927 three Comintern agents reported that dozens of Communist commanders, including a few regimental commanders and a Communist regiment, had a colossal influence.[201] Khmelev stated that Communist influence in the NRA was considerable, particularly with regard to political work, but Communist political workers were not unified by a single leading center. He criticized the Political Department. During operations the main burden of work had fallen on political workers at lower levels. Bliukher also saw the need for unified leadership of political work, said Khmelev, but he had no man who could undertake the task and it was hopeless to entrust it to KMT members in the Political Department. The creation of a well-thought-out leadership of political work was an extremely urgent task. The question of the institution of the commissar system had not yet been solved. In some units commissars served at regimental and higher levels; in others, only at the corps level. Sometimes corps commissars were appointed by corps commanders, as in T'ang Sheng-chih's Eighth Corps. Yet nothing could be done because regulations on commissars had not been made or approved. Khmelev may not have known of the Regulation of mid-March 1926, now our Document 41.

The report highlights the fact that centralization of finances and supplies, emphasized by the Russians in Kwangtung, remained a difficult task. The bulk of the appropriated money was eaten by those units that had contributed the least, Khmelev reported. T'ang Sheng-chih demanded $1.2 million (in addition to the funds his agents collected in Hunan) for combat action in western Hupei. Chiang Kai-shek allotted $200,000 for the operation and set T'ang's monthly budget from central funds at $600,000. Similarly, Li Tsung-jen's Seventh Corps requested financial support although it received revenues from Kwangsi. The basic Kwangtung units were worse off. Each received no more than $200,000 to $$300,000 per month. Hence, their soldiers had not been paid for a few months. Lately, Chiang had attempted to put the financial question in order. Official and legal income had now come under his headquarters' control, but he did not dare to take away or reduce money from the provinces. No one could take account of unofficial incomes.

Bliukher considered as the second achievement the centralization of supplies and weapons which was being carried out. No corps commander could now get weapons from arsenals, including T'ang Sheng-chih and Fifteenth Corps commander Liu Tso-lung, who guarded Hanyang. But the attempt to centralize captured equipment had failed. NRA generals were completely uncontrolled in this regard. A huge quantity of equipment had been captured, enough to form new units, but the majority went to those units that had taken the least part in the fighting, such as Ho Yao-tsu's division at Kiukiang. Bliukher had told Khmelev that it was intended to transfer captured equipment to Commander-in-Chief Chiang. According to Khmelev, Chiang made a number of decisions on troop reorganization and strategy on Bliukher's recommendation at a meeting after the conclusion of the Kiangsi campaign. It was planned to station NRA corps so that each could be fed locally. Changes had been partly introduced during Khmelev's last days at Nanchang in late November 1926, and further corrections would be made.

Without dispute, it was planned to form two corps out of the Fourth Corps. Chiang attempted to form another special corps for himself, while T'ang Sheng-chih wanted the Third Corps to be given to him. Khmelev pointed out that while it was necessary to find ways to preserve a certain balance, it was also necessary not to offend those generals who had carried the whole burden. It was decided to place Ho Yao-tsu's division, which had grown to a considerable size and become dangerous, under Sixth Corps commander Ch'eng Ch'ien, and to reduce it to six regiments. It was assumed that Ho would not agree and plans were made to disarm him in case of

refusal, but he accepted the order. The question was also raised of disarming Liu Tso-lung's Fifteenth Corps, which had grown to 10,000 men and swallowed $400,000 monthly, but which was useless.

Khmelev reported that a commission of all Soviet advisers at Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters was working on the problem of new troop strength. It was intended to draft a project by December 5 with the aim of introducing uniformity and increasing firepower. Intensive work was being done in reinforcing units up to the regimental level with prisoners of war. Bliukher assumed that in the course of the next month the army would be more or less battle ready. Provided the respite lasted two months, political training would be improved.

According to Khmelev, the following strategic decisions were made upon the conclusion of the Kiangsi campaign at a meeting between Chiang and Bliukher: seizure of Fukien; semi-military, semi-political seizure of Chekiang; and liquidation of the enemy in western Hupei.

Chiang and Bliukher, reported Khmelev, decided to reinforce Ho Ying-ch'in's forces in Fukien with Lai Shih-huang's Fourteenth Corps. Bliukher expected Ho to approach Foochow in early December. After that city was occupied, the Fourteenth Corps was to move north to the Chekiang border.

The NRA had made steady progress in Fukien after crossing the border from Kwangtung in October. On October 29 Ting-chou was occupied by the Seventeenth Corps, formed out of defecting units, and the Fourteenth Corps was sent from Kiangsi. Chang-chou near the southern coast was taken November 8, followed by Ch'uan-chou on the 21st. The navy in Fukien then announced it would cooperate with the NRA and cut off the defenders' route of retreat in the Foochow area. On December 3 NRA forces won a decisive victory. Foochow's defending commander abandoned the city and Military Governor Chou Yin-jen fled to Chekiang. The NRA's victories were facilitated by the assistance of more than 10,000 members of the *min-t'uan*.[202]

Khmelev reported that Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters was trying to avoid possible collision with the Fengtien Army. Hence Chekiang would be occupied under the pretext of Chekiangese themselves taking part. The province would be taken mainly by the forces of Chou Feng-ch'i, a Chekiangese divisional commander under Sun Ch'uan-fang with whom a "stable enough agreement" had been made. Chou was to proceed to Ch'u-chou, a strategic pass in western Chekiang where he would be reinforced by two divisions of the First Corps comprising Chekiangese sent from Kiangsi. The troops would be concentrated in the Ch'u-chou area by December 5 and advance toward Hangchow, capital of Chekiang, accompanied by the Soviet adviser Ianovsky. At Hangchow they were to be met by the troops of Civil Governor Ch'en I, who, along with most of Sun's generals, had sent representatives to negotiate with the NRA.

Sun Ch'uan-fang had appointed the Chekiangese divisional commander Ch'en I to succeed Hsia Ch'ao as part of his plan to win provincial support by conceding to the Chekiang commanders enough autonomy that they would defend their province against the NRA. But he failed to block the KMT-promoted independence movement. In November proponents of Chekiang autonomy negotiated with the NRA while attempting to implement provincial self-rule. Sun's appeal for aid from Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang undermined his efforts to retain Chekiangese support. The KMT accelerated its peace movement, attracting many prominent figures. The Affiliated Association of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhui called for democratic self-rule in the provinces still under Sun's control. In a wire to the association on November 17, Chiang Kai-shek urged it to cooperate with the NRA, claiming that its goals were the same as the revolution's.[203]

Khmelev's report makes no mention of the entry of First Corps troops from

Fukien into Chekiang, Chiang's native province. However, as we have seen, in mid-October Chiang had already expressed his belief to Ho Ying-ch'in, Eastern Route commander-in-chief, that Fukien could open the way not only to Chekiang but to the entire Southeast. On November 19, Chiang wired Ho to lead his main force quickly to Chekiang after taking Foochow and to occupy Hangchow. As for Kiangsu, Chiang said a decision would be made after Chekiang's occupation. Five days later he again wired Ho to advance immediately to Chekiang after taking Foochow.[204]

According to Khmelev, T'ang Sheng-chih was ordered to liquidate enemy remnants in western Hupei. He had tried to evade, suggesting that the Fourth Corps take over the burden again, but neither Chiang nor Bliukher had agreed. T'ang was to be assisted by Liu Tso-lung's Fifteenth Corps, the Ninth and Tenth corps, and Yang Shen, a Szechwanese militarist who had defected and had been appointed commander of the Twentieth Corps. Khmelev did not know whether T'ang had accepted the assignment. It was expected that all operations would be over by December 20 at the latest. Yüan Tsu-ming's group was also to assist in the operations. Should he refuse, the question of disarming him would be raised. Khmelev also expected that Yang Shen would be disarmed. He thought the operations in western Hupei would succeed provided operational plans were not arbitrarily changed.

Khmelev reported that Yen Hsi-shan had recently sent a representative to Chiang to declare his readiness to cooperate with the National Government and the First Kuominchun, but he had failed to give concrete indications as to the form of cooperation, and Chiang had replied in the same spirit.

Bliukher and Chiang decided that the NRA did not possess enough strength to advance toward Honan, wrote Khmelev. The majority of generals in that province opposed both Wu P'ei-fu and Fengtien and might join the NRA provided there was some revival of activity on the NRA's part. But the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters considered any northward movement very dangerous. Bliukher decided that Honan should be an open question for the time being. If it was to be occupied, it would be most advisable for Feng Yü-hsiang's First Kuominchun to do it. Feng's first task was to establish communications with the Northern Expeditionary forces. It would be premature and dangerous for it to move from Paotow toward Kalgan. Bliukher considered as completely correct Feng's decision to concentrate in Shensi in order to attack Honan and effect a juncture with the NRA.

On November 28 First Kuominchun troops from Kansu relieved the siege of Sian, Shensi, where units of the Second and Third Kuominchun had been under attack by the forces of Liu Chen-hua supplemented by Red Spear units since mid-April. Feng ordered his men to pursue the enemy fleeing eastward toward Honan. Meanwhile, the rest of his army marched from Suiyuan through Kansu into Shensi, a distance of almost a thousand miles. This was a considerable achievement, in view of the Kuominchun's demoralized state only shortly before.[205]

Feng's army was reported to comprise 300,000 men by November 1926, probably a great exaggeration. Delivery of supplies had become even more urgent and difficult. A Peking raid document dated November 20, 1926 states that the Soviet commissar for finance bound himself to assign necessary additional funds over the budget appropriation for transportation of supplies from Verkneudinsk to Urga. A Soviet adviser reported the next month that Moscow had so far assigned 20,000 [rubles?] for transportation, but supplies arrived slowly from Urga. So far only twenty-one cars had arrived. Anticipating that motor transportation would become difficult in the winter, he contemplated using camels, but there was no money for it.[206]

We have discussed the strategic plan proposed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on October 13, 1926, which called for an alliance with Chang Tsung-ch'ang against Sun Ch'uan-fang and the ceding of Kiangsu and parts of Anhui and Honan to Chang in hopes of breaking up his alliance with Chang Tso-lin.

Matters did not work out that way. On November 19 Sun Ch'uan-fang had proceeded to Tientsin to ask for Chang Tso-lin's support. The next day Sun, Chang, and leading generals of the Chihli and Shantung cliques discussed the southward movement of troops. On Chang Tsung-ch'ang's return to Tsinan he sent troops southward on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and ordered other units and the Po-hai fleet commanded by Pi Shu-ch'eng to enter Shanghai. By November 24 the Shantung Army's vanguard had passed Hsu-chou en route to Pukow, opposite Nanking.[207]

In Bliukher's opinion, as reported by Khmelev in his note of December 5, 1926, it would be dangerous and inopportune to advance to Anhui and Kiangsu at this time. He would agree to the occupation of Anhui only if it could be done without a war with Chang Tsung-ch'ang, and using only the Seventh Corps and Ho Yao-tsu's division. It would be quite desirable to push these units out of Kiangsi, he said, but it was already sufficiently evident that the Seventh Corps did not wish to be sent to Anhui.

Khmelev stated that movement to Kiangsu was completely out of the question, first, because the NRA lacked this capability and second, because Chang Tsung-ch'ang had already moved into Kiangsu. Collision with him would be inevitable.

Shanghai constituted a separate problem, according to Khmelev's note. No one at Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters wished to seize it. If it was to be taken, it should be taken last, in order to delay as long as possible the moment of direct clash with foreign imperialism. The formula of "Autonomous Shanghai," however, was quite acceptable to headquarters. It was possible that upon taking Chekiang the NRA might assist Shanghai social circles under this or that pretext to declare the city's autonomy.

Conclusion

The National Revolutionary Army's victories in Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi were achieved by a combination of factors, chiefly the fighting capacity and raw courage of some of its units, effective political work, assistance of the populace, defection of enemy commanders, and Soviet aid in supplies and guiding personnel. The Russians played a significant role, from planning strategy for the expedition to flying bombing raids against enemy troops during the siege of Wuchang and the last days of the Kiangsi campaign. While the attitude of Chinese generals toward their advisers varied, Bliukher was widely respected.

Shortly after the conclusion of operations in Kiangsi, Chiang Kai-shek publicly acknowledged that Soviet advisers were almost constantly with him. Although a few senior Russians held a low opinion of Chiang, they supported him against T'ang Sheng-chih's attempt to supplant him as commander-in-chief, particularly after the reverses suffered by Chiang's First Corps units in Kiangsi. The convergence of the interests of Chiang and the Russians is seen clearly in their urgent call, prompted by apprehension over T'ang's power, for KMT leaders to proceed to Wuhan. Impressed by the fighting skill of the Fourth Corps' Tenth and Twelfth divisions, especially the latter, Soviet advisers sought to strengthen the Fourth Corps to buttress the position of Chiang and the National Government at Wuchang.

Soviet advisers criticized certain NRA units from Kwangtung, notably the Second and Third corps, for failure to coordinate with other units in the Kiangsi campaign. They reserved their harshest criticism, however, for T'ang Sheng-chih's Eighth Corps, Li Tsung-jen's Seventh Corps, and other units that had joined the NRA in 1926.

In contrast to his cordial relations with Bliukher, Chiang Kai-shek was hostile to Borodin, who remained in Canton. His presence aggravated Chiang's suspicion of Chinese Communist activities in the rear. Although the CCP's Kwangtung Regional Committee still doubted the existence of a KMT Left Wing, the Party's policy of al-

liance with the Left bore fruit at the Joint Conference of the KMT held in Canton in October. The delegates resolved to request Leftist leader Wang Ching-wei to resume his duties and adopted a program that advanced the interests of workers and farmers. The Strike Committee called off the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott but its organs and influence remained, while violence continued to mark the labor scene in Kwangtung. Moreover, the NRA's advance into Hunan and Hupei was followed by rapid expansion and radicalization of the farmers' and workers' movements in those two provinces. For the time being, however, the uneasy relations between Chiang and the CCP were maintained. Neither side was ready for an open break.

Notes

1. Borodin, "Reports of the Senior Artillery Adviser Borodin on the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China," December 2, 1926, p. 105. See also Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 120; *As Military Adviser*, p. 227.

2. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 123-27; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 229-30; Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," pp. 39-40.

3. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih Hsien-sheng*, diary entry for July 1, 1926.

4. *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, XII, 1970, chronology section, states that Chiang decided on June 13, 1926 to overthrow Wu P'ei-fu, compromise with Sun Ch'uan-fang, and leave Chang Tso-lin alone. If correct, this means that Chiang adopted this strategy before Bliukher had obtained approval for his new plan. The chronology section, however, offers no source. Chiang's diary entry for June 13, 1926 makes no mention of any decision on strategy.

5. KMWH, XII, 1780-87; *Pei-fa chan-shih*, I, 61-66.

6. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 115' *As Military Adviser*, p. 226. Wu's troop strength: 210,000; Sun Ch'uan-fang's: 157,000; Chang Tso-lin's: 190,000.

7. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 63, gives the figure of 100,000. Cherepanov, in *Severnyi*, pp. 110, 107, 115, gives a similar number. PFCS, II, 321, states the NRA had less than 150,000 men.

8. The Second Corps under T'an Yen-k'ai's command had three divisions in twelve regiments. The Third Corps under Chu P'ei-te had three divisions in eight regiments and two battalions. The Fourth Corps under Li Chi-shen had four divisions in thirteen regiments. The Sixth Corps under Ch'eng Ch'ien's command had three divisions in nine regiments and two battalions. The Seventh Corps under Li Tsung-jen had nine brigades totaling eighteen regiments and two battalions. The Eighth Corps under T'ang Sheng-chih had four divisions and two regiments totaling seventeen regiments, plus two divisions of undetermined strength that had recently been incorporated. See KMWH, XII, 1802-1805.

9. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for June 8, 1926.

10. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," pp. 40-41, 37, 49-51. Ms. Mirovitskaia gives considerable detail on advance planning.

11. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 121, 139, 128; *As Military Adviser*, p. 228.

12. Katiushin-Kotov, "Notes of Adviser F. M. Katiushin-Kotov," January 3, 1927, pp. 131-34.

13. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 127-28; *As Military Adviser*, p. 230. Bliukher's report is quoted without any indication of the date. It appears to have been written after July 1, 1926.

14. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 298; *As Military Adviser*, p. 230. Cherepanov is consistently hostile to Chiang.

15. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for July 2, 1926.

16. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 294; *As Military Adviser*, p. 299.

17. The Peking office of the Dalbank (Far Eastern Bank of Harbin) informed the Soviet Embassy on October 23, 1926 that it had debited its account and transferred to Canton, to the consulate's account, 14,800 gold dollars. See "Financial Report of the Military Attaché in Peking, October 1926," *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 67-69.

18. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," pp. 49-50, based on Soviet archives. Chiang's diary entry states that Soviet supplies arrived on July 6. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for that date. According to A. Yurkevich, "Between October 1924 and October 1926, the USSR shipped 24 aircraft, 157 field cannons, 48 mountain cannons, 128 mortars, 295 machine guns, 73,993 rifles and other armaments and materiel to Guangzhou." Yurkevich, "The Huangpu Military School," p. 101, note 13, based upon A. Kalyagin, *On Foreign Roads* (in Russian), p. 13.

19. *Soviet Plot*, p. 61. The telegram was apparently sent by Egorov, Soviet military attaché in Peking. The currency is not indicated.

20. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 177.

21. *Soviet Plot*, p. 27; SLYM, III, "KMC," p. 75. The participants at the meeting included Unshlict, president of the commission; Galies, secretary; Bubnov; Yagoda; Longva; and Petrov. "Petrov" may be a Chinese Communist.

22. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 107; *As Military Adviser*, p. 222..

23. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 75-76.

24. *Soviet Plot*, p. 27. This item is deleted in SLYM.

25. *Soviet Plot*, pp. 24-26, 28, 29; SLYM, III, "KMC," pp. 73-76. Longva assumed the post of Soviet military attaché in Peking shortly after the meeting.

26. *Soviet Plot*, pp. 76-81; SLYM, III, "KMC," pp. 92-96. The Chinese version includes two lists. One, showing supplies already delivered, covers the period up to June 1, 1926 and indicates that discounts were given. The total amount, more than six million rubles, was similar to the cost of supplies reported by Lapin ("Seifulin") in April 1926. The other list shows supplies to be delivered.

27. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo-ti sheng-huo*, III, pp. 116-17.

28. Li T'ai-fen, *Kuominchun shih-kao*, p. 305. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for August 22 and 23, 1926.

29. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Sheng-huo*, III, pp. 129-34; Li T'ai-fen, *Kuominchun shih-kao*, pp. 314-15.

30. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Sheng-huo*, III, pp. 125, 135, 139, 136.

31. Ibid., p. 135.

32. "List of Soviet Personnel with the Northwestern Army," November 7, 1926. SLYM, III, "KMC," pp. 25-29.

33. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 51.

34. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Sheng-huo*, III, p. 147. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*, p. 210, states that Liu Po-chien, a graduate of the Far Eastern University in the Soviet Union, headed the Political Department.

35. Klein and Clark, *Biographical Dictionary*, II, p. 820; I, p. 586.

36. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 110-12, 140; *As Military Adviser*, p. 224.

37. Blagodatov, *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi revolutsii 1925-1927 gg*, p. 139.

38. Naumov, "The School of Whampoa," p. 136.

39. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for June 27 and 29, 1926. The association was to have a president, a secretary, twelve standing committee members, and three sections dealing with general affairs, organization, and propaganda.

40. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 110-14; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 224-25.

41. Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo hsin min-chu chu-i ko-ming shih*, p. 72.

42. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 139.

43. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 112; *As Military Adviser*, p. 225.

44. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 140.

45. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for July 30, 1926. Early in June,

while T'ang was being rescued by NRA units, he organized a provisional provincial government at Hengyang and assumed the chairmanship. Ibid., diary entry for June 4, 1926.

46. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Min-kuo pai jen chuan*, III, pp. 154, 141, 137.

47. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for August 11 and 12, 1926.

48. KMWH, XII, 1873-75; PFCS, II, 365-72. Yuan Tsu-ming, who had allied with Ho Lung and occupied Ch'ang-te on July 11, 1926, planned to attack western Hupei in cooperation with the NRA. P'eng was appointed Ninth Corps commander on August 6. Wang was appointed Tenth Corps commander on August 10. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for those dates.

49. KMWH, XII, 1876, PFCS, II, 372-75. PFCS omits our last sentence concerning the Fourth Corps. According to *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, p. 71, the Right Column was divided into the Left Flank comprising Seventh Corps units and the Right Flank comprising Fourth Corps units. The latter was ordered to eliminate the enemy south of the Huang-kai Lake area.

50. Chang Fa-k'uei's telegram of August 19; Chiang Kai-shek's telegram dated August 20; and T'ang Sheng-chih's telegram dated August 21, 1926. KMWH, XII, 1951-52.

51. Gorev, "Notes of Adviser Nikitin (A. N. Chernikov)," December 5, "From Notebooks and Correspondence," p. 131. The editor of *Historical Archives* mistakenly identified the author as Chernikov, who also used the pseudonym "Nikitin." The notes were written between October 10, 1926 and mid-1927.

52. Kuo Mo-jo, *Ko-ming ch'un ch'iu*, pp. 292-94.

53. Ch'en K'o-yu's telegram dated August 29, 1926, in KMWH, XII, 1960-61; *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, pp. 77-78. Many sources, particularly Communist writings, place the Independent Regiment directly under the Fourth Corps. Most contemporary telegrams, however, refer to the regiment as a unit of the Twelfth Division, as do *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih* and Chou Shih-ti, in "Recalling Comrade Yeh T'ing," p. 177.

54. Gorev, "Notes of Adviser Nikitin," p. 131.

55. Borodin, "Reports," pp. 106-108.

56. *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, pp. 86-90; Ch'en K'o-yu's telegram dated August 31, 1926, KMWH, XII, 1961.

57. Gorev, "Notes of Adviser Nikitin," p. 131.

58. Borodin, "Reports," pp. 107, 109-10.

59. Gorev's report quoted in Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 182-83; *As Military Adviser*, p. 249, in part. Liao Ch'ien-wu represented Hupei at the First KMT Congress in January 1924. KMWH, VIII, 1102. Chang Fa-k'uei praised him highly in his *Reminiscences as Told to Julie Lien-ying How*. General Chang knew Liao was a Communist.

60. "Liao Ch'ien-wu's Telegram to the Chairman of the Political Department of the Fourth Corps," August 19, 1926, in KMWH, XII, 1951-52. Unlike most contemporary documents, Liao's telegram refers to the Independent Regiment separately from the Twelfth Division. See also *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, p. 73.

61. Hsieh Fu, "Some Facts on the Direct Participation of Hunan Workers and Peasants in the Northern Expeditionary War," *Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti nung-min yun-tung*, p. 295, reprint from *Chan-shih chou-pao* 19 (September 19, 1926).

62. Vaksov, "Notes of Adviser Vaksov about the Taking of Wuchang," p. 134.

63. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, pp. 191-92.

64. KMWH, XIII, 1973-76, 1984, 2182. In a telegram to Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai in Canton dated September 9, 1926, Chiang informed them that measures were being devised to induce the enemy to surrender. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for that date; KMWH, XIII, 2008.

65. Borodin, "Reports," pp. 109, 107.

66. KMWH, XIII, 2001. The chart is not dated and does not contain data on the losses of other units. It is contained in an article, "Recovery of Wuhan," by Ch'en Hsun-cheng.

67. Chiang Kai-shek's telegram reporting to the CEC and the National Government, September 7, 1926, in KMWH, XIII, 2003-2004.

68. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 183.

69. Kuo Mo-jo, *Ko-ming ch'un ch'iu*, pp. 294, 357.

70. Pai Shan, "The Wuhan-Nanking Split and T'ang Sheng-chih," p. 34. In mid-March 1927, Lo Ch'eng, confidential aide to T'ang, informed the American consul general at Hankow that friction between T'ang and Chiang dated from the Hunan-Hupei campaign. See dispatch, Consul General F. P. Lockhart, Hankow, to Secretary of State, March 19, 1927, State Department Archives, 893.00/9040.

71. KMWH, XIII, 2047; PFCS, II, 316.

72. Borodin, "Reports," p. 100.

73. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 148.

74. Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp. 187-88.

75. T'ang's wire of September 30 is quoted in Chiang's telegram of October 5 to Chang Ching-chiang, T'an Yen-k'ai, and Li Chi-shen, informing them of the Fourth Corps' mission to take Ta-yeh and Huang Shih Kang. The next day Chiang reversed his position in a wire to T'ang Sheng-chih and Teng Yen-ta, saying that at first he had not understood the real situation. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for October 5 and 6, 1926.

76. Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser of the NRA Sergeev," March 1, 1927, p. 126.

77. "Notes of Adviser Vaksov," p. 135. See also Borodin, "Reports," p. 110; Katiushin-Kotov, "Notes," p. 133.

78. KMWH, XII, 1991-92; PFCS, II, 461. The Aviation Bureau's Field Department was moved to the front. See Doc. 71, p. 1.

79. *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, pp. 107-109. According to this source, Wu Chün-ch'in, commander of the Third Division, sent representatives to the NRA. Wu agreed that the units guarding Pao-an Gate would open it. Kuo Mo-jo recalls that a brigade commander sent representatives and agreed to open Pin-yang Gate on the night of October 9. See Kuo Mo-jo, *Ko-ming ch'un ch'iu*, p. 399. A press dispatch from Hankow dated October 11, 1926 states that $100,000 was said to be the price paid to one of the defending regiments. It was not clear whether the defenders put up poor resistance or actually opened the city gates, but it was certain that there was treachery from within, for as soon as the attackers penetrated the defenses, the Twenty-fifth Division surrendered. See *The China Illustrated Review*, October 16, 1926, p. 5.

80. A careful study of Soviet intelligence activities within Wu P'ei-fu's sphere before his defeat, and subversive activities that contributed to the defeat, is in Odoric Y. K. Wou, *Militarism in Modern China*, pp. 234-35 and 311, notes 136-42. The information comes from SLYM. See volumes II and X on "spying" in the ten-volume set; and KMWH, IX, 1326-71.

81. PFCS, II, 487-93; KMWH, XIII, 2021-25; 2030-31.

82. A. Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Northern Expedition," p. 124.

83. KMWH, XIII, 2023, 2166.

84. Chiang wired Sun on September 12 and 17 asking him to withdraw his army from Kiangsi. On September 18 he wired Teng Yen-ta to inform Sun's representatives in Hankow that Kiangsi could still remain within the combination of the Five Provinces on condition that Sun withdrew reenforcements from Kiangsi. On September

30 T'ang Sheng-chih wired Chiang that Sun had sent a representative to Hupei to discuss a truce. On October 5 Chiang repeated that Sun must withdraw reenforcements. The next day he wired T'ang Sheng-chih and Teng Yen-ta that Sun had given no concrete answer to his conditions and that he was insincere in his request for a truce. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for September 12, 17, 18, 30; October 5 and 6, 1926.

85. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for August 15, 1926.

86. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 180; *As Military Adviser*, p. 248.

87. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for September 14, 1926. KMWH, XIII, 2038. The First Division was ordered to the Kiangsi front during the first ten days of September. The Second Division was transferred to Kiangsi from the Wuchang front on September 17, 1926. Ibid., p. 2047.

88. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for September 19, 1926. Teslenko, Soviet adviser to the Seventeenth Division of the Sixth Corps, also states that the city was taken with the aid of the local people. See Teslenko, "From Canton to Wuhan," p. 115.

89. Ch'eng Ch'ien's telegram dated September 26, 1926, in KMWH, XIII, 2031-32.

90. Borodin, "Reports," p. 107. See also Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 151-52; Teslenko, "From Canton to Wuhan," p. 115. PFCS, II, 494, states that coordination was lacking between the Third and Sixth Corps.

91. Three telegrams on victory at Wu-sheng-kuan, dated September 16, 17, and 20, 1926, and Chiang's telegram to T'ang Sheng-chih, September 17, in KMWH, XIII, 2012-13.

92. Ibid., p. 2048.

93. Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 191. Li mistakenly dates the attack October 11.

94. Borodin, "Reports," p. 107.

95. KMWH, XIII, 2062.

96. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for October 2 and 3, 1926.

97. Ibid., diary entry for September 30, 1926.

98. Pai Shan, "The Wuhan-Nanking Split and T'ang Sheng-chih," p. 34.

99. Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to the National Government explaining changes in operations plan, dated October 16, 1926, in KMWH, XIII, 2121-22. See also pp. 2077, 2092.

100. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for October 14, 1926.

101. Bliukher, "A Note on Operations by a Military Adviser, Galin (V. K. Bliukher)," pp. 102-106.

102. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for October 23 and 28, 1926.

103. KMWH, XIII, 2185.

104. Khmelev, "A Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 113.

105. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 199; *As Military Adviser*, p. 254.

106. Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 191.

107. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, p. 207; *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*, pp. 113-14. On November 4 and 6, 1926, Chiang reported to the CEC and the National Government that the Seventh Corps had taken Te-an. See KMWH, XIII, 2173. Ch'en Hsün-cheng's article on the Nanchang-Kiukiang campaign quotes Pai Ch'ung-hsi's telegram of November 2, 1926, stating that the Seventh Corps took Te-an that day. In the next paragraph, however, Ch'en states that Huang Ch'i-hsiang's regiment took Te-an on November 3. See KMWH, XIII, 2150. PFCS, II, 555, states that the Seventh Corps took Te-an on November 2.

108. Chiang's telegrams of November 4 and 6, 1926, in KMWH, XIII, 2173-74.

109. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, pp. 207-208; *Ti-ssu Chun chi-shih*,

pp. 119-24. KMWH, XIII, 2150, also states that the Fourth Corps took Ma-hui-ling. Cherepanov confirms that the Fourth Corps took decisive action. The Second Independent Division showed no life in the first day of fighting. See Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 199; *As Military Adviser*, p. 254.

110. PFCS, II, 561.

111. Bliukher's telegram of November 15, quoted in Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," pp. 115-16.

112. Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," pp. 113-15.

113. Borodin, "Reports," pp. 113, 107.

114. Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser of the NRA Sergeev," p. 127.

115. Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 116.

116. KMWH, XIII, 2163-64; PFCS, II, 562-63.

117. On September 13, 1926, Chiang wired Ho Ying-ch'in to declare to Chou Yin-jen that peace could be maintained provided he did not send troops to invade Kwangtung. See KMWH, XIII, 2036-37.

118. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, p. 93.

119. PFCS, II, 317; KMWH, XIV, 2194-99; Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for October 16 and 19, 1926; KMWH, XIV, 2212-13.

120. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Sheng-huo*, III, 135, 147.

121. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entries for those dates.

122. An excellent account of Hsia Chao's background, connections, and activities is in Jordan "Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution: The Case of Chekiang, 1926-1927," pp. 127-37.

123. Ch'en Shao-yü, *Wu-chuang pao-tung*, pp. 61-65.

124. *The China Illustrated Review*, October 23, 1926, pp. 1-3; October 30, 1926, p. 5.

125. Jordan, "Provincialism," pp. 137-38.

126. Ch'en Shao-yü, *Wu-chuang pao-tung*, p. 65. See also Ch'ü Ching-pai, "The First Shanghai Uprising," *Chung-kuo chih-kung yun-tung ts'ai-liao hui-pien*, p. 448. The Soviet historian Yuriev appears to accept this version of events. See Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, pp. 426-27.

127. Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo hsin min-chu chu-i ko-ming shih*, pp. 86-87.

128. "Khmelev's Report to Borodin on the Work of Agitation in the Army in Shanghai," SLYM, II, "Military," p. 28. Orthodox Communist accounts allege that Niu knew that Hsia had been defeated and therefore stopped the KMT's men from taking action. Hence only workers took part. See, for instance, Chang Hui and Pao Ts'un, ed., *Shanghai chin pai nien ko-ming shih hua*, p. 139.

129. Khmelev, "Khmelev's Note on His Trip," pp. 125, 116.

130. "Notes of Adviser Vaksov," p. 134.

131. Borodin, "Reports," p. 107.

132. Katiushin-Kotov, "Notes," p. 134.

133. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *Rise*, I, 544.

134. Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 159. General Li considered Soviet advisers superior to American advisers sent to China during and after World War II.

135. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, pp. 166-67, 181.

136. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for November 7, 1926.

137. "Kuomintang's Startling Programme," full text of Chiang Kai-shek's statement, by Bruno Schwartz, *The China Illustrated Review*, December 4, 1926, pp. 10-11, reprinted from *Hankow Herald*.

138. Khmelev, "Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 123.

139. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for those dates.

140. Hsieh Fu, "Some Facts on the Direct Participation of Hunanese Workers and Peasants in the Northern Expeditionary War," pp. 293-97. The First Hunan Provincial Peasants' Congress adopted resolutions acknowledging the peasants' direct role in various battles in Hunan. See "Resolutions of the First Hunan Peasants Congress," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min yun-tung*, p. 367.

141. Huo Jan, "Hunanese Workers' Aid to the Northern Expeditionary Army," *Ti-i-tz'u kung-jen yun-tung*, pp. 321-23. Reprint from *Chan-she chou-pao* 24, November 14, 1926.

142. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for August 20, September 1, July 26, October 5 and 22, and November 11, 1926.

143. Naumov, "The School of Whampoa," pp. 126, 128, 136.

144. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Recollections on My Work in Party Affairs, 1926-1928," pp. 100-102; "A Piece of Party History in the Years 1926-1927," pp. 68-70.

145. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "A Piece of Party History," pp. 67, 70.

146. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Recollections of My Work," pp. 100-101.

147. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 215, 85, 216.

148. [T'an] P'ing-shan, "The Anti-British Movement and Ending of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike," HTCP 166 (August 6, 1926), pp. 1657-60.

149. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien-shih*, pp. 192-93.

150. Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-t'i*, p. 211.

151. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927*, p. 333.

152. Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921-1931*, p. 95.

153. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," CYB 1928, p. 1342.

154. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 333-34.

155. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p. 99.

156. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for September 9 and 18, 1926.

157. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung tao ch'ing Tang*, II, 530.

158. Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, p. 413, citing Rafes.

159. Discussion of the Joint Conference's resolutions is based on Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 531, citing minutes of the conference; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wuhan cheng-ch'uan*, p. 31. The official English communiqué issued by the conference is in Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," CYB 1928, pp. 1343-44. Dates of the resolutions are in *Chung-kuo ta-shih-chi*, pp. 297-300.

160. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for October 22, 1926; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 531.

161. On October 19 the Joint Conference passed a resolution on strengthening the National Revolution in each province through the convoking of district and provincial assemblies and the organization of the committee system of government. The next day it passed four resolutions relating to judicial organization and other matters and two resolutions on relations between provincial governments and provincial KMT organs. On October 21 it passed eight resolutions on relations between the national and provincial governments.

162. The KMT program is quoted in Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," CYB 1928, pp. 1344-48. The KMT program also dealt with military affairs, the institution of party representatives, women's rights, industries, trade, education, officials and employees in public office, and Chinese in foreign countries.

163. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for October 28, 1926.

164. "Resolutions on the Problem of the KMT Left Wing," p. 70.

165. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an Tang*, p. 31.

166. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Recollections of My Work," p. 107.

167. See, for instance, *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, IV, no. 42 (October 21, 1927), p. 1.

168. Naumov, "The School of Whampoa," pp. 126, 138.

169. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, pp. 26, 184, 226, 277. Chiang wrote Teng Yen-ts'un to encourage him in his new job. See diary entry for October 22, 1926, in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*.

170. Yang I-t'ang, "Biography of Teng Yen-ta," p. 10.

171. Kuo Mo-jo, *Ko-ming ch'un ch'iu*, pp. 381-85, 393.

172. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 321, citing *Chinese Economic Bulletin* for November 27, 1926.

173. Ibid., pp. 322-23.

174. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," CYB 1928, p. 1343.

175. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *Rise*, I, 541-42.

176. Nassanov et al., *The Letter from Shanghai*, p. 412.

177. *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, IV, no. 42 (October 21, 1927), p. 1.

178. Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser of the NRA Sergeev," p. 127.

179. Ibid., p. 129.

180. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for November 11 and 30, 1926. On March 1, 1927, Sergeev reported that a prestigious commission would visit Soviet Russia and requested his chief in Moscow to pay proper attention to it and give it a good leader. See Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser of the NRA Sergeev," p. 129.

181. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien-shih*, p. 253.

182. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, p. 215.

183. Iliushechkin provides a similar figure, 700,000, for the number of organized peasants in the fall of 1926. Eight thousand joined in October; 17,700 in November. See Iliushechkin, "Peasant Movement in Kwangtung in 1924-1927," p. 77. Two useful studies of the "peasant movement" in Kwangtung in the 1920s are Roy Hofheinz, Jr., *The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928*; and Robert B. Marks, *Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570-1930*.

184. *The China Illustrated Review*, December 11, 1926, p. 5.

185. *Tai Chi-t'ao Hsien-sheng wen-ts'un*, II, 609.

186. "Declaration of the National Sun Yatsen University Committee, October 17, 1926," in ibid., 615-19.

187. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 135-36. Such a rebellion took place in Canton a year later as the "Canton Commune," December 11-14, 1927.

188. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 323, citing the *Chinese Economic Journal*, November 1927; Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-t'i*, p. 218, gives a similar number of organized workers but says there were more than 200 unions.

189. Li Jui, "The Peasant Movement in Hunan During the First Revolutionary War," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 275, reprinted from *Hsueh-hsi*, IV, no. 9 (August 16, 1951).

190. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 323.

191. "The Peasant Movement in Hupei after its Occupation by the Northern Expeditionary Forces," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 395, reprinted from T'ien Chung-fu, ed., *Chung-kuo nung-yeh ching-chi tzu-liao*, March 1934.

192. "Resolutions of the First Hunan Peasants Congress," *Ti-i-tz'u nung-min*, p. 367. A careful study of the Hunan "Peasant Movement" is Angus W. McDonald, Jr., *The Urban Origins of Rural Revolution: Elites and Masses in Hunan Province, China, 1911-1927*, and particularly chapters 5 and 6 on the revolution in Hunan, 1926 and 1927.

193. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 532.

194. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 156.

195. Statement of the Canton Information Bureau, December 1, 1926, in *The*

China Illustrated Review, December 4, 1926, p. 24.

196. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 532, citing minutes.

197. Ibid.; Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 91; Chiang Ting-fu, *Chün cheng ling-hsiu Chiang Chieh-shih*, p. 99. Chang Fa-k'uei, however, asserts that he made the trip at Teng Yen-ta's suggestion, not Chiang's. *The Reminiscences of Chang Fa-k'uei*, p. 216.

198. Bliukher's telegram of November 15, 1926, quoted in Khmelev, "Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 116. Cherepanov states that some corps suffered 30-40 percent losses. Up to 70 percent of commanders were lost. See Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 224; *As Military Adviser*, p. 266. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, p. 92, quoting Chang Ch'i-yün's *Tang shih kai-yao*, reports that the final week of the Nanchang-Kiukiang campaign cost the NRA 20,000 and Sun Ch'uan-fang 40,000 casualties.

199. Bliukher's telegram of November 15, 1926, quoted in Khmelev. The breakdown of the main nucleus: First Corps: more than 3,000 men plus 8,000 in Fukien. Second Corps: 6,000 men of inferior battle readiness. Third Corps: around 3,000 men. Fourth Corps: 6,000 men (3,500 old, battle-ready soldiers, 2,500 newcomers). Sixth Corps: more than 3,000 men. The Fourteenth Corps: 500 bayonets. The "Second Group of the NRA": Seventh Corps: 7,000 bayonets; Eighth Corps: six divisions, thirty-six regiments, with 25,000-30,000 bayonets, some of the men battle-ready, some not. Fifteenth Corps: 5,000-6,000 rifles. Seventeenth Corps in Fukien, about 5,000 bayonets. Ho Yao-tsu's division, around 8,000 bayonets. Bliukher was unclear about the size of the Ninth and Tenth Corps, both of inferior quality.

200. Khmelev, "Khmelev's Note on His Trip," pp. 117, 124-25. Except as otherwise noted, the remainder of this section is based on Khmelev's report, pp. 117-25.

201. Nassanov et al., "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 416.

202. PFCS, II, 586-90; KMWH, XIV, 2204-06.

203. Jordan, "Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution," pp. 139-40.

204. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for November 17, 19, 24, 1926.

205. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*, pp. 207-209.

206. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 48, 51.

207. *Min-kuo ta-shih jih-chih*, pp. 340-41; Kao Yin-tsu, *Chung-hua Min-kuo ta shih chi*, pp. 232-34.

Chapter 7

Consolidating Revolutionary Gains and Contesting over Policy

The months of December 1926 and January 1927 were a time of consolidating revolutionary gains and planning for the next military stage. The Russian political and military advisers faced serious policy issues in their effort to steer the Chinese revolution. Military planning, reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army, and preliminary positioning of troops occupied the military advisers with Chiang Kai-shek, who, as usual, carried on extensive negotiations with potential military enemies as well as with military power holders theoretically his subordinates. Within the Kuomintang there continued to be leadership struggles, especially between a group at Nanchang centered around Chiang Kai-shek and a somewhat less conservative leadership that gravitated to Wuhan, where Borodin exercised great influence. In the Chinese Communist Party differences intensified over strategy: whether the social revolution should be restrained in the interest of a continued common front with the Kuomintang or be pushed forward full speed. The Party's official leadership tried to adapt its policies—within the framework of cooperation—to events it could not control and to national and international tendencies it feared.

Mounting friction within the revolutionary camp was still only a portent. All sides recognized the advantage of continued cooperation with Soviet Russia, and between the two parties and within them. The nationalist movement won glory when the Wuhan group, apparently without premeditation, gained control over the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. The British government found it wise, or expedient, not to oppose these takeovers, but it prepared militarily for greater dangers it perceived on the horizon.

Policies of the Comintern and the Young Communist International, November-December 1926

Comintern leaders in Moscow attempted to assess the profound changes brought about by the NRA's victories. The Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International met from November 22 to December 16, 1926, and adopted a set of Resolutions on the Chinese Question setting forth its policies. These were intended to guide developments in far-off China. Bukharin and Stalin were now the most prestigious leaders of the Comintern, but there were many "China experts," such as M. N. Roy, Pavel Mif, Voitinsky, and Bubnov. T'an P'ing-shan was principal delegate of the Chinese Communist Party.

The ECCI declared that the Chinese revolutionary movement was on the threshold of a new regrouping of classes. At this stage the motive force of the movement would be a bloc of the proletariat, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, excluding the greater part of the big capitalistic bourgeoisie. Although part of the big bourgeoisie might also for some time more go hand in hand with the revolution, the ECCI warned that during this transition period the big bourgeoisie, seeing that the anti-imperialist struggle was carried on under proletarian leadership, would strive to seize the lead in order to crush the revolution. It also warned against some militarists

who had begun to side with the Canton government. The proletariat must, of course, use all those bourgeoisie who still took an active part in the struggle against imperialism and militarism. While the current stage of the Chinese Revolution bore a bourgeois-democratic character, it must assume the character of a wider social movement. The Chinese Communist Party must strain every nerve toward this end.[1]

Shortly before, in October 1926, Stalin had issued directives to the CCP to restrain the peasant movement. In a speech before the Seventh Plenum's Chinese Commission on November 30, however, he laid strong emphasis on the importance of the peasant question and a radical agrarian program, thus nullifying to a great extent his October directive.[2] The Seventh Plenum's resolutions echo the emphasis on a radical agrarian program, stating that the agrarian question is the principal problem and that the proletariat is the only class able to carry out a radical agrarian policy, the condition for victory. The CCP must put forth demands for nationalization of the land and support the tendency to overthrow nobles, autocracy, and village authorities, and to substitute organs of revolutionary authority for old semifeudal officials. The CCP must insist on peasant participation in district organs. Together with the KMT, it must immediately carry out measures to attract peasants to the revolution. These measures should include maximum reduction of rents; confiscation of the lands of monasteries and churches, reactionaries, and those compradors, landlords, and nobles who carried on civil war with the KMT government; disarming of the *min-t'uan*; government support of peasant organs, including peasant associations; and the arming of poor and middle peasants, submitting all such forces to revolutionary government organs. Fear that the sharpening of class struggle in the countryside would weaken the united anti-imperialist front was groundless, the ECCI assured.

The CCP's duty was to induce the Canton government to carry out these measures. A governmental mechanism of the Canton government type should be established in the newly liberated areas. The CCP and their revolutionary allies should penetrate the new organs in order to put the agrarian program into practice and to carry out confiscation. Communists should remain with the KMT. To increase their activity, they should enter the Canton government to support the revolutionary Left in the struggle against the Right's weak and wavering policy. The extension of the Canton government's power over a considerably larger territory made participation in the National Government more pressing than ever, the resolutions state. The "Extra Theses" at the end of the document, as discovered in Peking, state that armed struggle was unavoidably going to develop in the villages. The CCP must take all measures to induce the National Government to help peasant detachments and organizations.[3]

In short, the ECCI called on the CCP not only to remain within the KMT but to penetrate its governmental apparatus in order to steer it to the Left and carry out a radical agrarian program. Reemphasizing the policy of alliance with the Left Wing, it stated that the CCP must strive to have the KMT become a real people's party. The CCP should struggle against the KMT Right; give proper form to, and collaborate closely with, the Left without trying to substitute Communists in the leadership's work; and persistently criticize the Center, which vacillates between Right and Left. The Canton government, in spite of its bourgeois-democratic character, contained the embryo of a revolutionary petty bourgeois state, a democratic dictatorship of a revolutionary bloc of the proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie.[4]

The Seventh Plenum of the ECCI was immediately preceded by the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International, which met from November 12 to 22, 1926. The Sixth Plenum adopted resolutions (our Document 73) on the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, the opening sentence of which endorses the Seventh ECCI Plenum's policies on the Chinese question, thus indicating that the latter had been drawn up in advance.[5]

Document 73 contains part of the Resolutions of the Sixth Plenum of the Execu-

tive Committee of the YCI, which closely follow the Seventh ECCI Plenum's line. The document concurs in the ECCI's estimate of the strength of the Canton government and the National Revolutionary Army. The Chinese Communist Youth Corps should strive to execute tasks advocated by the CCP and cultivate middle bourgeois revolutionary youths in accordance with the policy of alliance with the KMT Left. Because the CY struggled together with the CCP to strengthen the KMT Left, it should pay special attention to the establishment of relations with middle bourgeois revolutionary youths of different circles. It should actively participate in the KMT Youth Bureau's activities as a means for training middle bourgeois revolutionary youths of all circles, and it should support and organize the revolutionary elements of the middle bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia in the bureau to promote the interests of workers and peasants (Doc. 73, p. 20).

The "Extra Theses" in the Seventh Plenum's Resolutions emphasize political work in the NRA and in units that had come over to it and call on the CCP to display the greatest energy to intensify such work and strengthen the Left KMT in its military nuclei.[6] Document 73 similarly emphasizes work in the army, stating that various kinds of work in the NRA constituted the CY's extremely important duty. Its secret set-up and communications, liaison with persons working in the army, and means of secret direction should be kept intact and strengthened. It was absolutely necessary to plant several persons to work secretly in every [military] organ so that they could continue to perform their tasks in case of any change in the general situation (Doc. 73, pp. 20-21).

Following the ECCI's call on the CCP to struggle for open existence, the YCI's Executive Committee advocated open work by the CY. Half of its organs in Canton were secret, resulting in many mistakes, it said. The idea that open work might arouse the fear of bourgeois youths had led to the failure of labor, the CY, and the CCP to develop and assume the leadership of society. Henceforth all necessary work should be done openly and positively in the CY's name. All activities being conducted under cover among laboring classes in the cities and villages within the Canton government's jurisdiction must take the form of open struggle (Doc. 73, p. 20). Apparently the CY's work in the NRA was to be the only exception.

The YCI's Executive Committee stated that the CY could easily increase the proletariat's influence, which in turn would strengthen the influence of the CCP and CY. The CY had been an organization of intellectuals and this had affected its work. It should unite urban and rural proletarian youths and enlist all peasant and intellectual youths loyal to the revolution. But it should take special care to ensure proletarian leadership by the CY's worker cadres (Doc. 73, pp. 19-20).

It is uncertain when the Resolutions on the Chinese Question of the ECCI's Seventh Plenum and the Resolutions of the Young Communist International reached China. According to North and Eudin, who base themselves upon a 1929 account by Ts'ai Ho-shen,[7] the first copies reached Shanghai and Canton early in 1927, that is, first came into hands of the Chinese Communist leaders there. M. N. Roy, who played an important role in drafting the Seventh Plenum Resolutions, and shortly after the end of the plenum had left for China, arrived in Canton by at least February 22, probably by ship from Vladivostok.[8] According to Cherepanov, Borodin said that the ECCI Resolutions of December 1926—that is, the Seventh Plenum Resolutions—only came into his hands in March 1927 "because of the journey from the South and a blockade of information by the imperialists in Hankow."[9] The copy of the Resolutions on the Chinese Communist Youth Corps as printed in *Su-lien yin-mou* bears the date March 30, 1927, but it is uncertain what this date signifies (see Doc. 73, introduction). There were, however, several means of communication between Moscow and its agents in China—radio, telegraph, and courier—and it is difficult to believe that the substance of such important resolutions was not communica-

ted to the Russian Embassy in Peking and the Comintern's representative, Voitinsky, in Shanghai, if not directly to Borodin. The heads of the separate Soviet groups had codes and code clerks for their communications.

Decisions of the Lushan Conference, Early December 1926

Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary" recalls that he took a boat on December 2 to meet the group of Kuomintang leaders and Borodin that was traveling from Canton so as to escort them personally to Nanchang. At a welcoming banquet that evening Chiang said that the Northern Expedition was in the nature not only of a Chinese revolution but of the World Revolution, a thesis which Chinese Communist propaganda stressed. With the Kiangsi campaign concluded, the enemy had already lost his main forces and posed no problem, Chiang averred. Furthermore, Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun had already reached the vicinity of T'ung-kuan and would soon link up with the NRA. Chiang claimed that all leading military men in the country had sent representatives for negotiations. Yen Hsi-shan, ruler of Shansi, had declared it was only a question of time when he would join. The following evening, addressing a banquet at the Kiangsi Provincial Party Headquarters, Chiang declared that the most important problem was unification of the Party's direction and centralization of its power, a principle which must be upheld. He assured his audience that he had always carried out the Party's policies and orders and was certain that the Party was unified.[10]

Blagodatov ("Rollan"), who accompanied the KMT party from Canton, asserts that Chiang called for an immediate offensive at a banquet on their arrival. On December 4 Bliukher held a discussion with those Soviet advisers who were in Nanchang. They concluded that the offensive had to be temporarily halted; it was necessary to complete fighting at the flanks to secure the military-strategic situation. They also decided it was not advisable to mar relations with the Mukden grouping.[11]

The same day Chiang went to Lushan with the KMT leaders and Borodin. His published diaries disclose that he conferred with Borodin the following evening. On December 7 he held a conference with Borodin, four ministers (Sun Fo, Hsü Ch'ien, T. V. Soong, and Eugene Chen), and Sung Ch'ing-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen). The following decisions were adopted: 1) Eliminate Sun Ch'uan-fang and ally with Chang Tso-lin. 2) Moderate the labor movement. 3) Positively carry out the peasant movement as the foundation for solving the land problem. Chiang declared that as long as the peasant problem was solved, the labor problem could also be solved at the same time. The others agreed. 4) Unify finances. 5) Abolish the chairmanship system. This was proposed by an unidentified person and seconded by Chiang. 6) Request Wang Ching-wei to return quickly to his posts. This was proposed by Chiang and agreed to by all the others.[12] The next day, Chiang's guests departed for Hankow, where they arrived on December 10.

The decision to eliminate Sun Ch'uan-fang meant taking the offensive not only against Chekiang but also in Anhui and Kiangsu with Shanghai as the major prize. This reversed Bliukher's view, as reported by Khmelev, that it would be dangerous to advance toward Anhui and Kiangsu. Only three days earlier, as we have seen, Bliukher and the other Russians had concluded that it was necessary temporarily to halt the offensive.

Just before the conference of December 7, Chiang wired Wang Chün and Hsüeh Yüeh, divisional commanders of the First Corps, to occupy Ch'ü-chou, a key pass in western Chekiang, and establish connections with Eastern Route Army Commander-in-Chief Ho Ying-ch'in. Two days later Chiang wired Ho expressing gratification that Ho had entered Foochow and ordering him to lead two First Corps divisions immediately to Chekiang.[13]

The decision to ally with Chang Tso-lin was consistent with Soviet views, how-

ever. Actually, the KMT had been negotiating with Chang for some time. Apparently, some kind of understanding had been reached, for on November 29, Chiang met with Chang's representatives and rebuked them for violating the agreement by sending troops southward.[14] A few weeks after the Lushan Conference, Chiang informed Ho Ying-ch'in that the National Government would assume for the time being a mild attitude toward Chang Tso-lin, pending evidence of his attitude on the NRA's occupation of Chekiang.[15]

The decision of the Lushan Conference to unify finances was crucial in view of the National Government's inability to pay and otherwise provide for the NRA's swollen ranks. On December 10 Chiang stressed that the finances of the newly won province of Fukien must be placed under the Ministry of Finance. The next day he asked Finance Minister T. V. Soong, who had left Nanchang only three days before, to visit Kiangsi again for discussions.

Two decisions, abolition of the party chairmanship system and Wang Ching-wei's recall, were of course designed to reduce the political power of Chiang, the chairman. The Left-dominated KMT Joint Conference of October had called for Wang's return as well as extensive measures to promote the peasant and labor movements. Thus the decision at Lushan to moderate the labor movement went against both the spirit and the content of the Joint Conference's resolutions. Actually, it did no more than confirm measures already taken to curb excesses in the labor movement at Canton and Wuhan.

On December 6, an emergency conference of the Central Political Conference in Canton established an arbitration committee to deal with conflicts arising from strikes and placed severe restrictions on labor unions and workers. The measures prohibited unions from making arbitrary arrests; banned demonstrations; and prohibited workers from arbitrarily closing factories and shops and seizing their property. Employers, on the other hand, were forbidden to close factories or shops without reason.[16]

The same day a commission was set up in Wuhan to investigate labor disputes. It was composed of representatives of unions, the chamber of commerce, the KMT's Labor Department, and the Wuhan authorities.[17] Henceforth, according to a news dispatch, the KMT's policy in Hankow would be to exercise firm control over the labor movement.[18]

The Lushan Conference's decisions were obviously compromise solutions designed to maintain unity in the revolutionary camp. Neither Chiang nor the others could have been entirely pleased with the outcome. Chang Kuo-t'ao, the leading communist at Wuhan at the time, dates the start of the anti-Chiang movement there after Borodin's arrival on December 10. Chang recalls that when he called on the newly arrived Borodin, the latter's interpreter, Chang T'ai-lei, told him that judging from Borodin's looks, the Lushan meeting was unsatisfactory.[19]

Borodin and the Soviet Advisers in Wuhan

Borodin and the Chinese political leaders who accompanied him from Canton found handsome quarters on Hsin-ma Road in the Chinese section of Hankow, in a modern, four-story building owned by the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company. Borodin took rooms on the third floor, with Eugene Chen and his children—Percy, Jack, Yolanda, and Sylvia—in rooms adjacent. Other members of the revolutionary government were housed on lower floors. Early in January Fanny Borodin joined her husband after the long trek from Canton via Kiangsi with the second governmental party.

Hankow was the main trading city of central China, upriver 600 miles from Shanghai. Its waterfront on the Yangtze stretched several miles and its waters swarmed with thousands of native craft, which handled freight on the rivers that drained a vast area of West, South, and Northwest China. Ocean-going freighters

could come upriver to Hankow during seven months of the year, while local steam vessels carried passengers and freight upriver to Szechuan ports and downriver to Shanghai. The Peking-Hankow Railway traversed populous agricultural provinces of Hupei, Honan, and Chihli. Southward from Wuchang, the old walled vice-regal city across the Yangtze from Hankow, was the railway leading through Hunan toward Canton, though still incomplete at its southern end in 1927. Hanyang, the center of heavy industry and the arsenal, adjoined Hankow across the Han River, a great artery for the Northwest.

The three cities, known collectively as Wuhan, probably numbered one and a half million inhabitants, their major occupation being processing and shipping of agricultural products and minerals from the interior and distributing finished goods from other parts of China and abroad. The population was cosmopolitan, with merchants from all parts of China, organized in innumerable Chinese trade and craft guilds, native place associations, and four chambers of commerce. There was also a large industrial labor force, some of it secretly organized in unions. Wuhan had more than four thousand foreign residents, most of whom lived in a westernized strip of concession areas along Hankow's riverfront—British, French, Japanese, and the retroceded German and Russian concessions, now under Chinese administration. There were four foreign chambers of commerce and thirteen foreign banks. Each of the three cities had an electric power system, while a telephone system linked them across the rivers. Wuhan was connected by telegraph and the efficient Chinese postal system with all other centers in China, and abroad by cable lines.[20]

On arrival Borodin began to reassemble his staff. Some had come from Canton; others came directly from Russia. Among those from Canton were members of his "brain trust," the economist V. M. Shtein, a professor at the University of Leningrad; O. S. Tarkanov, who had been a secretary of the Young Communist League in Moscow; M. Volin and Ye. Yolk, recent graduates of Russian institutions of higher education who had made a careful survey of agrarian conditions in Kwangtung. Tarkanov's wife, Mila Zubietova, was Borodin's secretary, and Yolk's wife, Tamara Vladimirova, was on his staff of translators. Sofia Veprintseva, an artist trained in Moscow, joined the staff, and another member was Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova, a young secretary and interpreter.[21] Others we know of were M. O. Razumov, apparently a specialist on agrarian problems, and Limanov, a former adviser to Chu P'ei-te.[22] Others joined as the need for specialists grew. In the middle of January, Borodin's staff moved into an imposing building in Chinese territory behind the Japanese Concession. The press bureau which Borodin supervised was also housed there.

General Bliukher maintained quarters elsewhere in the city before he moved to Nanchang in mid-February, and some of his military staff were located in Wuchang where a branch of the Military-Political Academy was set up. Bliukher's staff was much larger than Borodin's, about fifty persons according to Marc Kasanin's recollection. He arrived in Hankow early in January to serve as a linguist on Bliukher's staff. The Soviet government also kept a small consular staff in Hankow, and there were intelligence agents.

Some of the men among the Soviet advisers had been able to bring their wives and even small children. All lived as an isolated colony crowded into row houses in Lockwood Gardens or in a pension managed by a German woman, Mrs. Rode. Ironically, Lockwood Gardens was owned by the great British trading firm of Jardine, Matheson Co., according to Kasanin.[23] The advisers worked long hours and had a restricted social life, though there were several successful courtships in the group—General Bliukher and Galina Kolchugina, and V. M. Akimov ("Silin") and Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova herself. Most of the foreign population in Hankow was suspicious of and hostile toward these "agitators."

Upon arriving in Hankow, one of Borodin's first acts as high political adviser

was to propose the creation of a new policy-making body to consist of such members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the National Government Council as had come to Hankow. He would advise the body just as he had advised the Kuomintang Political Council in Canton ever since its creation—upon his suggestion to Dr. Sun Yat-sen—in June 1924.

The Wuhan Joint Council, December 1926

On December 13 the Joint Council, officially known as "The Temporary Joint Council of Members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and the National Government Council," was convened. The official notice stated that the Joint Council would exercise highest authority before the convening of a CEC Political Conference in Hupei.[24] The legal authority of the body soon became an issue of contention. But creation of the council was an advance for the KMT Left.

Several members of the Joint Council did not belong to the CEC or the National Government Council. Teng Yen-ta became a member as chairman of the Hupei Political Affairs Committee and chairman of the army's Political Department. Others joined as members of the Hupei Provincial Political Conference or Hankow Party Headquarters. Hsü Ch'ien assumed the council's chairmanship. At a meeting on December 15, the Joint Council resolved that Central Party Headquarters and the National Government should be located in Wuchang. Chiang Kai-shek expressed agreement with the resolution in two telegrams to the council.[25]

A multitude of problems confronted the Joint Council. At its first meeting, for example, it discussed policy toward Great Britain, which had begun to reconsider its attitude toward the KMT. On the 17th the council resolved to send Wu Yü-ch'ang, a Communist member of the KMT CEC, to western Hupei to inspect Party and military affairs.[26] The campaign led by T'ang Sheng-chih to clear western Hupei of enemy troops had proceeded slowly. A regiment of the Ninth Corps mutinied, plundered, raped, and killed members of the gentry.[27] The NRA forces took Ichang only on December 21 and Shasi the next day.

Our Document 74 contains a portion of the minutes of the seventh meeting of the Joint Council on December 29, 1926. Advance Commander-in-Chief T'ang Sheng-chih reported that the NRA troops stationed in western Hupei were not up to strength; a few thousand or even a few hundred men were called a "division" or "brigade." T'ang declared that the central authorities should relieve the people's suffering and forbid the troops to rape and plunder like militarist armies. Tyranny should not replace tyranny. He reported hostility between the troops and the *hsien* and district KMT headquarters, and the slogan "overthrow the bogus revolutionary movement." Borodin pointed out that the poor conduct of the Ninth and Tenth Corps had not only caused the people to lose confidence but would adversely affect efforts to unify finances and foreign relations. The chaotic situation in western Hupei highlights the difficulty of maintaining discipline within units that had defected to the National Revolutionary Army.

The agenda of the seventh meeting of the Joint Council on December 29 also included Chang Tso-lin's purchase of arms and loans from Japan, Party affairs in Peking, reorganization of judicial courts, Party conflicts in Japan, organization of a capital-labor committee [in Wuhan], propaganda expenses, and finances in Hunan.[28] Finances were a perpetual problem.

Conflict quickly developed between the Wuhan Left Wing and Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang over delayed payment of funds to army units. On December 21 Chiang wired Finance Minister T. V. Soong and Teng Yen-ta to pay the Ninth and Tenth Corps in western Hupei immediately. On the 24th he wired Soong informing him that Seventh Corps troops in Hupei had mutinied for lack of pay and asked Soong to

devise measures to maintain regular payment to the army. The next day Chiang wired Soong complaining that the Central Bank in Canton had declined to pay the army on the grounds that it must await Soong's return to Canton. Chiang stated that the delay appeared intentional. In a second wire to Soong the same day, Chiang asked whether it was true, as reported by Ho Ying-ch'in in Foochow, that the First Corps' expenses henceforth must be raised in Fukien and that the Finance Ministry would stop payment as of December 1. On December 31 Chiang wired Soong, requesting him to supply funds immediately for the previous and current months. He emphasized the gravity of the situation and urged Soong not to base his attitude toward the NRA's corps on his attitude toward Chiang himself.[29] Another source of contention was Chiang's plan to push on to Shanghai, which was already opposed by some KMT members at Wuhan, and by the CCP leadership. The British consul-general in Hankow, Herbert Goffe, reported on December 24, 1926 that an unnamed foreign adviser to the KMT had called on him and said, apparently acting on instructions, that some KMT members wanted to call a halt and consolidate rather than continue to Shanghai. They needed some striking victory such as a declaration of recognition by Britain in return for which they were willing to come to some agreement about Shanghai.[30]

Policies of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, December 1926

Chiang's diary entries in November contain increasingly frequent complaints about Communist agitation and intrigue. On December 8, after seeing the KMT leaders and Borodin off at Kiukiang, he expressed regret that Kuomintang-CCP conflict was growing daily more apparent.[31] Friction had mounted in Canton as Communists attempted to infiltrate the KMT's Political Training Institute. Ch'en Kuo-fu's expulsion of twelve Communists from the institute exacerbated matters.[32]

As friction increased, the Central Committee of the CCP appeared anxious to avoid direct conflict with Chiang. In December it addressed a letter to him reassuring him of Communist support and good will and denying that it approved of Wang Ching-wei's return in order to overthrow him. The Central Committee said it approved of Wang's return only because it would mean greater advantage for Chiang. The Central Committee accused the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, however, and "greedy and covetous Chekiang officials" of disseminating rumors of a Communist conspiracy against Chiang. The behavior of these men in Kwangtung, said the CC, had already aroused the "wrath of heaven and the anger of men." Everyone knew, however, that they were men attached to the commander-in-chief, and this had caused the masses and the Left to lose confidence in him. The Central Committee warned Chiang that unless they were expelled, he would find himself in a highly undesirable position from which the Communists, though willing, would be unable to extricate him.[33]

Since Chang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Kuo-fu were Chiang's fellow Chekiangese and leaders of the movement to strengthen "pure" KMT elements against the Communists, they were obviously the "Chekiang officials" under attack. Soon the slogan "Down with the old, confused, mediocre, and rotten elements!" was coined in the Communist propaganda offensive against Chiang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Kuo-fu.[34]

On December 13, three days after Borodin's arrival in Hankow, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened a special plenum there, attended by Party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Comintern delegate Voitinsky from Shanghai. The Party's attitude toward increasingly radical tendencies in the mass movement emerged as a central issue. The resolution on the CC's report states that the greatest danger lay in the mass movement's turning Left, while political and military au-

thorities, seeing the mass movement's swift growth, were seized with panic and began to incline to the Right. Should these extreme tendencies continue to develop in the future, the cleavage between the masses and the government would deepen and in the end the Red United Front would be demolished and the whole national movement endangered. In the practical struggle of workers and peasants, Communists must avoid illusions so as to eradicate the infantile disease of Leftism.[35]

The special plenum adopted Resolutions on the Problem of the KMT Left Wing, which severely criticized the views of Kwangtung Communists who, the Central Committee charged, believed the present KMT Left consisted merely of high-level personalities; that only oppressed workers, peasants, merchants, students, and masses of all circles were truly of the Left; and that in the future only those who approved of solving the land question could become the Left. The CC maintained that at present one could not take approval of solution of the land problem as the criterion of the Left, declaring: "The land is not yet a problem! The peasants' immediate problems are [to raise] pressing demands for the reduction of rent and interest, freedom of organization, armed self-defense, resistance against local bullies and the bad gentry, and opposition to excessive taxes and irregular levies. To lead the peasants away from actual struggle for these demands to study the blocked land problem is to stop struggling."[36] Indeed, the Central Committee's agrarian policy was more cautious in December than it had been in July, for it no longer mentioned opposition to reactionary big landlords, then the target of its opposition.

The CC's peasant policy was of course predicated on the need to cooperate with the KMT Left Wing. The Resolutions on the Problem of the KMT Left Wing state that while the CC believed there were Right and Left wings, most Kwangtung comrades denied the existence of a true Left. Such a denial admitted of only two alternative courses of action: (1) the Communists would have to cooperate with the Right and follow it to oppress the masses of workers and peasants; or (2) they would have to struggle directly against the Right. If the existence of the KMT Left were denied, this struggle would be between the Chinese Communist Party and the entire Kuomintang, which was precisely what the reactionaries and imperialists wanted. The CC declared: "The comrades of the Kwangtung Regional Committee are taking exactly these two paths. . . . Evil results have already been reaped through the erroneous conception of the denial of the Left Wing. Should the comrades of the Kwangtung Regional Committee fail to correct their error at once and should other local Party headquarters fail to take precautionary measures, the situation would lead to extremely great and irreparable losses!"[37]

Why was it necessary to admit that there was a Left Wing? The CC's answer contains the essence of Communist policy: "Not only is it a fact that the Left exists, it is the pivot of our cooperation with the Kuomintang. We cannot of course believe that there is already a strong and responsible Left Wing. However, a Left that is different from and which cannot cooperate with the Right can still perform an extremely important function as a buffer between the Right and ourselves."

The CC defined the KMT Left in detail: The Left represented the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. It stood for democracy and opposed feudal power. The Left and Right were, however, relative terms. Those who were relatively Left-inclined, declared the CC, *were* the Left. "Since we cannot confuse the Right and Left wings of society with the Right and Left wings of a political party, and since a KMT Left that would favor solving the land question has not yet materialized, we can only recognize as the Left those elements who approve continuation of the three policies of Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai: alliance with Russia, alliance with Communists, and support of workers and peasants. Those who are opposed are the Right."[38]

One year earlier, Ch'en Tu-hsiu had declared that the Left must support the

policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with Communists, and nonopposition to the class struggle in order to realize the Three People's Principles.[39] It was only in December 1926, however, that the Central Committee decided to characterize these policies as the "Three Policies" and attributed them to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This is confirmed by Document 78, a report of the Communist Peking Local Committee, dated February 10, 1927, which states: "To ascertain whether any particular member of the People's School [KMT] belongs to the Right or Left, it is only necessary to observe whether his actions and thoughts violate Dr. Sun's Three Great Policies," recently adopted by the Central Committee as the criterion of the Left (Doc. 78, p. 162). The term "Three Great Policies of Dr. Sun" subsequently became so widely used that a considerable number of non-Communist writings on the Chinese Revolution accept the Communist definition and trace its formulation to the First KMT Congress of January 1924.[40]

The CC considered the Left weak, disunited, and wavering. It had not yet become a political group with definite policies, but only a tendency, not an organization: it was Left-inclined only in words but unable to carry out its policies. The CC placed its hopes in Wang Ching-wei's return. Singling out Wang as the supreme leader of the Left, it declared that on his return the Left would have an organization even stronger than that of the Right. The CC emphasized the urgent need of strengthening the Left by the following means.

First, Communists should help top Left leaders in the KMT's central and local Party organs to be united and strong. They should help Left leaders to obtain, but not to monopolize, political and Party power. The condition of such support was continuation of the "Three Policies." Communists, however, must take into consideration the Left's petty-bourgeois outlook and make concessions to it. They must not imagine, said the CC, that the Left could adopt the same attitude as their own, particularly with regard to actual struggle in the peasant and labor movements.

Second, Communists should work among the lower levels of society, such as handicraft workers, shop employees, and the peasantry, in order to organize the Left's masses. This was necessary so that the masses could rise on their own to oppose the Right. It would also reduce envy and suspicion of Communists and reduce the weakness and vacillation of Left leaders.

Third, Communists should help build up the Left's middle-level forces to cement the top Left leaders and Left masses, by helping the Left to establish Party schools and other organs to train Left personnel.

For the Left to organize it should have an independent platform. Communists should help Left leaders seize Party headquarters wherever differentiation of the Left was not great and the Right was weak. These Left leaders would then execute the Left's policies under the direction of Left leaders in the KMT's Central Executive Committee.

Finally, where there was Right-Left conflict, Communists should help organize small groups of the Left's masses in clubs, research societies, and schools. Left leaders should periodically call joint conferences of delegates of these small organizations, to which the Chinese Communist Party could formally send representatives. But Communists should not openly join the organizations.[41]

The CC took a somewhat less cautious approach to work in the NRA than it had in July, when it authorized organization of Communist nuclei only in militarist armies. It now decided to build nuclei in the NRA but restricted their membership to commanders, prohibiting the entry of enlisted men. Chou En-lai, who became head of the CC's Military Department shortly after, delivered a report, according to three Comintern agents in Shanghai, exhorting his colleagues to "go into this National Revolutionary Army, strengthen it, raise its fighting ability, but do not carry on any independent work there."[42]

Developments in Chekiang, December 1926–January 1927

Meanwhile, events moved swiftly in Chekiang. In the first part of December the situation appeared favorable to the NRA. Sun Ch'uan-fang's divisional commander, Chou Feng-ch'i, deployed his troops in the areas of Chin-hua, Ch'ü-chou, Yen-chou, and T'ung-lu, in the western part of the province. Civil governor Ch'en I's troops were deployed in Hangchow, Shao-hsing, south of Hangchow Bay, and Ningpo, the seaport to the east. Both Chou and Ch'en were awaiting the Eastern Route Army's concentration to announce their allegiance to the National Government. Sun Ch'uan-fang transferred his troops to the Shanghai area and, in what seemed a bid to moderate the revolutionary tide in Chekiang and obstruct the entry of NRA troops into the province, declared he would let Chekiangese rule their own province.[43] On December 11, during an inspection trip to Ch'ü-chou, the strategic pass in western Chekiang, Chou Feng-ch'i announced his defection and assumed the title of commander of the Twenty-sixth Corps of the NRA. Coinciding with this development, a Chekiangese self-rule group met in Shanghai from December 9 to 19 to elect a provincial government committee. Chou Feng-ch'i and Ch'en I were both named to the nine-man committee. On December 17 Ch'en I accepted the title of commander of the Nineteenth Corps of the NRA. Two days later the provincial government committee declared Chekiang independent of Sun Ch'uan-fang. Chiang Kai-shek reportedly agreed that his army would not enter the province if its leaders declared their independence from Sun.[44]

The situation changed abruptly when Sun secretly ordered his trusted subordinate, Meng Chao-yüeh, to advance from Shanghai to Hangchow on December 22. Most of Ch'en I's troops in the capital were disarmed and Ch'en was detained. Sun's troops advanced southward toward Fu-yang and engaged Chou Feng-ch'i's Twenty-sixth Corps in early January. Defeated, Chou's troops retreated to T'ung-lu and thence to Ch'ü-chou, where they arrived January 9.[45]

The First Kuominchun, December 1926–January 1927

In North China Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun assumed renewed importance after it lifted the siege of Sian in late November and pursued Shensi militarist Liu Chen-hua's troops toward western Honan on December 11. Wu P'ei-fu, leader of the Chihli Clique, sent large reinforcements to Liu.[46] On December 21 Chiang wired Finance Minister T. V. Soong, requesting aid for Feng's army. The Kuominchun had reached the Honan border but was in financial straits. In view of its importance, Chiang requested Soong to find the means to send it 300,000 dollars monthly. The next day the Joint Council at Wuhan resolved that Feng should be considered the "center of the Northwest." A few days later it decided to take measures to induce the various armies in Honan to welcome Feng.[47]

In a letter dated January 6, 1927, written at P'ing-liang, eastern Kansu, Feng outlined his plans. He intended to concentrate his troops in a southern direction to advance speedily toward T'ung-kuan in order to effect a junction with NRA forces in Honan. Some of his troops had already passed T'ung-kuan and the setting up of liaison with "the different sides" was very important. He hoped that negotiations would be conducted on as large a scale as possible so that everywhere forces might rise to help the Kuominchun. As for the northern direction (Suiyuan and Paotow), Feng intended maneuvering with his cavalry, taking up an "indefinite position," neither retreating nor advancing. Since his radio station had been moved from Paotow to Ninghsia in Kansu, liaison with Urga and Moscow could be kept up only through the [Soviet] embassy in Peking. Feng added that liaison with Hankow had been established.[48]

Feng's standing with the CCP had improved markedly. The Central Committee reported following his return that Feng had spoken in praise of the Soviet Union, the CCP, and Communist students in Russia. In his opinion, he said, there was no difference between the KMT and the CCP and it was only a matter of time before the two would merge. Another CC report states that Feng was cautious, studious, and thrifty, in contrast to members of Chiang Kai-shek's staff or Whampoa Academy officers who frantically strove to become great and to obtain as much as possible for their subordinates. Furthermore, Feng understood better than other generals the needs of the masses and supported their interests. His troops were destined to play a very great part in the future revolutionary struggle. A report of the CC's Military Department dated December 1926 states that Feng had made great progress in his revolutionary convictions and had inclined much to the Left since his trip to Moscow. He was not a mechanical imitator but a medieval hero anxious to perform some great deed.[49]

Britain, Japan, and the United States and the Nationalist Movement, December 1926

The successful consolidation of the Nationalist position in the middle Yangtze Valley raised for Britain two problems: whether and how to establish direct diplomatic contact with the National Government; and how to defend Britain's economic and territorial interests in the Yangtze Valley. David Wilson, who carefully studied the British documents for this period, notes that the problem of dealing with the Kuomintang's territorial expansion was subsumed under the search for a new policy, which had grown more from the failure of the Tariff Conference and disillusionment with the idea of cooperation with other Washington Conference powers than it had from the Nationalists at the Yangtze per se.[50]

Britain had turned a blind eye in October to the Canton government's collection of the 2.5 percent surtax without it being settled by treaty, in its desire to see the Hong Kong-Canton Strike and Boycott ended. The Foreign Office had put into general form a memorandum dealing not just with the tariff but with broad questions of relations. By the beginning of December, Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain wrote the final version. It was read to the diplomatic body in Peking on December 18 and published on the 26th after inaccurate reports had leaked to the Peking press.[51]

The "Christmas Memorandum," as it came to be called, established a policy toward which Britain was supposed to be working and would again move when conditions were more normal. To moderate Nationalist opinion in China, the memorandum should be a sign that the leading imperialist power was prepared to alter anachronistic privileges. The memorandum stated that the situation in China had changed entirely since the time of the Washington Conference (1921–22); hence it was necessary to adapt policies agreed to at the conference. It had proved impossible to proceed with the larger program of treaty revision foreshadowed at the Washington Conference while the Peking government's authority diminished almost to the vanishing point.

The British government suggested that the foreign governments should issue a statement setting forth the essential facts of the situation and declaring their readiness to enter into a revision of treaties and adjustment of all other outstanding questions as soon as the Chinese had constituted a government with the authority to negotiate. Such a declaration should show that the powers were prepared to consider in a sympathetic spirit any reasonable proposals that the Chinese authorities, wherever situated, might make, in return for fair and considerate treatment of foreign interests by them. The memorandum suggested that recommendations in the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality, and other reforms, could be carried out with little

delay. Regarding the tariff question, the British government had been opposed to dealing with the question of unsecured debt from the outset, and it advocated immediate and unconditional granting of the Washington surtaxes (2.5 percent on all goods, 5 percent on luxuries). The British government attached the greatest importance to the sanctity of treaties but believed this principle might best be maintained by sympathetic adjustment of treaty rights to the equitable claims of the Chinese.[52]

It was against this context that the new British minister to China, Miles Lampson, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara's close confidante Saburi Sadao, and U.S. Legation Counsellor Ferdinand Mayer held talks with Eugene Chen, the foreign minister of the Nationalist Government after it had arrived in Wuhan. On instructions from the Foreign Office, Lampson journeyed to Hankow from Shanghai before proceeding on to his new post in Peking. Arriving in Hankow on December 8, Lampson held several informal and inconclusive discussions with Eugene Chen between December 9 and 18, during which Chen pressed for British recognition of his government and Lampson stressed the importance of that government's acceptance of existing treaties and foreign obligations until they might be modified through negotiation.[53] However, there was opposition within the Chinese leadership even to the idea of talks with the British.

At the first meeting of the newly created Joint Council on December 13, Borodin proposed a resolution on policy toward Great Britain. While it approved of Chen's talks with Lampson, the resolution stated that if the British government's recognition depended upon the National Government recognizing all Unequal Treaties or accepting all obligations of the Peking government, then negotiations could not be conducted. The Nationalist Foreign Ministry should quickly let the people know about the discussions in order to expose the fact that Britain had only changed its attitude but not its policy, because the British government was still unprepared to recognize the National Government on the basis of revision of the Unequal Treaties; it only desired to protect its privileges and develop commerce.[54]

Concern for the safety of Shanghai in the event of its capture by the National Revolutionary Army led the British cabinet to decide in mid-December to reinforce Hong Kong by one battalion and to dispatch naval reinforcements—a modest first step. Thus the British government had embarked on a policy with two main elements: an attempt to achieve a modus vivendi with the Nationalist coupled with the declared intention of revising the most anachronistic aspects of the treaties; and the sending of military forces to defend whatever residue of its rights it might decide to retain at all costs, although a decision on that matter had not yet been made. Lampson, after his talks with Chen, hoped for some process of gradual de facto recognition. He hoped to "drift" into recognition of the National Government.[55]

Chen's talks with Saburi appeared to be even less substantive, though cordial. Chen later reported that Saburi wanted to sound out the National Government's policy toward Japan. Chen told him its immediate objective was revision of the Unequal Treaties. Saburi's idea, as described to Lampson before Saburi met with Chen, was to leave aside the question of the validity of the treaties and start conversations on specific questions (extraterritoriality, tariff autonomy, concessions, inland water navigation). Then, when a basis of agreement had been reached, the old treaties could be dropped and new ones adopted embodying the new arrangements. After his talks with Chen, Saburi reported his belief that the Nationalists wished to effect revision of the treaties by "adequate rational means" rather than by total repudiation. Chen said that the National Government well understood Japan's special position in Manchuria.[56]

Chen also held talks with U.S. Counsellor Mayer, who, he said, also wanted to ask about the National Government's diplomatic policy. Chen told him that revision of the Unequal Treaties and negotiation of new treaties based on equality was its

main objective. In his diplomatic report to the CEC on March 13, 1927, Chen stated that the U.S. attitude toward the National Government could still be characterized as good.[57]

There were important differences between the British, Japanese, and American positions toward the National Government, with consultations carried on in Peking and in the several capitals, but each government was seriously reassessing its China policy. The so-called Christmas Memorandum hardly achieved the results that the British Foreign Office had hoped for. It lent credence to the widespread rumor in Japan that Britain intended to recognize the National Government both de jure and de facto. Privately, Foreign Minister Shidehara vehemently opposed what he considered a precipitous change in British policy. The memorandum challenged the leadership that Secretary of State Kellogg had assumed in calling the Washington Conference. Many Americans were sensitive to any action that threatened what they regarded as their country's progressive and sympathetic policy toward China.[58]

In his capacity as political adviser to the Wuhan Joint Council, Borodin pressed his anti-British theme. During December the National leaders organized several anti-British mass rallies in the Wuhan cities in which Borodin's advice was evident.[59]

On December 27, the day after publication of the British memorandum, Borodin proposed to the Joint Council specific reactions. On the 29th the Central Propaganda Committee's Secretariat issued a propaganda report based on Borodin's proposals. Propaganda could welcome the memorandum's criticism of Japan, the United States, and other countries, because it might arouse anti-British feelings and conflicts in other countries. The British intention in releasing the customs surtax revenues was actually an evil plot to help Chang Tso-lin and Sun Ch'uan-fang, and it must be exposed to the Chinese masses and the peoples of the world. Another purpose of the memorandum, the report charged, was to reveal the split between the Fengtien faction and Japan, as well as British-Japanese conflict. Conflicts among the three reflected the success of collusion between Chang Tso-lin and the British, and they must lead to rebellion by Chang's pro-Japanese subordinates. The policy of the Kuomintang was to expand conflict between Britain and Japan and between Japan and the Fengtien faction. The propaganda report contained the following instructions: 1) Intensify anti-British struggle but avoid armed conflict. 2) Point out to the masses the conflict between democracy and imperialism. 3 and 4) Point out that the British intention in increasing customs revenues was to help Chang Tso-lin and Sun Ch'uan-fang. 5) Attack Chang Tso-lin as England's running dog. 6) Explain to Japan that the success of China's revolution would not diminish legal Sino-Japanese trade, nor would it benefit Japan to join with British policy toward China. 7) Point out to the people of Shanghai that the British intention to supply 40 percent of customs revenues to Sun Ch'uan-fang was to help Sun and Chang Tsung-ch'ang to massacre each other, adding to the misery of the people.[60] The Wuhan leadership intended to keep the heat on Great Britain.

On December 31, Foreign Minister Chen sent a telegram of protest to Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, stating that the National Government had learned that the U.S. government intended to agree to the British proposal for the immediate granting of the customs surtaxes and payments of the proceeds to local authorities at the ports. Two-thirds of the revenues would go to the Nationalists' political enemies. Shanghai alone would receive 40 percent of the total.[61]

Hankow and Kiukiang British Concession Incidents, Early January 1927

A dramatic turn in the Nationalists' relations with Great Britain, and to a lesser extent with the other Powers, occurred in early January 1927, when the Nationalists secured control of the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. The incidents

were the culmination of intense Chinese resentment against imperialism, fanned to fever pitch by Nationalist propagandists, although the outcome apparently was unplanned.

Anti-British demonstrations were suspended in Hankow during Miles Lampson's talks with Eugene Chen, but after his departure on December 18 the propaganda campaign resumed full force. On several occasions crowds of Chinese demonstrators surged through the Hankow British Concession. The local British authorities set up barricades at the entrances to the concession, manned by police, a small marine detachment, and members of the Hankow Volunteer Force. Individual Chinese were allowed to pass through but not crowds or armed troops, despite a request by Eugene Chen to the British consul-general, Herbert Goffe, that the barricades be removed.[62]

On December 26, coincidentally the day the British Christmas Memorandum was published, a giant rally organized by the Committee of Wuhan Citizens to Oppose British Imperialism heard fiery speeches by Li Li-san and other Communist leaders. It adopted a series of resolutions that echoed the propaganda line that Borodin had proposed at a meeting of the Joint Council on December 22. A particular grievance was the arrest of seventeen Kuomintang members in British and French concessions in Tientsin on November 23. After trial, they were turned over to Chinese authorities, who executed six of them. This event became a specific reason for a Nationalist demand that all foreign concessions be retroceded.

The Nationalist authorities declared the first three days of January holidays to celebrate the Northern Expedition and to welcome the establishment of the National Government in Wuhan—a point of contention with the Nanchang faction. There were parades and celebrations in the three cities that make up Wuhan. On the afternoon of January 3, a large anti-British rally gathered outside the boundary of the British Concession in Hankow. The British reinforced the barricades. Soon some in the agitated Chinese crowd began to hurl stones, which led to clashes with the British marines in which a few on each side were injured. No shots were fired, however. The situation remained tense until evening when Chinese soldiers accompanied by members of the National Government arrived and persuaded the crowd to disperse, promising to settle the matter in twenty-four hours. The clashes outside the British Concession had taken the Joint Council by surprise, and on Borodin's advice the Council decided to send Hsü Ch'ien and Chang Tso-pin to quiet the crowd, while Eugene Chen undertook to persuade the British to withdraw their marines and leave the Chinese police to maintain order.[63]

Consul-General Goffe, in consultation with Rear Admiral Cameron, decided to accept Eugene Chen's proposal to provide security for the British Concession. The volunteers withdrew from the barricades and the marines went back to their ships. Chinese police replaced them on the morning of the 4th. Urged on by agitators, crowds rushed into the concession and some of the crowd tore down the British War Memorial. The British consul-general asked for Chinese troops to maintain order. The next day, after a mass meeting organized by Li Kuo-hsüan and Li Li-san, groups of marchers poured into the British and French concessions, and one group attacked the British police station. The British Municipal Council decided to hand over authority to Chinese forces, making them responsible. British and American women and children were put on ships and sent to Shanghai, while the men were concentrated in a building near the Bund where they could be quickly evacuated if necessary. The Nationalists set up a commission to administer the concession.

Thus was the British Concession retrieved. On January 6 the small British enclave in Kiukiang was also taken over by crowd action, without British resistance, but with considerable looting and destruction. Great Britain avoided repetition of the May 30 and June 23 incidents, while the Nationalists won a great victory, as it seemed at the time. The Hankow Incident added to the Kuomintang's prestige in China but it also

hardened the determination of Great Britain and the other Powers to prevent a similar outcome in Shanghai.

Soviet Advisers and Plans for Reorganizing the NRA, January 1927

Nanchang, the scene of the group of Soviet advisers around General Bliukher, was a provincial capital southwest of Poyang Lake and about ninety miles by railway from Kiukiang. Marc Kasanin ("Lotov"), who joined Bliukher's staff as an interpreter in February, found Nanchang with its ancient wall and narrow, dirty streets a welcome change for a Sinologist from the considerably Westernized Hankow.[64] With a population estimated at several hundred thousand, Nanchang had a small electric power plant, but little else of foreign material culture. About 100 Western missionaries, mostly British and American, lived in Nanchang where they had established several Chinese Protestant churches, two small middle schools, a normal school, and several primary schools, as well as two hospitals, one for women. There was also a Chinese YMCA with about 1,000 members and two foreign secretaries on the staff.

The provincial government ran a hospital with six foreign doctors and two foreign nurses, a provincial agricultural college and two law colleges, and four middle schools, one for girls. Educationally rather backward, Nanchang did not have a large student body.[65] Besides being a government center, Nanchang had a lively trade in agricultural products, carried on traditional handicraft manufacturing, but had little modern industry.

The Soviet advisers lived in one of the few European-type houses in the city, a "dismal place," and walked as a group across the city to the premises where Chiang Kai-shek had his headquarters in a spacious house, formerly the governor's residence.[66] Blagodatov recalls that since the scope of military operations had broadened, it was necessary to create a headquarters for the South China Group at Nanchang. He was appointed chief of staff; M. G. Snegov, chief of the Operations Department; and Strumbis, chief of the Intelligence Department. E. V. Teslenko, head of the Department of Military Operations and Organization, summed up data on and prepared recommendations for improving NRA units. A department chief, explains Blagodatov, was the only department personnel and so had to do all the work, which was complicated by the lack of an interpreter permanently attached to headquarters. Tairov (also "Ter" and "Teruni"), Bliukher's political assistant, also worked at headquarters. Rudnev, an artilleryman and former tsarist general, was good at making precise sketch-maps of the most complex military situations. Protasov drew a non-relief map of the Yangtze basin. Nina M. Zenek, wife of adviser I. Ya. Zenek ("Zembrovskii"), was in charge of the Soviet group's financial affairs. Zotov was in charge of codes. Blagodatov's wife and Nadia Tsorn, who later married N. T. Rogov ("Lodzinskii"), were typists. M. M. Abramson ("Mazurin") and M. I. Kasanin were interpreters, as well as consultant-Sinologists and secretaries on Chinese affairs. Abramson was Bliukher's personal interpreter; Kasanin, Blagodatov's interpreter. The advisers worked sixteen to eighteen hours daily and took no days off.[67]

The Nanchang advisers worked on two main tasks: planning for the National Revolutionary Army's reorganization and strategy for operations in the lower Yangtze Valley. The NRA's heavy casualties during the first phase of the Northern Expedition were more than made up for by defecting units and prisoners of war. By December 30, 1926, when Chiang discussed troop strength with Bliukher, the NRA supposedly comprised 264,000 men organized in 200 regiments. The army had 227,000 rifles.[68]

On January 1, the National Revolutionary Army's Military Affairs Reorganization Conference was convened at Nanchang. According to conference regulations, participants were members of the KMT CEC, persons specially sent by the National Government, the commander-in-chief, various members of the Military Affairs Com-

mittee, commanders and chiefs of staff down to the independent division level, the head of the General Political Department, superintendents of military bases, chiefs of commander-in-chief's offices, persons designated by the commander-in-chief, and Soviet advisers attached to units down to the independent division level.[69]

According to Blagodatov, all corps and divisional commanders were invited to participate. Blagodatov criticized Chinese generals for their tendency to increase the number of divisions mainly by means of taking in untrained cadres, for the more divisions, the more possibility for commanders to increase their profits. Early in 1927, on Bliukher's orders and at Chiang's request, a regular commission of Soviet advisers was created under the chairmanship of Blagodatov, who stated that one of the commission's tasks was to work on troop organization. It tried to do all it could to fight the Chinese generals' tendency to increase their units. On January 3, 1927, a project for the NRA's reorganization was approved at a meeting of the commission attended by Chiang and Bliukher.[70] Thus Blagodatov provides independent information on the Military Reorganization Conference.

In a welcoming speech Chiang stated that the conference was called to rectify the lack of unity in the army. In the afternoon of January 3, the day the Soviet commission's project for the NRA's reorganization was approved, the first discussions took place at the conference, attended by Chinese political and military leaders and fourteen Soviet advisers including Bliukher, "Teruni," and Blagodatov. Chiang, who chaired the meeting, declared that the agenda's first item was the system of enrolling armies. He suggested appointment of a committee to look into the table of enrollments. If quality was good and the numbers low, all could be used and expenses reduced. He went on to discuss the system of divisional organization and asked the committee to listen to the Soviet advisers' opinion.

Bliukher then gave his views. He stressed the need to reduce costs and increase military effectiveness but said this could not be done under present circumstances. A corps should comprise 30,000 or so men, of whom 18,000 would serve at the front. He listed the quantity of equipment needed by each corps and emphasized the need for training officers and section heads. He said the best method was to set up a training regiment in each corps. Bliukher criticized the northern armies' use of the brigade as the independent unit of combat. The Soviet system of using three regiments to a division was better, he stated. Chiang then appointed an investigating committee of Chinese generals and ten Soviet advisers.

The second day of discussion was January 5. The meeting decided to adopt the divisional system with each division made up of three regiments; a corps should include a training regiment. Deputy Chief of Staff Pai Ch'ung-hsi declared that with the NRA engaged in conflict in Chekiang, it was better not to discuss such details. He proposed organization of committees on management and a check of the number of officers and troops in each corps. The committees were duly set up and various regulations adopted. More regulations were brought up for discussion and passed the following afternoon. Teng Yen-ta, head of the General Political Department, stated that because of lack of time the department had not been able to unify its organization, work, and expenses. Now that the revolutionary power was rising it was necessary to investigate and improve the personnel and methods of political work and adjust organization, training, and finances to achieve unity. More committees were set up.

The last session of the conference, January 7, saw five resolutions on political work adopted, including relations between organs for political work and the Party representatives in the army. The meeting discussed payment of troops, expenses of companies and battalions, recruitment, and weapons, and set up more committees. Chiang then gave the concluding speech urging all corps to carry out improvements in organization so that they could undertake the second stage of the Northern Expedi-

tion. The NRA's big defect was lack of system in the army and government, Chiang said. He stressed the need for accurate statistics and regular reporting. The various corps had still not reported fully at the conference and their statistics were still not clear enough. The second prerequisite for victory was unity and equality throughout the NRA. He declared that while organizing the revolutionary army back in Kwangtung, he had stressed three important points besides ideology—organization, military discipline, and spirit. Right now the army was not as good as it used to be, Chiang said, and he urged everyone to strive for improvement.[71]

It seems unlikely that even a small part of the ambitious program adopted at the Military Reorganization Conference could have been carried through, because the southeastern offensive to take the lower Yangtze area was launched shortly afterward. The Russians at Nanchang nevertheless pushed ahead with their efforts to improve NRA units. In accord with Bliukher's instructions, wrote Blagodatov, they decided not to wait for the Military Affairs Committee's directives and began to work out a program for training soldiers, and of lectures to commanders to be carried out by Soviet advisers with each corps. Particular attention was to be paid to political preparations. Advisers with units worked out concrete programs of training and of military preparations. This program, he noted, was most successful in the Eleventh Corps under the command of Ch'en Ming-shu, whose adviser was Gorev ("Nitikin").[72]

Situation of the Nanchang Soviet Group, Early 1927

Bliukher and other Russians found themselves laboring in a difficult atmosphere. Toward the end of December, Soviet Military Attaché R. V. Longva visited Nanchang, leaving on December 28 after consulting with Chiang and other NRA commanders.[73] On January 8 Longva reported that Chiang was pressing an offensive toward Chekiang, but characteristically he failed to inform Bliukher of his orders for the movement of troops.[74] Early in 1927 Bliukher wrote that he was being followed, had fewer and fewer visitors, and found it difficult to agree with members of the government and the CEC. Other Russians at Nanchang found themselves in a similar difficult situation.[75] Bliukher expressed apprehension over rising reaction to the mass movement. After Chiang spoke on the gap between the army and the masses because workers were guided by persons who were not KMT members, Bliukher wired Borodin on January 4, stating that the latest reports on the labor and peasant movements, especially in Kwangtung, caused many people to panic. The CCP was being blamed. Partly for this reason, secret negotiations were being conducted about the CCP's exit from the KMT. Bliukher thought the situation demanded Borodin's arrival lest Chiang should persuade everyone in favor of himself, such as those "unprincipled Leftists."[76]

After the Nanchang Military Conference, Bliukher distributed a document among the Soviet advisers saying that in connection with the fear of the mass movement, a Rightist group and a Rightist tendency had taken form. The commander-in-chief quite obviously did not trust the Communists and the Leftists in general. The Leftists were frightened by the deepening mass movement and talked about the need for retreat, especially in the labor movement. Bliukher stated that it was necessary to continue the Russians' work as before, deepening it in the direction of operational advice, organization, and bringing the army into fighting order. At the same time, he sent Borodin an analysis of those NRA corps that would, in his opinion, support Leftists and Communists in case measures were taken against the Rightists' conspiracy. He listed the Eighth, Sixth, Second, and Fourth corps in this category and considered the Third and Seventh corps as being unable to constitute a serious obstacle to any Leftist action.[77]

Bliukher's telegram indicates a marked change in the Soviet attitude toward

Eighth Corps commander T'ang Sheng-chih. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Borodin began to cultivate T'ang immediately after his arrival at Wuhan, as a counterpoise to Chiang.[78]

Plans for a Southeastern Offensive

Despite the misgivings of Bliukher and other Soviet military advisers about an advance in Anhui and Kiangsu, they began to plan operations to take the lower Yangtze area. Early in January Bliukher and his staff completed a plan entitled "A Memorandum on the Liquidation of the Enemy in the Area of the Lower Yangtze," dated January 6, 1927.[79] According to Cherepanov, the situation at the front had become dangerous due to the threat posed by Chang Tsung-ch'ang's assistance to Sun Ch'uan-fang. The advisers had to select the "lesser evil" and put the Chekiang operation into action because of their fear of agreement among militarists.[80]

The Soviet memorandum preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR states that in order to facilitate the second stage of the Northern Expedition the NRA's first task was to attack Shanghai and Hangchow and mop up the enemy in the lower Yangtze Valley. Toward this end it was necessary to concentrate the main force in eastern Kiangsu [Kiangsi] and western Chekiang. At the same time, units should be concentrated in northern Kiangsi and southeastern Hupei to create a threat to southern Anhui, and they should engage the enemy at Anking. In addition, troops should be concentrated in the southern section of the Peking-Hankow Railway and in northern Hupei to engage the enemy in Honan and northern Anhui. Before the first ten days of February, Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun was to attack Loyang and Chengchow on the Lung-Hai Railway and establish contact with Fan Chung-hsiu's units, those units that wished to join the NRA, and NRA units in northern Hupei. After destroying Wu P'ei-fu's remnant forces, the NRA's main force would engage Chang Tso-lin's Fengtien troops. One unit was to pin down Chihli-Fengtien-[Shantung] troops in the area of Suichow [Hsuchow] to facilitate destruction of the enemy in the lower Yangtze Valley. The troops would then meet in Peking.[81] Hsuchow in northwestern Kiangsu is strategically situated at the crossing of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lung-Hai railways.

For the next great military campaign the National Revolutionary Army was to be arranged in three route armies, plus general reserves. Ho Ying-ch'in commanded the Eastern Route Army, with Deputy Chief-of-Staff Pai Ch'ung-hsi as advance commander. The Eastern Route Army, comprising six divisions and one regiment of the First Corps and the Nineteenth, Twenty-sixth, Fourteenth, and Seventeenth Corps, was to concentrate in western Chekiang with some units stationed in southern Chekiang. Its target was Hangchow. The Central Army, commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, was divided into the Right Bank Army under the command of Sixth Corps commander Ch'eng Ch'ien and the Left Bank Army under Seventh Corps commander Li Tsung-jen. The Yangtze River Right Bank Army comprised the Sixth and Second corps and the Independent Second Division. Its main force was to concentrate in northeastern Kiangsi with some units assigned to western Chekiang. Its mission was to pin down the enemy in southern Anhui. The Left Bank Army comprised the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifteenth corps. Its main force should concentrate in eastern Hupei with some units stationed in the Hankow area. Its task was to obstruct the enemy at Anking and connect with units in northern Anhui that were about to defect. It should take Shou-chou and Ho-fei and prevent the enemy from crossing the Yangtze.

The Western Route Army under the command of T'ang Sheng-chih comprised his Eighth Corps, the Hupei Army's First Division, and the Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth corps. Its main force was to concentrate in northern Hupei with some units stationed in northwestern Hupei. Some of its troops were to enter southern Honan and ally with

friendly armies there to obstruct the enemy in that province. Its main force was to control the southern section of the Peking-Hankow Railway and respond to operations in various directions. Finally, the Western Route Army was to pay special attention to remnants in western Hupei. The main force of general reserves under Third Corps commander Chu P'ei-te was to concentrate at Nanchang with a portion stationed in the Kiukiang area.[82]

Bliukher remained Chiang's adviser. A. N. Chernikov was assigned to Right Bank Army commander Ch'eng Ch'ien. M. F. Kumanin was Left Bank Army commander Li Tsung-jen's adviser. Cherepanov remained with Ho Ying-ch'in in Fukien. Cherepanov knew Chinese and could do without an interpreter. V. N. Paniukov was assigned to Advance Commander Pai Ch'ung-hsi on the Chekiang front. F. I. Ol'shevskii ("Voinich") was adviser to Western Route Army commander-in-chief T'ang Sheng-chih.[83]

Beginning of the Wuhan-Nanchang Split, Early January 1927

Adoption of the strategy to attack the lower Yangtze Valley coincided with the beginning of conflict between Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang and the Wuhan Left Wing over the location of the capital. On December 2, five days before the scheduled departure of the Party and government staff from Canton, Chiang wired T'an Yen-k'ai requesting that they stop over at Nanchang for a conference.[84] On December 31, Central Party Headquarters and government staff, led respectively by Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai, arrived at Nanchang. A majority of CEC members there decided that Party headquarters and the government should temporarily remain at Nanchang. On January 3 the Central Political Conference passed a decision to this effect and also decided to call a plenum of the Central Executive Committee at Nanchang on March 1. On January 7, the Joint Council at Wuhan resolved to maintain the Wuhan regime, pending decision on the location of the capital at a CEC plenum.[85] Later, Chiang dated the conflict over the location of the capital to the arrival of the Party and government staff at Nanchang, which coincided with the development of military operations in the southeast. He asserted that while Wuhan was suitable from the standpoint of foreign relations and finance, Nanchang was more suitable from the military point of view.[86]

According to Cherepanov, the January 3 decision convinced Borodin that a break with Chiang was inevitable. He quotes a later interpretation by Borodin: "Prior to the time of the Nanchang decision of January 3, which signified the rise of the 'March Clique' against us, we had not been able to rise against them, but we had been sufficiently prepared for creating our center in Wuhan."[87]

Although Bliukher did not attend the meetings between Chiang and government and Party leaders at Nanchang, he was informed of the discussions and reported to Borodin. After Chiang wired Borodin to come to Nanchang to decide the "sore question" of the capital's location, Bliukher notified Borodin that he had been visited by several corps commanders who requested him to exert his influence on Chiang to let the government remain in Hankow. Borodin decided that he would lose prestige by going to Nanchang and used the Hankow British Concession Incident as his pretext for remaining in Wuhan. Hence Chiang had to go to Wuhan, according to Cherepanov. Borodin asked Bliukher to use his prestige among government leaders to persuade them to move to Wuhan as soon as possible.[88]

Evolving Policies of the CCP Central Committee, January 1927

The Chinese Communist Party's leadership tried to develop appropriate policies to meet the contentious situation within the Kuomintang, the violence of social revolu-

tion in the central China countryside, and the problems of military strategy and relations with the powers. Among our documents are two political reports of the Party's Central Committee, presumably produced in Shanghai during January 1927.

Document 75, The CC's report dated January 8, is of unusual interest. Issued at a time of deepening rift between Wuchang and Nanchang, and shortly after the Hankow British Concession Incident, it reveals that the CC opposed the plans of the National Revolutionary Army for an offensive against the lower Yangtze and avoidance of conflict with Chang Tso-lin's Fengtien Clique. The CC stated that Shanghai should be recognized as the place where serious conflict with imperialism would be encountered—a difficult problem to solve. The CC advocated support of the Shanghai Autonomous Movement in order to create a buffer zone between the NRA and the Fengtien-Shantung troops, but conceded that under Sun Ch'uan-fang's severe military pressure the movement had temporarily ceased (Doc. 75, p. 42).

Though the CC called for crushing Sun Ch'uan-fang's main force in Chekiang, it stressed concentrating military preparations against the Fengtien Army. Fengtien was still trying in every way to avoid a direct clash with the Northern Expeditionary Forces, it stated, but since the fortunes of Sun Ch'uan-fang and Wu P'ei-fu were receding, a direct clash with Fengtien-Shantung was inevitable. Military preparations must be expedited, with particular attention to the Peking-Hankow Railway, which, the CC declared, had become the center of military movement. All NRA forces should be concentrated on this line. The NRA should contact the armies in central Honan and connect them with the NRA to occupy the southern bank of the Yellow River. The CC stated that the Honan situation had become tense since the Kuominchun occupied the western part of the province. The Kuominchun suffered serious shortages and found it difficult to fight Fengtien's well-equipped forces (Doc. 75, pp. 43, 41).

The CC stressed the importance of Yen Hsi-shan's attitude toward the war. Final victory belonged to the side that could unite with him, it said. He recently demonstrated connections with the National Government, which naturally wished to cooperate with him in every way. On the sole condition that he would resist Fengtien, the CC said, all his demands could be accepted. His independence must be respected so that he would not be under Feng Yü-hsiang's control (Doc. 75, p. 42).

Dated a few days after the January 3 decision of the Political Conference for the Party and government to remain in Nanchang, Document 75 approves of the formation of the Wuhan Joint Council to support the government. The CC expressed grave concern over conflicts between government leaders, which constituted a very serious internal problem. Reconciliation between Chiang and Wang Ching-wei and among other KMT leaders was the most important of all problems, it said. Warning that if the problem was not solved the national movement would be destroyed, it called for continuous support of the slogan "Wang-Chiang cooperation!" (Doc. 75, pp. 42-43).

The CC reconfirmed its cautious approach to the militant mass movement. The effects of the militant peasant movement on the Hunan countryside were vividly described to the Joint Council by Chang K'ai-lien, finance commissioner of the Hunan provincial government, on December 29, 1926. Peasant associations often shot the gentry and local bullies, Chang said. Rich families were fleeing and there was no one left to pay the land tax. Proper trading in grain had ceased. Merchants had closed their shops due to their employees' demands for increased wages. Chang stated that the province was in an extremely difficult financial situation with receipts totaling less than 300,000 monthly, while the army's expenses alone amounted to at least 1,150,000 monthly.[89] He reported that a battalion commander had been killed by the masses for wanting to petition the government.[90]

Mao Tse-tung had arrived at Changsha from Shanghai while the First Hunan Provincial Peasants Congress was in session. Addressing the congress on December 28,

he called for a united front to resist the counterrevolutionary united front. He then embarked on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan.[91] By January 1927, according to his famous "Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement," two million Hunanese peasants had been organized in peasant associations. The number of persons under the direct command of peasant associations totaled ten million. The bad gentry, local bullies, and illegitimate landlords, reported Mao, were deprived of the right of free speech. The slogan "All power to the peasant associations!" was actually realized and every word of the peasant associations passed as command. The peasants had even raised the slogan "All who own land are bullies and all gentry are bad!"[92]

The Central Committee's report of January 8, our Document 75, states that the mass movement had entered the revolutionary path in the provinces of Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi occupied by the NRA. Revolutionary work had deeply penetrated the villages and assassinations of the bad gentry and local bullies were taking place without end. The current social revolution was more far-reaching than the 1911 Revolution or the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It warned of violent reactions should there be a military setback. While the CC approved the slogan "Down with corrupt and greedy officials!" it warned that the slogan "Reduce the people's burdens!" was inappropriate at the moment, particularly when military action was still in progress (Doc. 75, p. 43).

The Central Committee's report of January 26, 1927, our Document 76, states that following the Hankow Incident Britain made every effort to bring about a united reaction to the incident both internationally and within Britain. But these plans had thus far failed. Britain thought its tactics with regard to the 2.5 percent surtax were very clever, but they had only resulted in intensifying British-Japanese conflict. Britain had failed to secure cooperation from the United States, Italy, and France (Doc. 76, pp. 1-2).

The Central Committee advocated continuation of the policy of concentrating on the anti-British movement. "We cannot positively say that the British policy of creating an international alliance against us will not be crowned with success. For a while we can forbear from extending the anti-imperialist movement to Japan, France, and America, in order to keep Great Britain isolated" (Doc. 76, p. 3).

The CC's hostility to Britain stemmed partly from fear of an alliance between Britain and moderate KMT elements. The Nanchang-Wuhan schism had widened following Chiang's visit to Wuhan from January 11 to 18.

Chiang's visit began on a negative note. At a banquet welcoming him on January 11, Borodin warned him not to oppress peasants, workers, and the CCP and pointed to Sun Yat-sen's "Three Great Policies" and Three People's Principles.[93] Three Com intern agents reported two months later that Borodin had spoken against personal dictatorship at the banquet. It was under Borodin's influence that the Left Wing consolidated itself and took a firm stand against Chiang, they said.[94] Chiang Kai-shek conferred with Borodin for several hours. According to Borodin's report to the Joint Council on January 15, he proposed to Chiang that the Political Council meet at Wuhan and that Party leaders at Nanchang proceed there. Chiang, on the other hand, argued for the meeting to take place at Nanchang. The Joint Council resolved that it would continue to function temporarily.[95] Thus Chiang's Wuhan visit succeeded only in stiffening the attitude of both sides. Borodin had affronted Chiang personally.

While the Hankow Incident strengthened Borodin and the Wuhan Left Wing in their stand against Chiang, according to the three Comintern agents, it reportedly had the opposite effect on the Central Committee and the Russian comrades in Shanghai. The CC did not want to react at all, the agents asserted. They reported that Ch'en Tu-hsiu had declared at a conference of the CC: "Why should we clamor over it and what kind of agitation should we develop when the aggressors were not the English

but the Chinese?" The CC insisted that foreigners and the petty bourgeoisie should not have been incensed. The three Comintern agents complained that the CC and Voitinsky did not want to participate in the struggle against Chiang but, on the contrary, wanted only to appease him.[96]

Alarm characterized Document 76. The CC expressed apprehension over the possibility of an alliance between Britain, the northern militarists, and KMT moderates. Both Britain and the militarists were trying to attract the KMT moderates, it alleged. The future would show whether their tactics would yield results. "Were the National Government and the Kuomintang united in aims and actions, these tactics would, of course, yield no results at all. Unluckily, however, the internal situation is now extremely unfavorable. The Right Wing of the Kuomintang is daily becoming more and more powerful. . . . Now there is a very strong and serious sentiment inside the Kuomintang against Soviet Russia, against the Communist Party, and against the workers' and peasant movement" (Doc. 76, p. 2).

The main cause of this sentiment was class contradiction, the CC said. It pointed to three other causes. First, the belief of Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Ching-chiang that there must be only one party, that class struggle must not take place, and that the CCP was unnecessary. The CC warned that many politically unconscious people shared these bourgeois convictions. Secondly, there was a widespread opinion that the National Revolution would end very soon and that the class or social revolution would begin. Thus the CCP was the greatest enemy and there was resistance to Soviet Russia, the CCP, and the worker and peasant movements. Third, some persons who perceived that the development of the Northern Expedition and of the workers' and peasant movement were proceeding under the CCP's guidance were beginning to be jealous and afraid of this party. The principal question was the possibility of an alliance of imperialists with the Right or Moderate Wing of the KMT, which might lead to a concerted movement against Soviet Russia, communism, and the workers' and peasant movement, both from within and from without (Doc. 76, p. 2).

To cope with this danger, the CC reemphasized the policy of alliance with the KMT Left Wing. The Party was at fault for not having paid sufficient attention to making small concessions to the petty bourgeoisie in cases where their views did not seriously contradict those of the proletariat, it said. Hence even the Left Wing was ill-disposed toward the CCP. The CC explained that the danger lay in the fact that whereas on March 20 only Chiang personally and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had moved against the CCP, the Party was now confronted with the anti-Communist movement not only of the Right and Center of the KMT but also of a part of its Left Wing (Doc. 76, pp. 2, 4).

The CC outlined tactics to deal with the situation. In addition to concentrating on the anti-British movement, the Party should make the masses rise and give military and financial support to the National Government, so that the KMT would understand that the National Revolution was still in a period of acute struggle. This tactic would also lessen the KMT's fear of the CCP, its fear that the masses might ally themselves with the CCP. The CC called for agitation to make it clear that the National Revolution was not yet accomplished and that its successful accomplishment must be accompanied by political and social changes. The Party should criticize the development of bourgeois ideology within the KMT, in order to refute the ideology of Tai Chi-t'ao, Kan Nai-kuang, and others. The CCP must warn the KMT that "although it is not necessary to take active measures against the bourgeoisie, if it believes in the dreams of the bourgeoisie, and directs the revolution with its force, it will place itself into the bourgeois camp and oppress the real revolutionary force of the peasant and working masses. We must adapt our tactics so as to save the Kuomintang from the passive inclination to the Right" (Doc. 76, p. 3).

Tai Chi-t'ao had been a principal target of Communist attack for more than a

year. Kan Nai-kuang, however, was a new enemy. Indeed, only seven months before, at the Second Enlarged Plenum, the CC had identified him as one of the two top leaders of the KMT Left. As head of the KMT Peasant Department Kan wrote a pamphlet, "The Peasantry as the Kuomintang's Class Base," which was widely distributed in the summer of 1926. Beginning with the fall of 1926, Kan reportedly treated Communists and Russians more coldly. Following the departure of the Party and government staff from Canton, he became the acknowledged leader of the Left in Canton. At the beginning of December, the Leftist League, a secret organization, was created within the KMT under Kan's leadership. The League's program approved of the changes that had been effected after March 20. The league reportedly made use of anarchists to undermine Communist influence among workers. Its statement of December 14, 1926 declares its opposition to the spreading of Communist ideology within the KMT and Communist seizure of the mass movement from the KMT.[97] The CCP naturally found Kan's influence detrimental to its own interests.

Communist Penetration of the National Revolutionary Army

By January 1927 there were about 1,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army, and most of them were officers or staff members, according to Document 77, a plan for organizing them more effectively to carry out Party goals. We have already seen that in March 1926, before the Northern Expedition, an attempted numeration of Communists in the NRA showed a total of 887. The largest category, which clearly was an approximation, was 200 cadets in the Central Military-Political Academy, with another 50 among its officers and political workers. Only 53 of the total figure were enlisted personnel (Doc. 43). According to a report by S. N. Naumov, the Fourth Whampoa class, which graduated in October 1926, had almost 500 Communists among the 3,500 cadets, but the newly enrolled Fifth Class had only 100 to 120 (Doc. 72, p. 1). Yeh T'ing's Independent Regiment, part of the Fourth Corps and a spearhead of the Northern Expedition, had many Communists among its officers and men. Many Communist officers had been transferred into the regiment from the First Corps after the March 20th Incident.[98] As stated in chapter 6, A. Khmelev reported in December 1926 that there then were over 200 Communist commanders in the National Revolutionary Army.

Although the Communist Party was eager to convert military men and had organized the League of Military Youth in 1925 for that purpose, the Party apparently was slow in creating an organization among its military comrades, whereas the Kuomintang had nuclei in almost all units of the NRA by March 1926 (Doc. 3, p. 8). At that time the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party had a secret Military Section. One of its functions was to guide the nuclei of the Communist Party which existed as illegal organizations in southern armies, but much of its work was directed toward enemy armies and local paramilitary forces. The Central Committee in Shanghai itself had a small Military Section. Its efforts were mostly directed toward enemy forces or assisting in the creation of workers' and peasants' armed groups (Doc. 44).

In July 1926 on the eve of the Northern Expedition, the Central Committee criticized the ineffectiveness of the Party's military work (Doc. 65, Resolutions on the Military Movement): "Our organization appears to be a study group," it complained. "Although our comrades' attention has most recently been directed to the military movement, they tend to emphasize maneuvering high-ranking military officers" instead of "systematically preparing for armed uprisings." As a result of six months' work, the resolutions lamented, "we have only succeeded in creating central and local working organs and their mutual relationships." This probably referred to creation of the Central Committee's Military Section and provincial military sections. Henceforth,

the resolutions exhorted, the Party should try to organize soldiers' cells in reactionary militarist armies, arsenals, and ordinance bureaus. In the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuominchun, however, when some Communist became an officer his duty was to see that the army became more revolutionary; but at the same time he should studiously avoid "premature differentiation" of the revolutionary army, and his actions should be in complete accord with instructions of local Party headquarters (Doc. 65).

"The Letter from Shanghai" offers an explanation for the Communist Party's cautious position toward the National Revolutionary Army. In December 1926 the plenum of the Central Committee made the decision, says the letter, to build Party nuclei in the army, but only among commanding officers. In January, Voitinsky, the Comintern's chief representative to the Chinese Communist Party, opposed even that policy, saying that Moscow had decided against organizing such nuclei. The main reason, the letter charged, was "the fear of revolutionizing the army which pervades some party leaders."[99] Behind that fear, no doubt, was the cardinal policy of the Comintern's Executive Committee, accepted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to work within the structure of the Kuomintang and avoid "premature differentiation"—that is, the inevitable interparty conflict. Discovery of Communist activity, particularly organizational activity, within the National Revolutionary Army would intensify the hostility of the Kuomintang's Center and Right wings, and even of Leftist allies, a prospect which, as we have seen, the Communist Party's Central Committee greatly feared in the first month of 1927.

Document 77, dating from late January 1927, is a plan that the small Military Section of the Communist Party's Central Committee presented to its parent body for approval. Chou En-lai was a member of this secret organ in Shanghai. The plan called for organizing nuclei among the approximately 1,000 Communist commanders, political workers, and staff officers in the NRA. These men mostly worked as individuals without guidance from the Party, says the document. If the Party gave proper guidance, it could promote its principles among the military and increase its membership therein also. The system proposed was to create Communist cells at regimental level and above and link them by a guidance network. This secret apparatus would be completely separate from local Party organizations. Party guidance would come down a secret chain of command from the appropriate provincial Military Section appointed by the Military Section of the Central Committee. The regulations elaborate on how to maintain secrecy in the work of the cells, work which was to have three purposes: political instruction of cell members, recruitment of new Party members, and execution of the Party's program in the military unit to which the cell belonged. The cell must never reveal itself by putting forward suggestions in its own name, and above all, it must never openly criticize the middle and higher level commanders. It should attentively watch their actions and report them to the higher organs of the Party.

Notes

1. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 8-9. "Theses on the Situation in China," pp. 135-36. The theses are translated as Document 1 in North and Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, pp. 131-45. They are analyzed on pp. 39-41.

2. North and Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 31, citing Trotsky's *Stalin's School of Falsification*; Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 293.

3. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 11, 13, 15, 22; 16. "Theses on the Situation in China," pp. 139-41. The Academy of Sciences, USSR, Institute of the Far East published the full text of this document in *Kommunisticheskii International i Kitaiskaia*, pp. 89-105, thus validating the text seized in Peking, including the "extra thesis." Translated by Mrs. Lea Kisselgoff.

4. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 16–17. "Theses on the Situation in China," p. 141.

5. Preparations for the Seventh ECCI Plenum were completed by early November 1926. See North and Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 33.

6. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 22–23.

7. North and Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 42, citing Ts'ai, "Istoriia opportunizma v Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kitaia," *Problemy Kitaia*, 1 (1929):21–22.

8. Ibid., p. 148, the date of Roy's first article written in Canton.

9. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 297. Omitted from *As Military Adviser*.

10. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for December 2 and 3, 1926. The diary entry for December 1 states that Chiang met Chao Tai-wen, Yen Hsi-shan's representative, who reported that Yen was willing to join the National Revolution.

11. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 160.

12. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for December 4, 5, and 7, 1926.

13. Ibid., diary entries for December 7 and 9, 1926.

14. Ibid., diary entry for November 29, 1926. On October 3 Chiang instructed T'ang Sheng-chih to open negotiations with Chang Tso-lin's representatives at Changsha. On the 16th Chiang wired Chang Ching-chiang and T'an Yen-k'ai at Canton proposing that Fengtien be urged to send troops against Sun Ch'uan-fang at Nanking in coordination with the NRA. See diary entries for October 3 and 16, 1926. State Department records support the view that the two factions were close to an agreement. See D. Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 240, citing a memorandum by Nelson T. Johnson, chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division.

15. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for December 24, 1926. Five days later, Chiang wired Feng Yü-hsiang that it had been decided to deal first with Sun Ch'uan-fang before coping with Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang. See diary entry for December 29, 1926.

16. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, II, 564, citing minutes of the Central Political Conference, December 6, 1926.

17. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 331.

18. *China Illustrated Review*, December 18, 1926, p. 7; dispatch, Hankow, December 10.

19. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 557–58.

20. Julien Arnold, *China: Commercial and Industrial Handbook*, p. 432 ff.

21. Marc Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, pp. 244–45; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 281. These books are the source of much information on the life of the Soviet advisers.

22. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 294; *As Military Adviser*, p. 299..

23. Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 169.

24. Li Yün-han, *Tsung jung Kung*, pp. 532–33, citing minutes of the first Joint Council meeting.

25. Ibid., pp. 532–34; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing yu Wuhan cheng ch'üan*, pp. 33–35. Professor Chiang uses the minutes of the Joint Council extensively.

26. Li Yün-han, *Tsung jung Kung*, p. 534.

27. Telegram from Tenth Corps commander quoted in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, entry for December 3, 1926.

28. We are indebted to Chiang Yung-ching for this data from KMT archives, which supplements the translated minutes in Doc. 74.

29. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entries for December 21, 24, 25, and 31, 1926.

30. See David Clive Wilson, *Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924–1928*, p. 467, citing Hankow telegram of December 24, 1926.

31. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry.

32. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Recollections of My Work," p. 103.

33. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 118-19.

34. Yang Hsin-hua, "Yün Tai-ying," p. 298, where Yün is credited with the slogan.

35. Resolutions quoted in Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 398 (392).

36. "Resolutions on the Problem of the KMT Left Wing," pp. 69, 71.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., pp. 69-75.

39. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "What Are the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang?" pp. 1247-48.

40. Beginning in the summer of 1922, Dr. Sun did indeed decide to accept aid from Soviet Russia, admit Communists into the KMT but *not* ally with them, and support the interests of workers and peasants, but there is no evidence that he ever referred to these as "The Three Policies" or set them apart from other policies adopted at the same time. He specifically opposed "class struggle."

41. "Resolutions on the Problem of the KMT Left Wing," pp. 76-77, 72, 75-77.

42. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 412 (415). Chou took over the Military Department in late December or early January. See Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, p. 206.

43. PFCS, II, 598; KMWH, XIV, 2232-33.

44. Jordan, "Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution," pp. 139-41; Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, pp. 101-102.

45. KMWH, XIV, 2233-40.

46. *Min-kuo ta-shih jih-chih*, p. 343. See also *China Illustrated Review*, December 25, 1926, p. 11, dispatch, Peking, December 20, 1926; Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo ti sheng-huo*, III, 199-200.

47. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for that date.; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 14, citing minutes of the Joint Council's meetings on December 22 and 27, 1926.

48. *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 117-18.

49. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 117, 124.

50. Wilson, *Britain*, pp. 438-39.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 445; Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 228-31. The text of the British memorandum is in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1926), pp. 923-29.

53. Wilson, *Britain*, pp. 464-66, based on Lampson's reports to Chamberlain and the Foreign Office.

54. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 93-94, citing minutes of the Joint Council.

55. Wilson, *Britain*, pp. 473-74.

56. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 90, citing Chen's diplomatic report to the Third CEC Plenum on March 13, 1927. Chen described Japan's attitude toward the Nationalist Government as good. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p. 120.

57. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 90-91.

58. Gennaro Falconari, *Reactions to Revolution*, pp. 281-82; Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 231. Dr. Borg summarizes and quotes passages of the memorandum.

59. Details based on minutes of the Council and other contemporary documents are in Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 93-98.

60. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

61. *FRUS* (1926), I, 935. It was reported that the northern militarists would receive 27 million taels per annum from surtax collection while the National Government would receive 7.5 million from Hankow, southern, and upper Yangtze ports. See

China Illustrated Review, December 11, 1926, p. 6, dispatch reprinted from *Peking and Tientsin Times*, December 4.

62. The following account is based mainly on the careful study by David Wilson, *Britain and the Kuomintang*, p. 484 ff, and Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 85 ff. Each used contemporary documents and news reports. See also KMWH, XIV, 2343-78, a collection of contemporary documents. Chiang Yung-ching devotes a chapter to documents and studies of the Nationalists' foreign relations in early 1927 in *Pei-fa shih-ch'i ti cheng-chih shih-liao*, pp. 133-98. A volume compiled by the History Research Office of the Hupei Social Science Academy reprints sixty-three Chinese news reports dated January to March 1927 on the Hankow and Kiukiang incidents and their aftermath: *Hankow Chiuchiang shou-hui Ying tsu-chieh tzu-liao hsüan-pien*, Hupei, Jen-min, 1982. The events are treated in more detail in Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution*, pp. 73-77. A personalized account is in Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, pp. 277-78.

63. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 99, based on minutes of the Joint Council.

64. Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 193.

65. The above information is derived from China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China*, which is based on information of the early 1920s. Presumably many missionaries had been evacuated after the riotous seizure of Kiukiang on January 6.

66. Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 194.

67. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 161-62. A list of Soviet personnel serving with the South China Group found in the Peking raid corroborates Blagodatov's account of the Russians at Nanchang and their positions. It names altogether fifty-seven Russians including advisers in Canton and those serving with various NRA units, the navy, air force, Whampoa Academy, and other agencies, technical experts, typists, clerks, and guards. "The Real and False Names of Persons Sent by Soviet Russia to Serve in the South China Group and Their Duties in the Army." The document appears to refer to the winter of 1926-27.

68. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for that date. Blagodatov estimates the NRA's size after the Kiangsi campaign in November 1926 to be 250,000, organized in nineteen or twenty corps. See Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 153. Both figures include troops in Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

69. *Kuo-min Ko-ming Chün chün-wu shan-hou hui-i t'iao-li*, Kuomintang Archives, 441/9.

70. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 165-66. Khmelev's report of December 5, 1926 mentions a Soviet commission working on new troop strength. See also Teslenko, "From Kwangchou to Wuhan," p. 120.

71. *Kuo-min Ko-ming Chün*, pp. 1-18. Kuomintang Archives 441/9. Blagodatov confirms that he was present at the sessions of the conference. See Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 168.

72. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 170.

73. Ibid., pp. 163-64.

74. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 216-17; *As Military Adviser*, p. 262.

75. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 299-300; not found in *As Military Adviser*. Cherepanov was not in Nanchang at the time about which he wrote.

76. Ibid., p. 216; omitted.

77. Ibid., p. 299; omitted.

78. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, p. 557. Chang recalls that Borodin's interpreter, Chang T'ai-lei, told him that as soon as Borodin left the boat, he accompanied T'ang Sheng-chih, who had come to meet him, to his headquarters. Borodin said that whoever could faithfully carry out Sun Yat-sen's proposals would become the greatest

figure in China. Overjoyed, T'ang said he was prepared to do so. Chang T'ai-lei felt that Borodin was expressing his personal decision to ally with T'ang to oppose Chiang.

79. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 44.

80. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 225; *As Military Adviser*, p. 267.

81. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," p. 44. The document in the archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR is confirmed by two Chinese sources, an article by Ch'en Hsun-cheng, "Preparations for Operations to Clear the Lower Yangtze," in KMWH, XIV, 2224, and the account in PFCS, II, 601.

82. PFCS, II, 606-12; KMWH, XIV, 2224-29.

83. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 187.

84. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, diary entry for that date.

85. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 35-36; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 535-36, citing minutes.

86. Chiang Kai-shek, "Statement on 'Essential Points of Propaganda on Party Affairs," p. 19.

87. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 295; *As Military Adviser*, p. 300. Cherepanov does not date Borodin's remark, omitted from *As Military Adviser*.

88. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 208-10, 299; omitted from *As Military Adviser*.

89. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 139-40. Mitarevsky mistakenly dates the report December 27, 1926. It should be December 29.

90. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 258, citing minutes of the seventh meeting of the Joint Council on December 29, 1926.

91. Li Jui, *Mao Tse-tung T'ung-chih*, p. 260.

92. Mao Tse-tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement," in H. Day, *Mao Zedong*, pp. 339-43.

93. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 536; Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 295.

94. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 403 (400).

95. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 36-38, citing minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the Joint Council on January 15, 1927. For an account of Chiang's speeches and the meetings he attended at Wuhan, see dispatch from Consul General Lockhart, Hankow, to Secretary of State, January 22, 1927. State Department Decimal File 893.00/8342.

96. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 403 (400).

97. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 257; Yuriev, *Revolutsia*, pp. 417-19, citing Bakulin. Kan spelled out his peasant policies in a speech at the National Sun Yat-sen University on January 10, 1927. He declared that slogans in the peasant movement must not be too high or they would not be achieved, and he emphasized the need to form Party fractions in order to direct mass organizations. See Kan Nai-kuang, *Nung-min yün-tung ch'u-pu*, p. 23.

98. Biography of Yeh T'ing in Klein and Clark, *Biographic Dictionary*.

99. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," pp. 421-23.

Chapter 8

Tearing the Revolution Apart

Our final narrative chapter deals with the power struggles of February, March, and April 1927, between the more radical and the conservative leadership of the National Revolution. We end shortly after the raid on the compound of the Russian Embassy in Peking, the raid which uncovered masses of documents about the revolution itself and about the Soviet advisers' role in it.

During these months the conflict intensified between Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters and Borodin and the Left-inclined leaders in Wuhan. Chiang attempted to have Borodin dismissed, made reassuring approaches to Japan, and tried indirect negotiations with Chang Tso-lin. For such actions the Communist Party's propaganda machine attacked him. An anti-Chiang military alliance seemed to be forming. In March the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee met in plenary session in Wuhan, without Chiang Kai-shek, and passed a series of resolutions designed to curtail his authority and to "restore power to the Party."

Among the documents discussed in this chapter are three that provide revealing glimpses into the operations of the Chinese Communist Party at this stage of its development. Two of them deal with Communist tactics within the Kuomintang, in Peking and in Taiyuan, Shansi. One exposes continuing difficulties in North China in relations between the Chinese Communist Youth Corps and the Communist Party, and how the leaders of both organizations hoped to solve this persistent problem.

Just after the CEC Plenum, Chiang Kai-shek launched his military campaign to capture Shanghai and Nanking, and as he departed Nanchang his supporters began to suppress Communist-led organizations in Kiangsi and Anhui. After the National Revolutionary Army took Shanghai, with help from an uprising by the Communist-led labor movement, the struggle to determine the course of revolution continued and spread to other cities under Nationalist control. A new cast of characters joined the fray as a group of Kuomintang elders began to direct a "Party Purification Movement" to expel Communists from within the senior party and to break Communist control over the mass movement. This effort culminated by mid-April in terrible pogroms and ultimately in a permanent split between the two revolutionary parties.

Wuhan, Nanchang, and Soviet Advisers, February 1927

The Wuchang-Nanchang impasse over the location of the Party and government deepened in February. On February 8, the Political Council meeting in Nanchang resolved that Party headquarters and the government should move to Wuhan, but departure for that city was delayed due to the establishment of the Kiangsi provincial government. On February 22, the Enlarged Joint Council announced that it would begin work officially at Wuhan. The Left Wing also called for the Third CEC Plenum to be convened at Wuhan before March 1.[1]

On February 21, Chiang delivered a speech at his headquarters outlining his main arguments. He accused the Joint Council of usurping power and using the "Movement to Restore Party Power" as a tool to seize control. Chiang said he believed that Party power was already centralized and supreme. He did not think that there was any

other organ competing with the CEC; if there was, it was the Joint Council, which was without foundation; the commander-in-chief (Chiang himself), on the other hand, was legally empowered by the National Government and the Central Party Headquarters. Hence, Chiang declared, it was Hsü Ch'ien who was actually guilty of dictatorship.

Chiang vehemently denied that he did not wish Wang Ching-wei to return. He and Wang were loving and intimate comrades, Chiang said. "If I have the desire to seize personal control of the Party and do not wish Comrade Wang Ching-wei to return, I would be totally devoid of character. Anyone can come and kill me! I believe Comrade Wang Ching-wei and I can be united to the end." Chiang added that there was no obstacle at all between them, save for the atmosphere created on purpose by people who wished to destroy him by using Wang Ching-wei. Chiang defended Chang Ching-chiang indirectly. Those who denounced KMT members as "old, confused, mediocre, and rotten" merely because they were old, said Chiang, were guilty of wishing to destroy the Party.[2] Chiang said he was not opposed to Communists, but they were oppressing KMT members and were guilty of tyranny. He hoped they would genuinely cooperate with KMT members. He warned, however, that should they persist in their attitude, not only would the revolutionary forces be disunited but they would be extinguished by the enemy.

On February 24, a conference of 15,000 KMT members in the Wuhan area was convened in support of the "Movement to Restore Party Power." The chairman of the conference declared that the Party's salvation was the supreme objective. The government had failed to move to Wuhan and Wang Ching-wei was still unable to resume his duties. All these were symptoms of the ills of the Party, which were caused by the manipulations of reactionaries. Hence, he declared, it was necessary to carry out a program of democratization of the Party to strengthen Party power and eliminate feudal influence. According to a record of the meeting, at that point the audience shouted such slogans as "Down with the old, confused, mediocre, and rotten elements!"

Hsü Ch'ien made essentially the same points, adding that it was necessary to centralize the revolutionary forces by enabling Communists to participate in the CEC of the KMT and in all other political and mass organizations. Military leaders should be subordinated to the Party. Hsü's speech was interrupted by shouts of "Overthrow Chang Ching-chiang!" "Oppose military dictatorship!" and "Oppose the reactionaries!"

The conference adopted resolutions to strengthen the CEC's power and unify the Party's directing organ; convene immediately a plenary session of the CEC at Wuchang to solve Party problems; urge Wang Ching-wei to cancel his leave of absence and resume his duties at once; eliminate the "old, confused mediocre, and rotten elements" from the Party; and support the National Government's foreign policy and crush all reactionary elements in the Party who were attempting to compromise with the imperialists.[3]

A few days later, Chiang pointed out that the chairmanship of the CEC—the position he held—was established at the Second CEC Plenum in May 1926 as a temporary office, and that he himself had already proposed its abolition.[4]

From Nanchang's point of view, Borodin was the manipulator at Wuhan. In a letter to Borodin, dated February 2 and written at Nanchang, Tairov ("Teruni") informed him that members of the CEC were in a mood to move to Wuhan and that he was advising them to leave one by one. The attitude toward Soviet advisers was similar to that during March Twentieth. He warned Borodin that Chiang's main task was to get rid of him. Chiang had suggested to Ch'eng Ch'ien and T'an Yen-k'ai that they ask Soviet Russia to send Radek or Karakhan to replace him. In fact, anyone but Borodin would be acceptable. Tairov informed Borodin that when Chiang wired him

to come to Nanchang he had intended to send him back to Soviet Russia via Canton. He said that Ch'eng Ch'ien, T'an Yen-k'ai, and Teng Yen-ta had sent Borodin a telegram warning him of the plan.[5]

On February 26, the Political Council meeting in Nanchang resolved to wire the Executive Committee of the Comintern requesting that it voluntarily recall Borodin.[6] But Borodin stayed on at Wuhan. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Comintern delegate Voitinsky went to Nanchang to seek an understanding with Chiang in hopes of averting a separation of the revolutionary forces. But on his return to Wuhan he said the situation was beyond salvage. Voitinsky and Borodin quarreled bitterly, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao's account, Borodin accusing Voitinsky of being an antirevolutionary compromiser, and Voitinsky accusing Borodin of being a political manipulator whose acts were harming the Chinese revolution and the position of Soviet Russia.[7]

The deepening of the Wuhan-Nanchang schism coincided with the advance of the National Revolutionary Army in Chekiang. Cherepanov, who was attached to Ho Ying-ch'in, understood that Borodin believed that if Shanghai were taken by troops loyal to Chiang, a great danger would be posed to the revolution. This view was diametrically opposite to that of three Comintern representatives in Shanghai, who understood that Borodin was of the opinion that "it would not hurt for Chiang Kai-shek to break his neck on Shanghai and Chekiang, and . . . egged him on."[8]

Cherepanov tried in every way to delay the advance on Shanghai. He received a telegram from Blagodatov, Bliukher's chief of staff, saying that Pai Ch'ung-hsi's group was determined to carry out an isolated and, in the operational sense, harmful offensive. Cherepanov tried to convey his understanding of the situation to General Pai's adviser, V. N. Paniukov ("Komi"), and to Vasilevich, to let them know it would be better not to hurry, perhaps even to start a retreat, but they failed to understand his meaning.[9] Pai's forces captured Hangchow on February 18. That evening the Communist-led Shanghai General Labor Union decided to call a general strike to begin the following day, presumably expecting the army to move quickly on Shanghai. The general strike, which began on the 19th, developed into an armed uprising. The uprising was enforced by intimidation squads of the General Labor Union and by several assassinations of Chinese labor foremen and others opposing the strike.[10]

General Li Pao-chang, Shanghai garrison commander, suppressed the uprising ruthlessly, sending broad-swordsmen into the streets of the Chinese city to behead agitators, many of them students. Nevertheless, the uprising brought hundreds of thousands of workers out in a political strike, scarcely spontaneous, and demonstrated the power of the Shanghai Communists. On the 24th they called off the strike for the next day.[11]

Learning of the strike, Bliukher sought to hurry the Eastern Route Army's advance on Shanghai. On February 22 he informed the Wuhan authorities of a telegram from the Shanghai General Labor Union to the headquarters [of the commander-in-chief], proposing to declare a strike in which 5,000 men would take part.[12] When the news came that Shanghai workers had risen, Bliukher sent a coded message to V. N. Paniukov on February 25, demanding an immediate offensive to relieve the workers. Cherepanov asserts that Bliukher was aware of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's "reactionary leanings." Hence he suggested drawing a veil over the offensive by attributing it to operational motives.[13]

The "Second Shanghai Uprising" became a dress rehearsal for the uprising in March when Pai's forces did approach the city. The Second Uprising hardened the resolve of leaders in the Chinese business community and Rightists within the Kuomintang to oppose the CCP. It strengthened the British government's determination to prevent another "Hankow Incident," and France, Japan, and the United States advanced their preparations to protect their nationals. Thus the uprising probably assisted Chiang Kai-shek in his search for allies and sharpened the danger foreseen in

the January 26 Political Report of the Communist Central Committee—the danger of "an alliance of foreign imperialism and the Kuomintang Right Wing with the so-called moderate elements of the Kuomintang" against Soviet Russia, communism, and the labor and peasant movements.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang in Peking, to February 1927

The Communist policy of alliance with the KMT Left achieved impressive results at the lower echelons of the Party hierarchy. T'an P'ing-shan's written report to the 7th ECCI Plenum of November-December 1926 states that Left KMT members and Communists controlled nine-tenths of local KMT organs.[14] Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai reported to the Sixth CCP Congress, July-September 1928, that Communists had controlled many local, low-level KMT Party headquarters because true KMT Left members were actually Communists. Communist-controlled KMT Party headquarters of various levels established local "Party governments." The KMT Left Wing controlled only the CEC, he claimed.[15]

Wang Fan-hsi, who says he joined the Communist Party in the winter of 1925 as a student at Peita and then became a full-time worker for the Party in early 1927 after a visit to Canton, describes the emptiness of the Kuomintang in Peking. "Among the revolutionaries actively working underground in Peking at that time [early 1926], there was not a single real member of the Kuomintang, which apart from a handful of right-wing officials did not exist there as a separate organization. . . . Nevertheless we were forced to join the Kuomintang. When we were engaged in certain types of activity we had to say we were Kuomintang members and we were even forced to set up phony Kuomintang meetings." He describes such a meeting shortly after he joined the Party, and later learned that only one of those attending was a real KMT member; all the rest were members of the Communist Party.[16]

A report on the Peking Local Committee's work in the national movement dated February 10, 1927, our Document 78, provides insight into how Communists infiltrated and controlled the Left Wing and built it up against the Right at Peking. The author, Li Po-hai, was secretary of the Committee on the National Movement of the CCP's Peking Local Committee.[17]

KMT members and Communists in Peking found their activity increasingly narrowed under the repressive measures of Chang Tso-lin's regime. It was difficult even to pursue the task of secret propaganda and organization. These circumstances in effect isolated both the KMT and the CCP from the masses and concentrated the latter's attention on work in the KMT. As Po-hai reported, Kuomintang work constituted practically the entire work of the CCP in the national movement. He admitted that KMT work produced no effect among the masses (Doc. 78, pp. 157, 182).

In November 1925, the Peking Local Committee had warned that there were few Left-Wing members in Peking and that it was extremely dangerous to fight the Right Wing single-handedly. It instructed Communists to form a Left Wing of the masses and a united front of the Left and Communists to struggle against the Right (Doc. 18, pp. 148-49). The Communist Party in Peking effectively changed the situation so that by the time of elections of the Peking KMT Municipal Party Headquarters in January 1927, the balance of forces within the KMT had been completely altered.[18] The Left Wing and Communists won a solid victory over the New Right Wing. Communists won four of the nine Executive Committee seats and received 70 percent of the votes cast, although there were only 1,200 Communists among the 4,300 members registered at the KMT's Peking Municipal Party Headquarters.[19] Judging by Document 78, all Communists were KMT members. Some 20 percent of the votes went to independent Left organizations. The New Right did not even get 10 percent, a result which aston-

ished even the Communists (Doc. 78, pp. 158, 163, 177).

Communists controlled the KMT Municipal Party Headquarters through an effective nine-man Communist Party fraction. Hsieh Pai-yü, secretary of the fraction, held the important post of chief of the Organization Department. Other members of the fraction headed the Labor and Peasant departments and served on the Standing Committee.[20] The fraction held weekly meetings and issued detailed instructions to Communist heads of departments (Doc. 78, p. 178).

The Communist position was even stronger in the seventeen district Party headquarters subordinated to the Municipal Party Headquarters. Communists held thirty-seven of a total of fifty-one Executive Committee seats. They occupied an even greater portion of the seats at subdistrict Party headquarters. As Po-hai reported, Communists had planned only to control but not to monopolize low-level Party organs. For various reasons, however, they practically monopolized all such organs (Doc. 78, pp. 175-76).

Po-hai identified three main cliques of the New Right Wing and claimed that it had come to the end of the road during the past few months. The Left unification movement was born during the struggle against the New Right Wing. The CCP had a twofold policy: to unify the Left and oppose the New Right, simultaneously and without conflict (Doc. 78, pp. 160-61).

The CCP's instrument for carrying out its twofold policy was the United Council of the Left, set up in September 1926 by the CCP and nine Left-Wing organizations. Po-hai, the CCP's representative to the council, reported that it had gone through two stages: the movement against the Right and seizure of Party power. By the time of his report in February 1927, six of the nine Left organizations had come under Communist control (Doc. 78, pp. 162, 173).

An example or two may serve to illustrate how a small Communist minority, effectively organized into a Communist Party fraction, was able to seize control of Left-Wing organizations. There were only seventy-five Communists out of a total of 264 members in the New Army Society. In numerical strength, therefore, they constituted less than 30 percent of the total membership. However, Communists won three of the five seats on the Executive Committee of the New Army Society and were able to control it completely. The secretary of the Communist fraction, T'an Tsu-yao, was recognized as the society's leader and elected as its representative to the Peking KMT Municipal Party Headquarters (Doc. 78, pp. 165, 168, 175). The Communist Party fraction in the New Army Society was highly developed, with four departments—organization, propaganda, workers and peasants, and women—and a secretariat.[21]

Another example is the Soul of Hainan Society, which was directed by 6 Communists out of a total membership of 122. Communist infiltration of the society was accomplished when the society's leader, Mo T'ung-jung, joined the Communist Party and introduced many of the society's progressive elements to join the Party also. A Communist Party fraction was then established within the society, headed by Mo T'ung-jung,[22] who was elected to the Peking KMT Municipal Party Headquarters as the society's representative (Doc. 78, pp. 165, 172).

Both Mo T'ung-jung and T'an Tsu-yao were thus elected, not as Communists, but as representatives of Left-Wing societies. Only two of the four Communists on the Executive Committee of the Peking Municipal Party Headquarters were elected as Communists. In this fashion, Communists were able to bypass the May 1926 regulation of the KMT CEC prohibiting them from holding more than one-third of Executive Committee posts at Kuomintang central and local Party headquarters.

Another effective way of bypassing the regulations was for some Communists to keep their Party affiliation secret. Po-hai reported that Communists were sometimes elected to district Party headquarters without their Party identity being known (Doc.

78, p. 176).

Communist control of Left-Wing organizations facilitated the expansion of Communist influence in the universities of Peking through the activities of branch organizations of these societies. The New Army Society, for instance, established basic organizations in all the universities of Peking. The basic organizations met bi-weekly for discussions and reports. According to Po-hai, the spirit at the meetings was extremely good, and positive work was being done by basic organizations that were led by Communists under the direction of Communist Party cells (Doc. 78, p. 168).

Po-hai expressed gratification with the Left's attitude toward Communists. The CCP held controlling positions within the United Council of the Left. The Left's respect for the CCP, he said, was like that of a person whose "five members fall prostrate in obeisance." Such a weak Left, however, was not what Communists had hoped for. Indeed, Po-hai showed keen awareness of the Left's weakness despite its success at the elections. Peking Leftists had not been able to carry out independently their historical mission and had to rely on Communists everywhere. Po-hai considered that there were at most 600 members of the KMT in Peking who were truly under Left leadership. The Left had even less of a position with the masses. The KMT Left had a fantastic scheme, Po-hai reported. It thought that it should merely carry out the policy of supporting workers and peasants, who should serve as the KMT's class foundation. This was a manifestation of Left infantilism, which Communists had already tried to correct (Doc. 78, pp. 179-80).

The CCP's objectives included methodical development of the KMT so that there would be 10,000 members at the next elections of the Municipal Committee. Communists should exert every effort to develop their own Party and to secure the petty bourgeois masses in the course of the national movement. They should enable the Left Wing, however, to take over the social mass movement of the petty bourgeoisie. Communists should maintain the same attitude toward all Left organizations. The CCP disapproved of the concept that the Left should have a strictly disciplined and unified organization because that was impossible. While Left theories and policies should be unified, the CCP disapproved of the formulation of a special Left political platform. Communists should promote propaganda recognizing Wang Ching-wei as the leader of the Left (Doc. 78, p. 181).

From Po-hai's report it is possible to draw a few conclusions on Communist tactics in dealing with KMT Left-Wing groups in Peking. First, Communists were disciplined and diligent. Po-hai reported that each Communist had been told a few months before the elections that he was responsible for leading five Left-Wing members (Doc. 78, p. 163). Second, they stressed the need for establishing many types of Left organizations under different names and with different characteristics in order to include all groups. Their policy was not "mixture" but alliance (Doc. 78, pp. 164-65). Third, Communists stressed politeness, tolerance, and an unbiased attitude toward all Left organizations. Po-hai reported, for instance, that Communists were actually closer to the Soul of Hainan Society than to its rival organization, the Ch'iung-yai Association, both organizations of natives of Hainan. On the surface, however, they maintained exactly the same attitude toward both (Doc. 78, p. 172). Fourth, Communists sought to strengthen certain Left organizations in order to counteract the influence of others they had failed to infiltrate. They attempted to build up the New Army Society, which they controlled, as the leading organization; at the minimum, Po-hai stated, it should have a standing equal to that of the Practical Society, whose leaders had refused to admit Communists (Doc. 78, pp. 167, 169). Fifth, Communists stressed the need of temporary alliances. Despite their distrust of the Practical Society, which they expected to turn Rightist and reactionary, they continued to cooperate with it. It might be said, Po-hai wrote, that alliance with the society was one of the CCP's historical tasks (Doc. 78, pp. 167-68). Sixth, Communists tried to

avoid monopolizing Left organizations. Po-hai criticized the Communist position in the New Army Society as "unhealthy." Past errors had caused the society to appear excessively "Red." Henceforth Communists' work should be "grey." The society should allow enlightened elements to take charge (Doc. 78, pp. 169-70).

Communist success in infiltrating and seizing control of Left KMT organs in Peking cannot be attributed entirely to skillful maneuvering, good organization, and individual diligence. It was facilitated by the departure of many of the top KMT leaders from Peking. Following the Western Hills Conference of November 1925, the Right-Wing sponsors of the conference left for Shanghai. Another exodus of KMT leaders, this time Leftists, took place following the March 18th Incident of 1926.

The Peking Communists had another asset in the sanctuary provided by the Soviet Embassy. As the "White Terror" was intensified, the embassy compound served as the base of operations not only for Communist but for Kuomintang organs. There can be no question of the validity of the Peking government's charge that Kuomintang members functioned within the walls of the Soviet Embassy. This is proved by an urgent circular notice to district Party headquarters issued by the Peking KMT Municipal Party Headquarters on November 8, 1926, advising of the arrangements made with the Soviet Embassy guards for admitting committee and staff members.[23]

Efforts to Enlist Yen Hsi-shan as an Ally

Yen Hsi-shan had been the dominant figure in Shansi province for more than a decade, and the province was in a highly strategic position as the civil war unfolded. Mountainous Shansi flanked the Peking-Hankow Railway on the west, along which contestants for either Peking or Wuhan were almost certain to battle. If Yen remained neutral in the coming struggle between Fengtien and the Nationalists, it would simplify Fengtien's defenses; but if Yen joined with the NRA, his forces could at least menace the Peking-Hankow line at Shih-chia-chuang. The Peking-Suiyuan Railway ran through the northern part of Shansi, where it could be interdicted by Shansi troops. It also provided an approach to Peking from the northwest. Finally, the southern tip of Shansi nearly made junction with Shensi and Honan, separated from the Lung-hai Railway by the Yellow River. It was along the Lung-Hai that Feng Yü-hsiang's army was to move eastward into Honan to link up with the National Revolutionary Army. Naturally all sides courted Yen Hsi-shan, though Yen and Feng were not on good terms. Chiang Kai-shek received a delegate from Yen Hsi-shan on December 1, but as Khmelev reported on December 5, the discussions had been inconclusive.[24]

The Kuomintang established itself in Taiyuan, Shansi's capital, sometime after the 1924 reorganization, apparently as a secret organization at first. During the Anti-Imperialist Movement in mid-1925 the Kuomintang's popularity grew, but the provincial authorities regarded it with suspicion as subversive of the regime's stability. By December 1926 the Kuomintang was able to hold a provincial congress with representatives from many parts of Shansi.[25] The Communist Party also penetrated Shansi under the guise of the Kuomintang.

Our Document 79 is a report of the Taiyuan Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on political conditions in Shansi, dated February 18, 1927. According to the report, Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang Kai-shek had exchanged representatives and Chiang's delegate had been allowed to give a public address in Taiyuan. He had brought from Chiang a document appointing Yen as "commander-in-chief." When Yen's delegate returned from Hankow he praised the southern regime excessively, states the report.

Document 79 boasts of the friendly attention paid by Yen's senior adviser, Chao

Tz'u-lung, to the leaders of the Communist group within the Kuomintang. He divulged to them the military preparations that Yen Hsi-shan's deputies were taking. The writer stated that this special attention showed that the Communists serving in the Kuomintang were more important than the other Kuomintang leaders, who were members of the New Right Wing. The Communists had far more influence, the writer stated, and were actually feared by officials because of their influence among the masses. Books on communism and the collected works of Ch'en Tu-hsiu were now much in demand.

While the report tells of a close relationship having been established between Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang Kai-shek, it criticizes Chiang for leaning toward Yen, whom he knew to be a leader of the capitalist class; but it explains this by Chiang's desire to have a counterweight against Feng Yü-hsiang. Yen's reason for negotiation with Chiang "is because of the great power of our side with the masses, and affiliating with our side is a means of being in touch with the masses" (Doc. 79, p. 13).

Despite the optimism of the report, which was very quickly translated into Russian in Peking, it was more than a year before Yen Hsi-shan cast his lot decisively with the already victorious National Revolutionary Army, and by prearrangement sent troops into Peking to prevent Feng Yü-hsiang from winning that prize.[26]

Fanny Borodin Is Captured and Held Hostage

Travel on the Yangtze was not without risks during the civil war, for passenger vessels were sometimes fired upon by troops from one camp or another, and some vessels were commandeered. Mme. Borodin went in February 1927 from Hankow to Shanghai to put her younger son on a Soviet vessel sailing for Vladivostok. She then boarded the *Pamyat Lenina* to sail back up the Yangtze to rejoin her husband in Hankow. The *Pamyat Lenina* had previously plied between Vladivostok and Canton. On board with her were three Soviet diplomatic couriers, Carl Siarge, Ivan Krill, and another named Greibus, carrying dispatches and mail for the Soviet consulate in Hankow. The ship cleared Shanghai on February 27, but the next day, when it came opposite Nanking and Pukow, it was seized by Shantung troops, which included White Russian mercenaries. Mme. Borodin and the couriers, as well as the entire Russian crew of the *Pamyat Lenina*, were taken off and sent to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung province. All were at first imprisoned.[27]

For her captors, Mme. Borodin was an ambiguous prize. Apparently she was given good treatment during part of her detention, for the British consul general in Tsinan reported that "she was comfortably lodged and treated as a guest, feasted, and given a tour of the sights, as though she were an honored guest of the state."[28] But it was difficult for her husband, Michael Borodin, to learn where she was and how she was being treated; news was let out that she might be executed. The Russian advisers in Hankow were filled with anxiety.[29]

As for the *Pamyat Lenina*, less than a month after its seizure it was blown up and sunk in the river by Shantung troops on their retreat from Nanking on March 23.

Policies of the Chinese Communist Party toward Chiang Kai-shek, February 1927

The Communist Party backed the Wuhan Left Wing's demands to have the Nationalist capital moved to Wuhan. In an article dated February 13, P'eng Shu-chih insisted, contrary to the facts, that the KMT Joint Conference in Canton had decided on the move in October. He called on revolutionaries to admit openly that the present National Government was a mere signboard; actually it was a military dictatorship, he charged.[30]

The Central Committee of the CCP regarded the controversy over the location of the Third CEC Plenum as most significant. In a letter to the Northern Regional Committee dated February 13, 1927, the CC declared that the plenum would determine who would be the victor in the struggle between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces. Hence Communists must do their utmost to help the Left Wing convene the plenum in Wuhan.

The CC again revealed its anxiety over the possibility of an alliance between foreign powers, Fengtien, and KMT moderates. Japan now replaced Britain as the major source of worry. Under Japanese guidance, the CC stated, the moderates and Fengtien had begun a movement for compromise between the North and South. Should this movement succeed, it would mean a blow not only to the KMT Left and the CCP but to the Chinese revolution itself. The CC said it was necessary immediately to start propaganda against Chiang, who was guilty of nine "crimes." Communists must assist the Left with propaganda, explaining the "crimes," until Chiang's power was crushed. The CC warned, however, that caution must be exercised. Anti-Chiang propaganda was to be carried out verbally only. In printed matter his name must not be mentioned. In short, he should be "clandestinely bombarded."

Chiang's first "crime," according to the CC's Letter to the Northern Regional Committee, was entry into relations with the Japanese and with Chang Tso-lin of Fengtien. Huang Fu had introduced Saburi Sadao to Chiang, and the two had held a long secret conversation at Kuling. Chiang had also sent Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to Japan. Chang Tso-lin had expressed willingness to negotiate with anyone who was not a Communist. Finally, prominent members of the Japanese government were constantly saying that a compromise between the moderates and Fengtien was possible.

Chiang's second "crime" was the concentration of all Right elements around him. Huang Fu and others had become his intimate friends. He was contemplating the dismissal of Leftist Eugene Chen and T. V. Soong.[31] In the March 6 issue of *Hsiang-tao*, Ch'en Tu-hsiu accused the moderates of conspiracy with the Japanese imperialists and Fengtien.[32]

Huang Fu, who reportedly introduced Saburi Sadao to Chiang, had played a key role in planning Feng Yü-hsiang's coup in October 1924 and had subsequently served briefly as regent. He had held high posts in several Peking governments and had attended the Tariff Conference as a member of the Chinese delegation. In his early revolutionary years Huang had been close to Chiang; they were in fact sworn brothers. But they had grown apart following the Second Revolution of 1913. Madame Huang Fu recalled that her husband had no faith in political parties and was skeptical of the KMT's policies of alliance with Soviet Russia and admission of Communists into the Party. On November 22, 1926, however, Chiang wrote Huang a letter requesting him to come. Following another letter from Chiang dated December 28, 1926, repeating the request, and a visit from Chang Ch'un, Huang went to Shanghai and thence to Hankow and Nanchang, where he saw Chiang.[33] A Japanese Foreign Office source asserts that Huang went to South China to serve as liaison between Chiang and the Japanese. Shortly afterward he maintained close relations with Yada Shichitaro, the Japanese consul general in Shanghai.[34]

While we have seen no evidence that Saburi met Chiang, the available historical record indicates that the Japanese government assumed a friendly attitude toward Chiang around the beginning of 1927, upon Saburi's return to Tokyo and under his influence. On January 18, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro spoke to the Diet on revision of Sino-Japanese treaties and expressed the hope that Chinese nationalism would be reasonable.[35]

Charles MacVeagh in Tokyo sent to Washington a memorandum on a conversation held three days earlier between himself and Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara. Baron Shidehara expressed the opinion that the generals of the National Revolutionary

Army were dissatisfied with the increasingly open control exercised by Borodin, and that Chiang Kai-shek was not in favor of anti-British policies. Chiang's real feelings were far from radical, Shidehara said, despite his many radical speeches, which were necessary in order for him to keep his place. Ambassador MacVeagh suggested to the secretary of state that Shidehara's remarks about the political sympathies of the southern leaders, notably Chiang, were based on reports from Saburi Sadao.[36]

On January 8, Morioka Shohei reported on Chiang's friendly and reasonable attitude.[37] The same month, Murakami Yoshiatsu, Japanese consul at Kiukiang, reported on his conversation with Chiang at Lushan during which Chiang promised to respect China's treaties. Early in January, Consul General Yada in Shanghai reported on the opportunity to approach KMT Rightists and with Japan's assistance to eliminate Communists. Chang Chi was spokesman for the Right, he said.[38]

Tai Chi-t'ao, who was close to Chiang Kai-shek, and a Rightist, left Shanghai for Japan on February 14. While in Japan he gave many speeches and met military and political leaders, industrial and commercial circles, and leaders of the Black Dragon Society.[39]

As for Chiang's alleged negotiations with Fengtien, it is important to bear in mind that the National Government's policy was to avoid conflict with the Fengtien Army as long as possible. As shown in Document 68, the CCP Central Committee in its strategy analysis of mid-October 1926, had also advocated avoiding conflict with the Fengtien Army. To keep Fengtien out of the war, as we have seen, Chiang negotiated with Chang Tso-lin's representatives, at least until late November. In the winter of 1926-27, both the foreign and Chinese press carried reports of a possible compromise between the North and South. A Reuters dispatch from Peking dated January 14, 1927 states that General Yang Yü-t'ing and Liang Shih-i, a prominent politician who had served in various Peking governments, were working on a compromise between Fengtien and the KMT. Other newspapers, particularly the *Shun-t'ien jih-pao* in Mukden, carried similar reports. P'eng Shu-chih quoted a number of such reports in an article in the March 12, 1927 issue of *Hsiang-tao*. He concluded that the principals in the negotiations were Yang Yü-t'ing in the North and Chiang Kai-shek in the South, with Liang Shih-i, Li Shih-tseng, Sun Pao-ch'i, and Yang Tu as middlemen.[40] On February 27, the Canton CCP Committee and various mass organizations issued a "warning," pointing to rumors of a possible agreement between the NRA's commanding staff and Chang Tso-lin.[41]

According to Liang Shih-i's *Nien-p'u*, he had a conversation with British Minister Miles Lampson on January 16, 1927. Lampson asked whether it was possible for Right-Wing members of the KMT to cooperate with the North. Liang said that the KMT had no hostile feelings toward the Fengtien Army and in fact had never quarreled with it. He predicted changes within the NRA and suggested that Britain maintain patience and watch developments. He informed Lampson that he and others were making efforts to ally with the KMT Right Wing.[42]

In short, the available evidence—and there is a great deal more—suggests that beginning in the winter of 1926-27, Chiang used various channels to convey to the Japanese the sense that he was moderate and reasonable, and that they were responsive. But there is no evidence of any secret agreement. The evidence suggests also that Chiang conducted negotiations with Fengtien, but that they failed to come to a successful conclusion.

The CC's letter of February 13 to the Northern Regional Committee stated that another of Chiang's "crimes" was his organization of a movement against the Russians, Communists, and workers and peasants as well, to show that he was not "Red."[43] The Communists launched a propaganda offensive dominated by the theme of violation of the "Three Great Policies." In an article, "Sorrow on the Second Anniversary of Dr. Sun's Death," published in the March 12, 1927 issue of *Hsiang-tao*,

Ch'en Tu-hsiu denounced the moderates for allegedly abandoning the "Three Policies." Ch'en stated: "It is true that the Chinese Revolution was developed considerably following the death of Dr. Sun, particularly during the May Thirtieth Movement and the Northern Expedition. There is still a long road ahead, however, before the National Revolution can be completed. The revolutionary movement must be further developed in order to fulfill Dr. Sun's unfinished tasks, but some of the so-called stable elements [moderates] lack strong revolutionary determination and presume to be middle-of-the road revolutionary leaders. Through fear of the further development of the Revolution, they have thrown away Dr. Sun's Three Great Revolutionary Policies, namely, alliance with Soviet Russia, alliance with the Communist Party, and support of the workers and peasants. They have abandoned Dr. Sun's will and ceased working for the Revolution. Is this not a cause for great sorrow and anguish while we commemorate the second anniversary of Dr. Sun's death? . . . Is it not a cause for anguish that, barely two years following his death, Dr. Sun's policies should be secretly repudiated and even frankly regarded by certain elements as unsuitable for execution?"

In the same article Ch'en demanded that the Fengtien Army be the main target of attack. As previously noted, in early January the CC had urged concentrating all preparations against Fengtien forces in Honan. Ch'en again alleged that a conspiracy was taking place between Japanese imperialists, Fengtien, and the stable group.[44]

The Kiangsu-Chekiang Regional Committee of the CCP called for more aggressive tactics in leading the Left to struggle against the Right. Party members must not retreat in any way from the rising Rightist tide. It was first of all necessary to win the struggle within the KMT. Communists must take the offensive against the Right, but this struggle must not become a simple struggle between the CCP and the KMT. It defined the appropriate Communist-Left relationship as follows: "The so-called cooperation with the Left does not mean that we should let the Left Wing become the central element and the Communists its supporters. We should be the central element and force the Left to help us. The Left's capacity is still scattered and weak. Hence, it is necessary for us to lead it in struggle and become its vanguard. In past intra-KMT struggles, we let the Left Wing handle the situation, we merely suggested things at the rear. The Left was weak and it was often defeated. This has not only affected revolutionary work but has caused the Left to resent us. We must henceforth correct this error. The form of struggle should be a Right-Left struggle and not simply a struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. Actually, however, we should be the vanguard leading the Left to advance."[45]

A letter from the Central Political Bureau to Party leaders in Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi declared that if Communists were unwilling to serve as the Left's vanguard and allowed the Left to become the vanguard, it would mean letting the petty bourgeoisie lead the revolution, which they could never do.[46]

Anti-Chiang Military Alliance, Early March 1927

A Soviet report dated March 5, 1927, our Document 80, is strongly anti-Chiang in tone. Chiang had betrayed dictatorial conspiracy in opposition to the Left, it charges. He had cabled Wang Ching-wei, hinting that there was no need for him to return, the report alleges. Chiang's action had become known and consequently many wavering elements and a portion of the Right had been alienated from him. The Soviet author of Document 80 cautions, however, that the internal struggle to destroy Chiang had not been entirely successful, although the government had moved to Wuhan (Doc. 80, pp. 65-66).

The document expresses confidence that Chiang had lost the greater part of his influence in the army. The officers of Fukien and Chekiang, possibly meaning First

Corps officers in those provinces, had declined to support him and allied themselves with the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth corps. T'ang Sheng-chih had persuaded the Fourth and Eleventh corps, [formed out of the Fourth Corps' Twelfth and Tenth divisions, respectively,] to turn against Chiang. T'ang had greatly expanded his strength. In short, the author of Document 80 stated, the best elements of the NRA were no longer with Chiang (Doc. 80, pp. 65-66).

The report makes clear that T'ang Sheng-chih was the prime mover behind the anti-Chiang military movement. The Russians had reversed their previous attitude toward T'ang and Chiang, and were now T'ang's allies against Chiang. An anti-Communist source asserts that T'ang considered Chiang's position in February so precarious that he sought to interest Borodin in a plan for a surprise attack on Chiang at Nanchang. T'ang organized the Alumni Association of Four Military Academies led by the Paoting Clique as a counterpoise to the Whampoa Alumni Association. The association developed great influence in the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth corps and was also influential in the Second, Third, and Sixth corps.[47]

The author of Document 80 was proved completely wrong the very next day regarding the sympathies of Ch'en Ming-shu, commander of the Eleventh Corps and garrison commander of Wuhan. On the night of March 6 Ch'en, who was pro-Chiang, was reportedly forced to resign and leave Wuhan by T'ang Sheng-chih and Teng Yen-ta.[48] Yet there seems little doubt that T'ang Sheng-chih hoped to replace Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army.[49]

The Third Plenum of the KMT Central Executive Committee, Mid-March 1927

Early in March 1927, the Wuhan Left Wing won a test case over the location of the Third CEC Plenum. On March 6, five of the eight CEC members at Nanchang left for Wuhan. The Third Plenum was held between March 10 and 17, attended by thirty-three members and reserve members of the KMT CEC and CSC. Communists and Left members together constituted more than two-thirds of the members present.[50] Chiang Kai-shek did not attend.

The first session of the plenum opened with a report by Hsü Ch'ien on the formation and history of the Joint Council. This was followed by passage of a resolution stating that the Joint Council had been an indispensable organ for the revolution and that it had represented the government's authority. It praised the Joint Council's work and declared that all of its resolutions were still valid although it had ceased to function. This endorsement of the Joint Council indicated that the Left Wing was in control.[51]

The plenum adopted two important resolutions drafted in accordance with the principles of the Movement to Restore Party Power. The central provision of the "Resolution on Methods of Unification of the Party's Directing Organ" was the establishment of a seven-member Presidium of the Political Council invested with supreme Party authority. The chairmanship system was abolished. The second resolution outlined the organization of the Military Council which was to have authority over all the armed services and organs dealing with military affairs. Six members of the Military Council were to be CEC members not holding military posts. The other members, from nine to thirteen, were to be senior military officers. The Presidium of the Military Council was to be formed by seven members designated by the CEC. At least three were to be CEC members not holding military posts. The decisions of the Military Council and its Presidium must be reaffirmed by the CEC.[52] The resolution thus sought to strengthen Party authority over the military. The immediate effect of both resolutions was to eliminate the unique political and military authority of Chiang Kai-shek, until then chairman of the Standing Committee of the CEC and

commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army.[53]

The results of elections to Party and government posts on the following day were in harmony with the spirit of the resolutions. Wuhan Left KMT leaders won controlling positions in all organs. Their dominance was reflected most strongly in the Presidium of the Political Council, to be composed of Wang Ching-wei, T'an Yen-k'ai, Sun Fo, Ku Meng-yü, Hsü Ch'ien, T. V. Soong, and the Communist T'an P'ing-shan, back from Moscow after attending the Seventh ECCI Plenum. Not one of the members was identified with Chiang's faction.

The elections left no doubt as to who was the top Left leader. The name of Wang Ching-wei, still abroad, conspicuously headed the lists of members elected to all Party and government organs. Aside from the Presidium of the Political and Military Council, he was elected to the national Government Council and its Standing Committee. Furthermore, he was named to take over the KMT's Organization Department from Ch'en Kuo-fu. Until Wang's return, the Communist Wu Yü-chang was to act for him in matters concerning the Kuomintang, and Hsü Ch'ien in matters concerning the government. Chiang was elected to the Standing Committee of the CEC, the Political Council, the Military Council and its Presidium, and the National Government Council, but he was left out of the all-important Presidium of the Political Council. Chang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Kuo-fu were bypassed altogether. Thus, in the absence of both Chiang and Wang Ching-wei, the Plenum attempted to reverse the balance of power brought about by the March Twentieth Incident the previous year.

Moreover, on March 17, the plenum adopted resolutions revising regulations concerning the commander-in-chief. Although appointed by the government, the commander-in-chief was to be responsible to the CEC. Two days earlier the plenum had abolished the Military Affairs Bureau headed by Chiang.[54] The Left's ascendancy is also evident in the plenum's decision to invalidate the elections of the Kiangsi and Kwangtung Provincial Party Headquarters and the Canton Municipal Party Headquarters, which had been held under the guidance of Ch'en Kuo-fu and Chang Ching-chiang.[55]

Despite their influence, Communists did not strengthen their position in KMT organs. In fact, only two Communists, T'an P'ing-shan and Wu Yü-chang, were elected to the nine-man Standing Committee of the CEC, as compared with the election of three Communists to the same committee in January 1926. Not one Communist was elected to the sixteen-member Military Council. However, the plenum marked the height of KMT-CCP collaboration with passage of a resolution on unification of the revolutionary forces. This called for a joint conference of the two parties to meet at once to discuss problems of cooperation, including joint leadership of the mass movements, especially the peasant and labor movements, and the question of joint political responsibility—the dispatch by the CCP of responsible comrades to participate in the National Government and provincial governments.

Following passage of the resolution, the plenum voted to create five new government ministries. Communists were named to head two of the five. T'an P'ing-shan became minister of agriculture and Su Chao-cheng, minister of labor.[56] The appointment of Communists to cabinet posts pushed the original policy of admission of Com munists toward the concept of a two-Party coalition, particularly since the resolution specifically called on the CCP to send men to the National Government. T'an and Su in effect became the CCP's representatives in the National Government rather than KMT members who also belonged to the CCP.

This development was in tune with the "Theses" of the Seventh ECCI Plenum calling for Communist penetration of the National Government. According to Cherepanov, in December 1926, that is, before receiving the ECCI's "Theses," Borodin had proposed to Ch'en Tu-hsiu and others that they insist on Communists' entry into the government.[57] However, the Central Committee and the Comintern

delegate, Voitinsky, opposed entry into the National Government, as they had earlier opposed entry into local government.[58]

Communist influence is evident in the plenum's decisions on the peasant movement. On March 15 it adopted regulations on punishment of village bullies and bad gentry, proposed by the Hupei KMT Provincial Party Headquarters. Mao Tse-tung argued that it was necessary to deal with bad gentry and village bullies through revolutionary means and direct action by peasants.[59] The next day the plenum adopted resolutions on the peasant problem. All armed organizations in the villages were to be subordinated to village self-government organs. Those who refused would be punished as counterrevolutionaries. Village self-government organs had the right to reorganize armed units so that they would actually protect peasants. Whenever weapons were in short supply, the government should devise measures to help.[60] The plenum also issued a manifesto to the peasantry, proposed by Mao Tse-tung and Teng Yen-ta, as members of the Standing Committee of the Central Peasant Movement Committee, permitting peasants to have armed self-defense organizations.[61]

Chiang Kai-shek's Actions, Mid-March 1927

While these decisions were being taken in Wuhan to reduce Chiang's power, his faction took action against Communists and Leftists in Kiangsi. On March 11, one of Chiang Kai-shek's subordinates executed Ch'en Tsan-hsien, the Communist leader of the General Labor Union in Kanchow, a major town in the southern part of the province, and broke up the union. On March 16, as he was about to launch the campaign down the Yangtze, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dissolution and reorganization of the Nanchang Municipal Headquarters of the Kuomintang, which supported the Wuhan faction. A few days later, after he reached Kiukiang, his subordinates violently suppressed the Communist-led General Labor Union and the Kuomintang Municipal Headquarters there. On March 19, Chiang arrived in Anking, the capital of Anhui, which had come over to the Nationalist side through the defection of generals Ch'en T'iao-yuan and Wang P'u. On the 23d, a struggle between five hastily organized anti-Communist provincial associations (one of them taking the name General Labor Union) and Communist partisans culminated in the dispersal of the latter.[62] These were first steps in an abiding political rift.

The Capture of Shanghai

Chiang Kai-shek organized the drive to capture the important lower Yangtze cities along two routes. One was to drive down both banks of the great river, with the right-bank army under Ch'eng Ch'ien aimed at Nanking and the left- or north-bank army under Li Tsung-jen directed toward cutting the Tientsin-Pukou Railway, the enemy's north-south lifeline. The other route was directed against Shanghai. By mid-March, the forces that had taken Hangchow were positioned only a few miles from Shanghai under front commander Pai Ch'ung-hsi, while Ho Ying-ch'in's army was ready to press northward on both sides of Lake Tai to cut the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, the main escape route for Sun Ch'uan-fang's remnants and the fresh Shantung troops under General Pi Shu-ch'eng. The commander of the Chinese fleet at Shanghai, Admiral Yang Shu-chuang, had long been negotiating with the Kuomintang through its chief representative in Shanghai, Niu Yung-ch'ien. On March 14 Admiral Yang declared his flotilla for the Nationalists; he had already sent three vessels up the Yangtze to Kiukiang for Chiang Kai-shek's use. Preliminary battles in the third week of March and strikes and sabotage on his railway lines made it imperative for Chang Tsung-ch'ang to withdraw his troops toward Nanking or face entrapment.

According to a source lacking documentation but based apparently upon Russian

accounts, General Bliukher had put A. Khmelev in charge of efforts to capture Shanghai from within. Under him was a "troika" to guide the preparations, and under them a committee of thirty-one. We know that Khmelev was stationed in Shanghai about this time.[63] A document seized in the Peking raid and published in translation is a report by Chow, almost certainly Chou En-lai, who was head of the Military Section of the Communist Party's Central Committee. He made the report about March 15 to a meeting attended by Zotikoff, Arno, and Chernisk. Others who had met with the Military Section were Boukaroff, Radin, and Svetkoff, any of whose names might have been pseudonyms. Chou reported on plans of the Nationalist forces to attack Shanghai; on conflict within the Shantung leadership and the likelihood that Admiral Pi Shu-ch'eng would defect to the Kuomintang; about agitation among sailors in the northern navy; and plans to remove the breachlocks from the cannon guarding the entry to the Whangpu River at Woosung. Chou also reported on the preparation of a workers' detachment of 1,200 men, more than half of whom knew how to handle firearms, and also on 5,000 men who had been trained for picketing under the direction of the General Labor Union. For arms the workers' detachment had 250 revolvers and 200 grenades. Chou also described the volatile political situation in Shanghai. A Congress of Delegates had met in the French Concession with representatives from more than ninety organizations, whose spirit was militant. This meeting elected an executive committee of thirty, among whom were sixteen Communists and eight workers. He also reported on the successful carrying out of a campaign of red terror in Shanghai against strikebreakers, provokers, and other enemies, ten of whom had been killed.[64]

On March 18, a Nationalist attack broke the Sungkiang front and northern troops retreated into Shanghai, but not into the foreign settlements, which were protected by a multinational army manning barricades at all entrances. Pi Shu-ch'eng negotiated his personal surrender, gave the battle plans to Niu Yung-chien, then escaped by Japanese ship to Tsingtao and made his way to Tsinan, where he was apprehended and executed. On March 21, Monday, as Pai Ch'ung-hsi's forces approached the city's southern outskirts, the General Labor Union began the "Third Uprising." By now the Workers' Inspection Corps was said to number some 3,000, trained by Whampoa cadets, and some armed with rifles and pistols. Some guerrilla groups had also infiltrated the city, and intimidation squads—called "black-gowned gunmen" in Western reports—were active again. The uprising started at noon with pickets and gunmen attacking police on the streets, capturing police stations in sections of the Chinese city, and seizing arms. Simultaneously thousands of workers came out on a general strike, enforced where necessary, although the atmosphere was one of celebration and welcome for the National Revolutionary Army. The city was filled with Nationalist flags. The uprising appeared to be an effort by the Communist Party leadership to seize control of Chinese sections of Shanghai in preparation for a provisional government that they had already formed. Chou En-lai, Chao Shih-yen, Lo I-nung, and Wang Shou-hua were among the guiding hands.

General Pai Ch'ung-hsi arrived on March 22 with some 20,000 troops and set up his headquarters at the arsenal on the southern edge of the city. His subordinate, General Hsüeh Yüeh, commanding the powerful 1st Division, subdued the remaining northern troops. General Pai proclaimed his authority for maintaining order, demanded that all irregulars be incorporated into his army or surrender their arms, and promised the foreign authorities that he would not permit an effort to take over the foreign settlements by force. He ordered an end to the general strike, and his order was carried out on March 24. Between the 23d and 26th General Pai's troops in a variety of attacks against guerrilla centers rounded up twenty self-styled generals, including a Communist leader, Hsü Lang-hsi, and many "black gunmen." Most of the leaders reportedly were executed. Several large units of the Labor Inspection Corps,

well armed, remained in three centers, and the corps extended its control into Pootung, across the Whangpu River.[65]

The Nanking Incident

Northern troops retreated from Nanking on March 23, followed during the night by entering troops of the Nationalists' right-bank army. On the morning of the 24th, groups of soldiers in Nationalist uniform systematically looted the British, American, and Japanese consulates, wounded the British consul, and attacked and robbed foreign nationals throughout the city, killing two Englishmen, an American, a French and an Italian priest, and a Japanese marine. At 3:30 p.m., two American destroyers and a British cruiser laid a curtain of shells around the residences of the Standard Oil Company to assist the escape of some fifty foreigners, mostly Americans and British. The bombardment of this sparsely populated area killed, according to separate Chinese investigations, four, six, or fifteen Chinese civilians and twenty-four troops.[66] The bombardment quickly discouraged further attacks on foreigners. General Ch'eng, who entered the city in the afternoon, restored order among his troops and, on the 25th, all foreigners who wished to leave were evacuated without harm, although foreign properties were looted and burned for several more days.[67]

The Nanking Incident was a unique event during the Northern Expedition: previously there had been no such extensive attacks on resident foreigners resulting in killings and widespread property losses. The event created an atmosphere of crisis in the foreign settlements in Shanghai. In Peking the British, American, Japanese, French, and Italian ministers consulted among themselves and with their governments concerning reprisals. They reached agreement on a set of demands for retribution, but their governments could not agree on sanctions if apologies from the National Government and punishment of those guilty were not forthcoming. The Japanese government attempted to restrain Britain and other powers from too bellicose a posture, while at the same time hoping to persuade Chiang Kai-shek "to solve the present issue and eventually stabilize conditions throughout the South." In short, Chiang was to be encouraged to act against the radicals in his party. The Japanese consul general in Shanghai, Yada Shichitaro, passed this advice to Chiang Kai-shek through his close associate, Huang Fu. The British government's policy toward the Nationalists hardened. Britain now had the power in place to execute a variety of punishments, but the American government would not consent to participate in sanctions. In the end, after protracted international debate, the powers did not take direct sanctions: developments in the power struggle within the Kuomintang superseded such ideas.[68]

Not until April 1 did the Political Council in Wuhan, now fully informed about the incident and with some inkling as to the reaction in foreign capitals, consider seriously how to deal with the situation. Britain and America, it appeared, were preparing to intervene, while Japan's policy was still unclear. Borodin had put the matter bluntly—"if the imperialists should actually help the counterrevolutionaries, it could bring about the destruction of the Revolutionary Army." His proposals were familiar: divide Britain and Japan. This could be done by allaying Japanese fears of the revolution and by ensuring that Japanese in China were protected, particularly in Hankow where, according to Eugene Chen, Japanese residents were fearful their concession would be seized. Statements laying the blame for the Nanking Incident on imperialism, and with moral appeals, should be addressed daily toward foreign countries, and particularly to the Japanese and British people to arouse them against intervention. At the same time, the policy of the Political Council that foreigners in China should be protected must be clearly explained to all Chinese mass organizations and "especially to our armed comrades."[69]

Events soon overran the Political Council's determination to reassure Japan about

the safety of its concession in Hankow. On April 3, after a fight between a Japanese sailor and a rickshaw coolie in which the coolie was killed, an angry crowd killed two Japanese (or, according to Chinese account, seized ten). In this inflamed situation, Japanese marines were landed and opened fire with machine guns, killing nine Chinese and wounding eight. Japanese authorities evacuated most of the Japanese women and children, closed and manned the concession boundaries, and brought up more warships. In keeping with its policy, the Wuhan government tried to minimize the gravity of the incident and to cool Chinese passions. It gave strict orders against retaliation.[70] Its order was one of many efforts by the Wuhan leadership to gain control over fast-moving revolutionary developments.

Persistent Difficulties Between the Chinese Communist Party and Its Youth Corps

While these battles were fought in the lower Yangtze Valley, with an ever-sharpening conflict between the conservative Nationalist and the Communists, an old conflict within the Communist movement itself smoldered in the North—conflict between the Party and its Youth Corps. The last document in our book relates to these strained intra-Party relations, less than two weeks before the April 6 raid on the Soviet embassy compound. The Party and the Corps had a history of competitiveness, for the Youth Corps had been organized earlier, tended to be more radical, and had a larger membership than the Party until after the Anti-Imperialist Movement in 1925.[71] The age limit for Corps members had been set at twenty-eight, then reduced to twenty-six so that older members would leave the Corps and be available for Party membership (Doc. 2, p. 11). The Communist Party regarded the Corps as its adjunct. In its "Resolutions on the Work of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps" of July 1926, the Enlarged Plenum of the Party's Central Committee dictated that the Party itself would take over direction of the student movement, leaving the Corps to work with other youth "masses." These July resolutions reveal an attitude of suspicious concern about the Youth Corps, masked in polite phraseology (Doc. 63).

Eight months later, on March 26, 1927, the Communist leaders in the North were still plagued with rivalry and noncooperation between the Party and the Corps, as Document 81 shows. It was issued by the Northern Regional Committees of the Party and the Corps, although entitled "A Circular Notice of the Chinese Communist Party Explaining the Mutual Relations of the CY and the CP." The Northern Regional Committees supervised Communist and Youth Corps work outside of Peking in Manchuria, Chihli, and Shansi. The document must have resulted from careful analysis of recurring problems and negotiations among responsible leaders, probably residing in Peking.

It flatly states that "the CP's policy is carried out among the masses of youth by the CY, which receives its political policies directly from the CP. No one has ever doubted this since the organization of the Party and the Youth Corps." Yet "in recent months, relations between the Party and the Youth Corps under the jurisdiction of the Northern Regional Committees have not been very satisfactory." The document then lists nine major errors in the relations between the two, and it seems to blame the Party more severely than the Corps. "Hereafter, local Party and Corps organs of all levels should hasten to reform relations between Party and Corps and bring them closer together. Not only should the Party and Corps mutually supervise each other and correct past mistakes; Party organs should plan how to help develop the Corps and direct its work. Youth Corps organs should strive to realize the Party's decisions and lead the masses of youths to stand under the Party's direction for united action and struggle" (Doc. 81, pp. 54-55). Within a very short time the white terror in Peking forced both groups into hiding or flight.

The Struggle for Control of Shanghai

Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Shanghai on Saturday afternoon, March 26, and there immediately began an alignment of forces in a complicated struggle for control of the Chinese city, although this was but one aspect of the larger contest for authority over the National Revolution. The Leftists tried to arouse the support of the Shanghai masses. On Sunday the General Labor Union opened new offices in the Huchow Guild in Chapei and Wang Shou-hua presided over a meeting at which representatives of many organizations passed resolutions demanding retrocession of the concessions, pledging support for the National Government and the Shanghai Citizens Government, and urging General Hsüeh Yüeh to remain in Shanghai, it being rumored that his division was to be sent away. In Pootung a number of Chinese workers charged with being counterrevolutionaries were reportedly executed by order of the GLU. In the afternoon a huge rally at the West Gate near the French Concession heard fiery speeches demanding the immediate occupation of the concessions on pain of a general strike. Nationalist troops prevented the parade that followed from bursting into the French Concession. The American consul general reported that the situation was extremely tense and he doubted that Chiang Kai-shek had either the will or the power to control it.[72]

Chiang Kai-shek was urged from several directions to suppress the militant labor movement in Shanghai and to curb the Communists, but preparations took time. Leaders of the Chinese business community headed by Yü Hsia-ch'ing, Wang I-t'ing, comprador of a large Japanese shipping firm, and C. C. Wu, formed a Federation of Commercial and Industrial Bodies and sent a delegation to see Chiang on March 29. They emphasized the importance of restoring peace and order in the city immediately and offered financial support.[73] The Japanese consul general, Yada, saw Chiang's sworn brother, Huang Fu, several times shortly after Chiang's arrival, to urge the general to suppress disorderly elements as well as make amends for the Nanking Incident. The *North China Daily News*, Shanghai's leading British paper, editorialized that if General Chiang were "to save his fellow countrymen from the Reds he must act swiftly and ruthlessly."[74]

A prestigious group of Kuomintang veterans led by Wu Chih-hui pressed Chiang to purge their party of its Communist members. The group was part of the Central Supervisory Committee, elected in January 1926 at the Second National Congress in Canton. On March 28, five of the twelve regular members met informally and passed a resolution proposed by Wu Chih-hui to expel Communists from the Kuomintang. The effort would be called the "Movement to Protect the Party and Rescue the Country." Others at the meeting were Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, "dean" of Chinese intellectuals; Chang Ching-chiang, the wealthy patron of both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek; Ku Ying-fen, veteran of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen's financial commissioner; and Li Shih-tseng, a leader among the French returned students. On April 2, the group met again, with Ch'en Kuo-fu, Chiang's protégé and recently deputy head of the Party's Organization Department, and two alternate members of the Central Supervisory Committee, generals Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung, attending. This meeting produced a list of 197 Communists or near-Communists holding important positions in the Kuomintang and resolved to send the list to the Central Executive Committee with the request that the persons on it be placed under surveillance.[75]

Wang Ching-wei arrived in Shanghai on April 1, having returned from Paris via Moscow, where he received a handsome welcome. During the next few days he was in a swirl of discussions with T. V. Soong, who had been sent from Wuhan; Wu Chih-hui, Ts'ai Yuang-p'ei, and Li Shih-tseng of the Supervisory Committee faction; his old colleague Hu Han-min; his rival Chiang Kai-shek; and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, general

secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. On April 3 Chiang issued a telegram to all commanders of the National Revolutionary Army announcing Wang's return in most flattering terms and stating that now the administration of all military, civil, financial, and foreign matters should be centralized under Chairman Wang's direction; Chiang only had general direction of the several armies and would obey the chairman, as should all other commanders. Privately, Chiang urged on Wang the necessity of expelling Borodin and purifying the Party of its Communist members. He warned Wang against going to Wuhan, where he could not escape becoming a Communist pawn. Others begged Wang to join the Party purge, but he advocated a plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee to decide so serious a matter, and he urged his comrades not to act independently.[76]

The outcome of discussions between Wang and Ch'en Tu-hsiu was their joint statement published in the Shanghai papers on the morning of April 5. The statement first emphasized the continuing need for unity within the revolutionary camp and denied that the Communist Party, "no matter what its faults," had ever advocated overthrowing its friendly party, the Kuomintang. China was unlikely to have a proletarian dictatorship even in the future; what was needed now was a democratic dictatorship of all oppressed classes to deal with counterrevolution. The statement called for a spirit of cooperation between members of the two parties and reminded Kuomintang members of leader Sun's policy of allying with the Communists. It tried to set at rest two "rumors" current in Shanghai—that the Communist Party intended to organize a workers' government, invade the foreign concessions, subvert the Northern Expeditionary Army, and overthrow the Kuomintang; and that the Kuomintang leaders planned to expel the Communist Party and suppress the labor unions and their inspection corps. Neither Party had any such intentions. The statement ended by exhorting all comrades to rid themselves of suspicions, end rumors, and consult with mutual respect and good will "for the good of the revolution and the good of the two Parties."[77]

That same morning Wang attended a stormy meeting with an enlarged group of Party veterans and Nationalist generals determined to expel the Communists, and then that evening he secretly boarded a steamer for Hankow. In letters to Chang Ching-chiang and Chiang Kai-shek, he explained that he was going to Wuhan to arrange for a plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee to be held in Nanking on April 15 to settle the disputes within the Kuomintang.[78]

The Raid on the Soviet Embassy Compound, April 6, 1927

The foreign diplomatic corps gave permission for the Peking metropolitan police to conduct a raid on certain buildings adjacent to the Soviet embassy compound, which they did on April 6. The grounds for the search warrant were the suspicion that Chinese Communists were using the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Dalbank in planning an insurrection. During the raid, the police arrested twenty-two Russians, and some thirty-six Chinese in hiding there, including Li Ta-chao, one of the founders and principal theoreticians of the Chinese Communist Party. Six of the nine members of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Municipal Headquarters were taken. The police discovered documents of the Chinese Communist Party as well as Kuomintang and Communist banners and seals, and some arms and ammunition. Furthermore, when they saw that Russians in the Soviet military attaché's office were burning papers, they put out the fire and removed seven truckloads of documents.[79] A small number of these documents, some published in Chinese, some translated into English but never published, are presented in this book.

The immediate effects of the raid were to disrupt Kuomintang and Communist operations in the North and, probably, to disrupt the communications of the Russian

military advisers with the military attaché's office in Peking. On the next day the authorities of the French Concession in Tientsin searched Soviet establishments there, and in Shanghai the Municipal Council ordered police to surround the Soviet consulate and prevent access. Thus did the Western powers attempt to cripple Soviet assistance to the revolutionaries.

Mounting Violence Between the Revolutionary Factions

Radical and counterradical actions broke out in widely scattered cities during the two weeks prior to April 12, manifestations of the now intense conflict within the revolutionary camp itself. These actions were not merely struggles for power; behind the conflicts were issues of great revolutionary import.

There was a pattern to the conflicts that erupted in the cities. The radicals tried to win by propaganda and street lecturing, and by mobilizing the masses in patriotic rallies and parades, with handbills and slogans, some among which denounced conservative Kuomintang leaders. Armed workmen of the General Labor Union—so called inspection corps—which were characteristically controlled by Communists, protected the radicals' establishments and enforced strikes. Counterradical action also followed a pattern that points to central direction: for example, the same slogans, "Uphold Commander-in-Chief Chiang" and "Expel Borodin," were used in widely scattered places. As conflict intensified in some locality, military commanders might order the arrest of suspected Communists and close the organizations they dominated. In several cases Whampoa cadets loyal to Chiang were involved. Assisted by troops, a rival labor organization would attack the local offices of the General Labor Union and disarm its inspection corps.[80]

Conflict broke out in Hangchow soon after its capture on February 18, between Leftist Kuomintang Party Headquarters, the General Labor Union, and the Students' Association on one side, and an anti-Communist Labor Federation, the Whampoa Cadets Association, and the rear guard of the Eastern Route Army on the other. After a bloody fight on March 30, the rear guard commander forbade the GLU to hold a rally and parade the next day. When students and workers led by the inspection corps paraded anyway, troops fired on the marchers, then surrounded the headquarters of the General Labor Union. The same day in far-off Chungking, where there had long been conflict between rival unions and other revolutionary groups, Kuomintang leftists planned a great rally, ostensibly to oppose British and American imperialism because of the bombardment of Nanking, but also to arouse sentiment against Chiang Kai-shek. The garrison commander sent soldiers to surround the meeting place and arrest suspected Communists; they also searched two schools headed by Wu Yü-chang and closed down the municipal headquarters of the Kuomintang and the offices of the provincial farmers association, the city GLU, and the *Szechwan Daily*, all reported to be headed by Communists. When the inspection corps attempted to resist, much blood was shed. Thereafter the purge spread through Szechwan.

Leftists had their turn to overthrow their rivals in Nanchang on April 2. When Chiang Kai-shek left in mid-March he ordered the Leftist municipal KMT headquarters dissolved, but after his departure the Central Executive Committee in Wuhan appointed a committee to reorganize the provincial executive committee and government, and six of eight committee members were Communists. To push through Wuhan's instructions, Leftists mobilized supporters and students and staged a riotous coup on April 2. In this case the garrison commander apparently remained neutral while Chu Te, commanding an officer training regiment, supported the coup. Some twenty persons were killed and a number of Kuomintang members holding positions in the Kiangsi provincial government were arrested. However, Chu Pei-te protected them and they were spared the execution to which they had been sentenced by a

"people's court."

The balance of forces was more even in Foochow. Communist members of the Kuomintang dominated provincial KMT headquarters and had set up a Political Training Institute and the usual organizations of youth, women, farmers, and workers; but "pure" Kuomintang activists created parallel anti-Communist organizations. General Ho Ying-ch'in while still in Foochow did not permit the Communist-controlled labor union to form an inspection corps nor the creation of farmers' guards. On April 4, conservative forces organized a meeting to support Commander-in-Chief Chiang and call for the expulsion of Borodin. The meeting also resolved to punish local Communists and Leftists. The conservative leaders formally established a new provincial KMT headquarters on April 7, and the defeated faction fled from Foochow.

In Nanking, after its capture on March 24, there was a complicated struggle that came to its climax on April 10 and 11. The city had been taken by the Second and Sixth corps, each of which had a communist at the head of its Political Department—Li Fu-ch'un and Lin Tsu-han. Soon the usual pattern of creating mass organizations began under the leadership of the two political departments. On April 1 the Kiangsu provincial KMT office moved to Nanking from Shanghai; it was a Leftist group in which two Communists were prominent. Chiang Kai-shek and fellow conservatives, however, planned to make Nanking the capital of a newly organized National Government. Chiang ordered the Second and Sixth corps out of Nanking and sent in two divisions of the First Corps, "his own." He also sent Yang Hu, who had broken up the Leftist Anhui provincial KMT headquarters, to do a similar job in Nanking. Chiang and Ho Ying-ch'in arrived in Nanking on the morning of April 9. A rally scheduled for that day to welcome Wang Ching-wei was never held, for armed ruffians smashed the KMT provincial and city headquarters and dragged off many officers of mass organizations to the Public Security Office. The next day, Leftists succeeded in organizing a rally, but it came into conflict with troops and police, with many persons wounded. April 10 and 11 were days of terror: armed gangsters attacked the General Labor Union while military police searched the city for Communists. Several were killed, and Nanking was no longer safe for supporters of Wuhan.

Similar conflicts in Amoy and Ningpo on April 9 and 10 resulted in victories for the conservative side. In Canton the American consul reported on April 9 that the situation was becoming very tense and a clash between moderates and Communists was expected at any time.

In Shanghai many actions presaged Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters' final break with the Wuhan center and the Chinese Communist Party. Chiang's associates arranged for the Ch'ing Pang, the most powerful underworld society in the lower Yangtze region, to lead an anti-Communist action. By April 3 the International Settlement police learned that Tu Yueh-sheng and other Ch'ing Pang leaders had recruited armed gangsters in a "Society for Common Progress." They were to attack the headquarters of the General Labor Union and the several inspection corps that were holding out in the Chinese sections of Shanghai. On the night of April 11, the head of the Shanghai General Labor Union, Wang Shou-hua, a Communist, came by invitation to dinner at the home of Tu Yueh-sheng, where he was murdered. Before dawn that night, the corps of gangsters and select troops from the armies of Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Chou Feng-ch'i passed by prearrangement through the barricades surrounding the French Concession and the International Settlement into Chinese sections of the city and attacked the hold-out GLU inspection corps. After defeating and disarming the inspection corps, the attackers searched and sealed up the offices of various Leftist organizations. The leaders of the General Labor Union called a general strike in protest, despite General Pai's order forbidding it. After a rally in Chapei on the 13th, demonstrators marched on General Chou Feng-ch'i's headquarters to peti-

tion for the release of those arrested and the return of the workers' arms. Guards fired on the procession, killing scores of innocents. That evening a newly organized Committee on the Unification of Trade Unions took over the headquarters of the General Labor Union to bring the labor movement under conservative control. The violent repression of April 12-14 shattered the Left-directed mass movement in Shanghai. Hundreds had been killed and thousands fled in terror.[81]

Canton, the nursery of the revolution, underwent a brutal oppression of Communist-led organizations beginning April 15, and several noted radicals were slain. General Li Chi-shen returned on April 14 from the conferences in Shanghai and immediately set the purge in motion. Battalions of troops and 2,000 armed police surrounded the headquarters of the Hong Kong Strike Committee and scores of radical unions, disarmed guards, and arrested the leaders. Chung-shan University and two middle schools under radical influence and the offices of two Nationalist newspapers were raided and reorganized. Because Communist influence was thought to be strong among the cadets at Whampoa, they were all disarmed and on the 18th some 200 cadets suspected of being Communists were arrested. A few unions were able to mount a protest strike, which lasted from April 23 to 25, only to result in the arrest of more labor leaders. By April 27 some 2,000 suspected Communists had been captured. Among the scores executed were Liu Erh-sung, Li Ch'i-han, and Hsiao Ch'u-nü, all well-known Leftist militants who had joined the Communist Party.[82]

Radical labor leaders in Wuhan had an opportunity for revenge in the execution on April 14 of eight veteran union organizers who had opposed the Communist Party's domination of unions in Hupei. They were arrested by Teng Yen-ta's Political Department. On April 10, Communist labor leaders called a meeting of delegates of the Hupei General Labor Union, who resolved that the eight should be turned over to the masses for execution. A few days later they were condemned by a court and executed by a firing squad on the streets of Hankow. In Changsha, a focus of radicalism, an estimated thirty or forty Chinese who had foreign business connections were reported to have been executed, among them the noted scholar and conservative, Yeh Te-hui.[83]

In Peking another noted scholar was executed on April 28. Li Ta-chao, cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party, was executed by strangling, despite efforts of many noted Chinese intellectuals to win his release. A prison photograph of Professor Li shows a sturdy, bald-headed man with large mustache, dressed in a simple padded long gown and cloth shoes. The thirty-eight-year-old scholar gazes calmly at his photographer.

Nineteen others were executed with Li, most of them taken in the same raid on the Russian embassy compound. Among them were several mentioned in our Document 78, which was dated only two and a half months earlier. Two were Communist members of the three-man Standing Committee of Peking's Kuomintang Municipal Party Headquarters Executive Committee, Hsieh Pai-yü and T'an Tsu-yao. Other executed members of the Executive Committee were Teng Wen-hui, considered by the writer of Document 78 as being a member of the Kuomintang Left Wing, and Lu Yu-yü, whom he regarded as a leader of the Kuomintang's New Right Wing. Lu's prison photograph bears the caption, "head of the Merchant Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Peking Municipal Party Headquarters." According to Document 78, however, he had not taken up his office and Yao Yen, head of the Practical Society, had assumed his duties. Yao had been captured earlier than April 6, and his confession and those of others confirmed that Li Ta-chao and others were sheltered in the Soviet embassy, which led to the raid. Yao is listed among those executed.[84] Finally, we mention Ms. Chang I-lan, whose prison photograph is captioned "head of the Women's Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Peking Municipal Party Headquarters." Document 78 characterized her as "Wavering Left."

It seems that all twenty of those executed on April 28 were believed to be Communists, though some certainly were not.

The Russian embassy exerted great pressure on the Peking government not to execute the Russians who had been captured during the raid. Eventually they were freed and forced to leave China. Mme. Borodin and the three diplomatic couriers captured on *Pamyat Lenina* and moved to Peking also seemed in danger, but eventually they were freed.

Notes

1. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 40-41, citing minutes.

2. Chiang Kai-shek, "Speech at Nanchang General Headquarters," February 21, 1927, pp. 8-11. In a later letter to students of the Central Military and Political Academy, he specifically defended Chang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Kuo-fu. He described Chang as one of Sun Yat-sen's most trusted associates. See Chiang Kai-shek, "Letter to Students of the Central Military and Political Academy," p. 27.

3. "Documents on the Conference of Party Members of Wuhan, Han-yang, Hsia-k'o." See also "Essential Points of Propaganda on Party Affairs," published by the Central Propaganda Department of the KMT, outlining the Wuhan Left Wing's views on the policy of strengthening the CEC's power and unifying the Party's directing organ, in Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Internal Conflicts of the KMT and the Chinese Revolution," pp. 2045-46.

4. Chiang Kai-shek, "Statement on Essential Points of Propaganda on Party Affairs," p. 17.

5. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 211, 218; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 260, 263.

6. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 540; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 43, citing minutes.

7. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise*, pp. 570-71.

8. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 228; not found in *As Military Adviser*. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 409 (402).

9. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 228-29; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 268-69.

10. Evidence for this statement comes from NCH, March 19, p. 472, Municipal Gazette News: Police Reports for February; and "Minutes of the Military Section," p. 147, in a report by Comrade Chow (probably Chou En-lai), dating before March 10, which states, "The campaign of Red Terror has been successfully carried out at Shanghai. More than ten strikebreakers, provokers, and people opposed to the workers at the factories have been killed. This campaign had a sobering effect on the abovementioned people." (The figure may have included some executions after February 24.)

11. Among the primary sources on the strike and uprising are Shih Ying [Chao Shih-yen], "The Second Shanghai Uprising," HTCP 189 (February 28, 1927), 2025-30; Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 410 (403) (this interprets the strike as spontaneous); "Three Shanghai Uprisings," *Problemi Kitaii* 2 (Moscow, 1930), mimeographed, pp. 10-11; *North China Herald*, February 26, 1927, pp. 317-21 and March 19, p. 472, containing Municipal Gazette Police Reports for February; State Department NA (SD 893.000/8822), dispatch, Gauss, Shanghai, April 9, 1927, "Labor, Student and Agitator Movements in Shanghai during February, 1927." Also many secondary works.

12. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," pp. 45-46. The figure presumably refers to trained and/or armed men.

13. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, p. 176.

14. North and Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 36.

15. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp. 54-56.

16. Wang Fan-hsi, *Chinese Revolutionary: Memoirs 1919-1949*, p. 30. See also an account by Sheng Yüeh in *Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow*, pp. 22-24.

17. "Membership List of the Peking Local Committee's National Movement Committee," SLYM, III, "CCP," p. 185. According to Chang Tz'u-ch'i, Po-hai's surname was Li. He was appointed by Li Ta-chao for liaison with Left organizations. See Chang Tz'u-ch'i, comp., *Li Ta-chao*, p. 24.

18. "Report of the Peking Executive Headquarters on the Elections and Conditions of Work," February 5, 1927, SLYM, III, "CCP," p. 126.

19. Kuo Ch'un-tao reported to the Kuomintang's Second Congress in January 1926 on conditions in the Peking Kuomintang. He said there were over 4,000 KMT members, although not over 2,600 had identity cards. He also reported on the strategy of penetrating local societies to form party fractions. yet his report does not even hint at the extent of Communist penetration and control of the Kuomintang in Peking. *Chung-kuo Kuomintang ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hui-i chi-lu*, pp. 57, 59. In Document 78, p. 159, Kuo was listed as a member of the New Right Wing.

20. "Name List of the [Communist] Party Fraction at the Municipal Party Headquarters," SLYM, III, "CCP," pp. 189-90.

21. "Name List of the [Communist] Party Fraction in the New Army Society," SLYM, III, "CCP," pp. 185-86.

22. "Name List of the [Communist] Party Fraction in the Soul of Hainan Society," SLYM, III, "CCP," p. 186.

23. "An Urgent Circular Notice to All District Party Headquarters from the Peking Municipal Party Headquarters," November 8 [1926], SLYM, III, "CCP," pp. 219-20.

24. Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for December 1, 1927; Khmelev, "A. Khmelev's Note on His Trip," p. 122.

25. Donald G. Gillin, *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949*, pp. 104-105.

26. C. Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*, pp. 174, 176, 180, 184.

27. Accounts of Mme. Borodin's misadventures are in Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 291-93; Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, pp. 221, 295-96; and Dan N. Jacobs, *Borodin: Stalin's Man in China*, pp. 237-38.

28. B. G. Tours to Austin Chamberlin, March 26, 1927, in PRO (FO 405/235), Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, no. 13304, item 64. Mme. Borodin described her experiences in a pamphlet after her return to Moscow, *V zastenkakh kitaiskikh satrapov* (In the Torture Chambers of the Chinese Satraps).

29. The final outcome for Mme. Borodin, the three diplomatic couriers, and the Russian sailors is mentioned in our epilogue.

30. P'eng Shu-chih, "On the Transfer of the National Government," pp. 2008-2009. Prior to the development of the Wuhan-Nanchang conflict, Communists did not claim that the Joint Conference in October had decided to move the capital to Wuhan. See Tang Shin-she, "The removal of the Kuomintang government to Wuchang," p. 1498, written in December 1926.

31. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 119-20.

32. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Internal Conflicts of the KMT and the Chinese Revolution," p. 2046.

33. Shen I-yün, *I-yün hui-i*, pp. 228, 225, 247, 354, 356, 360. There are photographs of Chiang's letters.

34. *Gendai Shina jinmei kan*, p. 603. In mid-March Chiang confirmed that Huang had visited him at his headquarters but asserted the visit was a personal one, since they were old friends. See Chiang Kai-shek, "Letter to Students of the Central Military and Political Academy," p. 28.

35. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p. 110.

36. Dispatch from Ambassador MacVeagh, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, January 18, 1927, NA (SD 794.00/37).

37. Falconari, *Reactions to Revolution*, pp. 299-301.

38. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp. 121 and 318 n. 61, citing Yada's telegrams of December 26 and January 9; William F. Morton, *Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy*, p. 230 n. 11.

39. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Min-kuo pai jen chuan*, II, 127-28.

40. P'eng Shu-chih, "The Problem of a North-South Compromise," pp. 2055-58.

41. North and Eudin, eds., *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, pp. 150-55. See also Roy's "Watch the Leaders," dated March 9, 1927, which, he asserted, was refused publication by the Canton Committee. Ibid., pp. 156-58. See also Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," p. 404 (387-89).

42. Liang Shih-i, *San shui Liang Yen-sun Hsien-sheng nien-p'u*, II, 505-508.

43. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, p. 120.

44. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Sorrow on the Second Anniversary of Dr. Sun's Death," pp. 2056-57.

45. "The Recent National Political Situation and Tendencies in the Revolutionary Movement," pp. 64-65.

46. "Letter from the Central Political Bureau to the Comrades of the Regional Committees of Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi," pp. 67-68.

47. Pai Shan, "The Wuhan-Nanking Split and T'ang Sheng-chih," pp. 35-36.

48. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 541-42; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 43-44. U.S. Consul General Lockhart reported that Ch'en had replied in the negative when asked whether he was sympathetic with the Left Wing and had been forced to leave Wuhan. See NA (SD 893.00/8953).

49. See NA (SD 893.00/8373), MacMurray quoting telegram from Lockhart at Hankow, March 9, 1927.

50. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 542-45. Li states that nine Communists attended the plenum. Chiang Yung-ching, in *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 45-46, also lists nine. We have not seen the diary of Lin Po-ch'ü (Lin Tsu-han), the dual party member who was Kuomintang representative in the Sixth Corps, covering the period from July 1926 to June 1927, which was published in the PRC in 1982. According to a press release, the diary contains material on the preparations for the plenum and its meetings, and much else of interest concerning the Northern Expedition.

51. Dispatch, no. 478, American Consul General F. P. Lockhart, Hankow, to Secretary of State, April 6, 1927, NA (SD 893.00/8919), translating *Min-kuo jih-pao*, official organ of the KMT, March 8-18, 1927.

52. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 545-46; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 46-47, both citing minutes; KMWH, XVI, 2790-94.

53. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 549-51.

54. KMWH, XVI, 2794-95; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 546-47.

55. Dispatch, no. 478, American Consul General F. P. Lockhart, Hankow, to Secretary of State, April 6, 1927, NA (SD 893.00/8919).

56. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 548; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 50-51.

57. Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 296; *As Military Adviser*, p. 300.

58. Nassanov, "The Letter from Shanghai," pp. 428, 427 (422, 421).

59. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 500; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 259.

60. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 49, 269.

61. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, p. 560.

62. Ibid., pp. 565-68, 594-98, 660-62; Chang *The Rise*, p. 578; Liu Li-k'ai and

Wang Chen, *I-chiu i-chiu chih i-chiu er-ch'i ti Chung-kuo kung-jen yun-tung* (Peking: Hsin hua shu-tien, 1953), p. 55; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 352, summarizes these actions.

63. Jacobs, *Borodin*, p. 241. A report from Khmelev to Borodin on agitation among the troops in Shanghai, dated after February 24, 1927, is in SLYM, II, "Military," p. 14b, in the ten-volume set.

64. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Military Section."

65. Some contemporary accounts of Shanghai's capture are in *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, March 27, 1927. An article by Chao Shih-yen, using the pseudonym "Shih-ying," and several GLU proclamations in *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 193 (April 6, 1927), reprinted in *Ti-yi-tz'u kung jen*, pp. 473-90. NCH, March 26, pp. 481-88 and 515; April 2, p. 16. NA (SD 893.00/8406, 8410, 8414, 8415, 8421, 8422), telegrams from Consul General Gauss, Shanghai, March 19-24, some published in FRUS, 1927, II, 89-91; and NA (SD 893.00/8906), Gauss's long dispatch dated April 21, 1927, "Political Conditions in the Shanghai Consular District," covering the period March 21 to April 20. "Report on the Situation in Shanghai," by British Vice Consul Blackburn, dated April 15, in PRO (FO 405/253) Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 13304, April-June 1927, no. 156, enclosure 2.

66. NCH, April 16, 1927, p. 108, for the "diligent inquiry" of a Chinese man, who reported four Chinese killed; KMWH, XIV, 2381-82, for telegraphic report of General Chang Hui-tsan of the Nationists' 4th Division, dated April 5, who reported five or six killed; and telegraphic report of Li Shih-chang, head of the Political Bureau of the Commander-in-Chief of the Right Bank Army, dated April 5, reporting an officer and twenty-three soldiers killed and fifteen civilians.

67. Foreign eyewitness accounts in *FRUS*, 1927, II, 146-63; Great Britain: Foreign Office Comd. 2953, China No. 4 (1927), *Papers Relating to the Nanking Incident of March 24 and 25, 1927*; *China Yearbook*, 1928, pp. 723-36, "The Nanking Outrages"; Alice Tisdale Hobart, *Within the Walls of Nanking*, pp. 157-243. Chinese documents and studies, KMWH, XIV, 2378-92; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 117-24; Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 584-88. Other accounts in Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 290-317; Eto Shinkichi, "Nankin jiten to Nichi Bei" (The Nanking Incident and Japan and America), pp. 299-324; Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp. 126-33.

68. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp. 130-33, describes Shidehara's policy and instructions to his officials in China, based on Japanese Foreign Office documents. Wilson, *Great Britain and the Kuomintang*, pp. 575-91, describes the British reaction based on British Foreign Office and cabinet documents. American policy is covered in FRUS, 1927, II, 164-236; and in Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 296-317.

69. From the minutes of the Political Council, April 1, 1927, in the Kuomintang Archives. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 124-26, quotes Borodin's recommendations to the council in full. The Wuhan reaction to the Nanking Incident is well analyzed in Wilson, *Great Britain and the Kuomintang*, pp. 562-75.

70. H. Owen Chapman, *The Chinese Revolution 1926-27*, p. 72. Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 138-39. NA (SD 893.00/8555/8608/8609), telegrams, Lockhart, Hankow, April 3, 4, and 6, and (893.00/8952), dispatch, April 14, 1927; NCH, April 9, pp. 53 and 55, and April 16, p. 112, based on a letter from Hankow.

71. By January 1925 Party membership had reached 994; Youth Corps membership was 2,356. Mif, *Chin-chi shih-ch'i*, p. 37. By November 1925 membership in Party and Corps both stood at about 10,000. Doc. 1, p. 43. By April 1927 there were 35,000 Corps members and 57,963 in the Party. Harrison, *Long March to Power*, p. 99, and Mif as cited.

72. NCH, April 2, pp. 6, 16, 19, 37, and 3; NA (SD 893.00/8506), telegram,

Gauss, Shanghai, March 27, 6 p.m.

73. NCH, April 2, pp. 7 and 20; *China Weekly Review*, April 9. The amounts actually advanced to Chiang are uncertain, but three, seven, and fifteen million dollars are mentioned in Western reports, according to Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 151-52 and 350 n. 27. On April 8, Consul General Gauss telegraphed the State Department that local bankers had advanced Chiang three million dollars but were insisting that they would not support him further unless the Communists were ejected from the Kuomintang. NA (SD 893.00 B/276). Parks M. Coble, Jr., who has carefully studied reports on this matter, concludes that Chiang received three million dollars before the April 12 coup, and another seven million on April 25, 1927, both regarded as loans. Coble, *The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government*, pp. 30-31.

74. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp. 130-31 and notes. NCH, April 2, p. 13, editorial dated March 28.

75. KMWH, XVII, 3086-93 (list on pp. 3091-92); Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 611-14; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 158-60.

76. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 615-17. Chiang's telegram in KMWH, XVI, 2797-98; abstracted in NCH, April 9, p. 52.

77. KMWH, XVI, 2798-2800; translation in Warren Kuo, *Analytical History of Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 424-26; abstract in NCH, April 9, p. 74. According to Wang Ching-wei's later account, Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote the statement to refute the charges against the Communist Party that Wu, Ts'ai, and Li had made to Wang. See Wang's speech of November 5, 1927 in *Wang Ching-wei Hsien-sheng tsui chin yen-shuo chi*, p. 126. Ch'en himself later called it a "shameful" statement, and he blamed its position on Comintern policy of the time. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in his "Letter to All Comrades of the Party," December 10, 1929, translated in *Chinese Studies in History*, 3, 3 (Spring 1970), p. 231.

CMW is informed that records of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai for the months February to July or August 1927 have been found there. They include minutes of its meetings and provide much information on Ch'en Tu-hsiu's thoughts about the "united front" and his hostility to Chiang Kai-shek. The records support Ch'en's contention in his Letter to All Comrades of the Party that he pressed for withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang, but that his proposals were regularly vetoed by the Comintern. Interview with Professor Xiang Qing, January 17, 1985. The papers should be a rich source for contemporary information on the attitudes of Ch'en and other Chinese Communist leaders, and their strategy and tactics during the difficult months of early 1927, doubtless amplifying and probably correcting what is written herein. However, the only publications so far that have used these documents are *neibu* (restricted), according to Professor Xiang.

78. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 617-19. Wang's reminiscent account is in his speech of November 5, cited above, pp. 123-25. Wu Chih-hui wrote a very critical account of Wang's position, "Shu Wang Ching-wei Hsien-sheng hsien tien hou" [Written after Mr. Wang Ching-wei's Telegram of the 16th] (i.e., of April), *Chih-hui wen-ts'un*, 1st collection (Shanghai: Hsin-hsin shu-chu, 1927), pp. 1-14.

79. An account of the raid and of the authenticity of the documents discovered is given in Wilbur and How, *Documents*, pp. 8-37. See also Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, pp. 257-59.

80. The following accounts of conflicts in cities is abbreviated from Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution*, pp. 99-112.

81. For Pai Ch'ung-hsi's reminiscent account, see his *Shih-liu nien ch'ing tang yün-tung hui-i*, p. 11. Telegram of Pai and Chou Feng-c'hi warning the inspection corps, dated April 12, in KMWH, XVI, 2808. *Ti-i-tz'u kung-jen*, pp. 494-500, for an

early account from the Communist side; and NCH, April 16, pp. 102-104, and Gauss, "Political Conditions in the Shanghai Consular District," for outsiders' reports. Secondary accounts in Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 175-77; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 369-70; and Tien-wei Wu, "Chiang Kai-shek's April 12 Coup of 1927," pp. 146-49, 155-57. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 628-29. *Ti-i-tz'u kung-jen*, pp. 516-18; GLU report on pp. 530-33.

82. PRO (FO 405/253) Confidential. *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 13304, April-June 1927, no. 127, a dispatch from British Consul General J. F. Brenan, Canton, April 21, 1927, which includes translations of proclamations of the 15th and of other documents concerning the purge. Also PRO (FO 228, F3609/8135). Telegrams from American Consul General, Canton, April 15, 16, 22, and 25, NA (SD 893.00B/286, 290, 292, and 296. *Ti-i-tz'u kung-jen*, pp. 534-39, an article published in 1931. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 655-59, and Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, pp. 164-65, both based partly on a report by Han Lin-fu to the Wuhan leaders on May 15. (Han, a Communist, escaped from Canton and made his way to Hankow). *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, II, 673-77. Liu and Wang, *I-chiu i-chiu*, p. 57.

83. Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung jung Kung*, pp. 568-69; Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, p. 129; *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, pp. 601-602; Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, p. 326; NA (SD 893.00/8802), telegram from Lockhart, April 17, 1927.

84. See "Waichou Pu to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, April 6th, 1927," in *Chinese Government White Book*, p. 141. *People's Tribune*, May 17, has a list of prisoners and their sentences announced by Chang Tso-lin on April 28, 1927.

Conclusion

This book deals with major political events in China during the years 1920 to 1927 and is based upon documents contemporary to the period, supplemented by memoirs and historical research. Knowledge of this history aids one's understanding of China thereafter and even today.

The book traces the rise of two parties, Nationalist and Communist, which have dominated the political scene in China ever since. Their later fratricidal and enduring conflict was an aftermath of their uneasy cooperation during the early and middle 1920s. Both parties acquired their ideologies during the period, or in the case of the Kuomintang, its ideology was greatly modified. Both acquired their system of party organization, of indoctrinated party armies, and of party control of government, law, and all social organizations in the interest of the party's revolutionary goals. Soviet advisers taught these concepts and a great deal more during their brief mission in China.

The history of the period under review is bewilderingly complex, as revolutionary periods are. The Chinese people with their conservative traditions and longing for stability were, nevertheless, impelled by a revolutionary situation to struggle for a better order. Explosive pressures of population, rural poverty, fierce competition for land, and the exploitation of city workers provided a latent revolutionary situation. This was the soil. Strong sentiments of patriotism and resentment against foreign privilege needed only to be aroused into a fierce tide of anti-imperialism. The rival foreign powers, particularly Britain, Russia, and Japan, competed for advantage over great parts of China, and their competition intensified the rivalries among power-hungry militarists and political cliques all over the country. Such was the climate. The seeders of revolution were the Chinese activists in both parties, ardent patriots intent upon "saving China."

Within the revolutionary camp was the triangle of Nationalists, Communists, and Soviet advisers, uneasy companions in an adventure in which each had different goals. The Kuomintang was far from being united; rather, it was led by a conglomeration of politicians, publicists, educators, labor leaders, and generals with varying regional interests and local sources of power. These men, grouped into factions—some more conservative and some more liberal—constantly competed as well as cooperated. The Communist Party, too, had factions and bitter disputes over strategy and tactics. Likewise, we catch glimpses of jealousy and rivalry among the advisers.

The explosive situation that Chinese society had reached by the 1920s, the dynamic leadership that Communists and Nationalist provided with Russian encouragement and support, made up the texture of the nationalist revolution. But divergent purposes among the leaders enormously complicated the process. The masses, too, had their various hopes, not necessarily congruent with those of the men trying to steer the revolution.

A great conflict within the revolutionary leadership seems inevitable from nearly the beginning of their coalition. The march of events toward the bloody purges of 1927 is an important theme that forced itself upon this book. The Communist objective in collaborating with the Kuomintang was clear and consistent from the beginning, though hidden from public view. Communists intended to seize leadership of the Chinese nationalistic movement; it was one step toward the final establishment of

communism. The resolutions adopted by the Third Congress of the CCP, which affirmed the strategy of entering the Kuomintang and working within it, instructed members to utilize the opportunity to expand Communist Party membership, organize and absorb the masses, and prepare the Communists' independent forces. In pledging to uphold Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, Communists never gave up their goal of a communist revolution. Membership was merely a means to that end.

Soviet advisers sent to reorganize and strengthen the Kuomintang believed their work would create conditions necessary for the establishment of a communist state in China, a future ally of Soviet Russia. This was the goal of Borodin, the Kuomintang's principal political adviser, who creatively executed Russian policy. For his part, Sun Yat-sen, always hungry for foreign assistance, welcomed Russian aid and advice. He expected to use the Chinese Communists to strengthen his party and assist him to gain his own ends. Many of the Nationalist leaders were hostile to the Communists and suspicious of the advisers, but little by little they were forced out of positions of influence. Some, like Chiang Kai-shek, were hostile to particular advisers even while they accepted Russian aid. They wanted guns and technical military help.

The seemingly inevitable conflict did not break out in all its violence until just after the period covered by the documents that form the basis of this book. Yet there were many signals that it was coming—the emergence of "Taichitaoism," the Western Hills Conference, conflicts among students at Whampoa, the March 20 Incident, disagreements over the radicalization of the Farmers Movement, and the struggles between the Wuhan and Nanchang centers. In retrospect it is rather strange that the Kuomintang leaders in power tolerated Communist activities under the same revolutionary banner as long as they did. Ignorance of Communist intentions does not provide a good explanation. Suspicions were raised officially by various Kuomintang leaders in November 1923, in January 1924 at the First National Congress, and in a formal and detailed impeachment of the CCP on June 18, 1924. Thereafter there was no lack of exposers and denouncers of the Communists' ultimate objectives.

Possibly Dr. Sun did not really understand their strategy. Or was he so confident of his own powers of leadership that he minimized any threat? After his death, the prestige of his name was used to uphold the Kuomintang policy of embracing all revolutionaries. Leaders who disagreed had to voice their opposition from the sidelines. Kuomintang leaders in power, including Dr. Sun, focused their thinking upon unification of the country and ending foreign privileges—"Anti-Militarism and Anti-Imperialism." The theory that all should work for those goals under the Kuomintang banner had a powerful appeal. Also it fitted Lenin's strategy for the first stage of revolution in colonial countries as adapted to Chinese conditions by the Comintern. Apparently, there was also a fascination for Chinese in being part of "world revolution." During the 1920s, before Stalin's tyranny became widely known, idealists in many countries looked upon the Russian Revolution as a model of emancipation.

After the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, probably the most influential advocate of Dr. Sun's policy of cooperation with Russia and admission of the Communists, Wang Ching-wei defined the issue of debate as imperialism versus anti-imperialism; there was no reason, he argued, to create the issue of communism. Communist spokesmen and writers were indefatigable, of course, in trying to keep attention focused upon national revolution—after all, it was their purpose, too—and were adept in refuting charges raised against themselves of ulterior motives. Communists and Russian advisers supported Kuomintang leaders who upheld the policy of cooperation and threw their weight against opponents. Access to Russian money and arms, and the support of the CCP and its mass organization, were important elements of the Kuomintang's intraparty struggle. Dependency prolonged cooperation.

The latent conflict was alternately sharpened and then dulled by ambivalence in the strategy of both sides. Each was trying to use the other as long as advantage from

cooperation outweighed risk. Each made compromises and held itself in check. Why?

The Kuomintang had received into its ranks hundreds of younger intellectuals, who were particularly adept at organizing China's youth and gaining their support for the national revolution. Russian aid, too, was linked to continued cooperation between the rival parties. This aid, as we have seen from the documents, was extremely important in the Kuomintang's consolidation of its base in Kwangtung and for the Northern Expedition that was to unify the country.

The Communist Party, too, gained advantage by working within the Kuomintang. Its members could operate with relative freedom in territories under Nationalist jurisdiction—propagandize, organize the masses, and work among troops. Some CCP leaders attended the First and Second KMT Congresses as delegates; some held important posts in high KMT organs. They could influence Kuomintang policy and, more particularly, its execution. Examples are the organization of an extensive movement among farmers in Kwangtung under the shield of the Kuomintang, yet completely under CCP control; and shaping the indoctrination of cadets at Whampoa and troops of the National Revolutionary Army, with glorification of Soviet Russia, Lenin, and "world revolution," along with emphasis on anti-imperialism.

Yet membership in the Kuomintang imposed restraints. The Communist Party's Central Committee apparently feared pushing social revolution so fast as to create a counter-movement within the senior party strong enough to force them out. Yet some Communist leaders, notably Ch'en Tu-hsiu, wished to withdraw from the Kuomintang and cooperate as an independent party. They were forbidden by the Comintern to do so. The fundamental inconsistency—not to say duplicity—of the Communist Party's position led to endless disputes over tactics.

The Communist Party was inadequate in leadership and with too undisciplined a membership to carry out the role of revolutionary leader successfully. In 1923 when the leaders agreed to work within the Kuomintang and attempt to steer it, the combined membership of Party and Youth Corps was between two and three hundred. Party membership was still under one thousand in January 1925, at the time of the Fourth Communist Party Congress. Yet by May 1925 the Party claimed to lead over half a million organized workers, and four hundred thousand organized peasants in Kwangtung. After the May 30 Incident, Communist membership grew much too rapidly for new members to be adequately trained. A resolution of the CCP Central Committee in July 1926 calculated that a minimum of 355 persons were needed as directing personnel, yet in fact there were only 120.

Its organizational difficulties were compounded by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party had, almost from its inception, subscribed to the difficult standards of Marxism-Leninism. The principles of "democratic centralism" characterized its organization from the Second Party Congress in 1922 onward. Members were supposed to submit to the "iron discipline" of the Party and accept the "proletarian standpoint." Ideological orthodoxy and obedience to the Party line were demanded of all. These were difficult standards to achieve in the midst of revolution, when tens of thousands joined the Party.

There is a strange contrast between the self-assured analysis of class forces and the confident assertion of correct strategy that one reads in the resolutions of the Central Committee, and the fears for the safety of their movement that lay behind inner-Party disputes on strategy and tactics. A resolution on relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang of July 1926 discussed the persistent anti-Communist offensive within the other party. It noted that the armed center was in power in Kwangtung and the anti-Red movement of the Right Wing was prevalent throughout the country. The resolution attributed this situation to the "incorrect formula we previously used in directing the Kuomintang." Its correct formula was to expand the Left Wing and cooperate with it closely in order to deal with the Center

and openly counterattack the reactionary Right (Doc. 54). Yet according to adviser Stepanov ("Nilov"), the Left Wing was empty, a belief shared by members of the Kwangtung Regional Committee of the CCP. They denied that a Left existed and clamored for Communist seizure of Kuomintang leadership.

Alarmed by the growing strength of reaction, conscious of their own organizational weakness and the weakness of the Kuomintang Left, yet bound by the Comintern strategy of staying within the Kuomintang to lead it, the Communist Central Committee decided in January 1927 that the peasant movement in Hunan must be curbed. They decided to urge the masses both in the countryside and in the city to support the National Government and tone down their own demands (Docs. 75 and 76). This formula seemed to work for a while. By March 1927 when the Kuomintang CEC ended its plenum in Wuhan, the coalition of Communists and Leftists seemed triumphant. The Left controlled the Kuomintang party apparatus, and a powerful alliance of generals against Chiang Kai-shek seemed in the making.

But dialectical processes were at work. The domestic reaction to social revolutionary excesses and the foreign powers' reaction to the Russian challenge strengthened anti-Communist forces in the Kuomintang and among the articulate Chinese public. Personal factors, too, played an important part in bringing on the conflict. A number of older leaders of the Kuomintang had been driven from position of influence or had withdrawn in protest against the Party's leftist trends. Gathered in Shanghai, they had scores to settle. Hu Han-min, Tai Chi-t'ao, Wu Chih-hui, Ku Ying-fen, and C. C. Wu were examples of them. More importantly, Chiang Kai-shek controlled the powerful First Corps, trained and equipped by Russian advisers, and there were thousands of former Whampoa cadets willing to obey him. Chiang had been affronted by Borodin and shabbily dealt with by the Kuomintang CEC Plenum at Wuhan in March. He was determined, at a minimum, to rid China of Borodin and to wrest political power from the Wuhan regime, and the disaffected revolutionary elders in Shanghai were eager to help him.

Impelled both by dialectical processes and by personal factors of revenge and ambition, the inherent conflict erupted decisively. Communist ranks were decimated in bloody purges with many a leader executed. Mass organizations were left as shattered wrecks. By July 1927 the policy of working within the Kuomintang to use and control it had collapsed. The Soviet advisers were on their way homeward, defeated.

What of those advisers who tried and failed to guide the Chinese revolution to an appointed goal? It seems they could scarcely understand the social and political forces they pretended to harness and direct. The bafflement and exasperation of some advisers with Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih are revealed in Documents 50, 51, 66, and 69, while frustration with Feng Yü-hsiang, upon whom Russia expended much effort and great resources, is shown in Documents D and E in our companion volume by Julie Lien-ying How.

Even though the Russian missionaries left China defeated, they made a powerful impression on the country. Their great asset, aside from the ability of such men as Karakhan, Borodin, and Bliukher, was that they had something practical to offer Chinese patriots searching for ways to save their country. They had a theory of revolution, technical skills in the conduct of revolution and war, and they provided money and arms. These practical contributions are clearly seen in new documents appearing in this edition, such as Document 3, the History of the National Revolutionary Army; Document 9, Bliukher's Grand Plan; and the series 37 to 48 on political work in the Southern government and its army. Borodin taught Dr. Sun and his collaborators how to organize a revolutionary party on Leninist lines. Chinese Communists learned the same principles in Russia or from Voitinsky and Sneevliet. Chinese Communists discovered a great deal about "united front" tactics that was useful in their later struggle for power.

Soviet Russia contributed importantly to the rise of Chiang Kai-shek from obscurity to command of the National Revolutionary Army, which became his stepping stone to his dominant political position in China for two decades, and later in Taiwan. Russian influence persists in the organization system of the Kuomintang, though not in present-day Nationalist ideology, which is shaped by Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People. Marxism came to China initially from Japan, not from Russia. Before and during the period covered in this book, some Chinese intellectuals eagerly studied Marxian classics in Western or Japanese translation. The philosophical debt to Soviet Russia came mostly through students who went there in the 1920s, little from the Soviet advisers in China. Probably Soviet Russia's greatest contribution was to transmit the Leninist system of organization to the Chinese Communist Party. Soviet advisers endowed Chinese communism with the Bolshevik ideal of a totalitarian party dominating state and society. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of China, it has tried to control the national economy, the arts, education, all channels of information, all social organizations, and of course, China's entire political life—done to forward particular ideals for China's development. Russia endowed the Chinese Communist Party with certain absolutes: that Marxism-Leninism is the highest truth; that unquestioning service to the Party is the supreme good; and that otherwise unethical behavior is laudable if it advances the interests of the revolution. As viewed from the outside, the effects of these Russian contributions upon modern China have been profound. One may speculate, but can never know, how different China would be today had there not been the seven-year Soviet Russian missionary effort of the 1920s.

Epilogue

Domestic political developments in the months following the raid on the Soviet Embassy compound, and the initial wave of suppression and countersuppression, are detailed in *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923–1928*. Here we provide merely a brief sketch of the aftermath. On April 18, the more conservative Kuomintang leaders established a Nationalist government in Nanking to rival the government in Wuhan. For its part, the Central Executive Committee in Wuhan expelled Chiang Kai-shek from the Kuomintang. Yet the Wuhan regime was beset with such serious economic problems and with so much rural turmoil that it struggled to survive.

In May, both wings of the National Revolutionary Army mounted campaigns northward, the Wuhan armies under T'ang Sheng-chih and Chang Fa-k'uei fighting their way with heavy losses through Honan to Chengchow, where the Peking-Hankow Railway crosses the Lung-hai; and the Nanking armies under Chiang Kai-shek driving up the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to Hsu-chow, where it also crosses the Lung-hai in northern Kiangsu. Feng Yü-hsiang drove eastward out of Shensi to make juncture, first with the Wuhan contingent, then with the Nanking group. Now in the position of arbiter, he conferred successively with a high-level delegation from Wuhan, then with one from Nanking, and seemingly cast his lot with the latter, which had much more to offer in money and arms than did Wuhan. Meanwhile in Hunan, Wuhan's rear base, contingents of the Hunan army began a bloody suppression of Communists and leaders of the farmers movement.

On June 5, M. N. Roy, who had come to Wuhan as a Comintern representative and political adviser, showed to Wang Ching-wei an angry telegram from Stalin. Stalin demanded replacement of vacillating Kuomintang leaders by peasant and working-class leaders, creation of several new army corps made up of Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants, and a revolutionary tribunal to punish officers who maintained contact with Chiang Kai-shek or set soldiers on the people. This injudicious instruction from the Left Kuomintang's patron precipitated action by the Wuhan leaders to expel Communists from the Kuomintang. This they ordered in the middle of July, thus ending the historic policy of revolutionary collaboration inaugurated by Sun Yat-sen in 1922.

The Communist Party in Revolt and Retreat

Acting in compliance with new Comintern directives, the Chinese Communist Party now began a revolt against both wings of the Kuomintang and their governments. Some Soviet military advisers engaged in the planning of these revolts, and a few actually participated in them. In Nanchang on August 1, a group of top Communists succeeded in inducing half of Chang Fa-k'uei's army as well as Ho Lung's force to revolt and then stage a march back to Kwangtung. There the remnants were suppressed two months later, with most of the leaders fleeing to Hong Kong. Attempts to create uprisings of farmers and troops in Hunan, Hupei, and Kwangtung—the Autumn Harvest Uprisings—also failed disastrously. The most devastating defeat of the insurrectional policy was the short-lived Canton Commune in December 1927, which littered the streets with dead and left part of the city in ruins. An estimated two hundred Communist cadres and more than two thousand Red Guards and Red

Army men lost their lives, as well as five Russians from the consulate, captured and shot.

Nine months of Kuomintang repression, abortive Communist revolts, and further arrests and executions devastated the Communist Party, which was reduced from more than fifty thousand members in May 1927 to under ten thousand the following year. Probably most of these losses were through defections, but thousands had been slain. Submissions to Comintern dictation and the wild swing from collaboration to revolt caused great disillusionment. The Party lost a score of its top leaders, including one of its most prestigious founders, Li Ta-chao, and the two sons of Ch'en Tu-hsiu.[1]

Most of the early Communist leaders slain were intellectuals from the May Fourth generation; many had studied at the University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow, or in France under the Work and Study Program. April 1927 saw three important labor organizers executed. Wang Shou-hua, head of the Shanghai General Labor Union, was tricked into going to the home of gangster leader Tu Yueh-sheng, where he was murdered on the eve of the April 12 assault on the union picket corps. In Canton, two members of the Executive Committee of the National General Labor Union and organizers of the Hong Kong-Canton Strike and Boycott, Li Ch'i-han (Lin Sen) and Liu Erh-sung, were captured on April 15 when General Li Chi-shen suppressed Communist-led organizations in his domain. They were quickly executed. Three Communists who had been political instructors at the Whampoa Military and Political Academy also fell in April—Hsiao Ch'u-nü, a Youth Corps leader; An T'i-ch'eng, economist and teacher at Shanghai University; and Hsiung Hsiung, whom Chiang Kai-shek appointed head of the Whampoa Political Department in January 1927—caught in Li Chi-shen's roundup and executed April 18. Another famous intellectual lost was Hou Shao-ch'iu, captured in Nanking on April 9 and executed three days later. Like several of those already mentioned, Hou had been a delegate to the Kuomintang's Second National Congress. Ch'en Yen-nien, eldest son of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, had been head (i.e., secretary) of the powerful Kwangtung Regional Committee of the CCP, but when the focus of revolution moved into the Yangtze Valley, Ch'en became secretary of the Kiangsu Committee. Kuomintang agents captured and executed him in May or June 1927. Chao Shih-yen (Shih Ying), Central Committee member and successor to Wang Shou-hua as head of the Shanghai General Labor Union, was captured and executed on July 19.

Chiang Hsien-yün and Chang T'ai-lei fell in battle. Organizer of An-yuan miners and graduate of the first class at Whampoa, Chiang had been a principal organizer of the League of Chinese Military Youth and a favorite of Chiang Kai-shek. He commanded troops during the Honan campaign of May 1927, where he died of wounds. Chang T'ai-lei, one of the earliest recruits to study in Russia, interpreter for Voitinsky and Borodin, leader of the Communist Youth Corps, and a teacher at Shanghai University, led the Canton Commune revolt and died fighting on December 12, 1927.

In 1928 two important Communists were captured and executed. Lo I-nung, a founder of the Socialist Youth Corps and worker in the farmers movement in Kwangtung, was secretary of the Kiangsu-Chekiang Regional Committee in 1926 and 1927 and helped to organize the three Shanghai uprisings. He went underground, then helped to organize the Autumn Harvest Uprising and participated in the Canton Commune. Lo escaped to Shanghai again, but he was captured there on April 15, 1928, and executed on April 21. A few days later, on May Day, the outstanding Hunan feminist, Hsiang Ching-yü, was executed in Hankow. Wife of Ts'ai Ho-shen, she had been a student in France and later had studied in Moscow at Sun Yat-sen University. She had returned in April 1927 to Wuhan, where she was an effective propagandist in labor organizations there. A year later she was arrested in Hankow's French Concession and turned over to Chinese authorities, who executed her.

These men and one woman are only a few of the martyrs to their cause. Some other early leaders withdrew from the Party in 1927—Li Ta, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, T'an P'ing-shan, and Yü Shu-te. Some defected to the Kuomintang—Jen Cho-hsüan, Yuan Ta-shih, and perhaps Pao Hui-sen temporarily. There were many more losses in the next few years—Ho Shu-heng, P'eng Pai, and Yang Yin in 1929; Kuo Liang and Yü Hsiu-sung in 1930; Chou I-ch'ün, Ho Meng-hsiung, Hsiang Chung-fa, Li Ch'iu-shih, Lin Yü-nan, Lung Ta-tao, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Yang P'ao-an, and Yün Tai-ying in the disastrous 1931. No Chinese city was safe.

In the spring of 1928, some Chinese Communist leaders journeyed secretly to Russia for the Sixth Congress of their Party, held during June and July in a village outside Moscow. The congress elected Hsiang Chung-fa, a proletarian, secretary general and resolved to drive imperialism out of China, really unify the country, and abolish the landowning system of the landlord class. It called upon the Chinese people to overthrow the Kuomintang, establish soviets, confiscate foreign enterprises in China, and carry out a variety of social reforms. The Party's leaders faced an enormously difficult task of rebuilding their party in a hostile environment and emancipating themselves from Comintern direction.

Yet seven years since the Party's founding had provided its remaining leaders with valuable experience. They had learned a great deal about party organization from the Soviet model, and they had learned in a practical way how to organize political movements directed toward nationalistic goals and how to recruit patriotic youth. They had perfected the art of propaganda through journals directed toward different social strata. They could organize patriotic demonstrations and direct such movements toward the party's other goals, and they had learned how to carry on "united front" work with other organizations. Some of them had come close to the poor, and others had learned how to draw workers into unions and federations controlled by the Party; how to organize and finance strikes; the importance of coercion; and the need to generate public support. Those who had organized vast numbers of farmers in southern China had learned what grievances and hopes would bring the rural poor into action, but also how fragile and weak such rapidly created organizations were in the face of established local power. Starting from the school room, the workshop, or the farm, almost all the Communist leaders had undergone their baptisms of violence. Not a few of the remaining leaders had been combat officers in the National Revolutionary Army. The faint-hearted had fled the dangerous Party, but it still had a vigorous leadership with many talents, wide contacts, and valuable revolutionary experience.

The Triumphant Kuomintang

Early in 1928 the badly divided older leadership of the Kuomintang, after rancorous debate and much negotiation, finally drew together under Chiang Kai-shek when Wang Ching-wei departed again for France. Then in the spring, a nominally united and greatly expanded National Revolutionary Army made its final drive on Peking. Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchun, which had been retrained and partially reequipped by Soviet advisers, participated in this drive as did the Shansi army of Yen Hsi-shan. On June 8 some of Yen's troops entered Peking by prearrangement, about a week after Chang Tso-lin's retreating army had departed. Sun Yat-sen's dream had been accomplished.

A refurbished Nationalist government inaugurated itself in Nanking on October 10, 1928. Its structure carried out Sun Yat-sen's conception of five separate boards or *yuan*—executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control. Each was under a prestigious and conservative revolutionary veteran—T'an Yen-k'ai, Hu Han-min, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Tai Chi-t'ao, and Ts'ai Yuan-pei (soon replaced by Yü Yu-jen).

Above these boards stood a State Council made up of these veterans and twelve others—Feng Yü-hsiang, Sun Fo, Ch'en Kuo-fu, Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, Ho Ying-ch'in, Chang Hsueh-liang, Lin Sen, Yang Shu-chuang, and Chang Chi, with Chiang Kai-shek as its chairman and thus "president" of the new government. The State Council was a titular body including some military leaders it was hoped would actually subordinate themselves to the new regime. The Kuomintang Political Council made these appointments. Hereafter, as before, that council would direct government policy.

Four years of Russian involvement with the Kuomintang had left a Leninist stamp upon the senior party. Now it practiced "democratic centralism," with the inevitable emphasis on centralism and dictation by a very few. The Kuomintang was much better prepared to exercise tutelage than it had been before its reorganization in January 1924, more experienced in governance, but still riven by factionalism. The senior party had a large organized membership spread through most eastern provinces and larger cities, a much improved propaganda apparatus, and it now possessed an indoctrinated military force. The experience of Communist infiltration had created a strong reaction within the Kuomintang leadership. Not only were the more conservative ones in power, but most of these men were intolerant of any rival political force and suspicious of all deviations from the Party's ideology. They now attempted to control all mass movements—those of farmers, workers, students, women, merchants, and any other. They created a secret police apparatus to battle the Communist underground and to suppress suspicious intellectual or literary developments. It took about three years to stamp out the radical fires remaining in the Kuomintang, and for Chiang Kai-shek's machine to dominate the Party. Suppression of suspected subversion and residual radicalism went hand in hand with ambitious plans for financial reform and economic development, unification of the nation's military forces, and recovery of China's lost rights. The new regime had less than nine turbulent years—years marked by almost continuous civil war and continued foreign aggression—before it became engulfed in war with Japan.

The End of the Soviet Aid Mission

When the several centers of Kuomintang power successively turned against the Chinese Communist Party and began slaughtering their recent revolutionary comrades, the Comintern's "united front" and infiltration policies lay in tatters. Those in political command in Soviet Russia naturally called the missionaries home, although they left some secret Comintern agents behind. How many persons departed in the great exodus of July and August 1927 we do not know, but probably well over one hundred, for Marc Kasanin wrote that on Bliukher's staff there were several dozen commanders—many with the troops—and approximately fifty staff members.[2] In Hankow, Borodin had a large staff also, and there was a remnant group of perhaps ten in Canton. The Comintern had a group working with the CCP in Shanghai, and there were a few military advisers with General Feng Yü-hsiang. Several personal accounts stress disillusionment and danger in departure, and feelings of relief as the sojourners reached their native land.

On about June 20, 1927, Borodin advised Vera Vishnyakova-Akimova, then aged twenty-two, that it was time for her to return to Russia. The military mission was winding down, and she and her young husband, Vladimir Mikhaylovich Akimov, whom she had met in Canton, departed Hankow on a British ship, feeling "like prisoners." By then virtually all Chinese ships on the Yangtze had been commandeered. The couple went to the dock separately and had tickets for separate cabins. Vera somewhat disguised herself in a large, stylish hat in place of the boyish military cap she normally wore. To her surprise a young British sailor carried her bag

to the cabin, and she wondered if he had done it for a tip. Her husband was rudely questioned before departure, and en route the couple pretended to be strangers. Near Nanking their ship passed the sunken Russian vessel, *Pamyat Lenina*, from which Fanny Borodin and three Russian diplomatic couriers had been seized by troops of Chang Tsung-ch'ang and taken north to prison. In Nanking a number of "suspicious persons" were taken off ship and handed over to the local authorities, but Vera and Vladimir were spared. In Shanghai they stayed at a *pension* where many other advisers were waiting to depart. They were shadowed by detectives, and several of their comrades were arrested based on information supplied by a Russian turncoat who went by the name of Captain Pick. A friend of the young couple, the aviator Vasilii Sergeev, gave them his tickets on a Soviet vessel sailing soon for Vladivostok; then Sergeev himself was arrested and imprisoned. Once aboard their Russian ship, Vera and her husband felt as though on native soil, and they experienced a "marvelous feeling of peace and security."[3]

Borodin arranged for a group of Comintern representatives, including Voitinsky and several Indians, to leave Hankow on a yacht owned by T. V. Soong, but when it reached Hsia-kuan, Nanking's port, it could go no farther. Marc Kasanin, then in Nanking, arranged with the chief of Chiang Kai-shek's personal staff for a private railway car to take the party on to Shanghai, under the pretext that they were all military advisers. Among them was Captain Eugene Pick, who immediately became an informer for the British police. Once Voitinksy and several Chinese, Korean, and Indian Communists reached Shanghai's International Settlement they lost themselves in that cosmopolitan city.[4]

A. V. Blagodatov was less fortunate. Near the beginning of July 1927, he and a few other advisers and their families left Hankow by foreign steamer. Among them were young Kasanin and his wife, Hilda. They agreed to go to the pier separately and tried to avoid one another on board so as not to arouse suspicion. A fellow passenger was General Chang Fa-k'uei, on his way to Kiukiang to join his army. This was shortly before the Nanchang Uprising in which he lost half his troops. Debarking in Shanghai, the advisers went by separate routes to their *pension*, but some of them were stopped by British police, where Pick identified them. Blagodatov and some of the other Russians were planning to leave on a Chinese ship on July 18, but Pick came aboard with Chinese police, who arrested flyer Vasilii Sergeev, a political worker named Miliuschkevitch, interpreter Tolstoi, and Blagodatov, together with a Japanese Communist and several Chinese Communists. Taken to a police station, the four Russians were handcuffed and put in a cell. They demanded that the Soviet consul be notified, and they threatened a hunger strike. Four days later a Chinese prosecutor arrived, but their efforts to convince him that they were in China on the invitation of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen proved fruitless. The Nationalist foreign minister in Nanking ignored the Soviet consul's protests. Finally they were rescued by the intervention of the chief adviser of the Canton group, which was in Shanghai about to leave. M. G. Efremov and V. N. Panuikov, who had been adviser to General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, went to Nanking where they prevailed on Chiang Kai-shek to order the captives' release. This Chiang did, with a note of regret and the offer of $3,000 compensation, which the Russians refused.

Kasanin and his wife had a less adventurous departure, sailing for Dairen on a Chinese ship. Not risking a side trip to Peking, which Kasanin longed to show his wife, they proceeded by train to Harbin, where he was reunited with his parents. After two months they proceeded to Moscow.[5]

Michael Borodin would not leave until Fanny was freed from prison. Apparently Japan was willing to play the role of intermediary. In the early morning of July 12 a Chinese judge—probably rewardingly bribed—dismissed the charges against her and the other Russian passengers who had been seized on the *Pamyat Lenina*, but not the

crew. The judge then fled and later appeared in Japan. The Russians made a quick getaway from Peking, except for Mme Borodin, who was secreted in the home of a Russian recluse scholar named Pyotr A. Grinevich. Searches of the city failed to discover her. Then came a series of news reports: one by one the Japanese news agency Rengo reported her arriving in Vladivostok on a Japanese vessel and being interviewed; another, the report of an interview on the Trans-Siberian Railway; and finally her statement on arrival in Moscow. After these false clues had been dropped, Fanny was spirited out of Peking toward the end of August disguised as a nun. After a difficult trip across Mongolia she arrived in Moscow early in October, very near the time her husband arrived after his tortuous trip across the Gobi desert.[6] *Pamyat Lenina*'s crew was held for a year.

It was unsafe for Borodin to leave Hankow by steamer and sail from Shanghai, for Chiang Kai-shek had an implacable hatred for him and there was a large price on his head. Hankow is unbearably hot and humid in July; after a brief interlude in the mountain resort of Kuling to recuperate from his broken arm and disabling malaria, Borodin left Hankow by rail on July 27, going northward to Chengchow.[7] Wang Ching-wei and other important Chinese officials of the Wuhan regime saw him off with great courtesy. The train was loaded with trucks and heavy-duty touring cars, and a great store of gasoline for the long overland trip home. A number of Russians accompanied Borodin—his bodyguard Voloshin, Tarkanov, his secretary Kirishev, and "Dr. Orloff" and his wife, a nurse, are mentioned. Also, the two sons of Eugene Chen, American journalist Anna Louise Strong, and a member of the French Communist Party, a wireless operator, who was killed in an accident en route.

In Chengchow General Feng Yü-hsiang, the recipient of millions of dollars worth of Russian arms, received Borodin's party courteously, but then encouraged it to move on quickly. He later alleged that he received a telegram from Wang Ching-wei asking him to kill Borodin. By sending him off, Feng could reply that he had already departed.[8] Borodin gathered the few remaining advisers working with the Kuominchun—"Seifulin" (A. I. Lapin) and "Korf" (Fyodor Bokanenko) are mentioned—some of whom knew the overland route they were to take.[9] The party of twenty set off for Shenchow, then the western end of the Lung-hai Railway. Thence they went by truck and car to Sian; northwest through Kansu; and then north to the last Chinese outpost, Ninghsia city. Here began to arduous trek across the desert to Ulan Bator, capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, where they arrived in mid-September. After a long rest, Borodin flew to Verkhne-Udinsk, where he boarded the express train to Moscow. He arrived there on October 6, 1927, aged forty-three.[10]

General Bliukher remained in Hankow a little longer. After the Nanchang Uprising, in the planning for which he participated on July 26, he was free to leave. A former tsarist general, Shalavin, who had been a faithful member of his military staff, accompanied him to Shanghai. He left China about August 11, after saying farewell to Chiang Kai-shek, who later described it as "one of the most moving partings of my life." He described "Ga-len" as very depressed.[11]

And so the first extensive Soviet aid mission wound to an end.

The Comintern left a few persons behind, such as the lately arrived Besso Lominadze and Heinz Neumann, and there were five luckless Russians arrested in Amoy, one of whom, Kumanin ("Zigon"), had participated in the "Southern Expedition" after the Nanchang Uprising. They were sent to Shanghai where the French police turned them over to Chinese authorities, who tried and imprisoned them for eight months.[12]

The Russian Aftermath

The collapse of Russian policy in China beginning in April 1927 and the disasters

suffered by the Communist Party in China were a bewildering foreign policy defeat. Russia virtually broke relations with the Peking Government after the April 6 raid on the military attaché's quarters. The Russian press had glorified the success of the revolution in China until suddenly Chiang Kai-shek "betrayed" and turned on the proletariat. Then it immediately denounced him. In the next weeks, Communist mass organizations throughout most of Southeast China were crushed. Within three months the Wuhan regime also "betrayed the revolution," and the Soviet aid missions had to withdraw. Following the bloody Canton Commune of December, China's Nationalist Government, for which Russia had spent many millions of rubles, broke off relations and ordered Soviet consulates closed in the areas it controlled. Russia's influence in China had plummeted nearly to zero, and the strategy of "united front" for Communist parties lay in shambles.

Since Stalin had directed Russian policy in China, the disasters provided Trotsky and others of the opposition perfect ammunition for attack. The issue of China policy became entangled in Russia's ongoing intra-Party struggle. Differences over revolutionary tactics became elevated to ideological conflict. Stalin defended himself against Trotsky's charges with the argument that Comintern policy had been entirely correct; blame must fall upon the Chinese Communist leadership for not executing the Comintern's entirely proper directions.

This became the official Comintern explanation as early as July 14, 1927, as expressed in "Resolutions of the ECCI on the Present Situation of the Chinese Revolution." At that moment the Wuhan leaders of the Kuomintang ordered the Communists expelled from their ranks. The ECCI, after berating the Wuhan Kuomintang for sanctioning the disarming of workers and campaigns against the peasants, and for sabotaging the campaign against Nanking, "in spite of advice given by the Comintern," then bore down on the "present leaders of the CP of China" for grave political errors. "The CP of China should have, according to the instructions of the Comintern, developed and led the agrarian revolution, openly criticized and exposed . . . the leaders of the Wuhan government and the CC of the Kuomintang, warned the masses of the possibility of their betrayal by the generals, armed ever greater numbers of the workers, and pushed the Kuomintang and the national government determinedly onto the revolutionary path." After detailing mistakes of the Chinese leaders and calling upon the members of the Communist Party of China to fight against the opportunism of the Central Committee, the Resolution then instructed the CP to withdraw demonstratively from the Wuhan government, but to remain within the Kuomintang.[13]

On August 7 a special meeting of Chinese Communist leaders, guided by the new Comintern representative, Besso Lominadze, and with this resolution in hand, deposed Ch'en Tu-hsiu and confessed to the Party's recent "opportunism." When Stalin's insurrectional policy led to further disasters for the CCP, its leaders again were blamed. Thus the "opportunism" of the Chinese Communist leaders, or "Ch'en Tu-hsiuism," became the standard Comintern explanation for "Stalin's failure in China."[14]

Trotsky, of course, was unwilling to permit Stalin to shift the blame for failure of his policies so easily upon those who executed them. He kept arguing, so long as he was allowed to argue, that Stalin was responsible for his mistakes of guidance. Finally, Stalin forced Trotsky into exile and deposed the major members of the opposition. One by one they were executed or murdered during the "Great Terror" of the 1930s. The China failure thus contributed to Stalin's determination to eliminate all those who opposed him.

After China, Russia turned inward. Stalin and his bureaucrats embarked on rapid industrialization and forced collectivization. The Comintern became but a minor instrument of Russian foreign policy. Not until the Spanish Civil War in 1936 did Soviet Russia again engage in large-scale intervention in revolution abroad, and this

was against the rising menace of Fascism. A year later, Russia began to provide arms and an air force to China in its war against Japan, Soviet Russia's strategic menace on the east.

Soviet Advisers After China

What careers lay ahead for the Soviet missionaries after their return home? Most of the ones we know by name were military men, and they returned to their posts or were reassigned. Some rose to positions of great importance, defending their country in the Great Patriotic War with Germany. Before then, however, Stalin purged thousands of officers as well as most of the country's important revolutionary leaders. Sixty-year-old Mme Vishnyakova-Akimova and M. I. Sladkovsky were the only writers of memoirs on the China mission who had the courage to tell who among their comrades were purged by Stalin. Recent Russian historians of the Soviet effort, whose works we have seen, are also silent except for Mme R. A. Mirovitskaia. However, Russian rehabilitationist literature does attempt to make amends by praise for the more prominent victims. Perhaps Vera Vishnyakova-Akimova's book escaped censorship because it was published in 1965. This was nine years after Nikita S. Khrushchev's secret report on "Crimes of the Stalin Era," delivered to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 24-25, 1956. By that time, he stated, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court had rehabilitated 7,679 persons. But Khrushchev fell from power in October 1964, and the rehabilitation drive slowed considerably. Biographies of purge victims became rarer, and those published scarcely mentioned the Stalin terror.[15] Western scholarship has turned up a great deal of scattered information on the more prominent purge victims and those lost during the war.[16] We find many familiar names therein.

We developed a list of 267 names of Russians and other Europeans whose work in China during the years 1920-27 seemingly was part of the effort to promote the Chinese revolution. The names come from documents seized in the Peking Raid and from memoirs of participants in the action, such as Vera Vishnyakova-Akimova, A. V. Blagodatov, A. I. Cherepanov, Mark Kasanin, N. I. Konchitz, S. N. Naumov, V. M. Primakov, V. Sergeev, M. Y. Shass, and M. I. Sladkovsky. A few names come from other contemporary sources, but we have not accepted names produced by "Captain Pick" unless otherwise confirmed. N. Mitarevsky's names are more reliable because his information comes from the captured documents from the office of the Soviet military attaché. Modern Russian scholars using archives produced some names otherwise unknown to us. Our list includes all the known military advisers and interpreters working in North and South China, members of Borodin's and Bliukher's staffs, wives who held support positions, and some members of the Soviet diplomatic body known to have worked for the revolution, particularly military attachés and their assistants. There were also a few officials of the Comintern, Profintern, and Communist Youth International whose presence in China was more than ceremonial attendance at conferences held under auspices of the Chinese Communist Party. We have avoided using pseudonyms if we knew the real names. Eighty-five persons on our list are identified only by a single name, which makes further identification problematical. We are able to say something of what happened to 117 of our 267 participants, plus a few more single-name cases.

Seven of the participants died in China in the line of duty, and five that we know of died in Soviet Russia before the purges began. Two committed suicide in protest against Stalin's purges. We have discovered that forty-nine from our list were executed or died in prison under Stalin's reign of terror, and eight more may have been in this category. Seven survived long periods of internal exile. Probably there were many others, since Stalin's apparatus sent hundreds of thousands, even millions,

to Siberian labor camps. One person on our list escaped execution by refusing to return to Russia when summoned.

As a group, the military advisers were particularly vulnerable, for many of them could have reached high rank in the ten years after returning to Russia. According to one estimate, 90 percent of Russia's generals and 80 percent of its colonels were eliminated in the purges of 1936-38. A more specific account cited by the Soviet historian Roy Medvedev reports that 3 out of 5 marshals, 3 of 4 first-rank army commanders, all 12 of the second-rank army commanders, 60 of the 67 corps commanders, 136 of the 199 division commanders, and 221 of the 397 brigade commanders were arrested. Presumably most were executed. We find 15 (possibly 18) names of military advisers in China among Stalin's victims in a study by two Soviet scholars, one later living in the United States, who name 899 Russian officers of the highest levels in 1935 but no longer appearing in 1940.[17]

On the other side of the picture, we count four (possibly five) killed fighting the Germans in World War II, and thirteen who fought and survived (and four others possibly). We suspect there were many more who fought and many more who died. We also know of sixteen others from our list who survived that costly war.

Our introductory chapter described four key persons who steered the Russian effort to guide the Chinese revolution: Lev M. Karakhan, Michael M. Borodin, Gregory N. Voitinsky, and Vasilii K. Bliukher. Three of them fell victim to Stalin's paranoia.

Ambassador Karakhan returned to Moscow in August 1926 after his successful three-year tour in Peking and resumed work in the Russian Foreign Office. With Peking under the control of Chang Tso-lin, he was no longer *persona grata* to the Chinese government. Louis Fischer interviewed him in 1929 to gather information which he used in *The Soviets in World Affairs*. Karakhan signed a Soviet-Turkish agreement of friendship and neutrality, took part in several international meetings, and served as ambassador to Turkey from 1934 to 1937. However, he was recalled to Moscow and arrested. According to one account he was executed in prison on December 19, 1937, "for refusing to confess to uncommitted crimes." Another version has him tried, together with several others, before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court as "spies, bourgeois nationalists, and traitors."[18] Lev Karakhan was forty-eight years old when executed; he was rehabilitated some twenty-five years later during the Khrushchev years. In 1983, V. Sokolov published a book in Russian, *At the Key Post in the Diplomatic Front: The Life and Activities of L. M. Karakhan.*

Borodin's later career was all anticlimax. He came home to find the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition using the disaster in China as a weapon against Stalin. Borodin was attacked from both the Right and the Left. For fifteen months he was kept in limbo while blame for the tragedy in China was firmly fixed on Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other bourgeois leaders of the CCP, thus absolving Stalin. In January 1929 at a scholarly meeting to discuss "The Historical Roots of Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism," Borodin was savagely attacked for his guidance of the Chinese revolution. By accepting some blame for himself he escaped further persecution. It was shortly after this that Borodin permitted Louis Fischer to interview him ten times. According to the speculation of Borodin's American biographer, Stalin protected him because punishment would throw the spotlight on Stalin himself.[19] Borodin, a man of great ability, received routine administrative jobs. Then in 1932, Stalin put him in charge of the *Moscow Daily News*, a sensitive position but not nearly so challenging as his grand role in China. Borodin held this position for many years and became well known to the foreign community in Moscow. But he would not talk about China. That was forever behind him.

Early in 1949, probably in February, his attempts to assist Anna Louise Strong, who was then publicizing the achievements of Mao Tse-tung and the Yenan Communists, endangered him. Both Strong and Borodin were arrested. His Jewishness and

Stalin's increasing paranoia combined to bring him down. He was sent off to one of the harshest of Soviet prisons, the Siberian camp near Yakutsk. There on May 29, 1951, he died at the age of sixty-seven. His widow, Fanny, survived him by nearly two decades. His eldest son, Fred, who had helped in the Russian intelligence school in Canton, and after his return became a member of GPU, was killed early in the Great Patriotic War, but his younger son, Norman, survived and had a career as a journalist. He wrote an account of his almost forgotten father. In 1964, when Borodin would have been eighty, the Russian Communist Party rehabilitated him. A. I. Cherepanov wrote a sort of eulogy,[21] a plea for fairness in appraising his work in China. He did not mention how Borodin died.

Vasilii K. Bliukher had a meteoric rise after his return from China; then a sudden fall eleven years later. Appointed commander of a newly created Special Far Eastern Army in August 1929, he quickly suppressed Chang Hsueh-liang's attempt to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia's lifeline to its Maritime Provinces. General Bliukher systematically built up the army till it became a formidable defense against possible Japanese aggression, which became a serious strategic danger after Japan's seizure of Manchuria. In about September 1931, General Klementi K. Voroshilov, commander of the Red Army, personally presented Bliukher with the Order of Lenin, and in 1934 he became a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. General Bliukher and four other commanders were raised to the rank of marshal on November 20, 1935, the others being Budenny, Voroshilov, Egorov, and Tukachevsky. Still in command of the Far Eastern Army, Marshal Bliukher was listed as one of eleven members of the Main Military Soviet, chaired by Voroshilov and directly under the Politburo. Stalin, too, was a member, as was M. L. Mikhlis, the head of the Red Army's Political Administration. Stalin, Voroshilov, and Mikhlis were soon to cut Marshal Bliukher down.

In June 1937, during Stalin's assault on the military command, Bliukher was listed as a member of a special military tribunal which was reported to have tried Marshal Tukachevsky and six others, including Generals Primakov and Putna—both of whom had served in the North China mission with the Kuominchun. It is doubtful that any trial was held, but on June 12, Marshal Voroshilov announced that the seven were executed at dawn that day. While Bliukher was still in Moscow, the NKVD purge spread to his army, but it lasted only till his return. The next year, Stalin and Voroshilov split Bliukher's Red Banner Front into three separate commands. In May 1938, Mikhlis and the head of the Special Section of NKDV in the Red Army arrived in Khabarovsk and began a full-scale purge of Bliukher's commanders—70 percent of divisional and corps staff and over 80 percent of the officers of Bliukher's headquarters staff and departments were "scythed down." The enormously popular Bliukher remained untouched during the five-week battle in mid-1938 between Russian and Japanese troops for the high ground of Chang-ku-feng, near the meeting place of the borders of Manchuria, Korea, and the Soviet maritime provinces. When the fighting was over, Marshal Bliukher was recalled to Moscow on August 11, 1938, and, on Stalin's personal orders, he and his family were all taken into custody on October 22. Lavrenti Beria personally interrogated him and offered a ten-year prison sentence if he confessed to the charges against him, among them that of being a spy for Japan. Bliukher refused and underwent protracted torture. He died on November 9 at the age of forty-nine. Postwar study of the documents revealed that Ezhov personally shot the Soviet marshal.[22]

Robert Conquest suggests that the true reasons for Bliukher's elimination were that he was an independent-minded soldier and, as a candidate member of the Central Committee, a politician in a position of power and influence.[23] In his lifetime a hero to the Russian people, Marshal Bliukher had his good name officially restored at the Party Congress in 1956, and since then laudatory biographies have been published

in the Soviet Union.

G. N. Voitinsky, whose real name was Zarkin, fared better. From 1929 till his death on June 11, 1953, he was a teacher and senior researcher in several institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and also in Moscow University. For a time he was head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Institute of World Economics and Politics, and first vice-president of the USSR Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[24]

Early in our period two men played notable roles in bringing about the Russian missionary effort in China—the Dutchman, Hank Sneevliet ("Maring"), and the Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe. After his tutorship of the infant Chinese Communist movement and an unsuccessful attempt to steer Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Sneevliet returned to Russia in September 1923. Never again did he have the opportunity to work in China, as he longed to do. Frustrated in Russia, he returned to Holland in April 1924 and plunged once more into trade union work. In 1927 he quit the Comintern and the Dutch Communist Party, and two years later he founded a new organization, the Revolutionary Socialist Party. From then until his death, Sneevliet was active in European Left opposition organizations. During the Second World War he led an underground struggle against the German occupation of Holland, but he was captured by German security police and executed on April 12, 1942. Revered in the Netherlands as a resistance fighter, Sneevliet has been accorded several biographies.[25] A large collection of his documents is preserved in Amsterdam, and those from his China missions are to be published.

Adolf Joffe had been ill in 1922 and 1923 when he negotiated with Sun Yat-sen and his representatives in Peking, Shanghai, and Atami. His advice was surely important in the Soviet decision to assist Dr. Sun as a means to further revolution in China. After Joffe's unsuccessful negotiations in Japan for a treaty of mutual recognition, he suffered a nervous breakdown and was sent to Vienna in 1924 for treatment. He was briefly Russia's plenipotentiary representative to the United Kingdom and then to Austria. In 1925 he cast his lot with his close friend Trotsky in the struggle with Stalin. On November 17, 1927, Joffe committed suicide as a means of protest against the expulsion of his friends from the Communist Party.[26] His wife was sent into exile and she, too, committed suicide.

Another notable Russian revolutionary who became involved in the China venture was Andrei S. Bubnov, who headed the commission sent to study the progress and potentialities of China's revolution. His recommendation that a northern military campaign be supported after due preparation speeded the flow of materiel for the National Revolutionary Army. Bubnov was a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and of its first Politburo. He also headed the Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, though he lost the position in 1929 and became head of the Soviet Commissariat for Education. He wrote several books about the Russian civil war, as well as an autobiography—published only after his rehabilitation. Though thought to be a member of Stalin's faction, he was arrested during the 1937-38 purges and was shot on January 12, 1940. Two other members of the Bubnov Commission were also executed.[27]

Soviet military attachés in Peking were the communication links between the groups of advisers and Moscow; they were key persons in gathering military intelligence; and they advised on questions of military aid. There were five in Peking from 1925 to 1927. Four of them, distinguished officers, were executed during the Stalin purges. Of N. M. Voronin, who studied medicine before the First World War and had been a member of Leningrad's Revolutionary Military Council,[28] we know nothing more after his return from China in 1925.

General A. I. Gekker assisted Joffe in his talks with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai in January 1923. In June he selected five graduates of the Workers' and Peasants' Red

Army Academy to go to China, as we know from one of them, A. I. Cherepanov. After his term as attaché in Peking in the summer of 1925, Gekker carried on military and diplomatic work in Turkey and, from 1934 to 1937, headed the Department of Foreign Relations of the Red Army General Staff. The NKVD arrested him in 1937, and he was executed on July 1.[29]

General A. I. Egorov or Yegorov, military attaché from December 1925 to February 1926, was one of five to be conferred the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union in November 1935. In 1937 he became first deputy people's commissar of defense. He received the Order of the Red Banner four times. His highest honor was to be a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Arrested by State security organs, he died in prison on February 22, 1939.[30]

General A. Ya. Lapin ("Seifulin"), who accompanied Borodin on the trek back to Russia in the summer of 1927, became chief of staff of General Bliukher's Special Far Eastern Army and directed operations in 1929 that quickly quashed Chang Hsueh-liang's attempt to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway. From 1930 to 1937 he commanded an army corps in the Maritime Territory and held other high positions until he was arrested on May 11, 1937, in the first NKVD assault on the Far Eastern Red Banner Army. He was shot or died in prison.[31]

The last of the Soviet military attachés in Peking was R. V. Longva, a Polish revolutionary who, after being a member of the Bubnov Commission, held the post from September 1926 to April 1927. The Peking Metropolitan Police raid on his offices brought his activities in China to an abrupt end. On his return to Moscow he became a member of the Red Army staff, then of the General Staff as head of the Department of Communications. Arrested by the NKVD in 1937, he died in prison.[32]

N. V. Kuibyshev, who, under the *nom de guerre* of "Kisan'ka," headed the South China Military Group for nearly five months in 1925-26 and won the hatred of Chiang Kai-shek, held very high positions after his return to Russia: assistant commander of the Moscow Military District in 1929; commander of the Siberian Military District in 1930; head of the Naval Inspectorate, 1931-34. General Kuibyshev then became a member of the Control Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee and head of its Naval Group. His brother, a Politburo member, probably was murdered by Yagoda in 1935. N. V. Kuibyshev had the audacity to criticize the purges as harming the Russian Army's preparedness for war. He was immediately arrested and was executed on August 1, 1938.[33] Like the others, he was later rehabilitated.

General V. K. Primakov ("Henry A. Lin" or "Allen"), author of *Zapiski Volontera; Grazhdanskaia Voina v Kitae* (Notes of a Volunteer: The Civil War in China), used extensively by Julie Lien-ying How in our companion volume, came to North China in April 1925 at the age of forty-six after a long military career and headed the Kalgan group of advisers a few months later. He returned to Moscow in May 1926 and was appointed commander of the First Rifle Corps at Leningrad. From 1927 to 1929 he was Soviet military attaché in Kabul and commanded a cavalry detachment sent to Afghanistan to restore Ammual Khan to his throne. In 1930 he was assistant Soviet military attaché in Japan. Thereafter Primakov was deputy commander of the North Caucus Military District till 1935, and then deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1934 he had the honor to be a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, and in January 1936 the Politburo appointed him to membership in the Military Council of the Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and promoted him to corps commander. His star was on the rise, but in August the NKDV arrested him, and he was sentenced to death with Marshal Tukhachevsky and six other generals. The next day, June 12, 1937, he was shot at dawn.

That firing squad also executed General V. M. Putna ("Jen Te-chiang"), first head of the Kalgan group of advisers to Feng Yü-hsiang. On his return to Russia he

headed the Red Army Military Training Establishment Board, and then served successively as Soviet military attaché in Japan, Finland, and Germany. From 1931 to 1934 he commanded a corps, then a maritime group of forces in the Far East, serving under General Bliukher. From 1934 to 1936 General Putna was military attaché in Great Britain, but he was recalled, arrested, and sentenced to death. Both these revolutionary veterans had thrice been awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and both were subsequently rehabilitated.[34]

Thus, nearly every leading military adviser and attaché, and the top political figures among the Russians in China during the 1920s, fell victim to Stalin's paranoia. Yet some of the military advisers survived and had distinguished battle records during the Second World War. We have used their memoirs and those of some civilian workers.

General A. I. Cherepanov, author of two volumes of memoirs on his work in China, returned there in 1938 as chief Soviet adviser to the Nationalist forces resisting Japan. He helped to organize the defense of Wuhan, though the Chinese could not hold the city against the Japanese army, navy, and air force. With the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany, General Cherepanov commanded an army in the defense of Leningrad. In 1944 he commanded the 23d Army of eight divisions in the Karelian Isthmus in an effort to force Finland out of the war. He then became chief military adviser in Bulgaria, and in 1948 he was appointed deputy chief in the Department of Military Colleges of the Ministry of Defense. He retired as a lieutenant general with many honors and published his memoirs on China in 1964 and 1968. He died in July 1984 at the age of eighty-nine.[35]

We know very little of A. V. Blagodatov ("Rolan"), except that he was a commander in World War II and retired as a lieutenant general. His memoir of experiences in China was published in 1970, and apparently he was still alive in 1980 when the memoir was condensed for *Soviet Volunteers in China, 1925-1945*. E. V. Teslenko ("Tereshenko"), author of the valuable accounts of the Second Eastern Expedition and the Northern Expedition, in which he participated, returned to Russia and "occupied leading posts in the Soviet defense industry." His reminiscences of China were published in 1961, and he died in 1972. N. I. Konchits preserved his diary of battle experiences in China and supplemented it from memory before it was published in 1960. Mme. Vishnyakova-Akimova wrote of him in 1965 as "now retired as a Major General."[36]

Young Vera Vishnyakova-Akimova continued her study of China after her return to Russia, publishing articles and serving as a researcher for the Army General Staff. The officer she married in China, Vladimir M. Akimov ("Silin"), received the Order of the Red Banner for his work in China. He graduated from the Far Eastern Department of the Frunze Military Academy in 1932, and in 1936 he was assigned the task of establishing radio contact with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party after the Long March and almost died carrying out this work. During 1937 and 1938 he was in Lanchow, as chief of the supply system by which the USSR assisted China's defense against Japan. The Central Committee of the CCP honored him for this service with "the highest mark of distinction in the Chinese Red Army." During the Great Patriotic War, General Akimov commanded a division, then a corps, and during the last years he was deputy commander of a military district. He retired as a major general in 1956 but died before he could assist his wife in the writing of her valuable memoir.[37]

Marc Kasanin ("Lotov") wrote another account that we have used. A civilian who grew up in Harbin and specialized in Oriental studies, he served in Bliukher's staff in 1927. After returning to Russia, he continued his studies in the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, then in Leipzig and London. Kasanin's scholarly work concerned the geography of China and the history of Russo-Chinese relations in the

seventeenth century—seemingly safe topics. For reasons unclear to us, he too got entangled in Stalin's purge and was exiled to Siberia, where he wasted eighteen years, 1937-1954. After his rehabilitation he wrote his book *V. Shtable Blückera* (On Bliukher's Staff), published officially in 1966. His British-born wife Hilda later translated his memoirs into English. This was republished in a different translation in *Soviet Volunteers in China* after his death in 1972.

Kasanin was one of many persecuted Sinologists of the group who served as interpreters and translators in China. The eminent bibliographer M. F. Skatchkov became a senior associate of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1932 he published his bibliography of books and articles on China in Russian, dating from 1730 onward. He spent many years in internal exile, but after rehabilitation he produced an enlarged bibliography to cover the years to 1957. He died on November 8, 1964. Ten other China specialists suffered exile or execution after service in China. In a sad passage in her reminiscences, Mme. Vishnyakova-Akimova names those who perished, "men [and a woman] who were loyal to the party and their work, and who laid the foundation of Soviet sinology."[39]

Serge Dalin, as a young representative of the Communist Youth International, came to Canton in 1922 and there, as we related in chapter 1, he held several discussions with Sun Yat-sen shortly before Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops drove Dr. Sun from his presidential palace. Dalin spent another year in China during 1926-27, studying the course of the revolution and writing a journalistic account of it. His name disappeared from lists of officials in 1937 when he was deported, but he survived exile to write his reminiscences in 1965, using notes he had preserved. The account appeared in a Russian collection issued the next year to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth.[40] He died in 1985.

What of the authors of our documents—those whose names we know? We already have noted that Borodin, Bliukher, Kuibyshev, and Lapin, authors of Documents 5, 6 and 9, 22, and 52, were purged. S. M. Naumov ("Kalachev"), compiler of Documents 1 and 72, was among the survivors. He also wrote of his instructional work at Whampoa as he remembered it "more than thirty years ago." He lived till 1966. V. K. Stepanov, who took over command of the Canton military mission after General Kuibyshev's expulsion, and who provided two reports on the aftermath of Chiang Kai-shek's action on March 20, 1926 (Documents 50 and 51), advanced to the rank of major general before he was purged.[41] V. K. Tairov ("Teruni" or "Ter"), the author of Document 69, went on to become Russia's ambassador to Mongolia but was executed in June 1937.[42] The writer of Document 70, M. F. Kumanin ("Zigon"), Ho Lung's adviser, who participated in the Nanchang Uprising and march to Swatow, was commander of the Potsi Naval Base on the Black Sea during the war. In 1962 he wrote a memoir on the defense of the Crimea and the Caucasus.[43] Of the prolific L. Grey (a pseudonym?), we know nothing more. The same is true of document writers A. Khmelev (Doc. 12), Nefedov (Doc. 66), and Kostuchenko (Doc. 71). There were many more of those China sojourners whose careers we could not trace.[44]

The careers of two young officers in China during our period, V. E. Gorev and V. I. Chuikov, illustrate the different paths the returnees might travel. Gorev ("Gordon" and "Nikitin") studied in the Eastern Department of the Red Army Military Academy and was sent to China in 1925 at the age of twenty-six. After working in the Military Attaché's Office and the First Kuominchun, he was transferred to South China. There he helped to create a counterespionage organization (Doc. 20). He was married to Liza Goreva, a veteran of the Russian Civil War, and they had a son. Vera Vishnyakova knew the couple in Canton. During the Northern Expedition he was attached to the Fourth Corps—"the Ironsides." His notes on the early battles we have quoted. Gorev then became adviser to General Chang Fa-k'uei during the drive into Honan in May 1927. After returning to Russia, Gorev became military director

in the University of the Toilers of the East, and in 1930 he wrote a book on the Chinese army. Promoted to brigadier general, he was sent to Spain as Soviet military attaché. During the Spanish Civil War General Gorev was "the real organizer of the defense of Madrid." However, in 1937 his career ended. A victim of Stalin's suspicions, he was recalled to Moscow and shot. Liza Gorev was arrested also and perished.[45]

Vasily I. Chuikov, born in 1900, joined the Red Army in 1918, fought in the Civil War, graduated from the Military Academy in 1925, and then studied in its Eastern Department. Sent to China in 1926 or 1927 (there is ambiguity) to gain experience, he served as a diplomatic courier and may also have held an advisory military post (again ambiguity). From 1929 to 1932 he was a section chief in the office of the Chief of Staff of the Special Far Eastern Army under General Bliukher. After holding several command positions, Chuikov was sent again to China among a group of Soviet officers and airmen assisting Nationalist China's defense against Japan. Appointed Soviet military attaché in Chungking, he stayed in China till early 1942. Recalled to Russia, which was desperately in need of higher officers, he was soon given command of the 62d Army, which defended Stalingrad throughout the siege, losing 75 percent of its men in that long and bitterly fought battle. After the German Army had been turned back from Stalingrad, General Chuikov's rebuilt army was honored with the title of 8th Guards Army. The army battled its way back across southwestern Russia, Poland, and eastern Germany to the gates of Berlin. Then General Chuikov and his men participated in the final enormous assault on the German capital in May 1945. After the war, General Chuikov was commander-in-chief of Russian forces in East Germany, and then supreme commander of Soviet land forces. In 1955 he became a marshal of the Soviet Union. During his long career, Marshal Chuikov received many awards, and he wrote three books on his experiences in battle. He died in 1982.[46]

We end with the story of Mikhail G. Efremov ("Abnold"), who was chief of the Canton group of advisers when Li Chi-shen purged Chinese Communists in April 1927, and who went to Nanking in August to demand that Chiang Kai-shek release Blagodatov and his companions being held in Shanghai. During the war with Germany he first commanded the 21st Army and then the 33d Army on the West Central Front. Wounded in the fighting for Smolensk, he shot himself to avoid falling into German hands, and he died on April 19, 1942. He had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner three times, and the Order of Lenin. Posthumously he was named Hero of the Soviet Union.[47]

Notes

1. Most of the following information comes from Klein and Clark, *Biographical Dictionary of Communist China*, and Wilbur, "Influences of the Past," tables III and V. Disillusionment among members of the Chinese Communist Party at policy direction by the Comintern and mistakes of the national leadership is an important theme in the novellas of Mao Tun (Shen Yen-ping), himself a Communist, written in the two years after the disasters of 1927. See particularly the discussion of "Vacillation" (*Tung-yao*) and "Disillusionment" (*Huan-mieh*) in Dr. Yu-shih Chen, *Realism and Allegory in the Early Fiction of Mao Tun*.

2. *Soviet Volunteers in China*, p. 161.

3. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927*, pp. 326-29, 334.

4. Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, pp. 223-25.

5. Blagodatov, *Zapiski*, pp. 239-44; *Soviet Volunteers in China*, pp. 130-32;

Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, pp. 292-93, 295.

6. Kasinin, *China in the Twenties*, pp. 295-96; Vincent Sheean, *Personal History* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1935), pp. 255-58; Jacobs, *Borodin*, pp. 283, 292. Jacobs states that Mme. Borodin was taken back to Russia via Mongolia.

7. Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin," p. 40, and *Soviet Volunteers in China*, p. 48, give Borodin's departure date as July 16, but there is no doubt that the date in Western calendar was July 27.

8. Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo-ti sheng-huo*, III, 220.

9. Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 288, for names of Russians going with Borodin.

10. Vivid descriptions of the trip are in Strong and Kessar, *Right in Her Soul: The Life of Anna Louise Strong*, pp. 130-36, and Jacobs, *Borodin*, pp. 286, 292-300. Percey Chen, in *China Called Me*, also describes the journey, with himself at center stage. Tarkanov, writing as O. Erdberg, described the route in *Kitaiskie nevelly* (Chinese Novellas), published in 1959.

11. Wilbur, "The Ashes of Defeat," pp. 45-48, has Chang Kuo-t'ao's account of the planning; Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 292; Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China*, p. 52. Teslenko, "From Canton to Wuhan," p. 125, writes that Bliukher "was detained" in Shanghai "for several days and only on August 8 or 10 was allowed to proceed to Vladivostok."

12. M. F. Kumanin was an adviser to General Ho Lung. Zilbert or Joseph Socal (which is the real name is unclear), according to his testimony, had been sent by Bliukher with clothing and money to help Kumanin get back to Russia. I. Zil'bert had been an adviser to T'an Yen-k'ai and Li Chi-shen. The others were Michael Berg of the Soviet mercantile fleet and Mr. and Mrs. Michael Veger (or Verger). Those four apparently arrived in Swatow before the oncoming troops. All five came to the British consulate in Swatow on the morning of October 1, the day after the "Red" troops had fled, asking for visas to enter Hong Kong, as reported by the consul. Unable to get visas immediately, they sailed that night to Amoy where the Kulangsu police apprehended them. Fortunately for them, they were tried by the Suchow civil court on the insistence of C. C. Wu and Wang Ch'ung-hui, rather than by a Chinese military court. PRO: FO 405/255 and /256, Confidential, *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, 13448, no. 60, enclosure, and 13583, no. 315, enclosure. George Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia* (New York: Doubleday & Doran, 1932), pp. 340-41.

13. "Resolution of the ECCI on the Present Situation of the Chinese Revolution" (July 14, 1927), in *International Press Correspondence*, VII, 44 (July 28, 1927), pp. 983-85, as quoted in Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*, pp. 495-500; and in Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*, II, 390-96. The items cited are from 7 and 8 (3).

14. The term used by Conrad Brandt for his seminal work with that title. Benjamin Schwartz analyzed most perceptively Stalin's way of clearing himself, in *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, and there have been many other studies. In his biography of Bukharin, Stephen F. Cohen makes it clear that Bukharin had been a principal architect of the Comintern's policy for the Chinese National Revolution, insisting till the end on the "united front" policy. He says: "The Chinese debacle was among Bukharin's worst political experiences as a leader. Charged (together with Stalin) by the opposition with having aborted the real Chinese revolution, he found himself improvising tactics that were immediately outdated by events, blaming the Chinese Communists for having 'sabotaged' Comintern instructions, and generally engaging in the ugly subterfuges inherent in the defense of policies that, whatever their original wisdom, had come to ruin." Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography*, p. 261.

15. Borys Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documents from the*

Soviet Press, pp. 12–13.

16. Our princpal sources on this subject are: Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties*; Borys Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror*; Vitaly Rapoport and Yuri Alexeev, *High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918–1938*; John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918–1941*; Boris Souverine, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism*; Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II*; *Who Was Who in the USSR*; *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*; F. Beck and W. Godin, *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession*; Michael Garder, *A History of the Soviet Army*; Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovich, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern*; Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941–1945*; G. K. Zukov, *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*; and various lists of officials and important persons in the USSR.

17. Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 420. Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 213, who based this calculation on that of A. I. Todorskii, head of the educational institutions administration of the People's Commissariat for Defense at that time. Rappaport and Alexeev, *High Treason*, table 20.2 on p. 276, and pp. 365–73.

18. Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 541, for the first version; Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 272, for the other. On p. 425 Conquest writes that he was shot without public trial. The prestigious Soviet historian, M. S. Kapitsa, wrote a tribute to Karakhan in the collection *Vidnye Sovetskie Kommunisty* (Outstanding Soviet Communists) (Moscow, 1970). However, Kapitsa did not mention Karakhan's execution.

19. Jacobs, *Borodin*, p. 305. He subtitles the book: "Stalin's Man in China." These two paragraphs rely on Jacobs's account.

20. On Miss Strong's relations with Borodin and her arrest, see Strong and Keyssar, *Right in Her Soul*, pp. 243–49.

21. Cherepanov, *As Military Adviser*, pp. 298–301. Also Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin."

22. Rapoport and Alexeev, *High Treason*, p. 247.

23. Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 463. Sources for most of the information on Bliukher's later career come from John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, and from Borys Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror of the Thirties*, which quotes rehabilitational articles. Erickson, p. 499, writes: Bliukher was "the victim of a persistent and deadly intrigue from which neither Voroshilov nor Mekhlis emerge with any honor. At the death of Blyukher there were no trumped up charges, no orders of the day, no talk of tribunals—only a complete and utter silence which remained unbroken for some twenty years. It was the epitome of personal vengeance."

Bliukher's second wife and his brother were arrested with him; the brother probably perished. His first wife, Galina Pavlova, was arrested in Leningrad, and his children by the first marriage, Zoya and Vsevold, and Vaira and Vasilii from the second, were sent to orphanages, according to *Who Was Who in the USSR*. Conquest, however, has his sixteen-year-old son, Vsevold, sent to a concentration camp, but released in 1941, called up, and, concealing his name, fighting well against Germany. *The Great Terror*, p. 462, note.

24. *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, p. 550; Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 464. Miliband, *Bibliograficheskii Slovat' Sovetskikh Vostokovedov*, p. 117.

25. Tony Saich and Fritjof Tichelman, "Hank Sneevliet: A Dutch Revolutionary on the World Stage."

26. Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 460; *Who Was Who*, p. 235. Boris Souvarine, *Stalin*, p. 465, gives the date October 16 for the suicide. Joffe left a note, quoted by Souvarine: "This infamy . . . means inevitably the beginning of a Thermador period" in Russia.

27. Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, p. 836, who mistakes Bubnov for "Kisan'ka"; and *Who Was Who*, pp. 92-93. Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror*, pp. 199-205, gives a biography of Bubnov and a fine eulogy drawn from *Sovetskaia Istoricheskii Entsiklopediia* and *Voprovy Istorii KPSSR*, no. 4, 1963. Other members of the Bubnov Commission in China were N. A. Kubyak, arrested in 1937, who died in prison on August 13, 1942; R. V. Longva, who died in prison after his arrest in 1937; and I. I. Lepse, who died more naturally in October 1929 and was buried with honors in Moscow's Red Square. On R. V. Longva, see below.

28. Blagodatov, in *Soviet Volunteers in China*, pp. 89-90.

29. Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp. 214, 226; *Who Was Who*, p. 185.

30. This is the date given in *Who Was Who*. Both Conquest and Erickson give 1941 as the announced date of Marshal Egorov's death. Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror*, pp. 121-22, quotes from *Sovetskaia Istoricheskii Entsiklopediia*, no. 5, p. 422: "Slandered and subjected to repression during the cult of Stalin's personality, he was posthumously rehabilitated."

31. Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 215; *Who Was Who*, p. 337; Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 211.

32. *Who Was Who*, p. 354.

33. Ibid., p. 331; Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp. 229, 234, 414.

34. Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, p. 482; Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror*, pp. 75-77; *Who Was Who*, pp. 466-67.

35. Seaton, *The Russo-German War, 1941-1945*, p. 461; and *Voenny Entsiklopedicheskii*, p. 806.

36. *Soviet Volunteers in China, 1925-1945*, p. 132, note, for a brief biography of Blagodatov. Ibid., p. 86, for Teslenko. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 185, note, for Konchits.

37. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. viii and 93.

38. *Who Was Who*, p. 516. This does not mention his exile, which is told by Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, p. 31.

39. Idem. She names E. M. Abramson ("Mazuren"), Fydor Bokanenko ("Korf"), V. I. Melnikov, V. I. Noveselov, Boris Perlin, V. A. Vasilev, Tamara Vladimirova (wife of Ye. S. Yolk), V. Voyloshnikov, N. M. Yakovlev, and Yolk. Zoya S. Dubasova spent many years in exile. Ines Rubin, *Approach to Factual Material in Recent Soviet Biographical and Bibliographical Publications*, lists and discusses in the appendix forty-six Orientalists purged or exiled by Stalin, though most did not serve in China during our period.

40. Dalin, "The Great Turn: Sun Yat-sen in 1922."

41. Rapoport and Alexeev, *High Treason*, p. 368, no. 220.

42. Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror*, pp. 175-76.

43. Bialer, *Stalin and His Generals*, p. 643.

44. Herewith a list of other victims of Stalin's purges, who had served in China, not already mentioned: L. M. Aronstam, Oscar Bazhinavu, Mira Chubareva, E. A. Dreitzer, R. M. Khitarov, B. I. Kuzmichev, Ludwig Mad'iar, Pavel Mif, Heinz Neumann, F. I. Ol'shevskii, L. I. Penn, M. O. Razumov, Remizyuk, M. I. Rozenberg, M. V. Sangursky, G. B. Skalov, P. I. Smirnov (or Smirnov-Svetlovsky, V. I. Soloviev, John Tal'berg, O. S. Tarkhanov, D. Uger, and P. Zuik.

Seven others may have been executed or perished in prison or exile: Grigoriev, Galina Kolchugina (Bliukher's wife), P. Lunev, Nikulin, N. Y. Pelkevich, Trifonov, I. Zil'bert.


45. Information from Blagodatov, Cherepanov, and Vishnyakova-Akimova; quotation from Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 248.

46. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* 29, 195; *Soviet Military Dictionary* (in Russian); and *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1984, no. 2, p. 166.


47. Blagadatov, *Zapiski*, p. 243, has a long note on Efremov's career. See also *Who Was Who*, p. 608, under Yefremov. Others from our list not yet mentioned who fought in the war were A. A. Argentov, Colonel General T. A. Beschatnov (d. 1947), M. M. Gromov, N. T. Rogov (killed), Major General I. Vorob'ev, and Major General Y. A. Yakovlev (d. 1951). There certainly were many others from among our single-name persons, and some of whom we are uncertain, such as Katiuchin-Kotov, A. M. Kratsov, and F. G. Matseilik.



Chinese documents seized in the raid on the Soviet Embassy compound, April 6, 1927. Public Record Office, London.



Ambassador Lev Karakhan in Peking, 1925.
B. L. Putnam Weale [Lennox Simpson], *Why China Sees Red* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1925).



Sun Yat-sen and his adviser, Michael Borodin, November 3, 1924, at the Whampoa Military Academy.
Kuomintang Archives, Taipei, Republic of China.



Field conference during the Northern Expedition. From left: Vladimir Kristoforovich Tairov ("Teruni"), writer of Document 69; Teng Yen-ta, head of the National Revolutionary Army's Political Department; Kuo Mo-jo, Deputy Head of the Department.
Huang-p'u Chün Hsiao Chien Hsiao Liu-shih Chou Nien Chi-nien Ts'e (Beijing, 1984).



Stirring up the masses during the Northern Expedition.
Courtesy of the late General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, Deputy Chief of Staff during the Northern Expedition.




Russian and Chinese officers at Kiukiang, November 12, 1926, commemorating Sun Yat-sen's birthday. From left: V. K. Tairov, unidentified, General Vasilii Konstantinovich Bliukher, General Chiang Kai-shek, General Li Tsung-jen, General Teng Yen-ta.
Kuomintang Archives, Taipei, Republic of China.



Members of the Third Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee meeting in Hankow, March 10, 1927.

Front row	*Middle row*	*Back row*
Ting Wei-fen	Chiang Hao (CSC*) (CCP)	Chou Ch'i-kang*
Ku Meng-yü	Tung Pi-wu (CCP)	Wang Lo-p'ing*
Hsü Ch'ien	Ting Ch'ao-wu*	Wang Fa-ch'in
T'an Yen-k'ai	Teng Mou-hsiu (CSC*)	Hsia Hsi* (CCP)
Sun Fo	Ch'en Ch'i-yüan*	Chan Ta-pei*
Sung Ch'ing-ling	Yü Shu-te (CCP)	Ch'en Kung-po
Sung Tse-wen	P'eng Tse-min	Yün Tai-ying (CCP)
Ch'en Yu-jen	Mao Tse-tung* (CCP)	Teng Yen-ta*
Ching Heng-i	Lin Tsu-han (CCP)	Hsü Su-hun (CCP)
Wu Yü-chang (CCP)	Chu Chi-ch'ing*	Hsieh Chin*

*Alternate CSC = Central Supervisory Committee
CCP = Chinese Communist Party
Courtesy of the late Professor M. Searle Bates.



Li Ta-chao, cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party, seized in the Peking raid, before his execution on April 28, 1927.
Public Record Office, London.

Introduction

Our documents come from a variety of sources, but we believe all were among the documents seized by the Peking Metropolitan Police in the compound of the Soviet Military Attaché's Offices in Peking on April 6, 1927.

Those translated from Chinese all came from the official publication *Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien* (see bibliography). Documents in this collection were either translated from Russian into Chinese or, in the case of most of the Chinese Communist Party documents, found in Chinese. We have used the four-volume edition bound in Western style with Western-style pagination numbered under topical categories rather than continuously. We identify documents from this source as *Su-lien yin-mou* (*SLYM*), giving category and page numbers within. A nearly identical set of ten volumes in Chinese style with Chinese-style pagination is supplemented by an eleventh volume containing translations in English, entitled *Soviet Plot in China*. To convert page numbers from the Western-style four-volume set to the numbering in the ten-volume set, simply divide by two.

The Public Record Office in London has many of the documents we have used. The British military attaché in Peking, Colonel S. R. V. Steward, sent them through the British minister, Sir Miles Lampson, to the British Foreign Office. Some were issued by the Foreign Office in *China Confidential* to be read by members of the cabinet and other key officials, while others were read in the Far East Section of the Foreign Office and filed. We identify all these documents now in the Public Record Office as PRO, with their numbers, and Foreign Office numbers when we know them. The transcripts of all these crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.

The National Archives in Washington hold some of the documents in Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Division File. These were sent by the American military attaché in Peking, Major John Magruder, and the assistant military attaché, Captain John P. Ratay. We cite these as NA and give the original G-2 file number when we know it.

We have used a few documents sent by the Japanese legation in Peking to Tokyo and found in either *Mitsu dai nikki* or *Peking Ro-Taishikan oshu himitsu bunsho* (see bibliography). The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, has some of our documents. We used two of them in the papers of Jay Calvin Huston, an American Foreign Service officer who developed a keen interest in communism in China and in the Soviet involvement in the Nationalist Revolution.

We have made only minor stylistic changes in the documents, such as eliminating unnecessary commas, capitals, or articles. Anything in brackets is an addition by us. All parentheses were in the texts we used, though some parenthetical statements seem to have been inserted by translators. Footnotes are ours, and they appear at the end of the particular document.

Bracketed numbers at the left margin refer to page numbers in the texts we used, not to page numbers in the original Russian or Chinese documents, which we have not seen.

Part I: Three Historical Accounts

We have grouped together three documents, originally in Russian, that deal historically with developments of great interest to the Soviet missionaries—the Chinese Communist movement, the Socialist Youth Corps (in 1925 renamed the Chinese Communist Youth Corps), and the National Revolutionary Army. The first two represent efforts by Russians in Canton to understand how the Chinese Communist movement started and grew. The third is an insider's view, describing the accomplishments of the Soviet military advisory group in reorganizing and building up the military forces supporting the Nationalist Party in Kwangtung. In time span, they cover the years from 1920 to 1926.

Document 1

A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party

We now know that our first document, "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," was composed by Samuil Naumovich Naumov, who used the pseudonym S. Kalachev while in China. He was a political adviser to the Military-Political School, that is, the "Whampoa Military Academy." The "Brief History" was published in January 1927 in a little journal, *Kanton*, a sort of house organ of the Soviet advisory group in Canton. According to Dr. Dieter Heinzig, Naumov originally delivered a lecture on the history of the Chinese Communist Party to the "Circle for the Study of China" in November 1926. Naumov's information may have been based on conversations with Li Ta-chao, Chang T'ai-lei, and Ch'en Yen-nien.[1] The writer says his account is based entirely on Chinese data, and that he is ignorant of the Chinese language (p. 1).

Our translation is based on the Chinese translation of the original Russian document, prepared by the Peking Commission managing the documents seized in the Peking raid. We have cross-checked this with an independent English translation of the original, now in the Archives of the U.S. State Department.[2] We have corrected numerous errors in Chinese proper names and terms found in the two independent translations, and we have made a few stylistic changes in this edition. Topic captions were supplied by us. Page numbers in *SLYM* are given in the left margin in dark type. Our efforts to get a copy of *Kanton* have been unavailing.

Whoever provided the data, the final version of the "Brief History" is an interesting structure of blocks of narratives laced together with interpretive comments. It thus has a double nature: it offers a generally accurate account of the Party's history and revealing observations by the author or his informants.

The "Brief History" is valuable for its insider's account of the development of the Communist movement in China, and particularly for its inside information on the Party's history from around 1920 until the autumn of 1926. One finds statements such as: "At the end of the World War we paid much attention to the great increase of all types of Chinese workers" (p. 4); "Although our work was developing, we felt many inadequacies in the work of direction. . . . The scope of our activities was one such problem . . . we decided to proceed with the most urgent task of the day, the organization of labor" (p. 14); "we had to group our forces together and organize them" (p. 15); "the most conservative among them [the laboring masses] even suspected the purity of our motives" (p. 19).

Even when such personal touches do not appear, we could deduce that the information on the CCP's struggles to organize labor, to work within the Kuomintang, or to direct the May Thirtieth Movement and the Hong Kong-Canton Strike must have emanated from Chinese participants. Some passages have a documentary basis, such as the account of the Party platform of the Second CCP Congress (pp. 23-24) and the resolutions of the Third CCP Congress (pp. 32-37).

Other passages apparently were inserted by Naumov, such as the introduction and the optimistic statement that "in a few more years China will become the second Soviet Union" (p. 2). Perhaps he also remarked on the superiority of the CCP "to all other parties in absorbing the ideas of internationalism"; on the aid that has come

"from the Russian proletariat and its vanguard the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"; and on the "well-known fact, already noted at the last plenary session of the Comintern, that the greatest attention and aid must be rendered to the Communist parties of Britain and China in order to further the World Revolution" (pp. 2-3). A sure instance of Naumov's hand is the parenthetical statement (p. 44) that the incidents of March 20 and May 15, 1926, "are discussed in separate reports and will not be related here." The tone of the history is one of praising the CCP's activities, though at certain points there is criticism. It is not always clear whether this was self-criticism by the Chinese rapporteurs or criticism leveled by Naumov.

The "Brief History" is valuable also because of the date on which it was written. It is one of the earliest histories of the CCP extant.[3] Composed toward the end of 1926, it predates the official interpretation of the CCP's early history and the Revolution of 1925-27. In contrast to later orthodox Russian historians who denounce the Chinese Communist leadership, particularly Ch'en Tu-hsiu, for the error of opportunism during the early and middle 1920s, Naumov (on the basis of materials supplied to him) completely supported the Party's leaders. He tended particularly to glorify the Party's general secretary, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who was soon to be charged with much of the blame for the Party's debacle during the latter half of 1927. The writer also emphasized the work of the Communist Party's Central Committee in Shanghai to the virtual neglect of the Party's Kwangtung Regional Committee, a powerful and effective group of Communists. He regarded as dangerous the tendency of certain Communists to advocate breaking relations with the Kuomintang. Such currents of thought, he said, must be counteracted at once by the Central Committee (p. 45). It was a cardinal point of Comintern strategy that members of the CCP should join and work within the KMT, but this strategy had recently been challenged by members of the Kwangtung Regional Committee. At an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee held in Shanghai in July 1926 the issue was debated. The Resolutions on Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (our Document 54) adopted by the plenum completely rejected the Kwangtung Regional Committee's proposal. Thus the "Brief History" upheld the Central Committee against the Regional Committee. In fact, the writer of the "Brief History" had little to say about the accomplishments of the Communists in Kwangtung except to commend their leadership of the Hong Kong-Canton Strike (p. 41) and to remark briefly on their success in the villages of Kwangtung.

The writer presented the growth of the Communist movement in China as a purely indigenous development, at one point denying that "Russian rubles or Russian agitators" account for its "unceasing development" (p. 46). While at one point linking the Chinese revolution to world revolution and the CCP to the Comintern (pp. 2-3), the "Brief History" gives no information on relations between the Communist International and the CCP, in terms of either policy directives from Moscow or on-the-spot activities of Soviet advisers and Comintern representatives. Considering the audience for whom the "Brief History" was put together, this is understandable.

This was also Document 1 in our previous edition.

Notes

1. Letter from Dr. Heinzig to the authors, November 30, 1975; and his *Sowjetische Militarberater bei der Kuomintang 1923-1927*, p. 142 n. 569. Identification of source in E. F. Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress of the Communist Party of China," p. 26, Kovalev's note 3. Madam Vishnyakova-Akimova describes *Kanton in Two Years*, p. 222. Yu M. Garushiants probably referred to the "Brief History" when he mentioned among his sources material by Kalachev based on conversations with the three Chinese Communist leaders cited. (It is not clear whether Garushiants based

this on a statement by Naumov or on conjecture. The three men were early martyrs to their cause.) Garushiants, "The Struggle of Chinese Marxists for the Establishment of the Communist Party of China," p. 81. Naumov's position is mentioned in our Document 23, under the pseudonym Kalatchoff.

2. Chinese translation in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 1-47; English translation in *A History of Communism in China*, pp. 1-54, reprinted from the *Peking and Tientsin Times*. It was also published in *The China Illustrated Review*, January 21 and 28, 1928. Since our 1956 publication of Document 1 it has been republished in the Soviet Union and China (Chinese versions based on the *SLYM* text, which is defective). See Kovalev, "New Materials on the First Congress of the Communist Party of China," p. 26 n. 3.

3. Nearly three years earlier, in January 1924, Ch'en Kung-po, an early member of the CCP, completed his M.A. thesis at Columbia University, entitled "The Communist Movement in China." By then, Mr. Ch'en had left the Communist Party, but he had available five documents from the First and Second Congresses of the CCP and the Manifesto of the Third Congress. The essay lay unnoticed in Columbia's Special Collections Library for more than thirty years until it was published by the East Asian Institute of Columbia University in 1960 with an introduction by C. Martin Wilbur. In 1966 it was republished in more permanent form.

TEXT

[Introduction]

[1] It is not an easy task to present the entire history of the Chinese Communist Party in the context of general Chinese history and the history of the Chinese Revolution. In this concise narrative I hope to point out a direction of study to those who are interested in the problem. This brief history, however, is based entirely on Chinese data and the writer has encountered many difficulties due to his ignorance of the Chinese language. Suggestions from readers for correction of unsatisfactory points will therefore be appreciated.

The Chinese national revolutionary movement has advanced considerably in the last two or three years. It has absorbed a great portion of the masses and it is characterized by solid organization and the following explicit objectives:

1. National independence. To attain this objective, it is first necessary to eliminate imperialism.

2. National unification. To attain this objective, it is necessary to fight the internal enemy, militarism.

Three years ago, not only the majority of Chinese society in general but the higher levels of society were unable to understand the significance of these two objectives. Now, however, they have become crucial problems of the Chinese people.

This situation was brought about by the determination of a small group, the Chinese Communist Party. We call it a small group because, in the four years between 1920 and 1923, CCP membership was not quite one thousand. Adding the membership [2] of the Youth Corps, the total membership barely exceeded three thousand. In the two years of 1925 and 1926, however, membership increased tenfold to approximately thirty thousand. Of course, the CCP's position is not determined by the quantity but by the quality of its members, by their moral influence and weight. An agricultural country, China is culturally very backward. These thirty thousand organized, disciplined, and conscious members of one tight organization are capable of playing a most decisive role. Though representing an insignificant portion of the population, they have a well-defined program of immediate struggle which promises good pros-

pects for the future.

Revolutionary work has been temporarily suspended in Europe, all the more so in the United States. It is a fact that capitalism has managed to delay the day of its collapse, even though it has not achieved complete stabilization. History has taught us that social revolution can be successfully carried out even in agricultural countries, as in Soviet Russia, and we believe that present conditions in China are similar to those in Russia in 1905. In a few more years, China will become the second Soviet Union and the peasants and workers will exercise power throughout the country. To reach this goal, the peasants and workers should devote all their efforts to work and struggle.

The CCP will undoubtedly assume direction of this struggle of the masses because it is superior to all other parties in absorbing the ideas of internationalism and in its capacity to realize them. The slavery to which China has been subjugated by the bourgeoisie of European capitalist countries and the United States has compelled the world proletariat and the Communist parties of several countries to study the Chinese problem and to assist the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese national liberation movement.

Aid must first come, and it has already come, from the Russian proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The majority of the Russian masses, the peasants and workers, should be well informed about the struggle of the Chinese masses and should know who are the leaders of this struggle. In other words, they should be informed about the Chinese Communist Party.

It is a well-known fact, already noted at the last [sixth] plenary session of the Comintern [March 1926], that the greatest attention and aid must be rendered the Communist parties of Britain and China in order to further the World Revolution. We [3] will try to prove, in terms of history and concrete facts, that their achievements are indeed great. If the CCP follows this course of advance, we can truly say that the Chinese proletariat has found a loyal guide and the CI an excellent member in the CCP.

Ten years ago in China it was impossible to find anything that could have served as the foundation of a Communist Party. Even an embryonic organization was lacking, since there was no organized group of comrades for the study of Marxism who could at some future time serve as the nucleus of a new mass organization. China did not even have an organized social democratic party, from which men most devoted to the revolutionary cause could be detached (as was the case in several European countries and the United States).

Of course there were revolutionaries in China, but they were ideologically far from Marxist. Most of them were either followers of Dr. Sun or anarchists. There were also socialists, however.

A few prominent revolutionaries, most of them old but some young, were interested in Marxism and devoted themselves to the study of Marxist doctrines. While they individually professed interest in ideology, however, none of them (individually or organized in groups) possessed a concrete program of action or slogans to attract and organize the masses.

[The Effects of World War I and the Versailles Conference, 1919, in China]

China's participation in the European War produced far-reaching consequences, as follows:

1. The imperialist countries, particularly European countries, forced their bourgeoisie to leave China alone and concentrate instead on domestic affairs. Hence, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was able to develop. At the same time, there was continuous development of the position in China of such countries as the United

States and Japan, which formerly were of secondary importance.

2. Due to the above, there was great expansion of Chinese national capital and industry as well as Japanese and American capital in China.

3. What we regard as important is the extensive development of Chinese national [4] industry, the final result of the simultaneous expansion of Chinese national capital and Japanese and American capital. In view of the failure of Britain, France, and Germany adequately to supply the Chinese market with necessary commodities, these are now produced for consumption in China by Chinese factories.

4. Following the development of Chinese industry, not specifically industry founded with Chinese capital but industry in China generally, the Chinese proletariat developed to a certain extent.

At the end of the World War we paid much attention to the great increase of all types of Chinese workers who were already exposed to the "training" offered by British and Japanese factory foremen. Chinese men and women laborers thus directly encountered their enemy, the enemy which has enslaved China for many decades.

At the Versailles Peace Conference following the imperialist war, the victorious nations robbed the defeated. China, one of the victors, appealed for justice on the basis of her rights as a victorious nation. Her delegates demanded the return of Shantung, Tsingtao, Weihaiwei, and other territories formerly occupied by Germany. The result of the imperialist war, however, was the transfer of these territories to the hands of the allies, Britain and Japan.

The imperialist nations at the peace conference had very little sympathy or concern for enslaved China; their major concern was the protection of their own respective interests. It was a great humiliation for China! Although this was not China's first taste of humiliation its impact was singularly profound, and it will never be forgotten by the progressive masses of the Chinese people, especially the urban masses. The development of the working class and the moral and spiritual humiliation of Versailles were special phenomena of China in 1919.

[5] These two forces were of unusual significance and they were properly utilized by the true revolutionaries who joined the Communist movement as individuals for the purpose of organizing an embryo for the future Communist Party.

[Changes in the Labor Movement]

Many Chinese revolutionaries had previously studied anarchism, socialism, and communism. Their activities, however, were confined to study and they did not attend to propaganda work. Although the pre-1911 revolutionary movement continued to exist, the number participating from the masses was small and the movement was largely confined to the lowest [*lumpen*] proletariat (with the exception of the intelligentsia). The factory workers stood on the sidelines and watched without participating.

In the two years of 1912 and 1913, there were signs of the beginnings of a labor movement. The organizations, however, were not composed of pure labor elements but included members of the petty bourgeoisie, artisans, and politicians. Politicians are basically managers of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the propertied class in general. The urban and rural bourgeoisie took a keen interest in the movement for the sole purpose of using such organizations to get votes for the Parliament. They falsely proclaimed to the masses of the unions that since China is a republic, each citizen has the right to elect and to be elected to office. First of all, however, it was necessary to organize and elect good members to Parliament before such blessings could materialize.

Each politician organized a trade union and lent it his assistance with the idea of absorbing people who thereafter had to vote for their master. Members of trade unions (among them craftsmen, small shopkeepers, and the lowest elements of the

proletariat) were given the assurance that they would have no more employment worries once their masters were elected to Parliament. Such was the character of the labor unions when first organized.

[6] Due to the imperialist war and its consequences for China, a change was brought about in the labor movement. The old type of labor movement gradually disappeared and there appeared genuine labor organizations among workers (the industrial proletariat).

The railway workers are the most experienced among the industrial proletariat because the existence of railways and foreign capitalist interest in Chinese railways date back to the prewar period. The railways were essential to the foreign capitalists in absorbing the resources of the Chinese people (China's raw materials) and importing into China manufactured goods at exorbitant prices.

When Wu P'ei-fu had ambitions of becoming a national hero and unifying the country by force, he took an interest in, and wanted to make use of, the railway workers. He at first sanctioned and supported to a certain extent the organization of a labor union by workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway, hoping thereby to win them as allies. He was aware of the inevitability of economic conflict between workers and employers and categorically forbade political activity among the workers. He thought, however, that encouragement of union organization before the workers started an active struggle for it would be to his own benefit. Thus he readily gave his approval when the workers requested permission to organize a union.

A new situation was created following the war, in which Chinese labor found itself in a disadvantageous economic position with rising living costs and low wages. Hence, the first strike of the Peking-Hankow Railway workers occurred in 1923. The strike, which was at first purely economic, later became political. Details will be presented as follows.

[The Peking-Hankow Railway Workers' Strike, February 1923]

In February 1923, Peking-Hankow Railway workers presented various economic demands to the railway administration at the same time that the first congress of representatives of the Peking-Hankow Railway Union was to take place. When the administration rejected their demands, clashes broke out between workers and the railway authorities. Wu P'ei-fu, convinced that capitalist interests must be protected, forbade the convocation of the congress he had previously approved. His action was clearly a direct provocation by him and the capitalists supporting him. They were well aware that the workers would regard such action as provocative and that the strike would thus assume a political nature, at which time drastic action could be taken in accordance with martial law. Subsequent developments justified their expectations.

[7] The prohibition of the holding of the congress and rejection of the workers' economic demands by the capitalists aroused such tension that the workers actually made several demands of a political nature. Consequently, Wu P'ei-fu not only suppressed the strike but closed all labor organizations along the railway, arresting all leaders. The important ones were shot; many are still imprisoned.

This was a hard blow to those working for the labor movement, especially because the Peking-Hankow Railway workers had the most powerful and largest labor union. The strike was not well organized and plans were not fully prepared in advance so that the workers were disbanded almost without resistance.

It may seem wasteful to relate this event in such detail. A careful explanation of this most important historical motivating force is essential, however, and this subject will again be discussed in the following chapter.

The incident was not entirely without benefit, for it drew greater attention to the

labor movement and convinced the laboring masses that they themselves were responsible for the weakness of their organization.

When unions were first organized [by Communists], there was opposition even among the workers. It was due largely to labor's lack of thorough understanding of their own objectives and to the fact that the older unions were organized principally to get votes for Parliament. The workers were therefore extremely suspicious of any [8] plans imported from other quarters and considered Communists as outsiders because they had nothing at all to do with the manufacturing industry.

The above difficulties did not prevent the Chinese Communist Party from advancing, however. It continued to agitate among the laboring masses, explaining to them the necessity of organizing labor unions. It disseminated propaganda so that the workers could gradually understand the meaning of labor unions. Such work was done exclusively by the CCP, which achieved extensive results despite its numerical weakness.

[The National Liberation Movement]

Following the close of the European war, there was great development of the national liberation movement of oppressed peoples, such as the Koreans, Filipinos, and Indians. With even greater success, the movement has spread over wide areas of China, which has become the center of the movement.

The other peoples are under 100 percent de facto and de jure enslavement, and their countries have become colonies. China's case is different. Though no less oppressed than other nations, she nevertheless maintains national sovereignty and may be considered as semicolony. Her national liberation movement can therefore develop with far greater ease. Foreign troops are stationed in Korea, the Philippines, and India, where foreigners control administrative power. Although garrisons of foreign nations are stationed in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and a few other places in China, it can hardly be said that they occupy the whole of China. Chinese administrative organs do not everywhere oppose the national liberation movement, nor are they always able to oppose it to the fullest extent. This has been proved by recent events. For instance, in 1925, the confounded reactionary and militarist, Marshal Chang Tsolin, was forced to give this movement material as well as moral support.

The national liberation movement first assumed broad dimensions at the end of the imperialist war in 1919 and it has been characterized thereafter by opposition to Japan and the pro-Japanese Anfu regime.

At that time the most effective antigovernment movement prevailed throughout [9] the country. Newspapers everywhere carried such loud protests as that the government was selling the country to the Japanese. The masses then realized it was futile to resist the government and the Japanese merely through protests and peaceful demonstration movements. Since 1912, all movements had been of a purely peaceful nature, and it was not until 1919 that the masses began to believe that peaceful struggle must be abandoned to give way to active, even armed, struggle. Thus, a turning point was reached in terms of the people's psychology and their methods of struggle.

[The May Fourth Movement, 1919]

If we wish to fix a date marking the birth of the CCP, May 1919 is that date because, on May 4 of that year, the tide of the anti-Japanese movement swept the country.

The movement was caused by the open and fearless treachery of the Anfu Clique heading the central government. Japan utilized the opportunity to negotiate with this government a treaty amounting to surrender, under which China would hand over to

the Japanese all nationally owned railway trunk lines. This even coincided with the drafting of the Versailles Treaty and China's humiliation at the Peace Conference. Hence, Chinese youths, especially university students, who had hoped China would gain her freedom after the European war, were greatly agitated and resorted to drastic action. Unfortunately, the movement lacked proper organization and developed into an alarming situation. The Chinese minister to Japan was beaten up. In Peking, government offices were mobbed and assassination attempts were made on cabinet ministers. In Paris, an attempt was made on the life of the Chinese minister and the leader of the Communications Clique.

This was the beginning of the active revolutionary movement of the masses, which at first was composed of only university students and later included the laboring masses of Peking, Shanghai, and other cities.

At that time labor was already aware of the difference between its interests and those of the people in general.

Conscious of this difference, workers in Peking and Tientsin in North China hoped to have some political organization of their own. It was at this juncture that [10] the Group of Ten made its appearance. (The Group of Ten was a labor organization. Each group was composed of ten persons.) This indicates the workers' desire for political organization, even though they were not sufficiently developed to organize a party.

Veteran Chinese revolutionaries at that time were studying various theories with the hope of pushing forward the revolution. Nothing concrete was accomplished, however, and it was all in vain. It is not men who create history; history creates men. This is well understood by those who study Marxism. From the historical standpoint, men who are created by history occupy the most important positions in the development of any social movement.

[Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Activities, 1918-19]

In discussing the beginnings of the CCP, reference must be made to the important position occupied by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en is now secretary-general and leader of the Party. In 1918, Ch'en was the only person who engaged in Communist work. He began by grouping around himself the best revolutionaries. (At that time, he was professor of literature at Peking University. We cannot go into detail here on his personal life.) History repeats itself. Prominent individuals step forward, organize themselves into groups, and attract the best elements of society, especially workers.

Ch'en began publication of a weekly, *Mei-chou p'ing-lun* [Weekly Critic] [in December 1918], in which he cautiously promoted the cause of labor and discussed such questions as political organization of labor. He was chief editor and concurrently business manager, but later found two or three comrades to assist him. He also regularly published pamphlets under the title "To the Peking People." His activities were soon cut short by imprisonment, however.

As the country was greatly agitated just then over the problem of national liberation, the authorities felt it unwise to take drastic measures with Ch'en Tu-hsiu and he was released after several months. Since it was no longer possible for him to continue his work in Peking, he proceeded to Shanghai, where Tai Chi-t'ao was then living. Tai was also engaged then in publishing an organ for the discussion of Marxist doctrines.

As Shanghai is the most industrialized area and has greater numbers of laborers than anywhere else in China, Ch'en Tu-hsiu used it as the base of the labor movement and the center of his work. It is clear that Ch'en Tu-hsiu devoted the greater part of his attention to the labor movement. He fully realized the close connections [11] between party and labor organization. Since China had neither labor unions nor a

[Communist] party, Ch'en decided to promote both organizations simultaneously. He hoped, after one year's painstaking effort (1919), to gather a forceful group in preparation for the organization of the CCP.

[Organization of the Shanghai Communist Group, 1920]

At the beginning of 1920 (the ninth year of the Chinese Republic), seven persons, Ch'en and his associates, organized a group in Shanghai. They were: (1) Ch'en Tu-hsiu; (2) Tai Chi-t'ao; (3) Shen Hsüan-lu; (4) Ch'en Wang-tao (who soon left the Party); (5) Li Han-chün (who also left the Party); (6) Shih Ts'un-t'ung (still in the Party); and (7) Yuan Hsiao-hsien [Yü Hsiu-sung?] (still in the Party). Of the seven, four have left the Party (the group, actually) and only three remain.

As for Tai Chi-t'ao, who subsequently left the Party, a brief remark is necessary in order to understand him. Tai was a founder and active member of the organization but he split with the CCP and is now a member of the KMT Right Wing. Tai is an extremely capable man and is very well versed in Marxism, but he is now constantly waging an ideological struggle against the CCP. Tai Chi-t'ao is among those ideologists of the KMT who claim that China does not suit Communism and Communism does not suit the KMT.

At the beginning, the group published a [weekly] for workers [*Lao-tung chieh*] and a periodical especially for Shanghai clerical workers [*Huo-yu*]. Since a violent reaction was in force at the time, it was compelled to devise various measures in order to enlist young revolutionaries. The organization was named the Foreign Language School, composed of the best revolutionaries, who were trained for (1) work in China; (2) study at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in the Soviet Union. In 1920 there were altogether sixty people at the Foreign Language School, mostly members of the Youth Corps. (In China and a few other places, the Youth Corps was organized before the CCP. Elsewhere, both organizations appeared at the same time.)

It was planned to have a group of students of the school work in China and, under the direction of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, plant the seeds of a Communist Party in Shanghai. The most important task of the group was the organization of labor unions in [12] Shanghai. (There was then no organization at all in Shanghai.)

The first trade union to be successfully organized in Shanghai was the mechanics' union, followed by the printers' union and the textile workers' union. Organization of trade unions was successful first of all among skilled workers. Ch'en directed the work singlehandedly, handicapped by lack of funds and many other difficulties. It is significant that the only source of income was profit on the magazine, *Hsin ch'ing-nien* (*La Jeunesse*). Ch'en was aware that contemporary youths were engulfed by extreme revolutionary agitation and were therefore most interested in whoever could offer solutions to their difficult problems.

In sum, by the beginning of 1920, an embryo of the CCP existed in Shanghai.

By September 1920 we had in Shanghai altogether seventy organized comrades wielding influence over labor and able to direct the labor movement.

It is obvious that such a movement could not be confined to the area of Shanghai. If it were, it would soon be extinguished. However, with the establishment of an organization of Communist comrades in Shanghai, its influence did not fail to reach other areas in China.

[Organization of the Peking Communist Group, 1920]

In September 1920 we already learned that a situation similar to Shanghai had occurred in Peking, because at that time an organized group appeared in Peking. Of the eight comrades in the group, six were anarchists and two Communists. The anarchists

were led by Huang Ling-shuang and the two Communists were Li Ta-chao and Chang Kuo-t'ao, now members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The Shanghai group and the Peking group were heterogeneous. Hence this "alliance" did not last long. Three of the anarchists soon withdrew from the Peking organization, which was, however, strengthened by the addition of four new members: (1) Teng Chung-hsia, (2) Lo Chang-lung, (3) Liu Jen-ching, and (4) name unknown. [13] It published leaflets, pamphlets, and a daily [weekly], *Lao-tung yin*.

In view of the extremely reactionary situation in Peking, it was impossible to carry on concrete work. After a few months, however, an evening class for workers was established at Ch'ang-hsin-tien, a Peking-Hankow railway station not far from Peking. The workers there were even more backward than the Shanghai proletariat. The work was therefore even more difficult.

In considering the measures taken by the Peking group, such as publication of various types of provocative literature and establishment of the school, one must conclude that it was working under the advice, if not the direct supervision, of the Shanghai organization. The fact must be emphasized that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his group laid the real foundation of the Chinese Communist Party for all China and that Shanghai is the real center of the Party.

At any rate, there were two organizations of the Communist Party by the beginning of the second half of 1920, one at Shanghai and the other at Peking.

[Organization of the Canton Communist Group, 1920]

In the autumn of the same year, Mo Jung-hsin, [military] governor of Kwangtung, was driven out by Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, who took over the governorship. Ch'en Ch'iung-ming was then a self-styled national revolutionary. Following the capture of Kwangtung, he invited Dr. Sun from Shanghai to assume political leadership in Kwangtung. He also invited Ch'en Tu-hsiu to take charge of education in the province (it is not clear whether he did so directly or through Dr. Sun). Ch'en, having enjoyed a certain degree of success in organizing the Communist force in Shanghai, hurried to Canton with the hope of utilizing the opportunity to plant the seeds of a Communist organization there. He had not the slightest intention of pursuing the work of education but did not want to miss this excellent opportunity.

On arriving in Kwangtung, Ch'en moved immediately to organize the Communist force and enlisted the following comrades: T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Kung-po, and T'an Chih-t'ang. Several anarchists also joined him. He was able to work with relative freedom in Kwangtung and, with the experience gained in previous work in Shanghai and Peking, Ch'en was able to draft a program for the Party and to present it to the Kwangtung organization. However, the anarchist members regarded the Party program as irreconcilable with their basic ideas and did not wish to remain in the organization.

Fortunately, their withdrawal did not adversely affect the organization. As at Shanghai and Peking, it was of no consequence. The Chinese anarchists are basically [14] no different from anarchists in general. In China, they were little known, or even unknown, to the masses, for they made no effort to work among them. Their withdrawal from the organization therefore produced no reaction at all among the masses, if one may use the term "masses" when speaking of that period. The basic organization in Kwangtung finally accepted Ch'en Tu-hsiu's draft party program (unanimous approval was of course impossible) and organized a school of propaganda and agitation in Canton to train personnel for future work not only in Canton but in other areas as well. The organization also published a daily [weekly], *Lao-tung sheng* [*che*?], which exerted great influence.

With the successful establishment of the Kwangtung organization, the first chap-

ter of the history of the CCP may be considered closed.

The three cities of Shanghai, Peking, and Canton dominate almost the whole of China. They are the centers of the social and revolutionary movement. The development of the CCP proceeds from these places, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu should be recognized as the founder of organizations in all other areas.

Shanghai is the center of the nation's industry and commerce, Peking is the political and university center, and Canton is the center of the national revolutionary movement. With the foundation laid in these three important places, the Communist movement continued to develop. Within less than six months, Communist nuclei had been established in Hupei, Hunan, and Honan. Furthermore, the Communist movement spread to Chinese students studying abroad, who organized small organizations in Tokyo, Paris, and other places.

Although our work was developing, we felt many inadequacies in the work of direction and encountered numerous difficulties. The scope of our activities was one such problem. Since it was impossible to undertake all social movements with our available strength, we decided to proceed with the most urgent task of the day, the organization of labor.

While the number of the laboring class was daily increasing, the progress of the [15] labor movement was slow, and reactionary elements were also found mixed in with the laboring class. One may state and prove now from the historical point of view that the decision to emphasize labor organization has already been justified by subsequent developments.

The work of the three years from 1918 to 1920 was concentrated by grouping together individual revolutionaries and organizing them into small units capable of serving as nuclei at different places. Efforts were also made to examine in Party publications the basic problems of the masses. Thus the initial work of collecting material for laying the Party's foundation may be said to have been accomplished in three years. The CCP had by the beginning of 1921 an outline for the future.

After three years of perseverance and hard work by the small group of comrades working under the direction of Comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the following results were achieved:

The Shanghai organization was now composed of approximately seventy persons. Since the party had not then been established, these persons cannot be called party members but only comrades. There were about ten comrades in Peking and ten in Canton. In addition, there were three newspaper offices, in Peking, Shanghai, and Canton. There was the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Canton, with a membership twice as large as that of the organization. A small number among our comrades had had some experience sufficient to serve as the foundation of their future work.

What did our comrades undertake in 1921 in proceeding with their work?

[The First Congress, July 1921]

In May [July] 1921, the First Congress of the Party was held in Shanghai. At that time persons connected organizationally with the Party and those taking part in actual Party work totaled not more than sixty or seventy. The rest were mainly "sympathizers." Eleven delegates attended the Congress, which took place in the Shanghai French Concession, beyond the reach of Chinese law. Fortunately, no untoward incident occurred despite a search by police and gendarmes.

The organizers, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu, had hoped to solve at the Congress all outstanding problems relating to the Communist movement. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was busy in Canton and did not attend the Congress, but he sent his draft of the Party platform to be discussed at the meeting.

[16] The Congress reflected the real condition of the Party at that time. Men of

divergent ideas, political outlooks, and frames of mind assembled. The situation of heterogeneity previously characterizing the local groups in Peking, Shanghai, and Canton repeated itself once more at the Congress. Among the eleven delegates there were students of socialism, democratic socialists, anarchists, and communists. It was not easy, therefore, to find thorough solutions to any of the problems under discussion.

The program outlined and sent by Ch'en Tu-hsiu was brought forward for discussion. Ch'en was very cautious in drafting the program and emphasized the following points: (1) education and training of Party members; (2) guidance [of the Party] in accordance with democratic principles; (3) discipline; and (4) need for caution in approaching the masses with a view to bringing them into the Party fold. Seizure of political power, it was stated, was a problem for the future, since the Party was not yet established and efforts should first be devoted to work of a preparatory character. The nature of the draft program was already extremely mild and yet, when presented at the Congress, certain delegates considered it too radical and others too impractical. Still others believed it unnecessary to adopt a concrete program.

One of the delegates, Li Han-chün (now out of the Party), argued that despite similarities the Russian and German revolutions had many differences. In Russia the Communist Party was dictatorial while the democratic system existed in Germany. The right and wrong of these systems, Li said, had yet to be determined. Li argued that the problems of a Party platform and political policy raised by Ch'en Tu-hsiu should be deferred, pending the dispatch of comrades to Russia and Germany for study and inspection.

It is obvious that with such opportunistic currents of thought at the Congress, it was impossible to discuss or even raise the question of the Chinese Communist Party joining the Comintern.

Li Han-chün rejected all forms of active revolutionary work, interference of the Party in the labor movement, and publication of Communist literature, and he even opposed taking part in the politics in general. He and his group favored only the study of communism. This attitude is a reflection of Chinese conditions. It is also connected to some extent with the belief of Dr. Sun that it is not difficult to act but difficult to know. Li believes that action is easy if preceded by thorough study and understanding. He therefore advocated studying the conditions of the Russian, German, and Western European revolutions before selecting our own course. His position [17] thus coincides with Dr. Sun's repudiation of the old proverb, "To know is not difficult; to act is."

The disputed points on knowledge and action had nothing at all to do with the Marxist doctrines or the original aims set forth at the First CCP Congress. Had the wavering opinion of Li Han-chün and Ch'en Kung-po not been repudiated at once our Party would have been extinguished and become a miscarriage. Although the laboring masses in the revolutionary movement were not in a position to exert pressure on their leaders (the Congress was to a certain extent playing the role of leader), and the general environment precluded the possibility of such pressure, the majority of the delegates felt it imperative to resist firmly the current of thought of the "sitting on the fence" group and decisively rejected the position of Li Han-chün.

Almost all of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's proposals on Party centralization, discipline, and the Party's ultimate objective (seizure of power) were approved. These policies were to form the basis of the future program of the Party. It was also decided that the Party was to be called the Communist Party and the principles of Communism should guide the Party in its work.

The decision on the ultimate objective of the Party—seizure of political power by proletarian organizations under the leadership of the CCP—was the most objectionable point to the "sitting on the fence" clique of Li Han-chün and others. Finally, in ac-

cordance with the decision of the Congress on the withdrawal of all those who have non-Communist tendencies, Li and the others were ordered to leave the Party. This made it possible for the first election of the Central Committee to be carried out smoothly. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected secretary, a decision which was of great benefit to the CCP.

Upon his election as secretary, Ch'en left Kwangtung for Shanghai to direct the CC in performing the work of the labor movement in accordance with his principles. Ch'en, however, was arrested soon after his arrival in Shanghai. It was only after his release that he could, with considerable difficulty, again begin his work.

[Work of the Center]

[18] Once more Ch'en Tu-hsiu followed his old principles and devoted himself first of all to developing the labor movement, particularly since the situation at the time was favorable. A special bureau, headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, was organized to direct the labor movement.

A publishing office was also established to handle such Communist books as *Program of the Communist Party*, *Wage-labor and Capital*, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, *The Soviet System of Power*, and *Program of the Communists (Bolshevists)*. Most works were translated from English; only a few were directly translated from Russian. The publishing office failed shortly after it was set up because the directors of the office thought that books of that kind would command very few buyers and therefore sent them out free. The office was consequently forced to close down. The fault, however, was not only with the directors, but even more with the Central Committee, which directed the office.

This incident is characteristic and reveals that even such stalwart Communists as Ch'en Tu-hsiu and others were not quite confident of their own strength. They doubted whether their literature could be readily sold on the book market, even though it was not being published in millions of copies but in much smaller quantity! Thus underestimation of their own forces led to an erroneous decision. The slow progress in the work of agitation and propaganda was paralleled by slow advance in the distribution of literature. This, however, was due not to lack of interest among the Communists or the masses, who were full of revolutionary spirit, but to incompetence in handling publishing work and selecting materials for printing and publication.

While the work of agitation and propaganda was not very successfully carried out (particularly among workers), the labor movement advanced with rapid strides.

[Organization of Labor Unions, 1921]

The labor movement progressed rapidly throughout China (wherever there were industrial enterprises and workers). The CCP was able to organize big labor unions instead of the small organs it had previously established among the laboring masses. Organization of big unions first took place in Shanghai among the mechanics, printers, and textile workers. Membership in such unions was not confined to laborers, however. Employees in general could also join.

The mass labor movement coincided with the rise and development of industry. In contrast to the prosperous growth of industry, the workers were left in a deplorable state. Hence, a so-called active labor movement was initiated. It was of an exclusively economic character and expressed itself in economic strikes.

The first strike occurred in the Shanghai British-American Tobacco Company [19] [on October 24, 1921]. Members of the Chinese Communist Party took an active part in this movement, mixing themselves in with the laboring masses to agitate for

economic struggle and to stir the workers to the realization of the need for big labor unions.

The Party was confronted with numerous difficulties in this work because the laboring masses, though greatly agitated, regarded the Party's actions as dangerous and radical. They believed that the labor movement should stay within legal limits and the most conservative among them even suspected the purity of our motives, thinking that our action was a propaganda device. This was due to the older unions of 1912-13, which were well known to the workers. The unions did not recognize the CCP, which was unable to show its real face in view of its illegal status. On witnessing the fiery actions of the Communists, the laborers suspected them of being spies for the capitalists or propagandists for Sun Yat-sen. In short, the workers feared being used by others as instruments of violent struggle.

A very amusing episode may be related here. At a meeting, some Communists proposed to date all documents with the year 1921 instead of the 11th [10th] year of the Republic of China, and the workers suspected them of being emissaries of the Manchus, sent to stir up revolt against the Republic! The CCP was actually forced to put up a fight on this very elementary question, which should not have caused doubts even among the least conscious. It was only after all kinds of explanations that the laborers were brought to understand and recognize the Communists. Such were the difficulties in the work of the Party.

Party development proceeded in a strict and orderly manner. From the big proletarian center of Shanghai it gradually expanded to Peking, Canton, Hankow, etc. The same order applies to the trade-union movement.

The big trade-union movement developed at approximately the same time in Peking and Tientsin in North China. As mentioned above, an evening class was organized for laborers (mostly railway workers) near Peking. The Foreign Language School in Shanghai was a center of Communist propaganda and training of Party workers. The evening class at Ch'ang-hsin-tien was a center of agitation among workers, Communist propaganda, and enlistment of Party members. It is different from the Shanghai Foreign Language School, which does not enlist Party members but [20] gives them systematic training.

Aside from the evening class, CCP members frequently met workers at places where they relaxed, such as teahouses and cafes. This was done not without difficulty because Chinese workers (with the exception of the majority of railway workers) were in most cases completely dependent on their contractors, labor bosses, and all the other classes above the workers. Actually, of course, the Communists had nothing in common with the contractors, nor did they have any message intended for the contractors, but the only way was to try to alienate the workers from their bosses.

After half a year, in May 1921, some results were apparent when more than a thousand workers of Ch'ang-hsin-tien Railway Station assembled at a meeting at which the problem of contract labor was raised. This meeting was part and parcel of the campaign conducted cautiously and constantly by the Communists among individual workers and small groups. The party stated at this meeting that the time for liberation from contract labor had arrived and that workers should take into their own hands the right to take any action they chose. The slogan for organizing big labor unions was also issued and it met with the complete approval of the masses of workers. Thus in May 1921 the beginnings of a mass trade-union movement were evident in North China.

The year 1921 may be called the year in which the foundation of the mass trade-union movement was laid in all industrial centers of China. Various labor unions were organized among Shanghai workers and railway workers' organizations were set up.

The labor movement (including the miners of Honan, Chihli, Hunan, etc.) was well organized and it manifested proper characteristics. By "proper," we mean that

the movement was actually in the hands of the workers and the workers' party and was entirely different from the labor movement of 1912 and 1913, which was sponsored and organized by politicians and various "sitting on the fence" cliques. Now the movement is promoted and directed exclusively by the CCP. Although a foundation has been laid, however, further efforts are required to strengthen it and to prevent the influx of profit-seekers as in the old days.

[The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, January 1922]

[21] The same year witnessed another important event for the CCP. As a result of the CCP's efforts, China was able to participate in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which took place in Moscow [January 21 to February 2, 1922]. Its objective, roughly, was to organize the peoples of the Far East to oppose the Washington Conference and its decisions. (Details on the Washington Conference cannot be related here.) The CCP tried by various ways and means to organize a Chinese delegation to the Congress. At meetings, in open-air speeches, and in its newspapers, the Party insisted on the necessity of sending a Chinese delegation. Although this was strongly opposed in many quarters, the CCP finally succeeded in organizing a delegation of thirty persons, composed of students, workers, the KMT, and the CCP. It was a delegation with representatives of four organizations and three classes of Chinese society, namely, the labor class, the intelligentsia, student associations, and the urban middle and petty bourgeoisie. (The last refers to the KMT, which was then in close contact with the petty bourgeoisie.)

With few exceptions, members of the delegation had no organizational affiliation. At the Congress, they had no definite political program, unified opinion, or clear comprehension of their own position. The Communists were in a difficult spot and could not help the situation.

The above-mentioned inadequacies did not lessen the importance of the Congress, which was of international significance. Its importance was partly due to the fact that the Washington Conference devoted nine-tenths of its time and work to the so-called Pacific Question, the greater part of which is the China Question. We may [22] venture the opinion that had the Chinese delegation not attended the Moscow Conference, the latter would have lost all its significance. The CCP did its very best in this matter.

One more episode. Among the Chinese delegates was a woman named Huang Pi-hun [Wang Li-hun?]. On arriving in Moscow she called on [Alexandra] Kollontai, representing herself as the leader of the Chinese women's movement. She behaved badly. One of the first things she asked for was an appropriation of funds allegedly for use in the women's movement. After her return to China she was revealed as a propagandist for Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, on whose instructions she had made an attempt to assassinate Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen later ordered her to be shot.

Though optimism is not warranted by the women's movement, certain results have been achieved, also as a consequence of promotion by the CCP.

Good as well as harm (the word "unpleasantness" would be more correct) was done by the Chinese delegation in Moscow. At that time the famine in Russia was well known to all. Food provisions for the delegation, though not substantial, were far better than those enjoyed by the Russian workers and people in general. This should not have been a question of principles or politics and should not have been an issue at all to the politically conscious. However, it did produce a very great effect. The devastation in Russia resulting from the famine and war created a very bad impression on the delegates, particularly KMT members. Communist members of the delegation were extremely young and politically inexperienced. They did not bother to explain to the other delegates the causes of disorder, famine, and other defects in

Russia, but simply started quarrels. Without resorting to reason, they demanded that their fellow delegates admit the correctness of their Communist point of view. They merely relied on the following line of argument: "All is well, but to you all seems bad," which was usually accompanied by insults.

Many members of the delegation, especially KMT members, returned to China and declared that on the basis of the actual conditions observed, the treatment they had received in Russia, and the experience of traveling with the Communists, it was doubtful whether the CCP could be of benefit to the country. Some of the delegates, such as Chang Ch'iu-pai and other KMT members, declared that the Chinese Communists were their enemies and precautions must be taken against them.

[23] The foregoing relates the general experience and work of the CCP from the First Congress to the beginning of 1922.

[The Second Congress, July 1922]

Following the Moscow Conference, the CCP held its Second Congress in June and July 1922. Its position at that time was much stronger than at the First Congress. Not only had party membership increased; its quality had also improved. The Party was also a great deal more experienced.

The difference between the two congresses was that the people who gathered at the Second Congress were united in Marxist doctrines, platform, and objectives, and they were all capable of dialectical reasoning. The Party platform was completely passed at the Second Congress, the most important provision being the decision to join the Comintern. The Congress also passed a manifesto stating the Party's views on domestic and international problems.

One of the most important questions brought up for discussion at the Congress was the necessity of carrying on an active struggle for a democratic united front. The Party had become conscious of itself, of its strength and role, and the masses had also come to know the Party. The CCP thus had to present its political policies and clarify its stand. The political program adopted by the Congress comprised the following seven points:

1. Struggle against militarism to secure internal peace.

2. Struggle against imperialism until it is completely eliminated from the country; in other words, fight for the independence of the Chinese nation and people.

3. Create a united and democratic country (republic).

4. Grant the right of self-determination to the frontier peoples of Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang.

5. Organize the Republic of China on the federal principle.

[24] 6. Establish universal, direct, equal, and secret election; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and the right to strike.

7. Enact labor legislation and land laws.

a. *Labor legislation*: Labor legislation should provide for the study of means to improve the worker's living and working conditions; abolish the system of contract labor; enact regulations for the eight-hour day in all factories, mills, mines, and railways; establish free medical care and dispensaries for workers in all factories and mills; enforce the principles of hygiene; provide workers with life insurance; enact a special law to protect child labor and old workers; and establish organs to render assistance to the unemployed.

b. *Legislation on the peasant problem*: Abolish the *likin* and other abnormal taxes and levies, substituting for them a consolidated income tax; enforce fixed land rents.

c. *Other legislation*: Abolish all laws restricting freedom of women; grant women equal political and economic rights; improve the education of the people.

The resolutions of the Second Congress covered all fundamental problems of the

Chinese national revolutionary movement. The Congress could not end its duty with [25] mere resolutions, however; their execution required the unification of all democratic revolutionary forces in China. Hence, the Congress decided further that the newly elected CC should call all genuine democratic revolutionary forces to a unification conference. In other words, it strove to create a united front of the revolutionary elements in the Chinese social structure.

The importance of the Second Congress in the history of the CCP is due to the following:

1. The Party platform was passed to define the Party's objectives with reference to current and future problems.

2. With the passage of the Party platform and the adoption of the name "Kung-ch'ang-tang," the Party clearly revealed its true countenance, standing squarely on the path of Marxism.

3. The CCP established its connections with the World Revolution. By joining the CI, it has become an integral part of the world Communist movement.

4. The decision of the Congress on the absolute necessity of building a united front testifies to the fact that the CCP, though small in membership, was quite experienced and capable of finding solutions to the problems of the Chinese people.

5. The Congress declared that while the CCP was confronted with numerous problems, the basic task was development of the labor movement, that is, absorption of the working class by the Party. This was correct.

At the time of the Second Congress, there was a change in the frame of mind of the masses, who had begun to take an active interest in the Party. This is proved by the zeal with which they immediately bought up the Party's literature. The masses wanted to know what the CCP was saying, what proposals it was making, and how it was thinking. More than twenty delegates attended the Second Congress.

[26] The revolutionary movement advanced with great speed in 1922, not in terms of numerical increase but in improvement of the quality of personnel. The moral weight of the real revolutionary forces was gaining strength. The revolutionaries revealed undaunted courage in struggling for their objectives and solving the problems before them. This produced alarm among those who were in name democratic but who secretly harbored undemocratic principles. The true revolutionary movement was given a blow by these people. Although the blow was not aimed directly at the Chinese Communist Party, the Party had to face considerable unpleasantness.

[Conflict Between Sun Yat-sen and Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, 1922]

On July 12, 1922 [June 16, 1922], as the Second Congress was about to close, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming staged a political coup in Canton and drove out Sun Yat-sen. The incident was precipitated by Sun's demand that Ch'en organize a northern expeditionary force. Sun was concerned solely with revolution without taking into consideration his actual and potential strength. The only force he could rely on was the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people and the comrades of his own party, and he made his plans accordingly.

Even without Sun's demand for the northern expedition, Ch'en would certainly have been jealous of Sun as an elder revolutionary. Ch'en pretended to play the part of a revolutionary, but he differed from Sun in that he had no great ambition to unify China. Ch'en had already become a typical Chinese militarist, bent on robbery and oppression. He was also a wealthy merchant with close connections with the propertied classes of Kwangtung. As a pretext for rejecting Sun's demand, Ch'en proposed that efforts should first be concentrated on building up Kwangtung before the northern expedition could even be discussed.

Ch'en's proposal doubtless represented the opinion of the compradors and other

capitalists of Canton and Hong Kong, who realized that the enormous expense involved in the northern expedition would eventually fall on them. They believed it cheaper to feed Ch'en and his army, no matter how corrupt, than to shoulder the great burden of the northern expedition.

If we estimate the actual strength and influence of Sun Yat-sen, it becomes evident that the northern expedition would have been doomed to failure. The CCP was not sympathetic to Sun, but it did not openly support Ch'en Ch'iung-ming. The CCP had not then acquired an important position and therefore it could not express any [27] definite opinion of its own. Furthermore, it did not have confidence in the success of the northern expedition.

The opinion of other political, social, and revolutionary elements was also unfavorable to Sun Yat-sen. The best-educated and the most democratic elements were on Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's side and were dissatisfied with Sun Yat-sen's program. Take, for instance, the noted Chinese scholar, Dr. Hu Shih. In his speeches and writings, Hu Shih considered Ch'en Ch'iung-ming as a genuine revolutionary and regarded Sun Yat-sen as in the wrong. Many of Sun's friends and followers advised him to give up political life completely in view of his demonstrated inefficiency. Sun Yat-sen then proceeded to Shanghai.

[Communist Policy of Collaboration with the Kuomintang, 1922]

The Chinese Communist Party believed that the time had come when it should play its first act in the political arena, that is, carry out the basic resolution of the Second Congress to build a fighting front in the Revolution. Despite the fact that Sun was an insignificant figure, having just lost his base in Kwangtung, the CCP believed that he and his comrades were the only democratic elements who, given an opportunity, could be expected to succeed. The CCP therefore sent representatives to call on Sun and presented him with a proposal for KMT-CCP cooperation, while promising all kinds of assistance. Sun did not disappoint the confidence of the CCP and accepted its proposal at once. In this decision he was supported firmly by the most prominent KMT members in Shanghai, such as Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and others.

At the time, there was already a [KMT] Right Wing which opposed this decision and regarded the CCP's proposal as an act of deception for the purpose of expanding the CCP by means of KMT strength. Even now, people of the Right Wing still maintain that the CCP developed on the strength of the KMT. Honest KMT members admit that this statement is contrary to the facts and is sheer nonsense from beginning to end. The KMT's expansion is actually due to the help rendered by the CCP through its work.

[28] The talks between the representatives of the CC of the CCP and Dr. Sun led to definite results. In August 1922, the entire question was raised again in a broader sense at the plenary meeting called by the CC of the CCP at Hangchow, capital of Chekiang province. The meeting adopted a resolution to try to bring about an amalgamation of the KMT and the CCP in terms of internal organization. The resolution was adopted unanimously, although some individual comrades were opposed to it.

The adoption of this resolution was necessitated by the situation at the time, for the working class and its party were unable, with only their own forces, to handle their colossal problems. It was particularly difficult to work among the vast masses of the whole social structure whose interest in politics was growing constantly.

On the other hand, the KMT was inactive; in fact, it did not even exist. When the CCP conveyed the resolution to Dr. Sun, he expressed complete approval and was very pleased. The KMT was so weak at that time that all leading members, even those who never professed Leftist principles, such as Hu Han-min, endorsed Sun's

decision.

The CCP foresaw the difficulties engendered by the decision to ally with the KMT, which was actually not a party at all but a collection of groups and individuals espousing Sun Yat-sen's principles. Having no contact with each other, KMT members did not have any party program or regulations. They had many prejudices. It is sufficient to cite here only one example to show how backward the KMT was.

The Party practiced several ceremonies of an ordinary bourgeois character, completely devoid of revolutionary spirit, in initiating new members. Each candidate took an oath of allegiance to Sun Yat-sen and in place of the seal made an impression with his finger. These were the most characteristic rituals, but there were countless others that testify to the fact that the KMT was a religious sect rather than a political party. The CCP was willing to cooperate with such a "party" and concluded an alliance with Sun because this provided the only legal access to the mass movement.

["Down with Imperialism!" and "Down with Militarism!"]

The CCP decided to take up the most pressing problems with the KMT and build them up as slogans of the day. The two slogans were "Down with Imperialism!" and "Down with Militarism!" which covered all the urgent internal and external issues of that time.

The slogans were for the vast masses almost what the discovery of America was for the people of the Middle Ages. However, their significance had scarcely been comprehended previously by the lower classes or even by the intelligentsia who are supposed to be the leaders of the society. The CCP was forced to carry on agitation among the middle and lower social classes and to struggle for the recognition of these [29] slogans. Strange though it may seem, the Communists had to fight against the leaders of society, professors, etc.

Of the two, the slogan "Down with Militarism!" was understood and adopted with greater speed because it strikes at an oppressive burden borne directly by the masses then and in the past. Militarism, in short, does not allow the people to live in peace. It was a great deal more difficult, however, for the masses to understand, let alone accept, the slogan "Down with Imperialism!" The cause lay in the existence of opposition even within the circle of revolutionaries. Dr. Hu Shih, for instance, published a series of articles in the *Nu-li chou-pao* (The Endeavor) to the effect that the Chinese had not been oppressed by the imperialists, that the imperialists had given China many benefits and treated the Chinese very well, and that it was groundless to accuse them of insulting the Chinese.

Hu Shih's position represented not merely that of the foremost Chinese intellectuals, but larger circles of Chinese society as well. This is because the imperialists never directly carried out their policies but did so indirectly, in most cases through the comprador-bourgeoisie and the militarists. They were able to cover up their mischief so well that sometimes they were peace-makers in the eyes of the masses.

Although there was in the Chinese mind no opposition to imperialism, Japan was the exception. The Chinese masses despised Japan and were anxious to take revenge against her, but they regarded the anti-Japanese movement and the anti-imperialist struggle as two different matters. Not only was this the psychology of the masses, but it was true also of the leaders of society, the KMT, and other revolutionary organizations, which singled out Japan as the enemy but remained silent about the other imperialist countries. Furthermore, the anti-Japanese movement was not of an entirely independent nature, as it was closely connected with the antigovernment movement of the time (opposition to the Anfu Clique). This coincidence militated against a clear comprehension of the real situation, for the hatred of the Japanese was in fact

obscured to an extent by the hatred of the government.

The "good neighbor" relations with foreigners and the hospitable attitude toward them stem from the artful policy of the imperialists. Parallel to the robberies and violence they were committing in China, the foreigners founded schools, newspapers, and peasant societies, which formed an all-embracing apparatus for imperialist agitation and propaganda. They were thus able to deceive and cheat the Chinese people. There was a monopolistic character to their agitation, for there was nothing at all to oppose it for many years. In such a backward country as China, the results of this agitation are great. The people did not even react at first to this most urgent question of struggle against their bitter foe, imperialism.

[30] The CCP devoted two years of active propaganda to popularizing these slogans and to arousing the people's interest in them. As a result, they are now popular and known everywhere in China. With the exception of the reactionaries, the tools of imperialism, and those nationalists who are mentally childish and so anxious for the return of China's past glory that they have become fanatics, every Chinese understands the meaning of the slogans and is permeated with hatred for militarism and imperialism.

[The Strike Movement, 1922 to February 1923]

Following the Second CCP Congress, the entire country began to be covered by a network of labor unions (where a proletarian population and appropriate conditions existed). This time the labor movement differed from the previous movement because it was backed by strikes. In many places the strike movement developed faster than the labor movement, which meant that the unions were not able to cope with the rapid growth of labor activity.

Almost all the railways in the country were confronted with the strike movement. However, since the strike movement did not correspond with the strength of the leading organs of labor organization, it terminated as easily as it had developed rapidly. Of the eighteen railways in China, nine were under the control of strong labor organizations (all in central China), while control over the other nine was very weak.

Although the CCP itself was numerically weak and was thus unable to supervise the entire movement, guidance of the unions' work was almost everywhere in its hands. The total Party membership was from 200 to 300, and this number included young members. The number of labor unions was considerable. Unions in the vicinity of Shanghai alone numbered thirty. There were over ten each in Changsha, Hankow, Tientsin, and Canton. Altogether, 125,000 to 150,000 workers were under Communist guidance.

Many strikes of that period ended in victories for the workers, testifying to the organized character of the labor movement in many places and the ability of labor unions to champion the workers' interests. This was not true of the labor movement [31] everywhere, however. Furthermore, this period of rapid growth of the labor movement came to an abrupt end on February 7, 1923, when the reactionaries struck with a deadly blow.

When things first began to develop on the Peking-Hankow Railway, the masses were in a revolutionary frame of mind. The authorities were inclined to be tolerant and even sanctioned the convocation of a congress. Later, alarmed at the continuous advance of the labor movement which threatened their own position, they determined to destroy it. February 7, 1923, is therefore one of the anniversaries in the history of the CCP and the Chinese labor movement.

The above results were derived from the fact that the CCP was too weak to exert control over the entire labor movement. Furthermore, the incredibly sudden and rapid development of events allowed Communist leaders no time for thorough investigation

of all the issues which were arising daily. For instance, had some demands of the workers, even those of a purely economic nature, been adequately studied, they would not have been brought up at all, because the labor unions were then in no position to back them up. Emotion triumphed over reason when such demands were raised.

The CCP did advise the workers and their representatives that the time was not ripe for an aggressive policy and that they should reduce their demands to the minimum and proceed carefully. But such advice was given when developments were pressing. The CCP's responsibility is not lessened, however, and it should not be exonerated from blame. Neither should we minimize the gravity of the mistakes it committed. Most Party workers were members of the educated class, but they led a poor and hard life, sometimes even harder than that of workers. Their spirit of self-sacrifice is rarely equaled but they understood little of the workers' interests and living conditions, since most of them confined themselves to central labor organs and failed to penetrate the lower levels of the laboring masses. Had they exerted control over, or even penetrated low-level labor organizations, they would have understood how the laboring masses lived and breathed.

The incident of February 7, 1923, was a blow to the entire CCP as well as the labor movement. It amounted to big rocks being thrown at CCP organs in order to smash them. One of the consequences was the rise of conflict among young Party members, who began to feel nervous. This conflict grew in intensity when many comrades gathered at Shanghai. Some believed that the leaders of the Central Committee were responsible for all failures because of their incorrect policy. The CC, on [32] the other hand, blamed the local committees for poor execution of work. This situation did not last long, however, and order was soon restored.

This phase of development of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party corresponds to the post-1905 period of the Russian Revolution and the Russian Communist Party. The CCP followed in the footsteps of the late Comrade Lenin, who said in 1905, "One must hurry up with the revolution." Members of the Communist Party must be courageous in admitting and correcting their own mistakes, for improvement comes only through correction of mistakes. The CCP, after experiencing these setbacks, adhered to the words of Lenin and realized the futility of despair and downheartedness. Only by hard work and experience can the Party examine its own strength and the capacity of its members to hold to their original purpose.

In the one year following the Second Congress, the CCP encountered difficulties in many ways and suffered a serious defeat, but it was able to escape total destruction.

[The Third Congress, June 1923]

In June 1923, the Third CCP Congress was held in Canton under conditions a great deal more difficult than those that characterized the two previous congresses. The First and Second congresses merely laid the foundation of the Party, while the Third Congress was charged with finding solutions to problems of broader dimensions. The CCP was almost connected with the KMT and this situation alone charged it with great responsibilities. The Party had gained the recognition of the masses and the labor movement was under its direction. Its forces, however, were weak. Such, then, was the situation in which the Third Congress had to carry out its work.

The most important resolutions of the Third Congress were as follows:

1. The Congress decided that the CCP's activities should be centered on the development of the national revolutionary movement.

2. The CCP should recognize the KMT as the nucleus around which the national revolutionary movement should be organized and the leader of this movement because

of its historical connections.

[33] 3. CCP members, by virtue of the above, should join the KMT.

4. The CCP should positively help in the creation and formal organization of the KMT as the political party of the great masses.

5. The CCP should help strengthen the KMT's influence among workers and especially peasants.

6. The CCP should take the initiative in the reorganization of the KMT in order to transform it into a genuine political party.

The Third Congress confirmed the resolutions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, which took place [August 1922] between the Second and Third congresses, on the amalgamation of the CCP with, or its entry into, the KMT. The Third Congress believed that labor was incapable of independent struggle and that the progress of its struggle depended on the development of the great revolutionary movement. Hence, emphasis was laid in the resolutions of the Congress on the necessity of creating a political party capable of controlling and directing the national revolutionary movement.

The KMT problem aroused long debate. It was finally resolved that the KMT should have influence among the working masses, especially the peasantry, since the CCP could not expect to win over the entire masses in the near future. Had the CCP resolved otherwise, that is, that the KMT should not have access to the workers and peasants, the negotiations on the amalgamation with the KMT would have lost their significance. The CCP, in fact, needed the KMT as a means of organizing and influencing the vast masses and of directing the national revolutionary movement.

Although the CCP decided definitely at the Third Congress the question of cooperation and mutual relations of the KMT and the CCP, its decision was not final, because the last word on this matter rested with the KMT. The KMT decided on this problem in a positive sense only in 1924.

The significance of the Third Congress is further increased because of the following points in its draft program:

1. Abolish all unequal treaties concluded between China and the imperialist powers. Restrict the privileges enjoyed by foreigners in expanding their economic and political influence (that is, special privileges in developing industry, such as the construction of factories and other enterprises, obtaining concessions, establishing schools and peasant societies). A new law should be promulgated to revise tariff policies. (The foreigners have already expressed approval of this.)

[34] 2. Eliminate the militarists and confiscate their property for the development of national industry.

3. Large-scale industries and businesses (railways, banks, and mines) should be controlled by the government—that is, nationalized.

4. Institute universal and direct election by secret ballot. Elections should be held on holidays or festivals.

5. Grant the people freedom of speech, press, and assembly; repeal the Special Police Act which restricts freedom (promulgated during Yuan Shih-k'ai's time and still in effect), and the special strike laws.

6. Grant women complete equality.

7. Grant the people freedom of political expression; the right to influence removal of incompetent officials and appointment of high government officials, diplomats, and delegates to international conferences; and the right to elect all responsible officials of the local and central governments.

8. Grant the peoples of Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang the right of self-determination. They may unite with China if they so wish.

9. Organize local self-government throughout the country to administer local affairs.

10. Centralize the financial policy. Prohibit the uncontrolled issue of an unlimited amount of coins and the circulation of foreign paper money on the market. Publicity [35] should be given the financial policy of the country to make it clear to the masses.

11. Abolish the *likin* (transit duties between provinces or even counties). Introduce an income tax on movable and immovable property. Taxes should be fixed annually and then enforced by law.

12. Public instruction should be free and universal. Religion should not be taught in the schools. There should be separation of the church and school (or separation of the church and state, which is practically the same). Prohibit misuse of funds provided by the budget for education. Grant teachers one month's annual leave with double pay and provide pensions, in case of old age and sickness, to persons working in the field of public instruction.

13. The work of judicial organs should be revised and placed on a more proper footing. Repeal the death penalty and abolish corporal punishment. Law courts should not charge any fees.

14. Prohibit [establish] voluntary enlistment in the army and abolish compulsory military service. Enact special laws to regulate pay for military men.

15. Build new houses for the poor and repair and improve old dwellings. Regulate house rents by special laws.

16. Fix by law the ceiling price of daily necessities.

17. Protect by law the interests of the peasantry in the following ways:

a. Establish by law a unified land tax throughout the country which should not be a burden on the peasantry. The illegal and corrupt practices of tax collectors should be abolished. (The collectors usually draw no salary but take a certain percentage of the tax as compensation. Their functions are reminiscent of those of the public officers charged with executing the decisions of law courts.)

b. Promulgate laws improving land leases to permit peasant associations to lease land collectively.

c. Solve by special legislation the problem of distribution of water sources, that is, the order of their utilization. Improve the method of cultivation of grain and tilling of the soil. (Agricultural schools.)

[36] d. The state should assist the poor peasants with grain and agricultural implements.

e. Regulate by law minimum prices of agricultural products.

18. Labor legislation:

a. Abolish by law the system of contract labor. Labor unions should be recognized as legal organizations empowered to conclude contracts.

b. Prescribe by law the eight-hour working day and prohibit shifting workers from day working hours to night working hours.

c. Allow all workers thirty-six hours of rest weekly.

d. Fix the wages of equally qualified men and women workers on an equal basis. Women workers should be given maternity leave of three weeks with pay both during and following confinement.

e. Prohibit the employment of children under fourteen years of age. Persons between fourteen and eighteen should not work more than six hours during the day or night.

f. Compel industrialists by law to provide for and pay the cost of appropriate sanitation in their factories under state supervision. Unions should have the right to participate in such arrangements and the right of inspection.

[37] g. Promulgate laws on workers' life and health insurance and protection in case of sickness and death. Labor unions representing the workers should take part in such insurance organs.

h. Lend assistance to the unemployed as provided by labor legislation.

Although Party membership was still not large at the time of the Third Congress compared with its present strength, the CCP was conscious of its moral force and the consequent responsibility to the masses. Hence, the Party had the right as well as the duty to reveal its "political face" in a more or less complete form. Judging by the program, or rather the draft program, passed at the Third Congress, we see that the Party had high hopes of assuming a position of responsibility in the national movement as well as organizing the laboring masses. The program included provisions for the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie. In all these points and in the whole program generally, the CCP took a proper position in the national revolutionary movement. Credit for this must be given the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders because of their thorough understanding of Chinese conditions and foresight with regard to the development of the national movement. This and the absence of extraneous influences can be proved by the fact that the resolutions were formulated prior to the reorganization of the KMT and the KMT's final decision on the problem of Communist entry into the KMT. It can be said definitely that the extremely important resolutions and comprehensive program passed by the Third Congress contributed significantly to the unification of the KMT and the CCP, for the KMT leaders perceived that the CCP expressed in its program the desire to cooperate in directing the national movement.

In August 1924, the KMT finally called a plenary session [Second Plenum of the CEC], at which the problem of the CCP's entry into the KMT was completely solved. [38] At this meeting members of the KMT CEC accepted all the proposals of the CCP concerning its entry into the KMT. This raised the morale of those CCP members who had been rather downhearted. The question of a united front was most important from the very beginning. It was raised in its entirety as early as the Second CCP Congress. However, the KMT's [final] decision on this question was long delayed, thus causing dissatisfaction among certain CCP members, particularly in view of the development of the national revolutionary movement and the consequent need for direction. The KMT procrastinated and delayed organizing a party capable of gathering and organizing the national revolutionary forces, especially the active elements. The resolutions of this plenary session of the KMT, however, heartened and inspired the CCP.

Through 1924 and the beginning of 1925, the CCP made great efforts and progress toward the consolidation of the organization of the KMT.

Increase of CCP membership failed to keep pace with the growth of Communist influence over the masses. It is necessary here to summarize the work of the CCP since the Third Congress, that is, 1923. During this period, the Party experienced several difficult moments. It suffered defeat but also gained several victories. The Peking-Hankow Railway Incident of February 7, 1923, was a great defeat because it resulted in some confusion among Party members which, fortunately, did not last long. The incident was not a total defeat, however, because it stimulated the rise of the national revolutionary movement, which continues to grow daily in depth and breadth.

The February 7 Incident and the ensuing rise of national revolutionary consciousness contributed greatly to the final solution of the cardinal question of a bloc between the KMT and CCP. The positive settlement of this question must be considered a victory. The problem was all the more crucial because of the rapid growth of the national revolutionary movement and its lack of direction.

[Feng Yü-hsiang's Coup d'Etat, October 1924]

The above-mentioned points necessitated the holding of the Fourth CCP Congress in

January 1925, which coincided with the occurrence of a great event in China. This so-called great event was the recurrence of conflict between two strong militarist groups, Mukden and Chihli, around the end of 1924. The conflict precipitated great [39] changes within the Chihli Clique and resulted in the coup d'etat of the Christian General, Feng Yü-hsiang.

It is still difficult to form definitive conclusions on the causes of the coup. Doubtless, disagreements of a typically Chinese character, that is, lack of complete accord between Feng Yü-hsiang and Wu P'ei-fu, were responsible. The affront Feng received at the hands of Wu might also have been a contributing factor. However, it seems clear that Feng would not have attempted what he did had the national revolutionary consciousness of the masses not been highly developed. At the most, Feng would probably have started a simple armed conflict with Wu, to which end he could easily have joined some other militarist group.

It is highly significant that Feng, having staged the coup d'etat apparently in alliance with Chang Tso-lin, remained independent and preferred to ally himself with the national revolutionary movement. Thus, for the first time in the history of Chinese militarism in the last twelve or thirteen years, military men appeared who oriented themselves toward the people and called themselves the Kuominchun [the People's Army]. The three Kuominchun armies that were established in North China in 1924 [and 1925] would have been an impossibility without the proper objective revolutionary conditions.

[The Fourth Congress, January 1925]

The rise of the national revolutionary movement, the appearance of the revolutionary forces in the North, and the rapid rise of the labor and peasant movements stimulated CCP expansion. By this time, Party membership had increased to between 900 and 1,000 and CY membership to 2,000. With these forces at its disposal, the Party convened its Fourth Congress, which devoted the greater part of its attention to the work that had been carried out in accordance with the resolutions of the previous congresses. The Congress formulated concrete plans of direction and noted points of weakness in the Party's work for correction. It did not pass any new resolutions that altered in any way the resolutions of the previous congresses.

One of the most important problems confronting the Congress was policy in coping with the situation in the North. The question of the convocation of a national assembly was raised. At the time, Dr. Sun had just arrived in North China and the [40] CCP had to withstand all the attacks that were aimed at the movement for a national assembly. At the same time, the CCP had to struggle against the attempts of Tuan Ch'i-jui to convene a conference with limited representation, that is, a conference of representatives of the bourgeoisie only. The question of these two conferences was the crucial one at the time.

The imperialists were aware that a national assembly, if convened, would give a legal form to the demands and wishes of the vast masses under the influence of the national revolutionary movement. They therefore wished to see it crushed at any cost. At their instigation, the Anfu Clique, led by Tuan Ch'i-jui, proposed a reconstruction conference with the purpose of obstructing Sun's plans for a national assembly. The imperialists hoped that by delaying the convocation of a national assembly they could strike an organized blow at the national revolutionary movement and thus eliminate the dangers it threatened for them.

[Development of the Revolutionary Movement, 1925]

The labor movement, accompanied by the strike movement, developed parallel to the

national revolutionary movement. All the important centers of the country fell under their influence. Twenty Japanese factories were involved in strikes affecting 40,000 workers in Shanghai alone at the beginning of 1925. Similar conditions existed in Tsingtao, Hankow, and other cities.

The labor movement was making swift progress and was to be incorporated later into the revolutionary movement on a national scale.

On May 1, 1925, the First [Second] National Labor Congress was convened. This bore testimony to the fact that the Chinese labor movement had left the embryonic phase and was becoming a definite force with an important role to play in the future. Thus, the legalization of the movement was quite naturally the first problem discussed, since the labor movement had heretofore existed only as an underground movement.

Although the imperialists were aware of the development and steady consolidation of the labor movement, they did not expect a revolutionary movement of such broad dimensions within this short period of time. While they were skeptical that the workers would resort to positive action at that time, they realized that the growth of the labor movement would eventually lead to more drastic activities and decided therefore to provoke the labor movement and drown it in a "sea of blood."

[41] The May Thirtieth Incident of 1925 is an illustration of the degree of imperialist provocation. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the imperialists were acting completely alone, for behind them stood the Chinese comprador-bourgeoisie.

Following the incident, an unprecedented revolutionary movement occurred in Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, and Canton, and it rapidly spread throughout the country. Labor was the most active element in this movement. In Shanghai alone 500,000 workers were on strike and a major strike broke out in Kwangtung against the most powerful imperialist nation, Great Britain.

This movement of world significance was directed by the CCP. Otherwise, it would not have gained such vast dimensions. Without the guidance of the Kwangtung Communist Party [Kwangtung Regional Committee], the Hong Kong strike would not have become a political factor on a national scale or assumed international significance because it dealt severe blows at Great Britain. Let us assume that the strike would have broken out anyway without Communist guidance, as a result of mass indignation over the shootings at Shanghai, Tsingtao, Shameen, etc. In that case, the strike would not in the first place have enjoyed such an organized character; in the second place, it would not have lasted for such a long time; and in the third place, it would not have brought about the boycott of British goods. Furthermore, the strike was and still is of tremendous political significance and has contributed greatly to the unification of Kwangtung. (Kwangtung, the base of the Chinese national revolutionary movement, was for a long time molested by provincial militarists who fought among themselves. It was only at the beginning of 1926 that the revolutionary forces of the KMT succeeded in unifying the province.)

The May Thirtieth Incident aroused an unprecedented wave of indignation among the great masses. It would have been extremely easy at that time to provoke them to fight imperialism and militarism, and it was only the CCP's expert guidance that restrained the national revolutionary movement from attempting some premature course of action. The only possible result of such action, had it taken place, would have been the liquidation of the national revolutionary movement. The CCP followed the development of events with extreme care, studied every minute detail, and acted very opportunely in adopting tactics suited to the requirements of the situation.

At the initial stage of the movement following May Thirtieth, the active revolutionary forces, the workers and students, were isolated from each other and they acted independently. The Chinese Communist Party immediately moved to correct this by organizing central organs to direct the students and workers and centralizing in the

CC the power to supervise these active elements. Under CCP guidance, a central organ of the labor movement was established to guide the workers and an organ of the student movement was organized to guide the students. The petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia also participated in the national revolutionary movement, however. Thus, it was necessary to centralize the entire movement. The CCP created under its [42] direction an organ [the Joint Committee] consisting of representatives of labor unions, students, small shopkeepers, and merchants (the petty bourgeoisie). Since the CCP held the power of direction of the labor and student movements and since labor and students were the most active elements and formed the majority in this organ, the CCP succeeded in centralizing in itself the power of directing the revolutionary movement.

Judging by the Party's work during this period, its resolutions, and the confidence it enjoyed among the masses, it is clear that the CCP was developing rapidly and that it was capable of directing the national revolutionary movement. Yet practical difficulties were not reduced but were even increased in some instances. Take the Hong Kong strike, for instance. While the CCP took upon itself the organization of the strike and all the consequent difficulties, the KMT Right Wing not only opposed the strike but took active measures to suppress it at its start. The KMT Left Wing was irresponsible and brought up many unrealistic suggestions, such as declaration of war against Britain, demand for the return of Hong Kong, etc. In terms of the relative balance of forces at the time, it was utterly impossible to have declared war against Britain. Only silly idealists could have suggested such an absurd idea!

The CCP therefore had to struggle against the KMT Right on the one hand (the Right had always objected to fighting the imperialists in any way) and against the KMT Left on the other (the Left took the extreme opposite position, which was equally impractical). Even then, the CCP demonstrated its ability to carry out a wise and sound policy. It advocated prudence and cautioned against forcing events or being provoked by the British.

Recently, on September [3], 1926, the British attempted to provoke the National Government at Canton with a view to causing disturbances in the rear and thus undermining the success of the Northern Expedition. Two British gunboats approached Canton and seized landing positions on the river. This provocative action failed to produce the expected results, however, and credit for this must again be attributed to the Communists, who restrained the Strike Committee from taking rash measures. In short, the CCP's activities during this period prove that it is the only political party in China capable of handling all problems with sobriety and determination, and pursuing a national policy.

[43] It must be remembered that at that time—May 1925—CCP membership was still 1,000, plus a CY membership of 2,000, although the Party's influence was such that it could guide the entire revolutionary movement. The masses understood the significance and purpose of the CCP, which attracted wide attention and was very popular among the masses. The Party began to grow rapidly from that time on. Within half a year, Party and CY membership jumped to 10,000 each. Thus the Party grew tenfold, a phenomenal advance exceeding all expectations!

[Current Weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Party]

This tremendous growth is not unaccompanied by serious difficulties. The CCP is confronted with a great shortage of workers to carry out Party policies among the masses in local areas. Most of the Party workers sent to the various localities are inexperienced and incapable of directing work among the masses. It is clear that no good would result if the Party continues growing at the same rapid speed, since the work of direction definitely will not be able to keep pace with such growth. If we

can find a large number of able directing personnel, however, the future of the Party will be brilliant. The principal weakness of this period is inability of many Party members to direct the work among the masses.

The second weakness is that many Party members are too interested in big politics and neglect the daily, pressing problems of the masses.

The third weakness, though affecting only a limited number of Party members, is most dangerous. It is the tendency not to distinguish between the national revolutionary movement and the Communist and labor movements. Once a certain newspaper article discussed the future of the national revolutionary movement and advocated communizing the movement. It also claimed all credit for the CCP. The result was the withdrawal of representatives of the petty bourgeoisie from the Shanghai Joint Committee.

One further weakness, and that is, the tendency of our comrades to classify the masses into the Left, Right, and Center. This is both wrong and dangerous. There is no absolute criterion by which we may classify the workers as the Left, the students as the Center, and the petty bourgeoisie as the Right. (Even if this is usually the case, we must not approach this question with such a conventional point of view, particularly since there are exceptions to the rule.)

[44] The CCP's position in 1926 is markedly different from its previous situation. It was formerly a study organization devoted to theoretical discussion and devoid of practical work. Now the Party concentrates its efforts on concrete, practical work. It has not abandoned theoretical study, however.

Two or three years ago the CCP was merely taking an interest in politics, whereas it is now "making politics" itself and exerting a great influence. A minor mistake of an individual Party member, let alone mistakes committed by the Party generally, adversely affects the entire Party. In this respect, a study of the events that transpired at Canton on March 20, 1926, and May 15, 1926, would be particularly instructive and would prove that mistakes were made by the Party. (The incidents are discussed in separate reports and will not be related here.) The above incidents resulted largely from the CCP's erroneous policy in working among the masses. This problem necessitates careful study in order to avoid repetition.

[Objectives of the Chinese Communist Party]

The immediate objective of the CCP is to gain influence among the entire working masses and to approach the peasantry. The Party's ability to accomplish good work among the peasantry is proved by its record in Kwangtung. Although KMT influence is stronger there than anywhere else, the CCP has been able to direct the peasant movement in Kwangtung with such success that it has almost completely monopolized the entire work.

The CCP should also assume direction over the student movement. Mistakes in the past were due to the fact that CY members held the power of directing the students. The situation will definitely improve as soon as the CC takes over control of this work.

With reference to the bourgeoisie, the important question is that of the petty bourgeoisie. Also important is the problem of neutralizing the middle bourgeoisie. The big bourgeoisie should be considered a dangerous enemy because it will always be on the imperialist side and has never been connected with the national revolutionary movement. The imperialists are well aware of this and are now trying every means to establish closer relations with the big bourgeoisie and, through it, the middle and petty bourgeoisie. For instance, the Chinese bourgeoisie living in the foreign [45] concessions of Shanghai are allowed to feel very much "at home." Relations between the Chinese bourgeoisie and imperialism will always be close because the Rev-

olution ultimately threatens both to an equal extent.

The CCP fully understands this situation. It recently toned down slogans on "big" issues and is concentrating instead on daily problems, particularly those of a local character and those that involve the interests of the masses. This is the only means of winning the confidence of the petty bourgeoisie and alienating it from the big bourgeoisie.

In accordance with what has already been pointed out at the Fourth Congress, Party work should be so organized as to afford both central and local organs responsibility for carrying out Party work. Past relations between central and local organs have not been smooth. We must correct this weakness in every possible way.

The CCP currently is confronted with one great problem: the Northern Expedition. There was at first no unanimous opinion on this among Party members. Certain organs and comrades opposed the Expedition, believing it is difficult to achieve quick results. This situation will of course be detrimental to the future of the Party if allowed to be prolonged. These comrades forget that a successful Northern Expedition would conclude the initial stage of liquidation of the militarists and, consequently, the imperialists. Even if we assume the defeat of Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin does not mean the complete extermination of militarism, a successful Northern Expedition would still be an asset to the national revolutionary movement, since the new militarists are better disposed toward the national movement than the old militarists. (The word "new" is not absolute but relative. Some militarists have connections and struggle together with the KMT while other militarists oppose the KMT and the national revolutionary movement. Hence, they are classified as "new" and "old.")

The CCP has therefore issued explicit directives for the organization of a campaign to support the Northern Expedition. It has declared that unity is essential and that the masses of workers and peasants should be made to pay more attention to this problem.

Although certain members now advocate breaking off all relations with the KMT and entering the political arena independently, the CCP continues to exert all its efforts toward realizing the policy of the unification of all revolutionary forces. The tendency toward independence from the KMT may appear to be of a revolutionary character but it actually contains the danger of alienation from the masses. In breaking off all relations with the KMT, the Party would lose the means of carrying on work among the masses legally, which is a factor of great importance. The CC must counteract at once this dangerous phenomenon.

[46] The real cause of the unceasing development of the Communist movement and the fact that it will continue to advance in the future is not Russian rubles or Russian agitators, as is claimed by the imperialist and anti-Communist Chinese press. It is rather the poverty and hunger of the Chinese people and the policy of the imperialists and militarists, which pushes the people into the arms of the only force that shows them the first and only solution to their dilemma. This force is the Chinese Communist Party, and the only political party able and willing to carry on an active struggle and to lead the fight for the liberation of the Chinese people.

The history of the CCP for the past seven or eight years shows that the Party has been treading an extremely difficult path and that it has written many glorious pages into its history. Nevertheless, there are numerous difficulties lying ahead.

The time has now come when the CCP must become a true political party of the masses. It faces many serious problems, among them the question whether it will advance by pursuing a correct policy or decline by pursuing a wrong policy. The Party's influence is now so great that a minor mistake can seriously affect the Party itself and its mass following.

We can prove that the progress of the urban laboring masses has been great. The Party should have two objectives in the nearest future: to strengthen and advance our

position in the cities, and to gain influence in the villages.

Many difficulties confront the CCP with reference to the agrarian problem because the villages are extremely backward and conservative and cannot be compared with the cities. The problem is not a hopeless one, however. The CCP has gained both experience and good results in its work in the villages of Kwangtung. The Party has widespread and solid roots there and a considerable percentage of Party members there are peasants. This proves that the CCP is in a position to organize its own nuclei among the peasantry. Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to organize all the active elements in the villages, with primary attention to the poor peasants who constitute the majority of the population.

[47] The CCP has paid and is now paying great attention to work in the army. Some concrete results have already been obtained. The events of March 20, 1926, notwithstanding, the work done by the CCP in the National Revolutionary Army previous to that date has not been obliterated and will not be obliterated in the future. Political departments and political work still exist in the Army. Despite the temporary withdrawal, party work in the National Revolutionary Army will be resumed at an opportune time with even greater vigor than before March 20. There are already signs to this effect.

Document 2

Report on the Communistic Movement of Youth in China

The Chinese Socialist Youth Corps anteceded the Chinese Communist Party but became a subsidiary organ. According to an endnote by the translator of the Russian version of this history, the original text had a notation on the margin, "To Malysheff." Ivan Malisheff, supposedly a member of the Russian Embassy guard, was one of those arrested during the April 6 raid. Our copy of the translation is from PRO (FO 371-12502/9115). The report was also published in *The China Illustrated Review*, January 28, 1928. Throughout the document we have changed the name "League" to "Corps."

We do not know who the author of the report was but the source of information therein seems to have been one or more Chinese leaders of the Corps, possibly Chang T'ai-lei. We have not found this document used in modern Soviet scholarship.[1] The report has a curious construction. It gives information on the history of the Corps from 1920 to 1924, and then it jumps to the situation as of November 1926. It might be surmised that a portion of the report was missing when seized—there are many cases of missing or fire-damaged documents—or that a conclusion had been added to a report written in 1925 to bring it more nearly up to date. The report may be anachronistic in using the term Communist Youth Corps so early as January 1922. It is our understanding that the name of the Corps was changed from Socialist to Communist in February 1925 at the Third Congress of the Corps. There is no doubt, however, that the leadership considered it a communist organization, for the Socialist Youth Corps voted at its First Congress in May 1922 to join the Young Communist International.

The report is valuable in a number of ways. It provides nine dates related to the Corps' history, sometimes precise ones, and these prove to be correct when checked with independent sources. It also provides estimates of the number of Corps members at several periods, and for November 1926 it gives proportions of members who were workmen, students, peasants, and others. It tells of the early formation of socialist youth groups in named cities, the heterogeneous beliefs among members, and the expulsion of non-Marxists. It mentions the Youth Corps' leadership of the anti-Christian movement of 1922 and its activities in the labor, student, and southern peasant movements. The writer is particularly hostile to the Chinese YMCA and the Chinese Boy Scouts. He discusses in a rather guarded way the initial disagreement of the Corps' leaders with the Chinese Communist policy of joining the Kuomintang, and the more "leftist" stance taken by the Corps before it was brought under the dominance of the Communist Party.

Notes

1. An early Russian account of the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps dated 1928 is in Shumiatskii's "From the History of the Comsomol and the Communist Party of China," a eulogy for Chang T'ai-lei (killed in the Canton Commune, December 12, 1927), one of the founders of the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps. Shumiatskii used Chang's written reports of 1921 on the SYC's organizational work and early activities.

TEXT

[1] A. Origin

On the ground where remnants of the past and germs of the future are mixed up, two classes are conspicuous, viz., *bourgeoisie and proletariat*, which are constantly carrying on a class struggle among themselves.

The present-day proletariat, the poor peasants and workers, is the main base on which the communistic movement is developing in China. The fight against foreign imperialism extends this base and causes the large masses of the petty bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia to join this movement.

Within the last twenty years, the years of the intensive development of capitalism in China, the bourgeoisie did not produce either its own philosophers or outstanding literary men and writers; it did not manifest itself by anything in the domain of arts; neither did it do away with the ideology of feudal ages. The proletariat, however, succeeded in proclaiming a new ideology and in giving a new impetus to the social struggle. Communism became the object of a great attention of the part of the intelligentsia which had broken away from the feudal ideology. For that reason the majority of students were allured by communist theories. At that time communism was rather an intellectual current than a political movement. Therefore the communistic movement in China grew out of the left wing of the students' movement and did not appear at once as a movement of the working youth.

[2] In the middle of 1920, on account of the separation of classes, the students' "movement of May 4" also divided itself into several currents, the most extreme of which were socialism, anarchism, and communism (which represented Marxism in China).

The left wing with all its socialist, anarchist, and communist branches, as opposed to the other wing of the students' movement, began then to become consolidated into a single organization called the *Socialistic Youth Corps*. Thus, since its origin, there were hidden cross-purposes inside this organization which were caused by its heterogeneous composition. *The first peculiar feature* of these organizations was *heterogeneity* and not homogeneity.

The first organization of the Socialistic Youth was created on July 22, 1920, at Shanghai, then at Peking, Tientsin, Changsha, and other places. By January 1921 there were eight such organizations with more than 300 members.

These organizations grew out of the students' "movement of May 4," which bore an exclusively political character. General surroundings, however, were extremely unfavorable for new political movements. The frame of mind of students, with their slogan "back to studies," was also reflected in these organizations. Some students fervently began to study Chinese philosophers of old times, others proceeded to the study of the new doctrine of socialism.

The *political inactivity* and the *aloofness from the masses*, because actually they were only circles, mainly for the study of socialism, were the *second peculiar feature* of these organizations.

At the first meeting of the socialistic youth at Wuchang it was specially pointed out that the main problem of these organizations was not the participation in the class struggle or in the political life, but the study of socialism, as a new achievement of world's culture that was opposed to the Chinese culture of feudal ages.

[3] One of the members of the Hankow organization began his speech with the following proposal: "Theories that are studied by the Corps shall be gradually applied in practice. We must treat servants as our equals and must do ourselves, without calling servants, all the work that we are able to do without the aid of somebody else." Such was the point of view of members of the Corps as to the way in which "theory must

be applied to practice." They clung to this point of view, instead of trying to find the real causes of inequality in human relations and to raise the question referring to the organization of the proletariat, and of servants in particular. This point of view may be regarded as the *third peculiar feature* that characterized student organizations at that time.

Finally, as to the question relating to the seizure of power, they expressed themselves in the following sense: "We must conquer the power by means of oral and written propaganda and oppose the 'living word' to the rifles and guns of militarists." They expected by means of agitation to put socialism into practice.

To sum up, socialistic organizations of youth at that time were characterized by the following peculiar traits: they belonged to the *petty bourgeoisie* as regards their composition; they did not consider it necessary to take part in the *political struggle*; their studies bore a purely "academic" or theoretical character; it was a study of socialism along theoretical lines; their ideology was of a very confused character.

These characteristics, however, cannot be extended to all organizations of that time and to all members. Some of the members carried on an energetic agitation among workers, published special literature for that purpose, and distributed it among the masses, etc. In short, theory with them did not differ from practice. These members belonged to the *communist elements* of these socialistic organizations.

[4] These two parts of students' organizations could not live in harmony with one another. An internal struggle broke out very soon. This struggle was carried on around the question relating to the necessity of doing work among the masses and of organizing the proletariat.

Speaking generally, those cross-purposes, which in a more or less latent form existed ever since the creation of socialist organizations of the youth, finally found their practical expression against right anarchist elements and, as a consequence of this struggle, these organizations were dissolved in August 1921, i.e., just one year after their creation.

During this struggle the real revolutionary part of students was consolidated into a new and, as regards its ideology, more homogeneous organization, the *Communistic Youth Corps*.

B. The Communistic Youth Corps

Active work inside the socialistic organizations of the youth was carried on by communistic elements which, after becoming stronger in this struggle against idealists and opportunists, dissolved the socialistic organizations of the youth and created in their place a communistic corps.

New communistic organizations first of all began to carry on work among the masses and started independent political movements.

The new Corps started at that time the publication of a central organ, *The Pioneer*, which obtained a very wide circulation and was printed in 5,000 copies.

The first mass movement of the Chinese Communistic Youth Corps took place on January 15, 1922, the commemoration day of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. On that day this Corps organized at Shanghai, Changsha, Wuchang, Canton, and Peking mass meetings of the youth for the propagation, in both oral and printed form, of the ideas of Karl Liebknecht.

[5] The experience thus gained was afterward utilized during the *anti-Christian* movement which began in March or April 1922 and was organized and guided by the Communistic Youth Corps.

This was the period of mass propaganda not only of communistic ideas generally, but of the aims of the Corps in particular. The rapid growth of the Corps can be explained by the success of this propaganda. The Corps had at that time seventeen or-

ganizations and numbered 3,000 members. This may be regarded as a very great achievement of the communistic movement of the youth in China.

After the anti-Christian movement the Corps began openly to take part in the *labor movement* and sometimes even quite independently to direct strikes. At Changsha five members of the Corps who directed the strike were executed by being cut into small pieces by executioners in public places by the order of the Hunan Tuchun. At Shanghai five members of the Corps were arrested by the foreign municipal police for the same offense, i.e., instigation and direction of the strike.

Finally, the Corps took an active part in the May Day celebrations. At Canton the Corps, jointly with the Communist Party, succeeded in organizing on May 1 a demonstration in which 50,000 participated. Ever since, May Day celebrations with the participation of workers began to take place annually.

Having attained some success in the work among the masses and having created new organizations, the Shanghai organization took upon itself the initiative in consolidating separate organizations into a single Communistic Youth corps and convoked the *1st All-China Congress.*

The opening ceremony of this Congress took place at Canton on May 5, 1922, the 104th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx. In selecting this date for the opening of the Congress, the Corps specially pointed out its fidelity to the Marxian revolutionary ideology.

[6] The principal questions that were brought before the Congress for discussion were the *Regulations of the Corps* and its *program.* The Corps also defined its aims as follows:

As regards *politics*: the establishment of a democratic form of government of China, abolishing the domination of militarists and foreign imperialists.

As regards *economics*: the Corps puts forth a demand that child and juvenile labor be properly regulated, especially with regard to working hours, regular rests, sanitary conditions, and increase of wages; also another demand of a special character, viz., that "employers and their wives should be forbidden to send apprentices on errands."

As regards *instruction*: the Corps demands the training in some trade of working youth, universal free education, the introduction of a phonetic alphabet, and the abolition of hieroglyphic writing.

As regards *education*: members of the Corps, as well as the masses of the Chinese youth, shall be educated in a revolutionary spirit.

In addition to all this, the attitude of the Corps toward various political organizations generally and toward the youth in particular was clearly defined in the program of the Corps.

After the First Congress the growth of membership continued and the number of members of the Corps reached 4,000. During the period of time between the First and Second congresses the Corps developed its activities in the following directions: participation in the struggle of workers by instigating and guiding strikes, organization of workers into trade unions, guidance of the student movement, and propaganda in oral and printed form.

The Second Congress took place in August 1923, at Nanking. This was the period [7] of the victory of reactionary forces, when Ts'ao K'un was making preparations for his election as President of the Republic and when all student and other social movements were being crushed. Therefore the Corps was compelled to assume almost everywhere a secret character as an organization unauthorized by law. Its membership at that time decreased to 2,500 because during the period of reaction the less steady elements left the Corps. This decrease in membership, however, was accompanied by the corresponding improvement in quality; the working elements, after the less steady members had left, constituted 25 percent of the total number of members of the

Corps.

Principal questions that have been brought before the Second Congress for discussion were those relating to the centralization of authority and to discipline in the Corps, also to the necessity of transferring the main work of the Corps into the working masses and of organizing the Corps nuclei in the factories and mills.

The period that followed the Second Congress was the period of *propaganda* and of *organizing work*.

Instead of one central organ, *The Pioneer*, three central organs were published since that time: *Bulletin*, for members of the Corps, *The Chinese Youth*, for students, and *The Young Worker*, for workers. These publications are organs for communistic propaganda generally and not for the youth only. Almost all articles in them are devoted to general questions of the national revolution and to the theory and practice of communism. Questions concerning the youth movement occupy an insignificant place in these publications.

During the so-called Lenin days of 1924, enormous meetings took place. These were days of the national mourning in China. "Lenin days" were observed during the whole month. At that time the Corps was carrying on among the masses the widest propaganda of the ideas of Lenin.

C. The Part Played by the Communistic Youth Corps in the Revolutionary Movement of China

[8] The Communistic Youth Corps is an important political force in the country. Therefore it is compelled to come into contact with, and to define its attitude toward, various trade, revolutionary, and bourgeoisie organizations, such as (1) *bourgeoisie organizations*, such as "Young Men's Christian Association" and "Boy Scouts," (2) *national revolutionary organizations*, such as the Kuomintang party, various democratic societies, and student unions, (3) *workers' organizations*, the trade unions.

Americans who direct the work of the *Young Men's Christian Association* are bringing up the Chinese youth in the spirit of submission to foreign imperialism. But it would be a mistake to think that this association is an exclusively bourgeois organization as regards its composition. It comprises young men belonging to the typical petty bourgeoisie and to the employee's and students' class. In addition, the association attracted into its ranks a portion of the Chinese working youth. Therefore the struggle against the Young Men's Christian Association has for its exclusive aim the unveiling of its true character, in order to tear the masses of the Chinese youth away from the harmful and pernicious influence of this imperialistic organization. This struggle is carried on by two means; by revealing its true character and by undermining it from within.

Boy Scouts are organized either by the Young Men's Christian Association or by Christian schools. Mere revelation of the true character of boy scouts is insufficient. It is necessary to oppose them by organizing organizations revolutionary in spirit. Only then will it be possible to attract into them Chinese children from Christian boy scout organizations.

[9] The *second group* is composed of national revolutionary organizations. With reference to them the First Congress of the Corps expressed the opinion that a *moral* support should be given to the national revolutionary movement.

When, however, the question of giving also a *practical* support arose and when the Communist Party had resolved to enter the national revolutionary party of Kuomintang, to exert its influence upon it and to direct its work, the Communistic Youth Corps made an attempt to evade the entry into the Kuomintang. The Second Congress of the Corps passed a resolution approving the decision of the Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, but with the following amendment: "This entry must

not cause the weakening of the independent work of the Party and of the Corps among the working class." The purport of this amendment lay in the fact that this work, i.e., among the working classes, was opposed to the general work of the Kuomintang, as having nothing in common with it. Some disagreements occurred on this ground between the Party and the Corps. Experience proved, however, the expediency of the work of the Party inside the Kuomintang and the Corps also began to work actively with the Kuomintang.

The Corps succeeded in drawing into the general national revolutionary movement various *democratic societies* which were by their character decentralized and heterogeneous.

With reference to *student organizations*, the Second Congress pointed out the revolutionary role of the student movement and the necessity of directing it. There was not a single student movement of which the Corps was not the inspirer and the spiritual guide.

To the *third group* belonged *peasants'* and *workers' organizations*.

Taking into account the role of *peasants* in the revolutionary movement, the Communistic Youth Corps proceeded to their organization. In Kwangtung province the peasant movement directed by the Corps began to carry on armed struggle against the militarist in the south of China, General Ch'en Chun-ming [Ch'en Ch'ung-ming]. [10] Notwithstanding the fact that it was suppressed by the force of arms, it played an important role in the revolutionization of Chinese peasants. In Hunan the Communistic Youth Corps succeeded in organizing the "Union of Workers and Peasants," which numbered several thousands of members and which put forth the following demands: (1) the decrease of tax rates; (2) the reduction of land rent; and (3) other demands of an economic character. Similar organizations were created in other provinces also, and the Corps always played the organizing and guiding part.

As regards the *labor movement*, the Communistic Youth Corps takes an active part in the organization of trade unions and very frequently directs the struggle that the Chinese proletariat is carrying on by means of strikes. It succeeded even in attracting adult persons into its organizations. Thus the Communistic Youth Corps takes an active part not only in the revolutionary movement of the youth generally but in the organization of the labor movement in the country in particular. This, however, has as many *merits* as *defects*.

D. The Corps and the Party

The Corps was "born" during the period of the social and political work and struggle. The energetic revolutionary Chinese Youth took upon itself the mission of organizing not only the youth, but also adult people. This is the revolutionary *merit* of the Corps for which history will unquestionably give thanks. Such a state of affairs, however, is admissible only to a certain extent. One must not lose sight of the fact that there is in China *the Communist Party*. It is compelled to work in a more secret way, because it has been driven "underground." It is reserved and less numerous than the Corps, but its quality is better. When the Corps had grown up, it embraced a greater territory than the Party. In many localities there were no Party "cells" (nuclei), but there existed organizations of the Corps. *Thus the Corps assumed functions of the Party.* About the middle of 1923 internal disagreements occurred in connection with the question of joining the Kuomintang. "Left" elements entered the more "left" Corps. [11] A certain tendency was noticeable at that time to transform the Corps into another party along lines different from those of the real Communist Party. This tendency was favored by the fact that the Corps consisted of many adults, as according to regulations, persons of eighteen to twenty-eight years are admitted as members to the Corps. The moment approached when the good points of the Corps threatened

to assume a very dangerous tendency. Therefore the question was raised of "rejuvenating" the Corps as regards the age of its members, as well as its work. The Corps must set before itself the task of strengthening the Party, i.e., members of the Comsomol more than twenty-six years of age shall leave and join the Communist Party. The second task of the Corps is to carry on *direct work among the youth*, first of all among the working and peasant youth.

The Communistic Youth Corps is the *school* through which masses of the peasant and working youth and the revolutionary youth of the intelligentsia class must pass, in order to be able afterward to join the Communist Party. To the lot of the Communistic Youth Corps falls the task of *strengthening and developing the Party* under the direction of which it must carry on its work.

E. Conclusions

(At the time of the sixth plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communistic Youth Corps, "Comsomol," held on November 12, 1926.)

The Chinese Comsomol is growing and getting stronger. Quite recently this Corps numbered only 2,500 members, but now there are 12,500 members, subdivided into [12] 900 cells (nuclei), 40 percent of these members being workmen, 35 percent students, 5 percent peasants, and the remaining 20 percent belonging to other classes. Lately, however, the Corps has considerably improved; young workmen constitute now 43 percent of its total membership.

In spite of the persecutions and the most difficult conditions of the "underground work" under which the Chinese Comsomol has to carry on its activities, this Corps is gradually succeeding in winning over to its side the working youth of the oppressed country and is bringing up this youth in such a manner as to inculcate in it the hatred of the imperialists of all countries, the conquerors of China with its many millions of inhabitants.

But of particular importance is the fact that the Chinese Comsomol is beginning to direct now its activities toward the social work chiefly among the youth; whereas formerly, on account of the weakness of the Communist Party, this Corps was merely carrying on social and political work in general.

This change of tactics on the part of the Chinese Comsomol will ensure the Corps development into a real mass organization of the working youth.

Document 3

The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of Its Origin, Development, and Organization

This historical account of the National Revolutionary Army was translated from Russian and is from PRO (FO 371-12440/9156. F 94/87/10). We deduce that two separate writers were involved, General Vasilii K. Bliukher ("Galen") and General N. V. Kuibyshev ("Kisan'ka"). This deduction is based in part on statements by A. V. Blagodatov in his *Zapiski o Kitaiskoi Revolutsii 1925-1927 gg.* On page 123, Blagodatov states that when he was working in the apparatus of the Soviet military attaché in Peking, Bliukher arrived there in the summer of 1925. Because the Peking office was ill-informed about the situation in South China, Blagodatov asked Bliukher to describe the situation there. When Bliukher's report was completed, it was typed in thirteen copies and sent to all other groups of advisers. Somewhat later, N. V. Kuibyshev stopped in Peking on his way home to Russia and made a similar report, says Blagodatov.

Then Blagodatov incorporates some of the information, in the same sequence, as appears in the first part of our Document 3 (for example, the size and reliability of Sun Yat-sen's guard, and the various types of "allied" armies in Kwangtung, (*Zapiski*, pp. 123-25). Another reason for deducing that the first part of Document 3 emanated from Bliukher is that the writer knew of the defeat of generals Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan in June 1925 but discusses General Hsü Ch'ung-chih in the present tense, as if ignorant that General Hsü was expelled from Canton in September 1925. Bliukher guided the campaign against Yang and Liu, but he left Canton in mid-July 1925. As in the case of our Document 9, which is by General Bliukher, the writer was ignorant of events in Canton in August and September 1925.

We deduce that the last part of Document 3, beginning with our caption "Opposition to Army Reorganization, Summer 1925" on page 6, is by Kuibyshev because some of the information is similar, even as to phrasing, to that in our Document 22, "Report on Military Developments in Kwangtung," by Kuibyshev. For example, both documents mention in sequence the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, a reactionary tide in Kwangtung University under the presidency of Tsou Lu, dangers from Hsiung K'o-wu, Teng Pen-yin, and Wei Pang-p'ing, and Ch'en Chiung-ming's attempted blockade of Canton with warships lent by Wu P'ei-fu (Doc. 3, p. 6; Doc. 22, pp. 32-33). Kuibyshev arrived in Canton to replace Bliukher on October 30, 1925. In Document 22 he reviews conditions in Kwangtung from May 1925 onward but stops about the end of the year. Our Document 3, however, extends to March 1926. Kuibyshev was made to leave Canton on March 24, 1926, as part of the settlement of the Chung-shan Gunboat Incident, and he returned to Russia. Thus it seems that the writer of the latter part of Document 3 used materials from his own prior report, now our Document 22. The last two paragraphs of Document 3 have a ring of praise for the accomplishments of the Russian military advisers in Canton, which might well have been written by a chief of the group upon departing from his post.

The "National Revolutionary Army" is valuable for its realistic description of the character and quality of the armies in Kwangtung during the first year that the Soviet military advisers became acquainted with them, beginning in October 1923, and for

its systematic account of their efforts to reform the armies supporting the National Government in Canton. It frankly mentions several aborted starts in reform because of commanders' opposition, gradual success in clearing the province of hostile forces, and then sums up with a list of improvements accomplished as of March 1926.

In Document 3 we have introduced section headings, corrected some Chinese names that had gone through translation changes, and added some queries in brackets. After the NRA was reorganized in October 1925, "corps" rather than "army" is the appropriate translation for *chün*, as the organizational level above a division. However, we have left the term "army corps" when so used in the Russian military documents.

TEXT

[1] A short history of the origin of the National Revolutionary Army must be outlined in order to give a clearer idea as to its present-day state.

[Military Situation in Kwangtung, Winter 1923-24]

In the winter of 1923 only Dr. Sun Yat-sen's personal bodyguard (numbering about 150-200 bayonets) could be called a unit, which was entirely subordinated to Dr. Sun. The other numerous troops, which were then in the territory of Kwangtung and which constituted the so-called Allied Army, were nothing else than quite independent armies of individual generals. These generals were, to a greater or lesser degree, [2] subordinated to Dr. Sun. Some of them were Chinese militarists of the common type. Being expelled from their native provinces, they usually entered the territory of Kwangtung, the richest province in South China, in order to improve there their financial condition and then return to their own provinces. Owing to the growing popularity of Dr. Sun, they declared themselves as a matter of form to be his allies, supporters of the revolution, etc.; in fact, however, they were making plans for returning to their own provinces, and even for overthrowing the Canton Government (after their own position had been strengthened) and of seizing Kwangtung.

Others were old "companions in arms" of Dr. Sun, and actually shared his opinions and views. They went "arm-in-arm" with him, but still reserved a complete independence in matters of army administration, and were also cherishing the hope of returning later to their own provinces, and, after consolidating their position there, of forming an "Alliance of Southern Provinces," under the Kuomintang banner.

In addition, Kwangtung province was literally "inundated" by several "petty armies" of individual generals, who often had less than 100 soldiers under their command.

To the first category belonged the Yunnanese army of General Yang Hsi-min, into which was incorporated as a separate unit the army of General Fang Sek-san [Fan Shih-sheng] and the Kwangsi army of Lou Ch'ou-wang [Liu Chen-huan].

To the second category belonged the Hunanese army of General T'an Yen-k'ai, the Hunanese army of General Fan Shi-ming [Fan Hsing-min? or the Honanese army of General Fan Chung-hsiu], the Hunanese army of General Ch'eng Chim [Ch'eng Ch'ien], and the gendarmerie of General Wu T'i-hsing [Wu T'ieh-ch'eng].

Quite apart from the above-mentioned stood the Cantonese army of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih. It alone represented the local Kwangtung army, and for that reason enjoyed among the local population a much greater popularity than the other armies. Its commander, General Hsü Ch'ung-chih, after several conflicts with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, finally joined him in March 1924. Being a clever and cunning militarist, and taking into account the growth of the revolutionary movement in Kwangtung, he joined the

Kuomintang party, and he now makes speeches of revolutionary character, shows sympathy to Russian advisers, but, actually, is becoming more and more closely connected with comprador circles and right elements of the Kuomintang at Canton, and is deriving from them direct advantages of material kind. He puts forward the slogan, "Canton for Cantonese," which means the expulsion from Kwangtung of all troops from alien provinces and the maintenance there of the Cantonese army only. This slogan of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih was directed chiefly against the 1st Division of the Whampoa "party troops," which was just then being organized, because in this division General Hsü discerned already a force which, in the course of time, might be moved by the Kuomintang party, even against himself. This slogan is also readily accepted by the merchant class of Kwangtung, because this class suffers material losses from the numerous armies, which are extorting taxes from the province.

Of the great number of "petty armies," the following may be regarded as being comparatively large: the Hupei, Kiangsi, Fukien, and other armies. These armies, however, do not play any part in the general course of events in Kwangtung, and they only serve their generals as the means of deriving revenues.

All these "allies" are ruining the material well-being of Kwangtung province. Having divided the whole territory into regions, each army strives to get out of them as much as possible. The generals themselves who were allied to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, after enrichment of their armies, become gradually more independent, and, after establishing civil authorities in the regions which are directly subordinated to them, they gradually become actual masters of the province. In consequence of their predatory policy toward the population, the latter began to hate the army itself, as well as the government and the party, under the banner of which these armies were operating. Although the generals from other provinces were formally members of the Kuomintang, even holding responsible posts in this party (Yang Hsi-min belonged to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and Lou Ch'ou-wang [Liu Chen-huan] was candidate for membership in the Commission of Control attached to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang), they did nothing to enhance the authority of the party in the eyes of the population; on the contrary, it seemed as if they even encouraged arbitrary acts of their subordinates toward the local population. As has been mentioned already, this circumstance may be explained by the fact that the generals themselves regard their stay in the province as temporary. They intended, after having derived from Kwangtung province as much money as possible, to return to their native provinces, drive away from there their militaristic rivals, and to get hold of the post of Tuchun for themselves. Kwangtung province was literally inundated by [3] hundreds of small armies under independent generals, who had been driven away from their native provinces, and who were draining of financial resources the regions in which they happened to be. Being financially independent, they were quite independent of the National Revolutionary Government, although calling themselves allies of the latter.

[Opposition to the Revolutionary Government]

The government, having no real force at its disposal, was compelled for the time being to sanction such acts of these depredators, and thereby was compromising itself more and more in the eyes of merchants, as well as in the eyes of the peasantry and workmen. Gradually all classes of the population began to stand in opposition to the government.

The aid given by the government to the workmen of Hong Kong and Canton during the strike in the spring of 1922, and the congress of the Kuomintang party, which took place in January 1924, brought a change into the whole political situation in Kwangtung. It created a new grouping of forces, viz., a group of irreconcilables

toward the government of Dr. Sun, and also a group upon which the government could rely at some future date.

Although the government by giving aid to the workmen during the Hong Kong strike did not set before itself the direct task of bringing the Kuomintang party nearer to the toiling masses, nevertheless, the sympathies of the working classes of the Hong Kong and Canton population toward the Kuomintang party and the government of Dr. Sun increased to a considerable degree; on the other hand, the aid given by Dr. Sun during this strike drove a wedge between the latter and imperialism, which became since that time irreconcilable toward the Canton Government. Simultaneously with the imperialists, the big merchants of the comprador class at Canton also began to stand in opposition to the government, because the material prosperity of this class is based upon business connections with Hong Kong.

The congress of the Kuomintang party (in January) completed the intended separation. The introduction of clearness into Dr. Sun's "three principles" made a breach in the ranks of the Kuomintang party. The right elements, the merchants of the comprador class and large landowners, went over to the right wing and stood even in opposition to Dr. Sun, whereas the democratic elements of the Kuomintang created the left wing. The Chinese Communist Party also joined the left wing.

As a result of further anti-imperialistic policies of Dr. Sun (the support of the Hong Kong seamen's strike, support of the Shameen strike of 1924, etc.), the relations between Canton and Hong Kong became more and more strained. On the other hand, the growing activity of the left wing of the Kuomintang among the democratic elements made the difference between the population in the city and the village more and more evident and drove the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners into the camp of those actively opposing the government and its measures.

Hong Kong gave active support to this opposition; it approved the strengthening of the merchants' volunteer corps ("Paper Tigers"), which opposed the government. It gave support to General Ch'en Chiung-ming in his operations against government troops, when he strove to get hold of the eastern part of Kwangtung. Hong Kong also promised the generals from other provinces assistance in getting hold of their own provinces provided they would fight the Canton Government.

At that time the government had almost no support in Kwangtung province. Arbitrary and licentious acts, performed by the so-called government troops, undermined the authority of the government even among those classes of the population upon which the government tried to rely.

[Real Condition of the Armies in 1924]

As each of the generals, who were on the territory of Kwangtung, was financially quite independent and kept his units with the money derived from the taxes, which he himself was collecting, he became, *eo ipso*, quite independent from the government and the high command. As to orders issued by the government, the troops executed them in cases only when these orders coincided with the interests and wishes of the general concerned.

Each of these generals regarded his troops as his own personal investment, from which he derived his income; therefore, he strove to pay as little as possible for the upkeep of his unit and at the same time to increase their numerical strength, in order to get hold of larger regions, where he could collect taxes.

[4] All of the numerous "armies" which were stationed on the territory of Kwangtung province were kept according to their own budgets (or, which is more true, without any budgets at all) and had their own organizations. The quality of the officers' personnel was extremely poor. The higher officers, the majority of whom had had no military training at all, were mostly ex-bandits. They took little interest in the condi-

tion of their units and took no direct part in the administration of the army. They did not work at all, but turned everything over to officers of middle or lower rank.

Officers of middle rank were usually engaged because they were friends or relatives of the senior commander; therefore, frequently they were of little use. The majority of them had some military education but, being left without any guidance from the senior officers, they soon deteriorated. There was also a considerable percentage of opium smokers among them.

The junior officers were in the majority of cases old soldiers, without any military education at all, who had obtained their commissions after long service in the ranks. The whole burden of the routine work in the units fell to their lot. They were charged with the entire responsibility of the training of soldiers and had to bear the whole burden of actual fighting.

As regards political convictions, the senior officers in command were members of the Kuomintang party, but only in name; as for their real nature, however, they belonged to the usual type of Chinese militarists, who are always willing to ally themselves with those who can be useful to them in attaining their personal aims. The majority of the officers of middle rank are nonparty men; only the minority of them were touched by the revolutionary movement, but their number was very small, and therefore they could not exercise any considerable influence upon the political condition of army units. Almost all junior commanders are illiterate.

Taken as a whole, the enlisted personnel was extremely poor as regards quality. A large percentage consisted of soldiers who had been in the service for ten or more years; there was also a large percentage of sick men and ex-bandits. As a kind of guarantee against possible mass desertions, the soldiers were enlisted mostly in the remote northern provinces. This circumstance, in connection with the great difference in the language of the local population (the Kwangtung dialect), and that of the population of the neighboring provinces, created a complete estrangement between the soldiers and the local population. This fact explains the hostile attitude of the local population toward the army, and this feeling is still more aggravated by looting and marauding on the part of the soldiers.

The supplying of army units was carried on in a haphazard way. The commander of each separate unit, who was collecting taxes in the region where his unit was quartered, regarded the money thus collected from the population as his own and tried to spend as little of it as possible for the maintenance of his "army," reserving the greater part of it for his personal use. As to the moneys allotted for the maintenance of army units, the general distributed them among his subordinated commanders, who in their turn kept a considerable portion of them for themselves; in such a way only the minimum amount of what is necessary for the maintenance of soldiers reached the units. As a result, the soldiers have neither clothing nor footwear; their pay was not given them for years; soldier's provisions were being stolen from them, and the soldier lived without being able to satisfy his hunger. There was no trace of any organ that could control the expenditure of funds allotted for the maintenance of army units. Everybody was stealing, beginning from the commander of the army down to the company commander.

There were rifles of most various models and calibers, without any system of providing them with munitions. The generals made purchases of cartridges from one of the arsenals and distributed them among the units. No attempt was made to ascertain and to keep record of the exact amount of arms and cartridges available.

The training of soldiers, both for garrison and for field service, is extremely poor because the commanders themselves are quite unprepared for this task.

As regards garrison training, the principal attention was being paid to the showy side, such as parades. The "goose step" was widely used in all the units. Notwithstanding the fact, however, that much time was used for close order drill, the soldiers

could not even keep step.

It was even worse with the field service training, which was limited to practicing deployment into skirmishes. When deployed in skirmishes, particular attention was paid to a "straight line" of skirmishes.

As almost no attention was paid to rifle practice in the armies, the soldiers did [5] not know how to shoot. The army had no idea as to scouting and reconnaissance. There was no communication service in the units. Almost all armies were ignorant of engineering work.

Discipline among the commanders was very slack. It happened quite usually in the armies that the orders given were executed inexactly or not executed at all. There was, however, no punishment for disobedience, or failure to carry out orders. With regard to soldiers, the so-called cudgeling discipline was in use. The soldier was not allowed to talk much and was beaten very often. His commander acted quite arbitrarily toward him. At whim of the commanding officer the soldier was often publicly shot, even for an insignificant offense.

The staffs in the army units existed "on paper" only. There was never any question about regular staff work.

On account of all above-mentioned defects, the fighting value of the army was almost reduced to nothing. Had a really serious enemy force made an offensive move against Kwangtung, the armies would have been defeated and dispersed in a very short time. Therefore, even if all these armies actually had moved for the defense of the National Revolutionary Government, they could not have accomplished anything. The government was fully conscious of such a state of affairs, but was powerless to act. Although on paper it had at its disposal an army consisting of 150,000 soldiers, the government could not carry out a single operation or a single measure, unless the general commanding this or that army was interested in it. In short, the government, in view of such a state of affairs, was compelled to bring its decisions in accordance with the will of the "independent" generals. A lot of energy and strength was wasted for diplomatic negotiations with them and persuasions. As a result, however, each of the generals, disregarding the government's decisions, invariably stuck to his own line of conduct.

Before the beginning of each of the campaigns which the National Revolutionary Government had to undertake, the greatest effort usually was spent for persuasions and agitations, in order to induce the generals to take part in the campaign. During campaigns the high command paid more attention to persuading and to keeping the "good-will" of the generals than to fighting the enemy.

Whenever the government had to carry out measures contrary to the ideas of these generals, it was in danger of being destroyed by them. The government was more and more urgently confronted with the question of the reorganization (even though a partial one) of the troops of those generals who were most devoted to Dr. Sun, in order to create an armed force on which it could rely.

[First Step in Reorganization, Whampoa Military Academy]

The first step in the direction of the army reorganization was the establishment of the military school of the Kuomintang (Whampoa), at the head of which was put General Chiang Kai-shek, who was entirely devoted to Dr. Sun. The mission of this school was the training for the army of junior officers, well educated in the political sense; these officers, being afterward sent to the units of various generals, were to assist the "army reorganization from below"; on the other hand, should the government have at its disposal financial means, these same officers were to serve as a cadre for the formation of new units, organized in accordance with new regulations.

This school was organized by us in 1924, and at first it was maintained at our expense. By October 1924 about 1,000 cadets were enrolled in this school. The work

of the organization, as well as the instruction therein, was being carried on under the direct guidance of the Russian instructors. The Political Section was organized in the school in order to introduce political work also, and the cadets took a lively part in the political life of Kwangtung province. This school served as a model for various schools attached to the armies of generals from other provinces, and these latter introduced many analogous reforms, pertaining to the training for field service and for political work.

[First Eastern Expedition, Spring 1925]

Afterward, at this school were organized the so-called party troops. The history of these "party troops" is as follows. In January 1924 [1925], after the suppression of the revolt of the "Paper Tigers," the government was most urgently confronted with the question of creating a new, regularly organized and well-disciplined armed force. It was decided to form at first one regiment, and later a division, which could serve as a basis for the formation of a new National Revolutionary Army, and also as a model for those generals who could decide definitely to throw their lot in with the Revolutionary Government. General Chiang Kai-shek was charged with the formation of this division, and, as a result of two months' work, toward the beginning of the eastern campaign (spring 1925), General Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in bringing to the
[6] front two regiments, well supplied, disciplined, and so thoroughly trained in the political sense that they could hold firmly enough at the front, and did not loot the population. During this campaign, their first one, the "party troops" became at once very popular with the local population.

The Cantonese army of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih and the "party troops" acquired during this campaign the fame of being conquerors of General Ch'en Chiung-ming. The National Revolutionary Government, having become considerably stronger on account of the victories in the eastern part of the province (spring 1925), at last felt itself in a strong enough position to execute the first measures in connection with the reorganization of the "allied armies." It decided to give these armies a uniform organization; to create a supreme command for armed forces, which were quartered on the territory of Kwangtung province; to centralize the supplying, etc. The final goal of the government was the creation of a unified National Revolutionary Army.

But, soon after first attempts at the reorganization, the National Revolutionary Government met with a violent opposition on the part of the generals, who considered these governmental measures as an attempt to do away with their privileges. This opposition took the form of an open revolt against the government of two "allied" generals, Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan. In consequence, the government had to put off for a while all measures of reorganization and to attend to the suppression of the revolt. Thanks to the unusual (in the Chinese troops) resoluteness shown by the army units that remained loyal to the government, the latter succeeded in suppressing this revolt in a very short time. This victory considerably increased the political power of the government and afforded it the possibility to raise again the question of army reorganization.

In the middle of June 1925 the preparatory work pertaining to the army organization was taken up again. At that time the Military Council, which has the functions of the supreme command, was established, with a General Staff, which is directly subordinated to it. Then the first steps relating to the reorganization of the army itself were undertaken.

[Opposition to Army Reorganization, 1925]

However, as soon as the reorganization of the army itself was started, the opposition of the generals increased again. This time they found support in Hong Kong and

among the members of the right wing of the Kuomintang. By that time, a strike bearing an anti-imperialistic character was declared at Hong Kong, and in order to aid the strikers, several larger enterprises (such as the construction of a road to the port of Whampoa, the paving of streets, the plaiting of sandals for the army, etc.) were undertaken at Canton, public "soup kitchens" were established. All that affected Hong Kong and provoked it to take some active measures. Influenced by Hong Kong, the antigovernment groups were encouraged. The assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai was one of the first acts of these groups; a series of terroristic acts, directed against the members of the government and prominent members of the left Kuomintang, was to follow this assassination. A mutiny was instigated in some army units, which were to make a military coup d'etat in Kwangtung province. Also a serious antigovernment movement was started in Kwangtung University under the direction of the president of this university, Tsou Lu. General Ch'en Chiung-ming, supported by Hong Kong, again advanced against Canton from the east; and Canton was also threatened by the Szechuan General Hsiung K'e-wu from the north and by generals Teng Pen-yin and Wei Pang-p'ing from the south. Simultaneously, General Ch'en Chiung-ming made an attempt to blockade Canton with the aid of gunboats, which he had received from General Wu P'ei-fu, and to advance against Canton from the direction of Hong Kong.

The government was again compelled to put off the question of army reorganization and to attend to the disarming of unreliable army units, the arrest of the leaders of the conspiracy, etc. With the active support of the "party troops" (which by that time developed into an army corps), the government quickly carried through all these measures. The greater part of the Canton army (although some units, which were to be disarmed, succeeded in escaping and going over to the side of General Teng Pen-yin) and several smaller army units were disarmed.

The following measures were taken with regard to external enemies. It was decided, first, to put down the rebellion of General Ch'en Chiung-ming, as the most serious enemy and the general most closely connected with Hong Kong; in case of necessity, to disarm Hsiung K'e-wu in the north; and, second, to suppress the rebellion of other enemies in the south.

[7] Toward the beginning of these campaigns and after the disarmament of unreliable units, the government, in spite of all the difficulties, succeeded, nevertheless, in forming several army corps out of the loyal units, and although these army corps were extremely heterogeneous as regards numerical strength, organization, and armament, still, taking into consideration the conditions that prevailed at that time, their formation must be regarded as a considerable achievement.

[Army Reorganization as of October 1925]

By October 1925 the National Revolutionary Army had the following scheme of organization:

1. The Ist Army Corps "Whampoa" (formerly the "party troops")
2. The IId Army Corps (formerly the Hunanese army of General T'an Yen-k'ai)
3. The IIId Army Corps (formerly the Yunnanese detachment of General Chu P'ei-teh
4. The IVth Army Corps of General Li Chi-ch'en [Li Chi-shen] (the best units of the former Cantonese army)
5. The separate division of General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng
6. The separate division of General Ch'eng Ch'ien
7. The 3d Canton Division (of the former Cantonese army)
8. The Tanshui group (the Cantonese detachment of General Feng Chiu-p'ei [Feng I-pei])
9. Several small units.

By that time the Military Council held its regular meetings and decided questions pertaining to the administration of troops, their supplies, etc. The General Staff as well as the Political Directorate (PUR) began to function. But on account of the above-mentioned external events, further reorganization of army units was postponed until the end of military operations on all the fronts.

At the first opportunity, however, the work of reorganizing the army units was resumed. After the suppression of the enemy in the east and the north and the first important successes in the south, the government did not wait for the final suppression of the enemy in the south, but undertook the reorganization of those units that had been released from the eastern front. Objective conditions favored this reorganization. Formerly the government was so weak as to be compelled to bring its actions into accord with the will of individual generals, but by the end of 1925, after the victory in the east, the situation was radically changed.

[Growing Prestige of the Government]

The victory on the eastern and southern fronts not only proved the strength of the government to its open enemies, but also enhanced its authority in the eyes of the imperialists. Formerly they defamed in every way the National Revolutionary Army, but after its first victories the English press of Hong Kong began to praise the merits of this army.

Owing to the attitude of the National Revolutionary Government toward the Hong Kong strike, its popularity in the eyes of the population increased considerably. The government came out as a protector of national interests, and especially of the interests of striking workmen.

Owing to several measures which the government had put into practice, such as putting in order of local government, struggle against abuses on the part of officials, struggle against looting on the part of the army, attempts to reduce taxes, etc., the government gained the confidence of some classes of the population.

By that time the government became a force that had to be taken into consideration. The consolidation of the finances of the province, which was also started at that time, gave the government real power and made it possible for the government to assert its will.

[Military Reforms, December 1925 to March 1926]

The following measures, which were put into practice during the period from December 1925 to March 1926, were the most important:

1. To put an end to arbitrary actions on the part of commanders, which prevailed in the army, and in order to take decisive action against the prevalent disregard of all laws, a military tribunal was established which began to function at once.

2. The functions of the army administrative organs, of the Political Bureau [Council] of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, of the Military Council, and of the General Staff were clearly defined and were put into practice.

3. To enhance the authority of the General Staff and its popularity with the army units and also to create a closer connection between the Staff and the army units, one of the influential generals, the commander of the IVth Army Corps, Li Chi-shen, was appointed to the post of chief of the General Staff.

[8] 4. The commissions for the reorganization of the army finished their work in two army corps. The army units are now being reorganized in accordance with the new consolidated budget of the National Revolutionary Army. Several small detachments are being disarmed. The commissions for the army reorganization continue to carry on their work in accordance with the plan outlined in the special instructions, which

were approved by the Military Council (see annex [not printed; this may be our Document 21]).

Simultaneously, the reorganization of army staffs is being carried on, and measures are taken to organize the work in them along regular lines. Blank forms used to ascertain the exact number of personnel, arms, and munitions have been prepared, and the work of checking up on the numerical strength of the army units has been started.

5. A new grouping of army units, undertaken in accordance with the proper distribution of the army, is now drawing to an end.

To raise the standard of the officers of the National Revolutionary Army, several measures have been carried out:

a. A consolidated military political school was established in the beginning of March and the schools attached to various army corps are being gradually abolished.

b. Courses of instruction for officers have been organized in several army units, although not in all of them, on account of the lack of experienced instructors and Russian advisers, who are able to organize this work.

c. Publishing work has been undertaken; a great number of pamphlets, books, handbills, and placards on military and political topics have been issued already.

d. An army daily newspaper is being published and sent to various army units (about 18,000 copies).

6. To improve the quality of the enlisted men in the army, the following measures have been undertaken:

a. The work of clearing the enlisted personnel of bandits, opium smokers, and old professional men is being carried on and is half finished now.

b. The preparation of programs and methods of training for garrison and field service and for rifle practice has been started.

7. The following results have been reached with reference to the question of improving the supply of army units: the Central Administration of Supplies has been definitely established, and the organization of local organs of supply and a system of accountability and control started. A fixed military budget has been prepared and put into effect; budgets for all army units have also been fixed. The work in the arsenal has been put on a proper footing, and thereby the question of supplying the army with munitions has been solved.

8. The following results have been reached in regard to political work in the army:

a. Political sections have been established and the system of political commissaries instituted in almost all army units.

b. Nuclei of the Kuomintang party have been organized in almost all army units, and their work is being started.

c. Work of cultural and educational character is being started in all army units, etc.

I will not enumerate here in detail all achievements pertaining to the reorganization of the army, because these will be quite obvious, after the present-day condition of the armed forces of the National Revolutionary Government has been reviewed.

It must be recognized that, with regard to the reorganization of the army, its centralization and closer connection with the Kuomintang party, a great work has been accomplished, in spite of the limited financial resources of the government and the great difficulties and obstacles with which it was confronted when carrying through even minor innovations.

Part II: Developments in Canton, 1924–1925

These nine documents all concern the work of the Soviet advisers in Canton, arranged in chronological sequence, beginning with an early plan for what became the Whampoa Military Academy, formulated in February or March 1924. They end in the summer of 1925 when the chief Soviet military adviser, General Bliukher, left Canton because of conflict with Chief Political Adviser Borodin. Most remarkable is a prescient plan for a military campaign northward which General Bliukher prepared in September 1925, based on his assessment of the National Revolutionary Army's potential striking power, under Russian guidance. It is virtually a blueprint for the Northern Expedition that began nearly a year later.

Document 4

Regulations of the Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton

We have two versions of Document 4, "Regulations of the Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton." We use the one from PRO (FO 371-12501/9132. F 6605/3241/10). The other is in NA (G-2 2657-I-281). In the latter it is part of a longer paper, "The Whampoa Military School/A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents." Apparently this was put together in Peking in the American military attaché's office, perhaps by Captain John P. Ratay, who specialized on Soviet Russia and who helped to supervise the selection and translation of the raid documents. This longer paper (called A-44) is constructed from several of the seized documents, our Document 4 being the first. However, the sequence of numbered articles in Document 4 is rearranged (original numbers are given), a few articles are omitted, and there are stylistic improvements. We regard that version as derivative. The compiler of this longer paper states that our Document 4 was written in English. Presumably this was the form in which he saw it, though apparently he thought it had been translated from Russian in Canton. Our Document 24 is the second of the documents used by the compiler of A-44.

We believe Document 4 dates from February or March 1924 for reasons related to Chiang Kai-shek's actions, though it might be even earlier. According to A. I. Cherepanov, who was in Canton from late January 1924, and who was an early Soviet instructor in the military school, in the initial planning the school was to have been headed by Sun Yat-sen, with Chiang Kai-shek as deputy director (Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 85; *As Military Adviser*, p. 70, presented differently; Draft Translation, p. 110). In Document 4, the Generalissimo is to be the "chief principal" and there is to be an "assistant chief or second in command" (articles 1, 15, and 17a). The Generalissimo—that is, Dr. Sun—figures frequently in the text. On February 21 Chiang Kai-shek resigned as chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the school and departed from Canton, apparently in controversy with the Soviet advisers and dissatisfied with the authority he was to exercise in the school (Chiang, *Min-kuo* and KFNP for that date).

According to article 3 of Document 4, all applicants for the school must be examined by a special committee appointed by the Generalissimo. On March 20 Sun appointed Chiang Kai-shek as head of the examining committee for students seeking entrance to the school, but since Chiang was in Feng-hua, Sun appointed Li Chi-shen to take his place, and he appointed nine others to the committee. On March 27 Chiang wrote to four members of the Preparatory Committee objecting to the change of the school term from six months to one year, as well as other changes in the regulations "which I decided upon" (Chiang, *Min-kuo* for that date; see Pichon P. Y. Loh, *The Early Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 95). In Document 4, article 2 states that "The school course is fixed at six months." This seems to be as it was before the change that irritated Chiang. After much stalling and dispute, Chiang returned to Canton on April 21, seemingly after some of his demands were satisfied, and on May 2 Sun Yat-sen, as Generalissimo, appointed him commandant of the Army Military Academy, as it was then named, not "assistant chief" (PFCS, I, plate after p. 102).

These points argue for an early date for the "Regulations," as does the name "National Guard" instead of Army (*lu-chün*). There are other dating clues. Article 29, under the heading "Concluding," states that the regulations must be approved by the Generalissimo and practiced (put into effect) as soon as possible. This suggests that the Regulations were still in draft stage. Also, there is a handwritten, appended note concerning the authority of the chief of the Political Department, which elevates his authority over what is stated in article 17b. In that article, the chief of the Political Department is subordinated to the assistant chief of the school and carries out various named functions "according to his instructions." In the handwritten appendix the chief of the Political Department is appointed by the president of the Kuomintang—i.e., by Sun Yat-sen—and is directly subordinated to him. He carries out his functions "according to his [the President's] instructions." And, most significantly, all orders by the assistant chief of the school must be signed by the chief of the Political Department. The appendix seems to put the chief of the Political Department at the same level of authority as the assistant chief of the school. This may represent a redefinition of roles while Chiang Kai-shek was away from Canton, and a step toward creation of the post of party representative, the position occupied by Liao Ch'ung-k'ai and, on the early charts of organization, at the same level as the commandant, Chiang Kai-shek (KMWH, X, 1465-66).

Aside from the early date, probably the most significant aspect of the Regulations is the concept of political education and military training as equal elements in the curriculum of the cadets. Indoctrination in the Kuomintang's ideology was a distinctive feature of the Whampoa Military Academy, and later of the National Revolutionary Army.

It seems possible that this document was actually composed in English, which was the language of communication between Sun Yat-sen and Borodin, and was known by Liao Chung-k'ai and others close to Dr. Sun at that time. We do not know who inserted the parentheses, twice inserted *Remark*, and added the final handwritten note.

TEXT

I. General Rules

[1] 1. Generalissimo is the Chief Principal of the Military [School] for the Officers of the National Guard established in Canton.

2. The Military School is established for the training of junior officers of the infantry. The school course is fixed at six months. The cardinal object of the school is to prepare good combat officers with a good political education, viz., revolutionary military men.

3. The school (student-body?) must consist of volunteers of the whole country, principally of youths of the age from 18 to 25 who are graduates of middle school or have qualifications equal to it, and partly of military men, viz., literate soldiers and under-officers. Members of the Kuomintang party or sympathizers are preferred. All applicants who wish to enter the school must be examined by the special committee appointed by the Generalissimo.

4. The officers [of] command (tactical?) of the school must be military men who are educated and experienced in command (of troops?); the instructors must be well-educated military men. They are obliged in the training and teaching to follow the directions of the Generalissimo or the persons appointed by him.

5. The military education at the school is divided into two parts: the teaching and [2] training or the theory and practice. Both parts must be in accordance with each

other (?). The greatest attention must be paid to field service, i.e., how to direct troops on the battlefield. Politically the student who graduates must be able to explain to the soldiers the idea and the principles of the Kuomintang party and the political situation in China.

Remark: The educational work of the school must be based on this scheme in the teaching and training.

II. The Cadets

6. The students of the military school are called *Cadets*. Before entrance the Cadets must give their written consent to submit to all rules and regulations of the school and to serve the Government after graduation one year for every two months they have been at the school. After entrance they have no right to ask to resign under any pretext.

7. The Cadet must fulfill promptly the orders and instructions of his commanding officer except the visibly criminal as treachery, etc. (except when it is evident that is treachery?) which he must immediately report to the Chief of the School.

8. The Cadet may be dismissed:

a. When he violates discipline or continuously breaks the written rules;

b. When his conduct is bad and cannot be corrected;

c. When he does not improve in his studies and is unable to pass his examinations;

d. When he cannot continue his studies on account of illness.

9. Cadets dismissed on account of the above-mentioned reasons, except if it is on account of illness, are obliged either to repay the expenses of their maintenance at the school or to serve in the army (as enlisted men) as decided by the Generalissimo.

[3] 10. The Cadets are supplied by the school with everything such as clothes, food, stationery, etc.

11. The Cadets are obliged to lodge at the school.

12. The Cadets are in the military service and receive pay, the scale of which is determined by the Generalissimo. A part of their salary is deducted for their maintenance (food?) at the school, the rest is given to them for their extra expenses.

13. After finishing the school course, the Cadets must pass examinations and are graduated as junior officers of infantry—Second Lieutenants. The examinations must be given by a committee of high military men and political workers appointed by the Generalissimo.

14. The graduate Cadets will receive diplomas as Second Lieutenants and are obliged to be in the Government Service one year for each two months they have been at the school; they have no right to resign without the special permission of the Government, their diplomas and appointments must be approved by the Generalissimo or another head of the Government.

III. Officers and Their Duties

15. At the school there are the following officials and functions:

a. The Assistant Chief or Second in Command of the School

b. Chief of the Political Department

c. Chief Training Officer

d. Chief of the Department of Instruction, or Chief Professor

e. Chief of the Administration Department or the Chief of Staff

f. Chief of the Sanitary Department or Chief Doctor

g. Chief of Supply Department or Military Commissary

h. Lecturers and Instructors in Military and Political Subjects

[4] i. Commanding Officers

j. Aides-de-Camp or Adjutants

k. Assistants to Commanders

l. Commander of the Guard

m. Managers of sections and officers [offices]

Remark: All the officials, their ranks, number, functions, and salaries must be fixed on the list of officials.

[No number 16 in original]

17. Official Duties are as follows:—

a. Assistant Chief or Second in command of the School is subordinated directly to the Generalissimo and must report to him all the affairs of the school. He receives orders and instructions from the Generalissimo and must carry them out. All officials and functionaries are subordinated to him. He controls and instructs them and manages the affairs of the school. He is responsible for the whole state of the school completely.

b. Chief of the Political Department is subordinated to the Assistant Chief of the School and according to his instructions controls the political life of the school, directs the political education of the Cadets and officers of the school, instructs the lecturers on the political subjects, and is responsible for the whole political life of the school. He must be in the closest contact with the Kuomintang Group of the school and give it instructions how to work.

c. Chief Training Officer must be a good military man with great practice in command and not less than a regimental commander. He receives the instructions of the Assistant Chief of the School as to how to train and drill the Cadets and carries those out. He directs [the] Commanding Officers, instructs and trains them himself. He is responsible for the whole military training at the school.

[5] d. Chief of the Instruction Department must be an officer with a high military education. According to the instructions of the Assistant Chief of the School, he works out all plans of training and teaching the Cadets and commanding officers, prepares the training schedules, and gives them for verification and approval to the Assistant Chief of the School.

e. Chief of the Administrative Department manages all administrative affairs of the school. He holds the lists of service of the officers and Cadets (service records?) and the muster roll of the school. He manages the correspondence with governmental institutions and the statistics of the school. He reports daily to the Assistant Chief of the School the number of Cadets, officers, and others, and prepares the projects of the orders of the day and gives those for verification and signature to the Assistant Chief of the School, after that they must be multiplied and sent about [to] all necessary places. He controls the safekeeping of all documents of the school, the archives, etc., directs the guards, and is responsible for administrative affairs of the school.

f. Chief of the Sanitary Department must be a dr.med. He controls the sanitary state of the school and the state of health of the Cadets, officers, and others. Manages the hospital and ambulatory [dispensary] of the school and is responsible for all sanitary conditions of the school.

g. Chief of Supply Department or the Military Commissary of the school must take care of the whole supply of the school; the necessary articles, money, etc. He must get these within time, controls the correct and economic expenditure and the regular accounting of them. He inspects the building and takes care of their cleanliness and order. He controls and directs all works of the supplying and is responsible [6] for the whole economic state of the school.

h. Lecturers and instructors on political subjects are subordinated to the Chief of the Political Department and carry out his instructions. They must prepare beforehand their lectures and give these to the Chief of the Political Department for verification

and approval. According to the timetables of the teaching (Schedule of Instructors), they must lecture to the Cadets as well as to the officers on their subjects. They must take part in all political work of the school. Lecturers and instructors on military subjects must have a good military education, to be able to lecture and to explain their subjects to Cadets successfully. They are directly subordinated to the Chief of the Department of Instruction and must prepare beforehand their lectures and give him to examine. According to timetables of teaching, they must lecture their subjects to Cadets and officers, and also instruct them how to carry out these subjects in practice. They are obliged to be present when their subjects are exercised in the field [in order] to inspect and to direct these exercises.

i. Commanding officers are subordinated in the usual order of command. They must have a good practice in commanding troops in order to be able to train and drill the Cadets successfully. They must look that their troops are in the best condition of discipline and order, that the Cadets are supplied with all they need at the time, [and] that they are working successfully; they must be all the time among them to help them to work, to explain to them what they do not understand, etc.; they must report daily to their senior the progress of the Cadets, the conditions of their living and health, their conduct, their needs, etc.

[7] 1) Battalion commanders are subordinated to the Chief Training Officer directly and carry out his instructions as to training and teaching according to the order of the day. They report to him daily all the conditions of the battalion. They instruct and direct the company commanders and are responsible for the whole state of the battalion.

2) Company commanders are subordinated to the battalion commander and carry out his instructions; they report to him daily all conditions of their company. They instruct and direct the platoon commanders and are responsible for their companies.

3) Platoon commanders are subordinated to their company commanders, report to them daily the state of their platoons, carry out their directions and instructions, and direct and instruct the section [squad] commanders. They are responsible for the whole state of their platoon and must be always among the Cadets as their nearest senior to whom the Cadets can apply in all their needs.

j. Aides-de-Camp or Adjutants must be military men. They are attached to their seniors and are obliged to fulfill all the commissions given them by their seniors.

k. Commander of the guards is subordinated to the Chief of the Administration Department. He is obliged to observe and keep the order in the district of the school buildings, to put out and inspect the guards according to instructions. He is responsible for the order and safety of the school.

[8] l. Assistant commanders are subordinated to their seniors, assist them in the work, fulfill their orders and instruction, when the seniors are absent replace them and fulfill their duties.

m. Managers of the sections and offices, mostly the clerks, are subordinated to their seniors, receive their orders and instructions of them, and are responsible for the fulfillment.

18. First class officials, such as Chiefs of departments and lecturers, must be appointed and approved by the Generalissimo and may be dismissed only by order of the Generalissimo; others are approved by the Assistant Chief of the School and may be dismissed by his order.

19. In addition to the above-mentioned officials there are other persons employed in the school, as: under-officers, or N.C.O., clerks, servants, workmen, coolies, etc. Their number and duties are fixed on the list of the school. They are subordinated to their seniors, must fulfill their duties and instructions, and are responsible for the fulfillment. They may be dismissed when their seniors present their dismissal to the Assistant Chief of the School who must approve it.

IV. The Expenses of the School

20. All the officials and others employed in the school receive salary according to their rank and function, as fixed on the list of the school.

21. The salaries of the commanding officers, lecturers, and instructors are divided into three classes. At the end of every half year their salaries may be increased gradually if they work successfully by the presentation of the Assistant Chief of the School to the Generalissimo for approval and sanction.

22. The 25th of each month is the date to begin the payment of the salaries. The [9] military commander is obliged to prepare all the paylists, to give them for inspection and approval to the Assistant Chief of the School, and to get money in time. The officers and functionaries can receive their salaries directly from the paymaster. The Cadets receive their salaries from the company commanders, the guards from their commanders, others as clerks, workmen, servants, etc., from their seniors. All the receivers must give receipts for their salaries received, i.e., to sign their names on the paylists.

23. The Cadets and others, who receive maintenance from the school, must pay it off. The pay (amount) must be fixed by the military commissary of the School and must be deducted from their salaries.

24. The military commissary of the school is obliged to scheme the detailed budgets of the school for each half year, including the salaries and other expenses. He must give these budgets to the Assistant Chief of the School for inspection and presentation to the Generalissimo for approval and sanction.

25. The military commissary is obliged to get money according to the fixed budget from the financial institution in time—monthly, or as it will be decided by the Generalissimo.

26. The unforeseen expenses which are not fixed on the budget but are needed, the military commissary must estimate and give for inspection to the Assistant Chief of the School and for approval and sanction to the Generalissimo.

27. The military commissary is obliged to control the regular and economic expenditures of the resources of the school, to inspect and manage the correct accounting of them, and to report the accounts for every month to the Assistant Chief of the School and the Generalissimo.

28. For the revision [auditing] of accounts and of all economy of the school, the Generalissimo periodically designates the revisers, to whom the military commissary [10] gives all books, documents, and accounts to revise [audit].

Concluding

29. The regulations must be approved by the Generalissimo and practiced [put into effect] as soon as possible.

30. Other regulations besides these must be worked and, according to circumstances, inspected and proposed by the Assistant Chief of the School and approved and sanctioned by the Generalissimo.

The End

(In handwriting)

Note: All the orders given by the Assistant Chief of the School must be signed by the Chief of the Political Department. The Chief of the Political Department is appointed by the President of the Kuomintang party and is subordinated directly to him. Ac-

cording to his instructions he controls the political life of the school, directs the political education of the Cadets and officers, instructs the lecturers on political subjects, and is responsible for the whole political life of the school. He signs all the orders of the Assistant Chief of the School. If the Chief of the Political Department refuses to sign any order of the Assistant Chief of the School, this order must be considered by the Generalissimo and the President of the Kuomintang party.

Document 5

Borodin's Report on the Revolutionary Committee

Document 5 was translated from Russian into Chinese by the Peking Commission and published under the title "A Certain Gentleman's Report on the Proceedings of a Meeting of the Revolutionary Committee on October 14, 1924," in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 10-13. According to the "Catalogue of Russian Documents of Secondary Importance," *SLYM*, I, p. 6 (VIII, p. 3b in the ten-volume set), the report was written by Borodin on the morning of October 14, 1924.

Important points about Document 5 are its date—the day before the suppression of the Merchants' Corps when the outcome was uncertain—and the way it substantiates some accounts of the incident, including Chiang Kai-shek's "diary" account, with nearly identical lists of units that Dr. Sun put under Chiang's command, and names of other forces whose cooperation was problematical.

This was Document 11 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[10] The responsible Labor Party [Kuomintang] in South China elected members of the Revolutionary Committee at a meeting on October 14. Dr. Sun was elected chairman and Dr. Sun's deputy [Hu Han-min] was given only the right to speak.[1] It was decided that all orders issued by the Committee are to be signed by Dr. Sun and certified by the secretary. Liao Chung-k'ai was elected secretary.

General Chiang Kai-shek was elected chairman of the Military Committee with the following units placed under his control: (1) the Whampoa Academy; (2) the aviation squadron; (3) armored car unit; (4) General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's school [for gendarmes]; (5) General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's troops [gendarmes]; (6) the Yunnan [Army's] school; (7) General Ch'en Ch'i-mei's Hunan School;[2] (8) workers' police [pickets]; (9) [11] peasant [self-defense] corps; and (10) the arsenal. Liao Chung-k'ai was appointed Political Commissar to the above units and T'an P'ing-shan his deputy.

The Political Department. Wang Ching-wei was appointed Political Commissar for the whole province of Kwangtung and Chou Wen-lai [Chou En-lai], Liao Chung-k'ai, and T'an P'ing-shan were named his deputies. They determine the actions of the Revolutionary Committee and the armed forces.

Political Policies Adopted at a Conference on October 12

At this time, when we are continuing to unite with the masses, we should unite with the Center and the Left to fight against the Tiger Party [Canton Merchants Corps]. With this objective in mind, we should settle accounts with the Tigers by force either at 10:00 in the evening of October 14, or at dawn, October 15. The Revolutionary Committee is not opposed to the people but wishes to unite with them to oppose those bandits who disturb peace and order, oppress the people, and hamper reforms.

1. The Revolutionary Committee should attempt to sever connections between the Tiger Party and the people and should adopt certain slogans for this purpose. A

demonstration should be held in Central Park on October 15 to explain the relationship between the Revolutionary Committee and the people. Afterward, we stage an armed movement.

2. The Revolutionary Committee should proclaim to the people in advance the objectives and meaning of the present Kuomintang struggle. We should use airplanes and armored cars to distribute leaflets today (October 14).

3. Concede to the demands of the printers at once so that the *Kuo-min jih-pao*, organ of the Revolutionary Committee, may resume publication today.

Other political policies should also be adopted.

[12] The demonstration should be so organized that it would not appear to have any connection whatsoever with our armed action.

In the event that armed action fails to take place, the question of independent action by the troops directly subordinated to Chiang Kai-shek will be decided on after the demonstration of October 15. Action should take place on the night of October 15.

Appendix

The following measures have been carried out by a group of Revolutionary Committee members prior to October 14.

1. Transferred Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's army from Shaoyang [Shaokuan] to Canton.

2. Reappointed Wu T'ieh-ch'eng chief of the gendarmes.

3. Placed General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng and his troops under the direct control of the Revolutionary Committee.

4. Chiang Kai-shek entered the city as Commander-in-Chief, his position at Whampoa filled by General Ho [Ying-ch'in] as his deputy.

5. The headquarters of the Revolutionary Committee was set up in the home of Liao Chung-k'ai (it will move later to its permanent home at Central Kuomintang Headquarters).

6. The headquarters of Communist Party members was established at the home of a certain comrade.

The armies were ordered to be absolutely obedient during this critical period. The question of control of the above armies will be discussed and decided on after the crisis is over.

Inside plans for action. The Tigers' hideout in the western section of the city, Hsi-hua [Hsi-kuan], is to be raided and destroyed. The Tigers have been hiding there since martial law was proclaimed in this city. It has been decided to make a sneak attack on October 14, at 10:00 PM.

Troops not under the control of the Revolutionary Committee but which are to take part in the action are:

[13] 1. The Kwangtung First Division under the command of General Li Chi-shen.

2. The Kwangtung Second Division under the command of General Chang Ming-ta [Chang Min-ta].

3. The Yunnan troops under the command of General Fan Shih-sheng.

4. The Yunnan troops under the command of General Liao Chung-chou [Liao Hsing-ch'ao].

5. Other Kwangtung troops under the command of General Hsü Shun-ch'i [Hsü Ch'ung-chih].

The above troops obey Dr. Sun's orders. Liao Chung-k'ai and Wang Ching-wei also have connections with them.

In case they declare unwillingness to move, the troops under the control of the Revolutionary Committee will take action.

As Dr. Sun's deputy, Hu Han-min is to issue the order for action.

Notes

1. According to Chiang Kai-shek's "diary," which appears correct, Hu Han-min was not appointed to the Revolutionary Committee by Sun Yat-sen. Hence, he apparently had no voting power. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, October 10, 1924.

2. On October 14, 1924, Sun Yat-sen ordered a number of military units to be subordinated directly to Chiang Kai-shek. The list given in Document 5 corresponds exactly with that given in Chiang's "diary," except that the latter does not mention "General Ch'en Ch'i-mei's Hunan School." Ibid., October 14.

Document 6

Bliukher's Letter to Chiang Kai-shek

Document 6, a letter from Bliukher ("Galen") to Chiang Kai-shek, was translated into Chinese from Russian by the Peking Commission and published under the title "A Letter from Galen to Chiang Kai-shek, Dated April 16, 1925, on the Establishment of a Special Course to Train Personnel for the Organization of Communications Organs in the Army," in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 27-28. Thus, it dates about a month after the First Eastern Expedition.

Te-la-t'e-wen in the translation is Mihail Ivanovich Dratvin, adviser on communications, who figures for his accomplishments in effecting military communications against great difficulties in Cherepanov's account of the suppression of the armies of Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan in mid-June 1925 (Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, *As Military Adviser*, p. 150; Draft Translation, pp. 305-306). He is listed in Document 23 (January 1926) as "Inspector of Communications with the General Staff; Adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to communications."

This was Document 12 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[27] It is clear from past battle experience that the communications organs already established in the armies of the southern government cannot render proper assistance to army commanders. Communications organs should enable army commanders to contact and command their troops under all circumstances. At present, however, army commanders sometimes do not receive news of their troops for several days. The local populace is relied on for help in relaying information between officers of different units. The small number of army telephones is almost completely unutilized due to the shortage of specialists who understand the work of military communications. Special attention should be paid to this matter in organizing the new army at this time.

One of my subordinate officers, *Te-la-t'e-wen* [Dratvin], who is an expert on military communications, is now training a small unit of 22 soldiers at your Academy. I must point out, however, that the problem of military communications cannot be solved by these soldiers because: (1) Their training is limited to knowledge of telephones, the most elementary phase of military intelligence; and (2) Due to the urgent [28] need for specialists at the front, the training course is limited to two or three weeks. It is therefore impossible within such a short period to transform these soldiers, who are half-educated and with only slight knowledge of the written language, into specialists.

Other practical measures must be taken in order to establish military communications organs. My opinion is that you should set up a special class for 25 to 30 persons at the Whampoa Military Academy. They will be specially trained and organized into a communications unit upon graduation.

Graduates of the engineering course should be selected for this special course in order to achieve speedy results, since engineering students have a general background in technical matters.

As for instructors for the class, I can send *Te-la-t'e-wen* [Dratvin] to your Acad-

emy for general direction. As he is not well versed in the Chinese language, please select the direct instructors from among those officers who have knowledge of telegraph, telephone, and military communications work.

According to this plan, a sufficient number of officers trained for military communications work should definitely be available within two or three months. They are indispensable in organizing a new army and in modern military operations.

This special course will not entail heavy expenses. A certain sum will be required for the purchase of tools for experimentation, such as telephones, telegraph, and other accessories. The amount involved, however, will not be too great. I shall appreciate hearing from you as to your opinion on this matter.

Document 7

Chiang Kai-shek's Letter to Bliukher

Document 7, a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to General Bliukher dated June 26, 1925, was translated by the Peking Commission from Russian into Chinese under the title "A Letter on Military Questions from Chiang Kai-shek to Galen" and was published in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 14-21. The Russian text itself was presumably translated from Chinese. The following version is based on the Peking Commission's translation, checked and corrected against a Chinese text of the plans, but not of the letter, in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for July 1, 1925. There the plans are addressed to the Military Council. This plan may be compared with the proposals written by Bliukher in September 1925 (Doc. 9), but based on his knowledge of Canton in early July. Both plans contemplate a reorganization and expansion of military forces and a northern military campaign. They differ in details, and while Chiang estimates a needed force of 80,000 to 100,000 men at a monthly cost of $1,655,000, Bliukher estimates a needed 80,000 men at a monthly cost of $1,275,000.

This was Document 13 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[14] Dear General Galen:

[15] I had drafted plans prior to the Shameen Incident for fighting the British. In view of the present situation, it is necessary to carry out immediately the proposals on military construction suggested in my plans (e.g., repair of fortifications, establishment of mine factories and shipyards, etc.). The Government should complete within three to six months military preparations for an armed struggle against the British.

British influence in the Far East has indeed reached a climax! I believe that, besides employing peaceful means of struggle (such as a boycott of British goods), our Party should start military preparations to be completed within half a year for a long period of struggle against the British (which may last for three to five years). It is therefore necessary to establish within the Military Council a special affairs department or a national defense committee, to which a large number of Russian advisers should be appointed. The Committee should be held responsible for distribution of work and the study and investigation of plans in order to centralize responsibility. What is your reaction to this suggestion?

I am enclosing for your reference a copy of my plans. It will be appreciated if you would treat them as confidential for the time being and add to them whatever suggestions you may have, so that they may be used to facilitate a decision at the meeting on military construction.

Chiang Kai-shek

Enclosure: The plans

POLITICAL AND MILITARY VIEWS

Enemy remnants in southern Kwangtung and at places such as Chaoan and Meihsien should be cleared up within three months. After this, we should carry out our plans for future development. Important points, however, can be started at once.

The Question of Military Funds

The sum of $35 million can be collected in Kwangtung province. Upon the completion of financial reforms, this sum can be increased to $40 million (including Chaoan, Meihsien, and southern Kwangtung).
[16] From the above funds, it is proposed to appropriate $18 million to $20 million for military planning: $15 million to $16 million for the navy and infantry; $2 million to $4 million for improving forts and arsenals, rehabilitating mine factories and shipyards, improving aviation, and expanding the Military Academy, etc.

The Army Should Be Expanded Temporarily to 65,000 Men

The first military group (Kwangtung Army) should be composed of three corps, totalling 30,000 men.

The Party Army should be expanded to two divisions, totalling 10,000 men. Lin's army (former Kwangsi Fifth Division) and Wu T'ing-shen's [Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's] army should be placed under the command of General Hsü [Ch'ung-chih].

The second military group (Hunan Army) should be reduced to three divisions totalling 12,000 men.

The third military group (Yunnan Army) should be fixed at two divisions, totalling 10,000 men.

The fourth military group (small units of the Northern Expeditionary Forces) should be fixed at one division, totalling 3,000 men.

The above reorganization is based on the military forces now available to us. By the end of 1926 or early in 1927, the government force is expected to expand to 80,000 to 100,000 men.

If the Government plans a northern expedition, the defense of Kwangtung province should be strengthened to resist possible attack from Hong Kong and Fukien. At the same time, substantial forces should be prepared to launch offensives in the direction of Kiangsi and Hunan, or Hunan and Hupei. To cope with the estimated enemy forces in these two directions, the northern expeditionary army would require a minimum of 70,000 men, a number barely sufficient for effective deployment.

[17] There Will Be Four Kinds of Army Organization as Follows

1. Three companies to one battalion; three battalions to one regiment; three regiments to one division.
2. Four companies to one battalion; three battalions to one regiment; two regiments to one brigade; two brigades to one division.
3. Three companies to one battalion; three battalions to one regiment; three regiments to one brigade; three brigades to one division.
4. Gendarmes should be organized according to the former system of command.

The Problem of Military Preparation

1. The Hu-men and Ch'ang-chou forts should be repaired and commanded according to the former system, with one commander for each fort and a commanding

general responsible for overall direction.

2. The Whampoa shipyards and mine factory should be restored immediately. The training gunboats, S.S. *Fei-ying*, S.S. *Wu-feng*, and S.S. *Hu-ang [Fu-an]*, should be repaired at once. A commander of the training fleet should be appointed.

3. Reorganize the river defense fleet, the salt gabelle fleet, and the training fleet. The S.S. *Chung-shan* should be placed under the direct control of the Navy Department. In three years, we must have six submarines.

4. Expansion of the arsenal:

a. Establish a steel mill.

b. Increase the number of factories manufacturing cartridges.

[18] c. Increase machinery for manufacturing rifles in order to increase output to at least 150 daily.

d. Establish a cannon factory to produce at least four cannons per month. (In case of lack of funds, this can be deferred.)

5. Establish a sewing factory to make uniforms for all the armies.

6. Establish an airplane factory and organize a relatively large-scale aviation school.

7. All cartridge factories should be controlled by the central arsenal.

The Question of Expansion of the Military Academy

1. Establish an officer training school. Cadets are to be limited to from 1,500 to 2,000 men. Special classes should be set up for training in aviation, infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, army service corps, and gas [chemical warfare].

2. Promote the second and the third classes of Whampoa Academy cadets to an advanced military school where separate classes for training in artillery, staff work, bombardment, airplane manufacturing, and gas [chemical warfare] will be set up. (If a naval academy is not to be established, then the advanced military school should include in its program courses on mines, navigation, shipbuilding, and submarines.)

3. Establish a naval academy to train naval personnel.

4. Establish a military sanitation school and a military commissariat school.

5. Reorganize the surveying school.

Other Necessary Educational Institutions

[19] 1. Organize a central supervisory organ on military training.

2. Organize military training committees in all armies.

3. Organize an inspection and examination committee.

4. Establish political departments in all corps, divisions, regiments, and brigades to instruct officers and soldiers in common political knowledge.

Organs in Charge of Military Expenditures

1. Organize an army commissariat committee.

2. Organize an army commissariat supervisory committee.

3. Organize a committee to examine the military expenditures of all armies.

All organs connected with military training and expenditures and the army commissariat should be directly subordinated to the Military Council.

Improvement of the Economic Condition of Soldiers

Every soldier should receive a minimum monthly pay of ten dollars.

Organization and Training of Peasant and Student Armies

Of 100,000 men (organization as at Whampoa). This task is to be completed by the end of 1926.

The Budget

A. Monthly expenditures:

1. The standing army of approximately 65,000 men, organized into ten divisions and ten brigades, requires approximately $1,200,000 to $1,300,000.

2. The navy (river defense fleet, the salt gabelle fleet, and the training fleet) requires approximately $40,000.

3. The forts require $15,000.

4. General expenditures of the military schools, the officers' schools, the medical school, army commissariat school, gas [chemical warfare] school, surveying school, and the advanced officers' school require approximately $250,000 to $300,000.

B. Special expenditures:

1. Repair of forts: $300,000.
2. Repair of the training fleet: $200,000.
3. Restoration of the Whampoa mine factory and shipyard: $1,000,000.
4. Establishment of an airplane factory: $1,000,000.
5. Establishment of a steel mill: $500,000.
6. Expansion of cartridge factories: $300,000.
7. Replacement of machinery for the manufacture of rifles: $500,000.
8. Establishment of a cannon factory: $1,000,000. This may be deferred in case of insufficient funds.
9. Establishment of a sewing factory: $500,000.

[20] The total amount of monthly expenditures: $1,655,000. Annual expenditures: $19,860,000.

The total amount of special expenditures: $5,300,000.

If this great amount of funds cannot be provided this year, then the various items of special expenditures should be shifted to the budget for 1926. If, even in 1926, the special expenditures cannot be met with, we may establish first the aircraft factory, then the mine factory, and then the shipyard. It should not be too difficult to meet the cost of the above, which will not exceed two million dollars.

Document 8

Conditions at Canton after the Events at Shameen on June 23, 1925

The writer of this document, General Bliukher, left Canton in mid-July 1925, stopped in Peking, and then went to Kalgan where he wrote a report, or several reports, on conditions in Canton. The translation is from PRO (FO 371-12501/9132. F6462/3241/10). It is also found in *Further Correspondence Respecting China* (FO 405/254 Confidential, 13315, No. 27).

TEXT

(Extract from a Report of General Galen, dated September 20, 1925)

[1] On the following day (after the shooting on the Chinese demonstration parade), the indignation of the population and the troops was so strong that at all the numerous meetings which took place they insisted on attacking Shameen at once. Tens of thousands were parading the streets clamoring for vengeance. It became dangerous for foreigners to appear on the streets. In the shops the sale of foreign goods was stopped. Boycott completely paralyzed the whole of the foreign shipping between Canton and Hong Kong. The Chinese companies refused to transport foreigners and foreign goods. The strike at Hong Kong gradually extended to all industrial, municipal, and commercial enterprises. House servants also quit the foreigners. Within a few days the economic life of Hong Kong was completely paralyzed. Ocean steamers which arrived at Hong Kong remained tied up because all Chinese crews joined the strikers. The harbor was full of lifeless steamers. The city itself became a military camp. Detachments of foreign volunteers—men and women—were organized to provide for the needs of the community. The great number of Portuguese and Russian immigrants who had arrived at Hong Kong as strike-breakers were powerless to revive the life of the city.

Strikers arrived by the thousands from Hong Kong in Canton, where they were lodged in houses requisitioned and assigned to them by the Government. This raised still more the revolutionary spirit. The population of Canton was so excited and infuriated that one heedless word would have been sufficient to have this whole mass of several hundred thousands rush upon Shameen.

Among the Russians the serious question arose of taking Shameen by armed force and of attacking Hong Kong. The minority thought that an open declaration of war against imperialism by Canton would swell the wave of the national revolutionary movement in the country and lead to general open fighting against the foreigners. In their opinion even the risk of the loss of Canton could be faced, because the consequences of this scuffle with imperialism would still more revolutionize China and thus compensate for the loss of Canton. It has been figured out how much time it would take the British to prepare for an advance on Canton and a sufficient quantity of troops transported, and the opinion is that the town might hold out for one or two months from the moment when the attack was launched. The majority, however, did

not share this opinion, believing that a declaration of war against England on the part of Canton, which is cut off from the rest of China (the communication with the northern provinces is effected through Hong Kong and was interrupted by the British on the day of the shooting), might become an isolated struggle and might not create a national movement in the other provinces, and thus would end only in the loss of Canton. But in case the Shameen incident should find an echo in the whole country and create a strong outburst of the national movement, then the majority did not exclude the possibility of a declaration of war against England.

On June 25 the text of the note was approved definitely and without any amendment as regards the demands, and was sent to the consular body. At the same time, it was rumored that the British were moving land troops toward Hong Kong and that a fleet and aerial forces were also expected (the latter actually arrived). The greater part of the garrison of Hong Kong was to be sent to Shameen, and it is said that the troops were already embarking.

[2] In consequence of this rumor it was decided to take a series of defensive measures in order to prevent the British fleet and troops from reaching Canton. To this end a Council of Defense was formed consisting of Hsü Shen [Ch'eng]-chih, Chiang Kai-shek, and the chief adviser.

On the same day the order was issued to all armies, which were moving toward their respective regions, to stop and to be ready to march to the defense of Canton.

Considering that the British would be unable to concentrate quickly a considerable number of troops at Canton, and that in the beginning they would use the fleet only, the Council of Defense decided:

1. In case of a movement of the fleet toward Canton the channel to the river must be closed, and to this end ships filled with stones and cement will be sunk a little below the Island of Whampoa, preventing later on the cleaning of the channel by artillery fire from the forts of Whampoa. For this purpose the necessary number of ships were prepared a few days later. For the safeguarding of the Canton-Kailun [Kowloon] Railway and for the defense of this possible line of advance the 4th Division must be moved there, and the bridges will be mined in case the British should move that way. In order to carry out this plan sappers were immediately sent there, and the 4th Canton Division was moved to Shek-lung.

2. The forts Humen and Whampoa have been put in a state of siege and were given orders in case of an approach of the fleet to open fire on it. Simultaneously with the beginning of military operations on the river or in the direction of the railway line, an attack will be launched against the combined imperialistic forces in Canton. Shameen will be taken, and with the aid of the river flotilla and the coast artillery all foreign gunboats in Canton will be seized by the Whampoa troops.

Taking into account the fact that the river is blocked up with ships and rafts, which would hamper the free maneuvering of the men-of-war, the seizure of the foreign fleet was considered feasible, and that it might be carried out without great difficulties.

3. In the meantime, all troops will be concentrated southeast of Canton and Kongmen [Kongmoon] (southwest from Canton) and the advancing British troops will be attacked.

4. In case of failure, the Government and the army will retreat to the north toward Shao-K'un [Shaokuan]. Subsequently, according to circumstances, they either will remain in Kwangtung (in its northern or eastern part) or retreat into Kwangsi or break through Hunan-Kiangsi and join the national armies.

However, from the first days of July on the danger of intervention was already considered as excluded. Extraordinary defense measures which had been taken were slackened, and the Council of Defense was dissolved.

Document 9

Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of Kuomintang Military Activity for 1926

This valuable document was transmitted by the American assistant military attaché in Peking, Captain John P. Ratay, and we have it in two sources. One is in the Jay Calvin Huston Collection in the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. We presume it must also be in the files of U.S. Army Intelligence in USNA. The other source is the publication by A. I. Kartunova in *Narody Azii i Afrika* 5 (1967), pp. 144-56. In this she introduces General Bliukher and his work in China and then reprints the document from the Central Archives of the Party, Institute of Marxism and Leninism, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. She states that the document was a typewritten manuscript with the title we have adopted, and that at the end of the document is inscribed "Kalgan, 20 September 1925. Galen." Kartunova's article was translated into English by Jan J. Solecki of the University of British Columbia and published in *The China Quarterly* 35 (July-September 1968), pp. 18-34, with additional notes by C. Martin Wilbur, pp. 34-39. The two translations from Russian—one done in Peking, the other in Canada forty years later—are the same, line for line, except for minor differences in choice of terms. The two sources validate each other. We use the Kartunova-Solecki version with permission from Professor Solecki and *The China Quarterly*.

The interest in this document lies in Bliukher's close knowledge of the military situation in Kwangtung as of July 1925, his appreciation of the need to reform and modernize the armies upon which the Nationalist regime in Canton depended for protection, and his prescient estimate of the potential for a successful campaign northward in 1926.

TEXT

[23] The struggle by the left wing of the Kuomintang against the counterrevolutionary groups in Canton in June of this year took place in an atmosphere of wide support by all the revolutionary forces of the population. The Kuomintang owes its victory to the workers and peasants. The left wing of the Kuomintang, having strengthened its position through wide-scale support by the revolutionary masses and having come closer to these masses, will be forced in the future to seek further support from them. This, by the same token, will force the Kuomintang to more revolutionary policies and toward a greater shift to the left, which will result in deepening the national revolutionary movement in the South.

Concurrently the reverse process—the consolidation of antirevolutionary groupings who will continue their estrangement from the national revolutionary movement and from the Kuomintang party—will also take place. These antirevolutionary groups will undoubtedly be brought closer to the comprador bourgeoisie in towns and to feudal-landlord elements in the countryside, and through them to closer ties with imperialism as represented by Hong Kong. In the process of this stratification, apart from the final splitting away from the party by the right wing of the Kuomintang, a

considerable portion of those in the center will also separate from the left wing.

This process will inevitably spread to the army as well and will push into the counterrevolutionary camp those generals who in the course of the current reorganization of the entire civil and military administration have lost the right of unrestricted plunder of the population as well as their independence of action. The opposition grouping round Wei Pang-p'ing and Li Fu-lin will probably be strengthened further by the Third Canton Division.

The opposition forces not being sufficiently strong, General Hsü Ch'ung-chih will work with the party and the government. He will try to utilize the situation to strengthen his influence in the Military Council and in the government to remove from the Canton army those he considers undesirable. He will aim at increasing his influence in the army and thus strengthen his influence on the overall policy of the government and the work of the Military Council.

It should not be considered that the Military Council as now set up is the most perfect form of central military apparatus, capable of really bringing about final centralization and unity in military administration. The author considers the Military Council as created to be a temporary form, capable of changing into one best suited [24] to the conditions and the relationship of the forces. The Kuomintang as a party without unity within itself, abounding with contradictions, cannot eliminate these contradictions from the structures it creates. This is why with a change of circumstances, another structure can be set up for the central apparatus of military administration.

Strengthening the position of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih within the Military Council is likely to make him antagonistic toward Liang Hung-k'ai and his units, which could in turn push Liang Hung-k'ai into an attempt to keep in his own hands the taxes collected by him in the southwestern portion of the province (Kongmoon region) and to retain the independence of his units. This will lead him to union with the opposition. Hong Kong, whose communications with Canton along the main waterway, the Pearl River, and with Kwangsi through the Western River have been interrupted by the strike and the economic blockade organized by the Strike Committee (with the support of the government), will try to penetrate into Kwangsi by the water routes through Kongmoon (Liang Hung-k'ai's region).

As a result of this the English, in their struggle against the Canton Government, will make use of Liang Hung-k'ai in the direction of the antirevolutionary bloc.

With the reactionary groups gradually increasing in strength, a new political and military conflict in Kwangtung will be inevitable. In such a case the reactionaries will have at their disposal the following military forces: III Corps of Li Fu-lin, 4,000; 3d Canton Division (probably minus the 6th Brigade of General Ho T'ung), 2,000; and I Corps of General Liang Hung-k'ai, 6,000. Or, in all, 12,000 troops highly scattered and scarcely prepared for battle.

The Kuomintang and the government will be solidly supported by the Whampoa Academy, the Hunan Army, Chu P'ei-te and Ch'eng Ch'ien, as well as the VI Corps developed from the 1st Canton Division, i.e., a military force of approximately 40,000 fighters.

With such an alignment of forces, General Hsü will continue to stay with the Kuomintang. This in turn will determine the position of the remaining forces in Canton who will either openly come out in support of the government or will take up a wait-and-see attitude. If we were to assume the extreme situation and suppose that the antigovernment forces would be joined by a part of the forces of the II Canton Corps, which is not highly likely, even then the forces of the opposition would not exceed 20,000 men, scattered partly in the eastern and partly in the southwestern parts of the province. Using the Whampoa forces alone would be quite sufficient to defeat them.

[25] Will the majority of the merchants give active support to the opposition? This is unlikely. It is not just because their interests are sharply opposed to those of Hong Kong. From the government reforms (centralization of finances, regulation of military administration, and reform of government-administrative apparatus), merchants expect a great deal of order and peace and increased economic activity within the province. Unification of finances, fundamental reform in the taxation system, even freeing the masses of the population from a number of heavy taxes and the introduction of the property tax will hardly increase the tax burden of merchants, who are at present paying in a haphazard manner vast sums of money to various generals. It is most likely that the merchants will support the government in its efforts to bring order into the administration of the province.

Thus, there are no grounds on which to fear serious complications for the Kuomintang from internal counterrevolution. Basing itself upon the entire revolutionary mass of intelligentsia and with a favorable attitude toward its reforms on the part of the merchant class, the Kuomintang will be able to smash the above groups of opponents without any difficulty. It is hardly likely that the opposition would risk an open confrontation. It is much more likely to resort to intimidation and terror against the leading groups and through this will accelerate the liquidation of their own strength.

The only force that could cause anxiety for the Kuomintang in Kwangtung is imperialism and the possibility of an attempt by the English to intervene in Canton.

But the specter of the national revolution in central and northern China and contradictions among the imperialists themselves will not permit the open destruction by force of arms of the southern center of the national-revolutionary movement in China. This however does not exclude the possibility that Hong Kong, whose interests will be more and more impinged upon by Canton, would strive to destroy Kuomintang power in Kwangtung. If the English were not able to finish off the Canton Government by force openly, then they would take all measures to isolate it from the national-revolutionary movement in the country as a whole.

The experience of recent events has shown that by cutting off communications between Canton and central China, the British have thus hemmed in the Kuomintang at decisive moments of the national-revolutionary movement in Kwangtung and thereby deprived the Kuomintang of the influence it could have had, had it retained contact with central and northern China.[1]

[26] Since, at the present time, the political and military situation of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung is not in danger, and since the question of liquidating Teng Pen-yin, or the southwestern front, and the elimination of the remnants of Ch'en Chiung-ming, or the eastern front, does not present any special difficulties, it is timely to pose the question of the northward expansion of the sphere of influence of the Kuomintang and its emergence in the political stage of central China; that is, of transferring the center of political work from Kwangtung to the Yangtze with the base in Hankow. Now it is not only possible but essential for the interests of the national-revolutionary movement to reconsider once more the idea of a Northern Expedition and an armed movement to the Yangtze. I think the political situation in central China is favorable for such a move. To keep Kwangtung and to come up to the Yangtze the Kuomintang requires 80,000 men, of which 30-35,000 would remain in Kwangtung, and 45-50,000 move northward. This Northern Expedition could be carried out at the beginning of the second half of 1926. Can the Kuomintang assemble such a force? I consider this an attainable target and would say that it can. Kwangtung will provide the necessary financial resources, but the problem of arms will be more difficult. It will be necessary to secure 20,000 rifles and trained cadres of military, political, and administrative workers to make up the army and to create the future apparatus of power in territories newly acquired by the Kuomintang.

Financial Possibilities of Kwangtung and Means Needed To Maintain the Forces

Let us examine whether it is possible to organize such a force and whether there exist sufficient financial resources for the purpose.

In the past, in the days of imperial rule, Kwangtung had an income of approximately 50 million dollars. The income of the province has declined in recent years and the province at present yields 35 million. The Cantonese maintain that after reforming the tax collecting system it will be possible to gather 40 million, taking the province as a whole.

For safety's sake let us take a more realistic figure of 30 million or 2.5 million per month. From this, to maintain the army and for other military needs 22 million per year could be assigned. If we take out of this sum 2 million for extra and unforeseen expenses connected with minor military operations, we are left with 1,666,000 per month. Bearing in mind that to maintain a division numbering 5,500 men (as can be seen from the experience at Whampoa) costs 85,000 dollars per month, to maintain an army of 80,000 will cost 1,275,000; 391,000 are then left over monthly for the remaining needs of the military apparatus, i.e., to maintain schools, the air
[27] force, and the navy. The sum of 1,275,000 will be needed only at the end of the first half of 1926. Until that time the requirements will be very much less. Out of this difference equipment needed for the air force could be acquired, production of arms in the arsenal increased, and a sum necessary for the recruitment of new troops and training cadres accumulated. The cost of the additional demand for arms is not taken into account. It is considered that these will be bought on credit and that the costs would be covered in 1927. I regard these budgetary calculations to be highly conservative. Since the government income will probably exceed 30 million the budgetary estimates can be raised.

The funds necessary to initiate the campaign (the Great Northern March) can be obtained by borrowing from merchants.

Plan for Forming the Army

The reorganization of the army and the subsequent sequence of forming an army corps is to be as follows.

Hunan Army. In July of this year it had eight regiments (8,000 men) and was making up to nine regiments (9,000) using captured arms. The nine regiments are to be made up into three divisions to form the V Corps. Corps Commander T'an Yen-k'ai. By the end of 1925, by increasing the strength of the regiments, the corps will increase to 12,000 men and in 1926, by bringing the corps up to full strength, the number will be increased to 15,900 men.

Yunnan Army. In July, General Chu P'ei-te had 6,500 rifles, organized into two divisions, two independent brigades, and two regiments. These are to be reformed into one division and one independent brigade and will form the VII Corps. The Corps commander will be Chu P'ei-te. If his (Chu P'ei-te's) loyalty to the Party remains beyond suspicion in the future then in 1926 the corps will be made into two divisions with the full strength of 10,600 fighters.

Whampoa Troops. In July (excluding the Academy with its 2,000 students) these consisted of 1st Division which had three regiments, while the formation of the fourth regiment was just being completed. In all, the four regiments numbered approximately 6,000 men. The formation of the 2d Division was essentially started. There were in the stores more than 5,000 rifles (including the latest consignment to arrive from the USSR). The establishment of a base for the 3d Division in the near future has been considered. At the beginning of 1926 the numerical strength of the Whampoa forces will be brought up to 15,900 and IV Corps will be formed with

Chiang Kai-shek as Corps Commander.

Canton Army. The 1st Corps of Liang Hung-k'ai had 6,000 bayonets and was organizationally formed into three independent brigades and several independent regiments. If General Liang Hung-k'ai and his corps remain loyal to the Party, it will [28] be reformed into a division and an independent brigade or will remain as it is in the form of three separate brigades. There will be no increase in the numerical strength of the corps. In the case of it being disarmed the arms will be handed over to the IV or VI Corps and partly to the V Corps.

III Corps of General Li Fu-lin. 4,000 rifles. Organizationally it consisted of several independent brigades. It is to be disarmed at the first suitable opportunity. The arms in this case are to be handed over to IV, V, and VI Corps.

1st Division of Li Chi-shen. In July it had 6,000 bayonets formed into two brigades, a total of five regiments. It is to be made into the VI Corps consisting of two divisions and by the end of 1925 is to be brought up to 10,000. Corps Commander Li Chi-shen or Ch'en Ming-shu, preferably the latter.

3d and 4th Divisions, Mo [Hsiung's] Brigade and a number of independent brigades and regiments, numbering 11,000, will be reformed into two or three divisions and will make up the II Corps. Corps Commander Hsü Ch'ung-chih. Numerical strength is not to be increased.

The separate brigade of General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng in July comprised 2,000 men and has just begun to form the third regiment. It is to be made into a division and added to Chiang Kai-shek's Corps or it will operate as a separate unit, subordinate directly to the Military Council. In 1926 it is to be brought up to the full strength of 5,300 men.

5th Kwangsi Division. In July it numbered 1,000 men. It is to be disbanded and used to make up the numerical strength of the IV, V, and VI Corps.

The formation of General Ch'eng Ch'ien numbered 1,500 bayonets together with small units from other provinces numbering 2,000 men; they formed part of the northern expedition. They are to be formed into a division commanded by General Ch'eng Ch'ien and in 1926 will be brought up to the full strength of 5,300 men. It will be added to one of the corps or will remain separate.

Garrison troops of the Hui-chou fortress, under the command of General Yang K'un-ju, numbered in July 4,000 men, formed into four brigades. They will be disbanded, then used to bring up to strength corps loyal to the party.

Thus in July 1925 the numerical strength of the Kwangtung armies was 59,000 bayonets. At the end of 1925 the following should be disbanded and, in case of resistance, disarmed: III Corps of General Li Fu-lin, V Kwangsi Division, the Hui-chou garrison, 3d Division (with the exception of the Ho T'ung brigade) and probably the First Corps of Liang Hung-k'ai. Altogether 17,000 men should be disarmed. Their arms will be used to increase units in accordance with the outline above and the total [29] numerical strength of the forces at the end of 1925 will be the same as before, i.e., 59-60,000. In the first half of 1926 the corps of Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en Ming-shu, T'an Yen-k'ai, Chu P'ei-te, the division of Ch'eng Ch'ien and of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng will be brought up to strength in accordance with the schedules listed above, which will bring the total number to 72,600 bayonets, i.e., twelve divisions belonging to the corps, and two independent divisions.

By this time one more new division will have been formed. Thus by the end of the first half of 1926 there should be 78-80,000 troops made up into five corps, and three independent divisions. Depending upon the operational requirements the latter will be made into a sixth corps, or be attached to IV and VI Corps, or remain independent.

All forces are to be organized along "Whampoa" lines. Political training in the units is to be considered essential. The forces are to have their political organizations

and political commissars will be introduced.

It is essential to note that the program outlined above for the formation of the army can, on the organizational side, be subjected to changes, depending upon the political situation in Kwangtung. It may be necessary also to disarm part of the troops of II Corps or, instead of increasing the forces of Chu P'ei-te, it may be necessary to disband his units. But this will not change the overall numerical strength of the government forces, since new divisions can be formed in their place.

For the same political reason it may turn out that it will be necessary to forgo any considerable increase of the troops under the command of Chiang Kai-shek or some other general, but rather at this time create new alliances which would allow free manipulation between these power elements and would keep them more reliably under the command of, and subordinated to, the Party.

For some part of enlistment in the immediate future, especially for the "Whampoa" forces, strikers can be utilized and brought into the army. This will revolutionize the army still further.

Preparation of the Commanding, Military-Political, and Administrative Cadres

The training of the commanding, military-political cadres, and the raising of the tactical and political level of officers in the army should be started right away. To train these cadres the following schools are to be formed during the next few months:

a. Ordinary officers' school for the training of platoon and regimental commanders (to be developed from the Whampoa Academy);

[30] b. Refresher courses for the middle and upper class of commanding officers;

c. School for headquarters staff;

d. School for noncommissioned officers, to which are to be sent the most advanced and capable soldiers;

e. Schools for military-political workers;

f. A number of schools and courses of a specialized and technical nature, such as artillery, machine-gun units, communications, engineering, medical, supply units and naval.

To ensure uniformity in tactical and political training all schools are to be subordinated to the Military Council.

The regular officers' school and the noncommissioned officers' school should take in a considerable number of people born in Hunan and Kiangsi. The Northern March will proceed through these provinces and such composition of personnel would be of great advantage both politically and for the more immediate purpose of getting to know the province. Such men will provide a link between the army and the population and they will know the language.

To organize civil administration, peasant organizations, and political agitation work in regions occupied during the expedition, it is necessary to start training now the necessary cadres of administrators, organizers of peasant unions, and agitators. For this purpose Canton University should be transformed into a school of civil administration. The peasant school, which is already in existence, should be enlarged to a desirable size and a number of new courses should be introduced to prepare agitators. To those schools and courses should be sent large numbers of people born in various places in Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. In this way cadres of workers will be prepared who will be familiar with the provinces, and who will know the way of life and language, thus permitting them skillfully to make contact with the population and to establish a political foothold among the people.

There is ample time to prepare such cadres. By creating the schools in December and running courses of four, five, or six months' duration, we shall have people ready by June–July 1926.

Probable Situation in the Intermediate Provinces at the Time of the Start of the March

The relations between the Canton Government and the neighboring provinces existing at the present time will hardly change a great deal by the middle of 1926.

Because of the complicated structure of relations between its generals, Fukien, which is hostile to the Canton Government, will not be in a position to undertake serious active operations should the decision be made to interfere with our movement north. They will be unable to muster substantial forces. Two or three of our divisions [31] left in the area of Chaochou-Swatow will be quite able to safeguard the eastern borders of Kwangtung province. Kweichow, because of equally complicated internal relations between military groups, will not be in a position to hamper our movement at all and will remain inactive.

Szechwan, propelled by internal economic forces, has for a long time been striving to get to the Wuchang area and has on numerous occasions come against the *tuchün* of Hunan, General Chao Heng-t'i. It can be supposed, therefore, that our movement will also bring about a movement from Szechwan toward Wuchang. This will only make our success easier.

Kwangsi has always been friendly to the Canton government and has appeared to have been outwardly submissive. In view of the new military and political situation arising out of the struggle against Fan Shih-shen and T'ang Chi-yao it can, to some extent, change its former attitude. But the change will not be so great as to become a serious threat to Canton. (I am here deliberately leaving out the question of the role of Yunnan since, at the time of my departure, it was difficult to foresee what form events would take following the struggle between Fan Shih-shen and T'ang Chi-yao as a result of Fan Shih-shen's march into Yunnan. I think, however, that it will hardly be able to interfere with the implementation of the Northern Campaign.)

Hunan and Kiangsi Forces

I do not possess precise figures of the forces of Chao Heng-t'i and Fang Pen-jen, but I suppose that they will not differ a great deal from my estimates. When Fang Pen-jen began his struggle for power in the province against the former *tuchün* he had no more than 15,000 men. It must be assumed that by now his force has doubled. But, having swallowed up the remnants of the army of the former *tuchün*, Fang Pen-jen can hardly be expected to have forces uniformly loyal to him. In the event of our movement he will not be able to send more than 20-25,000 men against the Canton armies. The remaining forces will have the task of guarding the northern portion of the province and of countering still existing remnants of the old army who have gone underground or who are operating as bandits. There is even less information on the Hunan forces. It must be assumed that Chao Heng-t'i has at his disposal approximately 50,000 men of which he will be able to send 35-40,000 against the Canton army. The combined forces of these provinces which we shall have to face will be 55-60,000 men.

Wu P'ei-fu and his group, which includes Hsiao Yao-nan, will no doubt assist [32] them. But being tied down to the northeast of the Yangtze by the Chang Tso-lin group and in the north by the National People's Army [Kuominchün], they will hardly be in a position to set aside substantial forces and therefore will give support with not more than 20-25,000 men. Thus it can be expected that the numerical strength of the opposition will be 75,000 or at worst 85-90,000.

But the superiority in numbers is only an illusion. The Wu P'ei-fu support may come late or not come at all. It will all depend upon the attitude taken by Chang Tso-lin. In the end, the Wu P'ei-fu forces may find themselves tied up by the attitudes

taken by the National [People's] Armies. Since the Chinese forces, because of their internal contradictions, exhibit little ability to act in accord even within the army of one particular general, coordinated action by the armies of Fang Pen-jen and Chao Heng-t'i is that much less likely.

Thus the numerical advantage of the opposition is weakened by so many negative factors that it can be assumed that by the time a decisive clash develops the opposition will not have the necessary superiority at the required place, and that their numerical strength will be either equal to that of the Kuomintang or possibly less.

Generally speaking, opponents having superiority of up to 50 percent present no danger for the Kuomintang forces. With double numerical superiority success in the fight goes to the side which maneuvers its forces better. Superiority in maneuvering should be assumed to be on the side of the Kuomintang forces where operational directors shall in fact be our advisers.

Deployment of the Kuomintang Forces To Guard Kwangtung and To Supply the Northern March

Out of fifteen divisions created by the Kuomintang, five or six divisions will be set aside to guard Kwangtung and to retain control of the province. Three of these will be in the eastern part, one in the southwest, one in the west, and one in Canton. In all, 33,000 men.

The remaining nine divisions (47,000) will be sent north. If the situation in Kwangsi is under control and peace prevails, then at the outset of the campaign there will be no need to have a division in the west and it will be possible to incorporate it into the active force. This will bring its strength to 52-53,000. Included in the active force will be VII Corps of Chu P'ei-te, T'an Yen-k'ai's Corps, and II Corps of the Canton Army (if it exists). This will give the force its political character and will improve the battle-worthiness of the force as a whole.

[33] The VI Corps of Ch'en Ming-shu and individual divisions will stay behind to guard Kwangtung, or, as already indicated, one of the divisions may be incorporated into the active force.

The entire force shall move together, like a fist, through one of the provinces, Kiangsi or Hunan, and having dealt with one will quickly move on to clean up the other.

The concentrated attack will ensure initial success, which will no doubt determine the final victory of the Kuomintang. The initial success of the government forces will demoralize the ranks of the opponents and will bring to light the inner discord between generals, which in turn will lead to part of their forces joining up with the Kuomintang. This will undoubtedly result in the expansion of the Kuomintang forces through an intake of new men. The movement of General Fan in January 1925 from Kwangtung to Honan, which he started with 4,000 men, and during which he increased his forces by more than 20,000 men by the time he reached Honan, can serve as a corroboration of my expectations.

Having taken Hunan and Kiangsi and having in the course of operations formed the new units needed to guard the occupied positions, without losing time, the whole weight of the active force should be used to capture Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang.

After defeating the opposition in Hunan and Kiangsi it will not be difficult to defeat whatever Marshal Hsiao Yao-nan assembles at Hankow. The Kwangtung army, bringing with it freedom for workers and peasants to form professional organizations and trade unions, and the reform of the administrative apparatus, will without doubt have the wide support of all the revolutionary masses. Upon arrival at the Yangtze, the Kuomintang will call for the creation of a National Assembly and the formation

of a National-revolutionary Government. In this struggle the Kuomintang will receive the whole support of the entire national-revolutionary movement of the country.

The successful implementation of the Northern Campaign will prove the above conclusions unquestionably correct.

The Kuomintang's move to the Yangtze and their occupation of Hankow will bring them to the industrial center of the country. This will give impetus to the national-revolutionary movement and will so change the whole political situation that at present it is hard even to foresee all the positive effects that such a move will have on the national-revolutionary movement.

It can, however, be said that the prospects of revolution in China will increase enormously and will ensure the future spread of Kuomintang power all the way to Shanghai.

The success of the operations should be ensured by the appropriate attitude to it [34] on the part of the National People's Army [Kuominchün]. In order to become established in central China and to convert Hankow into the center of the national-revolutionary movement, making it the revolutionary capital, the armies must be prepared in the worst case to sacrifice Kwangtung and to reinforce the striking force with the forces that were to be left behind.

With such a change in location the political and financial base of the party would not diminish, but, on the contrary, would increase. The availability of one of the largest arsenals in China—in Hanyang—will provide for the future growth of the armed forces. Finally, the proximity of the Whampoa corps to the National People's Army [Kuominchün] will infect the latter with a revolutionary spirit.

The above considerations have been given by me the name "The Great Kuomintang Military Plan." I originally developed it by stages before a group of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, the Head Executive Body of the Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party[2] and the Chinese generals, after the occupation of Swatow in March 1925. The second time it was put forward was at the Military Conference of June 15, and the third time was before the officers and generals of the Hunan army in the last ten days of June. I now put forward the plan for your consideration.

I consider it realizable, and think that for its implementation we should put in the necessary effort and render the necessary assistance with supplies of arms.

Galen

Remarks

In order to avoid my being accused of attempting to militarize the Kuomintang I feel compelled to make the following explanations: the political side of the plan was not discussed in detail because it should be worked out by the political representative and the military plan should be only a complement to it.

Besides, only a rough outline of the plan is given here and this is why it needs to be further worked out and completed.

Kalgan, September 20, 1925
Galen

Notes

1. Telegraphic and cable communications passed through Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government imposed censorship.
2. The last five words come from Captain Ratay's text.

Document 10

Notes on Several Meetings of the Military Council

This document was translated by the Peking Commission from Russian into Chinese and published under the title "Minutes of a Military Conference in Kwangtung Attended by Rogachev, Military Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Borodin, Military Adviser in Kwangtung, and Others" in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 4-8. We have not seen the minutes of the Military Council in T'an Yen-k'ai's handwriting for the period June 29, 1925, to July 1, 1926, which are held in the Kuomintang Archives, according to information from Professor Chiang Yung-ching. Document 10 is not among them, and Professor Chiang thinks it is a Soviet report. In *SLYM*, VII, "Most Important Russian Documents," pp. 55b-57a (in the ten-volume set), many minutes of the Political Council and the Military Council are listed as translated from English, dating from October 9, 1925, backward to June 24, 1925. And on pages 107a-b, more Military Council minutes are listed, meeting by meeting during July 1925, with no indication of language. These were not published by the Peking Commission.

We deduce that Document 10 reports the substance of several meetings of the Military Council between July 4 and about July 20, 1925.

We know from the minutes of the Kuomintang Political Council that on July 4 there was a joint meeting of the Political Council and the newly formed Military Council, and that *Lo-chia-ch'ieh-fu* [Rogachev] attended it, as did Borodin and "Galen." This meeting formalized the regulations of the Military Council. On July 9 the Political Council set Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoons for its own meetings, and Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday afternoons for meetings of the Military Council.

Some matters discussed in Political Council meetings are also mentioned in Document 10. One example is Political Council meeting no. 36 on July 17: Borodin reported on the condition of Anglo-Russian relations. Discussion. Decide to continue the Strike. Decisions on Chiang Kai-shek's proposals: (1) Before October clear up the North, East, and Southern routes [of Kwangtung]; (2) this year bring about the military political reformation of Kwangsi; (3) before 1927 bring Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan directly under the government. Document 10, p. 5, on July 18: In view of deteriorating Anglo-Russian relations, we should follow the Political Council's decision to continue the strike, to clear up eastern Kwangtung in the near future, and then, to carry on the Northern Expedition. Political Council meeting no. 37 on July 20: Discussion of blockade plans, the matter to be managed by the Military Council. Document 10, decision on the blockade of Hong Kong, and details.

General Victor P. Rogachev, mentioned in Document 10 as chief of the General Staff, arrived in Canton in October 1924 and took over leadership of the Soviet military advisory mission from General Bliukher early in July 1925. At that time he was listed as chief of the Military Section and chief of staff,[1] the latter position referring to the military forces under the government at Canton, soon to be named the National Revolutionary Army.

Many of the decisions on military matters mentioned in this document were carried out in the subsequent months. We have omitted from our translation some in-

formation on minor issues given in the last section of the document.

A translation from Russian into English of minutes of a joint meeting of the Political Council and the Military Council on September 22, 1925, was published in *The Soviet in China Unmasked*, pp. 35-39, with photographs of the Russian text. Most of the meeting concerned problems of financing the military units being reorganized and united in the National Revolutionary Army. Listed but not translated in that collection are minutes of the Political Bureau—i.e., Political Council—on September 21, 1925, and of the Military Council meetings on November 10, 15, and 17, 1925. These dates are confirmed by minutes in the KMT Archives.

This was Document 15 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[Organization of] the Military Council

[4] The Military Council is officially convened. All problems awaiting the Council's decision should first be referred to the Political Council for investigation. The agenda of the Military Council should also be referred to the Political Council for approval.

Note: Members of the Military Council are members of the Political Council.[1] They all hold responsible positions in the government and the army.

Wang Ching-wei, chairman of the Political Council, serves concurrently as chairman of the Military Council. Other members of the Military Council are:

Hsü Ch'ung-chih, minister of war who supervises the affairs of the General Staff, a member of the Political Council.

T'an Yen-k'ai, superintendent of the arsenal.

Hu Han-min, member of the Political Council and minister of foreign affairs of the National Government.

Chu P'ei-te, commander of the Yunnan Army. (He is the only person not holding any governmental position.)

Liao Chung-k'ai, secretary of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, member of the Political Council, minister of finance, supervisor of sanitation in the army.

Wu Ch'ao-shu, member of the Political Council, concurrently holding other positions.

The chairman of the Military Council has the power of decision.

[5] Rogachev, chief of the General Staff, concurrently supervisor of naval and aviation affairs.

The Military Council meets weekly . . . [burned]

Important Problems [and Decisions] of the Military Council

Note: At the opening of each meeting, *Tsung-li's* Will should be recited. All members should rise and pay homage.

Appointment of heads of departments of the General Staff; distribution of Russian personnel among the departments; determination of the interrelationship between the General Staff and the Military Council.

Decision on need for the General Staff to determine under Russian direction the army's size and finances.

Decision on plan of organization of General Staff, which should not be amended.

Attention to sanitation in the armies and appointment of Liao Chung-k'ai as supervisor.

Liao Chung-k'ai, a member of the Military Council and finance minister, re-

ported on the unsatisfactory financial situation due to the failure of army commanders to turn in tax collections. *Decision*: Appointment of officials to investigate the condition and the quantity of arms and the funds to be appropriated to each army.

On July 18, the question of press opinion was discussed. In view of deteriorating Anglo-Russian relations, we should follow the Political Council's decision to continue the strike, to clear up eastern Kwangtung in the near future, and then, beginning with restoration of order in Kwangsi, carry on the Northern Expedition. The matter of clearing up eastern Kwangtung should be completed within three months. There is reason to believe that Feng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin of Mukden will clash early this winter. Chang is a tool of the imperialists.

[6] Plans on the Northern Expedition should be executed. The expedition should proceed along two routes; one starting from Hunan and Kweichow [?] to unite with various organizations in the North, and the other by sea. Certain members of the Council do not believe that the Northern armies lack support, but this is immaterial. We must, however, seek to delay military action by Wu P'ei-fu because the military governors of Hunan, Hupei, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien are all members of Wu's clique. Wu would be an important figure once he takes action. In addition, we should devise ways to encourage Wu to advance north and encounter Hu Ching-yi.[2] Concerning this matter we must . . . [burned]

Reports on the expansion of the navy and aviation have been made to the Military Council and the General Staff. Wang Ching-wei is appointed chief of the aviation squadron because he is a man of high prestige and will live up to the people's expectations. A Navy Department is to be established to centralize and organize the navy. A part of the garrison force should be organized as the military gendarmes.

Suspend publication of war news in newspapers to avoid furnishing information to the enemy.

Decision on the dispatch of two Whampoa battalions to suppress banditry in Shen [Shun-te] county. The plans are to be formulated by General Headquarters.

Decision on the summoning of military officers to explain the reorganization of the army, its objectives and tasks.

Prohibition of the shooting of the people at will by military officers. Abolition of the Military Department of the Kowloon railway because of the killing of a railway employee. This matter should be dealt with by the General Staff.

Decision on the regulations for checking arms. In the name of the national Government, the Military Council should check on and approve the size of each army.

Decision on the blockade of Hong Kong and the stopping of all shipments of goods there. The General Staff is to formulate plans to carry out this decision. It should dispatch the armored car battalion, but instruct it absolutely to avoid precipitating any conflict with British forces.

Appointment of responsible personnel (the Navy Department).

Decision on the withdrawal of troops from the city. The General Staff is to be instructed on this.

[7] Confirmation of the suspension of military reports in newspapers.

All military funds should be met by government revenues.

Four-fifths of the revenues should be appropriated for military expenditures. Estimates should be made of the expenditures of the armies of the National Government and the provincial armies. Priority will be given the former. [Remainder omitted.]

Notes

1. Not all members of the Military Council belonged to the Kuomintang Political

Council. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 111, *Draft Translation*, pp. 147 and 327; *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 35, minutes of a meeting of the Soviet group of advisers in Canton, July 1, 1925. Rogachev was also head of the South China Intelligence Branch—i.e., Russian military intelligence—according to *SLYM*, III, "Canton," p. 198. On February 22, 1926, the Political Council at its 115th meeting changed Rogachev's designation from chief of staff to adviser to the chief of staff and appointed Li Chi-shen to the position of chief of staff to the National Revolutionary Army. After the March 20 Incident of 1926, Rogachev was one of three Russian advisers made to leave Canton. He became assistant Soviet military attaché in Peking in the autumn of 1926, according to a note in Document 24.

2. Hu Ching-yi died on April 10, 1925. This evidence of misinformation, or of historical anachronism, may have resulted from mistranslation from Russian into Chinese. The Russian text may have referred to Hu Ching-yi's army, which was then commanded by Yueh Wei-chun.

Document 11

Chiang Kai-shek's Speech to the Military Council

This document contains excerpts from a speech delivered by Chiang Kai-shek on July 26, 1925, and was translated by the Peking Commission from Russian into Chinese under the title "Minutes of a Military Conference in Kwangtung Attended by Rogachev, Military Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Borodin, Military Adviser in Kwangtung, and Others" in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 2–4. Our translation is checked against a much longer and probably early version of the speech in *Chiang Chieh-shih Hsiao-chang tsai Kuo-min Cheng-fu Chun-shih Wei-yuan-hui chiang-yen tz'u*, and with shorter versions in Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for July 26, 1925, and in KMWH, XI, 1728–31.

The document provides an example of a speech given in Chinese, abbreviated and translated into Russian in Canton, then translated back into Chinese by the Peking Commission, and finally done by us into English. In this condensation and triple translation some errors have occurred, but the substance of the speech as recorded in Chiang's "Diary" is essentially the same.

This was Document 14 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[2] It is my belief that the detailed reports thus far presented on military strategy, finances, and personnel are inadequate. Our army must have unified objectives and spirit. I propose that it be called the "Revolutionary Army" or "National Revolutionary Army" and that, to avoid confusion, the names "Hunan Army" or "Kwangtung Army" should no longer be used. Our mission is determined by principles and not by mere names.

Our army should be called the "Revolutionary Army" because Dr. Sun devoted nearly forty years to the Revolution. Following the overthrow of the Manchus, Yuan Shih-k'ai, Ts'ao K'un, and, currently, Tuan Ch'i-jui and Wu P'ei-fu, became the most stubborn counterrevolutionaries. If we allow them to imperil the nation without a declaration of war by a revolutionary army, what hope is there for the future of the nation? We are fully aware that other counterrevolutionaries would rise to power even if Tuan should step down and that all counterrevolutionaries are equally destructive.

[3] To this day, the people still do not realize the cause of our struggle against the counterrevolutionaries or that imperialism and militarism are one. The root must first be removed! Gentlemen, you must know that the imperialists, recognizing the inconvenience of starting a direct war against us, secretly control the militarists and instigate disorders throughout our country. The imperialists aim at making profits and China is their field of plunder. I presume this is known to you all! We are sure to achieve success if we can fight the imperialists with unified objectives. Just think who is behind Yang Hsi-min and Lai Shih-huang. And why do people like T'ang Chi-yao, the slaves of imperialism and world capitalism, want to destroy the Kwangtung Government? Who actually dictates their actions? Clearly, the British and other imperialists utilize them against us. How can we tolerate this? We must resolutely at-

tack them until they are all eliminated!

Our country has become extremely impoverished because the militarists absorb the fat of the land. The Northern militarists have never succeeded in unifying China because they are lined up with the imperialists. We, on the other hand, build our force on the mass movement as well as the army. Though our army is small, the imperialists consider it very strong because it is backed by the force of the masses, while the Northerners have only the army. The psychology of the imperialists has changed recently and they greatly fear our army. Although they have specialists and technicians, we have spirit—the spirit of struggling for justice—which is sufficient to fight them. The British realize it is impossible to wage open war with China since it would result in the loss of all their interests. Modern warfare, moreover, is different from that of the old days. Military strength alone is not enough. There must be due regard for justice and principles.

On examining the world today, we find workers everywhere who are the real force of the Revolution, for every worker is opposed to military force. Even though our revolution may not be victorious at the moment, this is only a temporary phenomenon. It is only right that our revolution should succeed. Like the venomous snake which is endowed with a beautiful lady's feet to tempt the weak and secure their obedience, the imperialists are employing clever and tricky tactics in China to [4] cause our countrymen to kill one another for their profit. Are you gentlemen not aware of this? I hope you will not fear the British but will have confidence in victory. Victory will then be assured. Though long oppressed, the people are still unconscious and it is difficult to make them understand. But you, gentlemen, surely comprehend and realize that the divine duty of every military man is to subdue the imperialist countries. The imperialists assist the Chinese militarists, exclaiming, "Come, we give you food, but we will get it back from you someday!"

(*Applause*)

Document 12

Extract from the Report "Journey to Canton in October 1925," by A. Khmelev

Jay Calvin Huston secured this document, which is preserved in his papers in the Hoover Institution. A. Khmelev was a member of the Soviet Embassy staff in Peking. We have seen only this excerpt of his report, pp. 27–30. In a note explaining our Document 9, Captain John P. Ratay provides background for Document 12. According to Captain Ratay, because of incompatibility between Borodin and Galen, the latter left Canton and went to Peking to complain to the Soviet ambassador. A member of the Soviet military attaché's office, Khmelev was sent by the embassy to South China to investigate the matter. Document 12 is part of his report.

The document gives an unusual glimpse of a clash between Borodin and Bliukher, and of Borodin's subsequent power. Borodin had been in Canton for a year before Bliukher arrived in October 1924. In mid-November 1924, Borodin went north when Sun Yat-sen departed Canton. By the time Borodin returned in June 1925, Bliukher had been in charge of the Soviet mission for six months. Bliukher departed within a month of Borodin's return.

Two documents supplement Document 12. "Instructions from Moscow to Borodin on the Problem of Establishing a Military Affairs Council To Direct Military Affairs in Kwangtung" (*SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 13–14) outlines a plan for a Military Affairs Council and a subordinate Military Affairs Bureau, the former apparently a policy-making body of which the chief political director was a member and to which he issued orders that served as the basic policy for the work of the bureau. "All Soviet military personnel are to be under the direct control of the director of the Military Affairs Bureau in all matters. [But] (note): matters of a political nature are to be under the direct control of the responsible political director." Though undated, this appears to have been an attempt to separate the responsibilities of the chief political and chief military advisers. The other document is "Plan for the Employment of Personnel, etc.: Minutes of the Sitting of the Military Council on the 1st of July, 1925" (*Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 35–44). At this meeting, Borodin, Galen, Rogachev, and six other senior Russian military advisers are listed as present—the same list as in Document 12, with the addition of Tereshatov. A decision was made that Galen should turn over to Rogachev all records of the Military Section but should postpone his departure on leave for a fortnight. Discussion of the regulations relating to the Military Council produced only one apparent minor change. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to duty assignments, or the return to Russia, of twenty individuals in the current Soviet military mission, and to decisions on ways to ameliorate the conditions of life of the military advisers. We then learn from Document 12 what became of the Military Affairs Council.

We can identify the persons mentioned as making up the Military Council in addition to Borodin and Rogachev. *Stepanov I* is the real name of V. A. Stepanov, who came to Canton in October 1924, was an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in the First Eastern Expedition, and in July 1925 was soon to be sent to work in the north. Another person, called Stepanov 2d, is mentioned in "Plan for the Employment of Personnel, Etc.," but he was to be returned to Russia. *Zil'bert* may be the real name of I.

Zil'bert, who arrived in Canton in October 1924 and was an adviser to Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's brigade in the First Eastern Expedition. In July 1925 Zil'bert was assigned to advise the Hunan Army of T'an Yen-k'ai. *Cherepanov* was one of the first military advisers selected for Canton, where he arrived in January 1924. His full name was Alexander Ivanov Cherepanov, and he was an instructor in the Military Academy and adviser to Ho Ying-ch'in in the First Eastern Expedition. He is the author of two volumes of memoirs, cited herein as *Zapiski* and *Severnyi*, later published in English translation as *As Military Adviser*. *Nilov* is the assumed name of F. (or Pavel?) Sakhnovskii, who sailed from Shanghai for Hong Kong on July 10, 1924, and was married to Mira Chubareva, another member of the Soviet mission in Canton. In July 1925 he was to be assigned to the division of Ch'en Ming-shu or the corps of Li Chi-shen. *Remi* was the pseudonym of D. Uger, who came to Canton in July 1924 and became an adviser on aviation. In July 1925 he was given the added duty of advising the department of supplies of the Staff, i.e., the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army that was being created.

TEXT

During Com. Galen's stay at Canton, especially when he was in charge of both the political and military work, all guidance in connection with this work was concentrated in his hands. Upon the arrival [return] of Com. Borodin, however, an attempt was made at dividing the work between him and Com. Galen, but this attempt did not yield any positive results. Frictions were constantly taking place between Com. Borodin and Com. Galen and, as a consequence, the latter was compelled to leave Canton. In connection with the departure of Com. Galen, a question arose of finding a substitute for him; as, however, no suitable person could be found on the spot for such a purpose, it was suggested as a compromise that a Military Council should be established consisting of the following men: Borodin, Rogachev, Stepanov I, Zil'bert, Cherepanov, Nilov, and Remi; the remaining military advisers had only a consultative voice. Com. Galen was present at the first meetings of this council, when such questions as the handing over of the records by Com. Galen to Com. Rogachev, the amelioration of the living conditions of the military collaborators, the distribution of workers and such, were being discussed. At the first meeting, however, following the departure of Com. Galen, "the i's were dotted" and it was bluntly stated that the new institution was not a Military Council but a consultative organ attached to Com. Borodin. It appears that all present at this meeting made no objection to such a statement and after two more meetings the Military Council ceased to exist.

A project was then put forth of establishing a Revolutionary Military Council (Revvonsoviet), which was to consist of the political director, the chief of the Military Department, and a third member by special appointment, about whom Peking was to be consulted beforehand, but nothing occurred beyond mere talk. There now exists neither the Military Council nor the Revolutionary Military Council. There is only a dictatorship of one single person—Com. Borodin—in political as well as military questions. In conversation with me on this subject, he stated quite definitely "that he did not consider it to be possible to divide the power into the military power, directly subordinated to the Peking center, and into the political power. He even put this question in the following way: Were he to leave Canton, he admitted the possibility of appointing a man who would direct both the political as well as the military work, but that he considered it to be quite impossible to put a man in charge of the military work only." In accordance with this idea Com. Borodin began to keep a tight grip on the Military Department and to control every step of it, even to the extent of going into the most minute details. The military workers are not permitted to have any in-

itiative and regard the settlement of any question without Borodin's knowledge as the greatest breech of discipline. Even the chief of the group, Com. Rogachev, makes no exception in this respect and in some cases learns of the measures undertaken by Borodin after these measures have already been put into effect. The following fact may be quoted as an instance: When it had been decided to disarm the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih just before his deportation, Com. Rogachev learned of this matter only a few minutes before the time when this question was brought before the Military Council for discussion and consequently only some hours before the time when the disarming actually took place (see conversation between Com. Rogachev and Gen. Chiang Kai-shek on September 18, 1925). Com. Tereshatov also mentioned this fact to me and pointed out that Rogachev had not been sufficiently informed by the government concerning its intentions with regard to the disarming of the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih. In this connection there is one more fact worth mentioning: The part which Gen. Chiang Kai-shek played in this question of the disarming of the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih is not clear enough. As far as can be ascertained from the available data, Chiang Kai-shek knew perfectly well of the intentions of the government to disarm the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih, but did not tell Com. Rogachev anything about it until the last moment, whereas at the same time he was moving the "Whampoa" troops for the purpose of disarming. In any case this matter requires a more thorough investigation.

Under the existing conditions, the military workers have not even the right of holding direct telegraphic communications with Peking. All such correspondence goes in the name of Borodin only. Com. Borodin reserves for himself even the right to decide the question concerning documents to be mailed to Peking; there was a case when such documents had been carefully examined by him, according to the lists, before they were handed over to me for perusal. Questions pertaining to appointments, financial measures, dismissals, leaves, etc. have also to be decided by Com. Borodin; for instance, the increase of salaries by 0.5 of the coefficient for Canton collaborators was approved by Com. Borodin. This situation is quite abnormal. If not in questions of political character at least in those pertaining to field-service and having a purely military character—the independence of military workers must be maintained.

Com. Galen

During the stay of Com. Galen at Canton there was much talk among our workers about Galen to the effect that in some respects he was treating them in an offhand manner, did not afford them the possibility to work quietly, etc., but after his departure Com. Borodin's dictatorship proved to be much worse for them than that of Com. Galen and, as a consequence, many of those who formerly stood in opposition to Galen would like now to have him return to Canton.

While at Canton Com. Galen has acquired for himself an incredibly high prestige. Our advisers assert that hardly a single day passes without somebody of the Chinese here asking such questions as "Where is Galen now?" "How soon will he come back?" and the like. Some of them belonging to the military class are even following his movements and know that he has been to Peking, has gone to Kalgan, etc. The Chinese had absolute confidence in Com. Galen, so that his every statement on questions pertaining to military operations was considered to be a law. It is a curious fact that during the military operations Com. Galen always succeeded in sending to the front line such generals who during the previous period of their life had never left their offices. Gen. T'an Yen-k'ai, for instance, had never been with his units at the front, but immediately went to the front line as soon as Com. Galen had said that it was absolutely necessary for him to be there.

Part III: The Chinese Communist Party in 1925

We bring together seven documents of the CCP dating from the latter part of 1925 that reveal some of the problems faced by the rapidly growing Party—problems of indoctrinating and training new members; matters of effective organization and propaganda; and issues brought on by difficult interparty relationships with the Kuomintang under the penetration imposed by the Comintern.

Document 13

A Concrete Policy for the Work of Training the Chinese Communist Party Branch and the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Moscow

The following is a translation of an original Chinese document which was drawn up by the Moscow Branch of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps. It is undated, but it appears to have been drafted sometime before February 1925, when the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps changed its name to the "Chinese Communist Youth Corps." The Chinese document is published in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 49-53. This was Document 10 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[49] A. Systematize thought and study—oppose romanticism. Romanticism is a condition that destroys organization.

1. Do not forget we come from a Chinese petty bourgeois background. We have various old concepts and ideas inherited from an economically backward, patriarchal society which are not suited to proletarian revolutionaries.

2. We want to cultivate a pure revolutionary philosophy of life and self-conscious training—we cannot be depended on if we lack a definite philosophy of life and rush into the revolutionary path on a moment's impulse.

3. We should stand firmly on class grounds. We must not observe all things in accordance with old concepts.

4. We should destroy family, local, and national concepts—the proletariat has no family, no local or national limitations.

5. Destroy unity based on sentiment—sentimental unity is petty bourgeois unity—we build our unity on Party interests.

[50] 6. There is within the organization no class distinction or division between workers and students—such psychology is completely divorced from class and Party consciousness. If such phenomena occur within an organization, the spirit of unanimity would be destroyed.

7. We must at all times strive to learn—we must not indulge even slightly in self-satisfaction, self-exaltation, or boastfulness. If we suffer from these weaknesses, we will not be able to progress.

8. We must employ in our work for the Party the same kind of interest we have in love and literature—love and literature are the foundation of romanticism.

9. We must define the class point of view before we study ideology. We must proceed from fundamental understanding of [basic principles]. We must not aim too high and achieve nothing in the end.

10. We should exert our efforts in accordance with the plans and methods of study prescribed by the organization.

11. We must studiously avoid academic-type study—academic-type study denies that theory is born of practice.

12. We must at all times prepare ourselves to return to our country to participate

in actual revolutionary work—we must not feel our studies are inadequate and thus be unwilling to return to our country for service.

13. We must pay attention to the Russian language aside from our studies—we absolutely must not maintain the erroneous idea that we should first study Russian before we study ideology.

B. Discipline action—absolutely oppose anarchist tendencies. If we oppose iron discipline, we would be negatively helping the bourgeoisie destroy the proletariat's revolutionary organization.

14. We must train political agitators and mass organizers—every Communist member is required to have the capacity [to serve as such].

[51] 15. We must at all times maintain the organization's unity of action.

16. We must strive to eliminate the [bad habits of the] intelligentsia—the bad habits of university students and the entire petty bourgeoisie. If we maintain these bad habits, we would not be truly surrendering to the proletariat. We would not be thorough proletarian revolutionaries.

17. We must at all times and everywhere mutually correct each other's errors of thought and action.

18. When we have opinions, we must express them—if we hide our opinions and do not express them, we would be standing outside the organization and encouraging counterrevolutionary [tendencies].

19. We must cultivate the habit of perseverance—Communists are always willing to "lie on faggots and taste gall" in order to struggle for the interest of the proletariat.

20. We must not forget to [disseminate] propaganda every time we write a letter—propaganda is the minimum duty of every Communist member.

21. Our attitude and action outside the organization should be extremely cautious—divulging the organization's secrets is [equivalent] to the conduct of enemy spies.

22. Every comrade must develop close relations with at least two other comrades (exclusive of comrades belonging to the same small unit) in order to achieve solidarity among our comrades.

C. Collectivize individuality—oppose individualism and the concept of private property. Proletarian action is adapted to the masses. [The proletariat] has no private property.

23. The organization's interest is the individual's interest. We must not obstruct the organization's advance because of individual interest—if we hamper the organization's progress because of individual interest, we would be negatively or positively betraying disloyalty to the proletariat's revolutionary organization.

24. We must not have excessive self-confidence. We must have the psychology of thoroughly trusting the organization—it is counterrevolutionary conduct not to trust the organization.

[52] 25. Our lives and our will must not be based on individual beliefs or the individual will—in accordance with the organization's life and will, we should absolutely collectivize and adapt to the masses our own lives and will. There is absolutely no such thing as individual life or individual free will.

26. We must strictly criticize our comrades' errors and humbly accept our comrades' criticism—it is not the attitude of a Communist to fear criticism, to reject criticism or not to criticize his comrades. Wherever he may be, every Communist must at all times criticize and supervise his comrades in accordance with the relations of mutual supervision (the mutual relations of Communists mean mutual supervision)—criticism is a tool to train us to become iron-like Communist members.

27. Proletarian revolutionaries absolutely must not slight, deceive, or be mean to their comrades. They must not hold any other kind of attitude or indulge in any con-

duct which is incompatible with [their position] as Communists. They should always be closer and more intimate with their comrades than with their own brothers.

28. We must correct craftiness and other weaknesses derived from dishonesty—Communists cannot be anything but stark naked with their own organization and comrades.

29. We must absolutely and humbly correct pride, love of glory, and other weaknesses derived from not being solid.

30. If our nature is too temperate, we would reveal weakness and we would then be unable to accomplish anything. However, if our nature is too cruel, we would be inviting conflict and misunderstanding—in short, we must be calm and composed and observe facts with a cool head. We must have firm and positive spirit and skillful tactics in carrying out our work.

[53] D. On service—experience is founded on our work and our own errors. We must also express through work our loyalty to the organization. Neglect of work is counterrevolutionary conduct.

31. Aside from revolution, Communist members have no other profession—we are professional revolutionaries.

32. The organization's work is our only work. Aside from the organization's work there is no so-called individual work—Communist members always positively participate in the work of the organization.

33. We must be responsible in our work. We must at the same time understand that we are a part of this machinery which is the Communist Party. We absolutely must not maintain the attitude of being compelled [by the Party] or hamper the work of this machinery.

34. The quantity and quality of a Communist member is determined in accordance with his capacity—true Communists never show off their accomplishments, fear hardship, or long for ease.

Document 14

Resolutions on the Question of Organization

This document is translated from the original Chinese text of the resolutions on organization adopted at an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The document is not dated, but the resolutions appear to have been adopted at the Enlarged Plenum of the CC held in Peking in October 1925. This deduction is confirmed by Document 55, which summarizes the October 1925 resolutions. Our translation is based on a copy of the original Chinese text made in Peking and sent with a letter of transmittal by Major General Shigeru Honjo, Japanese military attaché in Peking, to the Japanese vice-minister of war on May 26, 1927. The copy was filed in *Mitsu dai nikki* V, 1927, and is available on microfilm at the East Asian Library, Columbia University.

This was Document 2 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[1] 1. Several hundred thousand workers of Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Canton participated in the latest national revolutionary movement by instituting strikes. The most backward portion of the proletariat in northern and central China also took up arms for the same cause. Thus, several million workers have become conscious of political and economic struggle. This is a period unprecedented in Chinese history! The Chinese Communist Party should give special attention to the struggle of the proletariat and guide its participation in the national liberation movement.

2. As a result of the high tide of the national revolutionary movement and the enthusiastic participation of the immature proletariat, the function of the Chinese Communist Party has naturally been enhanced many times. We must on the one hand [2] assemble and organize the proletariat; on the other hand, we must provide it with political training and education. Through study we have come to understand the means of unifying the peasantry and allying it with other democratic elements. Before we can perform this historically significant duty, however, we must first of all expand our Party by absorbing into the Party the proletariat and the most revolutionary elements of the advanced intelligentsia. The present phase of the Chinese Communist movement and the national revolutionary movement is marked by the daily rising of the revolutionary tide among the masses. It is absolutely true that the future destiny of the Chinese revolutionary movement depends entirely on whether or not the Chinese Communist Party will be able to organize and lead the masses.

3. The CCP should be able to direct and organize the revolutionary workers, handicraftsmen, and intellectuals, admit them into the Party, and provide them with proper organization. Within the Party, it is necessary to have a centralized organization of active elements, from the lower levels to the higher levels, from the cells to the CC. There must also be clearly defined and close relations between the low and high levels.

In view of the increase of Party membership, we plan to enlarge the CC considerably at the next congress. There should be definite organization of and clear rela-

tionships between the various departments of the CC, such as the Organization, Propaganda, Women's, Publications, and Distribution departments. If possible, the secretaries of the CC and the regional committees should not hold concurrent posts in the departments. Committees on the labor, peasant, and military movements should be established under the CC, to be responsible for the execution of regular tasks connected with such movements. The number of special commissioners appointed by the CC should be increased so that they may be able actually to direct the regional and local committee in the execution of their tasks.

Our experience of the past few months indicates that the CC has done very little [3] directing work at many places, particularly in the North, and that there has been uneven distribution of directing personnel. The Party's development is of the utmost importance in a period following a high revolutionary tide. We should pay particular attention to the North, because the majority of workers there have not yet taken part in the present movement. The failure at both Tientsin and Tangshan necessitates an acceleration in the development of our Party's work in that area. We should therefore strengthen the organization of the Northern Regional Committee to enable it to supervise Party work in Chihli, Shansi, and the Three Eastern Provinces. The Peking Local Committee is independently organized and is not subordinated to the Northern Regional Committee.

4. The regional and local committees should on the one hand carry out all the CC's instructions and, with reference to questions of political strategy, ask the CC . . . [missing; burned?] and send men to various places (departments, party fractions, workers' clubs, and research societies) under their jurisdiction to supervise the routine work of our Party.

At certain places such as Shanghai, our Party has already expanded considerably. We must organize sectional committees with the sections defined by area, under [local and regional] committees. This new method of organization is absolutely essential because (a) it is convenient in terms of direction; and (b) it provides an easier means to expand Party organization.

The duties of Party cells, particularly those in factories, are to consolidate our influence organizationally and continuously, and regularly to absorb revolutionary workers into the Party.

5. At present the most important organizational problem is the consolidation of our Party's influence among the masses. With the revolutionary tide running high, the mere fact that the masses are willing to accept our proposals is insufficient to prove [4] that we really have influence among them and can actually direct them. We must utilize the revolutionary high tide as follows:

a. Eliminate cumbersome formalities in enlisting revolutionary workers, students, and peasants into the Party. The probation period of workers and peasants is one month; the probation period for intellectuals is three months.

b. Organize cells and party fractions in labor organizations, peasant associations, and organizations of revolutionary intellectuals.

It is only by joining our Party that the revolutionary elements of society may receive Party training and really comprehend Party theories. We must not indulge the vain hope that many ready-made Party members in big industries are natural members of the CCP and may join the Party as long as they are class-conscious and loyal to the Revolution, without fulfilling other conditions.

During this revolutionary period, many of our responsible comrades in various localities entertain the erroneous idea that every Communist member should understand Marxism and possess a high capacity for work. They think that if Party membership develops merely in quantity instead of quality, this would not only be without benefit to the Party but would further intensify the looseness of Party organization. Hence, many of them believe that the quantitative development of our Party should

be contingent upon the development of the Party's capacity for internal education. This erroneous conception is a unique obstacle to making our Party a party of the masses.

During the period of high tide in the revolutionary movement and active struggle of the Hong Kong workers, the Kwangtung Regional Committee failed to utilize the opportunity to consolidate and develop our Party. The Kwangtung Regional Committee is able to influence the ideas of the masses of workers and peasants but it has failed to consolidate such influence organizationally by absorbing worker and peasant elements into the Party and establishing Party fractions in various organizations. This is erroneous.

[5] Our Kwangtung comrades work individually in the KMT, labor unions, peasant associations, and the army. They do not stand on the ground of Party interests as a powerful Party, organized and properly supervised, to lead the proletariat to struggle for position in the national revolutionary movement.

6. Our comrades and committee members of various levels (the CC and local committees) generally work as individuals in labor unions and the KMT, and among the student masses, or they limit their direction to certain specific tasks. Hence, they appear to be representatives of the various movements in the CCP rather than executors of the Party's policies and tasks while participating in such movements.

Such phenomena occur during the period of transition of the Party from a small organization to a party of the masses. This transitional phase should come to an end in the shortest possible time. We should enable the entire Party to come into contact with the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia.

7. At this time, the question of the united front of the proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and all democratic elements is largely the question of relations between the CCP and the KMT. Hence, in our organizational policies, we should pay particular attention to our Party's organization wherever the KMT has influence, for instance Kwangtung, so that we may expand the united front and strengthen our cooperation with the KMT Left Wing.

8. The recent reactionary and oppressive policy of the militarists and capitalists is first of all the inevitable result of the development of economic struggle and, secondly, the result of the failure of the majority of the laboring masses to participate fully in the revolutionary movement.

In view of the existence of reaction, we should resort to secret underground work [6] at certain places. This does not mean, however, that we should revert to the previous condition of our Party, under which we merely carried on underground work among the laboring class and the intelligentsia. We should simultaneously build up a clandestine organization and exert every effort to engage openly in the political movement. At all times, we must firmly fix in mind the fact that our Party cannot become a party of the masses through secret work alone.

9. Aside from the development of our Party's organization and work, the development and expansion of the CY to penetrate the masses of labor and peasant youths and the students is of great significance and assistance to the work of making our Party a party of the masses and to the national revolutionary movement. Hence the Enlarged Plenum considers the rendering of assistance toward the expansion and consolidation of the CY organization and the educational training of CY members as tasks of great importance at the present time.

Document 15

Resolutions on Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang

The following translation is based on a copy of an original Chinese document sent by the Japanese military attaché in Peking to Tokyo on May 26, 1927, and filed in *Mitsu dai nikki* V, 1927. The resolutions are not dated or otherwise identified. Judging by their content, they were adopted at the Enlarged Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in Peking in October 1925. This deduction is confirmed by Document 54, which summarizes the resolutions of October 1925. The document is signed "Chün," probably a code name.

This was Document 20 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[1] 1. Since the Reorganization, class differentiation within the KMT, following class differentiation in Chinese society, has become daily more apparent.

Following the death of Sun Yat-sen, bureaucratic and comprador elements formally established separate organizations, such as the Peking KMT Comrades Club and the Shanghai Hsin-hai Comrades Club. The Peking KMT Comrades Club, headed by Feng Tzu-yu and P'eng Yang-ch'ung [P'eng Yang-kuang], was organized for the purpose of seeking compromise with the militarist government and expanding its influence in the North. The Shanghai Hsin-hai Comrades Club, headed by Chang T'ai-yen and T'ang Shao-i, was organized for the purpose of uniting with the influence of the militarists T'ang Chi-yao, Chao Heng-t'i, and Ch'en Chiung-ming, and expanding their influence in the Southwest.

Although they differ in their attitude toward the northern militarists, the two organizations take uniform action in opposing the Communists (the CP and CY) and the Left KMT, and even conspire with imperialist Great Britain to destroy the Canton Government.

They plan not only to expand the military influence of their own cliques in order [2] to overthrow the Canton Government, but also to develop their own Party headquarters to oppose the KMT CEC at Canton. The Shanghai Club in particular has become the center of counterrevolutionary influence in the South.

2. In the last few months the high tide of the revolutionary movement has shown that the proletariat is an independent social force, and a very great and dynamic political force, capable of accelerating the progress of political development of the bourgeoisie. Such a phenomenon is directly reflected in the KMT and the petty bourgeoisie, who are making every effort to define their ideology and to consolidate themselves organizationally.

In the KMT, a small portion of bourgeois elements (such as Tai Chi-t'ao) has utilized the "signboard," "The Real Three Principles of the People," and promoted slogans for compromise between classes, in order to oppose the class struggle, the KMT Left, and the CCP. It becomes increasingly clear every day that this faction has formed itself into the KMT Right Wing. They do their best to distinguish themselves

from such elements as the Peking KMT Comrades Club and the Shanghai Hsin-hai Comrades Club of the militarists and compradors. However, since they oppose the KMT Left and the CCP, their acts are objectively equivalent to giving aid to counterrevolutionaries and imperialists.

3. The latest developments in the revolutionary movement have intensified the internal differentiation of the KMT. On the other hand, they have also enabled the [3] KMT to expand, especially in the South, and to become the real political party of the masses and of the National Revolution. Tens of thousands of peasants, workers, and the urban petty bourgeoisie have joined that Party as new members.

4. At present it is more than ever the responsibility of the CCP to cooperate with the KMT Government, to come into close contact with the majority of the masses, and to do its utmost to assist the KMT Left to enable it to develop the work of the revolutionary movement. At the same time, our Party should make every effort to oppose the slogans and strategy of the KMT Right.

Our Party members should know our present policy toward the KMT: We oppose its Right Wing and unite with its Left Wing by contracting a close alliance with it and helping it in every way possible to fight against the Right.

5. An important method of executing such a strategy is to expand and strengthen our Party everywhere, especially where the KMT's influence exists. Our Party should actively enter the political arena and carry out our ideological strategy and struggle everywhere. This is the second method by which we may attain our objectives. In concrete terms the method is as follows:

a. The CCP's political propaganda and organization should be independent and expanded, especially in Kwangtung.

b. We should win over the masses of workers and peasants.

c. Unless absolutely necessary, our new comrades should not join the KMT or engage in its work, particularly the work of high-level party headquarters (with the exception of Party headquarters which are absolutely under our influence).

d. Where we do not have any masses, we should not help the KMT to establish or develop its organization, particularly in central and South China.[1]

e. Where the influence of the KMT Left and the CCP exists (especially in Kwangtung), we should cooperate earnestly with the KMT and impel it to take an active part in the national movement to the best of its ability. We must not shun the [4] KMT intentionally or let it stand by in a negative and passive state. At the same time, we must not yield one inch of ground to the KMT in terms of the theory and practice of class struggle in all movements.

f. In the presence of KMT members, some of our comrades used to classify the KMT into the Left, Center, and Right, grouping KMT leaders with the Center. This is not only incorrect but strategically inappropriate. The first defect is that our comrades unconsciously neglect our own position and completely become members of the KMT Left Wing. The second defect is that Left-inclined elements of the KMT mistakenly think that the Left Wing is identical with the Communist faction. Hence, those who do not join the CCP or CY consider themselves to be members of the KMT Center and regard all policies of the KMT that are somewhat Left-inclined as the CCP's policies and refuse to approve them. The third defect is that the real KMT Right (such as Tai Chi-t'ao, Tsou Lu, and Shao Yuan-ch'ung) regard the reactionaries as the Right and themselves as the Center. All those who formerly belonged to the so-called Right Wing have actually already left the KMT, and those who formerly belonged to the so-called Center have now joined either the Left or the New Right. Hence, at present, the KMT consists only of the Left and Right. At the moment, however, the so-called Left is mere talk. It is not enough to be Left-inclined! The Left should not violate the Manifesto of the First KMT Congress in its actions. In terms of concrete political policy, it should be not merely different from the reac-

tionaries, but really closely united with the Communists. These [should be] the special characteristics of the KMT Left in this period. In our propaganda, we should classify [5] the Left and Right Wings of the KMT and the reactionaries according to political policies as in the accompanying chart.

[Policy]	Left Wing	Right Wing	Reactionaries
1. [Toward imperialism]	Oppose all imperialists from beginning to end	Oppose one imperialist and compromise with others because of the vigorous advance of the workers and peasants	Compromise with imperialists
2. [Toward the labor and peasant movements]	Assist the labor and peasant movements for the sake of the Revolution	Advocate compromise between capital and labor	Destroy the labor and peasant movements
3. [Toward militarism]	Oppose militarists for the sake of democracy	Oppose militarists for the sake of maintaining its own political influence	Compromise with militarists
4. [Toward Soviet Russia and the CCP]	Make connections with Soviet Russia and the CCP	Make connections with Soviet Russia in order to oppose the CCP	Oppose Soviet Russia and the CCP
5. [Toward reactionaries]	Eliminate all reactionary influence for the sake of political reform	Procrastinate in instituting reforms in order to preserve the reactionary influence for the sake of opposing the Left	They are themselves reactionary elements

Note

1. This point is crossed out in pencil. There is no indication whether this was so in the original document seized in the raid, or the marking was made by the Japanese who copied (or edited) the document.

Document 16

Resolutions on the Question of Propaganda

Document 16 is translated from the original Chinese text of the Central Committee's resolutions on propaganda, apparently adopted at the Enlarged Plenum in October 1925. A comparison with Document 56, which gives the CC's resolutions on propaganda adopted in July 1926, confirms this deduction. The Peking Commission published the original text of Document 16 in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 56-60.

This was Document 7 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[56] 1. In view of the current high revolutionary tide, the duty of our Party is to absorb the masses of workers and the revolutionary intellectuals in order to strengthen and expand the Party's influence among the working class of the entire country. We should begin work among the peasantry in the villages and build the foundation of our Party among the peasant masses. Unless our Party becomes a real political party of the masses, we will not be able to strengthen our position of leadership of the struggle of the working class and of the National Revolution.

To fulfill these important tasks, our Party should undertake agitation and propaganda among the masses. Wherever he may be, each and every Party member should endeavor to promote propaganda on our Party's principles and slogans.

2. To be effective in our work of agitation, we must enable the masses, even the most backward workers and rickshaw coolies, to understand our propaganda. Hence, only the most popular speech and writing should be used.

However, not only the language and writing but the content of agitation should also be close to the masses. The most important principle of mass agitation is that it must be concretely based on facts immediately confronting the peasant and working masses.

[57] Therefore, a Communist should not only direct and train the masses but be able to observe and analyze what they say and to understand their needs in order that our Party's oral and written propaganda reflect their psychology.

In disseminating Party propaganda among the masses, it is best to point out the Party's accomplishments and the fact that the Party has already fought for and obtained concrete benefits for the working class and the peasantry. Such accomplishments are our point of departure in getting hold of the masses.

3. The first formula of mass agitation is "propaganda mobilization," which focuses the attention of all classes in the country (in the beginning, of course, only Party members and the working class) on a certain event or problem. "Propaganda mobilization" calls for the enlistment of the Party's total strength and influence. Hence, it must be planned well in advance. This does not mean, however, that Party organs of all levels should reduce their capacity to meet emergencies or to cope with important movements and upheavals.

4. The second formula of mass agitation is the workers' club. Before our Party was organized, the workers' club had served a great purpose. We should continue to

develop the workers' clubs by making use of their good points and introducing certain changes so that they will become more suited to the functions of our Party. Some very good results may be obtained from such work.

5. Special attention should also be paid to agitation within the Party. Such agitation should encourage the entire membership from bottom up to participate in positive political life. This is one of our current basic tasks. The Party cell is the foundation in carrying out such work.

[58] The Party cell is the organ for realizing party tasks, just as the entire Party is the organ for realizing the workers' class struggle. The work of each cell must not deviate at any time from the actual circumstances of the particular cell. The agitation work of each cell should be based on the daily struggle of the Party and of the working class.

6. The Communist Party is an inseparable part of the working class. The only difference between the Communist party and the entire working class is that the Party represents the portion that has the highest degree of class consciousness. In fact as well as words, the Party stands as vanguard in the workers' class struggle. Party members should see that their own class consciousness increases continuously. This is the sole guarantee of the Party's triumph. Each member should not only be able to fight for Party principles himself but lead others to fight for and expand the Party's influence among the masses.

Mass propaganda to carry out the two above-mentioned functions provides the most intensive training for the entire Party.

The Party carries out mass propaganda through the small units of cells and the self-study programs of the clubs. Party cells, particularly those with large memberships, should be divided into many units for carrying out their work. The duty of small units of Party cells is to enable labor comrades to know and to understand every detail of the daily struggles in which they themselves participate, and which are reflections of the entire class struggle.

Hence, propaganda work of these small units should be coordinated with the entire work of the cells. We should exert every effort to improve the organization of small units to make them organs with well-defined plans. Particular attention should be directed to past experience in order to eliminate many defects and drawbacks.

The self-study groups of the clubs must absorb non-Party members. Propaganda [59] in such groups should be particularly interesting and realistic. Propaganda work should take the form of discussions of newspaper articles, interpretations of the current situation, and brief discussions of the history of the class struggle. Of course propaganda should be based on the degree of political knowledge of the workers. Propaganda, like agitation, should be easily understood or its goals will not be attained.

7. For mass agitation and propaganda work there must be competent personnel. Therefore the establishment of Party schools at various places is an important task.

In view of its present strength, the Party is in a position to open only two kinds of Party schools:

a. General Party schools under local committees for training agitators among the masses. Such schools should be provided only for workers and the length of time required for graduation should not exceed one month or half a month;

b. Advanced Party schools under regional committees to train our comrades of more advanced political knowledge and experience to become directing personnel. The time required for graduation should not exceed three months.

Training in the Party schools should be based on experience in the national revolutionary movement. The function of the Communist Party in the many revolutionary movements should be explained. Our comrades attending Party schools should not be separated from the masses. They should simultaneously work outside, among our

comrades and noncomrades. Only thus can they acquire true proletarian ideas. Our experience with Party schools in Shanghai and other places has been highly satisfactory and we should review such experience for further improvement.

8. Fundamental tasks in written propaganda and agitation are the development and popularization of our Party organs, editing popular pamphlets, and songs, and the [60] translation of books on Marxism. Material of all kinds should be collected to facilitate the editing of Chinese Marxist writings to serve as the theoretical basis for forming solutions to the numerous problems of the National Revolution and the class struggle. It is necessary to establish an appropriate organ in the Central Committee to direct and plan the work of collecting material.

Only through such efforts in carrying out the Party's work can we guarantee the fulfillment of our duties.

Document 17

An Outline of the Curriculum of the Chinese Communist Party's "A" and "B" Party Schools

Though undated, this document appears to be related to Document 16, which we believe contained resolutions on propaganda adopted by the Central Committee of the CCP in October 1925, and which called (p. 59) for two kinds of Party schools: (a) general Party schools for training agitators among the masses, and (b) advanced Party schools to train comrades of more advanced political knowledge. Document 17 outlines the curricula for just such schools. Our translation is from an original Chinese document in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 138–46.

This was Document 9 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[138] Outline of Curriculum for "A" Party Schools

"A" Party schools are established for workers. The curriculum may be divided into six lecture topics, each followed by "problems." The number of lectures for each topic and the distribution of teachers are fixed by local propaganda committees themselves. In view of the present shortage of theoretical works in Chinese, teaching material is outlined only in general terms.

A. Capitalism

1. What is commodity? What is commodity economy? What is hired labor? (Marx, *Wage-Labor and Capital*, published by the People's Bookstore, Canton.)
2. How do capitalists exploit labor?

[139] 3. What is capital? What is surplus value? (Kautsky, *The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*, published by the Commercial Press.

4. Why is capitalist society divided into many classes? Explain the special characteristics of the following classes: (a) the bourgeoisie—big capitalists who own the instruments and capital of production (materials of production); (b) the petty bourgeoisie—the handicraftsmen and farmers who own the tools of production; (c) the proletariat (workers)—who are unable to own the materials of production but can only sell their labor.
5. What is the significance of class struggle? (*Manifesto of the Communist Party.*)
6. What is industrial and commercial competition? Will small handicraft production or big production triumph in this competition? Why are the small farmer and small handicraftsman bankrupt? What is the meaning of concentration of capital?
7. Why do capitalists want to employ more female and child laborers? This is a capitalist tactic of competition and exploitation of the working class.
8. What is the function of the state or government in the class struggle?

(*Note*: The foregoing is a general outline of "The Nature of Capitalist Society." Aside from using the above-mentioned books and such material as *Hsin ch'ing-nien*

and *Ch'ien-feng*, teachers should pay special attention to facts which are easily observed and understood by local workers and explain the following: (a) class struggle is unavoidable in capitalist society; to achieve liberation, the proletariat must take an active part in the class struggle and in the struggle to seize political power; (b) competition between the petty bourgeoisie and capitalists is also unavoidable in capitalist [140] society. The poor peasants become daily more bankrupt and capital daily becomes more concentrated. The proletariat and the peasantry should therefore unite to oppose the capitalists. These are the two most important ideas contained in the above eight questions.)

9. What is the phenomenon of "anarchy in production" in capitalist society?

10. What is economic crisis?

11. Why is it that as capitalism develops, economic crisis deepens and class conflict in society becomes more violent?

12. What is the result of concentration of capital? What is the meaning of corporations and trusts?

13. What are the merits of concentration of capital and mechanized production as compared with small handicraft and small business?

14. In what way does capitalist development prepare the social and economic foundations for communism? (Marx, *Wage-Labor and Capital*, Bukharin, *Program of the Communists [Bolshevists]*; Kautsky, *The Class Struggle*.)

(*Note*: The main purpose of the above six questions is to explain two important ideas: (a) capitalism must collapse through self-contradiction; (b) in the course of capitalist development, improvements in production methods and concentration of productive material have already laid the foundation for communism.)

B. Imperialism

1. What is the organizational method of industrial production during the period of financial capitalism?

2. What is the function of banks during the period of financial capitalism?

[141] 3. What is the goal of capitalists when they unite in trusts and syndicates?

4. What is the tendency of concentration of capital during the period of financial capitalism? (Must give illustrations.)

5. What is imperialism?

6. Is it possible to avoid war between capitalist countries?

7. Why does the bourgeoisie of all countries fight for markets and colonies?

8. Give concrete examples of the partitioning of the world and seizure of colonies by the Powers during the second half of the nineteenth century (illustrated on simple maps of the world). (Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*, translated by Li Ch'un-fan, published by the Shanghai Book Co.)

(*Note*: The central idea of these eight questions is to explain (a) capitalism has developed to become the world's economic system; (b) in the period of financial capitalism, war and struggle for colonies among the capitalist countries is unavoidable.)

9. What is the condition of imperialist aggression in China? (Illustrate with the unequal treaties, rights of customs administration, consular jurisdiction, rights to engage in railway, mining, and industrial enterprises, foreign loans, securities, etc.)

10. What is the connection between militarists and imperialists?

11. What is the power of imperialists in Chinese industry?

12. Give concrete examples of direct exploitation and oppression of Chinese workers and the common people by the imperialists and foreign capitalists (including Christian mission schools).

[142] 13. Is China an independent nation or a semicolony?

14. During the imperialist period, why does conflict between the Powers and

China and other oppressed peoples become daily more acute? (For material on the above questions, use histories of Chinese foreign relations, current events, and articles on the movements of oppressed peoples in various magazines (*Hsin ch'ing-nien*, etc.)

(*Note*: The central idea of these six questions is to explain (a) the development of imperialism has caused the division of the world into two big camps. In one camp are the proletariat and poor peasantry of all countries and the oppressed peoples; in the other, the bourgeoisie of all capitalist countries and their imperialist governments; (b) China is one of the oppressed peoples and the imperialists have oppressed her politically, economically, and culturally.)

C. Proletarian Dictatorship and Communism

1. Why does capitalist development inevitably lead to social revolution?
2. What is the system of proletarian dictatorship? What is a proletarian state?
3. Why is proletarian dictatorship transitional in nature? How will it be transformed from a proletarian state into a proletarian society?
4. Do classes still exist in a Communist society?

[143] 5. Does the system of private ownership of productive material still exist in a Communist society?

(*Note*: The meaning of communism is often misinterpreted by the Chinese as calling for the confiscation of all "private" daily consumer goods. Hence, among our worker comrades and especially the working masses, we should . . . [missing; burned?]

Outline of Curriculum for "B" Party Schools

"B" Party schools are established for comrades who are intellectuals of more advanced standards. Two lecture topics may be added to the curriculum and lecture material may include more details. This would, however, accentuate the shortage of Chinese material. Hence, if the local committees have suitable propaganda workers, they should consult the following foreign books. If such personnel are not available, follow the outline for "A" schools.

A. The Development of Capitalism

1. Period of natural economy
a. Economy is the foundation of social development
b. Primitive communism
c. Patriarchal society
d. Feudalism
e. The rise of private ownership and international trade during the period of national economy
2. Rise of capitalism and commercial capitalism
a. Urban handicraft economy
[144] b. Commercial capitalism
3. Basic contradictions between industrial capitalism and capitalist society
a. Peculiar characteristics of capitalism
b. Process of development of industrial capitalism
c. Basic contradictions in capitalist society
d. Capitalist country
4. Financial capitalism, imperialism, and the World War
a. Alliance of capitalists
b. Bank capital
c. The struggle of the Powers for markets and export-capital imperialism
d. The World War

B. Imperialism and China

(Same as outline for "A" schools—items nine to fourteen—but teaching material may be doubled for detailed treatment.)

[145] **C. History of the Socialist Movement**

1. Evolution of socialism
a. History is the history of class struggle
b. Early communist theories—Christian communist movement
c. "Heretical" communism
d. The English and French bourgeois revolutions and the theory of communism (Babeuf)
e. The Utopian [Socialists] Fourier, St. Simon, Owen
f. The revolutions of 1830 and 1840 and scientific socialism
2. The three Internationals
a. The First International
b. The Paris Commune
c. The Second International
d. The Third International
3. Communist society

D. History of the Russian Social Revolution (During lectures attention should be given to the history of the development of the Russian Bolsheviks and internal conflict within the Russian Socialist Party.)

[146] 1. History of the Russian revolutionary movement and the Bolsheviks
a. The earliest revolutionary organization in Russia
b. The rise of the Russian working class and its movement
c. Before and after the 1905 Revolution
d. From 1905 to 1914
e. The European war and the Bolsheviks
2. From the February 1917 Revolution to the October Revolution
3. The October Revolution and the period of military communism
a. Meaning of the October Revolution
b. National construction by the working class
c. The October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Congresses of the Communist Party)

Document 18

Our Immediate Attitude Toward the Kuomintang in the North

This is translated from an original Chinese document dated November 25, 1925. It is signed "Pai Wei" and appears to be a document of the Peking Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This deduction is supported by Chang Kuo-t'ao's statement in an interview with C. Martin Wilbur, Hong Kong, November 24, 1954, that Pai Wei was a code name for the Peking Committee at that time. The document seems clearly to be the reaction of Peking's Communist leaders to the recent emergence of Tai Chi-t'ao's theories and the convening on November 23 of a conference in the Western Hills near Peking, whose participants called it the "Fourth CEC Plenum." Document 18 was published under the title, "The Attitude of the Communist Party," in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 146-56.

This was Document 21 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[146] 1. A very thick reactionary atmosphere has prevailed in the Kuomintang in the North in the last few months. Furthermore, such reactionary influence tends toward gradual concentration. The following facts will prove these phenomena.

[147] a. Widespread anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Russian propaganda.

b. The arrival of Tsou Lu and Lin Shen in the North and their antagonistic attitude toward the Kwangtung Revolutionary Government.

c. The actions of Hsieh Ch'ih and others in seizing the Peking Executive Headquarters.

d. The arrival in the North of Tai Chi-t'ao, leader of the New Right, and the recently convened meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at the Western Hills.

2. The above-mentioned phenomena prove that the Right Wing in the National Revolution is daily leaning farther to the Right and that its influence is concentrating in Peking. Such concentration does not mean expansion of the Right's influence, however, but on the contrary, its retrenchment.

3. The result of Taichitaoism is merely the formulation of the Right Wing's working principle in the Kuomintang: "Raise the left hand to drive out the Communists! Raise the right hand to overthrow the reactionaries!" This principle not only cannot cause the Right Wing to be Left-inclined, it causes the Right to incline further to the Right. The value of Tai Chi-t'ao's theories lies solely in furnishing the reactionaries with a weapon to attack the Left and the Communists and to subdue the Right. It is otherwise not worth a cent! Consequently, since the appearance of Taichitaoism, the Right has leaned further to the Right, to the extent that it has allied itself with the reactionaries to destroy the alliance of the Left and the Communists.

[148] 4. The concentration in the North of the Right Wing's influence is not a result of expansion of the Right's influence but the fact that it is surrounded by the revolutionary force. The reactionary conduct of the Right is not tolerated in Kwangtung

under the southern revolutionary regime. It has failed to secure a foothold in central China, [as in] Shanghai, where the proletariat's organization is very strong. Consequently, the Right can only come to Peking, the center of political reaction in the North, to maintain its dying life.

5. The North, particularly Peking, is the nation's center of political reaction. Furthermore, there is lacking strong and organized proletarian masses. Hence, the urban petty bourgeoisie in general are completely surrounded by the reactionary atmosphere. Their political outlook is extremely confused, and they are therefore easily influenced by Taichitaoism. Except for a very few old members, there is no real Left Wing in the Peking KMT. Party members are all inclined toward Taichitaoism. Under such conditions, the reactionaries regard Taichitaoism as a treasure, and avail themselves of the opportunity to utilize it. First, they use Taichitaoism to destroy the alliance of the Left and the Communists and then use the same weapon to threaten the manufacturer of the weapon. This may be seen in the reactionaries' recent attacks on Tai Chi-t'ao and the Right Wing. However, the Right does not realize the error and danger of its theory. It will eventually be subdued by the reactionaries and incline ever further to the Right.

6. Although there are a few old Party members in the North who may be considered Leftists, they have always paid scant attention to work among the masses and are unable to form a Left Wing within the Party on strong foundations. Due to the fact [149] that they have not gotten hold of the vast masses and for other reasons, they do not employ drastic means in dealing with the reactionaries, but maintain a watchful, wavering attitude. This is the situation of intraparty struggle in the Northern Kuomintang: the Right has allied itself with the reactionaries to destroy the revolutionary organization of the Kuomintang, and the Communists are seeking an alliance with a vast and strong Left in the Northern Kuomintang to counteract the reactionary conduct of the Right.

7. Under such conditions, it is extremely dangerous for the Communists to fight singlehandedly against the Right within the Kuomintang. An isolated Communist struggle not only cannot overthrow the Right, but can enhance its strength. The reason is that in such an event many shortsighted and wavering elements who cannot see clearly that this is a struggle between revolution and counterrevolution would mistake it for a struggle between Communism and anti-Communism. Henceforth, the highest principle of our work in the Kuomintang is to build within the KMT a Left Wing with a vast mass [following], and, under the united front of the Left and the Communists, from the lowest level of the masses up to the high-level organs, oppose the Right and the reactionaries who are conspiring to destroy the foundation of the Kuomintang.

8. In accordance with the above principles, we should endeavor to carry out the following important propaganda work among the masses and in our daily practical work. We must first create an anti-Right atmosphere among the masses before we can attain our objective, the formation of a Left Wing with a vast mass [following] and a united front between the Left and the Communists.

[150] a. We must make the wavering masses in general understand that Taichitaoism is not true Sunyatsenism. Attack the Right's counterrevolutionary slogan, "Overthrow the Communists with the left hand and the reactionaries with the right."

b. Expose the most recent conspiracy of the Right and the reactionaries to destroy the organization of the Kuomintang and to violate discipline.

c. Explain to the masses the Kuomintang members' misunderstanding of the Communist Party and the Communist attitude toward the Kuomintang. We should make the masses understand the mutual relations and necessity of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT in the national revolutionary movement.

9. Regarding the first point, opposition to Taichitaoism, the content of our

propaganda should be:

a. Taichitaoism is not Sunyatsenism. The basic premise of Sunyatsenism is the concept of a Chinese revolutionary movement for national liberation, and not continuation of Confucian morality or development of China's traditional civilization. In short, Sunyatsenism is Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary conception; not Confucius's moral conception. Sunyatsenism is a theory of revolutionary struggle, not a doctrine of pacifist morality.

b. Class struggle does not harm the National Revolution. Chinese workers have assumed leadership of the Chinese National Revolution. This is a fact that no one can deny. Therefore, the stronger the organization of Chinese labor, the stronger the national revolutionary force. Hence, a strong organization of Chinese labor not only does not harm but benefits the Chinese National Revolution. Under the present semicolonial conditions of China, class struggle for liberation is not harmful but necessary to the National Revolution, just as, under the capitalistic conditions of Russia, the struggle for national liberation was not harmful but necessary to the proletarian revolution.

c. There is absolutely no possibility of the CCP destroying the KMT in the national revolutionary movement. Revolution is a form of social force. Each political [151] party represents a certain type of revolutionary organization. The Communist Party represents the interests of the proletariat. The Kuomintang is the political party of the oppressed classes for the National Revolution. These two organizations have different class natures and different historical missions, and represent different social forces. While these two social forces are both in an oppressed position and are struggling together, it is impossible for one oppressed social force to destroy the other. Thus, the CCP cannot now destroy the KMT, just as the KMT cannot deny the existence of the CCP.

d. Taichitaoism is a weapon of reactionary theory. Viewed from all angles, Taichitaoism not only is not Sunyatsenism and cannot train genuine Sunyatsenist revolutionary members for the Kuomintang, but can only furnish the reactionaries with a sharp weapon to attack the revolutionary actions of the CCP, shake the ideological faith of the Left Wing, and intimidate the Right Wing with its weak psychology.

10. Regarding the second point, exposure of the conspiracy of the Right and the reactionaries in destroying the organization and discipline of the Kuomintang, the following should be pointed out.

a. The Kwangtung Revolutionary Government is publicly recognized by the revolutionary masses of the entire country as the only existing Chinese revolutionary government. No one can deny that this government is supported by the revolutionary masses of the entire country. The Kwangtung Revolutionary Government is daily becoming stronger, while the people under its jurisdiction live in relative freedom [152] and peace. Yet Tsou Lu and Lin Shen, as members of the Central Executive Committee and representatives of the Kwangtung Government, actually attack and insult the Kwangtung Revolutionary Government at mass meetings and in declarations.

b. The Peking Executive Headquarters is a legal Kuomintang organization. Even if it were guilty of unlawful acts in violation of Party principles, it should be dissolved in accordance with the Party Constitution and not forcefully seized by any one clique. Tsou Lu, Lin Shen, and Hsieh Ch'ih actually led their own people to occupy the Executive Headquarters and, in the name of the Headquarters, convened the CEC in violation of Party principles. Can such action have been taken by members who protect and cherish the Kuomintang?

c. China has adopted the policy of the Russian alliance in international diplomacy. This is the course our people must take. Yet the Right Wing follows the reactionaries in fabricating rumors to attack Soviet Russia and the Kwangtung Revolu-

tionary Government, thus serving the interests of imperialism.

d. Tai Chi-t'ao's publication of his personal definition and interpretation of Sunyatsenism, freely attacking, without going through Party censorship, the statements of the CCP, a friendly party, already has violated Party principles and discipline. Moreover, his theory is actually used as a weapon by the reactionaries to destroy the Party. Nevertheless, he still does not realize all this and is in fact forming cliques within the Party. Without the consent of the Party and in total disregard of Party decisions, he privately convened in the Western Hills of Peking an illegal CEC. Is this intended to protect or destroy the Party organization?

e. The Kuomintang Political Council is an important organization for directing the actual work of the Party. Party members and organizations, even the CEC, cannot [153] dissolve such an organization at will. Yet the Right Wing dared to propose to dissolve it at the illegal CEC meeting. Who is actually trying to destroy the Kuomintang?

f. Communists participating in KMT work undertake the same duties as pure KMT members. Similarly, KMT members who simultaneously belong to the CCP should enjoy the same privileges and rights as pure KMT members. This is beyond doubt! Of course, CCP members cannot necessarily be members of the KMT CEC, but KMT members should not bar CCP members from the CEC. Yet the Right Wing insisted that high-ranking committee members should not be permitted to join two parties. Who is actually attempting to dictate everything and bar all save its own clique?

g. The laws governing election to the Second National Congress were determined by the Third CEC Plenum [May 1925], and therefore cannot possibly be changed at any illegal meeting. Yet the Right Wing dared propose changing the election laws at the illegal CEC meeting. Who is actually rebelling against the KMT?

11. On the third point, the CCP's attitude toward and relations with the KMT, we should explain the necessity of cooperation between these two basically different political parties in the national revolutionary movement and clarify the following misunderstandings.

a. A general misconception of the masses is that CCP members joined the KMT either to utilize or to destroy the KMT. On this point, we should warn the people against being too shortsighted. They need only refresh their memory of the condition of the KMT a few short years ago and they will know whether CCP members joined the KMT to utilize or destroy it. We should pose the following questions to be answered by the masses.

[154] 1. What were the revolutionary objectives of the KMT before the Communists raised such slogans as "Down with imperialism and militarism" and "National Revolution"?

2. What was the position of the KMT before Communists proclaimed it the national revolutionary party of China?

3. What was the people's impression of Sun Yat-sen before Communists declared to the broad masses that he should be venerated as the leader of the Chinese National Revolution?

4. What was the relationship between the KMT and the masses before Communists pointed out that a revolutionary party without a broad mass foundation is doomed to failure?

5. What was the nature of the KMT organization before Communists joined the work of the KMT?

We need only request the people to think over the above questions. Any faithful and loyal revolutionary may judge for himself whether Communist participation in the KMT is intended to destroy and utilize the KMT or to develop its work and strengthen its organization. We need not defend ourselves subjectively.

b. The Right Wing's attack on the Communists is centered on the charge that the KMT has split into several cliques since the Communist infiltration, Communists in the KMT having concentrated on fomenting trouble for their own benefit. Actually, we need only ask a few questions in order to stump the Right Wing.

1. Did such phenomena as intra-KMT splits and conflicts occur only after the Communist entry?

[155] 2. Can Communists be accused of fomenting trouble when Communists within the KMT lead the masses toward revolution and Communists outside the KMT awaken it and criticize its work?

3. Can Communists in the KMT be accused of intentionally attacking and expelling all cliques save their own when Communists in the KMT give warning to those who are nonrevolutionary, who look for political promotion and personal gain under the shields of the KMT and Sun Yat-sen, and to those who align themselves with the enemy?

Only reactionaries can answer "yes." Any awakened person would understand that these charges are not true.

Many people mistake the Left-Right struggle for a struggle between communism and anticommunism. This is an erroneous conception! Everyone knows that Communists have never advocated communism in the KMT or attempted to carry out communism under the Kwangtung Revolutionary Government. This is entirely the fabrication of the running dogs of imperialists and militarists, who wish to destroy the people's organizations. The real nature of the struggle between the Left and Right Wings of the KMT is a fight between revolution and counterrevolution, not between communism and anticommunism. The masses follow the reactionaries to misinterpret the struggle as one between communism and anticommunism because of ignorance of the real situation and of the meaning of the struggle, and failure to see clearly their own revolutionary responsibility. This is no slight deception!

12. At a time when the situation is so tense, when the Right Wing has become so reactionary, when the masses in general are so unstable, and when a few leaders of the Left are taking a watchful attitude, the duty of Communists, viewed from all [156] angles, is to engage in positive propaganda and agitation among the masses of the lowest levels. Our comrades should raise this problem for discussion at KMT meetings and explain to the masses the dangers of the Right Wing's mistake as well as their own heavy responsibilities. They should be organized to form a strong Left Wing of the vast masses which will be allied with the Communists to sweep away the last reactionary influence remaining in the Party, thus strengthening the foundation of the National Revolution. This is the immediate objective of our work in the KMT for which all comrades should be mobilized at once.

Document 19

Plans for the Organization of Party Cells

Document 19 is translated from an original Chinese document, which was issued as Correspondence Circular No. 1 by the Organization Department of the Northern Regional Committee of the CCP on December 10, 1925. Our translation is based on a copy sent with a letter of transmittal by the Japanese military attaché in Peking to the vice-minister of war in Tokyo on June 14, 1927. The copy is available in *Mitsu dai nikki*, V, 1927, and is also on microfilm at the East Asian Library, Columbia University.

In our previous edition this was Document 3.

TEXT

[30] Significance of Cell Organization

1. The cell is the basic organ and organizational unit of the Party. Without cell organization, the Party would lack foundation; if the cells are not strong, the Party would become loose. Hence, solidity of Party organization is completely dependent on the strength of cell organization.

2. The cell is the Party's school for education and propaganda. If we desire to [31] learn proletarian revolutionary theories and policies, the only way is to go through the cell. If we want our ideas and actions to be proletarian, the cell again is the only place where we can attain this goal. Hence, if we desire to understand proletarian revolutionary theories and policies and to make our ideas and actions proletarian, we cannot do all this in what we call universities or research institutes, but in cells.

3. The cell is the kernel of the Party among the masses. All policies and plans of the Party must go through Party cells before they can materialize. Otherwise, even if the Party had very sound policies and plans, they would be mere empty words. We [32] depend entirely on Party cells to explain the Party's policies and plans and to carry out propaganda and agitation among the masses.

4. The cell is the Party's instrument for development. If the Party is in need of development, it is entirely dependent on Party cells to bring this about. The cell is the organization of the Party among the masses. Since the life of the cell is the life of the masses, if there is no life among the masses, there is no life in the cell. The cell comes in contact with the masses daily, and the Party develops with the masses as its objective. Hence the Party depends upon the cell for its development.

5. The cell is the Party's ears, eyes, arms, and legs among the masses. The Party must have cell organization before it can understand the demands of the masses and the masses can recognize the guidance of the Party. Only thus can the Party function among and lead the masses.

6. The cell is the center of life of the Party and of every Party member. The life of every Party member should be a part of the life of the Party and the life of the Party is concentrated in Party cells. Therefore the life of every Party member cannot

be separated from the cell. If a Party member separates his or her life from the cell, then he or she cannot understand the whole life of the Party. The separation of a Party member from the life of the cell is equivalent to separation from the life of the Party; and separation from the life of the Party is equivalent to separation from the Party.

7. The cell is the Party's weapon of struggle. To acquire fighting strength, it is necessary for the Party to absorb the vast organized masses. The cell represents a part of the organized masses of the Party. It is the synthesis of the Party's crack army.

8. In short, the significance of cell organization is as follows:

a. It is the basic organ and organizational unit of the Party.

[33] b. It is the school of the Party for education and propaganda.

c. It is the kernel of the Party among the masses.

d. It is the instrument for development of the Party.

e. It is the center of life of the Party.

f. It is the Party's weapon of struggle.

Standards for Internal Party Education and Propaganda

9. Politicize ideas; oppose the hatred of politics in the minds of intellectuals and scholars.

10. Discipline action; oppose anarchist tendencies.

11. Systematize studies; oppose romantic and academic tendencies.

12. Collectivize life; oppose individualism.

13. Have absolute confidence in the Party; oppose all subjective points of view.

14. Cultivate the proletarian revolutionary philosophy of life and become professional proletarian revolutionaries; oppose petty bourgeois romantic revolutionary ideas and actions.

Principles of External Agitation and Activities

15. See clearly the objective environment and the objectives of the masses.

16. Study the psychology and demands of the masses.

17. Make use of various types of slogans to summon, assemble, and organize the masses.

18. Make sure that all our slogans are adapted to the demands of the masses; the simpler and the clearer the slogans, the more practical they will be.

19. In our practical work we must always get hold of the progressive elements among the masses. Only by so doing can we avoid isolating ourselves.

20. When we lead the masses to engage in daily struggle, we always absorb the progressive elements into our Party to strengthen the Party's directing capacity and to
[34] expand our organization.

21. Make use of every means and opportunity to raise the demands and courage of the masses, particularly when they are in despair.

22. When the masses are assembled, we should plan to organize and lead them to realize our policy.

23. Every opportunity should be utilized to engage in agitation among the masses so that our flag will march at the head of every movement.

24. When the Party's masses achieve victory, we should hold out new demands or augment old ones in order to strengthen mass organizations. We should explain to them that not all our victories are presented to us by the objective situation, but that they are the results of our own struggle.

25. When our Party achieves victory we must not be arrogant. We should be judicious in further consolidating the foundation of our mass organizations in order to

strengthen our fighting force. Only by so doing can we resist new oppression.

26. When we fail we need not be disappointed. We must study with great care the causes of our failure from the subjective and objective points of view. In particular, we must study our errors. Only thus can we enrich our experience in struggle so that we may prepare for new struggles to come.

Cell Meetings

27. Content of cell meetings:

a. Political report

b. Discussion of concrete methods to realize the Party's policies

c. Discussion of means to develop the Party

d. Discussion of the distribution of work among our comrades

[35] e. Comment on the work of our comrades

f. Report and discussion of life within and outside the Party

g. Proposals

28. Cell meetings should be held weekly, and there should be a definite time and place for such meetings.

29. It is unnecessary for the cell secretary to be chairman at every cell meeting, but it is his duty to designate comrades to serve as the chairman by rotation so that they may practice the techniques of chairmanship.

30. If a comrade is unable to attend a cell meeting due to reasons of business, he should ask the cell secretary for leave of absence and present the reasons for such a request prior to the meeting. Those who fail to ask for leave of absence are considered absentees without cause.

31. When a cell meeting is in session, any comrade who wishes to leave halfway through the meeting or earlier must explain to the chairman his reasons for doing so. He may leave only with the consent of the chairman.

32. Cell secretaries should talk to those comrades who fail to attend cell meetings without cause. They should employ all means to make every Party member attend meetings and take an active interest in them.

Responsibilities of Cell Secretaries

33. Cell secretaries are not merely technical experts but Party organizers. Hence they are vested with the responsibility of carrying out the policies and plans entrusted to them by the local committees.

34. Cell secretaries bear the responsibility of educating our comrades. To achieve this aim, they must be active among their cell comrades. They must get to know them and study their inclinations and demands, their good points as well as shortcomings. Only thus can they lead their comrades to work.

[36] 35. Since cell secretaries direct all members of the respective cells, they must pay attention to their own behavior, ideas, and speech. When they commit an error, it is not merely a personal error. It affects all other cell members as well.

36. Cell secretaries should take cognizance of the external situation and the capacity of their cell comrades, motivate them to engage in activities among the masses, agitate and organize the masses, and be responsible for the Party's current proposals and policies.

37. Cell secretaries should formulate concrete plans of work for the cells so that all work may be carried out methodically. They should also enable every comrade to work. Only thus can Party cells become alive and able to function among the masses.

38. Cell secretaries should pay special attention to the progressive elements among

the masses, motivate themselves and other comrades to engage in activities among the masses, and absorb to the fullest extent the progressive elements into the Party.

39. Cell secretaries should do their best to attend cell meetings of the CY [Communist Youth Corps] in order to present political reports and to carry out the Party's supervision of the CY. They are responsible for the execution of all the Party's duties with reference to the CY.

Responsibilities of Educational Propagandists to Party Cells

40. The most important tasks of educational propagandists of Party cells consist of the work of political education and ideological propaganda. More important still, political propagandists should enable comrades in general to analyze various current problems from the theoretical point of view. Such are the duties of educational propagandists.

[37] 41. Since the responsibility of educational propagandists is so great, they should not have to recite the propaganda outline word for word or pronounce stereotyped theories at cell meetings. It is their duty, however, to enable our comrades to acquire a clear and precise understanding of reports after they are presented and to comprehend the significance of Party policies. It is their duty also to increase our comrades' interest in politics, capacity for work, and tools for carrying out Party directives.

42. To realize the above tasks, educational propagandists should avoid "injection-type" reports to the best of their ability and rather employ the method of stimulating our comrades at cell meetings, drawing questions from them and encouraging discussion. At the end of meetings, they should formulate conclusions to resolve the difficult questions raised by our comrades and criticize our comrades' point of view. This is the means to enable our comrades to understand certain kinds of problems with greater clarity.

43. Especially when attending cell meetings of worker comrades, educational propagandists should pay even greater attention to their objective capacity to understand. Before making reports or discussing questions, they should take note of their degree of understanding of and interest in such questions. Great care must be exercised even in selecting the language to be used so that it may properly convey our message. If this is not done, it would not be easy to make our worker comrades really understand and take interest in these problems.

44. Educational propagandists not only take charge of the work of political education and ideological propaganda in Party cells but render assistance to cell secretaries in the entire work of direction. Hence there should be close relations between [38] educational propagandists and cell secretaries. We may say that educational propagandists are the central elements in Party cells.

Meetings of Cell Secretaries

45. Since Party cells are the foundation of our Party, and since cell secretaries are organizers of the Party and directors of the cells, cell secretaries should frequently hold meetings to review and criticize the work of the various cells and to discuss concrete methods of execution of work.

46. Meetings of cell secretaries are called by the organization departments of local committees. In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, representatives of local committees appointed to attend meetings of cell secretaries should present reports on important current problems.

Technical Work

47. One day before cell meetings, cell secretaries must send out notices to all cell

members and to educational propagandists who attend such meetings.

48. At each meeting cell secretaries should fill out the attendance record of each Party member. (This type of record is issued by local committees.)

49. Cell secretaries should distribute and sell all publications and propaganda material not only to Party members, but to non-Party members.

50. Cell secretaries should shoulder the responsibility of collecting Party membership dues. However, they should pay attention to the following:

a. Party members who are concurrently members of the CY do not pay Party membership dues.

b. The rules governing collection of Party membership dues are based on the section on collection of dues in the regulations revised at the Fourth Congress of our Party [January 1925].

Upon the collection of membership dues each month, cell secretaries immediately turn them over to the local committees.

51. Cell secretaries should make reports on the work of the cells. (Forms on which such reports are made are issued by the Organization Department.)

[39] 52. Cell secretaries should order every comrade to submit weekly reports. (Report blanks are issued by the Organization Department.)

Part IV: Developments in Kwangtung, November 1925-March 1926

The following six documents return to the work of the Soviet military advisers in South China: creating a counterespionage system; directing the reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army; reporting on provincial military developments; codifying procedures for their own group; transmitting regulations for the reorganized Central Political-Military Academy; and reporting on the Hong Kong-Canton Strike.

Document 20

Report Relating to Counter-Espionage Work in Kwangtung During November 1925

This document makes up numbers 3 and 10 of a series dealing with Soviet intelligence activities in Canton, dating from mid-December 1925. Translations of others in the series were published in *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 133-40: "Plan for the Organization of the Intelligence Services in the Provinces of South China and Contiguous Regions" (no. 4, December 14, 1925); "General Theses Relating to the Organization and Development of Counter-Espionage (Okhrana) Work in Kwangtung" (no 5, December 14, 1925); and "Report Relating to the Intelligence Work in Kwangtung" (no. 7, December 14, 1925). All are marked *Very Secret* and none is signed. Our Document 20 is in NA (G2 2657-I-281 /122 or /109).

Persons mentioned in Document 20 may be briefly identified: *Fu Li* is otherwise unknown to us. *Yang Ying* is probably Yang Yin (Klein and Clark, pp. 992-93), a seaman and one-time member of the T'ung Meng Hui, in which he was a contact man with secret societies. He became an important labor leader in South China, joined the CCP in 1923, and in 1925 was one of the leaders of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike. *T'an P'ing-shan*, 1887-1956 (Boorman and Howard, pp. 217-20), a native of Kwangtung, had been a member of the T'ung Meng Hui. After graduating from Peking University in 1920, he helped to organize a Socialist Youth Corps in Canton. In 1923 he became a member of Sun Yat-sen's Propaganda Department, and also joined the CCP. In January 1924 he was elected to the KMT Central Executive Committee, and by 1925 he was an important figure in both parties. *Comrade Ch'eng* has not been further identified. Among the Russians: *Kisanka*, properly Kisan'ka, is the assumed name of Nikolai Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, who arrived in Canton on October 29, 1925, and took over duties as head of the Soviet military group on November 1 (see Doc. 22). *Brailovsky* was the assumed name of Aitikin, who arrived in Canton in July 1924 and served as assistant chief military adviser until October 1924 (Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militarberater*, p. 166). *Katiushin*, see the translator's note on page 8 of Document 20. Ms. How wondered if Katiushin might be Kotov. *Nikitin* is the assumed name of V. E. Gorev, who also used the pseudonym Gordon. He was twenty-six years old in 1925 and had studied Chinese in the Eastern Department of the Frunze Military Academy. In January 1926 he was listed as chief of the Information and Intelligence Department of the staff of the Group of Soviet Military Advisers (Doc. 24). *Mikhailov* is listed in "Plan for Employment of Personnel" of July 1, 1925, as being in bad health and possibly to be sent back to Russia. He is not listed in Document 24, dated January 13, 1926. *Fred Borodin* was the elder son of Michael and Fanny Borodin. He was born in the United States and probably was about seventeen years old in 1925. He was, at times, a student in the Shanghai American School. *Tereshatov* is the real name of Nikolai I. Tereshatov, a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy and one of the earliest of the advisers to arrive in Canton, on January 25, 1924, together with A. I. Cherepanov. He taught at the Whampoa Academy and is listed in "Plan for Employment of Personnel" of July 1, 1925, as deputy of the Chief of Staff Office and inspector of the Office of the Military Section—i.e., of the Soviet advisers.

Italics are apparently as in the original Russian document.

TEXT

Very Secret

1. Beginning of the work. General conditions.
2. Work during November 1925.
3. Conditions of work.
4. Personnel.
5. Considerations as to the future.
6. Conclusions.

[1] 1. Beginning of the Work. General Conditions

I arrived at Canton on October 25, 1925, and in accordance with the order which I had received in Peking, presented myself to comrade Borodin. I gave him an account of instructions which I had received and got from him an order to start the work.

About the time of my arrival at Canton, the fight against criminal activities in Kwangtung province, from capital crimes to espionage cases, fell principally to the so-called Department of Public Safety at the head of which at Canton stood General Wu T'i-hsing [Wu T'ieh-ch'eng]. We cannot of course fully entrust *the fight against counterrevolution and espionage* to this department which, however, cannot be abolished, notwithstanding the fact that there are many reasons, on the strength of which such an abolition is urgently required. For instance, we may point out that the assassination of comrade Liao Chung-k'ai was known to Wu T'ieh-ch'eng long before [2] it had been actually committed, but he did not take any measures to prevent it. This has not been proved *officially*, but there are some data that point in his (i.e. General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's) direction. Another peculiar instance took place, when one of the bandit chiefs (belonging to an organization called "Blood Brothers") was arrested. This bandit was killed and proved to be a nephew of the person who was in charge of the criminal investigation section in the Department of Public Safety. In spite of all these facts, however, we cannot raise the question as to the abolition of this department or even as to some "cleaning" of it, because it could not be replaced by anything else. About the middle of September, at a secret meeting of our workers and the Chinese communists, it was decided to start the work in this direction. Two comrades who of course had no preparatory training were selected and entrusted with this work. *Officially* this organization existed as an *Intelligence Section attached to the local garrison.* The work was carried on just from case to case, as these comrades did not receive any advice or directions. After a month's work they succeeded in organizing a small agency and got sometimes interesting materials. In any case *the work was started.*

Of these two comrades who have been entrusted with the work, one named Fu Li, secretary to the Military Commission, has been in the USSR. He is an intelligent, steady, and clever man, well developed politically. He is not able, however, to carry on the work directly, because he does not know the Canton dialect.

The other one, Yang Ying [Yang Yin], is somewhat inferior to Fu Li, but is an excellent organizer of minor work. He is a Cantonese. Therefore all organizing work among the lower strata of the population fell to him.

There were no more workers available. In the beginning general conditions were favorable, but the absence of a properly organized work was felt by everybody. Only *an impetus* was wanted to put the machine in motion. Assassination of comrade Liao Chung-k'ai and several cases of treason on the part of generals were such *an impetus.* The necessity of *a systematic counter-espionage work* became more and more pressing and, as a makeshift, the above-mentioned organ was created. Therefore the beginning [3] of a serious organization of this work met with sympathy and support on the part

both of our two workers and of the Chinese Communists.

2. Work During November 1925

Our problem was *to create an organization that would be able to secure the safety of the province.*

In conformity with this plan, which was approved by both comrade Borodin and comrade Kisanka [Kisan'ka], it was decided to *establish schools*, for the training of workers.

Students for the first short-term courses were selected from among the best military commissaries and political workers. Teaching (first twenty-four hours per week, but afterward the number of hours was increased to thirty-two) was done almost exclusively by means of lectures and only partly by means of lectures combined with colloquies (on account of lack of time). Summaries of all lectures were previously translated and distributed among students, which circumstance enabled the latter to master the subjects more easily. As a result twenty-four efficient comrades completed their studies. Some of them returned to their units and will continue the work there in political sections in which they had been engaged previously, doing our work at the same time. Others entered the service either in local organs (in prefectures) or in the central apparatus and will do exclusively *our work.*

It has been decided, as a general principle, to have two men in each army corps and also two men in each prefecture. In practice, however, it proved impossible to put everywhere this proportion into effect. For instance, we succeeded in sending only one worker into the 5th army corps of General [Li] Fu-lin, but with great difficulties and that only in a very secret manner. The question relating to salaries of workers was decided at the meeting of November 25. These twenty-four men, together with some workers of the central apparatus, will form the basis of *the future Chinese G.P.U.* (the Soviet secret police) [presumably inserted by translator].

It is not to be expected that a great number of Communists will join our work, and sixty Communists in the apparatus will be the maximum which it will be possible to get.

[4] The chief work during this month was done at meetings of the Collegiate and at conferences with workers. There were six official (with minutes) and two preliminary meetings of the Collegiate. In accordance with my plan, at each meeting some new theoretical question was brought up for discussion and, when approved, was then put into execution in due order of time. Meetings bore a serious character, because the attitude of all members toward their work was also very serious. At present the organization of the Collegiate is as follows. T'an P'ing-san [shan], president of the Collegiate, coordinates and directs the whole work. Fu Li, first assistant, directs the work of counter-espionage, and of the secret and economic sections. Yang Yin, second assistant, directs the work of our agencies and economic and banditry sections. I am holding the post of adviser and member of the Collegiate. Comrade Ch'eng, assistant chief of the political section of the 3d Army Corps and member of the Communist Party, will also enter the Collegiate shortly as a member, and will work in the organizing and preparatory training sections. Thus the Collegiate will consist of five members. There is also a *section of information and censure.* A comrade, graduate of the school, is in charge of this section, but he is not a member of the Collegiate. Altogether seven persons constitute the central apparatus, T'an P'ing-shan included. Such a staff is of course *absolutely insufficient.*

We are just beginning to put *the information service* on a proper footing.

Some system as regards *enlistment of agents* is being introduced. There is a small net of agents which is increasing daily. So far, however, it is too early to speak about *the really serious organization of the work.* For instance, such a question as *banditry*, which is of great urgency for Kwangtung, has as yet not been taken up in all its

entireness, on account of the lack both of time and of men. Actual fighting against banditry is done exclusively by *military commanders*, and our task consists only in registering what is done in this direction.

No work is done *on the frontiers*. A question was raised about sending men for the examination of incoming vessels, but had to be dropped on account of *the lack of personnel*.

[5] All those questions are unavoidably put off on account of this same lack of *a suitable staff*. As under such conditions the work cannot be carried on in all required directions, I have decided for the moment to confine myself to the work of the most important and urgent character, in order not to split up our forces, and to leave out altogether all other questions. At present *the army* and *some regions* are *of the utmost importance* for us. Therefore workers have been sent there. Nobody here knows anything about the army. Even the numerical strength of most units is unknown, to say nothing of making a more detailed study of them. As a result, unexpected treasons take place constantly, as, for instance, the case of desertion of the 12th division, which took place only a month ago.

On the other hand, 95 percent of officials here are guilty of embezzlement of government funds, but we absolutely cannot take up this matter, because it is impossible to divert the attention of our workers with such questions as *malfeasances in office*. Fighting these offenses has to be postponed.

In addition to counter-espionage, the Collegiate is busy also with questions relating to *intelligence service*. We have agencies in Hong Kong and in Kwangsi. We had to pay attention to these questions also because no other organ with the exception of our Collegiate is capable to take charge of them.

During the last month we had to consider the question relating to *the protection of responsible workers* here. A new system of passes which is more perfect than the former system of badges has been introduced, and the question pertaining to a greater systematization of the protection service is now being worked out.

Regulations governing schools have been drawn up and approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925.

As a result of the work of agents, several cases have been put on record, partly occasionally and partly in consequence of systematic work. As some of these cases concern *foreigners*, the work is carried on in two directions: from the Chinese side through agents enlisted among the Chinese, and from our side through foreign agents working for us. The work in connection with these cases is developing satisfactorily, [6] connections are being established, and several agents have been enlisted and are now at our disposal.

Until November the *information work* consisted in arranging materials furnished by the *Canton press*, but no systematic arranging of these materials for the purpose of intelligence and counter-espionage service was done. Now *materials furnished by the British press are arranged systematically*. Moreover, Chinese newspapers have been ordered from the neighboring provinces, also from Hong Kong and Macao.

Bulletins containing all materials that were obtained through the *information service* were issued, not regularly, but dependent upon the quantity of materials available. Only materials relating to individual cases were not utilized for bulletins.

3. Conditions of Work

The conditions of work, generally speaking, did not change, but remained the same as in the beginning, when the work was only started. The work developed in an energetic manner and some results have been attained. We met with sympathy and support from everywhere, and our position here has been firmly consolidated. Sympathy and support alone, however, cannot give us all that is absolutely necessary for the work.

The proper organization of a secret service is based generally upon three, and here even upon four, conditions. The work cannot go on successfully, when even one of these conditions is absent. These conditions are: (1) money, (2) personnel, (3) support of party organizations, and (4) interpreters. So far the first and the third did not fail, but *the second and the fourth conditions were absolutely lacking.*

The money question stands now as follows. The whole organization is so far kept *at our expense.* For the time being monthly expenses are about $5,000, but in two or three months will increase up to $20,000, but even this sum is small in comparison with the work we have to do. We cannot seriously count upon receiving this money [7] from the government (i.e., of Canton), at least not until we win its confidence and are quite sure of our own forces. Thus we will have only the same source of obtaining money as now. No special agreement in this respect exists between Peking and comrade Borodin, and I was asked quite a natural question, as to whether money would be given for this work. A complete clearness as regards this question is necessary. Otherwise it may turn out that some day I shall find myself without money for carrying on the work. Another question concerns *expenses which are not connected with the Chinese work.* It is absolutely necessary for me to have at my disposal a certain amount of money and to send accounts regarding expenditure of this money directly to Peking. Then there will be a certain independence in the work, because it is quite understandable that the organization that gives money shall of course have the right to demand that this money should be used only for purposes which this organization thinks proper. Therefore please remit me at the next opportunity $1,000 Gold and I, on my part, shall send accounts concerning the expenditure of this money directly to Peking.

I always obtain *all necessary support both from Party organizations and from our comrades.* Owing to their support, excellent students were selected for the first courses, and I am able almost always to obtain workers which I need. For instance, I succeeded in obtaining comrade Ch'eng (one of our responsible comrades) for our work. Russian workers also give assistance in every way. Still neither of them can help in solving the urgent problem as to *personnel and interpreters.*

The question relating to personnel is of the utmost importance and affects the whole work. It must be divided, however, into two parts: (1) *the Chinese personnel* and (2) *the Russian personnel.* As regards *the Chinese personnel,* all measures are taken to secure the needed men, and all that is possible will be done in this respect. With reference to *the Russian personnel* (*instructors*), "things followed their usual course." When I was leaving, I was positively promised (upon word of honor which was quite unnecessary) that Brailovsky and Katiushin for the work in the G.P.U. and somebody for the work in the Intelligence Department (R.U.) would be sent here immediately. Being still in Peking, I permitted myself to express doubts as to the fulfillment of this promise. Now I am convinced that I made a mistake in that I left without awaiting the arrival of all those men. To say the least, it would be strange to think that it is possible to organize the work of the G.P.U. without obtaining a suitable personnel. All my doubts and considerations, which I exposed when at Peking, are now realized. I shall not repeat my arguments, but unless two men whom [8] I asked for are at once dispatched from Moscow, and unless those workers who were promised me are immediately sent from Peking, I shall be compelled to believe that the work of the G.P.U. here is considered to be of secondary importance. In that case I will concentrate my attention on a more important (apparently) work, i.e., *military work,* in which I will probably be of more use. The school cannot be established without instructors, without the school Chinese workers cannot be obtained, and without workers the work of the G.P.U. cannot be organized. I cannot hold myself responsible for the work which it is impossible to organize.

(In the three lists of collaborators of the South China group for the period June to October 1926, *Katiushin* is mentioned as adviser to the Inspectorate of Communica-

tion of the General Staff. *Translator's note*).

The problem relating to the interpreter is still worse. Granted that I alone, just as an ordinary plenipotentiary, am able to do something as regards sending instructions and directions to agents, but without interpreter I am compelled to remain idle. I cannot obtain interpreters locally, because those who are here are overcharged with work and cannot be detached for our work. Li, who was promised me, did not as yet arrive. I leave it to you to form a judgment as to whether it is possible to carry on the work without interpreter. The talk about using the English language is nonsense, because there are very few Party men who can speak this language, and I do not venture to engage some "speculator" even for translating lectures, to say nothing about translating materials obtained through agents. The attitude of Peking toward this question is quite incomprehensible and makes me have doubts as to the seriousness of the work I am doing here.

I do not see any sense in my work, unless these two questions (i.e., relating to *personnel and interpreter*) are solved satisfactorily, because it is hardly expedient for [9] me to sit here only to have once a week a conversation with the Chinese.

Personnel

As to the *personnel* available, there are now 2.5 men (because one is doing only part-time work) who are doing the work of instructors.

Nikitin carries on the work in the Collegiate, delivers lectures in the school, draws up instruction schedules, directs agents, collects from the English press materials relating to information, and is in charge of the organizing work.

Mikhailoff is in charge of all matters, enlists foreign (non-Chinese) agents and keeps in touch with them, directs educational matters and delivers lectures in the school, prepares financial accounts.

Fred Borodin acts as English secretary of the Collegiate and arranges English materials for information purposes (does this work only when he has spare time, because he has other, regular work).

The personnel as available now are overcharged with work and cannot do anything more. So if materials in a greater quantity are obtained, *they will remain not utilized*.

Considerations as to Further Work

Considerations as to the further development of the work are based upon the supposition that *the work is recognized as important*, and that *the defects* that are indicated in paragraph 3 *will be eliminated*.

In accordance with the plan for work (which has been approved already), about December 14 *a school will be organized to train workers for counter-espionage and intelligence work*. The organization of this school has been approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925. Provided this undertaking does not end in a failure, *our work in the future will develop in a systematic manner*.

As to the organization of the work generally, it is done now *in a secret manner*, under the guise of *an Intelligence Section attached to the local garrison*. As this section is to be abolished, the new official designation will be *Bureau of Detectives attached to the 1st Army Corps*. In accordance with the project drawn up by Wang Ching-wei, the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang intends to organize a *Political Investigation Bureau* which will prove to be entirely "*ours*," because T'an P'ing-shan is [10] designated as its chief. In that case *our work will assume quite a legal character*. Otherwise the work will be carried on *in a semi-legal manner*, until our organization becomes powerful enough.

It is planned that in its final form our organization will be called "*Commission*

for the Defense of the Revolution," with the Collegiate at its head and the following *sections*: counter-espionage, special, economic, inquiry, bandit, information, agents, censure, and especially secret. There is also a project *to organize special troops* for this commission. The work beyond the borders of the province is also developing. Workers to be employed by residences will be trained in the school. Permanent agents for Hong Kong and Macao will be selected among strikers. These will be given proper instructions and will then be able *to throw a complete light on the situation at Hong Kong and Macao*. It is also intended to organize a kind of *bureau for letters* to which all strikers will send information concerning local state of mind, general situation, etc.

Conclusions

My *general conclusion* is that *the ground and the conditions at Canton are favorable for the organization of the counter-espionage work*. This work can be successfully developed, and even if it will not be possible to put it on the same footing as in the USSR, in any case we shall succeed in securing ourselves from such dangers as unexpected betrayals of whole army units, mutiny, assassination of responsible workers, and impudent espionage work, which is done here without any constraint.

The work has been started, and our task is not to let it stop, but to develop it at the same speed. For that purpose *main defects*, such as *insufficient number of instructors* and *absence of an interpreter, must be eliminated*. Otherwise there cannot be any question about the further development of the work.

(November . . . 1925)

Very Secret

Draft Project of the Organization of the School of Counter-Espionage and Intelligence Service in Kwangtung
(No. 10, December 14, 1925)

[1] (*Note*: The organization of this school has been approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925.)

1. The aim of the school is to train theoretically *chiefs of counter-espionage and intelligence groups*, also *ordinary agents* and *plenipotentiaries* (delegates or representatives).

2. This school shall be accordingly divided into *two* sections: *Counter-espionage Section* and *Intelligence Section*.

3. Students, middle and junior-grade officers, members of trade unions, of peasant and other organizations, strikers, etc., are admitted into this school, but only after a careful selection and checking up on their political reliability.

4. Part of the students shall be so selected as to their dialect as to be able to work in different regions of Kwangtung province.

5. Students of the school are considered to be *in the military service* and are at the absolute disposal of the school.

6. Students of the school are enrolled upon the basis of the following calculations:

A. *Counter-espionage Section:*
a. for the army and navy, 15 men
b. for six prefectures (four men for each), 24 men
c. for Canton and borders, 9 men
Total, 48 men

[2] B. *Intelligence Section:* 12 men
Total enrollment: 60 men

7. The duration of the course shall be *three months* or about 624 working hours reckoned on the basis of 8 working hours per day (drilling not included).

8. The teaching shall be done by means of *lectures* or seminars and *practical exercises.*

9. For seminars and practical exercises students shall be divided into *five groups* each consisting of twelve students.

10. Subjects shall be divided into (a) obligatory for both sections and (b) obligatory for one section only.

11. Approximate distribution of hours according to subjects.

[We omit details of hours and subjects which are unrevealing.]

[3] [Grand total for Intelligence Section: 245 hours of lectures and seminars, 135 hours of practical exercises; Counter-espionage Section: 412 hours of lectures and seminars, 190 hours of practical exercises.]

12. Each student shall study one of the European languages. Preference will be [4] given to the Russian language; English, and French will follow next. There will be about six groups, each consisting of ten students: three groups for the Russian language, two for English, and one for French.

13. Students of the school shall carry on political work among themselves in accordance with our plan.

14. Studies of languages and the political work shall be outside of the hours indicated in the schedule.

15. Students, before being admitted into the school, shall pass before a special commission *an examination* consisting of the following subjects: (a) their political views; (b) general knowledge (in Chinese); (c) knowledge of European languages; (d) memory and intelligence.

16. After completing their course, students shall receive certificates.

A. *Personnel of the School*

a. Teachers of special subjects (not less than five) are wanted; they also shall be charged with the direction of groups.

b. One chief director of the school.

c. One chief director of the Intelligence Section.

d. One chief director of the Counter-espionage Section.

e. Instructors in military subjects.

f. Teachers of languages: three for Russian, two for English, and one for French. Chinese teachers may be used for teaching English and French.

B. *Chinese Staff*

g. Teachers of special subjects (not less than five) are wanted; they will also be charged with the direction of groups.

h. Teachers of political subjects (for groups) are wanted.

i. Instructors in military subjects are also wanted.

[5] C. *Considerations*

j. Chief director of the school: Nikitin.

k. Chief director of the Intelligence Section: Tereshatov (deputy chief of the General Staff and secretary of the Russian Military Council).

l. Chief director of the Counter-espionage Section *is wanted.*

m. Teachers of special subjects: Mikhailov and Fred Borodin. Three more teachers are wanted.

n. Military subjects can be taken up by those forces of our group which are available now.

o. As Chinese teachers of special subjects, those may be utilized who have completed their studies, and who are now working at Canton.

p. Instructors for political work are wanted.

Document 21

Instructions to the Commissions for Reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army

The immediate purpose of the Russian advisers in Canton was to modernize the military forces serving the Kuomintang. Document 21 is a scheme for carrying through a reorganization and consolidation of existing forces into five corps and two independent divisions, and for the disbandment of such units as did not fit into the scheme. General Bliukher anticipated such a reorganization in his report written in Kalgan in September 1925 (Doc. 9, pp. 27-28). The Kuomintang Political Council at its 101st meeting on January 6, 1926, passed a reorganization scheme for the NRA allocating nineteen divisions among six corps, confirming corps commanders, and allocating one division (later the 20th) to be under the direct control of the Military Council and commanded by the Canton garrison commander (Minutes, KMT Archives, 001/29).

The present document probably dates from November 1925, because it mentions budgets for December and January that were to determine the size of forces after reorganization, and because the Short History of the National Revolutionary Army (Doc. 3, p. 8) mentions the reorganization commissions working during the period December 1925 to March 1926.

Document 21 sets January 30 as the date for completion of the reorganizational work, but it was easier to issue such an order than to carry it out, given the nature of militarism in South China at the time. This document illustrates some of the problems as anticipated. The chief of the General Staff at that time was General Victor P. Rogachev. Hence each commission would be made up of two Russians and the Chinese commander of the unit being reorganized.

Document 21 is in NA (G-2 2657-I281/109), sent by the American military attaché in Peking as his Document A-20.

TEXT

(Approved by the Canton Military Council)

[1] 1. For the reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army on the basis of the budget for the months of December and January as established by the government and in accordance with the approved list of personnel, commissions are formed for each corps and for all separate divisions. These commissions consist of the chief of the General Staff, the commander of the corps or of the separate division that is being reorganized, and the Russian adviser.

2. The chief task of the commission is to make a minute study of the corps or the separate division and then to find means to carry out the necessary measures to have its upkeep arranged according to the budget and to reorganize it strictly adhering to the approved list of the personnel.

3. Considering that it is necessary to have the numerical strength of the National Revolutionary Army brought up to five corps and two separate divisions, the commission is instructed to abolish all units that do not enter into the corps and divisions

as parts of them. Such units are either incorporated into the corps or divisions or disbanded.

4. The chief of the General Staff submits to the Military Council for approval a plan for the disbandment of the units that do not enter into the corps and separate divisions.

5. The commissions must pay special attention to the immediate organization of sections of the supply service in the corps and divisions, and they must insist that these offices keep exact accounts of all army supplies.

6. The commissions are instructed to supervise the proper organization of the staffs of corps and divisions and to make it the duty of these staffs the regular reporting of the actual effective force of the units.

[2] 7. Having finished the reorganization of the corps and the separate divisions and having reported the results to the Military Council, the commissions shall submit to the Military Council plans for the formation of new units in the corps in order to bring their effective force up to the necessary numerical strength. In accordance with these plans the government will in the future establish a new budget for the corps.

8. The order in which the work of the commissions is done.

a. The commissions start working as soon as these instructions will have been approved by the Military Council.

b. The commissions can obtain results only if they are thorough in their work and well familiar with the condition of the unit and with its peculiarities. The responsibility for keeping the commissions informed is imposed by the Military Council on the commanders of the respective corps and separate divisions.

c. Having become thoroughly familiar with the condition of the corps or of the separate division the commissions work out a plan for its reorganization and carry it out immediately through the commanders of the corps or the divisions.

d. In case of disagreement among the members of the commissions on measures for the reorganization of some unit, the disputed question is submitted to the decision of the Military Council. However, the disputed question must never be the cause of a delay in the rest of the whole work of the reorganization of the corps or the division.

e. The 30th of January is fixed as the final date on which the reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army must be accomplished. The commissions shall take all possible measures to have this time shortened as much as possible.

Document 22

Kuibyshev's Report on Military Developments in Kwangtung

Document 22 was translated by the Peking Commission from Russian into Chinese under the title, "A Letter from the Chief of the Soviet Branch in South China to Egorov, Military Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Reporting on the Entire Situation in Kwangtung, Military Developments, and the Condition of Various Kinds of Work," in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 31-62. In our translation, we have omitted the middle section of the report giving detailed information on troop movements and battles during the Second Eastern Expedition and the war in southern Kwangtung. The report, marked "Most Secret," was evidently written by General N. V. Kuibyshev, who used the pseudonym "Kisan'ka" and was head of the South China Group of Military Advisers from November 1, 1925, until March 24, 1926.

According to the Chinese text, the document was dated May 3, which must be erroneous. On pages 55 and 57, the writer mentions graduations to take place in January, and on page 59 he states that "the regulations of our group" will be forwarded by the next mail. Our Document 23, which may be dated January 13, 1926, seems to be that set of regulations. The writer tells of difficulty in preparing this report because most Soviet advisers and Chiang Kai-shek were—or had been—at the front. Chiang returned to Canton on December 30, 1925, according to his "Diary." Hence, we believe this document should be dated near the end of December 1925 or very early in January 1926.

The writer mentions several annexes to his report, most of which we have not seen. The person mentioned in Chinese transcription as *Ao-li-chin* is I. Ia Razgon, who used the pseudonym "Ol'gin" in China. He was deputy to Kuibyshev, and in January 1926 was assistant chief of the South China Group of Soviet Military Advisers and temporarily acting chief adviser to the Political-Military Academy at Whampoa.

Document 22 is a comprehensive military report, and should be read together with documents 3 and 26. Battle details, which we have omitted, may be found in KMWH, XI, 1752ff. Appendices mentioned in Document 22 have not been found.

This was Document 16 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[31] I arrived in Canton on October 29 and assumed my duties as chief of the group on November 1. At the time of my arrival, the fighting in the East against Ch'en Chiung-ming had ended, while the fighting in the South against Teng P'ei-ying [Teng Pen-yin] was still in progress. The greater part of the National Revolutionary Army, together with many of the Russian advisers, was therefore at the front, including Rogachev, former acting chief of the group, and Chiang Kai-shek, commander-in-[32] chief of the Eastern Expedition. Consequently, my survey of conditions in Canton and of our work here was greatly handicapped. As the reports available at the group headquarters are insufficient, a relatively longer period of time has been necessary in conducting the survey.

To understand the present situation and the plans and tactics resulting therefrom, it is necessary to draw our attention to past events.

In May of this year, the government was faced with a critical situation: The armies of Yunnan [commanded by Yang Hsi-min] and Kwangsi [commanded by Liu Chen-huan] were on the verge of rebellion and rendered help to the enemy. Although the final success of the government troops in suppressing the rebellious armies was attributed to the former's determined efforts, victory was actually beyond the ability of the government forces and was due to the assistance of the Russian advisers. Since then the government has been in a stronger position politically and has begun to reorganize the army according to our direction. The following are basic problems in army reorganization.

Organization of a unified National Revolutionary Army; centralization of the military and financial system of the government; regulation of the number of standing army units and the military budget; centralization of all administrative and political organs; appointment of Party representatives to all army units and administrative organs; regulation of medical facilities for the army. A part of the above has already been put into effect. Furthermore, the National Government has organized the Military Council [as] the central directing organ and has established under it the General Staff and the Political Training Department. The Military Council is responsible for all problems.

Plans on the number of army units and organization of a model army have been drawn up and are ready for execution. A further step is now being taken to unify finances. On the surface, the generals unanimously favor this move. Actually, however, they are completely opposed, because they consider as their own private property territories where their troops are stationed.

They fundamentally oppose the taking of revenues from their hands and appointment by Party Headquarters of supervisors to their armies. In view of this, the generals are dissatisfied with the government's new plans and have united in a strong organization with the support of both the Kuomintang Right Wing and Hong Kong.

At first, the National Revolutionary Government helped the striking workers of Hong Kong by creating various public welfare works for their employment at Canton (such as the construction and repair of streets, avenues, and roads to Whampoa, and [33] work in the army, etc.). Hong Kong was in serious economic difficulties and therefore gave substantial support to organizations opposed to the National Revolutionary Government. The first incident resulting from such support was the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai. Subsequently, there arose all kinds of violence against the government and the Kuomintang Left Wing leading to various kinds of agitation for a military coup in Kwangtung.

The antigovernment agitation of Kwangtung University was instigated by the university's president, Tsou Lu, with the aim of overthrowing the Canton Government from within and without. Ch'en Chiung-ming, with help from Hong Kong, attacked Canton from the east, Hsiung K'o-wu of the Szechwan Army from the north, Wei Pang-p'ing and Teng P'ei-ying [Teng Pen-yin] from the south. At the same time, Ch'en Chiung-ming got three battleships from Wu P'ei-fu to blockade Canton while his troops proceeded along the river from Hong Kong toward Canton. The government was subjected to serious pressure and faced the danger of total destruction. It was able, however, by swift and determined measures to resist internally the antigovernment organizations and, externally, the enemy armies, thereby acquiring a strong and firm position by November 1925.

The government's first step toward internal consolidation was the thorough disarming of unreliable troops. A number of them, however, had already joined Teng P'ei-ying [Teng Pen-yin].

The assassinated Liao Chung-k'ai was commander of the Second Kwangtung

Army. Hu Han-min was exiled abroad because of his ideological connections with the secretary of the Political Council of the KMT Central Executive Committee[1] and revelations of the involvement of his brother [cousin, Hu I-sheng] in Liao's assassination.

In view of the serious situation at Canton, General Hsü Ch'ung-chih, whose revolutionary determination appeared wavering, was given leave of absence to go to Shanghai.

The following measures against our external enemies were considered necessary:

1. Extermination of Ch'en Chiung-ming's army because of its most violent hostility toward the government and its close connections with the Hong Kong Government. The disarming of Hsiung K'o-wu's troops in the North.

[34] 2. Extermination of the enemy in the southern route.

The Military Council adopted the following plans to distribute the army for the battlefronts. For the eastern front, the First and Third divisions of the First Corps, number 6,000 men, and the Fourth Corps (excepting the Tenth Division) under Liao Fu-lin [Li Fu-lin],[2] about 6,000 men. For Tan-shui, about 3,000 men from the Fourth and Ninth brigades and 3,000 men from the two independent regiments of the former Kwangtung Army, seven battalions of the Independent Division under Wu Chi-hsin [Wu Chung-hsin], four regiments of 1,500 men under General Ch'eng Ch'ien, and 2,500 to 3,000 men from the provincial armies of Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupei, totalling about 20,000 to 21,000 men. For the northern route against the forces of Hsiung K'o-wu, part of the Second and Third corps and the Kwangsi troops, which offered to attack Hsiung's forces from the rear by way of Kiangsi [Kwangsi]. For the southern route in defense of the Southwest, the remaining portion of the fourth Corps (that is, the Tenth Division) of Li Fu-lin [Li Chi-shen].

The responsibility for preserving peace and order in the provincial capital was assigned to the Second Division of the First Corps, the schools of the First, Second, and Third corps, and the navy.

The attitude of the Fifth Corps toward the government has not been clear since the fighting started. Hainan [Honam] Island, which it occupies, is opposite Kwangtung [Canton], and in case of unfavorable fighting conditions on the government's side, there is danger of revolt.

Some advisers are at the southern front, others at the eastern front. Reorganization of the army has therefore been delayed. All battle records will be forwarded by the next mail.

[Omitted: detailed battle record, pp. 34–48.]

[48] The Military Council

The Military Council is actually the mastermind of the National Revolutionary Army. In spite of the independent power of the various generals and their habitual unwillingness to be subordinated to others, the Council has been able in a short space of time [49] to win prestige in the National Revolutionary Army. The generals refer various problems, even minute ones which can be solved either by themselves or by their headquarters, to the Military Council for instructions. Military plans, including [plans for] military reorganization, supplies, and distribution of ammunition, and plans on the principles of political work, and many minor problems are executed upon the Council's approval. We are endeavoring to guide the work of the Council in the right direction.

The standing members of the Military Council consist of myself, as chief military adviser to the National Revolutionary Government, Rogachev, as chief of the General Staff, and Ol'gin [I. Ia Razgon], as chief adviser to the Political Department of the National Revolutionary Government.

The Military Council recently solved the following important problems:

1. Approved battle plans for the eastern, southern, and northern routes.
2. Approved plans for suppressing banditry.
3. Approved the budgets of all armies and organs.
4. Established the censor's bureau.
5. Fixed the oath of military men.
6. Solved all problems relating to the supply of military uniforms.
7. Decided on plans for army reorganization and issued orders for reorganizing the army and the [Political] Department. (Refer to appendix 10.)

The General Staff

The General Staff should not be as inactive as before, since its position has been elevated. It must be noted that the Military Council, the actual directing organ of the army, is not charged with minor and purely technical problems. The General Staff is the Council's assisting technical organ. The armies at first slighted the General Staff. [50] The commanders referred directly to the Council matters that should have fallen within the jurisdiction of the General Staff. This situation stemmed from the failure of high-ranking officers to realize the need for the General Staff and from the difficulty of selecting suitable personnel to head the departments of the General Staff.

At present, the General Staff has set up the following departments: (1) intelligence; (2) administration; (3) infantry; (4) artillery; (5) communications (army communications, etc.); (6) engineering; and (7) sanitation. All the above departments are headed by a Chinese who is assisted by a [Russian] adviser, except the Communications Department, for which no suitable Chinese could be found. Therefore a Russian was employed to head the department. The problem that needs immediate solution is establishment of the General Staff in a firm position so that it will not be merely the secretariat of the Council as before.

The Political Training Department

This organ was established not long ago. It has not been set up in all armies. Heretofore, political work in the army was poor in many respects. It is still in the initial stage of establishment. The fundamental tasks of political work in the immediate future are as follows:

1. Carry out the unified commissar system. This system should be carried out first by the First Corps and gradually by other corps. Because regulations on the political commissars had not been promulgated, however, the commissars themselves and the army officers have varying interpretations of their function. Now such regulations have been drafted and await the Council's approval (see appendix 11).
2. Establish a Military Tribunal to impose penalties on the army for such crimes as the forceful occupation of territories, acceptance of bribes, and embezzlement of public funds.
3. Give advanced political training to the army, with particular emphasis on the officers and cadets of the Military Academy.
4. Establish clubs in army schools.

[51] 5. Set up a unified curriculum of political courses at all army schools.

The Armies of the National Revolutionary Government

The reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army is not yet complete. The present organization is as follows.

First Corps. Commander, Chiang Kai-shek. Consists of three divisions, each

division consisting of three regiments. The number of men is as follows: the First Division, approximately 4,000; the Second Division, approximately 3,500; the Third Division, approximately 3,100. The First and Third divisions are stationed in the East, bordering Fukien, and the Second Division is stationed in Canton and environs.

Second Corps. No organization into divisions. Consists of nine regiments, two independent battalions, and the former Kwangtung Nineteenth Independent Battalion, which fled at the time the Kwangtung First Army was disarmed [late August 1925], but has now returned to the government's forces and is combined with the Second Corps (the former Hunan Army) because the majority of the soldiers are Hunanese. The number of men in the Second Corps totals approximately 15,000, but cannot be definitely determined because reorganization has just been launched. A part of the Second Corps has been dispatched to the new territories to the north of Shaokuan.

Third Corps. Its organization is as follows: First Division consisting of three regiments, one artillery company, and one machine-gun company. Second Division, consisting of two regiments, one artillery company, and one machine-gun company. Two independent brigades. One independent regiment and the Kiangsi Army. The total [52] number of men is approximately 14,000 to 15,000 with approximately 7,000 magazine guns [rifles?], 14 machine guns, and 3 cannons. At present part of its forces are moving along the southern route.

Fourth Corps. This group consists of three divisions and two independent regiments. It is difficult to determine the number of men because it is now on the southern route. Furthermore, enemy troops have often been incorporated into the Fourth Corps.

Fifth Corps. Although its commander, Li Fu-lin, is a member of the Military Council and has participated in its meetings and work, the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Military Council have received no report concerning the Fifth Corps. The commander, Li Fu-lin, is close to the Canton Merchant Corps. Should the Fifth Corps be disarmed, it would surely arouse the resentment of the [Merchant] Corps. Therefore, when some of the unreliable armies were disarmed, no such attempt was made with the Fifth Corps. The Fifth Corps is the largest of the National Revolutionary Army but yet has no Russian advisers. However, for the sake of the final victory of the National Revolutionary Army, Li Fu-lin has consented to organize a political department in the [Fifth] Corps and it will be possible from now on to infuse Kuomintang elements into it. Attention should be directed to the fact that Li Fu-lin will sooner or later display violent opposition to army reorganization and the National Revolutionary Army will encounter conflicts with his army.

The First Independent Division amounting to 3,000 men under General Wu Chihsin [Wu Chung-hsin] is stationed in the east of the province, as are also the Second Independent Division and the Third Independent Division under General Ch'eng Ch'ien.

In addition, there is a small army unit in the South which has no particular form of organization.

The above explains the organization of the armies. It is difficult at present to ascertain the total number of men in the National Revolutionary Army because most of [53] the smaller units are in contact with the Operations Department only when they request funds from the Military Council. When our troops were moving to the South, these small units actively declared their loyalty to the government. At the beginning of the fighting on the southern front a rough estimate of the forces of the National Revolutionary Army was made. It is not possible to form an estimate now, however. Reorganizing or disarming these small units has been contemplated, but that would be a tremendous task.

Ammunition. Ammunition supply in the army is very poor. Some of the armies still use obsolete guns. Each company possesses only seven to nine magazine guns.

Machine guns are insufficient and there was a shortage of cartridges in the recent fighting.

In all units of the National Revolutionary Army, there are altogether 137 cannons, mostly 8 mm, 7.5 mm, 6.5 mm, 5.7 mm, 4.7 mm, 4.5 mm, or 3.5 mm mountain guns manufactured by the British, Japanese, and Krupp factories. Most of the cannons are obsolete 1880 or 1890 models, lacking rapid firing power and pressure gauge. There is insufficient ammunition in store in all the armies. A corps with seven cannons has only twenty shells. However, the replenishment of ammunition at this time is impossible because the supply has to come from abroad or from other provinces. The arsenals in Kwangtung are not yet in a position to manufacture shells.

Communications. Army communications are not regulated. Technical communication is completely lacking; manpower communication is not organized. The local populace is relied on for transmitting telegrams. This is most inconvenient.

Sanitation. Sanitation is very essential in the army. In previous fighting, the wounded frequently died on route to the rear. Recently, the General Staff has enlisted the support of the Sanitation Administration Department in sending the wounded to military hospitals for treatment. But sanitary equipment in the various [54] corps is still insufficient, owing to the lack of funds, medicine, beds, and other supplies.

Arsenal. Replenishment of military supplies at this time is still difficult because of (1) financial shortage, and (2) collection of taxes and levies by the various generals. The government must establish financial organs to replace the collectors appointed by the generals. The work has just begun and the revenues are still insufficient. The Administration of Supplies is now being organized to see that the manufacture of military supplies, cartridges, and guns is handled by the arsenals. There are still a few generals, however, who hire people to manufacture such needed ammunition for themselves. The big arsenal's regulations on requisition of military supplies provide that any general may order unlimited quantities of necessary supplies, but he himself must pay for them. The government does not subsidize the arsenal, which depends solely upon proceeds from the sale of arms to meet material and labor costs.

The first step taken by the Military Council in reorganizing the army was the appointment of a supervisor at the arsenal. Without the Military Council's approval, no ammunition or supplies may be issued. However, the generals at present do not respect the Council's instruction and freely place their orders with the arsenal, not infrequently causing conflict with the government. The arsenal's production is 125,000 cartridges per week.

Aside from this arsenal, there is a small arsenal of the former Yunnan Army that can produce from 15,000 to 20,000 cartridges per day or 20,000 to 25,000 per day and night. They are of 7.9, 6.8, or 6.5 caliber, used for Japanese-type guns.

The reason for operating the small arsenal is to increase the quantity of cartridges on the one hand and, on the other, to combat the monopoly of the big arsenal. There are some unstable elements even at present among the workers at the small arsenal, partly because of economic reasons and partly [because these elements are] under the influence of the antigovernment movement.

In order to explain [investigate] the causes of the workers' dissatisfaction with the [55] government, a special committee has been set up with one of our representatives participating (see appendix 12). Attached is the report of Ol'gin [Razgon], who is working on this committee [not found].

Army Schools

There are officers' schools in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth corps. We have had no reports from the Fifth Corps. The objective of the schools is to train low-

ranking officers for the armies. Lately the work of the schools has been unsatisfactory because most of the Russian advisers have left for the front with the troops and the schools lack proper direction. After fighting in the East had ended, only one person was sent to join the schools of the First, Third, and Fourth corps. Up to now there is no adviser in the school of the Second Corps. Since army officers must be given solid political knowledge, the two Russian political workers will be installed as political advisers at the schools as soon as they arrive. (Now only two schools have one adviser each.)

School of the First Corps (Whampoa). Organization of the school: (1) regular school; (2) preparatory school. High school and college graduates who have had no military education enter the preparatory school first and then, after a general military education, they enter the regular school. Each school has one thousand students.

The regular school is located on Whampoa Island close to Canton and the preparatory school is at the Hui-chou Fort. During the recent fighting a number of students remained aboard the gunboats, as the officers of some of the ships were suspected of being unreliable and the students, on the other hand, are trustworthy. Six months are required for graduation from the regular school. Graduation takes place in the first part of January.

As a result of the war, courses have not been given as scheduled and the records of students due for graduation are below passing. The reason is that the students were assigned to guard duties in suburban areas during the fighting.

[56] Instructors are engaged by invitation. Nine-tenths of them have no political background. The permanent instructors are politically organized, but further efforts are necessary in this respect.

Tactics instructors, sufficient.

Ballistics [instructors], only 20 percent sufficient.

Survey instructors, only 70 percent sufficient.

Engineering [instructors], about 70 percent sufficient.

Artillery [instructors], about 50 percent sufficient.

The distribution of students is satisfactory, but classrooms are 70 percent short.

Clubs, none [?]. It had been planned before the war to organize a club. The outbreak of war, however, obstructed its progress.

As yet, there is no Sunyatsenist lecture group. Political courses and general political lectures are also lacking. There are only occasional lectures during classes.

All the students are revolutionary elements. Due to the weak political curriculum and the instructors' lack of political organization, however, the students have an indifferent attitude toward political problems.

With the war over, plans have already been formulated to institute reforms:

a. Change instructors. Elevate the political standards of the instructors who remain.

[57] b. Appoint regular political instructors and fix a systematic political curriculum.

c. Organize clubs and define their activities.

d. Organize a Sunyatsenist lecture group.

e. Expand experimental work and increase the number of classrooms.

Schools of the Second Corps. There are two schools in the Second Corps: (1) officers' school; (2) enlisted men's school. Two hundred eighty students graduated from the officers' school at the beginning of this month. The remainder, 470 students, will graduate in the first part of March.

Three hundred new students should be selected, with 150 to come from high schools and the rest from among enlisted men.

The enlisted men's school has 550 students recruited from [formed into?] five companies. The students of the Second and Third companies, totaling 280 persons, will complete their course in January. The rest will finish by February. The quality

of the instructors and of the training is below average.

Schools of the Third Corps. There are two schools in the Third Corps: (1) the officers' school; (2) the supplementary school for low-ranking officers.

The officers' school was established in early September. It now has 800 students and 300 magazine guns. The position of president is filled by the commander of the Third Corps, General Chu P'ei-te.

The acting president is the dean, General Kuo Ching-wei, who is a native of Kiangsi. He is a graduate of a Japanese military academy and possesses profound military knowledge.

The instructors are poorly organized. Tactical training is weak. The number of instructors is insufficient. Students are admitted without taking entrance examinations and their general technical knowledge varies greatly.

[58] The supplementary school for low-ranking officers has about 600 students and 200 magazine guns.

Many of the students formerly were enlisted men and they lack military knowledge. Their age ranges from twenty-five to thirty. The school has actually ceased to function because of the shortage of instructors. Dissolution of the school is now considered, with the older men to be repatriated to their native places and the strong ones (that is, useful elements) transferred to the officers' school.

School of the Fourth Corps. The school is still in the stage of organization. It is recruiting students and building a campus.

The Navy

During the recent fighting the navy was charged with the following responsibilities: (1) protection of harbors and river mouths against attack by enemy ships and prevention of the transportation of armed personnel by ships sailing under foreign flags; (2) defense of Kwangtung and [from?] Fukien; (3) suppression of banditry along the river front. The ships, though old, were capable of carrying out the first two duties but not the third. Although eight armed ships were captured from the rebels, the present strength of the navy is still inadequate to destroy the bandits. More ships are needed in order to suppress the great number of bandits who are supported by Hong Kong.

To repair the ships, a torpedo and mine factory was established. The factory has completed repairs on one torpedo boat, special repairs on one gunboat, and general repairs on six gunboats. It has prepared a dockyard for the gunboat *Chung-shan*.

All unstable officers of the gunboats have been discharged since a Russian [Smirnov] became chief of the Navy Department. New appointments of officers and [political] commissars of the ships have now been completed.

Aviation

There were six airplanes and one naval [hydro?] plane in the Aviation Bureau before [59] the war. They were all old models and were regarded by the Russian advisers and specialists as entirely unfit for use. However, at the eastern and southern fronts, the air force was able to achieve 50 percent of the duties assigned to it.

In mid-November, the Aviation Bureau established one air squadron and an aviation training school. Many Whampoa graduates came for training. A number of very fine military air squadrons and instructors, absolutely indispensable in the development of aviation, can be turned out within a short time. Most of the present air force personnel have no military knowledge. Being sons of wealthy merchants, they had studied abroad. They have very little contact with the National Revolutionary Government and it is difficult for them to serve in the army.

For geographical reasons, aviation in Kwangtung should be particularly stressed, as it would render great service to communications organizations and army administration.

Our Work

We have already secured good positions in the various departments of the National Revolutionary Army. It is not possible, however, to penetrate further to obtain complete control because of the following major reasons:

1. Shortage of advisers. The advisers available at present are insufficient for distribution among the armies and the schools. There have been cases of one adviser handling the work of two persons. Much important work has been suspended because of such shortages.

2. Complete lack of interpreters. Most of the advisers do not understand foreign languages. Each adviser has to have one English-Russian and one English-Chinese interpreter. At present, we have only one English-Russian and one barely capable Russian-Chinese interpreter, and they are at the eastern front with the army. The rest of the interpreters do not understand Russian speech, not to say writing. Consequently, a good deal of time has been wasted and much of the real meaning has been lost through roundabout translation.

The regulations of our group, a report on its work, and the budget will be forwarded to you by the next mail.

[60] *Our Present Duties.* In view of the favorable situation in Canton's foreign relations, we should now direct our attention entirely to political training and the training of powerful combat troops loyal to the National Revolutionary Government. Those troops should be given considerable supplies. The tasks of the group in the immediate future are:

1. Suspend purely military work and engage in political-military work. As war activities have not yet ceased, our advisers are tied up with military activities and are unable to pay adequate attention to political work. Most of the armies are ignorant of political work. In the first stage, all the advisers should benefit army political organs by their experience and knowledge and draw the officers' attention to political work so that a suitable groundwork can be laid.

2. Establish a centralized military academy, as previously mentioned. The schools of the armies are at present very much handicapped by lack of personnel and finances and have failed to provide adequate military-political training for officers. The establishment of a single military academy would bring economy in personnel and finances. The good elements of the four schools should be sent to the army and given suitable appointments as officers (for details, see appendix 13). [See Document 23.]

3. The General Staff should be the actual administrative organ of the National Revolutionary Army. Abolish the generals' independent power. Only thus can a regular army controlled by the National Revolutionary Government be created.

4. Establish a central commissariat organ and promulgate laws regulating necessary supplies to the regular army.

5. Reorganize the armed forces into five corps and two independent divisions. The present numerous small army units impose extra cost, waste actual strength, and considerable affect combat ability. (See appendix 10 [Doc. 21] for instructions on army reorganization.)

[61] 6. The regular troops stationed at various places should expedite their movements through short-cut routes, setting up defense where the enemy could be attacked [could attack?] and establishing safe camps for training.

7. Establish supplementary classes for training reserve army officers, and estab-

lish a military study society among officer-instructors in the army.

8. Fix the training curriculum. A uniform curriculum has not yet been fixed. The advisers independently formulate their own curriculum in the armies, resulting in great divergences.

9. Establish a political and military publishing office. Chinese military science is completely lacking in the army, and consequently Chinese officers are entirely ignorant of military science. All new publications on political and military matters should be translated into Chinese and distributed to the officers and political personnel of the National Revolutionary Army.

10. Revise army regulations. Most of the laws in force at present in the army are translated from old Japanese and German laws. They are obsolete and unsuited to present needs.

11. Organize a strong navy in view of the many water routes in Kwangtung.

12. Strengthen and expand aviation.

13. Organize and regulate sanitation in the army.

The following should be done immediately in order to realize the above plans:

1. Increase the personnel of the group. This question was put to Voronin [Egorov's predecessor], who consented to our request. The additional expenses should be borne by Moscow.

[62] 2. Send fifteen Russian-Chinese translators. The idea in Peking that interpreters working in Kwangtung need only understand the Kwangtung dialect is fundamentally erroneous. The officers and [Party] members here speak the Peking Mandarin in dealing with our advisers. Therefore, it is necessary to have translators who understand the Peking Mandarin.

3. Send ammunition and telephone and telegraph materials according to the amount requested.

In addition, it is necessary to establish liaison with your office for transmission of information. (a) Send two regular couriers to travel from Peking to Canton and back to Peking at least once a month; (b) send us the military code, without which communication with your office is handicapped because (1) at present, there is only one secret code at Borodin's place. Those of us who are scattered at various places have to wait for our chance to send telegrams through Borodin, thus causing great delays; (2) the present procedure does not ensure secrecy, as the secret code is known to many people; (3) Borodin's decoding clerk often piles up telegrams without transmitting them; (4) if I had the secret code for direct communication with you, it would prove extremely beneficial.

This report will conclude here. Further reports will be sent by the next Soviet ship going to Shanghai.

Notes

1. Either the Peking Commission made errors of translation or Kiubyshev was misinformed. Liao Chung-k'ai was not commander of the Second Kwangtung Army. Hu Han-min's connections may refer to Lin Chih-mien, secretary to Sun Yat-sen when the latter was Generalissimo, who was allegedly associated with Hu Han-min and who was a suspect in Liao's assassination.

2. The Fourth Corps was commanded not by Li Fu-lin, but by Li Chi-shen.

Document 23

The South China Group of Military-Political Workers: Draft Regulations and Staff List

We first reproduce a letter from the head of the South China Group of Soviet Military Advisers, General N. V. Kuibyshev ("Kisan'ka") to "Comrade Suvaroff," dated January 13, 1926, as published in *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 41-43, and in several other collections of translations. This lists seven addenda, the first of which was published in abbreviated form in the same source, pp. 56-58. We reproduce the entire document. (It is also found translated into Chinese in *SLYM*, I, "Political," 34-46; and KMWH, XV, 2575-85.) We include the second addendum, which lists thirty-one members of the South China Group and gives their assignments. (Also in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 98-100, and KMWH, XV, 1589-91.) Where we know the full or real name we add it in brackets.

Our source for the Draft Regulations and Staff List is NA (G-2 2657-I-281 /93 and 104), sent by the American military attaché in Peking.

Together the three parts of Document 23 give a broad view of the purposes and activities of the South China Group in January 1926, while the first reveals in particular the attitudes of General Kuibyshev toward his Chinese counterparts.

TEXT

[41] Chief of the South China Group

Very Secret

January 13, 1926
No. 18
Canton

To Comrade Suvaroff [Egorov]

Report

[Translator's note:] On the first page of the report are directions in the handwriting of Egoroff, the Soviet military attaché at Peking.

I beg to present herewith a draft of the statutes of the South China Group of military-political workers together with a list of the staff of the Group and the budget of salaries and other expenditures of the Group.

1. So far the Group had no statutes approved by the center, and therefore it had no definite aims before it nor had it any solid organization.

Two years' work of the Group and progressive molding of the military forces into the united National Revolutionary Army give, in my opinion, a full possibility of bringing clearness as to the problems which are before the Group as well as to its organization.

Continual growth of the Group makes it difficult to unify the consciousness of

its tasks and brings complications into mutual relations of the members of the Group. Therefore the drawing up of statutes for it has become necessary and they are now presented for your approval.

With the object of making the statutes as clear, complete, and coordinated as possible, their draft has been previously *worked out by a commission of leading workers* and then passed by the general meeting of the Group.

[42] I am not going to dwell here upon the problems of the Group or on relations and duties of its workers because, in my opinion, in principle these questions hardly can give rise to any arguments. I will only draw your attention to two questions: (1) *scope of the work of the group*, and (2) *penetration of* its workers into the organism of the National Revolutionary Army.

In compliance with the ideas of the statutes, the work of the group must be all-embracing, and the penetration of its workers must go as far as the regiments. For that reason in the original project of the statutes, appointment of advisers *to regiments inclusively* has been planned. However, as it would make the staff of the group too big and expenses too heavy, I was obliged to limit myself by introducing assistant divisional advisers, as I hope that through intensive discipline of the troops in time of peace we may be able to direct the work in each regiment. During the period of military operations these *assistant divisional advisers* will be attached to the regiments entrusted with most responsible tasks.

This penetration of the workers of the group I think is absolutely necessary, because in the nearest future we will have no chance to get and to prepare a commanding personnel which could be satisfactory in a military respect; still less we can hope that it will be satisfactory in a political respect.

Chinese generals and officers are not only completely ignorant as regards the art of war but also most unbalanced in all other respects. Even their common routine work can yield desirable results only with Russian advisers. The popularity of Russian advisers is so great that their enormous political, military, and moral influence on any general or officer in the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army is beyond doubt. However, on account of their inconsistency, only occasional meetings and conferences with them are absolutely insufficient. It must be borne in mind that our comrades have to work through interpreters and mostly very rotten ones, and thereby are obliged to spend three times as much time as under ordinary conditions. For that reason it is impossible for them to combine several duties, even in case of military units being stationed at one point.

[43] 2. The staff of the group is planned in accordance with the statutes. Taking however into consideration that it is hardly possible to expect that all the offices that are projected will be filled in the near future, I beg to present simultaneously a plan for a *reduced staff which in my opinion should be filled up without delay*.

3. *In accordance with the reduced staff* of the group for salaries to its members for February and March the sum of G. $63,132.25 monthly is required. As for the month of *January*, taking into account that though the whole staff cannot yet be filled up, still some of the workers which have been demanded from the center will arrive in January, the salaries to the staff for that month are calculated on the following basis: The sum of G$12,398.75 necessary for the present members of the Group plus one-half of the difference between the sum of monthly salaries for the reduced staff (G. $26,162.50) and the sum of monthly salaries required for the present members (G. $12,398.75). The difference being G. $6,881.88, the sum required for salaries of the members of the Group for January is G. $19,280.63.

I beg to present herewith the budget for expenditures for January, February, and March with an explanatory note thereto.

As it is necessary to regularize payment of sums required for salaries and other expenses of the Group, I should *ask for ratification of the budget* by telegraph.

Addenda:

1. Statutes of the South China Group (3 copies).
2. Staff of the South China Group (3 copies).
3. Scheme of the organization of the Group on the basis of the full staff (1 copy).
4. Reduced staff of the South China Group (3 copies).
5. Budget for expenditures for January, February, and March with an explanatory note thereto (3 copies).
6. Schedule of emoluments for the workers of the South China Group (3 copies).
7. Estimate for purchasing means of transportation for the staff officers of the South China Group (3 copies).

Chief of the South China Group
Signed: Kisanka

Regulations Relating to the South China Group of Military-Political Workers

[1] Section I: Task of the Group

1. To organize and instruct a National Revolutionary Army in the south of China for national liberation from the yoke of imperialism and for unification into one independent democratic republic.
2. To give every assistance to the government by working in the army and among the population in order to promote its democratic principles.
3. To make popular the doctrine of communism and Sovietism and to work toward bringing about a complete rapprochement and (mutual) support between (China and) the USSR, and to create in the army, in the labor organizations, and in the peasantry the desire (pledge) for a further revolutionary movement.
4. To keep informed about the counterrevolutionary forces of China and the people oppressed by them, or about the people of adjacent countries.
5. To make an exhaustive study of China and, chiefly, of its southern part.

Section II: Organization of the Group

In order to carry out the task indicated in Section I, the group is organized as follows:

1. A chief military adviser is attached to the National Revolutionary Government [2] and to the commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army. He is at the same time the chief of the South China Group who directs the whole work of the group and is responsible for it.
2. The chief of the group has two assistants. The first is the permanent deputy chief of the group and at the same time the senior adviser of the General Staff; the second is the assistant for political matters in the office of the chief of the group and the senior adviser of the Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army.
3. In each inspectorate and department of the General Staff, such as the Operative and Intelligence Department, the Administrative Department, the inspectorates of infantry, artillery, communications, engineering, and sanitation, there are advisers who direct the work of the respective departments or inspectorates and who at the same time direct the work of their respective branches in the army.
4. The advisers of the inspectorates and departments of the General Staff work under the direct supervision of the senior adviser of the General Staff.
5. The Naval Bureau, the Department of Aviation, the Department of Supplies, and the Military-Political School of the Communist [sic] political party of the National Revolutionary Army have each a separate senior adviser who carries out the in-

structions of the supreme adviser.

6. Each corps has a senior adviser who functions in accordance with the instructions of the supreme adviser and who directs the work of his subordinate advisers for the special branches of the service, and of the junior general army advisers and the political advisers.

7. In questions of political work the senior advisers of the corps receive instructions from the senior adviser of the Political Intelligence Department and carry them out through their subordinate political workers.

8. The advisers for special branches of the service attached to the corps, who direct the work in the respective units, are subordinated in general military matters to the senior adviser of the corps and in special matters, to the adviser of the respective inspectorate of the General Staff.

[3] 9. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the senior adviser of the corps, and they carry out the latter's instructions in their units.

10. The adviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political matters.

11. The apparatus for the work of the chief of the group is the staff of the group. The staff collects and digests information about conditions in the National Revolutionary Army and in the armies of the neighboring provinces, arranges the information of the advisers and of the military attaché in China, and works out the plans for the current work of the group, attends to the personal affairs of all coworkers and their pay, as well as to the economic affairs of the group.

12. At the head of the staff of the group stands its chief, who is directly subordinated to the chief of the group.

Section 3: The Chief of the Group

1. The chief of the group is responsible for the whole military-political work of the Russian advisers in the National Revolutionary Army.

2. Exerting the maximum of his influence he directs the work of the commander-in-chief in conformity with the aims of the group.

3. Through the Russian advisers in military units he carries out measures corresponding to the aims of the group.

4. The chief of the group receives all his instructions from the military attaché in Peking. As regards questions of a political character, he coordinates his decisions with the chief political adviser of the Canton Government.

[4] Section IV: The Deputy Chief of the Group

1. The deputy chief of the group assists the chief of the group in all matters relating to military operations, administration, and training of the army.

2. He is wholly responsible for the work of the General Staff, its departments, and inspectorates, and works daily at the Staff.

Section V: The Assistant Chief of the Group for Political Matters

1. The assistant for political matters, as the senior adviser of the Political Intelligence Department, directs the whole political work in units of the National Revolutionary Army.

2. He keeps in close contact with all party organizations (Kuomintang as well as Communist) and with the civil political organizations, being the link between the chief of the group and these organizations.

3. The assistant for political matters is subordinated only to the chief of the

group. With the latter's knowledge he corresponds with the chief political adviser of the National Revolutionary Government on questions of a general political character.

4. To the assistant for political matters are subordinated (a) the deputy adviser of the Political Intelligence Department, (b) the advisers of the sections of the Political Intelligence Department, (c) all senior political advisers in the army, (d) all political advisers in the units of the National Revolutionary Army.

[5] Section VI: The Advisers of the Inspectorates and Departments of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army

1. The advisers of the inspectorates and departments of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army work under the supervision of the senior adviser of the General Staff; they watch the work of the inspectorates and departments and assist the respective inspectors or chiefs with their advice; they look after the respective work in the army and take a part, together with the chiefs, in the inspections and instructions of the units.

2. The advisers of the inspectorates and departments give account of their work to the senior adviser of the General Staff.

Section VII: The Senior Adviser of the Naval Bureau of the National Revolutionary Army

1. The senior adviser of the Naval Bureau of the National Revolutionary Army works hand in hand with the chief of the bureau and must (a) handle the questions relating to the organization of the fleet; (b) see that the fleet carries out the tasks imposed upon it by the government or the commander in chief; (c) be informed of the condition of the fleet (its preparedness for war, its armament, its morale, etc.); (d) watch the manner in which the political work is conducted on ships and among the crews.

2. The senior adviser of the Naval Bureau has under him the political advisers and the specialist instructors who work in the navy.

[6] 3. The senior adviser of the Naval Bureau is subordinated to the chief of the South China Group, to whom he gives an account of his work.

Section VIII: The Senior Adviser of the Department of Aviation

1. The senior adviser of the Department of Aviation works together with the chief of this department and looks after the organization of the air service in National Revolutionary Army, assisting the chief in solving the questions he has to decide.

2. He sees that the air service carries out the tasks imposed upon it by the government and the commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army.

3. The senior adviser of the Department of Aviation must be informed of the condition of the air service and see that the latter is used properly. He is responsible for the manner in which the political work is carried on in the units of the air service.

4. The senior adviser of the air service has under him the specialist instructors who work in the units of the air service.

5. The senior adviser of the Department of Aviation is directly subordinated to the chief of the South China Group and gives to the latter an account of his work.

Section IX: The Senior Adviser of the Department of Supplies

1. The senior adviser of the Department of Supplies works side by side with the

chief of this department, assisting him with his advice. He looks after the proper organization of the work of supplying the National Revolutionary Army.

2. He sees that the money and materials are properly distributed among the units [7] and properly spent by the latter and that proper accounts are kept in the units.

3. He gives directions to the advisers of corps and separate divisions in matters relating to supplies.

4. The senior adviser of the Department of Supplies has under him the advisers of sections for financial matters, for equipment, and artillery supplies.

5. The senior adviser of the Department of Supplies is directly subordinated to the chief of the South China Group and gives an account to the latter of his work.

Section X: The Senior Adviser of the Communist [sic] Military-Political School

1. The senior adviser of the Communist Military-Political School works under the direct supervision of the chief of the South China Group.

2. He directs the school and sees that the military and educational as well as the political work in the school is properly done.

3. The adviser of the Military-Political School has under him the political adviser and the advisers of different branches of the service who are working in the school.

4. The adviser of the school gives an account of his work to the chief of the South China Group.

Section XI: The Senior Advisers of Corps

[8] 1. The senior advisers of corps in doing their everyday work in the units must, the same as the chief of the latter: (a) be fully informed of the condition of the units (their commanders, their preparedness, armament, morale, political work, etc.); (b) take an active part in solving the questions the chief of the unit has to decide; (c) see that all orders of the commander-in-chief are carried out; (d) inform the chief of the Group of all that is going on in the unit, throwing light on all phases of its life in monthly reports and, in cases when urgent instructions are needed, by special reports; (e) using the intelligence apparatus, gather information about possible enemies, about the situation in the neighboring provinces and nearest colonies and submit this information to the staff of the Group.

2. The senior advisers of corps and separate divisions are responsible for the manner in which the political work is done in the units, and they direct the work of the Russian political advisers in the units.

3. The senior advisers of corps direct the work of the specialist advisers in the corps and of the advisers of the divisions of which the corps is composed, according to the instructions they receive from the chief of the Group.

4. Not less than once a month they assemble all military, political, and special advisers who are subordinated to them in order to exchange information, to sum up the results of the work, and to exchange opinions.

Section XII: The Advisers of Divisions Belonging to a Corps

1. The advisers of divisions work hand in hand with the commanders and must: [9] (a) be thoroughly informed of the condition of the division; (b) in time of peace see that the units are trained according to the plans and programs worked out by the General Staff; (c) in time of war see that the instructions and orders of the commander of the corps are carried out and assist the commander of the division in making decisions; (d) watch the manner in which the political work is being done and direct the work of the political workers of the division according to the instructions

received from the senior military-political adviser of the corps.
2. The adviser of a division directs the work of his assistant.
3. The adviser of a division regularly informs the senior adviser of the corps of everything that is going on and of the work done in the division.

Section XIII: The Specialist Advisers Working in the Corps

1. The specialist advisers, such as artillery men, communications men, experts for the supply service, and engineers, look after the work in their respective branches of their corps and see that all instructions and orders of the respective inspectorates of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army and of the respective advisers of the inspectorates and of the senior advisers of the corps are carried out.

[10] **Section XIV: The Political Advisers in the Corps**

1. The political adviser of the corps works in close contact with the chief of the Political Department of the corps and directs the political work.
2. He sees that all instructions of the Political Intelligence Department are carried out.
3. Using his experience he assists with his advice the political workers and keeps up their prestige in the eyes of the commanding staff.
4. He is subordinated to the senior adviser of the corps and the senior adviser of the Political Intelligence Department.

Section XV: The Assistant Advisers of Divisions

1. The assistant adviser of a division looks after the work of the staff of the division.
2. He sees that the program for training and preparedness of the units is carried out.
3. During the military operations he is with one of the regiments in accordance with division orders.
4. The assistant adviser of a division is in all respects subordinated to the adviser of the division.

Section XVI: The Political Advisers of Divisions

1. The political adviser of a division directs the work of the Political Department of the division according to the instructions he receives from the senior military adviser of the division.
[11] 2. He delivers occasional or scheduled lectures on political subjects; he speaks at meetings and sittings, looks after the work of the nucleus of the Kuomintang and the club, and directs their work.
3. The political adviser of a division gives an account of his work to the adviser of the division.

Section XVII: The Group for the Preparation of Work in Neighboring Provinces

1. In proportion to the expansion of the influence of the Kuomintang in the south of China, in the provinces neighboring Kwangtung a cadre of military-political workers is appointed for work in the armies of these provinces.
2. For the first period two such groups are to be organized: (a) the Group for work in the province of Kiangsi [Kwangsi?], as being already connected with the

Kuomintang, and (b) a reserve Group for the other provinces.

3. These groups consist of a senior adviser, a deputy senior adviser, and a political adviser.

4. The senior adviser of such a Group must get acquainted with the armed forces of the respective province and make popular among the commanding staff of the respective army the idea of the necessity of creating a united National Revolutionary Army.

5. He must acquaint the higher commanding staff with the principles on which a National Revolutionary Army must be built up.

6. Further on he has to do the usual work in the army of the respective province.

7. The senior adviser of such a Group has under him the political adviser and the deputy adviser.

8. The adviser of such a provincial Group is directly subordinated to the chief of the South China Group.

[12] Section XVIII: The Staff of the South China Group of Military-Political Workers

1. The staff of the South China Group is the working apparatus of the chief of the South China Group.

2. The staff of the Group fulfills the following duties: (a) it collects all kinds of information, from the communications of the advisers as well as by means of secret agents, about the condition of the National Revolutionary Army and the armies of the neighboring provinces; (b) it arranges the materials relating to the study of the National Revolutionary Army and the south of China; (c) it organizes the means by which the advisers and the military attaché in China are supplied with information; (d) by means of studying the materials and examining the situation it works out the plan for the current work of the Group; (e) it attends to the personal affairs of the co-workers of the Group; (f) it attends to the financial and economic affairs of the Group.

3. Conforming to the duties incumbent on it, the staff of the South China Group is divided into the following departments: (a) the Information and Intelligence Department; (b) the Administrative Department.

4. At the head of the staff stands the chief of the staff, to whom the chiefs of the departments are directly subordinated.

5. The chief of the staff directs the work of the departments of the staff and issues instructions to them. He works out the plan for the current work of the Group and gives instructions and orders to the advisers who work in the National Revolutionary Army.

6. The chief of the staff disposes of the sums for "economic and office expenses" and "the expenses for transportation" according to the budget of the Group.

[13] 7. The Information and Intelligence Department has at its head the chief of the department who is directly subordinated to the chief of staff.

8. The Information and Intelligence Department does the following work: (a) it gathers all kinds of information from Chinese and English newspapers about the situation in China and particularly South China; (b) it arranges the information received from the advisers as to the condition of the National Revolutionary Army and of the armies of the neighboring provinces; (c) it organizes the work of the secret agents in the units of the National Revolutionary Army, of the provinces adjacent to Kwangtung, and the neighboring colonies, and systematizes their reports; (d) it prepares the maps for military operations; (e) it studies the statistics and economic conditions of South China; (f) it informs regularly the advisers of the Group and the military attaché in China.

9. The Information and Intelligence Department is divided into two sections: the section for information, and the intelligence section.

10. To the Information and Intelligence Department a staff of interpreters and draftsmen is attached.

11. The Administrative and Economic Department of the staff copies and translates the materials supplied by the advisers and instructors; it attends to the personal affairs of all coworkers of the Group, pays the coworkers, keeps an account of all public property in the staff and its departments, supplies the advisers with conveyances, and looks after the guard of the staff of the Group.

12. Conforming to the tasks imposed upon the Administrative and Economic Department it is divided into: (a) a general office; (b) a financial section; (c) office of the commandant (to which the platoon of guards is attached).

13. To provide for the needs of the coworkers the following institutions are attached to the Administrative and Economic Department of the Staff of the Group: (a) a dispensary with a dental office and consultation office for children; a club with dining rooms for adults and children, and a kindergarten.

Military and Political Workers of the South China Group

[1] 1. Bestchastnoi [Timofei Andreevich Beschastnov]: Adviser to the Artillery Inspectorate of the General Staff; adviser attached to the arsenals; adviser to the Central Administration of Supplies on questions pertaining to artillery supplies; adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to artillery.

2. Guileff [Gennadii I. Gilev]: Adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to supplies; adviser to the Central Administration of Supplies; adviser to the 1st Corps on questions pertaining to artillery.

3. Gromoff [Mikhail Mikhaylovich Gromov]: Adviser to the 3d Division of the 1st Corps.

4. Dratvin [Mikhail Ivanovich Dratvin]: Inspector of Communications with the General Staff; adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to communications.

5. Zebrovsky [I. Ia. Zenek]: High adviser to the 2d Corps.

6. Zilbert [I. Zil'bert]: High adviser to the 1st Corps.

7. Kalatchoff [Samuil Naumovich Naumov]: Political adviser to the Military-Political School.

8. Komi [V. N. Paniukov]: (Temporarily) acting senior adviser to the 4th Corps.

9. Luneff [Lunev]: (Temporarily) adviser to the 3d Corps School.

10. Mamaeff [Ivan K. Mamaev]: Adviser to the section of the Political Department.

11. Matzeilick [F. G. Matseilik]: Senior adviser to the 3d Corps; adviser to the Administrative Department of the General Staff.

12. Miliuschkevitch: Adviser to the . . . Division of the 2d Corps.

13. Meyer [N. Miller]: Chief of the Information Section of the Information and Intelligence Department of the staff of the Group and (temporarily) adviser to the School of the 2d Corps.

14. Nikitin [V. E. Gorev]: Chief of the Information and Intelligence Department of the staff of the Group.

15. Niloff [Pavel Sakhnovskii]: On leave.

[2] 16. Orloff [Nikolay Alexandrovich Sokolov]: Physician to the Group.

17. Olguin [I. Ia Razgon]: Assistant to the chief of the South China Group; (temporarily) acting senior adviser to the Military-Political School.

18. Pribyloff [N. A. Shevaldin]: Adviser to the 2d Division of the 1st Corps; adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to infantry; adviser to

the garrison commander.

19. Pollo [or Pallo]: Adviser to the 12th Division of the 4th Corps.

20. Remi [D. Uger]: Chief of the Aviation Department (now sent on official business).

21. Rogatcheff [Victor P. Rogachev]: Deputy chief of the South China Group and chief of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army. Note [by translator]: In the autumn of 1926 assistant Soviet military attaché in Peking.

22. Smirnoff [P. I. Smirnov]: Chief of the Naval Bureau.

23. Tereshtchenko [Y. V. Teslenko]: Adviser to the 1st Separate Division.

24. Tereshatoff [Nikolai Tereshatov]: Sent on official business.*

25. Tereshatoff (Mrs.): Adviser to the Military Sanitation Inspectorate of the General Staff.

26. Kontchitz [N. I. Konchits]: Adviser to the 10th Division of the 4th Corps.

27. Tcherepanoff [Alexander Ivanovich Cherepanov]: On leave.*

28. Tchubareff (Mrs.) [Mira Chubareva Sakhnovskaia]: (Temporarily) acting chief of the staff of the Group.

29. Shalfeef [I. Vorob'ev]: Adviser to the 11th Division.

30. Shneider [S. Shneider]: Adviser to the section of the Political Department.

31. Yakovleff [Evgenii Andreevich Yakovlev]: Adviser to the Military Engineer Inspectorate of the General Staff; adviser to the Operations and Intelligence Department of the General Staff; adviser to the Military-Political School on questions pertaining to engineering.

[*According to Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 16 and 17, Tereshatov and Cherepanov reported to the Bubnov Commission in Peking.]

Document 24

Plan and Regulations for the Central Military-Political Academy of the National Revolutionary Army

This document comes from reports in Russian concerning the Central Military-Political Academy in a more general study entitled "The Whampoa Military School: A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents," probably by John P. Ratay. This thirty-four-page study is now in NA (G-2 2657-I-281 /120). Parts of the first pages of Document 24 were translated into Chinese and published in *SLYM*, II, "Military," 11-13, and also in III, "Canton," 24-27, but with deletions. This became Document 18 in our previous edition.

An approximate date may be derived from entries in Chiang Kai-shek's "Diary." On January 12, 1926, the Kuomintang Military Council decided that the Military Academy should be reorganized as the Central Military-Political Academy. On January 19, Chiang was appointed its head, and on February 9 he carefully read the regulations of the Central Military-Political Academy, which was formally opened on March 8, 1926. Hence, we consider the original source, or sources, of Document 24 to date from mid-January to mid-February 1926.

We have found no original Chinese source for Document 24. We assume the organizational plan was translated from Chinese into Russian, though parts of it may have had a Russian genesis. We know that Captain Ratay, in the first part of his study, rearranged the sequence of some parts of "Regulations of the Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton," our Document 4, taken from another source, and that he added underlining. He did not, however, change or distort the meaning. Comparing our former Document 18 with the present Document 24, we find the first four points in both are variant translations of the same source. Section B in the former Document 18 is not found in the present Document 24. The items in Document 18 under C, D, E, and F (which had deletions made by the Peking Commission) are similar to items on pages 13, 14, 18, and 24 in the present Document 24.

In his introduction to this section of his longer essay, Captain Ratay mentions "a comprehensive report drawn up by the chief of the General Staff, relating to the reorganization of the Whampoa School." General Victor P. Rogachev was chief of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army until the appointment of General Li Chi-shen on February 23, 1926, when Rogachev became adviser to the chief of staff. Even though Document 24 must be regarded as derivative, we consider it a valuable and comprehensive account of the planned Central Military-Political Academy and a reflection of the spirit of the period.

TEXT

[12] Object of the School

The object of the Central Military-Political School, as defined both in the above-mentioned *report* and in *the statutes* relating to its organization, is as follows:

1. By concentrating all attention on *only one school*, to obtain the best political

training possible for the officers.

2. By means of centralized organization and sole direction of the political work, to do away with the provincial separatist tendencies of the officers.

3. By concentrating in the school the best command and instructor personnel, to get the best and uniform military preparation of the officers.

4. By using the money allotted to school affairs on one school only, to get the maximum improvement of educational and economic equipment of the school as well as of the allotment to the cadets of all kinds of equipment and provisions.

Chief of the School

In accordance with the order of the Military Council, General Chiang Kai-shek is the chief of the school and General Teng [Yen-ta] is his deputy. Both the chief of the school and its military commissary are directly subordinated to the Military Council.

[13] Council of the School

To harmonize all educational questions, to coordinate the general work of the school with the ideas and tendencies of the Military Council, and to elucidate questions connected with the procurement of students for the school and with the subsequent service of its graduates, a *Council* or *Advisory Board* is established composed of the chief of the school, as chairman, and of the high adviser of the Military Council, the chief of the General Staff, the chief of the Political Directorate, and the high adviser of the school, as members.

Pedagogical Council

To define the general progress of cadets, to harmonize the programs of various classes, and to regulate the inner life of the school, a *Pedagogical Council* is established which works in accordance with instructions issued by the chief of the school as chairman, of his deputy as vice-chairman, and of the following members: the political assistant of the chief of the school, the assistant of the chief of the school in charge of economic affairs, the chiefs of the Political, Infantry, Artillery, Technical, and Supply Sections, all head or chief instructors of the school, and *all Russian advisers*.

Division of the School

The school is divided into the following *sections*: (1) political; (2) infantry; (3) artillery; (4) supply; and (5) technical. Each section, except political and technical, is subdivided into two *classes*: (1) officers class; (2) noncommissioned officers class.
[14] In the officers class a *preparatory class* is also established to which young officers of the army who have had no military training will be admitted and prepared for admittance into the officers class.

Duration of the Course

The duration of the course is eight months for the officers class and four months for the noncommissioned officers class.

Cadets

The *number* of cadets in the school is based on the number of platoon commanders

and political workers needed for the National Revolutionary Army.

Cadets are recruited partly from among students and partly from enlisted men of the army and cadets of various army corps schools. All candidates, after passing through the Medical and Mandate Commissions, must undergo examinations given by the special *Examining Commission* which is appointed by the chief of the school.

Special importance is attached to the *Mandate Commission*, the duty of which is *the careful selection of cadets*. Candidates whom this commission finds undesirable are not admitted for examinations. Special instructions were prepared for the Mandate Commission and also a *list of questions* to be used in the competitive examination. Most of these questions, altogether thirty-six, are of a purely *political* character, as can be seen from the following list: (1) Why do you intend to enter the school? (2) Who are the chief enemies of China? (3) By what means can the Chinese people be helped? (4) What is the difference between imperialists and militarists? (5) What is the purpose of the National Revolutionary Army, and how does it differ from the armies of the militarists? (6) Who are Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu? (7) What is the basis of the doctrine of Dr. Sun Yat-sen? (8) What is the attitude of the Kuomintang
[15] party toward the peasantry? (9) What are the "Three Principles" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen? (10) Who is Lenin? (11) Which branch of the army service do you like the most? (12) What are the problems with which officers and political workers of the National Revolutionary Army are confronted? (13) How does the policy of our government differ from that of Chang Tso-lin? (14) For what purpose do labor unions exist? (15) Why was the strike declared? What are its purposes and aims? (16) What is Hong Kong? Who wields the power there? (17) What are the fundamental phases of the Chinese Revolution? (18) Which provinces surround Kwangtung? (19) Which are the principal towns in China? (20) Which are the principal rivers of China, and which oceans surround China? (21) Why do several dialects exist in China? (22) How large is the population of China? (23) Where is the capital of China? (24) What countries, besides China, are known to you? (25) Which country is the most hostile? Which country is the most friendly? (26) What is the chief occupation of the inhabitants of Kwangtung? (27) Why does the foreign capital strive to penetrate into China? (28) Is there any difference between the doctrines of Confucius and of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in what does it lie? (29) What is the purpose of the political work in the army? (30) What is the object of the Northern Expedition? (31) Can the national revolutionary movement gain a victory without being supported by the *world's revolution*? (32) Who
[16] carries on the principal fight for *the world's revolution*? (33) What is the main force in the national revolutionary movement? (34) What is the part of the peasantry in the national revolutionary movement? (35) Can the national revolutionary movement gain a victory without the participation of the peasantry, and why? (36) To whom do the peasants pay taxes and in which way?

Cadets who have successfully completed their studies in the noncommissioned officers class are sent to military units for (practical) active service as *squad leaders* for a period of three months, and later, after recommendation from their superior officers and after passing the examinations for admission, they are admitted into the officers class.

Cadets who have successfully completed their studies in the officers class are promoted to the lowest rank of officer and are sent to army units as *platoon commanders*.

Three Departments

The Central Military-Political School consists of three departments, viz., *Educational*, *Political*, and *Sanitary*. The chiefs of these departments also act as *assistants* to the chief of the school.

Chief of the Educational Department

The chief of the Educational Department holds the rank of major general and is the *deputy* of the chief of the school and at the same time his *assistant* in all matters pertaining to *the education* and *military training*. He directs and regulates all work of this department.

The Educational Department is an organ that (1) directs all instructive and educational work of the school, (2) prepares programs and schedules of lectures, (3) regulates the work of instructors, (4) collects materials as to the progress of cadets in their studies, (5) supplies the Pedagogical Council with information as to the characteristics of cadets with regard to their studies, etc.

[17] Assistants of the Chief of the Educational Department

In conformity with the number of sections of the school, the chief of the Educational Department has five assistants, each holding the rank of colonel, who are the *chiefs* of the respective sections, i.e., Political, Infantry, Artillery, Supply, and Technical.

Chief of the Political Department

The chief of the Political Department is the *assistant* of the chief of the school for *political matters*. He is appointed to his post by the Political Directorate or P.U.R. and is responsible to the latter for the direction of the political work in the school, but administratively he is directly subordinated to the chief and to the military commissary of the school.

The chief of the Political Department (1) superintends the whole political life of the school, (2) directs the work of the party nucleus, (3) takes a direct part in the decision of all questions of educational character, and (4) is responsible for the political and moral state of the school.

Assistant of the Chief of the Political Department

The assistant of the chief of the Political Department is *the chief of the Political Section* and is subordinated to the chief of the Educational Department with regard to *educational matters* and in all other respects to the chief of the Political Department.

The assistant of the chief of the Political Department (1) directs the work of the Political Section of the Educational Department, (2) prepares political programs and schedules of lectures, and (3) coordinates the work of political instructors.

Assistant of the Chief of the School for Economic Affairs

The assistant of the chief of the school for economic affairs (quartermaster) is the *chief of the whole economic apparatus of the school*. He is directly subordinated to the chief of the school, but as regards questions pertaining purely to *supplies*, he is also subordinated to the chief of the Central Administration of Supplies.

[18] His official duties are (1) to draw up all estimates of the school, (2) to provide all provisions and equipment the school requires, (3) to obtain from the Central Administration of Supplies all artillery and other supplies the school requires, (4) to receive necessary financial allotments, and (5) to distribute them in conformity with the respective items of the school budget.

Chief of the Sanitary Department

The chief of the Sanitary Department is the *chief surgeon of the school*. He is directly

subordinated to the assistant of the chief of the school for economic affairs, but in purely *medical* matters he also follows instructions of the Sanitary Inspectorate of the General Staff.

Both the *hospital* and *dispensary* are in his charge, and the whole medical personnel, as well as all employees of the hospital and of the dispensary are subordinated to him.

Instructors

The instructors of the Central Military-Political School are divided into three categories: (1) *chief instructors*, (2) *senior instructors*, and (3) *junior instructors*.

For all *principal subjects* which are taught in the school, such as political instruction, tactics, artillery, topography, supply service, engineering, etc., there are one chief instructor and several senior and junior instructors. All chief and senior instructors and also a part of the junior instructors belong to *the regular staff of the school* and, as such, must have not less than five hours daily of instruction work. In addition, in case of need, instructors from outside may also be engaged by the school, but these do not belong to the regular staff. Commanders of units may also be employed as junior instructors.

As principal attention is paid to *the practical work* and *field exercises*, lectures [19] are shortened as much as possible. They are given by the senior instructors, who receive directions for each series of lectures from the chief instructor of the respective department and from the adviser of the school.

School Day

The school day of the cadet lasts nine hours, of which two hours are used for political training, but in the Political Section six hours are allotted for political work and three hours for military training.

Club

Great attention is paid to the out-of-school work of cadets. To that end the organization of a club has been started, and the construction of the club building will be completed in the nearest future.

Political Section

The *political training* as given in the Political Section of the Central Military-Political School is based on the following *ten theses*:

1. Cadets must be given to understand that the duty of the Kuomintang army consists in elucidating the policy of Sun Yat-sen and the declaration of the Assembly of the National Representatives of China [First or Second KMT National Congress], as well as the order of the Central Executive Committee to the effect that "the soldiers must obey the Nationalist Government and their commanders and sacrifice themselves for the sake of *their party* and their country."

2. Cadets must be taught *the special spirit of the Kuomintang Army* and to submit to the political training and to accept political work of our party.

3. Cadets must know that the *Chinese Revolution* is *a part of the world's revolution*, that *the Chinese soldier* is *a part of the world's army*, and that our life is closely connected with the life of the whole world.

4. Cadets must be taught that *the object of the Chinese Revolution*, from the inside point of view, is *to overthrow the militarists* and, from the outside point of view,

to overthrow the imperialists.

[20] 5. Cadets must be taught that *the Chinese Revolution* is *an international revolution* and by no means a local political revolution.

6. Cadets must be taught that the duty of the revolutionary soldier, from the point of view of army organization, is to sacrifice his freedom to the army and, from the point of view of the party, *to sacrifice his freedom to the party.* If one serves in the army of the party, one must not insist on personal freedom. To insist on it is unworthy of the revolutionary soldier.

7. Cadets must be taught that rank in the army is a duty imposed on an officer and that by no means does it isolate him from the soldiers, as it was during feudal times.

8. Cadets must be made to understand that everybody's duty is to die for *the party* and the people without regret.

9. Cadets must be taught that, in order to be able to solve social problems, it is above all necessary to comprehend historical and political motives, social phenomena and conditions, as well as the relations between social and natural phenomena. To be able to decide all these questions, *a good knowledge of the revolutionary social sciences is necessary.*

10. Cadets must be taught that the life of our party depends on all its members who uphold the discipline and programs of our party and the principles of Sun Yat-sen. A very important duty toward the party is therefore incumbent on every member of the party.

The political work is divided into *two parts:* (1) political study, and (2) general political work.

Political study is carried on by the Political Department and the chief of this department is responsible for it. The purpose of this study is to give the cadets a theoretical political education which is necessary for revolutionary military men, and to inculcate into them the radical standpoints which will help them to comprehend the contradictions of the modern society and to make clear the puzzled modern situation. This study is divided into (a) lectures and (b) practical work in groups consisting [21] of ten to fifteen cadets, the so-called seminaries. Cadets must attend both. The lectures give theoretical ideas relating to political sciences, and later these ideas are discussed in detail by the groups of cadets under the direction of special instructors.

The following *political subjects* are taught in the Political Section of the school: (1) outlines of political economy and political science; (2) imperialism in China; (3) the short history of revolutionary movements in other countries; (4) the history of the revolutionary movement in China; (5) the history of the Kuomintang and its future prospects; (6) the platform of the Kuomintang; (7) the land question; (8) the labor question.

For convenience's sake, those political subjects that are taught in the school are divided into: (a) ordinary political training, and (b) special political training.

A. *Ordinary political training* embraces the following subjects: (1) the history of the Chinese Kuomintang Party; (2) the doctrine of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (nationalism, democratism, and socialism); (3) the history of the imperialistic aggression in China; (4) the Russian revolution; (5) imperialism; (6) outline of the political economy; (7) social problems; (8) political work in the army; (9) problems of party organization; (10) socialism; 11) special lectures.

[22] B. *Special political training* embraces the following subjects: (1) the history of the Chinese Kuomintang Party; (2) doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; (3) the history of imperialistic aggression in China; (4) the history of the world's revolution; (5) imperialism; (6) outline of social sciences; (7) outline of politics; (8) outline of economics; (9) the history of social revolution; (10) social problems; (11) socialism; (12) questions of party organization; (13) political work in the army; (14) special lectures.

The general political work is carried on by the Kuomintang group and by the Club of the school, under the direction of the party representative and of the chief of the Political Department, and it has for its purpose (a) to draw cadets into active political work and to give them the opportunity to put into practice their theoretical knowledge; (b) to give the commanders and other personnel of the school radical political ideas by means of practical work in the Club and in the Kuomintang group of the school. It consists chiefly of lectures and discussions on current political topics, of meetings which serve as practical examples, of the distribution of political literature, etc. Its *general purpose* is to show how to use and to put into practice *the theoretical political knowledge.*

Infantry Section

The Infantry Section is headed by *the chief* who holds the rank of lieutenant colonel, prepares all educational programs, and directs the whole training and educational work of the cadets of the officers and the noncommissioned officers classes.

All cadets of both classes, i.e., officers and noncommissioned officers classes, form *two regiments.* Commanders of these regiments are subordinated to the chief of [23] the school as far as operations and field service training are concerned, but they also follow the directions of the Educational Department in matters pertaining to education and military training.

Artillery Section

The Artillery Section is divided into *two classes* and is headed by *the chief of the section* who holds the rank of colonel. The chief has the authority of a commander of an artillery regiment and is subordinated directly to the deputy chief of the school (chief of the Educational Department), from whom he receives all instructions and directions with regard to the Artillery Section. He prepares the programs and schedules of studies, in accord with the chief instructor in artillery, and he directs the work of the instructors of the section. The chiefs of both classes act as his *assistants.*

A. The *officers class* is headed by *the chief of the class,* who holds the rank of lieutenant colonel and has the authority of a commander of an artillery battalion. He is responsible for the whole work of this class.

The officers class as regards *enrollment* is equal to a *platoon* and cadets of this class are recruited either from among young men from civil life or from artillery units; graduates of the noncommissioned officers class are also admitted, after three months of active service, to the officers class. They must be not more than twenty-five years of age, physically fit, "politically" reliable, and satisfy generally all the requirements of the school program.

As a military unit, the officers class forms a *platoon* headed by the platoon commander, who in educational matters is subordinated to the chief of the Artillery Section and, as regards operations and the field service training, to the chief of the school. Two *instructors,* each holding the rank of lieutenant, act as his *assistants* and direct the military training of cadets of this class. Instructors who belong to the regular staff of the school act as *lecturers in special subjects,* i.e., artillery tactics, artillery, general tactics, and topography.

[24] The *duration* of studies is eight months. During this period cadets become acquainted with the theory and practice of the artillery art, but on account of the shortages of this period, they are taught only the minimum necessary to junior officers of the artillery battery. Political subjects and social sciences are also taught.

After the completion of their studies in the officers class, cadets are promoted to the lowest commissioned rank and are sent to artillery units of army corps as *junior*

officers, viz., platoon commanders and assistant battery commanders.

B. *The noncommissioned officers class* is headed by the *chief of the class* who holds the rank of captain and has the authority of a battery commander. He directs the training and the education of cadets of this class.

The *enrollment* consists of sixty cadets who are recruited from among the best soldiers of artillery units. They must be physically fit, know how to read and write, have some knowledge of arithmetic, and be "politically" reliable.

As a military unit, the noncommissioned officers class forms a *battery* with the chief of the class acting as battery commander, and it is divided into *three groups*. Six *instructors* holding the rank of lieutenant are on duty with this class. Three of them are *the heads of the groups* and the other three act as their *assistants*.

The *duration* of studies is four months. Instructions are given in general military training, in artillery, and also in political subjects and social sciences. Only the most elementary *theoretical knowledge* is imparted to cadets of this class.

After the completion of their studies in the noncommissioned officers class, cadets are sent to various military units for active service as noncommissioned officers, viz., gun section chiefs or gun commanders, sergeant-majors, chiefs of "liaison" or scouting sections, etc. After three months of active service the most able of them are sent to the officers class to continue there their studies.

[25] C. *Three batteries* are attached to the Artillery Section as school batteries, viz., (1) a battery of "Arisaka" field guns; (2) a battery of "Krupp" mountain guns, and (3) a battery of mountain guns of smaller calibers, i.e., 37 mm and 47 mm.

Supply Section

The Supply Section is divided into *two classes*, and its object is to train men for the *supply service* of the National Revolutionary Army.

General military subjects are taught both in the noncommissioned officers and the officers classes by ordinary lecturers of the school, and *special subjects* by specialists who belong to the special Lecturers' Group.

The Supply Section is headed by *the chief of the section* who is subordinated directly to the deputy chief of the school (chief of the Educational Department). He (1) directs the whole work pertaining to the educational, military, and political training of cadets, (2) prepares plans and programs of studies, and (3) is responsible for the general state of affairs in his section. The chiefs of both classes act as his *assistants* in this respect.

A. The object of the *officers class* is to train *experienced workers* for the Supply Service to fill the posts of assistant regimental quartermasters and downward.

The *enrollment* is seventy-five cadets. Those officers of the army and navy who are not more than twenty-five years of age, have a general education corresponding to that which is required for admittance to other officers classes of the school, and who have served in the army for not less than three months are admitted into the officers class after passing examinations in accordance with the general requirements of the school.

The officers class is divided into *three groups* headed by *instructors*, each of whom directs the field training of his group.

The *duration* of studies is eight months. After the completion of their studies in [26] the officers class, cadets must undergo examinations in accordance with specially drawn up programs. Those who pass them successfully get their appointments to various posts through the Central Administration of Supplies, which keeps records of all graduates of the Supply Section. Those cadets who fail in these examinations are sent back to their respective army units.

B. The *noncommissioned officers class* trains supply men of lower grades.

The *enrollment* is 150 cadets. They are recruited from among the most intelligent and quite literate enlisted men of the army and navy who are not more than twenty-five years of age and who for more than one year have been in the field service or have fulfilled duties in connection with economic affairs. Young men from civil life are also admitted to the noncommissioned officers class, provided they pass examinations in accordance with the requirements for admittance into the officers classes of the school.

The noncommissioned officers class is divided into *six groups* which form *two companies*. Field service training is carried out under the direction of officers belonging to these companies.

The *duration* of studies is four months. After the completion of their studies in the noncommissioned officers class, cadets must undergo examinations. Those who pass them successfully are sent on active service for a period of three months. After the expiration of this period, the best are sent to the officers class to continue their studies there, and the rest are appointed to various posts.

Technical Section

The Technical Section is divided into *two classes*, i.e., the military engineering class and the communication class, and its object is to train junior officers as specialists in military engineering and communication services for the National Revolutionary Army.

The Technical Section is headed by the *chief of the section*, holding the rank of major general, who is appointed to this post by the Military Council on recommendation of the Council or Advisory Board of the school and is subordinated directly to [27] the chief of the school. He (1) directs the whole work pertaining to the educational and military training of students of both classes, (2) regulates the work of instructors, and (3) is responsible for the work of the section itself and of the classes.

In view of the short duration of studies, viz., eight months, and of the necessity of mastering *special subjects*, students for both classes of the Technical Section are recruited exclusively from among junior officers, i.e., second lieutenants, of the National Revolutionary Army.

A. *Military Engineering Class*. As regards field service training, the military engineering class has the same organization as an engineer company, and as far as educational matters are concerned, it consists of *three groups*.

The *chief* of this class is appointed by the chief of the school from among officers holding the rank of colonel, who have received a proper military engineering education and who have been in the active service in the engineer troops of the National Revolutionary Army. He is subordinated directly to the chief of the school with regard to field service training, and as far as technical matters are concerned, to the chief of the technical section. With regard to *special training* this class is also subject to the inspection on the part of the Military Engineering Inspectorate of the General Staff. The duty of the chief of the military engineering class is to direct the whole military and engineering training and education of students of this class. A military engineer holding the rank of major acts as an *assistant* to the chief of the class and directs the field service training of the students. In addition to him, there are at the disposal of the chief of the class three military engineers holding the rank of captain, who during field service exercises act as *platoon commanders*, and as far as educational matters are concerned, are the *chiefs of the groups*. Instructors in special subjects, such as construction of roads and of bridges, laying of mines, construction of fortifications, bivouacs, and encampments, are engaged by the Council or Advisory Board of the school.

Students for the military engineering class are selected from among junior of-

ficers of various divisions, and their number is fixed by the council of the school. It [28] is planned that *the first enrollment* will comprise sixty students. Prior to their being admitted into this class, aspirants must undergo additional examinations by a special Examining Commission which is organized for that purpose by the school itself, but in which a representative of the Military Engineering Inspectorate of the General Staff also takes part.

The *duration* of studies is one year and comprises eight months of studies in the *Fundamental Section* and four months in the *Special Supplementary Section.*

During their eight-month course in the *Fundamental Section*, besides the general politico-military education, the same as is given cadets of the Infantry Section, students of the military engineering class receive also a general preparatory training in *principal special subjects* of military engineering. After the completion of their studies, they must undergo examinations. Those who *pass* them successfully are transferred to the Supplementary Section to complete there their special technical education. Students who *fail* in these examinations are either appointed to *fusilier units* as platoon commanders or sent back to their respective units to be employed in secondary positions.

After the completion of their studies in the *Special Supplementary Section*, students who *pass* their examinations successfully are promoted to the rank of first lieutenant and are appointed platoon commanders of divisional engineer companies, and those who *fail* in them are either detailed for service in the engineer troops retaining their rank of second lieutenant, i.e., without promotion, or sent back to their respective units to be employed in secondary positions.

B. *Communication Class.* The object of the communication class is to train officers for service in communication units of the National Revolutionary Army. It is divided into *two sections*, i.e., the Telegraph and Telephone Section and the Radio [29] Section, both of which are divided into *groups* headed by *instructors*, under whose direction students receive their technical training in accordance with the plan and schedules drawn up by the chief of the communication class. The *duration* of instruction in both sections is eight months. A special *show room* or *communication laboratory* is established in the Central Military-Political School, in order to facilitate the mastering by students of all *special subjects pertaining* to the communication.

The Telegraph and Telephone Section forms as a military unit one telegraph and telephone company which consists of 120 students, and its object is to train officers who must be specialists in telegraphy and telephony, as well as in the organization of communication between army units generally. After the completion of their instruction in this section, the more successful graduates may be appointed at once to the posts of communication company commanders in army corps, and the less successful are appointed as communication company commanders in divisions and regiments, as well as platoon commanders and their assistants.

The Radio Section forms as a military unit, one radio platoon which consists of twenty-five students, and its object is to train specialists in radio who are appointed either chiefs of radio stations or assistants in the various army units.

Document 25

Report on the Hong Kong-Canton Strike, March 1926

This document is in PRO (FO 371-12501/9132 F6462/3241/10). It was printed in *Further Correspondence Respecting China* (FO 405/254 Confidential, 13315, No. 27). In this it followed after our Document 8, by Galen (Bliukher), but clearly is later and by a different writer.

The document is not dated, but on page 4 is the phrase "now, after nine months of the strike," which would place it about mid-March 1926, if the writer was being literal. The unknown author, presumably a member of the Soviet mission in Canton, appears to give a candid and objective appraisal of the effects of the strike on Hong Kong, British trade, the politics and economy of Canton, and on the strikers themselves.

TEXT

[2] Preparations for the strike had begun as early as in June 1925, but the conditions at that time were not yet favorable. The strike could become important and deal a blow at Hong Kong and British imperialism only on condition that the strikers, or at least the greater part of them, could leave Hong Kong. Otherwise Hong Kong might quickly suppress the strike by repressive measures. The nearest place to which the strikers could go was Canton and the province of Kwangtung, both of which formerly had already served several times as a refuge for the Hong Kong strikers. But in May 1925 a conflict was already brewing between the Revolutionary Government and the most powerful group of the Yunnan and Kwangsi militarists, and on June 6 an open rupture had taken place. The government evacuated Canton, of which the Yunnan militarists became masters. However, they had no time to consolidate their success and to get the support and confidence of foreigners, especially of Hong Kong, because in a week's time, i.e., on the 13th, they were defeated and disarmed by government troops. During the period of the Yunnan domination in Canton any ingress of the Hong Kong strikers into Canton was naturally out of the question. The beginning of the strike had been fixed on June 22, but as early as the 18th the strike [3] broke out already in some establishments in Hong Kong, and on the 20th the influx of the strikers into Canton commenced. On June 22 about 100,000 workmen and employees in Hong Kong as well as all the Chinese working in Shameen (the foreign concession in Canton) were on strike. The strike broke out as a protest against the May and June shooting in Shanghai and Hankow. But it became especially intensive after the firing by foreign troops into the protest demonstration in Shameen on June 23. After that incident not only all the workmen and employees in Hong Kong, altogether more than 200,000 went on strike, but even the Chinese merchants, with the exception of the larger firms, closed their shops as a protest. Over 180,000 strikers went to Canton and to the province of Kwangtung. The strike was planned for one or two months, but owing to the obstinacy of Hong Kong and the firm attitude of the Strike Committee it continued a longer time. The strike was followed by a boycott of all foreigners, except Germany and the USSR. But already in August the

boycott against all foreigners, except Hong Kong and England, was called off. This boycott was carried out very strictly and energetically. Unloading was refused to all British steamers, and all British goods which happened to be imported into Canton or other cities of the province through some other channels were subjected to confiscation.

As mentioned above, the number of strikers who went to Canton and to the province of Kwangtung was 180,000 in June. In Canton there remained about 50,000 of them, and the rest were scattered throughout the whole province. When the strike became protracted the strikers began to return to Hong Kong, or went into the other provinces. Still in December there were in Canton about 40,000, and in the province about 100,000 of them. Only the strikers who were in Canton were given support. According to the data of the Strike Committee, that support amounted to 6,000 Canton dollars a day. Those funds were partly provided by the government, and partly were subscribed throughout China and abroad among the Chinese and the proletariat. In December the representatives of the Strike Committee declared that they had at their disposal funds sufficient at least for two or three months.

Results of the Strike

The strike has dealt a serious blow to Hong Kong and British imperialism in the south of China. Economic losses for Hong Kong reached 4 million a day. As Canton and the province of Kwangtung, which are the main basis of the economic supremacy of Hong Kong, were practically cut off from Hong Kong, its export and import decreased by about 60 percent. At the same time, banknotes issued by the Canton Government supplanted gradually on the money-market the banknotes of the Hong Kong banks which enjoyed hitherto a complete monopoly in the south of China. A still more serious blow has been dealt by the strike to the English political influence and prestige not only in the south but throughout the whole of China. The strike contributed to a great extent to the increase of the influence of the Revolutionary Government, and only owing to the strike the latter suppressed so easily all the counterrevolutionary conspiracies and revolts that followed the defeat of the Yunnan militarists. They could not coordinate their activities on account of the fact that Hong Kong was cut off from Canton, and the counterrevolutionary conspirators when starting a revolt could not hope, in case of failure, to find refuge in Hong Kong, and that their General Staff, which was in Hong Kong, had no connection with individual counterrevolutionary leaders and detachments operating in the rear of the Revolutionary Government. This fact especially influenced the plan of a joint attack (under British direction) on Canton by Ch'en Chiung-ming from the east, by Hsiung K'o-wu from the northwest, by Teng Pen-yin from the south, and by the bandits in the Canton region. All those groups were defeated one by one. After the defeat of Ch'en Chiung-ming in November 1925 when thus the most serious danger was over, the Revolutionary Government recommended to the Strike Committee to consider the question of calling off the strike. This question was raised by the committee in the conference of the strikers' delegates, as well as at mass meetings. Both the conference and meetings, by an overwhelming majority, carried out resolutions to the effect that the strike could not be called off until Hong Kong accepted all the demands which have been put forth in the beginning of the strike after the Shameen firing.

[4] The following were the principal demands:

1. England should take upon herself the responsibility for the Shameen firing and the indemnification of the families of the killed.

2. Political rights should be granted to the Chinese part of the Hong Kong population.

3. All the strikers should be taken back to work, and all wages due for the time

of strike should be paid to them.

Negotiations with Hong Kong were started in December at first through the local merchant guilds, because the Hong Kong Government refused to conduct direct negotiations with the Strike Committee, and the Canton Government declared that the strike did not concern it at all. Those negotiations, however, failed. After that, several attempts were made to come to an understanding, but without result.

During that time Hong Kong succeeded in replacing a considerable number of the strikers by workmen imported from other provinces of China and from Singapore. Still, it is very important to Hong Kong to find a way to get out of the existing situation, because simultaneously with the strike a boycott of the British trade and shipping is going on. Even with the resumption of normal relations with Canton, Hong Kong will suffer considerably, as Canton has already entered into commercial relations with places other than Hong Kong, and although its trade has not yet reached the extent which it had before the conflict, yet it has already risen to about 70 percent.

In December the strikers in Canton were very firm and their disposition was resolute. But those of them who were in the province were scattered, and it was difficult to form an opinion about their disposition.

It is possible that now, after nine months of the strike, they feel some discontent and indifference. The right wing of the Kuomintang will undoubtedly try to use that discontent for its own ends.

Generally speaking, the strike has played a positive part in the consolidation of the Revolutionary Government, and consequently in the revolutionary movement of the whole of China. The time to call the strike off has come already in December 1925, because in future its negative influence on the economic structure of Canton will increase more and more (especially as to the budget possibilities of the government). It is probable that both the Strike Committee and the Revolutionary Government will be obliged to make some concessions. Still, something may be obtained from Hong Kong too.

Part V: Analysis of the Armed Forces of the National Government in March 1926

Here we reproduce eleven documents, NA (G-2 2657-I-281), a group of reports by the Soviet military advisers in Canton, giving professional assessments of the condition of the military in forces under the Nationalist Government—army, air, and navy. They all appear to date from March 1926, but before the middle of the month; some are dated March 15, 1926. Systematic and detailed, most of them are directed toward the objective of modernizing the armed forces to make them battleworthy for the forthcoming northern campaign. Some are specific as to needed arms, ammunition, and equipment. Perhaps the reports were prepared in anticipation of the visit of the high-level Bubnov Commission, which was sent from Russia early in 1926 to investigate the work of several Russian military missions in North and South China, and which visited Canton from March 13 to 24.

Several of the documents are attributed to L. Grey, and the one on the navy was signed by him. We are uncertain whether the name is a pseudonym or the real name. Document 36, dated March 15 and signed by L. Grey, states (p. 18) that the writer has spent forty-eight days of work in the navy and concludes that he will have to work a long time. We believe the same person appears as *K'o-lei* in the Chinese version of Document 51, dated about mid-April 1926, pp. 83 and 84, as one knowledgeable about Canton naval affairs. Grey may have been sent to Canton to replace Smirnov ("Svetlovsky"), who was to be sent back to Russia on September 1, 1925, to finish his studies in the Naval Academy (*Soviet Plot in China*, p. 39, meeting of the Soviet Military Council on July 1, 1925), although Smirnov was listed in Document 23, dated January 1926, as though still in Canton. A person identified as Gray, in the position of adviser on naval affairs, was listed in a French intelligence report as among the "Soviet agents" leaving Canton after April 15, 1927 (PRO FO 13315, No. 78, Enclosure 3: J. Brenan, Canton, to Miles Lampson, July 28, 1927; and the Hoover Institution, Huston Papers, Bk. II, Pt. 3, F.4b, #3). In May 1927, Grey was identified by a Russian defector, Eugene Pick (*China in the Grip of the Reds*, pp. 42 and 47), as one of two naval advisers in Canton. He is called "Russo-German."

The sequential order of the eleven documents is our own.

Document 26

Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926

This document makes up the last twenty-nine pages of a comprehensive Russian report from Canton probably completed early in March 1926. Brief parts from another copy, considerably burned, were published in the *Chinese Government White Book*, pp. 259-65, and *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 62-66. In *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, pp. 245-47, we published excerpts from the same incomplete copy, drawing on a Japanese source, as our Document 22. We now offer a more complete version in NA (G-2 2657-I-281/94). This copy, though not burned, lacked the first twenty-eight pages.

The authorship is not stated, but the writers—for evidently more than one writer was involved—may have been General Kuibyshev and some of his senior staff members. On page 57 there is a statement that clearly refers to Borodin: "All guidance with regard to the Party and Government has been carried on until recently with the closest participation of our political director." Borodin left Canton for the North on February 4, 1926. On page 36 it is stated that "our military director (assistant chief of the group) acts, in reality, as chief of the General Staff, but his official position is that of the adviser to the chief of the General Staff." On February 22, General Li Chi-shen was appointed chief of the General Staff and General Rogachev's title was changed to adviser to the chief of staff.

Two seemingly contradictory dating clues may be explained by the supposition that the report took some time to prepare. On page 53, under Plans and Projects of the Government and Military Council, it is stated that in order to defend the regime from within and without, "it is necessary to create a Central Military School." Yet on page 52, in a reference to the Military School of the Kuomintang, there is a parenthetical statement "(Whampoa—now Central)." The Central Military-Political Academy began classes on March 8, 1926.

Document 26, although truncated, is a comprehensive account of the recent history and present condition of the National Revolutionary Army, with emphasis on its deficiencies. It is interesting in its appraisal of several senior Chinese commanders, including Chiang Kai-shek, shortly before the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident of March 20, 1926. It emphasizes the importance of political work in the army and mentions the influence of the Communist Party, especially in the First Corps. It concludes with an assessment of the political situation within the Kuomintang, though there is no reference in this part of the document to the recently concluded Second Kuomintang National Congress. It warns against a too-rapid radicalization for fear of a counterreaction.

TEXT

[Pages 1-27 missing]

[28] 7. Our Influence

All above-mentioned forms of government organization, as well as the policies of this government have been worked out and carried through with the direct participation and under the influence of our political director (adviser to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party).

[29] CHAPTER 3
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF CANTON

Introduction

Even by the end of 1923, when our first instructors arrived at Canton, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his government had already realized the necessity of reorganizing the army and centralizing the administration of it. Under the actual conditions existing in China and, particularly, in Kwangtung, this problem proved to be not an easy one, because individual militaristic generals, supported by groups of their adherents, by no means acquiesced in the loss of their independence with regard to the collection of taxes or simply "squeezing" the population of the region occupied by them. But the centralization of the administration of the army meant exactly the unification of finances and taxation. In spite, however, of logical arguments, proving the advantages of such centralization (the generals themselves acknowledged these advantages), the pecuniary interests of the generals and their satellites always prevailed. Therefore, the government had to start with the creation of a military force of its own, entirely devoted to it, which, in future, could unify the military groups, which were dissatisfied with the policies of the big militarists. The first nucleus of such an army, afterward called "The Revolutionary Party Army," was made by establishing on June 10, 1924, a Military School of the Kuomintang and of [at] Whampoa. Within a year this nucleus grew into the famous Whampoa Corps, which succeeded in unifying almost all military groups loyal to the Revolutionary Government, for the struggle against the "invincible" Yunnanese and their allies, the Kwangsi troops. On June 12-13, 1925, these unified forces of the Revolutionary Government defeated the united [30] forces of Yunnan and Kwangsi round Canton and at Canton itself. Such military defeat has never been seen in the south of China before. They surrounded and disarmed more than 20,000 troops, which enjoyed the reputation of being the "best" in the south of China. At the outset this nucleus was in most difficult financial straits because the funds of the government were not sufficient even for the maintenance of the school which was originally intended for 600 cadets, not to speak of the enlargement of the school and the simultaneous formation of regular troops. Nevertheless, owing to the curtailment of all other expenses and with *our support*, it had been possible, by the end of 1924, to increase the number of the school's cadets up to 1,000, to create two new regiments of regular troops, and to organize the staff of the 3d Regiment.

The program of the school and regiments had for its aim the training of officer personnel and soldiers, politically conscious and having military knowledge; also short-term courses were organized (in the school) as early as July, for the training of commissaries (party representatives).

As regards military affairs, special attention was being paid to the preparation of troops for field service. The results of such training became manifest in March and April 1925 during the first campaign (for Whampoa) against Ch'en Chun-Ming [Ch'en Chiung-ming], when, before the sudden onslaught of Whampoa troops and their Cantonese allies (the attitude of Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops was almost entirely indifferent and, partly, even hostile), Ch'en Chiung-ming's superior forces were dis-

persed. One can realize the suddenness of the attack when one considers the length of marches—often forty to fifty versts [a verst is two-thirds of a mile] a day. The following typical episode of this campaign gives an idea as to the fighting capacity of Whampoa troops. The first Whampoa regiment, about 1,000 bayonets strong, having advanced too far forward, sustained one whole day the onslaught of a detachment of the enemy, 7,000 bayonets strong, and having made several counterattacks, held its positions, until the main forces arrived. The relief of the locality played, of course, a great part in that case because it did not give the enemy the possibility to turn the flank by a short movement, but if one takes into consideration the usual Chinese tactics of numbers, i.e., the obligatory retreat before superior forces—this episode shows that the training of Whampoa troops was properly organized and gave certain positive [31] results. About that time the Hong Kong newspapers made a noise, calling Whampoa "Bolshevik Cadets" and Whampoa troops "Red Army." By the end of April, Swatow, a stronghold of General Ch'en Chiung-ming, was taken, but a considerable part of his forces succeeded to retreat from Kwangtung province into the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi. Government troops were not sufficiently strong to pursue the enemy, the more so, because, toward the beginning of May, it was established by documents that the Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops were preparing a blow in the rear, as they wanted to overthrow Canton's "Bolshevist" government and to disarm Whampoa troops. Negotiations with the Yunnanese were started, in order to gain time; at the same time secret measures were taken to prepare the campaign against them. Toward the beginning of June the preparations for this campaign were completed, negotiations with the Yunnanese broken off, and government authorities and institutions left Canton. Open rupture took place in June 1925, and on June 12 the troops loyal to the government approached from all directions. On June 13 the Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops were defeated in a decisive battle and, during the following two days, disarmed. A portion of these troops dispersed in the mountains and turned bandits, but the majority were taken prisoner and afterward filled up the ranks of troops loyal to the government, but, of course, only after receiving proper political instruction. Whampoa troops had only one main division, the other one was in the state of being formed; two other divisions, however, in which intensive political work was being carried on, joined them. After the defeat of the Yunnanese the prestige of Whampoa troops grew far beyond their real strength. Our instructors, who were placed in all large units of troops, loyal to the government, and who, in fact, played a leading part in the campaign, contributed much to this enhancement of the prestige of Whampoa troops; at every opportunity they cited instances of fighting capacity and political consciousness of Whampoa troops.

[32] During the next three months, following the defeat of Yunnanese, the government had also to put down several other counterrevolutionary movements and to disarm the rebellious generals, chiefly with the aid of Whampoa troops. The Whampoa troops, the name of which at that time had already been changed to that of "the 1st Army Corps," transformed these disarmed troops into its own 3d Division. While the Whampoa troops and their allies—forces loyal to the government—were busy with the campaign against the Yunnanese and with the suppression of other rebellious movements in the vicinity of Canton and in Canton city itself, the Eastern part of the province was again occupied by the troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had received financial support from Hong Kong and Peking and promised to clear the province of "Bolsheviks." The question of Ch'en Chiung-ming's suppression—final for this time—became again the order of the day. But to the danger from the East was also added the danger from the Northwest, in the shape of General Hsiung K'e-wu's detachment, comprising 10,000 men. General Hsiung K'e-wu came from Szechwan province, as a "friend" of the Canton Government, but proved to be in league with Ch'en Chiung-ming. Another danger came from the South, from General Feng [Teng]

Pen-yin, who, for the last five years, dominated in the south of Kwangtung province, and whom the Canton Government was not able, during all this period of time, to suppress, owing to the fact that the locality was inaccessible and [because of] more important and pressing problems with which this government was kept busy at that time. One of the divisions, which had revolted against the Canton Government, joined General Teng Pen-yin, who started the campaign against this government at Hong Kong's insistence. At the same time bandits and pirates, also supported by Hong Kong, started a movement in the immediate neighborhood of Canton, taking villages and small towns and looting the whole population. Therefore, it was necessary to take urgent measures against all these hostile movements.

The Whampoa Corps (the First), divisions of the IV Army Corps, and one separate division were dispatched against Ch'en Chiung-ming, as the most dangerous enemy; moreover, several small detachments, not yet reorganized into large units, also took part in the campaign. The second campaign against Ch'en Chiung-ming started [33] in the beginning of October and in the first part of November Swatow was already taken and the majority of Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces disarmed. A portion of these forces again left the territory of Kwangtung province, but for this once the revolutionary troops pursued them and even requested the governors of Fukien and Kiangsi provinces to take measures for their disarmament. By the end of November these units were also suppressed, except several small detachments, which were enlisted to serve in the army of the said two provinces.

The Second Army Corps was entrusted with the suppression of Hsiung K'e-wu. By the end of October the 2d Corps succeeded in accomplishing this task and then moved one part of its forces to the south.

Only one division of the IV Army Corps was left in the south by the end of September for action against Teng Pen-yin. This division delayed the advance of the enemy and retreated slowly. The III Army Corps was intended for the support of this division and for counterattacks; but as it had to be moved from afar and as there were no good means of communication, this corps, with its two divisions, succeeded in arriving at the battlefield only about the 20th of October and then stopped the enemy's offensive. But these forces were not able to assume the decisive counteroffensive; they had to wait for the arrival of more reinforcements; still they were strong enough to drive back the enemy slowly. In the middle of November four regiments of the III Army Corps came to the south and in the beginning of December, in connection with Ch'en Chiung-ming's suppression, the IV Army Corps (two divisions) was also moved to the south. With the aid of these forces it was, of course, possible not only to assume the decisive counteroffensive, but also finally to defeat Teng Pen-yin, who, for so long a time, remained invulnerable to the Canton Government. Besides the Canton Government's forces, several regiments belonging to the forces of the allied province—Kwangsi—were also called forth to take part in the suppression of Teng Pen-yin because from the southern part of this province the most convenient roads lead toward the rear and the main base of General Teng Pen-yin. Toward the middle of January 1926 all the detachments of General Teng Pen-yin on the mainland were defeated (they were either disarmed or went over to the side of the Canton and [34] Kwangsi Government). Only the island of Hainan remained in his hands, but, by the end of January 1926, one division of the IV Army Corps was transported there with the aid of the Cantonese navy, and Teng Pen-yin's power was finally crushed. After this defeat, the province of Kwangtung became clear of all open enemies of the Revolutionary Government. The task of suppressing banditry and the activities of the pirates was given to the V Army Corps. This corps succeeded in fulfilling the task of suppressing open activities of the bandits, but of course the task of fighting banditry in the south of China generally proved to be beyond the power of one army corps: the whole army and the whole population must take part in such fighting.

It was necessary to give this short history of the growth of the revolutionary army and the struggle undertaken by it as an introduction to the chapter devoted to the army, in order to make clear why so far the reorganization and the new system of political and military training has not been extended to the whole army, and why even the best unit of the Revolutionary Army, i.e., the Whampoa Corps, still has its defects.

[35] Reorganization of the Army

By the end of 1925 the army of Revolutionary Canton was in the period of reorganization, which probably is not finished even now. All the same, fundamental features of army administration are outlined and put into effect; the army lists have been drafted and partly put in force or are being prepared; and some already have been prepared, but are being put into effect very slowly, on account of almost uninterrupted military campaigns. For the time being, the majority of the army is using old Japanese and Chinese regulations.

A. Administration

Military Council. Since June 1925, a Military Council has been put at the head of the army. The Military Council consists of several members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. The president of the Political Bureau [Council] (corresponds to our Revcom—Revolutionary Committee) acts as president of the Military Council, in view of the close connection between the Political Bureau and the Military Council. The Military Council consists also of all army corps commanders (there are six of them now) and of the chief of the General Staff, also of our military director (chief of the group). Although the Military Council is vested with extensive rights, nevertheless all questions of principle of a military character are first discussed by the Political Bureau (till the end of 1925 even technical questions of army administration were first discussed by the Political Bureau; this was called for by the necessity to preserve the government from too large demands of the generals, who did not want to give up so easily their former positions of absolute independence). The Military Council discusses all questions pertaining to the army administration, both of administrative and [36] operative character; examines and confirms army lists, regulations, and statutes prepared by the General Staff. The Military Council holds its regular meetings once every week, but, in case of necessity, these meetings may be called more frequently by the president of the council.

General Staff. The General Staff is a technical organ of the Military Council. Our military director (assistant of the chief of the group) acts, in reality, as chief of the General Staff, but his official position is that of the adviser to the chief of the General Staff. By December 8, 1925, there were as yet no strict regulations governing the General Staff, i.e., the regulations were being prepared simultaneously with the organization of the General Staff in June 1925, but were subject to continual alterations, in connection with the everyday work. By that time there were the following departments in the General Staff: Operations and Intelligence Divisions (including "liaison" [communications] service); Administration and Inspection; Supplies; Navy. The last two departments were considered as independent and were subordinated directly to the Military Council. Apart from the General Staff there was an Aviation Bureau, which claimed to be subordinated directly to the Political Bureau. Our instructors were, in fact, at the head of all these departments, but officially they were called advisers to the chiefs of department. By the end of December our instructors held even officially the posts of commander of the navy and chief of the Aviation Bureau, but, at the first opportunity, they had to become advisers again, because it is

politically inconvenient for our instructors to hold official posts, whereas our influence will not suffer in the least from their transformation into advisers again.

B. Army's Subdivision and Organization

By June 1925 there were as yet no definite forms of organization in the army of the Southern Chinese Republic. Each military group was called differently; their names were based principally upon provincial designations. There were armies of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Hunan, Canton, Honan, Shensi detachment, etc.; besides, there were many separate divisions, brigades, regiments, and even battalions. The most conspicuous [37] among them was the so-called Party Army, better known under the name of "Whampoa troops." The strict system of army organization and subdivision—into corps, division, regiment, etc.,—according to fixed lists was introduced for the first time in the "Whampoa troops," but in other units the name very often did not correspond to their numerical strength. After the defeat of Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops, the name of the whole army was changed into that of "People's Revolutionary Army," and it was divided into Army Corps, as follows:

Whampoa troops, 1st Army Corps
Canton Army, 4th Army Corps
Hunan Army, 2d Army Corps
Yunnanese (loyal to Canton Government), 3d Army Corps
Li Fu-lin's Cantonese, 5th Army Corps

Several separate detachments, regiments, and divisions were not transformed into larger units, as they were stationed far away on the frontier or were hostile to the project of reorganization. Several months more were required to suppress the troops who had a hostile attitude and to introduce into the newly named army corps a proper organization and subdivision according to the army lists, already prepared and tested by the experience of the Whampoa troops. In the middle of November after the defeat of Ch'en Chiung-ming, the VI Army Corps was formed from Honan and Shensi detachments and several separate regiments. Officially one division only remained in existence as a separate unit, but as its military and political training was done after Whampoa standards and as it gravitated to the I Corps, it was permitted to remain as a separate unit, in order to increase the importance of the I Army Corps (Whampoa). Unofficially several more regiments and small detachments existed (they exist probably even now), but after being informed of their existence the government either suggested to them that they incorporate into some existing unit or, in case of refusal, took measures for their disarmament.

Each army corps consists of three divisions; each division of three regiments; each regiment of three battalions; and each battalion of four companies. A company [38] must be 100-120 bayonets strong. Each regiment must have a machine-gun detachment, but the number of machine guns depends on how many there are at hand. In the I Army Corps machine-gun detachments have about twelve machine guns, and in the II Corps not more than six. Each division must have an artillery division [regiment?], but the number of guns also depends on the artillery at hand. Some divisions have no artillery at all; in this connection a question was raised of organizing artillery regiments to be attached to army corps, but how this question will be solved, by the end of December 1925, there was as yet no information available. It is important to point out here that on account of previous practice of generals being independent, neither their army corps nor divisions ever give up their artillery or machine guns to other units; therefore, the question of redistribution of such equipment remains till now at a deadlock. But in time, when the habit of centralization and subordination of command will penetrate more deeply into the life of the army, it will probably be possible to make a proportionate distribution of all equipment in all units

of the army.

As regards technical means of "communications," they are almost totally lacking; therefore, they are not included for the time being into the organization tables of the army. If the staff of an army corps has some even primitive communication by telephone with its own divisions, it may consider itself fortunate; but, for the most part, there is only personal communication, provided by the units themselves, most often—on foot, sometimes—on bicycle (this is being introduced in Whampoa); mounted communication is absolutely lacking, not to mention the army, there are no more than 500 horses in the whole province. The staffs of the army corps are using either local telegraph lines to establish communication with the General Staff, or the city telephone lines at Canton itself (where the staffs of the army corps are most often quartered). Nevertheless, there is a special course, a part of the Whampoa School, for the training of specialists in communications. It is also necessary to mention that there are in the I Army Corps (Whampoa) some technical means of communications, even field radio stations (of the regimental type).

The same must be said about the engineering materials. Courses for engineers and [39] sappers have been opened at the Whampoa School; upon completion of the course there, the specialists have to be, in the future, the instructors for the organizations of sappers in the army units.

C. Question of Furnishing Supplies

The question of issuing army supplies, in the sense we understand it, is not centralized. Each unit is providing food as well as clothing for itself independently. The fact is that every soldier gets a fixed pay—ten to twelve Canton dollars per month—and provides himself with food and clothing. This is usually done by a cooperative system and every soldier's share of expenses is then deducted from his pay. Sometimes regiments and divisions are purchasing provisions or ordering soldiers' equipment on a large scale, but even then the companies get all that is necessary, for cash payments. During the campaign the units are usually living on local resources, by buying provisions from the population (formerly they simply looted, but this is severely persecuted now, and the guilty ones are executed by shooting). Only in case that it is known that provisions cannot be procured locally, they are brought from the rear. As regards the supply of munitions for the army units, this is, of course, the duty of the high command, but their expenditure is not large, owing to the fact that both adversaries are equally short of them. During all previous campaigns 200-300 cartridges per rifle were regarded by the high command as a good supply; those who had 500 and more considered themselves as sufficiently provided for in all emergencies. During the campaign the soldier had to carry 150-200 cartridges; the lesser quantity among the soldiers provoked discontent and even refusal to take the field. The remainder of the cartridges was carried in the rear of the units by "coolies" on their shoulders. *The supply of cartridges for machine guns did not exceed 1,000-1,500. The artillery munitions (shells, etc.) were almost absolutely lacking; seldom a gun had 20-30 shells; moreover, the artillery almost never took part in the battles.*
[40] Only for the sieges of some places was artillery used at all, and even in that case more for the enemy's intimidation than for destruction. It is clear that, the issue of supplies being organized in such a manner, there are neither supply sections nor army service corps; moreover, there is not and cannot be an army service corps, as we understand it, because *there are no roads at all in Kwangtung* province, with the exception of areas of big cities and even then within the radius of 10-15 kilometers only. Instead of roads there are only narrow footpaths, along which the troops are moving mostly in Indian file. *All small supplies, which it is necessary to carry in the rear of the units, are carried by specially hired men—"coolies"—on their shoulders. These coolies*

are hired for the march only; when quartered at some place, the troops do not require them. The only supply service that is now more or less centralized is that of finances. Formerly the generals themselves, through their own men, were collecting taxes from the population and so were not in need of government funds. Now such a system is in force only in the frontier regions, where the government had as yet no time to establish its own organs for the collection of taxes. At present the funds for the army units are allotted by the central government, according to the estimates presented, which are checked up and confirmed by the government, and the army units (army corps) must present a report, concerning the expenditure of allotted sums. All units (army corps) must present such estimates. As mentioned above, in some areas the military authorities themselves are collecting taxes, through their own men, but they must make a report concerning the sums collected by them; these sums are then put on account of their estimates. As far as possible, the government sends its officials to check up the collection of taxes and the expenditure of sums, thus collected. It is necessary to point out here that, till the end of 1925, the government was spending about 70 percent of its revenues for the army.

[41] *D. Effective Force of the Army and the High Command*

Until the end of 1925, the effective force of the army was not fixed definitely, the more so as it was frequently changing, especially in connection with the defeat of Yunnanese and the subsequent disarmaments of some units and the corresponding reinforcement, at their expense, of other units. Besides, after the formation of the army corps and centralization of finances, the army corps commanders, in order to receive more money from the government, were giving considerably exaggerated information concerning the numerical strength of their units. To check up these figures was difficult, because the units were either scattered or taking the field. It was necessary to curtail the figures thus given, but only approximately, so as not to give offense to the generals. For instance, it may be mentioned that even General Chiang Kai-shek (commander of the I Army Corps) informed the government that the numerical strength of his corps was 40,000 men, whereas we know very well (because there were more of our instructors in the 1st Whampoa Corps than in all other units; moreover, this corps had been organized by us) that there were not more than 20,000 men in it and among them 12,000 combatants.

According to our approximated data, there were in the whole army (in December 1925) about 65,000 combatants, distributed as follows:

I Army Corps (Whampoa), about 12,000
IV Army Corps, about 11,000
III Army Corps, about 10,000
II Army Corps, about 10,000
V Army Corps, about 8,000
VI Army Corps, about 9,000
Separate Division, about 3,500
Schools, about 2,500
Several small units, about 2,000

To these must be added (about 50 percent) various officials, clerks, workmen, etc., serving in the army.

After the defeat of the enemies of the government in the south, the numerical strength of those army corps that were at the front probably increased, owing to the
[42] fact that some units of the enemy went over to the above-mentioned army corps.

On December 8, 1925, the following generals were commanders of army corps:

I Army Corps, General Chiang Kai-shek
III Army Corps, General Ch'u Pei-teh [Chu P'ei-te]

II Army Corps, General T'an Yen-k'ai (actually General Liu T'i-p'ing) [Lu Ti-p'ing]

IV Army Corps, General Li Ti-kan [Li Chi-shen]

V Army Corps, General Li Fu-lin

VI Army Corps, General (Ch'en Chim) Ch'eng Ch'ien

General Wu T'i-ch'ien [Wu T'ieh-Ch'eng] (commissioner of public safety and chief of the police and gendarmerie of Kwangtung) was officially commander of the (separate) division, but it was actually commanded by his chief of staff; during the campaigns this division was usually attached to the I Army Corps.

E. Political Work in the Army

Systematic political work was and is being carried on among the Whampoa troops or the I Army Corps ever since their organization and until the present time, according to the Red Army's standard. Not only political sections and party cells are in existence, *but the system of commissaries [commissars] has also been introduced, although not with such great authority, as in the Red Army during the period of the civil war. As for the other units of the Canton Army, almost no political work was being conducted until June 1925, or, if conducted, then only in the form of occasional lectures and contrary to regulations.* First of all it was necessary to shape the minds of the generals, to prove to them that political work did not threaten them with diminution of their authority, but, on the contrary, would increase it; that, in connection with the growth of political consciousness, the fighting capacity of their units was growing also. (Our leaders wanted, of course, quite the contrary; i.e., to undermine the authority of several independent generals and to disorganize their units. The subsequent events confirmed the soundness of our line of conduct—the destruction of Yunnanese and other troops, the dismissal of counterrevolutionary generals.) The instance of Whampoa troops, the rapid growth of their strength and fighting capacity, was always [43] cited in favor of the carrying on of political work. The generals hesitated: they were afraid of possible loss of their independence, but dared not openly refuse us and the government. Actually some political work was being carried on in all units, but not officially, although the generals were compelled to permit this work. The destruction of Yunnanese troops in June 1925 and the subsequent events forced the hesitating generals to acknowledge openly the principle of the necessity of political work and they began persistently to request us and the government that instructors and political workers should be sent at once to their units, in order to organize the political work, according to the Whampoa standard. This change in the minds of the generals took place in the end of 1925, but for want of sufficient numbers of necessary workers, also in connection with military events (described in the introduction), it was impossible to meet all the requests entirely and at once. The organization of political sections in the army corps was started, and the Political Directorate for the army was also organized. This work is continued now and is extended to divisions, regiments, etc.

The organization of political work in the I Army Corps (Whampoa) is as follows:

Political Section of the army corps; the chief of the section is also representative of the party (commissary);

Political Sections in divisions and regiments; the chiefs of these sections are also representatives of the party (commissaries);

Representatives of the party (commissaries) in battalions and companies; they are also political guides.

Moreover, there are everywhere cells of the Kuomintang Party which are carrying on work in close connection with political guides.

The influence of the Communist Party over the I Army Corps is quite consider-

able, because most of the Party representatives (commissaries) are member of the Communist Party or Consomol (Communistic Youth Corps), but the pure communistic work is carried on secretly in order not to give the reactionaries reason to raise a cry about forceful communistic influence.

[44] Army's Conditions

The condition of the Army of Revolutionary Canton cannot be called splendid, not only with regard to the technical equipment, but even in the sense of being equipped with the most necessary articles. The I Army Corps (Whampoa) is, of course, the best equipped because the government is sparing no efforts and means, in order to provide this army corps with all that is necessary, especially with money. Moreover, our support was almost exclusively given to this army corps. The food of the soldiers, with small exceptions, is generally insufficient; the equipment in the greater portion of the army is poor. In the future, with the improvement of the government's finances, the conditions (standard of life) of the army will probably improve also, in the sense that they will be provided with all necessities. But the same cannot be said about the improvement of accoutrements and technical equipment, because, even if the government has some ready money, it will be difficult to obtain these articles as they can be imported only as contraband. And, in order to manufacture them on the spot, it is necessary to create a military industry, for which time and big capital are required, and the Revolutionary Government lacks both of them. The equipment of the army is, in general, very poor. There are rifles and machine guns of most various makes, from quite obsolete to most modern ones (there are, however, very few of the latter kind). The greater part of the army is armed with Mannlicher rifles (German), because they were easiest to obtain, and because the Canton Arsenal is manufacturing them (about seventy rifles per day, but of poor quality). Then there are Arisaka rifles (Japanese). The I Army Corps is mostly armed with them. Moreover, there are French rifles, "Berdan" rifles, etc., but their quantity is small.

As for machine guns, those of the "Schwarzloz" make were used in great numbers (the Canton Arsenal was also manufacturing them, to the number of six per week); then there were French machine guns of "Leblanc" make, Russian—of "Maxim" make; besides, there happened to be other machine guns of various makes.

[45] There is, generally speaking, a very small quantity of artillery; it is of the lightest type, easy for transportation, mostly of 1.5-2 inch.

The supplying with ammunition, on account of the fact that it was lacking, was also poor enough. The Canton Arsenal is a sole source for the regular supply of the whole army with ammunition; it had the capacity to manufacture about 50,000 cartridges per day, but it was actually manufacturing only 15-20 thousand for want of materials and pecuniary means. Besides, several generals had their own arsenals, of primitive type, for manufacturing cartridges.

I have no information concerning the supplying with artillery munitions. It is necessary to point out that the artillery took part in the battles in only rare cases. There was also along the river at Humen and Whampoa forts, fortress artillery, in order to guard the approaches to Canton from the sea.

There were no other technical means of warfare, except four airplanes, of which two only could ascend into the air, but could not leave their base more than ten to fifteen kilometers.

Technical means of communications are almost totally lacking. Only by the end of 1925 the I Corps succeeded in buying several field radio apparatus (of regimental type), but it will be possible to use them only after the training of specialists. The I Army Corps had also several commutators and about twenty telephones of field type, but other army corps had no such technical means of communications at all.

With reference to the army's training, particular attention has till now been paid to the training of soldiers according to a drill system suited for parades and marching. But the Whampoa troops were an exception to this rule, because, during the course of their training special attention was always paid to their preparation, by means of maneuvers, for field service. This explains their successes during military operations, in comparison with other units of the army. In order to introduce such training, it [46] was necessary, first of all, to train the officers of the lower and middle grades, including company and battalion commanders. In the middle of 1924 the Whampoa School was established for this purpose; also practical courses (refresher courses) for commanding officers. But as the course of training in the school covered six months only and in the practical courses even less, and as there was no sufficient time for the preparation of troops, in connection with continuous campaigns, neither the commanding officers nor the soldiers of the Whampoa Army Corps can, of course, be considered as thoroughly trained and prepared. But, judging from their knowledge, they are still superior to other units of the army, because there the commanding officers of lower and middle grades are almost totally lacking military instruction and have worked themselves up from rank and file through practical work.

From the beginning of 1926 the question of supplementary training of the I Army Corps and new training of other units became the order of the day. This question requires much intensive work, but without its solution, the army cannot become the instrument of spreading the influence of the Revolutionary Government, especially in the northern direction.

Characteristics of Units and Commanders

As regards fighting capacity and political stability, the I Army Corps (Whampoa) is the best one, especially its 1st Division; the 2d and 3d divisions are next (according to the time of their organization and the length of political work and military training). This army corps may be considered as a loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government and in case of the anti-North expedition as "shock troops," provided it is properly supplied with technical equipment. This army corps has a peculiar feature, which makes it conspicuous among others (perhaps, in the whole of China), i.e., it carries on, during the campaign, political work on a most extensive scale among the population; it follows, as a matter of course, that the troops of the I Corps never indulge in looting the population. As the rumor about such conduct on the part of soldiers spreads very widely and quickly all over China, it is very possible that, during the [47] campaign, the Whampoa troops will be welcomed by the population, as such was the case during the expedition against Ch'en Chiung-ming. Enough has been already said in the preceding chapters about the fighting qualities of this corps.

Our influence over this army corps is very great, because it has been organized and trained by us. The majority of our instructors are working in this corps.

General Chiang Kai-shek, commander (until January 1926) of the I Army Corps, is regarded as one of the most loyal followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and one of the best revolutionaries; according to his speeches, he might be regarded as communist, but looking more deeply at his convictions, one sees that he belongs to typical "intelligentsia" of the radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins. By character he is irresolute, but stubborn; his stubbornness being of a special Chinese type, as when persons, holding some post (it happens so especially among military men), in case all does not go according to their wishes, immediately resign or simply leave, but come back again after long negotiations and entreaties. He received his military education first in the Pei-yang Military Academy and then in Japan; besides, he reads much. Theoretically he is strong enough in military science, but, on account of his irresoluteness, could not have obtained much success as leader of troops on the

battlefield without the aid of our instructors. The same, however, may be said with reference to almost all other Chinese generals in the south. He is comparatively young—about thirty-five years old now. In the second middle of 1923 [August] he went to the USSR at the head of the delegation sent by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. After his return he was appointed chief of the Kuomintang Military School (Whampoa), which it was intended to establish at that time, but it became possible to open this school only in June 1924. His rapid advancement, with our aid, began since that time. He is so connected with us that the possibility of the rupture on his part can hardly be admitted.

It is more difficult to characterize the IV Army Corps, because our work in it begins just now. Only the 1st Division of this army corps is better known to us, because our adviser was working there as early as during the first expedition of this [48] army corps against Ch'en Chiung-ming and the Yunnanese. This division was subordinated at that period of time to the Whampoa Army Corps, and the political work in it was carried on according to Whampoa's standard. It is the opinion of our instructors that this division can be considered loyal to the government and gravitating to the Whampoa Army Corps. The other two divisions are unknown to us (by the end of 1925). As regards fighting qualities, this Army Corps is considered to be next best to the Whampoa corps. Until the political work takes more solid roots in this army corps, politically much will depend upon its commander, to whom the soldiersgot accustomed and whom the commanding officers are obeying.

General Li Ti-kan [Li Chi-shen], commander of the IV Army Corps, received his military instruction at the Pei-yang Military Academy (Chinese), but he knows military art more by practice than theoretically. He is considered a good enough general. Politically the Revolutionary Government has not much confidence in him. Till now he was active in assisting the government with the suppression of counterrevolutionary generals: Ch'en Chiung-ming and Teng Pen-yin. But it is rumored that he is dissatisfied with the government's policy—it being too radical in his opinion—and, at the first opportunity, may try to exercise his influence in order to change the course of this policy.

Until the end of 1925 no divisions were as yet organized in the II Army Corps, and the regiments were directly subordinated to the staff of this corps. At that time there were eight regiments in it, and, at the Military Council's recommendation, the formation of the 9th Regiment was started. The question of organizing divisions then became the order of the day. The Military Council insisted on this measure, but the high commanding officers in every way evaded giving a direct answer; besides, it was difficult to carry through this organization at that time because the units were taking the field. This army corps (i.e., its eight regiments) was considered a good one and as having fighting capacity. The troops were properly trained and sufficiently supplied. There was even a separate artillery regiment, but it was equipped with ten to twelve obsolete guns and had only a small supply of shells. The high commanding officers [49] insisted, in the second half of 1925, upon the introduction of political work into this army corps. The political work was then actually started, but did not yield as yet big results, on account of the want of a sufficient number of workers.

General T'an Yen-k'ai, commander of this army corps, is an older member of the Kuomintang Party and is regarded as a revolutionary, though of not very radical type. He was governor of Hunan province, but was driven away by Chao Heng-t'i (Wu P'ei-fu's creature) in 1925. He is not a military man; therefore, his assistant General Liu Ti-pin [Lu Ti-p'ing], of whose personal devotion he did not doubt, was actually in command of this army corps. The Revolutionary Government and our leaders regarded General T'an Yen-k'ai as trustworthy and as a loyal partisan of the government.

The III Army Corps consisted of the Yunnanese, loyal to the government (the so-

called General Chu P'ei-te's troops). After the defeat of Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops in June 1925, about 5,000 defeated and disarmed Yunnanese were incorporated into this corps. Its troops, i.e., the Yunnanese, were considered to be the best in the south of China as having fighting capacity and being reliable. Their stability will increase after proper political work. The main defect of this army corps was the poor equipment of its units with arms (about 20 percent have no arms at all, another 20 percent are provided with obsolete arms—"Berdan" rifles, matchlocks, etc.), and the poor supply service. Before the organization of the corps was completed, the detachment (or the so-called General Chu P'ei-te's Army) was constantly stationed along the border of the province and occupied the poorest area; the funds there collected were barely sufficient for its existence. The Revolutionary Government, for want of financial means, also could not give the corps any considerable support, although in governmental circles and among our leaders an opinion was expressed that this army corps, after a proper political and military work, and provided its equipment and supplies are improved, could become a trustworthy and loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government (second to Whampoa troops), the more so, because the high commanding officers of the corps were always ready to cooperate with the government in all its undertakings.

General Chu P'ei-te, commander of this corps, was always a loyal adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and of the Revolutionary Government. He executed all the orders of the government without reserve; the same, however, cannot be said with reference to other generals (except Chiang Kai-shek), whom it was always necessary to persuade for quite a long time. He does not take an active part in politics; he just executes orders, referring to military matters. He did not receive high military instruction, but acquired by practice a good knowledge of the military art.

[50] The V Army Corps—formerly General Li Fu-lin's Army—does not enjoy the reputation of having fighting capacity. These troops were exclusively busy with fighting bandits and pirates in the delta of the Canton River; these troops themselves are for the most part former bandits. Their military training is very slight; till the end of 1925 no political work was carried on among them. Still, in the beginning of 1926 the organization of this kind of work was actually started. In June 1925 a portion of these troops took part in the defeating of Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops.

The equipment of this army corps was of medium quality; only artillery was almost totally lacking; but the corps had a river flotilla, consisting of about thirty small vessels, one-half of them steam vessels, the others for the most part junks. The vessels were provided with artillery—guns from the most obsolete type to the most modern models; there were, however, very few of the last class. This flotilla was necessary for fighting river pirates. During all the period of their existence, these troops had a continual regular revenue from the population of the area occupied by them, and also from the merchants and ship owners, for protecting their ships from attacks of the pirates; therefore, the supplying of these troops (afterward reorganized into an army corps) was comparatively good.

General Li Fu-lin, commander of this army corps, did not receive any military instruction. He is a former bandit and has distinguished himself, owing to his cunningness and to the support of a part of Cantonese merchants. He disliked the Revolutionary Government, but was clever enough not to give his opinion openly and not to speak of his moving against it. As a contrast to other generals, he was supported [51] by (to say more correctly, was relying upon) the merchants, who were carrying on a trade in the delta of rivers and in the areas menaced by bandits, also the wealthy peasants and land owners of those areas. On this account, the government (and our leaders) also dared not make an open move against him, in order to disarm and disband his army corps, although it knew of his hostile attitude toward itself, because he himself did not give cause for such a move against him. By the end of 1925 the

government prevailed on him to give assent to the organization of political work in his army corps.

The VI Army Corps was organized as late as November 1925 from several separate detachments and regiments. In December it had not yet the full complement but was in the stage of organization. These separate detachments were always very badly equipped and supplied, their fighting capacity was very small, but the value of these troops rests on the fact that, the majority of the soldiers being emigrants from the northern provinces—Shansi [Shensi?], Hupei, Anhui, Kiangsi—they can be very useful in the future, during the anti-North expedition. But it is necessary to improve their equipment and supplies, also to give them a thorough military training and to carry on among them an intensive political work.

General (Ch'en Chim) Ch'eng Ch'ien, commander of this corps, was considered a loyal follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a good member of the Kuomintang Party, but, according to his conviction, he is nearer to the right than to the left elements. He received a high military instruction in the Japanese Military Academy. Till 1925 he was a member of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's government, as minister of war, and took part in all the anti-North expeditions organized by Dr. Sun. He did not play an active part in politics and considers himself a military man and not a politician, but the government and our leaders always thought and think now that he will accomplish all the tasks given him by the Revolutionary Government and will not play traitor.

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's separate division gravitates toward the I (Whampoa) Army Corps, because, during 1925, it took part in the campaigns together with the Whampoa Corps and was subordinated to the latter's headquarters. Political work was
[52] carried on in it, according to the Whampoa standards, but not so intensively. The equipment and supplies of this division are good enough. Its fighting capacity is of a middle quality, but will, of course, increase, after a proper military training and after the appointment of Whampoa School graduates to its commanding posts. This division was considered trustworthy and loyal to the Revolutionary Government.

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, commander of the division, has no military training, but got the possibility of organizing his division, owing to his holding permanently, from 1923 till now, a post of commissioner for public safety of Kwangtung province and chief of police of Canton city. Actually, however, not he himself but his chief of staff, who had received good military instruction in Japan, was in command of this division.

The Military School of the Kuomintang (Whampoa—now Central) was and is the best military unit of the Revolutionary Government. This school was a nucleus from which the revolutionary army (the I Army Corps) grew into a formidable force and around which were grouped all military forces now supporting the Revolutionary Government. The school has been established, at the insistence of our directors, in the beginning of 1924 and was given our special attention. As long as the Revolutionary Government was not set on a firm footing, the school was also taking advantage of our material support. Instruction and education in the school were conducted under the supervision and with the closest participation of our instructors, according to Red Army standards, but in conformity with Chinese conditions. The school was principally concerned with the training of officer-personnel infantry, but had also separate classes for artillery, military engineering, and communications work. Moreover, there have been organized at the same school special courses for political workers and commissaries (party representatives), and also practical courses for commanding staff of the middle grade. The number of cadets of the school fluctuated from 1,000 to 2,000. Ten to 20 percent of the cadets belonged to the Communist Party and Comsomol (Communist Youth Corps), depending on the proportional number of men who were sent to the school by the Central Committee or the local committee of the Communist Party.

[53] General Chiang Kai-shek was appointed president of the school at the time of its establishment and still holds this post; he has been devoting to the school as much of his time as he could spare. During his absence General Hu, his assistant, was put in charge of the school. General Hu [General Ho Ying-ch'in?] is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and a well-read man.

Plans and Projects of the Government and the Military Council

After Kwangtung province had been cleared of counterrevolutionary military forces (by the end of January 1926), the government and the high command drafted a new plan for the military training of the units and for extensive political work among them. Moreover, it is considered necessary to increase the numerical strength of the units; to complete, as far as possible, the equipment and other supplies; and to accumulate a stock of provisions of all kinds and also special funds. All these measures are called forth by the necessity of starting an anti-North expedition, in order to extend the influence and the authority of the Revolutionary Government, in the interests of the Chinese Revolution. Much time is required to carry through all these preparatory measures, but our leaders consider that it is necessary to organize now the anti-North expedition as best as possible, in order that this expedition should not meet with the same failure as did all the previous ones organized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It is also necessary to make Canton and Kwangtung province secure from unexpected dangers from within, as well as from without, but for this purpose it is necessary to create a Central Military School and a specially trustworthy division, upon which the government can rely, in case of necessity. For the purpose of securing the frontiers of the province and fighting bandits and pirates, a certain part of military forces of the government will not take the field. The units, which it is intended to leave in the province, are just the most untrustworthy ones, as regards their commanding officers. Therefore, the government pays particular attention to the political work among these units, in order to diminish the influence of their commanding officers.

Military Industry

There are two arsenals and one powder factory in Kwangtung province. Besides, at [54] the disposal of some generals there were workshops of primitive type for manufacturing cartridges; also, as everywhere in China, there are several workshops of primitive type, making powder for fireworks and rockets.

The arsenal near Canton was the most important source for the supply of munitions. In 1925 the number of workmen was estimated to be about 1,500, but, for want of money, and materials, the work was going very slowly. Actually, about 500 workmen only were working. On an average, the arsenal was manufacturing daily 15-20,000 cartridges, 50-80 rifles, and one machine gun. If capital were available, and if there was the possibility of getting good materials (especially steel), the arsenal could do full work and would become a main source of war materials for the revolutionary army. The arsenal was equipped with German machinery and, till the middle of 1925, the work was going on under the direction of a German engineer. At present the arsenal is under the direction of a Chinese engineer. Supplementary equipment for the arsenal (machines and stands) for 1,500,000 Chinese dollars had been ordered as early as 1923. This equipment was shipped to Canton by the end of 1924, but, as the government had no funds to pay for it, remained in the godown till the end of 1925. The government had the intention to pay for this equipment in the beginning of 1926 and to enlarge the arsenal (to enable it to make small guns and artillery munitions).

The second arsenal was at Swapua (Swatow) [Swabue] and was a source of supplies for the troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming. After his defeat, the arsenal stopped

work, because a part of its machinery and equipment was removed. This arsenal is of a considerably smaller size and is less fully equipped. It was manufacturing mostly cartridges and a certain quantity of rifles. Ch'en Chiung-ming intended to enlarge and equip it more fully, in order to enable it to manufacture machine guns and even small guns, but it had not time to do it. By the end of 1925 there was no exact information concerning manufacturing possibilities of this arsenal. In any case, the government had the intention either to utilize this arsenal, in case a sufficient quantity of its equipment was still av.:ilable, or to merge it into the Canton Arsenal, [55] by removing to that place all remaining equipment and materials.

The powder factory is near Canton. It was manufacturing especially black powder in a quantity sufficient for use of the arsenal. The government and our leaders intended to enlarge and to equip this factory more fully, in order to be able to obtain from it smokeless powder, as well as some chemical products.

Conclusion

At present the Revolutionary Government of the Kuomintang at Canton is more stable than at any previous period of time. The Kuomintang Party, which is the basis of this government, gathered strength and grew into a considerable revolutionary force not only in southern China, but also over the whole of China. The masses of the people, particularly the organized peasants and workmen, are supporting the party and at the same time the government of the Kuomintang.

Owing to the skillful political guidance, even the middle class and small bourgeoisie, especially the merchants who represent a considerable social force in China, are supporting the Revolutionary Government in the south of China. This support is, of course, conditional, and if the economic interests of this part of the population are affected by the government, they will turn against the latter.

The army has been transformed from several independent groups into a more or less centralized whole. During the process of unification, these groups were compelled to waive the privilege of collecting taxes and to consent to the introduction of a political organization. This circumstance alone renders the reverting of the army back into separate groups difficult enough, provided the government does not fall down.

Owing to the consolidation of finances and monopolization of taxation by the government, the economical and financial basis of the latter was strengthened, which is one of the most important achievements of the Revolutionary Government, even as compared with the Central Government in Peking, as the latter cannot by any means [56] prevail on individual generals to put at its disposal the local revenues.

The following are the weak points of the Revolutionary Government: insufficient unity and insufficient stability of the center of the Kuomintang Party, which consists of quite diverse elements of the population and, by its nature, is subject to constant vacillations. For the time being the overwhelming majority of the party center is under the influence of and in alliance with the left wing, i.e., with the Communist Party and Comsomol (Communist Youth Corps) and under our political leadership. But *in case that we make mistakes in our guidance and the left wing becomes too enthusiastic about plans, which are too radical for the present time, then the possibility is not excluded that a split will occur in the center and a considerable part will go over to the side of the right elements*, who, notwithstanding a series of defeats, do not cease the struggle against the radical policy of the Kuomintang and the Revolutionary Government at Canton.

Some time ago the better-class bourgeoisie was able to draw over to its side the middle and the small bourgeoisie, especially the merchants' guilds, and to organize at Canton itself its own military forces—"Merchants Militia" or "Paper Tigers," who turned against the Revolutionary Government, but were suppressed and destroyed by

this government. Now these classes of population, except the better-class bourgeoisie, are supporting the government, but, in case of too radical a policy and mistakes on the part of our political leadership, they might again turn against the Revolutionary Government.

The army is also not yet wholly fashioned in a political sense; individual generals still enjoy considerable influence and, under favorable circumstances, some of them may make a revolt against the Revolutionary Government and unite the malcontent elements of the population under the political slogans of the right Kuomintang. *On the other hand the technical equipment of the army is considerably worse than that of the northern armies, and when the collision with the latter comes, which will inevitably take place, when the influence of the Revolutionary Government spreads to the neighboring provinces*, it is difficult to say, whether the revolutionary ardor and the political consciousness of the Revolutionary Army will successfully hold out against the [57] technical superiority of the enemy; and, of course, the defeat of the Revolutionary Army will give the counterrevolutionaries a favorable opportunity inside Canton itself.

In order that these weak points be not changed into fatal ones, our skillful guidance is necessary, first of all because this guidance plays a great part at Canton. The least mistakes painfully affect the left wing and still more painfully the center and the Revolutionary Government. If our leaders become enthused for measures too radical for China's real conditions, the government will begin to carry them through and provoke the discontent of a part of the population, the discontent of which will be immediately made use of by the opponents of the government among the right Kuomintang, in order to draw over to their side the majority of those elements of the party who belong to the small bourgeoisie, under the slogan of "struggle against bolshevism." That our leadership plays an exceptional part there can be seen from the fact that the Kuomintang Party, such as it exists now, has been created by us, i.e., the program, the regulations, and the forms of constructive work of the party have been worked out under our political leadership, according to the RCP (Russian Communist Party's) standards but in conformity with the conditions prevailing in China. All guidance with regard to the party and the government has been carried on until recently with the closest participation of our political director, and there has not yet been a case, when any measures, proposed by us, were not accepted and put into effect by the government.

For the very short period of existence (two years only) of the party in its organized form, a stable and skillful nucleus to guide the party and the government has not yet been worked out. Therefore, our political leadership has to take into consideration all the elements of social changes, in order to pursue a correct policy.

The left wing of the Kuomintang in the future will have to proceed with great care in regard to an extensive communist work, but, on the other hand, it must concentrate [58] *on the work of organizing peasantry and workmen, under the revolutionary slogans of the left Kuomintang*. These organizations, under the guidance of the left wing, will counterbalance to a considerable extent the right elements and the vacillating center and, moreover, will give the possibility to keep in the future under the influence of our leadership and of the left center the government, consisting of the elements of the center.

It is necessary to carry on political work in the army on a most extensive scale and to try to introduce into the political organs of the army as many workers from the left wing as possible (this is already being done). One must train the army up to the new methods of warfare, i.e., to increase the tactical preparedness of the army. *It is necessary to take all measures to improve the outfitting and supplying and the technical equipment of the army generally. In this respect our material aid is necessary.*

The government already has a definite financial basis and, at the same time, it is

working out plans for the economic development of Kwangtung province, such as construction of Whampoa port, roads of communication, etc. But as yet the government has no proper organ of audit and control; no such organ, however, is in existence elsewhere in China. The embryos of these organs have already been created, but the development of their activity is proceeding very slowly. It is necessary to intensify, through our guidance, the work in this direction, but care should be taken that the Revolutionary Government does not undertake enterprises the execution of which would be beyond its powers, because in that case it would uselessly waste its small means, which could be utilized for other more easy, but also more pressing, undertakings.

Document 27

Organization of the Highest Organs for Administration of the Army

This is an "Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 III, 1926, Canton." It contains three interrelated statutes defining the relationship among, and the responsibilities of, the Political Bureau [Council] of the Kuomintang, the Military Council, and the General Staff. Our version, translated from Russian, was also translated into Chinese and published in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 28-31, from which we published an abbreviated version in *Documents*, p. 205. The present version is superior in having undergone only one translation.

There is an interesting coincidence. A. I. Cherepanov, in the second volume of his reminiscences (*Severnyi*, pp. 75-76; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 206-207, a slightly different translation), describes the military situation in Canton before the March 20 Incident of 1926, and there he says that "A new 'Statute on the Administration of the National Revolutionary Army,' in which the military functions of the Politburo of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the Military Council were defined, was passed." He then mentions that from the membership of the Military Council "a standing commission (actually a presidium) was selected." In our Document 27 the section on the Military Council, item 6, also mentions the Presidium of the Military Council and its membership, while items 7 and 8 describe its responsibilities. The Presidium consists of the president of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war. The first is in charge of questions relating to the political character of the army; the chief inspector is in charge of questions pertaining to organization and training; and the minister of war is in charge of matters relating to supplies and bringing the army up to full strength.

Cherepanov, for his part, correctly names the three persons holding these positions at this time, and then he tells the distribution of responsibilities: Wang Ching-wei was responsible for political questions; T'an Yen-k'ai for supplies and recruiting; and "Chiang Kai-shek concentrated in his hands all the basic things, the organizational and operational questions and the training of the troops." Since Cherepanov had not been in Canton since early in January 1926, having been sent to Peking on the way to home leave, his account in *Severnyi* probably is based on documents, possibly this very one as transmitted in Russian to Moscow and preserved there in archives. Or, he may have learned of it on his return to Canton on April 29, 1926.

TEXT

[1] I. The Political Bureau [Council] of the Kuomintang

1. The Political Bureau of the Kuomintang is the supreme organ of the National Revolutionary Army.
2. The Political Bureau determines the political character of the army.
3. The Political Bureau fixes the budget and the numerical strength of the army.
4. The Political Bureau decides questions of peace and war.

5. The president of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war are appointed by the Political Bureau.

6. The Political Bureau confirms the appointment of the members of the Military Council.

7. The Political Bureau confirms the program of work, which is prepared by the Military Council.

8. The Political Bureau confirms the important decisions of the Military Council on principal questions.

9. The Political Bureau confirms the appointments of the following officials: army corps commanders, chiefs of the central administration, the chief of the Naval Bureau, the chief of the administration of the army air service, and the chief of the Central Military-Political School.

10. The Political Bureau supervises the work of the Military Council and of the National Revolutionary Army. It receives regularly from the president of the Military Council reports relating to these questions.

[2] **II. The Military Council**

1. The Military Council is the highest military organ of the National Revolutionary Army.

2. The Military Council is subordinated to the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang.

3. The Military Council consists of the following officials: president, chief inspector, minister of war, chief of the General Staff, chief of the Political Department (P.U.R.), chief of the administration of supplies, army corps commanders, chief of the Naval Bureau, chief of the administration of the army air service, chief of the Central Military-Political School, commissioner of foreign affairs, commissioner of home affairs, and commissioner of finances.

4. The Military Council examines and approves (1) the plans for military campaigns; (2) the plans for the organization of the army; (3) the plans for bringing the army up to full strength; (4) the plans for the supplies of the army; (5) the plans of training of the officer personnel; (6) the plans of political and military training of the army in general; (7) the plans for military service of officers and soldiers.

Army corps commanders, chiefs of the central administrations, the chief of the Naval Bureau, the chief of the administration of the military air service, and the chief of the Central Military-Political School are appointed by the Military Council.

The Military Council confirms the appointment of divisional commanders and chiefs of units and institutions holding corresponding rank.

5. The Military Council carries on its work in accordance with the plan, which is prepared by the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) and confirmed by the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang.

6. In order to put into effect the plans confirmed by the Military Council, and to [3] direct the routine work of the central administrative departments of the army corps commander, of the chief of the Naval Bureau, of the chief of the administration of the military air service, and of the chief of the Central Military-Political School, the following members of the Military Council constitute a *Presidium* (Permanent Commission of the Military Council): the president of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war.

7. As regards the routine work, the president of the Military Council is in charge of questions relating to the political character of the army; the chief inspector is in charge of questions pertaining to organization and training; and the minister of war is in charge of questions relating to supplies and bringing the army up to full strength.

8. All questions of principle, as well as questions concerning the whole army in

general, are decided according to the resolutions of the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) in corpore.

9. The meetings of the Military Council are called no less than once a week.

10. The meetings of the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) are called as often as necessary, but no less than twice a week.

III. The Central Administration of the National Revolutionary Army


1. The central administration of the National Revolutionary Army, consisting of (1) the General Staff, (2) the Political Department, and (3) the Administration of Supplies, is the working apparatus of the Military Council and its Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council).

[4] 2. The *General Staff* works out, and is in charge of, problems relating to operations, field service, and organization, and also of problems pertaining to training and to bringing the army up to its full strength.

3. The *Political Department* (P.U.R.) is in charge of questions relating to political training of the army and is in charge of providing it with political personnel.

4. The *Administration of Supplies* prepares the plans and is in charge of the supplying of the army.

Administration of the Kuomintang Army



Document 28

General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government

We suspect this document is from the pen of General N. V. Kuibyshev ("Kisan'ka"), who headed the group of Russian military advisers in Canton from November 1, 1925, until his enforced departure on March 24, 1926. This deduction is based on the accusations of some of his colleagues that he pushed the process of centralization of the National Revolutionary Army too rapidly (see Doc. 50, p. 70, and Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 15, 76, 83-84; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 211-12. The first two items, which criticize "Kisan'ka," that is, Kuibyshev, by name, are omitted in the official English version), and on the evident enthusiasm of the writer of Document 28 for the centralization process. Furthermore, the report appears to be an overall summary of most of the more detailed reports in this section, appropriate for the head of a mission. It begins by eulogizing all that has been accomplished in reforming the Nationalists' military organization, but in the last part it reflects the individual studies, which report deplorable inadequacies in arms, ammunition, equipment, and auxiliary services.

TEXT

[1] In the process of the struggle with individual militarists for its existence and subsequently in the struggle for the unification of Kwangtung, the national liberating movement has hammered out an army whose character as well as the ways and methods of its organization are quite different from those of the armed forces of the rest of China. The experiments in erecting military forces that would consciously defend the young national liberating movement and be free of the features of the present Chinese militarism proved a great success. Under very complicated and unstable conditions of continual struggle between various militaristic groups, under the active opposition of imperialism (Hong Kong), in the presence of a great diversity of interests in the forces that constitute the national liberating movement, under many very serious material and technical difficulties, it has proved possible to create on absolutely new principles an armed force which was able to defend the national liberating movement during the most trying period.

The experiment of creating the Whampoa military forces has an enormous political significance for the national liberating movement not only in China, but also in other oriental countries as it exactly indicates to them the path to follow.

A decisive part was played in the victories of the National Government by the Whampoa troops. All that was best in the armed forces of Kwangtung was rallied around them, and after their pattern the whole army of the National Government is now being organized.

[2] The chief weapon of the National Revolutionary Army is its political consciousness and political enlightening. Owing to this weapon, of which the National Government is the only possessor, it will always surpass its opponents even if all other conditions are quite equal.

The second feature which shows the National Revolutionary Army to the best advantage is that all its elements are pursuing one aim through one will. Through the centralization that is now being put in practice, it will be possible to extend throughout the whole army all necessary measures in connection with its administration, organization, and preparation which, if duly carried out, will guarantee the power of the army.

Unification of the command may to no little extent insure success in the armed struggle to come.

At present the amalgamation of the armed forces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi is proceeding; the military apparatus is being centralized; the military economy and military industry are being reorganized; technical means of fighting are being created and developed; expansion of the political work throughout the whole mass of the army is taking place—all of which testifies to the vitality of the National Revolutionary Army and shows the enormous work which is going on within it.

The transition from militarism to the centralized National Revolutionary Army has not happened at one stroke. This process cannot as yet be considered completed. But the fundamental thing is attained, namely, conditions are created under which the ideas of centralization more and more are being recognized by all classes and social groups. Those ideas are considered now as necessary conditions for the further consolidation of the power of the National Revolutionary Government and its army.

There are inevitably many obstacles in this respect. Taking into account the nature of the national liberating movement, defects in the organization of the Kuomintang, scarcity of human revolutionary resources, etc., a great deal of time and effort must necessarily be used for campaigning. However, there is no doubt that the coming period will pass under the motto of the concentration of all efforts in creating [3] the National Revolutionary Army and in the further development of the idea of centralization.

The firm course for centralization puts as a basis of the whole work the question of the higher administration of the National Revolutionary Army. Before this question is satisfactorily settled, no work in connection with the centralization of the army will be possible. If the Military Council of the National Revolutionary Army enjoys a sufficient authority within and without the army, the same cannot be said of the General Staff, the organ on which properly speaking the whole burden of work in connection with carrying out the idea of centralization is resting. So far, the General Staff with its departments of inspectors has not yet won popularity in the army, nor could it get in touch with military units; still less has it been able to direct the work in connection with administration, preparedness, etc.

The problem of the present moment is to carry out a series of measures in order to enable the influence of the General Staff to penetrate into the army and to intensify its work in connection with the preparation of necessary plans for operations and mobilization and to take other measures in connection with preparedness for war, as well as to solve a series of questions relating to the centralization of the army. For all that, the mere fact of existence of the General Staff, the Political Department, the Department of Supply, etc., shows that in the question of high military command the National Revolutionary Army is ahead of any army in China.

Worthy of being mentioned is the fact of adoption by the whole army of a plan of regular supply of finances, artillery material, etc. through the central military organs. Day by day one observes a gradual departure from the most characteristic features of the Chinese militarism. The National Revolutionary Army acquires step by step all qualities of a regularly administered army. All its large units (corps, division) [4] as well as tactical units (regiment, company) are formed on the basis of a united organization and distributed in accordance with a definite plan of distribution of troops. In twenty divisions of the National Revolutionary Army (six corps and two

separate divisions of three regiments each) stationed now in various places of the territory of Kwangtung, there are 65,000 rifles (100,000 men), 370 machine guns, 70 artillery guns.

The complement, political trustiness and fighting preparedness, in the various army corps may differ. The 1st, 2d, and 4th corps are to some extent better than the rest.

The bringing up to full strength of the National Revolutionary Army is being carried out through recruiting, which is not yet centralized and is in hands of the army corps commanders. The enlisted personnel are in general homogeneous, a difference is noticeable only in the degree of the political training of various units. The soldier is extremely unpretentious and most enduring. He yields to discipline and political training and in general is splendid fighting material. The least attention shown to him will be returned a hundredfold.

The commissioned personnel as a whole are unsatisfactory. The majority of them are devoid of strong will and firmness of character. They are very irresolute in their actions, prefer to avoid fighting, and their tactical training is most insufficient. Young officers, graduates of the Whampoa School, possess resolution, energy, and impulse (impetus), but have no service and fighting experience. Still, the National Revolutionary Army possesses in them the best younger commanding personnel in China.

The material equipment of the Army is in a lamentable state. Some 20,000 rifles are needed. Thirty-six percent of all existing rifles need to be replaced. Not less than [5] 50 percent of rifles have no bayonets. The stock of cartridges is insufficient—250-600 per rifle. Not more than 30 percent of machine guns can be considered in good condition. Artillery consists only of mountain guns of small caliber (75 mm, 57 mm, 47 mm, and 37 mm) of obsolete models, which had long ago come into disuse in other armies. Only about 50 percent of those guns still possess more or less passable ballistic qualities, the rest being completely worn out and having no value. Firing is only possible with direct aiming from open positions. There are only 30-60 shells (very old) per gun.

The most important arm of the National Revolutionary Army is the infantry. Here it is in a very real sense the "queen of the campaigns." But the equipment of the infantry with artillery and other technical equipment is in some cases less than that during the epoch of Napoleon. Roughly speaking, we have in the National Revolutionary Army one gun for every 1,000 men, one machine gun for every 250 men, one heavy machine gun for every 750 men.

Aviation and communications (technical) are in an embryonic state. Cavalry and armored forces are not of much use on the local theater of military operations. The sea fleet, on account of its condition, is able to carry out only missions of strictly local character. Service of sanitation is of the lowest grade. Supply service and General Staff work are just being arranged.

The fighting preparedness of the National Revolutionary Army is not of a high standard and cannot be even critically discussed from the European point of view. Still, it is higher than that of its probable nearest enemy (at least up to the Yangtze River). Field training and firing exercises are being carried out on approximately the same principles as in the Russian Army before the great war. Preparation of auxiliary kinds of troops (except artillery) is being taught, with a few exceptions, only to the commissioned personnel and noncommissioned officers.

The military education is now centralized. Army corps schools are being closed, and the Central Military-Political School will be the only service school.

[6] Fighting experience and certain traditions of the National Revolutionary Army have been acquired in the last three or four campaigns. The army has now a great confidence in its strength. The idea of the inevitability of liberation of all China from militarism and imperialism (northern expedition) is entering gradually its

thoughts.

Existence of the National Revolutionary Army and its future activity are not separated now from the destinies of the national liberating movement. In this respect we are able to say that we have an army that recognizes that it exists only for the people and not against the people.

Document 29

The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War

[1] The training of an army for war must be carried out in accordance with its armament and the armament of its probable enemy. The probable theater of war must be also taken into consideration.

The National Revolutionary Army and its next adversaries are armed with magazine rifles, a rather small quantity of machine guns (6-10 to a regiment) and artillery guns (from 6 to 24 to a corps, mostly obsolete mountain guns), very few and often rather useless technical communication equipment. Cavalry is completely absent. The number of other auxiliary and special troops is so insignificant that they are quite unimportant.

For this reason the training of the National Revolutionary Army must be conducted approximately according to the same standards as the training of the European armies before the great war, adding to it the political instruction. In this stage it will probably have to remain for quite a long time because while in the West the introduction of powerful technical equipment radically changed the tactics and conformably the training of the troops, in South China the extensive use of technical means will be hindered, on the one hand, by the lack of railways and the poverty of the government, and on the other hand by the special conditions in the theater of war, by the absence of roads, and by the fact that the regions are infested with bandits who make it impossible to supply the army regularly from the rear.

Though the training is done in a comparatively primitive manner, the troops are even from this viewpoint by far not sufficiently prepared for war. The reason for it is the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of the old officer-personnel, and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior officers, who are graduates of the schools of the National Revolutionary Army. Besides, the drill regulations and the [2] textbooks on tactics which the army uses are extracts compiled from the German and Japanese regulations which were used in those armies in the beginning of this century and which do not agree with the methods of modern warfare. There are, moreover, several kinds of military terminologies which the officers use indiscriminately; this also hinders much the training of the troops. It is therefore necessary to revise the old regulations (this work has already been started), to "jack" up the commanding officers, and to make exercises more effective.

There is almost no military literature in China and the few books that exist are not used by the majority of the officers.

The training is being done in each corps separately. The General Staff, however, will soon issue a general training program. Each corps has now its own program, but it is carried out inconsistently and there are often no training schedules in the companies. The higher commanders pay little attention to the manner in which the training is done and the junior officers seldom account to their superiors for the work they are doing. This lack of control brings about an incomplete and irrational waste of time that should be used for instructions.

Considered from our standpoint the training is even below any criticism; but it must be considered that the training of the troops which the National Revolutionary

Army had to fight was, in the best case, the same or even worse. The same can be said of the probable next adversaries. But considering that the task of the National Revolutionary Army goes beyond the struggle with neighbors and that it will probably have to do with the better prepared armies of central and North China, the training must be considerably improved, so much the more as under the present conditions (of which I shall speak farther on) this is, if not quite, then at least to a great degree possible.

A critical examination of the training for war will doubtless show that many things must be improved and even changed altogether, but no conclusion should be [3] drawn that the National Revolutionary Army is at present unfit for war (the preparedness of the "Whampoa" units is a little better than that of the rest of the army).

The method of instruction is absolutely irrational. In the training program prepared by the Chinese too much time is given to drill. About four and a half hours daily are given to instruction in classes where, besides the political instruction and the teaching of regulations, too much time is spent on the theory of shooting and even of field service. This proves, first, that there is a tendency toward training for the parade ground, and second, that the method of lecturing is quite irrationally applied to the illiterate Chinese soldier, instead of the method of practical instruction on the range and in the field. The exercises are carried out indolently according to the old established routine, without any interest on the part of the commanders and the soldiers, both of whom seem to be carrying out a boresome fatigue duty. It is worth noting that very little attention is being paid by the commanders to faults and very little is being done to correct them, and that the critiques of tactical exercises, though being practiced, bear the character of reports of the commanders and not of a discussion.

The present methods of training of the National Revolutionary Army, as far as its principal objects are concerned (political instruction, drill, shooting, and athletics), is approximately as follows, being slightly better in the 1st Corps.

1. Political instruction (see separate report).

2. *Drill.* In spite of the fact that much time is being spent on drill, it leaves much to be desired. Its chief defects are the lack of soldierly bearing and of cleanliness, which also applies to the officers. The commands are not properly executed; after the execution of the command the men continue moving. When a command is badly executed, the soldiers correct the defects themselves as much as they can. Stopping the drill after a badly executed command in order to explain it and to have it repeated until it is properly done is not sufficiently often done. The result is that the [4] soldiers are not accustomed to paying attention to the exercises and are learning very little by executing them. Such a manner of drilling fails also to accomplish one of the chief aims—the discipline in the ranks and discipline in general. As has been already mentioned, attention is chiefly paid to the showy side, i.e., to marching. The Chinese army marches in a particular manner which is something between the German and the Japanese parade march, which at first sight looks rather ridiculous. But in spite of the passion for marching, the soldiers in closed ranks march badly, without keeping the direction and a straight line. The drill ground formations and marches are also executed badly and without "snap."

The rifle drill is not executed with precision. The manner in which the rifle is made ready for shooting shows lack of knowledge.

Deployment in skirmishes is effected in a routine manner; intervals are not kept, adapting to the terrain is badly done, and, which is very significant, the commanders only strive to keep as much as possible an ideal alignment.

It is necessary to issue a detailed drill schedule, separating the essential from the less important; to improve the bearing and to raise the discipline, by means of cor-

recting the faults, and to obtain a precise execution of the commands by explaining how it should be done.

3. *Shooting*. The low standard of shooting is clearly shown by the paltry losses which are inflicted. For instance, in a two-hour battle in which 10-11,000 cartridges were fired, the casualties usually amounted to about ten or twenty men or even less.

The knowledge of the rifle itself and the cleaning and keeping in order of it is almost satisfactory.

The handling of the rifles when getting ready for shooting is carried out in such a way that it is evident that the soldiers do not understand their proper manipulation. There are no dummy cartridges at all, and the men are therefore not taught how to [5] load and do not know how to handle the bolt. The soldiers are also ignorant as to the proper use of the sight; they cannot estimate the distance to the target and are simply incapable of setting it off in meters (into which the sight is graduated).

Of all preparatory exercises for shooting, only aiming from a sand bay to a point on the controlling triangle is practiced, and not until lately have the advisers introduced into some units aiming stands and controlling mirrors.

The officers pay no attention to the manner in which the trigger is pulled and never control it. Therefore, this essential condition of accurate shooting is lacking completely. In general, the whole preparatory training for shooting is carried out without proper understanding, and the commanding officers do not recognize its importance. Thus the soldier comes to the range having had no training in all those essentials which would lead to good shooting.

The percentage of hits is very insignificant: at 100 meters 10 percent hit the target; at 70 meters, 50 percent are misses. This is partly explained also by the fact that the rifles are mostly in bad condition and have not been tested, so that even naturally good marksmen cannot hit the target. As for the testing of rifles, the officers have no idea of it.

Lastly, the shooting exercises are carried out without any system. They are not divided into preparatory, training, and combat exercises. The first exercise begins often from a distance of 300 meters and in general all exercises are quite useless. Combat firing is not practiced at all.

Before regular shooting exercises are started, it will be necessary to have the rifles tested. First precision must be attained in handling the rifle, and systematic training with aiming stands must be practiced. Then shooting must begin in the simplest manner and end in combat firing, at least in squads.

4. *Training for field service.* Of all kinds of training, the training for field service is most neglected. It is useless and even impossible to dwell minutely in this report on all defects of this most important branch of training. I shall speak only of [6] the principal and most typical defects. One of the principal defects is the lack of reconnoitering. In the Chinese army the chief sources of information are the questioning of the local inhabitants and spying, which is also done through local inhabitants. The troops usually send out scouts only a few hundred meters ahead. Therefore the commander is never exactly informed about the enemy. The communication between units, with neighboring organizations and headquarters is mostly done on foot and is carried out very inefficiently. The sending of written reports from small units to their regiments is almost not practiced at all. Mutual support does not exist, and moving in the direction where shots are fired, to assist a neighboring unit, is never done. Owing to the lack of communications, the control is generally wanting, especially in battles; it is done by signals. Probably owing to the lack of reconnaissance and to the fact that night marches are rarely made, outpost duty and advance guards on the march are done very poorly. The soldiers are badly prepared for the field service and do not know the duties relating to this service, as they are taught these duties in the class and very seldom in the field. The chief defect is that the

soldiers do not know how to adapt themselves to the terrain. The targets and the necessary sight setting are not indicated exactly, if at all, during battles, and the commanders have no idea of fire control.

Tactical exercises are arranged unsatisfactorily and are carried out in a routine manner. The problems have an occasional character and are not carefully prepared. They are carried out in the same routine and careless manner. The mistakes are overlooked and the critiques are of a purely formal character.

The task of improving the training for war will be the most difficult one, for it will be necessary to replace some of the tactics to which the commanders are accustomed and to have them adopt modern tactics, which conform to modern warfare. [7] It will be necessary to issue new programs and instructions and to teach the officers to understand correctly and clearly the aims of different exercises and problems and to notice and correct all mistakes. Regular reconnoitering, keeping up communication, sending in of reports, and controlling the battle and the fire will have to be introduced.

5. *Athletics.* Athletics are completely neglected in the Chinese army, although the soldiers are very clumsy (e.g., they do not know at all how to jump). Time allotted to athletics is seldom to be found in the training schedules and there is only one instructor to a company. It is therefore natural that the movements are made drowsily and incorrectly, and as they are never corrected, they do not develop the muscles and the energy but rather weaken the latter. There is no athletic equipment and no facilities for field sports.

It is necessary to have the athletics before lunch and to divide them into calisthenics, gymnastics on apparatus, and field sports. The simplest equipment ought to be procured and facilities for field sports arranged for this purpose.

Conclusion. The present sketch of the training of the National Revolutionary Army shows that during the two years' work of the Group (South China Group of Soviet instructors), very little has been accomplished as regards the results that might be expected from the training. This is explained by the fact that the situation prevented the advisers for a long time from taking up this problem, their attention being drawn to other matters. Only after the latest eastern campaign it became possible to take this matter systematically in hand. At present the regulations are being revised and a plan of exercises with necessary instructions is almost completed.

This forms *the basis of the further work of the advisers in the units.*

[8] It must be once more emphasized that in spite of the defects in training, the National Revolutionary Army is quite fit for war. As the standard of its possible adversaries is also rather low, each progress made will give it an advantage over the enemy. A maximum of attention must therefore be paid to this work. This work is great and minute and it requires constant watching of the units. It is therefore evident that *without having at least one adviser to a division, no substantial results can be expected from this work.*

Document 30

Characteristics of the Officer Personnel of the Army

[1] Procurement

Until recent times the procurement of officers for the National Revolutionary Army was carried out in the usual Chinese way. Commanders of divisions, brigades, or regiments invited for service in their units officers they knew, sometimes from distant provinces. Since 1911 there has been no distribution throughout the country in accordance with a definite scheme of the government of officers who were graduates of military schools. Young officers, graduates of provincial military schools, usually enter the service of the armies of the respective tuchüns or provincial militarists. The best military school in China, which was in Paotingfu (Chihli), and which had a character of a central school, does not function anymore. During the last few years that school was under Wu P'ei-fu, and many of the graduates of that school served in his army and until the present time remain his adherents. The majority of them are in the northern armies. The officers in the south of China are chiefly natives of the southern provinces and followers of Dr. Sun, who were formerly invited by him or came to him of their own accord, and also others who have been invited during the last few years by individual generals. Graduates of the Paotingfu School have much better training than officers with a military education obtained in a provincial school. The Paoting graduates all know each other and have in Canton their own association and a club. A year ago there were 300 members in that association. Besides graduates of the Paoting School, there are in the National Revolutionary Army graduates of military schools of Yunnan (formerly the best of all provincial military schools) and of Kiangsu. There are also a few higher officers who were educated in Japan (Officers School). Finally, there are in the National Revolutionary Army about 800 officers who are graduates of the "Whampoa" School (now, the Central Military-Political School), who are mostly platoon, company, and battalion commanders. Those officers have played an important part during the period of organization of the fundamental units of the National Revolutionary Army, the so-called Whampoa troops, [2] and also in the campaigns against Ch'en Chiung-ming and the Yunnanese. By having revolutionary spirit, energy, and impetus they greatly differ from the rest of the officers' body. There are many communists among them (6 percent). The chief defect of this class of officers is the lack of service and fighting experience. However, those young officers must become a foundation of the National Revolutionary Army. There is no exact information as to the number of officers of various classes in other corps. The great majority of regimental commanders are graduates of the Paoting School. Among generals the percentage of graduates of the Paoting School is the greatest. The graduates of the Whampoa School are in the majority in the 1st Corps and in the 2d and 20th separate divisions. Before the Central Military-Political School (the former "Whampoa" School) was opened, there were military schools in the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th corps. The terms of instruction in these schools were six months, and the graduates were appointed platoon commanders. At the present time all those schools are being liquidated, and the National Revolutionary Army has established the "only" Central Military-Political School.

Living Conditions of Officers

Material conditions of the officers are far from advantageous. Salaries are very seldom paid in full and on time. On an average, an officer receives not more than thirty to forty dollars per month, and that inevitably drives officers to embezzlement of public funds.

The monthly pay of officers (in the 1st Corps) is as follows:

Colonel, $216-240
Lieutenant Colonel, $180-198
Major, $160-180
Captain, $80-100
1st Lieutenant, $56-72
[3] 2d Lieutenant, $40-50
Warrant Officer, $20-35

There are no prescribed rules or regulations for promotion, for the support of families, pensions, etc. Plans are being drafted now.

Document 31

Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel

[1] Recruiting

The matter of recruiting the enlisted personnel of the army is not as yet centralized, nor is it regulated by legislation of the government. It is completely in the hands of the high commanders of military units. The principal method of procurement is recruiting, which is carried out in various ways in the provinces in accordance with personal discretion of respective army corps commanders and sometimes divisional commanders. For instance, the Whampoa units (former party troops, now the 1st Army Corps) were usually recruited exclusively from northerners, chiefly from the provinces of Chekiang (the native place of General Chiang Kai-shek himself), Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Shantung. Some Chinese generals explained this by the comparative cheapness of labor in the North, because of the great unemployment in the above provinces. According to the opinion prevailing among the higher and middle-ranking officers, the natives of Kwangtung are very poor material for the army and the Cantonese are very bad soldiers. They always were autonomists, have nothing to do with China as a whole, and are only able to defend their own province. For that reason, in the opinion of the majority of Chinese generals, for a northern expedition it is better to dispatch the units composed of northern soldiers. As regards the former wars in Kwangtung, the majority of militarist generals from other provinces always preferred to recruit soldiers from their native provinces, because a soldier from another province could not desert with his rifle, as he did not know the local dialect and was almost unable to exist outside of his military unit. In such units, officers were procured also from the same province, had close contact with the soldiers, and as a whole always followed their "boss," the fellow countryman-general. Such conditions partly still exist in 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th army corps.

The 2d Army Corps is wholly composed of the natives of Hunan (it is the former
[2] army of General T'an Yen-k'ai), and at present the men are still being recruited from Hunan.

The 3d Army Corps consists mostly of Yunnanese (the commander of the corps, General Chu P'ei-te, is a native of Yunnan).

The 4th Army Corps consists of the natives of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (the commander of the corps, General Li Chi-shen, is a native of Kwangsi).

The 5th Army Corps consists of Cantonese (the commander of the corps, General Li Fu-lin, is a Cantonese).

In the 1st Army Corps the enlisted personnel is mixed: the 1st Division is composed of natives of Chekiang and Kiangsu. The 3d Division consists of natives of Hunan, Kwangtung, and Anhwei. The 14th Division is composed of Cantonese. The 1st Army Corps usually recruits soldiers in the North, chiefly in Shanghai.

The 6th Army Corps consists of natives of Hunan, Kwangtung, and Hupei (the commander of the corps, General Ch'eng Ch'ien, is a native of Hunan).

So far the recruiting in the army corps is carried out by the commanders themselves by enlisting men from their native provinces. However, this system at present is not so strictly followed as formerly. Very often generals incorporate into their units

officers and men who have surrendered or have been taken prisoner. Still, the principal method of getting replacements is recruiting through special agents who for that purpose are sent with necessary funds to the regions fixed beforehand.

Formerly mostly professional soldiers were recruited. At present, men who never were in military service such as workmen, peasants, unemployed coolies, and also brigands are being enlisted.

The soldiers enlist for one or two years, with transportation and food at the expense of the recruiting agent, i.e., at the expense of the respective military unit. To recruit a soldier in the North and to bring him to Canton costs an average of fifteen to twenty dollars.

It takes the recruiting agents about two months to bring recruited men from Hunan and Chekiang. The recruits are brought in parties of 200 to 300 men on small [3] Chinese steamers under very bad conditions. The recruiting in Hunan, Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Anhwei as well as the transporting of recruits are being done secretly. Formerly some individual attempts to recruit men were made in the "revolutionary" districts Kuoming [Kaoming?] and Haifen [Haifeng] of Kwangtung, but this was not done on a large scale and did not bring any tangible results.

Physical Condition

It is quite obvious that with such a system of recruiting, any selection of men is out of the question. Those who are first met with are enlisted, and very often sick and physically undeveloped men are recruited. The consequence is that there are many men in the army who are sick, physically weak, and unfitted for military service. The absence of no [*sic*] selection at all during the recruiting is also noticed in respect to the moral state of the recruits: that is criminal, depraved elements, professional soldiers, etc. are very often enlisted into the army.

Living conditions of the soldiers: The soldiers on the whole are extremely unpretentious. For many of them two or three bowls of rice a day and clothing is, in comparison with their former conditions of living, a very alluring prospect. Regular pay, satisfactory equipment, and tolerable lodging conditions can work miracles. So far we have not attained satisfactory results in that respect in the National Revolutionary Army. Although the food and equipment of the soldiers are comparatively sufficient, the lodging conditions and especially regularity in giving them pay are far from satisfactory.

At the present time the monthly pay is as follows:

2d class private, $10
1st class private, $10.50
Corporal, $11
Junior noncommissioned officer, $12
Senior noncommissioned officer, $14
Sergeant, $20

[4] The above figures show the pay in the 1st Army Corps. In several units of other army corps, privates of the 2d class receive $8 per month. Of this sum, the cost of monthly subsistence, i.e., $5 to $6, must be deducted, so that privates of the 2d class (who form by far the majority) get $4 in Cantonese small money per month. At the time of enlistment, the soldier (or his family) receives from the agent a small sum (about $10 to $15). When, after expiration of his enlistment, the soldier is discharged, he receives about the same amount and some money for traveling expenses to his home. However, these conditions are not observed everywhere. Some legislation of the government in this respect is necessary.

Term of Enlistment

There are no fixed regulations for soldiers with respect to serving their terms. Under local conditions, this question is not one of great importance. Promotion of a soldier to the next grade depends exclusively on his nearest commander and is only considered from a material standpoint. In the course of time, this question will no doubt become of more importance and will need special attention.

Document 32

Organization of an Army Corps and Its Component Units

[1] A. An *army corps* is the largest tactical unit in the National Revolutionary Army. According to the original idea, a corps must be sufficiently independent, in order to be able to carry separate fighting missions. Tactically, a corps carries out a definite fighting mission in a section of the front or on the whole front; it therefore must be an independent unit. It is a Chinese custom to call a corps "army"; this designation has some ground, because army corps are entirely independent units, have nothing in common such as enlisted personnel and arms with other army corps.

B. Even now there is in the National Revolutionary Army no uniform organization of army corps. There is no such uniformity not only in the details of the internal organization, but also in the number and numerical strength of units that compose an army corps. Some army corps are made up of two divisions; and there are army corps that, according to regulations, are composed of three divisions, and finally some army corps consist of four divisions. In some army corps there is an artillery regiment, in others, only an artillery battalion. In view of such differences in the organization of the units that compose an army corps, it is impossible to give a comprehensive account of the organization of an army corps.

The reasons for such differences lie for instance in the fact that it is still impossible to make army corps of equal strength as regards the artillery, because it would be necessary to withdraw artillery guns from one army corps and to pass them on to another. There are, however, some common features of the organization; e.g., [2] infantry units, which compose regiments and smaller units, are organized, approximately, according to the same scheme, with slight exceptions.

C. As a rule, an army corps is composed of the following units, which are subordinated directly to the corps commander: divisions (from two to four), army corps staff, political section, and gendarmerie battalion. Subordinated directly to the chief of staff: the administration of supplies, the engineer section, the sanitary section, and the artillery battalion. The commander of the artillery battalion is also the commander of the corps' artillery. It can be seen from the above that subordinated to the corps commander are five to seven officers, and also four officers whom he may transfer to the chief of staff. The artillery is concentrated in the army corps; as there is a limited quantity of artillery in the whole army, it is necessary to secure its proper distribution and direction during the time of war.

In view of the fact that (as has been mentioned before) the composition of army corps differs, their numerical strength is fluctuating from 12,000 to 23,000 dependent upon the number of divisions.

As the army corps is a complete unit, the administration of supplies gets everything necessary from the central administration and then makes the distribution to the various units independently.

D. The organization of a *division* is more exact and definite. A division is made up of three regiments. As a unit, a division is composed almost exclusively of infantry; it is provided with no technical equipment except machine guns and has only small engineer and communication sections.

E. The organization of a *regiment* is even more definite. Although an attempt has

been made in some divisions to organize regiments consisting of four battalions, as a [3] rule, there are no regiments composed of sixteen companies. A regiment is made up of three battalions or nine companies. Each regiment must have a machine gun company, but the number of machine guns varies and is dependent upon the total number of machine guns available in the army corps. Machine guns are at the disposal of the regimental commander; in wartime they are distributed to the platoons of the battalions.

According to its nature, a regiment is a fundamental unit which can fulfill an independent fighting mission.

In addition to three infantry battalions, the regimental commander has at his disposal a machine gun company, a scout company, a headquarters company, and a sanitary detachment.

F. A regiment is made up of three *battalions*, each of which consists of three *companies*; each company is divided into three *platoons*.

A company has no arms except rifles.

[We omit six charts showing the composition of units in the National Revolutionary Army. An infantry *company*: 125 men—5 officers, 11 noncommissioned officers, 90 combat soldiers, 19 noncombatants; a *battalion*: 397 men—19 officers, 37 NCOs, 274 combat soldiers, 67 noncombatants; a *regiment*: 1,666 men—102 officers, 171 NCOs, 981 combat soldiers, 412 noncombatants; a *division*: 5,347 men—2 generals, 375 officers, 555 NCOs, 3,198 combat soldiers, and 1,419 noncombatants. The fifth chart shows the complements of units attached to a corps or an independent division: staff, 328; supply section, 142; communications, 81; engineer section, 4; political section, 38; headquarters company, 129; artillery battalion, 285; for a total of 1,401 officers and men. The last chart calculates the numbers in a corps of two divisions to be 11,553; of three divisions, 17,105; and of four divisions, 22,652. We assume these are ideal, or approved table of organization, numbers.]

[8] There is no *cavalry* as a special branch of the service in the National Revolutionary Army. The total absence of cavalry in the whole of South China can be considered as an established fact. The following are the principal reasons: (1) the lack of horses, especially in Kwangtung province; (2) the character of terrain: mountainous, with marshy paddy fields, which renders the use of the cavalry impossible. Mounted courier service is also very much hindered by the character of terrain and roads, which are simply footpaths. But mounted men can be used to maintain communication with the rear of the army. There is not the least doubt that the probable enemies (Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, and the other provinces in the Yangtze River valley) are also lacking cavalry.

The use of the *artillery* is very limited on account of the absence of roads and the lack of horse or mechanical traction. As the roads are simply footpaths and the traction-power is provided by men, it is possible to use only light mountain guns of small caliber (45, 57, 75 mm) suitable for transportation, but even these only in limited numbers. Therefore, the army corps have only one artillery regiment or even only one artillery battalion.

Great distances, mountainous terrain, the mobile warfare, short duration of battles, absence of heavy artillery, and heavy loads—all these circumstances render the use of *engineer* units and particularly of *sappers'* units very limited. It is considered sufficient to have one sappers' company (for the construction of roads and bridges) in the division without a corresponding unit in the regiment. In fact, however, engineer units are almost totally lacking in the National Revolutionary Army.

[9] The importance of *communication* is increasing. The radio can be very widely used. Communication between various corps and between a corps and the high command can be maintained only by radio and, occasionally, by permanent telegraph lines. The field telegraph must be widely used.

Document 33

Organization and Function of Army Staffs

[1] The introduction of the new organization of army staffs (in army corps, divisions, and regiments) in the National Revolutionary Army was started about two months ago (in the 1st Army Corps, since the summer of 1925).

There were, of course, staffs in the National Revolutionary Army even before that time, but they did not carry on staff work in the proper sense of the word. Judging by the character of their work, they were rather the offices of commanding officers, in which no one (not excluding the chief of staff) had specified duties.

In view of the fact that formerly the army consisted actually of mercenary troops, commanders of military units had more independence and did not execute orders of the high command without reserve; therefore, there could not be any question of centralization or of real staff work. The chief of staff merely executed orders and staff officers were simply given certain work to do or were more or less qualified clerks. There was no control, no guidance. It is clear, therefore, that there are at present no properly trained chiefs of staff or staff officers.

In view of the aforementioned circumstances and the comparative facility of administering military units, which consist almost exclusively of infantry, it was necessary, during the reorganization of the army, to introduce the simplest forms of organization for army staffs.

In the army corps staff a secretary (as required, in accordance with the Chinese custom) and an adjutant are attached to the chief of staff.

The staff itself consists of four departments: (1) the Operations Department, (2) the Adjutants' Department, (3) the Sanitary Department, and (4) the Communications [2] Department.

The *Operations Department* is subdivided into three sections: (1) *Operations Section*, which carries on operations and is in charge of questions relating to military preparation and maps (three officers and two clerks); (2) *Intelligence Section*, which is in charge of questions relating to intelligence (two officers and two clerks); (3) *Section* in charge of *combat personnel* (one officer and one clerk). All the work is coordinated by the chief of the Operations Department, who also acts as deputy chief of staff.

The *Adjutants' Department* is the administrative department of the staff (in the 1st Army Corps, however, both Administrative Department and Adjutants' Department exist separately), which through the *Section of General Activities* is in charge of the control and distribution of personnel and enlistments. According to Chinese traditions, it also executes various commissions, especially of an economic kind. Attached to this department are in addition the Headquarters Company and the Company of Musicians. The Adjutants' Department, besides the chief of the department, is composed of six adjutants of various grades and three clerks.

The *Sanitary Department* consists of senior army corps surgeon and his office and fulfills the functions of the sanitary inspector.

The *Communications Department* is in fact the communications battalion, but the chief of this department has the right of technical control over all communication units in an army corps.

Moreover, attached to the army corps staff is a reserve personnel for posts of high command, consisting of ten men.

The chief of staff must always receive reports about the progress of work in the administration of supplies and in the engineer and artillery battalions (engineer regiment).

[We skip similar details on divisional and regimental staffs.]

[3] From the above, it may be seen that the organization of army staffs is very simple and their duties are also small. The following duties are the most important ones: to check up the fighting personnel and the army personnel generally, according [4] to the simplest forms; to introduce some plan and system into the work of military preparations; to systematize and prepare intelligence data (the army corps carry on intelligence work in neighboring provinces, but the information acquired is not being utilized to the full extent); to be able to utilize properly auxiliary troops. But the most important duty of army staffs is to direct as fully as possible the lower units and to maintain the most intimate liaison with the staff of the higher unit.

Even these most simple duties, however, so far could not be done properly because (as has already been pointed out above) this work is quite new; there is no trained personnel nor is there the habit of executing orders exactly and of making reports.

Provided, however, that the work of the General Staff is carried on properly and the support of the advisers is given, this work must in the near future yield results.

Document 34

Report on Sanitary Conditions in the National Revolutionary Army of the Canton Government as of March 15, 1926

[1] General Characteristics of the Organization of the Sanitary Service

With a few exceptions the sanitary conditions in the National Revolutionary Army are unsatisfactory as regards the medical organization as well as the state of health of the army itself. Therefore the problem of the present and the future is to improve these conditions and to change the existing state of things under which the units have to provide their own medical assistance, which is wholly inadequate.

The Sanitary Inspection [Inspectorate] (a part of the General Staff of the army) was so far unable to issue instructions to the sanitary organizations of the army because it did not know what was going on in these organizations and had no idea as to the amount of sickness in the army. The local institutions were functioning quite independently of the central sanitary organization (the Inspection).

The result was that the troops were almost completely lacking medical assistance. They went to the front with occasionally hired physicians and without medical supplies. There was no organized first aid in battles, or it was done in a primitive way and inefficiently.

The medical institutions of Canton and other towns of Kwangtung province were supplied according to the generosity of the commander of the local troops, and they were unworthy of being called hospitals as they completely lacked proper hygiene and sanitation.

[2] At present medical establishments are being distributed among the troops stationed in different places, and the establishments are provided with the necessary staff. Measures are being taken to have them properly organized and to supply troops and the fleet with dispensaries.

The Medical Personnel

As no attention has been paid to the medical personnel and its qualifications, a very great percentage of the army physicians were found insufficiently prepared for the sanitary service. At present lists of physicians are being prepared and they have to pass examinations; but the result is that there are few physicians qualified for the service. For instance, after examination of nineteen physicians of the 2d Corps, only two were found satisfactory—the rest will have to be sent to the newly opened school for physicians at the Central Hospital for a course of one year, pending which they can do only the work of assistant surgeons in the army.

When the medical personnel was being examined it also appeared that the physicians were not properly distributed among the corps. The 1st Corps proved to be better provided as regards the qualification of the medical personnel (90 percent were recognized as qualified for the medical work in the army). The other corps (the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th) have up to 60 percent of unfit physicians according to a preliminary report of the inspectorate. The Sanitary Inspectorate and the Central Hos-

pital at Canton have some good physicians who owing to their knowledge and experience may be employed for the organization of the service.

The Present Organization of the Medical Service in the Army and Navy

The organization of the medical and sanitary service in the units is at present as follows: (a) the navy, the air service, and the engineering school have no dispensaries and send their sick men straight to the Central Hospital at Canton; (b) the arsenal has a dispensary with ten beds; (c) 1st Corps—2 hospitals at Canton (at Tungshan, 520 beds, and at Pakan, 420 beds), and one hospital at Swatow (250 beds); (d) the school [3] "Whampoa"—a dispensary with 60 beds; (e) the 2d Corps—a dispensary; (f) the 3d Corps—a hospital at Canton (which is being disbanded); (g) the 4th Corps—has nothing; (h) the 5th Corps—a dispensary on the island Honam; (i) the 6th Corps—a dispensary.

At Canton there is the Central Hospital with an annex, altogether 500 beds, for the needs of the garrison, of the fleet, and of special units and other organizations of Canton. The above-mentioned hospitals are better than the other military medical establishments as concerns the sanitary conditions; their chief defect is the unfitness of the buildings in which they are established (former Chinese temples). At the Central Hospital the records of the patients have now been put in good order.

Two other Canton hospitals which belonged formerly to the 1st Corps (altogether 940 beds) have now been handed over to the Sanitary Inspectorate, their monthly expenses having been cut down by 50,000 dollars. The hospitals of other corps (at Honam and Swatow) are poorly organized and in an unsanitary condition.

According to the peacetime budget, it is planned to reorganize and to keep up three central hospitals (the present central hospital and the former two hospitals of the 1st Corps) with 500 beds each at a cost of 36,000 dollars for all three. In places where troops are concentrated at Swatow—the 1st Corps, at Shaokuan—the 2d Corps, at Siaotsiu—the 4th Corps, at "Whampoa" (the school), one hospital of the division type (200 beds) will be established. At Kongmoon (the 4th Corps) and Honam (the 5th Corps), one division-hospital of 100 beds in each of these towns will be established and placed under the control of the sanitary sections of the corps concerned.

For the fleet and the air force, it is contemplated to organize dispensaries (by each aerial squadron one dispensary with 100 beds); for the fleet a hospital on a small [4] ship especially outfitted for this purpose.

Some regiments at present have dispensaries which are kept up in various ways (wherever there are more than two physicians to a regiment).

When the physicians will have been distributed among the regiments, the regimental dispensaries in those regiments that are quartered at a great distance from the large hospitals will be changed into hospitals of 60 beds. The regiments in the vicinity of large hospitals will have only dispensaries.

The following amounts will be necessary for the organization and the monthly upkeep of the medical establishments:

A. *In time of peace*:

1. For the establishment of a division hospital, $3,660; a regimental dispensary, $956.

The central hospitals exist already and require only repairing, which will be carried out with the money contributed.

2. The monthly upkeep of a sanitary section of a corps, $454; a central hospital, $12,044; a divisional hospital, $4,496; a regimental dispensary, $1,794.

B. *In time of war*:

1. For the establishment of a corps hospital, $6,945; a division hospital, $3,660; a regimental dispensary (when required), $995.

2. For the monthly upkeep of a sanitary section of a corps, $784.40; a corps hospital, $9,543; a division hospital, $4,196.60; a sanitary section of a regiment, $2,342 [5] (the number of medical men is fixed at 72 men).

The Sanitary Inspectorate

The reorganized Department of Sanitary Inspection is now functioning according to the new plan for three months (up to the 1st of May). This plan includes (a) records of patients and of casualties in battles (summaries in the form of daily, weekly, and monthly reports); (b) school and instruction work; (c) lectures on sanitation; (d) accounts of hospitals and sanitary units; (e) inspection of local institutions; (f) physical inspections; (g) reorganization according to the plan; (h) providing the army with medical supplies according to the plan (a central depot of medical supplies will be established at the inspectorate).

The Sanitary Inspectorate has submitted a plan of providing the army with medical supplies, estimating the cost at 8 cents daily for 10 men, which, at an average, makes daily $12.40 for a regiment, or $372 monthly (counting 1,500 men in a regiment).

Sickness in the Army

According to statistics, the diseases in the army are as follows:
Of epidemic diseases (which are rather evident everywhere), in the first place stands beri-beri (over 5 percent of the whole army); next comes malaria (2 percent); then dysentery (1 percent), of which about 20 percent of the affected men die. There are some cases of typhoid fever.

Of the wounded (in the eastern campaign), 5 to 10 percent die. The high percentage of mortality among the wounded was a result of the lack of first aid at the front; almost in every case there were complications (necrosis, tetanus, septic inflammations, etc.). It is worth noting that 40 percent of the men were wounded in the hips.

[6] As to the general amount of sickness, the diseases may be classified in the following order according to their prevalence: (1) skin diseases (eczema, itch, ulcers on the head), (2) tuberculosis (of the lungs), (3) stomach and bowel diseases (not contagious), (4) trachoma, (5) syphilis, (6) other venereal diseases, (7) nervous system.

During the inspection of the hospitals (formerly belonging to the 1st Corps), a great number (up to 250 men) of patients were found who had been there a long time and who ought to be sent back to their native countries (some of them had been at the hospital for over two years). This fact was explained by the lack of funds for the evacuation of these people. At present, measures have been taken to rid the hospitals of these old patients as well as of those patients and wounded who do not require constant medical attention.

The cause of the prevalence of beri-beri in the army and in the navy is the rather poor food which consists chiefly of bad rice and not quite fresh meat. The cause of the skin diseases is the unsanitary way of living of the soldiers and sailors, as well as the insufficient supply of linen.

It is intended to have in the future the whole personnel of the army and navy examined physically. In the beginning of this month, the students of the Whampoa school were examined with the following results: of the 5,790 men who were examined, 153 were altogether dismissed from the service and 15 percent were found fit only for inactive service.

Most of the dismissed men had hernias (60 percent); next came those with tuberculosis of the lungs (20 percent); then those with trachoma, syphilis, and physical

defects, and finally those who were too young or old (20 percent).

Of those who were transferred to inactive service, 50 percent had phimosis, 25 percent stenosis, and the other 25 percent had different diseases and defects, chiefly piles and itch. Considering that the students are in comparatively better condition than the other troops, it may be expected that among the latter the percentage unfit [7] for military service and sick will be found greater when the inspections are made.

Conclusion

Since the plan has been put into effect, the work of improving the medical and sanitary service in the army has been making good progress and in the near future when the plan for providing the army with medical supplies and with a competent medical staff is carried out, it will be no doubt easier to raise the sanitary condition of the army to a proper level than it was before.

Document 35

Aviation

[The following head-note appears on this document, representing the opinion of the American Military Attaché's Office in Peking.]

This report relating to the Aviation of the Kuomintang Army is a translation of a confidential report of a Soviet adviser which was prepared for the information of Moscow. The information contained in this report is based on facts and can be considered as absolutely trustworthy, as the South China Group of Soviet Advisers, having organized the Kuomintang Army, knows more about it than the officers of the Kuomintang Army themselves.

(Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 III, 1926, Canton)

[1] The air service at Canton was started in 1915-16 when in accordance with the instructions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a group of men left for America in order to purchase machines and to train personnel.

The training of the personnel was done in short courses; the machines purchased were chiefly for training purposes; but there were also some passenger-carrying machines which were very heavy.

At the head of this group was Yang Sen-yat [Yang Hsien-i], who was afterwards appointed director of aviation. After his return from America he started a very energetic campaign for the purpose of creating an air service, and by 1923 had already at his disposal about thirty machines.

In the beginning of 1923, during the military operations against General Ch'en Chiung-ming, an explosion occurred at the headquarters of the air service and all persons who were then in charge of the aviation affairs perished.

For some months the aviation remained without a responsible head owing to the lack of suitable candidates for this post. Then Eugene Ch'en, foreign secretary to Dr. Sun, was appointed director of aviation. He decided to introduce some kind of organization and to put an end to the disorders and to the enormous leakage of funds caused by the dishonesty of the air service personnel.

His initial steps in this direction were opposed by the whole personnel of the air service and finally in consequence of more decisive measures taken by him a fire was set to hangars located on the island of Taisato at Canton and all aviation materiel was actually destroyed by fire.

With a view of reestablishing the air service, four advisers were engaged from Germany; also some steps were taken to purchase machines. Our stay at Canton in 1924 as advisers coincided with the arrival of German instructors, and we were literally struck with the state of affairs in the administration of the air service; this administration included a flying squadron, workshops, etc., which had no proper organization, no fixed salaries, etc.

[2] On account of the intricacy of the situation at that time, it was necessary, however, to send to the front a flying squadron consisting of two machines of the "Curtis" type and one hydroplane of the same type, with the necessary personnel, and

this notwithstanding the fact that these machines originally were intended for training purposes and that the bombs were of an unsatisfactory make (mostly of no use).

These airplanes took part in all campaigns during the last two years. The flying squadron was strengthened by two more machines of the same type which had been repaired in the workshops. Operating over short distances, even these airplanes, although of very poor quality, demonstrated to Chinese generals the boundless possibilities afforded by this branch of the service.

In June 1925, after completion of military operations, when the reorganization of the army was started and the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang party confirmed the fundamental plan relating to the armed forces of the Canton government, it was decided to apportion from the general military budget a sum of half a million dollars for the organization of the air service and to send a commission to the USSR in order to establish contact and to find out whether there was a possibility of getting support to purchase new machines and to train personnel.

At that time the creation of the *Civil* (commercial) *Aviation* was recognized as necessary and the Society of "Friends of Aviation" was organized with the object of carrying on propaganda for the creation of commercial aviation and for the establishment of an aerodrome at the expense of local cells of the said society.

It was also recognized as necessary to establish at first no less than two air lines: Swatow-Canton and Canton-Wuchow (on the Kwangsi border) and afterwards to develop the net of air lines and aerodromes so as to cover all the principal regions. After six months' work the Society of Friends of Aviation, although it did not fulfill all the tasks set before it, nevertheless succeeded in executing all preparatory measures: forty-five cells of the society were organized and about 25,000 dollars were collected, which circumstance made it possible to start immediately the establishment of an aerodrome.

For uses of the civil aviation, one passenger-carrying machine (Junker 13) was purchased in the USSR. This machine though not quite new is quite suitable for flying in Kwangtung province for propaganda purposes. The task set before the civil aviation, namely, the purchase of machines and the establishment of air lines, has now, with the spreading of influence of the Canton government, become more complicated, but the favorable financial condition of the province will afford the possibility of establishing "civil" air lines in the near future.

The work of *Military Aviation* is proceeding in two directions: (1) training of personnel and (2) purchase of machines.

In September 1925, six men were sent to the USSR for training and according to information received, their studies are progressing quite satisfactorily. They are supposed to return to China by August or September 1926.

For preparatory training and for the selection of more suitable persons who thereafter might be dispatched to the USSR for further studies in higher technical schools, a school has been established at Canton. On account of the lack of funds this school has at first set before itself the modest task of training the flying personnel so as to enable them to make flights alone in "Curtis" machines. One may fully count [3] upon the further development of this school, because even now the course of training is proceeding successfully enough, but there will be a further improvement in this respect in the near future when the training machines "Avro," which already have been ordered, are delivered and the necessary workshops are fully equipped. Two German officers have been engaged as instructors and at present they meet entirely all the requirements of the school.

In order to add to the flying equipment of the school, it is necessary to purchase two more "Avros" with four spare motors, and two "De Havilands" with Purna engines and two spare motors. All other equipment for training purposes can be purchased in China so that toward the beginning of the new (1926-27) term the school

will be able to set before itself the task of fully training the flying personnel.

At present there are no *flying squadrons* for *fighting purposes*. The formation of a mixed Russo-Chinese squadron has been started. The delivery of six "De Havilands" and 400 h.p. "Libertys" for the use of this squadron is expected. The squadron will be under the command of a Russian aviator and will consist of Russian aviators and instructors. The Chinese will do auxiliary service. Taking into consideration, however, climatic and other local conditions, these six "De Havilands" will hardly be of much service as regards the creation of an air service for fighting purposes.

In view of the peculiar conditions prevailing in China generally and, particularly, in the province of Kwangtung, it is necessary to pay special attention to the creation of the air service because it will play an important part in peacetime as well as in war.

Before speaking about the use of the air fleet for military purposes, it is necessary to point out here that the National Revolutionary Army, which is now carrying on a fundamental reorganization, will not always be in a position to equip itself with sufficient materiel. In view of the fact that as soon as military operations begin, no less than three or four army corps will be sent to the front, such factors as the above-mentioned absence of adequate technical equipment and the lack of (1) communications between army corps, (2) means for proper reconnaissance, and (3) good survey maps may lead to a defeat.

On the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that for our probable enemies it is possible to obtain technical equipment from foreign sources. According to information at hand, the province of Yunnan has an air service which may be strengthened from French Indo-China by two squadrons, and, in case of need, probably with a greater number of machines. There are also a small number of airplanes in the province of Kiangsi which also may be increased by the Japanese from the island of Formosa and by the British from Hong Kong.

Speaking now about the utilization of the air service of Kwangtung, one can point out the following concrete tasks which must be set before it for accomplishment.

1. To provide with flying machines each army corps or even each division—if the available quantity of this technical equipment permits it—in order to keep an uninterrupted communication between these army units.

2. To take photographs of the enemy armed forces and of the localities in which they are quartered, as that is absolutely necessary and important for drawing up a plan of operations; also to take photographs of various localities generally, for the purpose of making survey maps; there usually is a complete lack of such maps in the [4] Chinese army, and their importance for all military operations is self-evident.

3. To reconnoiter the armed forces of the enemy.

4. To use flying machines for the purpose of demoralizing the enemy and of maintaining the fighting spirit of our own troops, which will greatly improve once they are conscious of being protected from the air.

5. To do damage to enemy troops by dropping bombs and by machine gun firing.

6. To guard our rear and lines of communication with it.

7. To put down quickly counterrevolutionary movements and disorders (banditry, etc.).

8. To guard the coastline through joint action of the air service and the sea fleet (both for defensive and offensive purposes).

9. To fight against the air forces of the enemy and to protect our own airplanes (of light and heavy types, used for scouting purposes) during the flights into the area occupied by the enemy for the purpose of bombing.

10. To observe uninterruptedly the activities of the enemy—his concentrations,

movements, etc.

As may be seen from the above-mentioned tasks, aviation, through the fulfillment of these, will be able to make up those defects that now exist in the army on account of the lack of adequate artillery, cavalry, and other auxiliary branches.

The question of the type of land machines and their number must be settled now with a view of accomplishing all the above-mentioned tasks and also taking into consideration the character of future operations, namely, thirty airplanes of the "Scout" type, light and heavy (which may also serve as bomb carriers); ten airplanes of the "destroyer" type, and six hydroplanes. In recommending this type of airplane and their number, the following circumstances were also taken into consideration: as the military operations possibly will be conducted in two or three directions, the cooperation of air forces will be needed in order to be able to act with more mobility and quickness and to insure thereby to a greater degree the success of the operations; moreover, as the major operations in the future war zone will be conducted mainly on land, only occasionally intersected by water courses, only a small number of hydroplanes is considered necessary; the airplanes to be used for scouting purposes, however, must be of such a type as to be able to float on water as well as run on wheels.

It is desirable to organize these air forces into independent units or squadrons in the following manner: (1) light and heavy scouts, six airplanes in action, six in reserve; (2) destroyers, eight in action, two in reserve; (3) hydroplanes, four in action, two in reserve.

These squadrons will be attached to army units operating in the areas nearest to the front line.

As for the types of engines, the following must be recognized as most desirable, considering the character of terrain and special atmospheric conditions: (1) destroyers, "Fokker D13"; (2) light scouts (may serve also as two-seater destroyers), "D21"; (3) heavy scouts (may serve also as bomb carriers), "Fokker F's 4 Bis"; (4) hydroplanes, "Junker 20" or "Darnier" of the same type.

In deciding upon the above-mentioned types of engines, the following points were taken into consideration:

1. Heavy scouts: considering local conditions of work, the engine of the airplane must be able to meet the strictest requirements, i.e., it must be strong in order to endure the changes of temperature, have small but excellent vertical and horizontal speed, have a large radius of action; have sufficient load-lifting capacity; when making a selection of engines it is necessary to pay attention to its capacity of being kept cool, in view of the considerably high temperature of the air (tropics).

2. Light scouts: the engine must be able to meet the same requirements as those of heavy scouts and have in addition sufficient reserve of horsepower.

The above-mentioned number of airplanes will facilitate in a considerable degree the task of executing military operations, but in order to create a real efficient military air service, it is necessary to send immediately to the USSR thirty to forty students of the Military Aviation School for further studies of aviation and, especially, its auxiliary services.

Besides the purchase of new machines for air service units as well as for the school, the foundation for big airplane workshops is at the same time being laid at Canton in order to be able to build airplanes and to make major repairs.

Document 36

The High Sea and River Patrol Fleet of the Kuomintang Government

We have this document in two versions, one from the U.S. War Department, as transmitted from the American military attaché in Peking; the other from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, as transmitted by the American naval attaché in Peking (ONI File No. E-9-b, Reg. No. 11981, "The Chinese Navy General Data 1907-37"). The navy copy was provided to us by Professor Bruce Swanson, History Department, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. It contains the following note, presumably the opinion of the American naval attaché, Peking:

The report enclosed was found in the papers seized at the Soviet Embassy on April 6, 1927, and L. Grey is a pseudonym of the Russian adviser to the Cantonese Navy Department. He was practically chief of operations.

The organization diagram together with the list of ships with commanders, etc., was taken at the same time in blueprint form. The information is probably more accurate than we have from other sources, and indicates the tremendous task before the forces of reorganization. Just what progress has been made on these lines is not known. A copy of this report is being transmitted to the commander-in-chief with the request that the commander of the South China Patrol be asked to check or supplement the information.

TEXT

[1] The Navy Department is subordinated to the Military Council and has the following organization:

1. The staff of the navy which consists of the Operations Section, Command Section, Combat Section, Engineering Section, Juristic Section, the sections for supplies, and the Secretariat of the Staff.
2. The Educational and Political departments.
3. the bureaus of Shipbuilding, Inspection, and Control.

Active and Subsidiary Units of the Fleet

The ships are divided into three fundamental groups:

First Group: sea-going warships of different kinds, 7; armed troopships, 4 (sea-going); Second Group: river gunboats of different kinds, 15; armed troopships, 12; Third Group: patrol boats (river torpedo boats of a very obsolete type), 6; another group, which does not belong to the active fleet: old worthless launches which are to be transferred to the Ministry of Finance, 13.

Personnel of the High-Sea Fleet

Officers, 431; enlisted men, 1,742

Personnel for Service on Shore

[2] In the staff and the departments: officers, 153; enlisted men, 1,852
Landing Forces (marines) consist of 82 officers, 750 enlisted men (650 rifles, 39,000 cartridges).

Conditions in Different Departments of the Navy

The Navy Department (including the Staff)—The Navy Department was organized in August 1925, but owing to the lack of suitable personnel and owing to the fact that those who were at hand lacked experience, it was wrongly organized into three independent sections: (1) the Staff; (2) the Educational Section; and (3) the Port-Administration (which includes the Section of Supplies)—all of which are directly subordinated to the chief of the department. As stated above, the functions of the Staff are mixed up with those of the sections of repairs, supplies, and economic matters of the navy in general. Owing to this organization, the operations problems of the fleet are intermixed with questions of supplies, of instruction, etc., and are therefore often solved in a wrong way. The work of the Navy Department as a whole is still far from being properly arranged. The chiefs of the sections do not as yet know their business and continue to muddle along. During the past period the chiefs of the sections have only learned to record the work, which helps to control the latter and to have the work properly arranged in the future. The cause of all these defects is that the Navy Department is undermanned and that its funds are 50-60 percent below the sum that ought to be spent for the fleet in order to have it put in proper condition. Another cause is the ignorance and incompetence in staff work of the higher officers of the navy, including admirals, which prevents the quick and proper reorganization of the department according to European standards. They are absolutely ignorant in matters of their profession. At present some steps have been taken to prepare the reorganization of the Navy Department: the personnel is being trained and the method [3] of working is being changed in some sections of the Staff, viz., a military staff with special regulations and under discipline is being used instead of compradors. The regulations and the budget of the department and instructions for all chiefs of sections are being prepared in conformity with European systems. There will be three fundamental sections (organizations)—the Staff, the Educational Section, and the Section of Supplies.

The tasks which the national revolutionary movement imposes on the fleet are divided into the local task and the task of an all-national nature. The local task consists of the safeguarding and patrolling of the rivers and the coast; the tasks of an all-national nature are (1) the defense of Kwangtung, which, as experience has shown, cannot be effected without a fleet; and (2) the supporting of the northward movement of the National Revolutionary Army, especially as there are two bases of the enemy—Macao and Hong Kong.

The chief difficulty in carrying out these tasks is the lack of funds and of technical means. This makes it necessary to create as soon as possible a small but strong mobile nucleus of a fleet using local resources.

The High Sea Fleet

The fleet is at present carrying out operations in the service of the government of four fundamental kinds: (1) gunboats that are on duty in distant provinces and are subordinated, as regards to their operations, to corps commanders of the National Revolutionary Army; (2) gunboats that are under orders of the Military Council and are engaged in the suppression of piracy in the delta and on the high seas; (3) gun-

boats that in conjunction with the Strike Committee are blockading Hong Kong and guarding the mouth of the river as well as the approaches by sea to Canton; (4) the rest of the ships are at Canton, either being under repair or awaiting repair. The state [4] of repairs of the active fleet that is operating at present is extremely unsatisfactory. Not to speak of the armament, the bodies of the ships, which have not been docked for ten to thirteen years, as well as the parts below the water line are mostly holding together only by means of cement. However, gradually and as far as means permit, the ships are patched before going into action. Should all the repairs of the fleet as needed be carried out at once, the government would remain a long time with its boundaries open to pirates. The repairs therefore are carried out according to the means at hand and according to the (inner) political conditions which require the use of the fleet. Thus at present there are thirteen gunboats of different types docked and their bodies and machinery are being overhauled; others have already undergone the necessary repairs, and others have had no repairs at all and are unable to move.

Armament of the Fleet

The condition of the artillery, the rifles, and the machine guns is such that with a few exceptions all of them must be replaced; on 59 ships there are 18 different types of guns and machine guns; these obsolete arms are no more "effective" and must be replaced by arms of one type; only the ages of the guns vary from 98 to 23 years. At present there are altogether in the fleet 97 guns of various makes and of calibers from 10.5 to 2.5 cm, with about 7,000 shells of various kinds of which some 3,500 are good for firing. There are 293 machine guns (mitrailleuses?), from 7 to 20 years old, with about 48,273 cartridges of which about 30,000 are good for firing.

Machinery

The machinery and bodies of the ships, which have had no proper repairs since they were built, are falling into complete decay and only if a monthly sum of 20,000 Canton dollars is allotted for this purpose, it will be possible in the course of a year to have the river flotilla thoroughly repaired. Anyhow, it is necessary, first of all, to repair the gunboats with small draught of the type of the "Kiang." One boat of that [5] type can be repaired each month and at the same time the current repairs on other ships can be made. Major repairs of sea-going ships can be made only at Shanghai or at Vladivostok.

Supplies

The Section of Supplies is very bulky and inflexible. It bears more the character of supplying through compradors than by means of a military establishment working in conformity with a plan. There are several reasons for it: all technical as well as other supplies necessary for the fleet are purchased by compradors through market brokers, who cannot be controlled, as it is impossible to fix the prices or to purchase the supplies necessary for the fleet by competition bids. Besides, it is impossible to purchase everything necessary for the navy from only one firm as in the other ports of China or in Japan. In Canton there are no special firms or contractors for navy supplies and the navy itself has no depots or stores. Thus all the necessary equipment, the tackle, the navigation instruments, and all that is required for the machinery of the fleet is being procured as occasion arises, and the quality and the price of those goods depend entirely on the compradors, who take advantage of the political situation in Canton and the boycott of British goods and charge triple prices. As a whole, it may be said that the supplying is being done without any plan and at random. At present

the question of supplies is to be solved by finding a "general comprador" for the navy, with a "bond" and with a proper contract, who will supply all sections of the navy according to a prearranged plan and at prices as fixed in the price lists of the firms, with a moderate commission.

Fuel

[6] The Navy Department has a contract with the comprador of the coal company "Missiu" for the regular supply of coal for the navy at the rate of 14 dollars per ton. The quality and the delivery of the coal are stipulated in the contract. So far the company has been carrying out the contract properly (according to the Chinese law the contract has been made for an indefinite time) and supplies the fleet with coal in proper time; it even allows some indebtedness in excess of the one fixed in the contract, which is at times 30-40,000 dollars.

Principal Monthly Expenditures

Salaries of the whole department, including the Political Section, $21,000 Canton dollars; salaries of the sea fleet, $52,000; monthly expenditures for coal and lubricating oils, $30,000; current repairs of the ships, $32,000; equipment, $5,000; supplies for the fleet, $10,000; total (in Canton dollars), $150,000.

The sum of $150,000 Canton dollars monthly is at present received from the government according to the semi-annual budget which does not include the expenditures for extensive repairs of the ships or the greater part of the expenses for the current repairs, which cost much more than the monthly allowance. The repairs in the navy have so far been paid for principally with the money realized by the sale of contraband seized by the fleet. According to a (verbal) agreement with Minister of Finance Sung, the fleet receives 80 percent of the seized contraband and the Ministry of Finance 20 percent. With this money the sea-going part of the fleet is being put into seaworthy condition. Thus the gunboats *Chungshan* and *Yuangyin* and three torpedo boats were repaired.

Schedule of Repairs in the Navy During the Current Year

[7] 1. The gunboat *Chungshan* to be rebuilt and rearmed with 130 mm artillery guns, central fire control apparatus; two range finders, two search lights, one 75 mm antiaircraft gun, four 47 mm guns, two 37 mm guns on the bridge, two machine guns, one steel mast with a machine gun platform, and one torpedo tube are to be installed.

2. The gunboat *Foiying* to be rebuilt and rearmed with three 130 mm guns, one 75 mm gun, and four 47 mm guns. Central fire control apparatus, two projectors, two range finders, and a steel mast with a machine gun platform are to be installed. Construction of a catapult for a light seaplane or, if this is impossible, of a platform for seaplane and changing of torpedo tubes are also planned.

3. Construction, using local facilities, of two torpedo boats, not over 500 tons; the machinery of scrapped old Russian torpedo boats to be bought.

4. Purchase of two submarines from the USSR (scrapped from the USSR fleet).

5. Repairing of five torpedo boats of the type Liuchin and changing of the torpedo tubes.

6. Construction of five fast sea-going torpedo launches, with a speed of 30 knots and a ten-hour cruising radius; armament—one torpedo tube and one machine gun.

7. The troopship *Hoshan* to be changed into a mine layer.

8. Repairing of the two gunboats *Haifong* and *Pingnan* and changing them into

mine sweepers. Construction of two new mine sweepers.

9. Purchase of two troopships from 2,500 to 3,000 tons deadweight and remodeling of one of them into an airplane carrier for four or five seaplanes.

10. Repairing of the troopship *Fooan* as an auxiliary and training ship.

11. Reconstruction of the *Kwongpek* and *Lulung* (former river boats) into repair boats (water pumpers?).

12. Repairing and rearming of the *Wofong*, *Wenping*, *Kwangken*, and *Paopek* and [8] the construction of new patrol and dispatch boats with a maximum speed of 16 knots and a cruising radius of 2,500 miles at a speed of 10 knots, with two 100 mm guns and one 75 mm antiaircraft gun.

13. Purchase of six scout seaplanes and organization of an air service detachment.

14. Repairing of three gunboats with small draught and the construction of four new gunboats with a draught of 2 to 3 feet.

15. Rearming of all boats of the river flotilla with guns of one type.

Bases of the Fleet

16. Repair of the "Whampoa" dock and organization of all kinds of workshops necessary for the fleet.

17. Repair of the Kwangnan yard at Canton.

18. Outfitting of a torpedo station and providing the fleet with torpedoes of a more modern type.

19. Organization of a mine-planting station at Whampoa.

20. Installation of a station of mines and purchase of mines for blocking the access to Canton from the sea.

21. Arming the port Swatow with four 6-inch guns and organization of a base.

Means for Repairs

All current repairs and the partial rearmament of the fleet are at present carried out by private contractors, because there are no government factories; all repairs are therefore in the hands of compradors, of various "union" workshops and small factories which have concluded contracts with the fleet and are liable for default if urgent repairs are not finished in the time specified.

The repairs from a technical standpoint are made very poorly, especially the riveting of the bodies and the repairing of the heavy machinery, as there are no qualified riveters, blacksmiths, and boiler-makers at Canton. The reason is that previous to the blockade of Hong Kong the repairs were mostly made at the dockyards [9] and workshops of Hong Kong. If really good work in the rebuilding of the fleet is to be done at Canton, it will be necessary to have skilled workmen come from Hong Kong or Shanghai.

Personnel

Ships Officers. On the boats of the first group (sea-going) and on the troopships there are eight officers on each: a commander, a senior officer, a second and a third officer, a senior engineer, a second and a third engineer, and an artillery officer (there are no physicians, not even medical enlisted men in the whole fleet). On the boats of the second group (river boats), there are a commander, a senior officer, a second officer, an artillery officer, a senior engineer, and a second engineer. On the gunboats of the third group (patrol boats), there are a commander, a senior officer, an engineer, and an artillery officer.

Efficiency of Officers in Military Matters. Up to this month the controlling com-

mission of the navy has succeeded in examining as to efficiency about 300 officers. The results were as follows: 65 men have finished a course in military naval schools, 14 in schools for radiotelegraphy, 8 in army military schools, 1 in a police juristic school, 1 in an engineering school, and 111 are primary school graduates. Two are in the school for commercial navigation, two are high school graduates. In general it may be said that none of the officers knows his business theoretically or practically [10] and, as a matter of fact, none of them deserves to be called a naval officer, not only in regard to ability, but also with respect to his moral character. Some of them have been in the service from five to thirty years, and yet they often know less than noncommissioned officers. In the Naval Department and in the Staff the officers are paid as follows: the chief of the fleet (commander in chief), 450 dollars; the chiefs of departments, 400 dollars; the chiefs of sections, 350 dollars; the assistant chiefs and the staff officers in general, beginning with the rank of first captain down to midshipman, from 240 to 100 dollars with board, but no equipment is furnished.

In general, the officers of the navy do in no wise differ from the army officers as concerns their intellect, their manners, their speculativeness, their tendency to avail themselves of their offices for making profit. Moreover, they smoke opium, play cards, take bribes wherever possible, not disdaining even trifles, such as cheating their subordinates out of their food and equipment. As regards politics they are, even judging from the standpoint of Chinese, little conscious of them; they take an interest in political lessons only as a matter of duty, outwardly following the precepts of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; their counterrevolutionist mostly rests not on political, but on material reasons.

Such as they are, the officers must be replaced by new ones as soon as the first contingent of new officers finishes the course at the school and has had sufficient practical experience on sea and on rivers.

As regards naval experience, the officers are absolutely useless, not only as (military) administrators, but also as specialists. They know absolutely nothing of tactics, astronomy, navigation, artillery, mines, ship-building, mechanics, and other naval sciences. The special functions are mostly done by senior noncommissioned officers [11] who have served some ten years in handling guns or machinery. Peculiar to say, there is in the whole fleet only one man, who knows how to handle mines, a former noncommissioned officer; he is now seventy-two years old, and when he dies, there won't be anyone in the whole navy who knows how to assemble and to take to pieces a mine, in spite of the fact that there are officers in the fleet who are supposed to be specialists in mine planting. As for navigation and sailing in general, each gunboat has two pilots who have the rank of noncommissioned officers and who get comparatively low pay. They steer the gunboats and are actually in command of them when they are at sea. As regards military service, the officers are good from a Chinese standpoint, but the Chinese military drill regulations are appropriate only for ceremonies and of no use for military operations.

Pay of the Officers. The commanders of gunboats are paid according to their rank, from 180 to 240 dollars, with board, but without equipment. the senior officers get 100 to 180 dollars; junior officers, artillery officers, and engineers get from 60 to 100 dollars with board but without equipment.

Enlisted Personnel. The land contingent in the service of the Navy Department, a total of 110 men, consists of clerks, messengers, chauffeurs, and coolies. Each seagoing gunboat of the first group has a crew of 89 to 109 men—artillery men, helmsmen, engineers, stokers, and deckhands. There are very few men trained for special duties, as for instance there are only four signalmen in the whole navy and they are very poor. On each gunboat of the second group (river gunboats) are from 47 to 67 men; on those of the third group, from 20 to 40 men. The recruiting of the ship crews is very poorly done. It must be improved and men must be recruited who

are specialists and who have a better moral character (most of the crews at present consist of former pirates and bandits who have had plenty of experience in these matters on sea and on rivers).

[12] *General Military Efficiency.* Forty percent of the sailors have been formerly trained in some special duties in the northern Chinese fleet. The abler men have the rank of noncommissioned officers and know from a practical standpoint more about naval service than the officers. The other 60 percent are former soldiers and artisans. As regards their military ability, the sailors are fairly good in the Chinese way, but certainly not in the European; everything is meant only for parade, not for military actions.

The Pay. The sailors of all groups are paid the same. Each one gets monthly 15 dollars, of which 6 are deducted for the food. Forty-five dollars are set aside annually for equipment, but the latter is supplied irregularly and only as far as the means permit it. Only about 10 percent are properly equipped. Bedding and other things the sailors must purchase themselves.

Noncommissioned Officers receive 36 dollars monthly, less 10 dollars for their food; they are better equipped than the sailors. Sixty dollars are allotted annually for their equipment.

Generally speaking, the material conditions of the enlisted men are far from satisfactory as regards their pay, their food, their equipment, and their housing.

The Bodily Constitution. As stated above, the men of the navy are in the majority former pirates or bandits or soldiers who have been well-schooled in all sorts of civil wars and adventures of Chinese generals. The men are therefore physically rather worn out. Their age is from twenty-five to thirty years. Their physical defects are approximately as follows: 15 percent have tuberculosis; about 27 percent have dysentery, malaria, venereal diseases, etc. The diseases are mostly chronic. In the whole fleet there is not a single ship surgeon or other medical man and no trace of a [13] dispensary; there are not even bandages or iodine. There is one surgeon for the whole fleet, and this one is of questionable ability; his work consists mostly in registering and burying the dead. The mortality in the fleet is from 5 to 7 percent yearly.

Conditions of Service in the Navy

A particular body of men for military service has been developed in the course of history in China without any compulsion on the part of the government, partly owing to the character of those men and partly because, for a Chinese pauper—whether an honest man or a "rag proletarian"—the navy was formerly a good job, because there he could always get clothed and fed. He had, moreover, a few dollars in his pocket which was a boon in the great chronic unemployment prevailing in China. It may be added that formerly the fleet belonged to several admirals, who carried contraband and at the same time were watching for contraband and confiscating it. In consequence of the aforesaid, the service in the navy has become voluntary, without contracts and terms; the men are even afraid of being turned out.

The officers, like the sailors, are serving voluntarily, without contracts, and stick to the navy like a louse to the skin. It is not easy to dismiss an officer from the navy, for the navy has its traditions of which the Europeans are unaware, and the mass of officers cling to the navy, because they know that owing to their ignorance they cannot find employment in the commercial fleet.

Educational Work

There were no schools up to this time. Now a class for 100 signalmen is being organized and will be opened on March 25; the course will last six months. The orga-

nization of the school and its program have been worked out and approved. At present sailors are recruited for the school, partly from the fleet and partly from the union of commercial seamen. The recruiting is being controlled by the party and by trade unions. A program is also being prepared for two other classes—an artillery and [14] an engineering class for sailors; it is intended to open them at the end of June. It is all right as far as the engineering class is concerned, because the old machinery will be in use for a long time and because it is all of one type. But as regards the artillery class, this is very difficult, as practical and theoretical instruction are impossible with the existing eighteen models of guns that have to be replaced. The results to be obtained from the artillery class depend therefore on the rearmament of the fleet in general.

The educational work in the navy is a very serious matter and it will take a long time, because heretofore nobody was interested in such work in the navy and there are therefore no books and textbooks on special naval subjects in the Chinese language. Some people have English and Japanese textbooks, but they are not adapted to the Chinese conditions and to the elements of which the Chinese navy is composed. The intended teachers are themselves very little prepared and have hitherto had no practice in instructing. Most of them have studied at the naval academies in Japan, England, America, and France. Nevertheless, there is hope that some results will be achieved which will form the base of the educational work in the future navy.

Landing Troops (Marines)

Eight months ago, during the civil war, a detachment of landing troops, consisting of 750 men and 82 officers, was formed. The armament consists of 650 rifles of different patterns with 39,000 cartridges. Besides tents, it has no other equipment.

[15] *Organization.* The detachment is divided into three battalions of 200 men each. Fifty men are distributed among the three battalions as "coolies." Each battalion has 27 officers, and there is one commander of the whole detachment.

Military Efficiency. The commander has completed a course in a military school in America. He has served in the Chinese army nine years and in the American eight years and has been in some battles during the civil war.

The Officers do in no wise differ, as regards their efficiency, from those of the National Revolutionary Army.

The Soldiers are well trained, have participated in battles with the fleet; they desire to be a special military unit and in general they do not differ from soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army.

The Pay. A soldier [marine] receives monthly 7 dollars, from which 6 are deducted for his food; 1 dollar is his pocket money. From time to time he gets some equipment, but it is rather poor. In accordance with his service, he lives in old harbor buildings or in the temporary barracks near the naval dockyard. An officer gets 20 to 30 dollars a month and has to provide himself with food and equipment; he lives with the soldiers. The commander gets 150 dollars monthly without food.

Physical Condition of the Men. The majority of the men are healthy and carefully picked; the percentage of sickness is very low; their age is from twenty-five to twenty-seven years.

Purpose of the Detachment. The detachment has been formed as naval infantry for landing operations on rivers. A program to this purpose has been worked out but it has not yet been approved by the Military Council. The detachment is at present guarding the ships under repairs and is keeping up the communications with the forts which are taking now an active part in operations on the river against bandits and smuggling.

[16] Conclusion

First of all, the work in the navy cannot be considered only from the standpoint of current requirements in connection with the conditions in Canton. The prospects of the development of the national movement, of which little is written and spoken, require the creation of a strong nucleus of a navy in the south. A nucleus which should be able not only to satisfy the present local requirements but would also become the embryo of a future navy, around which, as around a new creation, the rest of the Chinese fleet could be formed. As it is at present, with its worthless ships, its rotten machinery, and its incompetent personnel, the whole Chinese fleet is an obsolete thing, capable only of political blackmailing, of opium traffic, and of extorting money by all means from the population and the merchants. It is unable to give battle not only in the European, but even in the Chinese sense of the word, because of the condition of its armament and the moral character of its personnel. Nevertheless, Chang Tso-lin strives to scrape up a kind of fleet in the north using the old rotten elements.

The question of the future of the Chinese navy can be solved only in two ways: (1) either a nucleus of a fleet, superior in technical equipment and with a new personnel, must be created in the south and, consequently, schools for officers and training courses for sailors must be arranged at Canton and Whampoa; (2) or considering that the principal bases of the fleet are in North China, where the ports are well-provided with shipyards and docks, the schools should be opened there when these bases will have been taken by land.

The above summary of a plan for the reconstruction and rearmament of the fleet cannot be carried out without the support of the USSR, and this problem must be solved as soon as possible (the decision not to do anything would be a great mistake).

[17] A Short Summary

1. The fleet, which not so long ago consisted of seven groups under seven commanders, is now united.

2. Commissars have been appointed to the principal ships.

3. Everything has been prepared to have strikers and communists appointed to take the place of a part of the sailors (so far there is not a single communist in the fleet, except the chief of the Political Bureau).

4. The staff has to be organized according to European standards. Now the higher commanding officers are being prepared for that. (From the Chinese standpoint, the work is well organized; from our standpoint, it is far from perfect.)

5. An inventory has been made of the property of the fleet and lists have been made of lacking articles.

6. Budgets and plans of schools and training courses have been prepared.

7. A schedule has been made for the repairs of sea-going ships, and lists of defects on the river boats are being made.

8. A special commission has been formed to examine the enlisted personnel. So far about 75 percent of them have been examined with good results.

9. A vigorous campaign is being conducted by means of control and strict orders against bribes and thefts. In some cases the culprits were arrested and tried, which put quite a damper on the appetites of the other corrupted officials who were taking bribes.

10. A plan of having the fleet supplied and repaired according to a fixed budget is being worked out.

[18] 11. It is possible now to keep the work of some sections of the staff secret, especially the work concerning military operations, because so far nothing has been kept

secret in the Naval Department and the chiefs of the section could not even understand the necessity of secrecy. Everything was done in the comprador fashion based on word of honor and friendship.

12. A Political Section has been organized, and 60 percent of its work is being done on the gunboats.

13. A Naval Club managed by the Political Section has been organized for officers.

14. A pilot station has been established at the mouth of the Pearl River.

15. The regulations relating to the service in the navy are being worked out.

16. Guard ships have been stationed in places indicated by the Military Council.

17. A sea-going destroyer with a ten-hour cruising radius, a speed of 30 miles an hour, and one mine tube is being constructed. It will be ready at the end of July 1926.

This report is not exhaustive and does not give all details concerning the fleet and its future. It is an attempt to give an account of what I could find out and improve during my forty-eight days' work in the navy. There will be certainly a lot of difficulties in the future as regards the carrying out of a series of measures to revive the fleet and its efficiency. The difficulties are not only of a financial character, but they result also from the incompetence of the staff and of the government as a whole in naval matters, and I will have to work with them for a long time.

In this report no light has been thrown on the political life and organization of the navy and on other questions connected with the work of the Kuomintang, the commissars, and the Political Section. The reason is that the political life of the navy will form the subject of a separate report.

(signed) L. Grey
March 15, 1926
Canton

[We omit an annex supplied by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Canton, Navy Department, that names with Chinese characters fifty-seven vessels, fifty-four captains, and twenty-one Kuomintang "commissaries"—i.e., party representatives.]

Part VI: Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army and Communist Penetration, July 1925–March 1926

The documents in this section give a comprehensive account of the many-sided efforts of the Russian advisers and their Kuomintang and Chinese Communist associates to politicize the National Revolutionary Army. The main report, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army," was accompanied by fifteen annexes presenting various aspects of this effort, though three of the annexes were reported missing from the papers seized by the Peking Metropolitan Police.

The documents from this section do not all come from the same time, but the terminal date is probably mid-March 1926, and assuredly before the March 20 *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident. The main report, our Document 37, mentions (p. 2) the special regulations for the P.U.R. (that is, the Political Training Department of the Military Council) as having been passed by the Military Council and refers to annex no. 1. This annex, our Document 38, is dated March 15, 1926, and we know that the Military Council promulgated the regulations on March 19, 1926 (KMWH, IX, 1814).

All documents in part VI are in PRO (F.O.371-12502/9115. F 8322/3241/10). Some annexes were printed in *China Confidential. Further Correspondence Respecting China.*

Document 37

Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army

[1] Even the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen was long ago conscious of the necessity to give *political instruction* to the troops of the National Revolutionary Army. The "Whampoa" School was established with the aim to give the army an officers personnel well educated in the revolutionary spirit. In this school (which was established in May 1924), in addition to the usual military subjects, sufficient attention was also being paid to political instruction. The members of the Chinese Communist Party took an especially active part in directing the political instruction, and it is only owing to the fact that the school was sufficiently permeated with Communists that it succeeded in reaching, politically, a very eminent place. In the course of time a special apparatus was established at the school to serve exclusively political needs, and in such manner the first nucleus of the political department of the army was created. Simultaneous with the gradual growth and development of the school and its development first into the division and afterward into the army corps, the development of the political apparatus kept pace. Now lectures are being given to cadets and soldiers, a club is being organized; leaflets, proclamations, and placards are being issued. The work of political sections makes its influence felt during campaigns. Political workers establish contact with the local population and with peasant organizations, and explain the problems of the national revolutionary movement; and for the first time in the history of Chinese wars the population begins to regard the troops not as robbers, but as a force that can serve the interests of the people. A system of political commissaries [i.e., commissars] has been introduced into the companies and higher army units; these commissaries fulfill the functions of control on behalf of the party. At first the appointment of political commissaries was made directly by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, without previous agreement with the Political Department. On account of that, frictions occurred between the Political Department and the political commissaries. In spite of this, however, officers began soon to acknowledge the great importance of political work in the army and in every way to give assistance to the Political Department. As early as the autumn of 1925, during the Eastern campaign, the Political Department of the Eastern Front (actually, the Political Section of the First Army Corps) directed all political work of the whole front, established contact with the population, and continued to carry on an enormous work in all army units. Seeing the success of the troops of the First Army Corps, other army corps also began to establish their own political organs. This work, however, was not coordinated. Therefore, the National Revolutionary Government, seeing the gradual growth of its influence and power, proceeded to the centralization of the military administration, and as the consequence thereof, almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Military Council, the *Political Directorate* (P.U.R.) was created. Originally this P.U.R. was considered a semi-military, semi-party organization, directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and working as one of its departments. At first the Political Directorate, as well as other central administrations of the Ministry of War, had only a very slight contact with local organs; moreover, almost all army corps (with the exception of the First Army Corps) did not [2] have a clear and exact understanding as to the problems and functions of the

P.U.R.; and the fact that almost all political workers were appointed by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang without the knowledge of the Political Directorate, led to an almost complete absence of guidance on the part of the P.U.R. with regard to army units. The absence of well-defined regulations relating to the P.U.R. and the shortage of funds for the upkeep of all the political organs in the army corps greatly contributed to the above-mentioned state of affairs.

P.U.R. and Its Organization

At present the P.U.R. has new personnel and is organized in accordance with special regulations, which have been approved by the Military Council (see annex no. 1). According to these regulations, the P.U.R. consists of three departments: the Department of General Affairs, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, and the Department of Party Affairs.

Agitation and Propaganda. The P.U.R. paid special attention to regulating problems relating to political instruction. Various army units have gradually made it a practice to devote one hour daily to political instruction. To spend this "political hour" in accordance with some definite plan, the P.U.R. compiled a three-month program of political instruction to be given to soldiers (see annex no. 2). A special feature of this program is the fact that in addition to giving a list of questions, an attempt is also made to facilitate and guide the work of the political instructor by giving him directions as to the manner in which methodical instruction should be conducted. According to the program, the duration of the political instruction is calculated on the basis of three hours per week. This is done because in many army units the number of political workers is not sufficient to carry out a program based on six hours a week. In army units that have a sufficient number of political instructors (as, for instance, the First Army Corps), political sections of army corps may use their own discretion and utilize these extra hours for club work and for teaching of reading and writing. As regards political instruction of officers, none was given until now. Only recently such instruction was started in the units of the Third Army Corps, where a "Society for the Discussion of Political Questions" has been organized. The P.U.R. worked out a program of political instruction for officers (see annex no. 3), which is to be given under the guidance of the political commissaries of the respective army units.

Theses for Agitation. Recently the newspaper published under the title "The Political Work" began to feature articles about the present political situation in China. These articles are written by the local committee of the Chinese Communist Party and are one of the means of the P.U.R. of instructing the political personnel and through it the officers and soldiers.

Cultural and Educational Work. Until now the P.U.R. did not pay any serious attention to educational work. Practically nothing was done in this respect, and there was no section organized for the purpose. The only fact worth noting is the compilation of a textbook for reading and writing.

The work of compiling the textbook for reading and writing was started as early as October last year. For this purpose a special commission was formed, which consisted of several teachers. At the present moment the compilation of this textbook is finished and it is in print now. Everybody concerned is looking forward to the publication of this textbook with great impatience and interest, because in all units of the National Revolutionary Army more or less instruction is given to the illiterate, but (as it was to be expected, however), the political workers, in their quest for textbooks, found on the local market only books filled with "divine stuff." The textbook, which [3] will be published shortly, will play an important part in the life of the soldier because it is not only a textbook for reading and writing, but also the only book within

the reach of soldiers' understanding, as everything else that is published is written in a lofty style with a complete disregard for the state of mental development of the soldiers. For that reason the publication of this textbook will create "an epoch" of its kind ("sui generis") in the domain of the political instruction of soldier masses.

As regards clubs, their number is very limited. Clubs have been organized in schools and in some army units. In other units there are only the so-called "Dr. Sun's corners." This state of affairs may be explained by the fact that until quite recently funds were lacking and troops were not assigned to permanent stations. Military campaigns ended only recently and army units are still being shifted from one place to another, which circumstance does not give the political workers the possibility of paying the necessary attention to club work. The P.U.R. is now busy with drafting well-defined by-laws for clubs and it may be expected that in a short time the "net" of clubs will be extended. Under the conditions now prevailing in the National Revolutionary Army these clubs will play an important part in the matter of raising the general political standard of soldier masses.

The Department of Political Affairs. Until quite recently there were in the army units no "nuclei" in the strict sense of this word. If the commander of some unit was a member of the Kuomintang the whole unit under his command was considered as belonging to the party and by his orders all soldiers and officers were enlisted into the party. The P.U.R. took into account this state of affairs, which was evidently quite abnormal, and the organization of Kuomintang nuclei in the army units has already been started. The aim of these nuclei is to create a party organ around which soldier masses could be grouped. Regulations governing party organizations in the units of the National Revolutionary Army have already been drawn up (see annex no 4 [missing]).

Publishing Activity. The Publishing Section occupies the principal place in the work of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda because, under the conditions existing in China, publishing is almost the sole means of agitation and propaganda among the masses. Principal attention is now being paid to the newspaper *The Political Work.* The fundamental aim of this newspaper is to reflect the life and the constructive work of the National Revolutionary Army and to give reading material, principally, to the officers and the political personnel of the army. Taking into consideration the existing conditions and that political work is just beginning to penetrate into the masses of the army, and the P.U.R. cannot spare good newspaper workers on account of a shortage of them, one can say that this newspaper, under the above-mentioned conditions and on the Chinese scale, fulfills its allotted task in a satisfactory way. Its experimental publication during the last three months shows that this newspaper is beginning to attain a more and more stable position in the everyday life of the officers and political workers. To put the newspaper on a proper footing, several measures had to be undertaken, which are now being put into effect. First of all, the newspaper is being improved as regards the technical side. Several kinds of type are being used; the editorial office entered into contracts with several telegraphic news agencies and publishes telegrams at the proper time (it does not copy them on the following day from other newspapers); the newspaper is issued not later than 10 o'clock in the morning; the publication of weekly illustrated supplements has been started; sufficient attention is now being paid to the proper organization of the business department, etc. All these are the elementary conditions of putting a newspaper [4] on a proper footing. It required and still requires at present a great amount of attention to make the staff of newspaper workers comprehend the importance of these fundamental principles. No less attention is also being paid to questions of the proper ideological tendency of the newspaper and of its close contact with the readers.

Until recently the newspaper confined itself to publishing in a condensed form materials relating to the political work in various units of the National Revolutionary

Army, as well as programs and instructions for the carrying on of the political work. The conviction (which is spread widely enough among political workers) that "as we are political workers, everything that lies outside the domain of 'politics,' such as officers' life, soldiers' living conditions, the organization of the army, etc., is beyond the sphere of our interests,["] was at first reflected in the attitude of the members of the editorial office toward the newspaper generally. This professional narrow-mindedness is now being shaken off among the political workers, and in the editorial office it has been entirely discarded: now in the columns of this newspaper are inserted articles relating to political work, as well as to constructive work in the army.

But one of the most considerable (comparatively speaking, of course) achievements of this newspaper is the establishment of a living contact between the editorial office and the reading masses. This contact found its first expression in letters addressed to the editorial office, which are now being received more and more frequently. These letters serve as a beginning for the organization of a net of military correspondents. It is to be mentioned that usually there is no such section (for correspondence) in Chinese newspapers. Therefore, those twenty to thirty letters daily, which are now being received by the editorial office, must be considered as proving a certain achievement. It is true, however, that the reading public must be "dragged out" to write such letters. For such purpose a public discussion of some question is usually started. Two "campaigns" in this direction have already been carried through by the editorial office: (1) about the name to be given to the newspaper; (2) "what is discipline?"; (3) "is corporal punishment admissible in the army?". The Editorial Office hopes to educate its readers by this method and thus to establish constant contact with them.

The Editorial Office is now composed of the following persons: the editor—a Communist; two correspondents and two newspaper workers, who are collecting materials and issuing the paper. Some 18,000 copies of the newspaper are printed, which are sent out free of charge. The Business Department is in direct communication with political sections of the army corps and separate divisions; political sections of the army corps are in charge of the further distribution of the newspaper. The Department of Agitation and Propaganda sets now before itself the task of making this newspaper more accessible for the soldier masses. (Annexes: illustrated supplement and several numbers of the newspaper. *Translator's note*: no such annexes are in the file.)

As to the publication of pamphlets and placards, it must be admitted that political sections of the army corps and divisions have displayed a very great activity in this respect. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that being very often out of [5] touch with the P.U.R. (the proper contact with the National Revolutionary Army has not yet been established) and having no experience in political work, the political organs of the army units used the most common methods of political propaganda, those of printing pamphlets and placards. To coordinate the publishing activities and to exercise a more effective political control over it, a special Publishing Committee has been established in the P.U.R. This committee (representatives of political sections of the army corps and divisions have been invited to take part in its work) drew up the following plan for publishing, which is to cover three months:

[Abstract of pages 5-7: A series of six pamphlets for soldiers on such subjects as "The Soldier and the Peasant"; a series for political workers with six titles, such as "The Party and the Army"; and four titles in a General Political Series such as "The History of the Kuomintang" and "Who Are the Imperialists?" Five pamphlets are in press. Multicolored placards are being issued. The Navy Department publishes a "Wall Newspaper of the Revolutionary Navy" and a newspaper of cartoons such as one showing "an imperialist handing a Chinese the cross, the pipe, the lamp, all the paraphernalia of opium smoking." To date twenty-five have been issued. "The main

defect of this newspaper is the monotony of colors (blue)." Other productions are placards with portraits of Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and "*piao-yu*" with large-character slogans such as "The revolutionary navy is the force of the people." Among books published are a "Collection of Revolutionary Songs," "Political Questions and Answers," etc. Whenever a revolutionary event occurs, different organizations produce many leaflets.

The Political Training Department is gathering information on work underway in various parts of the National Revolutionary Army.]

Keeping of Records. The P.U.R. has prepared blank forms for the keeping of records of the political and party personnel of the army and has issued detailed instructions for the use of them (see annex no. 5 [missing]). To strengthen the connection between the P.U.R. and the local organs and to improve information service, political sections in the army corps and divisions, besides making ordinary periodical reports, must also send to the P.U.R. at least once a month letters of information. The information relating to the number of political workers, as now available, is not absolutely exact. This is explained by the fact that various army units have only recently begun to use uniform blank forms of keeping records of the political and party personnel and that the idea as to the necessity of sending in regular reports to the P.U.R. has not yet penetrated into all army corps. According to the information available, the number of political workers in the National Revolutionary Army is 876 men.

[8] Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel

The social status of the soldiers of all army corps is almost identical. The soldiers, for the most part, are enlisted among the landless peasants, whom hunger has driven away from their native villages and who for that reason are compelled to enter the military service. About 90 percent of the soldiers are peasants and about 40 percent of them have broken off and belong to the "rabble proletariat"; about 10 percent are petty traders and town dwellers. Only 20 percent know how to read and write; the only exception in this respect is the First Army Corps, in which the number of literate soldiers is about 70 percent.

Until quite recently the living conditions of the enlisted personnel were very hard. They were harshly treated by their officers; in the rare instances in which rations were issued, they were stolen by the officers. The enlisted personnel were paid eight, ten, and twelve dollars, according to the rank of the soldier, but usually the enlisted man did not get this pay in full. The company commander was generally in charge of getting the food, and he deducted for that monthly five to eight dollars from the pay of every man. The rest should have been given to the soldier, but on account of the absence of control the soldier got his due only in very rare cases. Moreover, the army units themselves received the funds for the pay of the soldiers in an irregular manner. Only since the last month they began to receive the allotted sums from the Central Administration of Supplies directly. During peacetime the soldiers get their meals three times a day, during war only twice. The food consists of rice, bacon, and vegetables; meat is given five to ten times a month.

As regards clothing, the soldier gets an upper garment (shirt), trousers, and shoes; there is not a sufficient number of blankets for everybody; usually two soldiers use one blanket. There are no barracks in the ordinary sense of this word. The soldiers are usually quartered in temples and pagodas and sleep on the bare floor, using mats sometimes. Until recently there were no fixed schedules pertaining to the supplying of soldiers with clothing and food, which circumstance also leads to abuses.

The sanitary condition of the troops is characterized by the high percentage of sick men. The first place among diseases is occupied by beri-beri (up to 5 percent);

the second, malaria (2 percent); and the third, dysentary. Then follow other diseases, in the following order: skin diseases (eczema, rash, and leg sores); pulmonary tuberculosis; abdominal and intestinal diseases; trachoma; syphilis; and nervous diseases. As regards mortality, dysentary takes first and tuberculosis second place.

Officer Personnel

The officer personnel may be divided roughly into two groups: officers who have received military instruction and those who have been commissioned from the ranks. The second group, however, is not numerous. With few exceptions, all the higher officers have received their military instruction either in Japan or at Paotingfu. According to their social status, they are for the most part sons of officials, merchants, and well-to-do peasants. In addition, there is now a cadre of young officers who have completed the course of studies in the "Whampoa" School or in schools attached to various army corps. A kind of antagonism can be observed between the younger and older officers. The older officers are dissatisfied with the rapid advancement of the younger and instinctively see in them their competitors. The majority of the officers are typical professionals. They have no ideal motives, are illiterate in the political sense, and indifferent in temperament. The attitude of the enlisted men toward their [9] officers is unfriendly. The officers maintain the discipline often by beating the men with bamboo. This manner of enforcing discipline, however, is gradually falling into desuetude, due to the influence exercised by young officers and to the work of political organs. A great number of officers, as well as soldiers, are addicted to games of chance and opium smoking. The disciplinary rights of the officers of different grades are not regulated exactly enough and generally each commander is a fully independent master of his unit. There are no regulations relating to the infliction of disciplinary punishment (in the ordinary sense of this expression). The so-called Regulations Relating to the Infliction of Disciplinary Punishment, which have been promulgated in 1925, are a Military Penal Code and inflict the death penalty for almost all offenses. The army corps commanders very often inflicted the death penalty; now, however, this question is being regulated (see below). All the junior officers now are members of the Kuomintang party; there is also a certain percentage of Communists. Recently the attitude of the officers toward political workers and soldiers began to improve.

Political Personnel

The political personnel according to social status belong to the "intelligentsia." The labor element constitutes not more than 10 percent. The political workers may be divided into four categories: (1) Communists; (2) members of the Kuomintang party (those who belong to the left wing and are working together with the Communists); (3) officials devoid of any principles, who are endeavoring to obtain "a position" in the army and are serving for the sake of money and advancement in rank; (4) the right Kuomintang men, whose attitude toward the first two groups is extremely hostile. About 75 percent are Communists and left Kuomintang men; about 20 percent are "officials without principles"; and about 5 percent are right Kuomintang men. The majority of the political workers have had little experience in political work and need strong guidance. Nevertheless, the political personnel enjoy great prestige among the enlisted men because the soldiers see in them their defenders. A certain part of the older officers is very hostile toward the political workers. They see in them their enemies and the men who are undermining the army. Recently, however, this antagonism between the officers and the political personnel began to be somewhat allayed. Now the political staff begins also to take an active part in the

work among the population and to establish contact with various public organizations, especially with peasant unions. Both in the eastern and the southern fronts the political workers played an important part in the matter of the organization of new local authorities.

Political Commissaries

The system of political commissaries of the National Revolutionary Army has been introduced only recently and has not yet been extended to all units of the army corps. In introducing this system, the P.U.R. had to take into consideration, on the one hand, the necessity for the party to have control over the army and, on the other hand, the opposition with which this new system naturally met on the part of the senior officers and higher command.

In accordance with the regulations (see annex no. 6), which have been drawn up by the P.U.R., political commissaries in the units of the line fulfill principally the functions of political guides and are the assistants of the commander in political matters. Political commissaries in the staffs (headquarters), administrations, and other organs of the army fully enjoy the same power as the commanders and chiefs to whom they are attached.

The question relating to the appointment of political commissaries and their mutual relations with political and party organs has also been regulated (see annex no. 7).

[10] Communists

There is no need to dwell on the importance of Communists and the part they played in the National Revolutionary Army. All the previous military campaigns have fully justified their work and activity. The Communists are not evenly distributed in the army corps (see annex no. 8). The First Army Corps is considerably more permeated with them than the others. This fact explains its greater political stability. Most of the Communists are of the "intelligentsia" and former students. They are distinguished by their devotion to the revolutionary cause. Their political training, however, is rather poor.

With the increase and development of the activity of the Communists in the army, frictions naturally began to arise between them and the right Kuomintang. There was a time when these frictions assumed such an acute form that our chief political adviser at Canton raised the question of the exclusion of Communists from the army. But besides the fact that all the previous work of the members of the Chinese Communist Party confirmed the necessity of their further work in the army, one must also take into consideration that the Communists and the army must have relations because the Communists, insofar as they enter into the Kuomintang, cannot avoid taking part in the constructive work of the National Revolutionary Army. All these considerations were enunciated in a letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a copy of this letter was sent to the representative of the Comintern at Peking (see annex no. 9). (*Translator's note: there is no such letter in the file.*) This question has been definitely settled now.

Military Question

To direct the work of the Communists in the army, a special Military Section has been organized at Canton by the Provincial Commission attached to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (for the aims and functions of this section, see annex no. 10).

The Military Section began its activity only quite recently and, at first, set before itself the following tasks: (1) to ascertain the exact number of Communists who are working in the National Revolutionary Army; (2) to verify their qualifications; (3) to organize a party school for those whose previous training has been insufficient; (4) to fix a definite method of work for military nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party; (5) to put in practice a real guidance for the Communists who are working in the army.

In addition to these tasks, which have been enumerated above, the Military Section has also for its aim the organization of peasants' and workmens' armed detachments and work pertaining to the destruction of morale of army units of the enemy. In connection with the intended plan, the following results have already been achieved:

1. The exact number of Communists in the army corps and divisions has already been ascertained.

2. The checking up on the qualifications has also been finished. The Military Section appointed for each army corps a special Commission of Control (for the examination of qualifications), consisting of three members: the representative of the Military Section, the chief of the Political Section of the army corps, and our adviser. **[11]** A list of questions was specifically drawn up for the guidance of this commission (see annex no. 11). All Communists who were examined are divided into four groups. To the first group belong all those Communists who are holding in the army posts of commander and political posts; they are allowed to carry on Communist propaganda in the army units. To the second group belong those Communists who retain the posts they were previously holding, but who are forbidden to carry on propaganda work. To the third group belong those Communists who are to be sent to the party school. To the fourth group belong those Communists who are to be permanently excluded from the National Revolutionary Army. This work has now been completed.

3. Two party schools have been organized, one at Swatow for the First Army Corps, and one at Canton for other army units.

4 and 5. The following measures have been undertaken in connection with these two items. The Military Section has one representative in each army corps and in each division. The nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party are working without legal authorization. Meetings of the Communist nucleus in the regiment may be held only with the sanction of the representative of the Military Section attached to the division. Instructions were issued to the nuclei to the effect that at the present moment the further "deepening" of their training along Marxist lines is required from a member of the party and that the new members must be enlisted with great caution. All Communists received directives to penetrate into the Kuomintang organizations and to gain influence therein. The present-day slogan for the Communists is the following: "A good Communist is a good member of the Kuomintang nucleus." It may be expected that, owing to the measures that have been undertaken already, the Military Section will finally succeed in taking into its own hands the real guidance of the Communists.

Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism

The following is the history of the origin of this society. After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in order to make his ideas popular and to work up his basic principles and the methods of their adaptation of the existing conditions of the national revolutionary movement, a "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism" was organized at the initiative of some members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, including the late Liao Chung-k'ai. Branches of this society began to penetrate into the army, especially into military schools. For the members of the Chinese Communist Party who

were working in the army, it was not sufficiently clear what their attitude toward this society was to be. Instead of taking an active part in its work and attaining thereby some influence in it, the Communists declared the activity of this society to be harmful and counterrevolutionary and stood in open opposition to it. For that reason, the right Kuomintang and certain counterrevolutionary elements acquired a strong influence in the "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism." The right elements of the Kuomintang convert even this society into the tool of their struggle against the left wing of the said party and are carrying on this struggle under the slogan of "struggle against communism." This conflict gradually assumed a more and more acute form and there was a time when it reached such proportions that some comrades even raised the question of the total elimination of Communists from the army. The real cause of this conflict can, however, be detected in the tendency of the right elements of the Kuomintang to crush the left wing and to take hold thereby of the preponderant influence of the party. The state of mind of the comprador elements of the Chinese bourgeoisie was reflected in this struggle against the Communists as clearly as [12] in a drop of water. These elements begin now to see in the awakening and the political activity of large masses of the people the growing threat to their economic interests, and the "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism" had to play the part of a "fig leaf" for the national counterrevolution. The Communists began to carry on an open struggle, but on account of the absence of regular methods in this struggle and the lack of proper leadership, the influence of the right Kuomintang began to be felt even more and, as a result, the society fell definitely under their influence. They put forward the slogan, "The Communists must be excluded from the Kuomintang." Recently, however, several measures of a decisive character have been undertaken in order to put an end to such a state of affairs. The leaders of this society after undergoing individually a proper "schooling," made public denial of their program, acknowledged their activity to be erroneous, and accepted the platform of the left. They made public their declaration to the effect that they considered it to be necessary to carry on the struggle against imperialism to the end, to work jointly with the Communists, to organize peasants, workmen, and students, and to tighten party discipline in the Kuomintang. Now the Military Section [of the Kwangtung CCP Regional Committee] issues instructions to the Communists to take an active part in the work of this society. Its activity in the army is now under the direct control and guidance of the P.U.R. A tendency, however, can now be discerned to make this society proceed to its own liquidation and it may be expected that in the near future this question will totally dwindle away from the army.

Young Military Men Association

This association has been organized only recently and its activity is not yet extended to all army corps. Its aim is to unite officers and cadets of various military schools on the common ground of carrying on the struggle for the new methods of constructive work in the army and gradually to get rid of those militaristic habits and customs that still exist in the army. The association is under the influence of the Communists and the left Kuomintang (see annex no. 12).

The Politico-Moral Condition of the Army

The politico-moral condition depends upon the number of Communists in the army unit, the duration of the political work, and the condition of the political apparatus. The First Army Corps occupies the first place in this respect. Political organs and political commissaries are in all its units. The relations between the officers, the political staff, and the enlisted personnel are good. The attitude toward the population

and vice versa is also good. The chief of the political section takes an active part in the organization of local authorities, peasant unions, etc. The army corps possesses a great offensive spirit. The whole officers' and enlisted personnel has been "inoculated" with the idea of the Northern Expedition.

The Fourth Army Corps occupies the second place in this respect. The morale is good. The relations between the officers, the political staff, and the enlisted personnel are also good. The 11th Division makes the only exception, because its political personnel do not possess the required qualifications. This army corps also takes an active part in the work of the civil authorities and in the political work among the peasantry. Those elements (from other army units) that have been merged into this army corps after the "liquidation" of the southern front will need thorough political training, but the work in this direction has been delayed for want of trained political workers. The fighting quality of this army corps is quite good.

The Second Army Corps occupies the third place as regards the politico-moral condition, then follow the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Army corps respectively.

The political condition of the Second Army Corps of the National Revolutionary [13] Army presents some peculiar features which are worth noting. The chief of the political section and the Communists who are working in this army corps enjoy great prestige among the enlisted men. This is explained by the fact that the commanders were pitilessly robbing the soldiers and that the soldiers saw in the political workers their only defenders. There was a time when the Communists tried to make the soldier masses the object of their work and to carry on Communist propaganda among these masses. As a result, the state of mind was created in some units of this army corps that reminded one of that of the tsarist army in Russia during Kerensky's administration. There were cases when officers were beaten and orders remained unexecuted. *The soldiers' masses turned left too prematurely.*

Cases of desertion take place in some army units. This is explained by the expiration (in many cases) of the term of enlistment, by hard material conditions, and by the harsh treatment on the part of officers. Now, however, since the material conditions of the enlisted personnel have begun to improve, cases of desertion are becoming fewer.

The Navy

The politico-moral condition of the navy leaves very much to be desired. The officer personnel of the navy are not up to standard. The officers are embezzlers of public funds and typical "compradors" of the military class. They are quite ignorant as regards the profession of naval officers. Several measures are being undertaken now in order to instruct the commanding personnel. A club has been organized in which courses in politics are given. Political commissaries have been appointed to warships but their political training is unsatisfactory.

The Arsenal

Eighteen hundred workmen are employed by the arsenal. There was a time when they all were under the influence of the counterrevolutionary Mechanics' Union. All this, however, is being changed. There is a Kuomintang nucleus now, which numbers 300 members. A representative of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang is attached to the arsenal and is carrying on his work jointly with the political commissary. A club has been organized and a school is attached to this club for workmen's children and for those workmen who are illiterate. Fifteen Communists carry on their work in the arsenal. The arsenal now may be considered to be entirely devoted to the National Revolutionary Government.

The Central Military Administration

The Central Military Administration consists of three organs: the Central Staff, the P.U.R., and the Central Administration of Supplies. With the exception of those who are holding the highest administrative posts, the staff of all those organs consists, for the most part, of nonparty men who are doing their work just as ordinary officials. There are very few among them who work "for the idea." Recently, however, some men of the staffs of these organs have been replaced by new men and, due to the influence of the Military Council, the quality of the work is beginning to improve. The greatest evil of all these organs is nepotism. All those who are holding the higher posts strive by all means to find positions for their relatives and friends. This is the greatest evil of the Chinese army and it will take a long and persistent struggle to eradicate it. Some steps in this direction have already been taken. For instance, all appointments must now be confirmed by the Military Council; for that reason it is now, of course, much more difficult to place "one's own men." Recently the work in the above-mentioned organs began to improve, and it is to be hoped that gradually they will become the real central organs of the army. It is intended to appoint in the near future political commissaries to the General Staff and the Central Administration of Supplies. A political commissary has already been appointed to the Sanitary Inspectorate.

[14] Characteristics of the Higher Political Personnel

(*Translator's note*: this report on characteristics being rather lengthy, only a short resume is given here.) The characteristics of the higher political personnel, i.e., chiefs of the political sections of the army corps and of the navy and directors of the departments in the P.U.R. show that, for the most part, Communists are appointed to these posts of responsibility and, only in comparatively rare cases, the more prominent members of the Kuomintang. Almost all of them are devoted to the revolutionary cause, have received a thorough political training, fulfill their duties very energetically, and enjoy great prestige among their subordinates. In two or three cases only the choice proved to be rather unfortunate, but these men will be replaced soon. [Another translator's note:] (Below the characteristics of the chief of the P.U.R. are given because he plays now a prominent part in the Wuhan government. He took the place of the notorious Communist Teng Yen-ta in the Political Bureau.)

Characteristics of Ch'en Kung-p'o

The chief of the P.U.R., Ch'en Kung-p'o is a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and candidate for membership in the Political Bureau. Ch'en received his education in England [the United States]. He is young, very ambitious, and well-developed in the political sense. Formerly he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party. He has no fixed political convictions, only a mixture (melange) of anarchism, Sun Yatsenism, and socialism. As he was concurrently holding several other posts (minister of labor, minister of agriculture, chancellor of Canton University), he was until recently unable to devote much time to his work in the P.U.R. His prestige among the chiefs of political sections is not very high; for that reason, he is to be replaced.

The Military Tribunal

To carry on the fight against criminality in the army and to centralize this effort, a special Military Tribunal has been organized and is attached to the P.U.R. The

regulations governing the Military Tribunal have been approved by the Military Council (see annex no. 13A).

Li Chang-ta, the old member of the Kuomintang and "companion in arms" of the late Dr. Sun, has been appointed president of the Military Tribunal. Yang P'ao-an, a Communist and member of the Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang, has been appointed deputy president. The senior examining magistrate and the governor of the prison are also Communists.

The Military Tribunal has not as yet started its activities, because just now the personnel are being selected. It has also been decided for the time being not to establish tribunals in the army corps as no fully qualified men are available. Besides, the college of this tribunal jointly with the P.U.R. is busy with drawing up regulations governing military criminal cases, which are conformable to the present-day aims of the National Revolutionary Army. Provisional instructions to the Military Tribunal (see annex no. 13B) have been approved already by the Military Council. Penalties for the graver military offenses are provided for in these instructions.

Conclusion

During recent times the political work began to penetrate more and more deeply into the masses of the army. Both the higher command and the senior officers have come to the conclusion that political instruction is absolutely necessary for the troops. The P.U.R. is being gradually converted into the organ to which the real guidance of the political work in the army belongs. The political workers succeeded in attaining great prestige among the officers and enlisted men. With regard to the extension of political work to the whole army, the lack of trained political workers is a serious handicap. [15] To create a cadre of such workers, a special political class has been started at the Central Military-Political School. The number of students in this class is 430. Moreover, much attention is also given to the political instruction in other classes of this school. Under such conditions only is it possible to count upon creating at some future date a politically educated army. The new system of political commissaries affords even now the possibility of having some control over army units, which renders of course the carrying on of the political work much easier. The carrying on of such work would be impossible without some form of control over the economic life of army units and without combating the stealing of provisions of the soldiers and the beating (slapping on the face) of the men by their officers. The political commissaries are making great efforts to combat these evils. The National Revolutionary Army enters now a new phase of its development. Instead of relying upon the general as the "master" of the unit, the army must henceforth rely upon the officers and enlisted men. The P.U.R. has already taken into account this circumstance and chooses the officers in command and the cadets of military schools as first objects for its political work. As for soldiers, it has been decided to carry on cultural and educational work among them; this work is to be concentrated in clubs. At present all units of the National Revolutionary Army are devoted to the Revolutionary Government. As for the negative traits of the army, such as nepotism, provincialism, stealing, beating on the face, etc., they can be got rid of by measures of persuasion as well as by measures of coercion. This is being done now by the P.U.R. and the Military Tribunal respectively. The National Revolutionary Army must be given literate officers (in the political sense), political workers, and honest supply officers in order to be able to carry out successfully the missions that have been assigned to it.

List of Annexes

1. Regulations Governing the Political Directorate (P.U.R.).

2. Program of Political Lessons for Enlisted Personnel.

3. A. How To Carry on the Political Education of Officers.

B. Program of Political Instruction of Officers.

4. Regulations Relating to Party Organizations in the Units of the National Revolutionary Army (missing part).

5. Instructions Relating to the Keeping of Records of the Political and Party Personnel in the National Revolutionary Army (missing part).

6. Regulations Governing Political Commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army.

7. Letter of the Political Directorate to all Political Commissaries of the National Revolutionary Army.

8. Number of Members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army.

9. Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (missing).

10. A. The Military Section Attached to the Provisional [Provincial] Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: (1) Theses Relating to Its Aims and Function. (2) Organization.

B. Statutes of the Military Section of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party ("Voenka").

11. List of Questions for the Guidance of Commissions of Control in Charge of the Checking Up on Qualifications of the Members of the Chinese Communist Party.

12. Young Military Men Association: A. Introduction. B. Organization. C. Duties of the Members.

13. A. Regulations Governing the Military Tribunal of the National Revolutionary Army.

B. Directives to the Military Tribunal Relating to Penalties.

14. Diagram Showing the Connection Between Political and Army Organizations [we omit this annex].

15. By-laws of the Central Political-Military Club [we omit this annex].

Document 38

Regulations Governing the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army

A Political Training Department for the National Revolutionary Army was being planned as early as July 7, 1925, as shown in the Minutes of the Political Council of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee (KMT Archives 001/29, Meeting #30). On July 22 the Political Council adopted an organizational outline for the Political Training Department of the Military Council (Meeting #38). The Political Council appointed Ch'en Kung-po to head the department on July 27; two days later it appointed the chairman of the Military Council, Wang Ching-wei, to supervise it (meetings #40 and #41). On September 16, the Political Council reached decisions on relations between Party Representatives and the Political Training Department, while on February 19, 1926, the Political Council approved the Organizational Regulations of the Political Training Department and its expenses, and also passed Regulations for Party Representatives in the National Revolutionary Army (meetings #57 and #107).

Our Document 38 is a set of regulations for the "Political Directorate"—that is, the Political Department—of the National Revolutionary Army, and it bears the date March 15, 1926. The official Chinese version was promulgated by the Military Council of the National Government, i.e., the government in Canton, on March 19, 1926, according to KMWH, XII, 1814, which reprints the regulations on pp. 1814–18. Our document probably is a double translation—Chinese to Russian to English; as should be expected, the official Chinese version differs in many minor respects.

Some differences are matters of substance, probably due to changes made before passage. For example, article 8 of the Chinese version is a new item that specifies that orders from the Political Training Department to Party representatives in army corps, independent divisions, the Central Military-Political School, etc., as specified in item 7, must be signed by the chairman of the Military Council and cosigned by the head of the Political Training Department. Article 9 in the Chinese version (article 8 in the Russian to English) specifies that all Party matters, and political and cultural work, in the armies shall be carried out according to the direction and plans of the Political Council, not, as in Document 38, according to the direction and plans of the P.U.R. (i.e., the Political Training Department itself). The extra article 8 in the Chinese version also means that all numbers in the Chinese version after article 8 are one digit more than in Document 38. The Chinese version stops with chapter 4, its article 26, on the Military Law Committee (Military Tribunal in Document 38). The title in the Chinese version, "Organizational Outline of the Military Council's Political Training Department" (*Cheng-chih hsun-lien pu*) has a different ring than that of the Russian to English version, "Regulations Governing the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army."

Despite the existence of the official version in Chinese, we present Document 38 because it is authenticated by the official version yet shows some of the slippages that occur with double translation. Furthermore, one may deduce that in this case, at least, the Russian adviser who forwarded the version found in Peking (and those also in Moscow) was unaware of changes of substance introduced by the Chinese colleagues. We enter in brackets important differences found in the official version and each

alternative term on its first appearance only, to avoid overloading the text with numerous alterations.

The official version is followed by Regulations for Party Representatives in the National Revolutionary Army (KMWH, XII, 1818-21). Both were issued at the same time, as was the Organizational Outline of the Military Law Commission, though the text of it is "missing," according to the compiler of KMWH.

TEXT

Annex No. 1 March 15, 1926

[1] I. General Articles

1. The Political Directorate [Political Training Department] has for its aim the guidance of the Party [duties] and the political and cultural work in the National Revolutionary Army.

2. The Political Directorate is subordinated to the Military Council and carries on its work in accordance with the plans [and resolutions] approved by the said Council.

3. In its routine work, the Political Directorate is guided by instructions of the president [chairman] of the Military Council. [Who is at the same time chief Party representative in the National Revolutionary Army.]

4. As regards questions relating to Party work in the army (organization of nuclei [special district Party organizations], admission and expulsion of members, education of members of the Party along Party lines), the Political Directorate is guided by resolutions of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau [Council] of the Kuomintang Party.

5. At the head of the P.U.R. [Political Training Department] is a chief who is at the same time member of the Military Council.

6. The P.U.R. carries on its work in the army [and other military organs indirectly] through [corresponding] commissaries [Party representatives] and political sections.

7. The following are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.

a. Commissaries of army corps and separate [independent] divisions.

b. Commissaries of the navy and the air services.

c. Commissary of the Central Military-Political School.

d. Commissaries of the General Staff and the Central Administration of Supplies.

Note: At present the president of the Military Council is concurrently commissary of several army corps and of the Central School. In these army corps and in the Central School permanent [acting or] deputy commissaries are appointed, who are subordinated to the P.U.R. in accordance with the general regulations. [for ordinary Party representatives.]

[8. Orders of the Political Training Department to the directly controlling organs in the above article must be signed by the chairman of the Military Council and cosigned by the head of the Political Training Department.] [Each article hereafter will have one higher number in the Chinese version.]

8. All party, political, and cultural work in the army is carried on in accordance with the plans and directions of the P.U.R. [changed to Political Council].

[2] 9. All social [and] political organizations in the army (such as "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism," "Young Military Men Association," etc.) carry on their work under the guidance of the P.U.R. and of the respective commissaries and political sections. The existence of organizations outside the control and guidance of the P.U.R. is not permitted.

10. All party [workers] and [other] political workers in the army are at the exclusive disposal of [receive the direction of] the P.U.R. and its subordinated political organs. Without the knowledge and consent of the P.U.R., they cannot be appointed, dismissed, or transferred to other work.

11. The P.U.R. is in charge of control [selection], replacement, and appointment of political workers in the army. The procedure of appointing commissaries is fixed by the special regulations governing political commissaries.

II. Organization of the P.U.R.

12. The Political Directorate consists of:
1) Administrative Department
a. Secretariat
b. Section for Economic [Financial] Affairs
c. Dispatching Office
2) Propaganda Department
a. Propaganda Section
b. Cultural and Educational Section
c. Information Section [Statistical and Investigation Section]
d. Publishing [Editing] Section
3) Department of Party Affairs
a. Party [Affairs] Section
b. Organizing Section

III. Aims [Duties] of the Departments of the P.U.R.

[Section 1. Administrative Department]
[3] 13. The Administrative Department acts as an organ of the P.U.R. in charge of administrative affairs and supplies [omit supplies].

14. The Secretariat is in charge of the compilation of papers going out and the registration of all papers issued and received by the P.U.R.

15. The Section of Economic Affairs is in charge of the supplying of the P.U.R. with necessary articles and funds; it prepares the budget of the P.U.R. and checks up the budgets of the Political Sections, which are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.

16. The Dispatching Office is in charge of the dispatching of all literature, materials, and documents issued by the P.U.R.

[Section 2. Propaganda Department]

17. The Propaganda Department works out materials of ideal and directive character for the whole party and political personnel of the army in the sphere of cultural and political education and instruction of soldiers, students, and officers; it arranges conferences and meetings on questions relating to political work in the army.

18. The Propaganda Section is in charge of the preparation of plans, instructions, theses, programs, and other materials relating to political education and to the conduct of various political campaigns and gives instructions to the political personnel of army units in the sphere of political work.

19. The Cultural and Educational Section is in charge of the preparation of all materials relating to the organization of cultural and educational work and of the teaching in schools, clubs, and other cultural and educational organs of self-activity, organizes libraries, sporting, and other competitions and contests, and gives instructions as to how this work is to be carried on in army units.

20. The Information Section is in charge of the control [controls the records] of the whole political and party personnel of [in] the army, and studies materials relating to the political work and condition of army units [substitute: and studies the condi-

tions of the development of political work in the army].

21. The Publishing Section is in charge of the compilation and publication of all [4] materials issued by the P.U.R. such as newspapers, books, placards, leaflets, etc.; the distribution of all published materials is done by the chief of the Propaganda Department.

[Section 3. Party Affairs Department]

22. The Department of Party Affairs is in charge of the organization and guidance of all party work in the army; directs "the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-senism" and all party organizations and convokes party conferences and meetings.

23. The Party Section is in charge of the compilation of all programs, theses, and other materials relating to party work and education and to the conduct of various party campaigns, etc.

24. The Organization Section is in charge of the preparation [omit the preparation] of all regulations in connection with the military-political, party, and cultural-educational work in the army and [also directs (*chih-tao*) them. Omit the rest] compiles regulations and instructions.

IV. Military Tribunal [Military Law Commission]

The Military Tribunal is attached to P.U.R. Its organization and personnel are fixed by special regulations.

V. Personnel of P.U.R.

[We omit the list of thirty-six positions, aside from messengers and servants, in the table of organization. The section is also missing from the official version.]

Document 39

Program of Political Lessons for Enlisted Personnel

This document is not dated, but the reference (p. 2) to the Tariff Conference "which has been called for October 26 and which is now sitting in Peking" suggests that it was composed before mid-December 1925 when the conference recessed for two months. The conference reconvened on February 18, 1926, but if this were the session referred to, why the reference to October 26?

The major part of the document consists of indoctrination themes, while near the end come instructions in educational techniques.

TEXT

Annex 2

[1] The First Hour: *Why hast thou become a soldier? Note*—In the village he had no land to cultivate; he is not admitted into artisans' guilds, because there are too many workmen there; in the cities there are few factories, where a job can be found; no warships, steam vessels, railways, or paved roads are being constructed; nowhere is it possible to find work.

The political instructor must know every soldier's name, native province and district, and family condition; he must learn the real reasons why the soldier entered military service, and by means of concrete examples, describe general conditions under which the toiling masses of China are living.

2. *Who are the landowners, and why have they so much land?* The political instructor, besides giving the general characteristics, must explain the part the big landowners are playing in the village—enslavement of peasants by means of usury, farming on onerous terms, etc.

3. *Why couldst thou not find work in the city?* The political instructor must illustrate the life and general conditions of artisans, their struggle against imported goods, their powerlessness to compete with foreign goods, etc.; he must also explain the same in connection with the slow development of factories.

4. *Who is guilty of thy misfortunes? The Imperialists.* Why? They have built at home many factories which are manufacturing all sorts of goods. All these goods cannot be sold at home, not because everybody has them, but because the workmen and peasants there are so poor that they cannot afford to buy them. For that reason the capitalists are importing these goods into other countries, where these goods can be sold. Besides, they need cotton for their textile factories, iron for their machines, coal for fuel, etc. Where can they find all that? In the Far East, where there is such a plenty of these natural riches that they can obtain them almost for nothing. And that is not all! The capitalists possess much money that is lying "idle": factories and railways are not worth building, because there are too many of them and they yield such small profit; in the East, however, they can use the very cheap labor ("yellow" or "black" as they call it). This is the reason why the imperialists rush with such avidity

upon Eastern countries, in order to subjugate them. They do not simply come to us; they strive to conquer and to enslave us.

5, 6, 7. The political instructor must devote four hours to this theme in order to elucidate fully the character of imperialism. All these colloquies must be based on materials and notions, which are adapted to the understanding of the soldier. Mere reasoning will be of no use. What kind of materials must and can be used by the political instructor? It would be useful to obtain some statistical data. For instance, ask the soldier whether he has been at Shameen, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and other places where many foreigners are? Ask whether the soldiers know the name of some foreign bank or firm? Or by whom and with whose money the railways to Shaokwan [2] and to Kongmoon have been built? Having these data as a starting point, the political instructor whose mind is capable of deep reflection will be able to give the proper explanation of the substance of imperialism.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. *What are the unequal treaties? What is extraterritoriality? What are concessions? What is tariff autonomy?*

Colloquies 8 to 15 (inclusive) must be devoted to dwelling on above-mentioned questions. Least of all, recourse is to be made to theoretical reasonings and definitions while dwelling on these subjects. In connection with each of these questions it would be quite possible to find appropriate instances which are known to soldiers. One must train the soldiers so as to make their minds work in the direction of conscious understanding of the life which surrounds them. It would be much better if the soldiers succeeded in finding such examples by themselves. By what instances can these questions be illustrated? Here are some specimens:

a. England imports opium into China. The British know that this is contrary to law, that the government of China promises to inflict penalties for that, but still they continue to import opium. Who was right? The Chinese, of course; but the British bombarded Canton, demanded indemnity, and, moreover, occupied and are still occupying the island of Hong Kong. Is this an equal treaty?

b. On May 30 the imperialistic police at Shanghai shot dead Chinese students and workmen. The persons guilty of shooting must be handed over to the court for trial. What court? The Chinese court, of course, because the crime was committed on Chinese territory. The trial of the offenders, however, is taken up by the foreigners themselves. There you have the substance of extraterritoriality. Judge for yourselves what comes out of this practice. The imperialists sent the police to shoot down the workmen, but the police is tried by these very imperialists!

c. Shameen—this is what is called a concession. The foreigners came to China, seized an island, and declared that here was England, not China! Is this not an impudence?

d. Has China the right to say, "Import more machinery, but do not import chocolate, we do not want it"? Not only has it the right to say, but it also has the right to forbid importation. Such a practice is being observed in all countries, but not in China; China is deprived of this right. (Say something on the subject of the Tariff Conference, which has been called for October 26 and which is now sitting at Peking.)

With the fifteenth colloquy the political instructor finishes the first part of the elucidation of reasons why the soldier has become a soldier, why he was suffering from hunger, why he was not able to find work and he has been enlisted into the army.

As soon as you see that the soldiers have mastered the subject matter of all these colloquies, you must pass to the second part of the same theme and explain that the imperialists are not the only persons who are guilty of the oppression of China, and that not the whole population of the country is suffering from the oppression by the imperialists. There are small groups of Chinese who not only do not suffer from this

oppression, but are even quite content and enrich themselves. Who are these Chinese?

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. *Why are the landowners acting in concert with the imperialists? Who are the compradors, and why are they also acting in concert with the imperialists? Who are "Shen-shih" (gentry), "T'u hao" (local rowdies), and why are they acting in concert with the landowners and imperialists? Why are some merchants, students, and capitalists acting in concert with the imperialists?*

You must devote eight colloquies to the elucidation of these six questions, applying the same methods which have been indicated before, i.e., you must try to elucidate those questions by means of examples which are known to the soldier from the village or town life and from his own experience.

As soon as you are convinced that these questions have been made sufficiently clear to the soldier, it will not be difficult for you to make him understand.

22. *What and who are the imperialists?*

It will not be difficult for you to prove that the militarists are armed at the expense of the imperialists and the landowners, who are sympathizing with them. They [3] are armed in order to oppress the people and to make the robbing of the people easy for the landowners, the compradors, and their masters, who are the imperialists.

23, 24. *Invite the soldiers' attention to some militarists: Yang Hsi-min, Lou Ch'ou-wang [Liu Chen-huang], Wu P'ei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Sun Ch'uan-fang.*

Make a brief examination of wars between them in 1920, 1924, and 1925. Call to their mind how we have defeated Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huang, and what came of it, and what the result is of the struggle between the militarists in the north.

After you have finished this part of your colloquies, you will be able to elucidate fully to the soldier all the causes of his miserable state, which compels him to buy his soldier's pay of 10 to 12 dollars at the price of his own life.

After fulfilling this task, you must pass to the cycle of questions to the effect that, having entered the National Revolutionary Army, which is defending the interests of the mother country from oppression on the part of all the parasites (foreign and domestic), he has become not the mercenary, who is fighting to get a piece of bread but does not know for what and for whom, but the conscious citizen, the honorable citizen (because the calling of the soldier in the National Revolutionary Army is honorable), who is fighting honorably for the welfare of his country.

25, 26, 27. *What is the National Revolutionary Army? How is the National Revolutionary Army organized? What aims does it set before itself?*

While discussing these questions, the political instructor must give a brief outline of the history of the creation of the National Revolutionary Army during the last two years and its exploits in two wars against Ch'en Chun [Chiung]-ming and in the wars against Teng Pen-yin, Liu Chen-huang, Yang Hsi-min, and Hsiung K'e-wu. He must show the National Revolutionary Army in contrast to the armies of the militarists, and explain the part which the soldier has to play in the armies of the militarists and in the National Revolutionary Army.

28. *Who are the enemies of the National Revolutionary Army?*

The previous colloquies give answer to this question. The enemies of the National Revolutionary Army are the imperialistic countries (first of all, Japan, England, America, France), the militarists (you must dwell on the treacherous part which is played by Ch'en Chiung-ming, Teng Pen-yin, Fang Pen-jen, Wu P'ei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, etc.), the big landowners, the compradors, etc.

29. Of other foreign countries, you must dwell on the part which Russia is playing and explain that Soviet Russia was carrying on and is still now carrying on a struggle against imperialism, and that the power there belongs to the toiling masses, which are struggling not only for their own liberation, but also for the liberation of the toiling masses of the whole world. You must devote one colloquy to this topic.

30. You must then tell the soldiers that the toiling masses of other oppressed

countries—India, Egypt, Philippines, Indochina, Korea, Burma, Siam, etc.—are also friends of the National Revolutionary Army, i.e., of the national liberation of China. Try to get a geographical map and show on it the imperialistic countries and the oppressed countries. Take some daily newspapers and read them aloud in order to show how the toiling masses in these countries are carrying on our common struggle against the imperialists.

31. You must tell during this colloquy that when we are speaking about imperialistic England or Japan, etc., we always have in mind the dominating class of capitalists; that in all these countries there are also workmen and peasants, who are as much oppressed as we are, and who are sympathizing with us. Take any newspaper and you will obtain sufficient material there, in order to prove it (rebellions, strikes, work of trade unions, fascists, shooting, etc.).

32. During this colloquy you must tell about the revolutionary struggle in China of the workmen and peasants, who are doing the same work as the National Revolutionary Army. Sufficient materials are available to prove it. Call to their minds the Taiping Rebellion of peasants, the Boxer Uprising, the shooting of workmen of the Peking-Hankow Railway in 1924, the shooting affair of May 30 at Shanghai, the shooting at Hankow, Canton, etc. Tell them about the struggle of peasants in Kwangning and other districts of Kwangtung province. Show on the basis of these instances that the workmen and peasants are the friends of the soldiers.

[4] 33, 34, 35, 36. These hours are to be kept in reserve, in case it proves to be impossible for the political instructor to carry through all the previous colloquies; otherwise, he must devote them to the reading of newspapers, to the exchange of opinions, etc.

If all the above-mentioned topics are thoroughly mastered by the soldiers, it will not be difficult for the political instructor to pass to the next cycle of colloquies relating to the methods of the revolutionary struggle, the parties, the part of the Kuomintang, the teaching of Sun Yat-sen, etc. The program relating to all these topics will be presented in due time.

The P.U.R. invites the attention of all political instructors to the organization of the "political hour" and to the proper methods of the work, because the proper organization of the "political hour" and the right methods of work are the basic guarantees of success.

1. Three hours per week must be devoted to political instruction, i.e., three days, one hour a day.

2. The schedule of political lessons must be made in agreement with the regimental commander.

3. All officers and soldiers must know exactly at what time and where these colloquies will take place.

4. The political instructor must come to these colloquies on time in order to be an example of military exactness and punctuality.

5. All officers of the company concerned must attend these colloquies.

6. The political instructor must see to it that no one fails to attend these colloquies.

7. The place for holding the political colloquy must be chosen beforehand; if it is to be held in the open air, the place must be situated far enough from any noise; if the colloquy is to take place in some building, it must be light, spacious, and warm in order that the soldiers may be comfortable.

8. Before proceeding to his work, the political instructor must get thoroughly acquainted with this program, think it over, and collect the necessary material.

9. The political instructor must prepare himself for each colloquy, devoting no less than one hour for this purpose. Before going to the colloquy, the political instructor must carefully think over the subject on which he is to speak; he must con-

sider the instances which he wants to cite, etc.

10. The political instructor must keep in mind that to give the soldiers "lectures" is the worst method of this work. If he uses the whole hour to deliver a lecture and then goes away, he may be sure that he will not obtain any results whatever. To listen to lectures and to understand them is a difficult matter, even for the educated persons, the more so for the soldiers, among whom there are many who are illiterate, i.e., those who are unaccustomed to mental work.

11. The best method of work is the method of questions and answers, i.e., you ask the soldier some question which he answers; but this method is very difficult. The political instructor, having in view the carrying through of a colloquy on some theme, must think it over carefully, what questions to ask. It is not enough to ask a question; it is necessary that the question be understood by the soldiers, i.e., the questions must be simple, practical, adapted to the soldier's experience. If you cannot get an answer, try to lead the soldier's mind up to the desired answer, help him with the answer. Ask two, three, or four soldiers; ask the whole audience, perhaps you will find some man who is able to give you an answer. If you are unable to carry through the whole colloquy in questions and answers, you may summarize it at the end, make some generalizations, but devote not more than five or ten minutes to it.

12. If you are not able to organize your colloquies on the basis of this method, try to apply a mixed method, i.e., a lecture and then questions and answers.

13. You must be well acquainted with your soldiers. You must know their names, ages, their native provinces and districts, their family conditions, their professions before entering military service, whether they know how to read and write, etc. Only such detailed knowledge of each soldier will give you in their eyes the great authority, which is based not on the rank you are holding but on their confidence in you and respect. Thereby, your task in connection with their political education will be greatly facilitated.

14. You will find among your audience men of different abilities; some are more active than others; some are older men with experiences, others are young; some know how to read and write, others are illiterate; for some it is quite easy to understand questions you ask them; for others, on the contrary, it is rather difficult, etc. It [5] may happen that only three to five soldiers will be able to answer your questions, the others will be silent. Try to avoid such a situation.

Be able to study the character and abilities of every man and try to induce to work not only the able and active soldiers but also those who are less able and less active.

15. Try to ask as frequently as possible the question whether you have been understood, and find out whether you have been understood properly.

16. Do not get angry if you are not understood. In 99 percent of such cases it is your own fault and not the fault of your audience. Try to explain patiently everything that is difficult to understand, using various ways and methods.

17. Pay attention to the language you use when speaking to soldiers. If you use words, terms, philosophic expressions which are unknown to the men, nobody will understand you. Keep in mind that different people use different languages. When speaking to soldiers use one language and cite corresponding instances; when speaking to officers or students use another language and cite other instances. The experience of our political work shows that the political workers frequently forget this important circumstance.

Document 40

How to Carry on the Political Education of Officers

Annex 3

[1] 1. It is the duty of every regimental commander to organize every week political lessons for officers of his regiment.

2. Not less than one hour a week must be devoted to these political lessons.

3. The schedule of political lessons for officers must be prepared by the political commissary of the regiment in agreement with the regimental commander.

4. All officers and political workers of the regiment must attend these political lessons for officers.

5. In case some officer or political worker neglects these political lessons, a penalty is inflicted on him by the political commissary of the regiment and the regimental commander.

6. The political commissary of the regiment organizes these lessons by distributing several themes among the officers, who study these themes and prepare a thesis:

7. In case these theses cannot be read (by the officers), the political commissary of the regiment reads them himself.

8. Quite independently of the fact by who the thesis is read, the political commissary of the regiment must hold himself prepared for each thesis.

9. After the thesis has been read, the political commissary organizes discussion in the form of a colloquy and tries to draw into this discussion the whole audience.

10. The political commissary of the regiment must keep in mind that to draw all the officers into political self-activity is the best method of their political education.

11. In carrying out the program of the political instruction of officers, the political commissary of the regiment must rely upon the sympathy and the support of the Kuomintang nucleus and of the "Young Military Men Association."

[2] 12. It is likewise the duty of the Kuomintang nucleus and of the "Young Military Men Association" to give the political commissary of the regiment full support in his work in connection with the political instruction of officers:

Program of Political Instruction of Officers

1. What is imperialism?

2. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the nineteenth century.

3. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the twentieth century.

4. What are extraterritoriality, concessions, and the mixed court?

5. What is tariff autonomy?

6. Upon whom does Chang Tso-lin rely? His power. The history of his rise.

7. Wu P'ei-fu. The history of his rise.

8. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in 1922.

9. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-

fu in 1924.

10. The military-political sketch of the war between Sun Ch'uan-fang and Chang Tso-lin in 1925.
11. The coalition between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.
12. The first war against Ch'en Chun [Chiung]-ming in 1925.
13. The second war against Ch'en Chiung-ming in 1925.
14. The rebellion of Yang Hsi-min and Lou Ch'ou-wang [Liu Chen-huan].
15. The defeat of Teng Pen-yin [ca. end of 1925].
16. The organization of the National Revolutionary Army.
17. The importance of political work in the army.
18. The military-political problems of the National Revolutionary Army.
19. How is the National Revolutionary Government organized?
20. How is the provincial government organized?

Document 41

Regulations Governing Political Commissaries [Party Representatives] in the National Revolutionary Army

This document is available in three versions. One is a Chinese translation of the Russian version sent to the Russian military attaché's office in Peking. It was published in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 21-24, and from this we published our English translation in *Documents*, pp. 200-202, as Document 17. The second version is annex 6 to our Document 37, for which we use the number Document 41. This is an English translation of the Russian version. The third is an official Chinese version promulgated by the Military Council on March 19, 1926. It was republished in KMWH, XII, 1818-21.

Some changes of substance were made before passage of the regulations. We checked Document 41 against the official Chinese version and have added in brackets necessary corrections or additions. We interpolate "Party representative" for "commissary," and "Political Training Department" for "Political Directorate (P.U.R.)" only at the first occasion of their use.

Our next document explains and elaborates on these regulations.

TEXT

Annex 6

[1] Section A. Commissaries in the Units of the Line

1. The system of political commissaries is introduced for the purpose of political education of the army in the national revolutionary spirit and in order to increase its fighting value [power], to strengthen discipline, and to inculcate in the mass of the army the fundamental principles of Sun Yatsenism.

2. The commissary is the representative of the Kuomintang party [in the army] and is responsible to the latter for the political and moral condition of the military unit; he sees to the proper execution of instructions of the party and of the superior military organs, and assists the commander of the unit in strengthening the foundations of the national revolutionary discipline.

3. The commissary is the guide of the party nucleus in the military unit, and carries on all political and cultural work in it; under his guidance are also working all social organizations of the military unit, such as the club, "Young Military Men Association," "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism," [Physical Culture Society], etc. He also directs all the commissaries subordinated to him and the political section.

4. The commissary must be [well-]acquainted with all officers of his unit and with the living conditions in this unit. He must also make a thorough study of the state of mind of soldiers and officers.

5. The commissary must remedy all defects discovered by him, and remove all obstacles in the work, and, in case it is impossible to do so, make a report to the higher commissary.

6. The commissary exercises the party and political influence in his unit and directs the work in accordance with the instructions of the higher commissary.

The commander coordinates this work with the program of instructions of [in agreement with] the commander of the unit [to avoid conflicts over timing].

7. The commissary is the authority [the superior officer] for all military men of his unit, and his orders must be obeyed and executed the same as those of the commander of the unit.

8. The commissary has the authority to impose penalties through the commander of the unit [authority jointly to conduct investigations in the army unit].

9. The commissary does not interfere with administrative orders of the commander of the unit.

10. Should the commissary consider the orders of the commander as prejudicial to the national revolution, he [immediately] makes a report to the higher commissary.

In cases of obvious treason or perfidy [rebellion against the party], however, he takes measures that the orders given are not executed, and acts independently at his own discretion; at the same time, he reports to the higher commissary, to the Political Directorate (P.U.R.), and to the president of the Military Tribunal [reports to his superior Party representative and the chairman of the Military Council].

11. During battle the commissary must set an example to all soldiers and officers, and encourage them by his bravery.

[2] 12. The commissary must investigate the economic life of the unit, see that the soldiers get their food on time, and that the food is of good quality. He must insist that soldiers handle all government property carefully. It is also his duty to see that newspapers and magazines reach the units in good time and are distributed properly.

13. The commissary must take care that during campaigns the peaceful population does not suffer, and explains to the soldiers their role as liberators of the people from foreign imperialism.

14. The commissary must establish connections with the population [with the local Party office] and with peasants' and workmens' organizations of the region in which his unit is quartered, and try to bring them and the army together.

15. The commissary relies in his work upon the Kuomintang nucleus in his unit, directs it, and through it puts into effect all measures necessary for the strengthening of the unit [the army].

16. In case of a disagreement with the Party nucleus, the commissary has the right to suspend its decisions. He then makes a report to the higher Party organization and to the respective political section [Political Department].

17. The commissary must be acquainted with all the regulations which are in force in the National Revolutionary Army, and with all orders and circulars pertaining to his unit.

18. The commissary must present to the higher commissary [at the least] a monthly report concerning his work.

Moreover, it is desirable that the commissary should make reports, which contain information concerning his work and the condition of his unit, at the conference of officers and political workers.

19. Section (A) of these regulations refers only to commissaries in the units of the line (regiment, company, battalion, detachment, ship, etc.).

The rights and duties of the commissaries in the staffs, administrative, and other organs of the National Revolutionary Army (army corps, divisional and navy staffs, general staff, sanitary sections, sections of supplies, arsenals, etc.) are enumerated in Section (B).

Section B. Commissaries in the Staffs and Other Organs [of the National Revolutionary Army]

1. The commissaries in the staffs, administrations, and other organs of the army fully enjoy the same power as the commanders and chiefs to whom they are attached.

2. They have the power of control in military, political, and economic affairs.

3. Jointly with the commanders they consider all reports which are presented by officers of lower rank and make decisions. Jointly with the commanders they sign all orders, instructions, and documents, all of which are invalid without their [the Party representatives'] signatures.

4. In cases when the commissaries disagree with the commanders, they must sign the order, but make a report to the higher commissary.

If commissaries discover a criminal design in the actions of the commanders, they act in accordance with article 10 of Section (A).

Section C. Appointment of Political Commissaries

1. Those members of the Kuomintang Party who have shown their devotion to the national revolution and are well developed in the political sense and well disciplined may be appointed to the posts of [are qualified to be] political commissaries.

2. The appointments of political commissaries for regiments and smaller military units and for other corresponding organs are made by the Political Directorate (P.U.R.), [and the appointment form should bear the signature of the chairman of the Military Council and the cosignature of the head of the Political Training Department; but in case of a crisis a higher Party representative may make an acting appointment which must later be reported to the Political Training Department].

3. Political commissaries for divisions and higher units are recommended by the Political Directorate (P.U.R.), in agreement with the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, and their appointments are confirmed by [ordered by] the Military Council; [but in case of a crisis an appointment may be made on the signature of the chairman of the Military Council with the cosignature of the head of the Political Training Department, but afterward the appointment should be made by the above procedure].

Document 42

Letter of the Political Directorate (P.U.R.) to All Political Commissaries of the National Revolutionary Army

Annex 7

[1] Dear Comrades!

A. *The regulations governing the political commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army* are herewith enclosed (see annex 6).

These regulations are the principal document by which are defined the rights and duties of political commissaries in the army; their mutual relations with the officers (those officers who hold equal posts, as well as those occupying inferior positions); and their mutual relations with party organs.

The Political Directorate does not consider it to be necessary to elucidate these regulations *in extenso*, but invites your attention to the following articles only:

Article 3. This article must be interpreted in the following sense: the political commissary is the chief for all those political workers who are placed under him; at the same time, as regards the party nucleus, "the Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism" and the "Young Military Men Association" (these being party and social organizations), he is their senior comrade, guide, and tutor who is educating the members of the party and the revolutionary youth in the spirit of Dr. Sun's principles, as well as in the spirit of the regulations and the program of the party, and in accordance with the instructions of the superior commissaries.

The character of mutual relations between the political commissary and the party nucleus is explained in articles 15 and 16.

Article 15. This article states that the political commissary relies in his work upon the party nucleus; that he derives his strength from the members of the party; and that through them or with their aid he carries through his measures.

The political commissary is the representative of the party in the eyes of all, including members of the party, and all his activities in the military as well as in the party-political domain are based upon his close connection with the party nucleus, the general guidance of which he holds in his hands.

The prestige and authority of the political commissary must stand very high in the eyes of every military man and most of all his prestige and authority must be upheld by the members of the party.

The political commissary must attend all meetings and conferences of the party nucleus, "The Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism," and "The Young Men Military Association" and guide all members of the party along proper party "channels" (lines).

At these meetings the political commissary is just like an ordinary member of the party, equal to everybody present there; he controls all members of the party by his prestige and authority, and influences all resolutions that are passed at the meeting by clear reasoning, convincing arguments, and definite suggestions.

In cases, however, when the political commissary considers that the organizations
[2] concerned (be it the party nucleus, "The Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism,"

or "The Young Military Men Association") goes the wrong way, he has the right to suspend the decision of this organization and to order that it should not be put into execution. He must at the same time make a report to the superior commissary.

Not a single member of the party has the right to speak at nonparty meetings or conferences against the political commissary. Should the party nucleus consider that the political commissary has taken a wrong line of conduct, it has not the right to discuss this question at the meetings of the party; in such cases the party committee must collect all materials and send them to the superior commissary who takes all measures necessary.

Article 18. This article recommends to the commissary "to make reports at the conferences of officers and political workers." The political commissary must make the same reports at party meetings also, in order that the whole nucleus of the party should be kept informed about the work of the political commissary and the condition of his unit. It is desirable that the political commissary should also make reports containing such information at the meeting of the whole unit.

Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10. These articles are about the question of mutual relations between political commissaries and officers.

According to articles 7 and 8, the political commissary is an authority to all officers who are inferior to him in rank, and he has the same right to give them orders as their commander.

It is necessary to establish a procedure in the work of the commanders and the political commissary according to which all orders are given in the joint name of the commander and the political commissary. Doing it in such manner, it will be possible to prevent misunderstandings.

Moreover, in this way it will be possible to induce the officers to take part in the political work, and the political commissary will be kept informed about the life of his unit as regards military operations, garrison service, and economic affairs.

According to Article 9, the political commissary has not the right to countermand the order given by the commander, provided that this order is not contrary to law.

According to Article 10, however, when the political commissary considers that the commander has made a serious mistake he must send immediately a report to the superior commissary who will take the necessary action after consultation with the higher commander concerned.

Should the political commissary discern in the action of the military commander not a mistake, but an intentional desire to do harm to the revolutionary cause, or to assist the enemy or any evil design generally, he must, relying upon the support of the party nucleus and of the politically conscious soldiers and officers, make use of all the power which is put at his disposal by the party, and take all necessary measures according to his own judgment; simultaneously, the political commissary must report to the superior commissary, to the chief of the P.U.R., and to the president of the Military Council [report to his superior party representative and the chairman of the Military Council].

The party nucleus must show in such cases an absolute obedience to all orders of the political commissary and do whatever he orders.

The rights and duties, as defined above, apply to all political commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army without exception.

[3] B. The work of political commissaries in army units differs to a considerable degree from the work in the staffs and other organs of the National Revolutionary Army (such as the General Staff, army corps, divisional, and navy staffs; the sanitary detachment, the detachment of supplies, etc.).

For that reason Section B of the regulations defines *the rights and duties of political commissaries in staffs and other organs of the army.*

According to *articles 1 and 2*, the political commissary has the same power as the

chief of staff or the chief of the organ to whom he is attached; and moreover he has the right of control over the activity of all officers of the staff or organ concerned as regards military-political and economic affairs and operations.

According to *Article 3*, the political commissary must, jointly with the commander or with the chief, receive all reports, examine all materials, read carefully all documents, reports, and demands before they are forwarded; and, also jointly with the commander or with the chief, he gives all orders and signs all documents and other papers.

Neither the political commissary without the chief nor the chief without the political commissary has the right to give any orders whatsoever independently: they must do it jointly after joint deliberation.

In case the political commissary disagrees for some reasons with the chief, he must sign the order (provided it will do no harm), in order to avoid delay, but at the same time send a report to the superior commissary, enclosing the copy of the order.

There may be different opinions and views about all work (especially in regard to military work); in order that this difference of views between the chief and the political commissary should not affect unfavorably the work, the political commissary must in some cases yield to the chief and sign the order which is produced by the latter. Endless altercations between the chief and the political commissary cannot always be of use, but the political commissary, after signing the order of the chief, sends at once a report to the superior commissary who has to decide which party is right (see Article 4).

Should, however, the political commissary discover that the order may do harm, or that the chief pursues a criminal policy, he takes measures according to his own judgment in accordance with Article 10, Section A, of these regulations.

C. The P.U.R. advises all political commissaries to establish the closest official and personal relations with the commanders and chiefs.

It is necessary that the commander and political commissary, being one and an indivisible whole, should always and everywhere work together trying to attain one common aim: the unification of China under the banner of the Kuomintang Party.

The Political Directorate is of the opinion that in the matter of establishing good official relations, political commissaries must take the initiative, as the establishment of such relations depends entirely upon their ability and desire.

[4] The Political Directorate advises the political commissaries of the army corps to call together all commanders and commissaries and to explain to them in detail the regulations governing political commissaries.

Reports relating to all obscure points, difficulties, and mutual relations between the officers and political workers must be sent to the P.U.R. before April 15, 1925 [1926].

Document 43

Number of Members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army

This document must date from mid-March 1926, since it refers to the number of Communist students in the Central Military-Political School, which opened and admitted its students on March 8. The figures, however, appear to be estimates for this school. The document was originally in chart form.

TEXT

Annex 8

Units

1st Army Corps: Political workers, 69; officers, 37; students, 27; enlisted personnel, 21; officials, 2; other employment, 71; total, 227.
2d Army Corps: Political workers, 23; officers, 2; students, 15; officials, 1; total, 41.
3d Army Corps: Political workers, 14; total, 14.
4th Army Corps: Political workers, 16; officers, 28; enlisted personnel, 30; officials, 3; total, 77.
6th Army Corps: Political workers, 11; total, 11.

Navy: Political workers, 17; total, 17.

2d Separate Division: Political workers, 34; officers, 11; enlisted personnel, 2; other employment, 6; total, 53.
20th Separate Division: Political workers, 15; total, 15.

Central Military-Political School: Political workers, 30; officers, 20; students, 200; total, 250.
Political School attached to 2d Corps: Students, 80; total, 80.

Students' Regiment, Waichow: Students, 81; total, 81.

P.U.R.: Political workers, 6; total, 6.

Young Military Men Association: Political workers, 4 (6?); total, 6.

Aviation: Students, 9; total, 9.

[Category totals: political workers, 241; officers, 98; students, 412; enlisted personnel, 53; officials, 67; other employment, 77; grand total, 887]

Document 44

The Military Section Attached to the Provisional [Provincial] Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Annex 10A uses the term "Provisional Commission," which we have changed to Provincial Commission, because it is so named in Document 37, p. 10, in which its functions are described and it is said to be located in Canton. We are not aware of a Provisional Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP. There was, however, a Kwangtung Provincial Committee that directed Communist Party work in the south. Annex 10A refers to the National Revolutionary Army, which was only in Kwangtung at this time. Annex 10B, "Statutes of the 'Voenka,'" is more general and clearly describes an organ of the Central Committee itself. Ms. How believed that Annex 10B may have been of a later date than March 1926, but if so, one wonders how it could have been attached to Document 37. Annexes 10A and 10B were also published in English translation in *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 30–33, where "Provisional" is used.

TEXT

Annex 10A

[8] I. Theses Relating to its Aims and Functions

1. The present-day military-political situation and the necessity of creating a strong, well-disciplined National Revolutionary Army of great fighting value require unity of views and actions on the part of the members of the Chinese Communist Party who are working in the army.

2. A special Military Section is established at the Provincial Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in order to exercise a proper guidance of all the military political work.

3. The military-political work is divided into two parts: (a) the strengthening of our forces; and (b) the destruction of enemy forces.

4. The revolutionary forces must be strengthened—(a) by the increase of Communist influence in the army; and (b) by all peasants' and workmen's armed detachments.

The nuclei of the Communist Party which exist in the army as illegal (unauthorized) organizations, must be guided by the directives of the Military Section, which is carrying on its work in the most secret manner.

5. The Military Section organizes detachments of workmen and peasants and establishes connection with those armed detachments of workmen and peasants which exist now; it must try to secure for the Communist Party the guidance of the latter in order to preserve them thereby from degenerating [into] counterrevolutionary bands or bandits.

6. The Communists who penetrate, under the guise of members of the Kuomintang, into all the army organizations, such as clubs, cultural and educational

societies, "The Young Military Men Association," "The Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism," military scientific organizations, etc., must carry on their work in them in accordance with the directives of the Military Section.

7. To destroy the rear of the enemy and to put down quickly all possible counterrevolutionary risings, the Military Section organizes its nuclei on trunk railways and main waterways.

8. The Military Section establishes, through its agents, connections with various secret societies, detachments of landowners, and other armed organizations, and creates in them its illegal nuclei.

9. The Military Section carries out its policy in the army in the P.U.R., in the political sections of divisions and in other army units, through its representatives. The party apparatus in the army requires the strictest centralization in order to preserve its secret character; for that reason the Military Section is in charge of all appointments and transfers of Communists in the army.

II. Organization

1. The Military Section is attached to the Provincial Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and consists of three comrades, who enjoy the absolute confidence of the party.

2. One of these comrades acts as secretary of the section. He is a member of the Provincial Commission of the Central Committee, and is responsible for the work of the whole Military Section.

3. Similar sections also are organized in lower party organizations. Local Military Sections receive directives from the secretary of the higher Military Section.

4. To preserve its secret character, the workers of the Military Section must be unknown to the general mass of party comrades; they carry on their work quite independently, and do not keep the Party Committee *in corpore* informed about it.

STATUTES OF THE "VOENKA" (THE MILITARY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY)

Annex 10B

[9] (Very Secret)

I. Structure of the Military Section

1. The Military Section is composed of three members, who must be selected only from the members of the Central Committee.

2. The Military Section carries out instructions of the Central Committee and reports to the latter as to its activity.

3. In large provincial centers, as well as in places where the Military Section considers it necessary, delegates of the Military Section may be appointed.

4. The delegates in all respects are subordinated to the Military Section.

5. The technical apparatus of the Military Section is divided into the organizing department and the intelligence department.

II. Functions of the Military Section

1. The functions of the Military Section are organization and guidance of the military work and informing the Central Committee as to military affairs.

2. The moment an armed revolt is started, the Military Section turns into the

General Staff of the revolt and directs the struggle.

3. The Provincial Commission coordinates and regulates all military work among military units, workmen, and peasants, with the object of getting their full cooperation at the moment of a revolt.

4. The Military Section exercises control over the distribution of arms among the militarists cooperating with the party.

III. Work in the Military Forces

Taking into account that an armed revolt, not supported by regular troops but, on the contrary, opposed by strong and disciplined military forces, is beforehand doomed to failure, the Military Section pays special attention to the work in the regular troops of the Chinese army, namely:

1. Through its intelligence department it acquaints itself with the armies of Chinese militarists, establishes connections therein, and organizes military work in military units.

2. It establishes cells inside military units, through which it carries out the preparatory work for the disorganization of those units at the moment of revolt, or for their turning over to the side of the revolting people. (*Note*—Special attention must be paid to the technical troops, artillery, armored-car detachment, etc.)

3. Through those military cells it prepares the ground for seizing military depots, arms, and munition stores.

4. It supervises closely all military Communists working in the troops of individual militarists and controls their distribution.

5. It prepares new contingents of military workers by dispatching workmen and students devoted to the revolutionary cause to military schools.

6. It makes preparations for armed revolts, at the same time takes steps to weaken the strength of the adversary by means of destruction of his rear (blowing up of munition stores, bridges, steamers bringing arms, etc.).

IV. Military Work Among Workmen

1. The Military Section takes into account possibilities of establishing military cells and fighting squads among the masses of the revolutionary workmen of China.

2. After establishing those cells and fighting squads, the Military Section regulates their preparatory work and military training.

3. The Military Section organizes the issuing of arms and munitions to the fighting squads.

[10] 4. The Military Section directs the training of the fighting squads with a view of turning these contingents into a workmen's army in time of armed revolt. To that end it leads propaganda among the workmen who are not as yet enlisted into the fighting squads.

V. Military Work Among Peasants

1. Through its intelligence apparatus the Central Committee investigates the conditions of the peasantry, their needs, problems which trouble them, etc., with the object of utilizing the state of mind of the peasants for the organization of peasants' military cells, partisan bands, etc.

2. Through its intelligence apparatus the Military Section investigates the hunghutze movement with the object of utilizing it during the revolutionary struggle.

3. The Military Section organizes the issue of arms and munitions to armed bands of peasants.

Document 45

List of Questions for Guiding Commissions of Control in Charge of Checking on Qualifications of Members of the Chinese Communist Party

Annex 11

1. The part played by the Communist Party and its importance in the national revolutionary movement.
2. The class struggle and the national struggle.
3. The classes now existing in China.
4. The economic resources of militarism and imperialism.
5. The history of the revolutionary movement in China.
6. The problem of the proletariat in colonial countries.
7. The part played by the National Revolutionary Army and its problems.
8. The duties of the officer and of the soldier.
9. The problem of Communists in the army. The Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
10. The federative and autonomic principles of the political organization of China.
11. The part played by the national intelligentsia and its problems in the national revolutionary movement.
12. The social base and the associates of the Chinese Communist Party.
13. The part played by the peasantry in the revolution of China; the future problems of the peasantry.
14. The organization of the army; its fundamental statutes.

Document 46

Young Military Men Association [League of Chinese Military Youth]

This annex seems to be a general description of the League of Chinese Military Youth rather than formal statutes of the organization. The league was formally set up on February 1, 1925, so Document 37, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army," is in error in stating (p. 12) that the league had been organized only recently. Document 46, however, states that branches of the league must be started in all units of the National Revolutionary Army, which corresponds with the statement in Document 37 that the league's activity is not yet extended to all corps. It seems Document 46 may date from late 1925 or early 1926.

TEXT

Annex 12

[1] A. Introduction

The Young Military Men Association has for its aim the bringing together of all officers, cadets of military schools, and soldiers in the Chinese National Revolutionary Army on the common ground of putting into effect, in connection with the constructive work in the army, the latest principles of the science of war and the turning of the army into a force capable of serving the interests of the masses of the Chinese people.

Taking into consideration all negative traits of mercenary militaristic armies (aloofness from the population; looting; ignorance of the troops of the aims, for the sake of which they are compelled to fight; the tendency to serve and to sell themselves to any master whatever), the Young Military Men Association unites only those military men who have decided definitely to break off from the past and who understand the inevitability and the necessity for the Chinese people to possess an army, educated in the spirit of revolutionary discipline and possessed of a good knowledge of military art.

The Young Military Men Association is a voluntary organization and all its members enjoy equal rights; they have the right to elect their own organs and to be elected as members of them.

B. Organization of the Association

It is necessary to start at once the organization of *branches* of the Association in all units of the National Revolutionary Army. For that purpose special "Initiative Groups" are created in all divisions (it is desirable that these groups should be composed as follows: the divisional commander, the chief of the divisional political section, and the adviser). Such a group calls a general meeting of commanding officers [2] and the political personnel, explains the aims of the association, and enrolls all

those who desire to join it. The president, secretary, and treasurer are then elected for the divisional branch of the Association. These three officers call periodic meetings of members of the Association for the discussion of various political-military questions. The Association takes upon itself the initiative in organizing "circles of military science" and schools for illiterate soldiers, and carries on the oral and printed propaganda relating to the arms [aims] and problems of the Association.

The general conference of divisional branches of all separate units of which the divisions and army corps are composed elects the Army Corps Executive Board. The general conference of all Army Corps Executive Boards elects the Executive Board of the Association for the whole army.

C. Duties of Members of the Association

The members of the Association must set other military men of the National Revolutionary Army an example in matters of discipline, consciousness, and in conscientious fulfillment of their duties.

The members of the Association are forbidden to beat soldiers and in addressing their subordinates must be polite but persevering.

The members of the Association during campaigns or maneuvers must see that the soldiers do not oppress the population. They must also explain the aims and problems of the National Revolutionary Army to the population.

The members of the Association must be constantly improving their political-military knowledge; for that purpose each member of the Association must read newspapers and books on military subjects.

The members of the Association must be most careful in handling government property; they must keep their arms clean and in good order, and preserve arms and [3] other property of their units from damage and stealing. The members of the Association do not enjoy special rights in the army.

Each member of the Association wears on his breast a special badge with the following inscription: "The Young Military Men Association. I am the friend of the people, but the enemy of militarists."

Each member of the Association contributes 1 percent of his pay as members' fee; the money thus contributed by the members as fees are handed over to the Central Treasury of the Association and are spent at the discretion of the Central Executive Board.

Document 47

Regulations Governing the Military Tribunal of the National Revolutionary Army

On February 19, 1926, the Kuomintang Political Council at its 114th meeting passed the regulations for the Military Law Commission of the National Revolutionary Army and the standards for punishments to be used by the commission, which is here called Military Tribunal. The Political Council also approved the organizational rules for the Political Training Department and regulations for Party representatives in the National Revolutionary Army. According to KMWH, XII, 1814, all three regulations were promulgated by the National Government's Military Council on March 19, 1926. A comment adds (p. 1821) that the "Organizational Outline for the Military Law Commission" is missing from the gazette in which the others were published. Document 47 appears to be the missing regulations.

Our documents 38 and 41 are the regulations of the other two systems, but the texts differ in many minor respects due to double translation. A significant difference, however, is the dimunition of the authority of the head of the Political Training Department ("Political Directorate" in the translated version). Rights of important appointments and decisions are given to the chairman of the Military Council in the officially promulgated version. Our Document 47 probably suffers from double translation, and its seems likely that so powerful and sensitive a body as the Military Tribunal would have been placed under either the Political Council or the Military Council, not under the "Political Directorate." In Annex 14, a chart which we do not reproduce, the tribunal is shown directly under the Central Committee of the Party, that is, the CEC of the Kuomintang.

TEXT

Annex 13A

[1] A. General Principles

1. In order (a) to maintain the revolutionary lawfulness, discipline, and order in the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army, (b) to carry on the fight against crimes of economic character, against espionage and treason, and (c) to prevent possible crimes against the government and the army command, a *Military Tribunal* is established and is subordinated to the Political Directorate [Political Training Department] of the National Revolutionary Army (the P.U.R.).

2. The Military Tribunal has for its aim the raising of the general political standard of the army masses; in addition it is the organ which inflicts unmerciful penalties on all enemies of the national revolution, of the government, and of the Chinese army. For that purpose its activity must be as clear and open to all as possible.

3. The Military Tribunal must be guided in its activity by governmental regulations and by the directives of the chief of the P.U.R.

B. Composition of the Military Tribunal

4. The Military Tribunal consists of the president of the tribunal, his deputy, three members of the tribunal and two deputy members, one secretary and his deputy. Suitable candidates are recommended by the Political Directorate and appointed by the Political Bureau [Council] of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang.

5. The president of the Military Tribunal is the spiritual guide and administrative chief for all officials and organs of the tribunal.

6. All members of the tribunal and their deputies constitute the College of the Military Tribunal, which decides such questions as the bringing up for trial of the accused, the dismissal of prosecution, or the additional examination of the case.

C. Court Martial

7. The court martial is constituted, under the chairmanship of the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy, of two members of the Military Tribunal or, in case of their absence, of their deputies and of the secretary who is in charge of the records of the court. The members who constitute the court martial must be confirmed in their office by the president of the tribunal.

8. The court martial in pronouncing its judgments shall be guided solely by the considerations of the revolutionary expediency, taking into consideration the interests of the national revolution.

9. The question relating to punishment is to be decided by the voting of the members of the court martial (the chairman and two members).

D. Investigation Section

10. An *Investigation Section* is attached to the Military Tribunal, and it consists of one senior and four junior examining magistrates who are appointed to these posts in accordance with the same procedure as the members of the Military Tribunal.

[2] 11. The examination of a case is instituted by the senior examining magistrate, in accordance with the order issued by the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy.

12. When it is proved that the act of the accused constitutes no offense, the case may be dismissed only after the College of the Military Tribunal has rendered such a decision. The same procedure is followed when the case that has not been fully investigated is sent back for additional investigation.

13. The senior examining magistrate assigns to the junior examining magistrates the work in connection with the investigation of cases and, as soon as the investigation is completed, transmits the case to the College of the Military Tribunal for consideration.

The deputy-president of the Military Tribunal is in charge of the general supervision over the examining section.

E. Administrative Section

14. The *Administrative Section* is in charge of all the administrative and economic affairs pertaining to all organs and officials of the Military Tribunal, of the Investigation Section, and of the Commandant's Office, which is subordinated to the chief of the Administrative Section.

15. The *Commandant's Office* is in charge of the property, buildings, and of the guarding of the members of the tribunal. He is responsible for the maintenance of

order and for the condition of units which are guarding the tribunal. The commandant shall attend all sittings of the tribunal in order to maintain order.

F. Jail for Preliminary Detention

16. A *jail for preliminary detention* is attached to the Military Tribunal for the confinement of persons accused of crime.

17. The governor of this jail, his deputy, or the commandant shall admit any person who has been arrested by order of the government, of the chief of the P.U.R., or of the president or members of the Military Tribunal.

18. The release from this jail of prisoners can be authorized only by the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy, who issues a special written order for that purpose. After receipt of the order the release can be effected only by the governor or his deputy.

19. The governor of the jail is subordinated only to the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy.

Remarks. 1. A member of the Military Tribunal or of the court martial or an examining magistrate who is a relative, direct or indirect, of the accused, or who is otherwise concerned with the case, shall withdraw from the examination and the trial.

2. The Commandant's Office functions in accordance with special instructions.

3. The internal arrangement of the jail for preliminary detention, the duties of the officials, and the guarding are provided for in special instructions.

[3] Officials of the Military Tribunal of the National Revolutionary Army

[We omit a list of twenty unnamed officials, also clerks, servants, and guards of the Tribunal, and thirty-two officials of the Jail, plus servants and guards.]

Document 48

Directives to the Military Tribunal Relating to Penalties

Annex 13B

[1] I. The continual struggle that has been going on during the last fifteen years for the national liberation of the masses of the people of China and the creation of an independent Chinese government require the establishment of a strong punitive organ. The aim of such an organ should be the combating of crimes against the government and against the discipline in the army, as well as the fight against attempts to demoralize the army.

During the period when the struggle against the enemies of the national revolution assumes a more and more acute form, the old laws of the pre-Republic time or even those laws that have been promulgated after the establishment of the Republic cannot be applied now for many reasons. The main reason is that they are absolutely inadequate under the present conditions of life and of the struggle for national liberation.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, the government decrees:

a. that the Military Tribunal should be guided in its activity, first of all, by the considerations of revolutionary expediency and by the necessity of defending the national revolution, the government, and the foundations of the National Revolutionary Army; and

b. that the tribunal, as the organ of the people, should mercilessly punish all crimes that, directly or indirectly, are committed against the people and the national revolution. At the same time it must take measures for the most careful study of the causes of these crimes, because one of the aims of this tribunal consists also in the prevention of possible crimes.

II. The Revolutionary (Military) Tribunal shall be guided by the following norms of punishment which are approximate only and may be increased or reduced in accordance with the decision of the tribunal.

A. *Counterrevolutionary offenses (crimes).*

1. Attempts on the life of or plots against the government, the army command and its organs, and the revolutionary organizations that aim at the suppression of militarism and imperialism, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years or death by shooting.

2. Destruction, blowing up of arsenals and other factories, storehouses, bridges, railways, etc., which have state or strategic importance shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years or death by shooting.

3. Formation of counterrevolutionary groups and of organizations, the activity of which is directed against the National Government and the army, the participation in these organizations or connection with them shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than five years or death by shooting.

4. The open or secret struggle against the government, the army, and the national revolution with arms in hand or through other methods, such as service in the counterrevolutionary armies, defending of interests of the enemies of the national revolution, etc., shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than

five years or death by shooting.

[2] 5. Treason to the cause of the national revolution by deserting to the enemy, the delivery or sale of documents which have strategic or state importance, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than four years or death by shooting.

B. *Offenses committed by officials in connection with the performance of their official duties (malfeasance in office).*

1. Intentional or unintentional "sabotage," the negligent performance of official duties, as well as the failure to carry out the instructions and orders issued by the government and the army command, shall be punished, dependent upon the damage that has been caused or may ensue, with imprisonment for a period of not less than two years or death by shooting.

2. The appropriation or embezzlement of government property (arms, equipment, etc.) or of money and other valuable articles, the negligent handling of them, the sale or cession of property or valuable articles which bears an unlawful character, and the conduct of commercial and other operations from which a damage may ensue for the government and the army shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than three years or death by shooting.

3. Unlawful extortions, requisitions, or confiscations and unlawful exactions of all kinds, occupation of houses and other buildings without the permission of competent authorities, etc. shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than three years or death by shooting.

C. *Various offenses.*

1. The insult by word or deed of members of the government or army command, the insult of military men (both enlisted and officers' personnel), of officials and of political workers who are performing their official duties or are off duty, the undermining of authority of the government, of the army command or of governmental organs, and the causing of disorganization by one's actions or other means shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of four months to five years.

2. The abuse by a public officer of his authority or the assumption of authority which does not belong to him by right, as well as the nonexecution of the authority (inaction) done with intent to benefit one's self or in consequence of which a damage ensues to the government or the army, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of six months to five years.

3. The failure to inform the authorities of offenses already committed or to be committed, as well as the concealment of offenders shall be punished in cases bearing a malicious character, as the offenses themselves; in other cases with imprisonment for a period of three months to three years.

III. A. The above-mentioned forms of punishment apply without exception to all citizens of the Chinese Republic, as well as to foreigners.

B. For soldiers, workmen, and peasants who have been involved in committing an offense against the national revolution on account of their ignorance, these norms of punishment must be considerably reduced; they are not, however, to be relieved of any punishment.

C. The maximum term of imprisonment shall be fifteen years.

D. All cases of death sentence shall be immediately reported to the president of the Political Bureau [Council] who has the right to suspend within twenty-four hours the execution of the sentence.

E. The escape from the jail of detention, the illness and the absence of the accused generally do not stop the pronouncement of judgment, provided all materials relating to his case have been collected.

Document 49

Characteristics of Prominent Men of the Kuomintang

This document contains rather unusual appraisals of some high Kuomintang officials and officers, written by Russian advisers who worked with them. It is now in NA (G-2 2657-I-281/111). The note by the translator beneath the caption says that the appraisals were "Translated from Soviet Reports, dated May 1926." We deduce that the translator put together a number of personality sketches, probably found in a biographical file. The translator was mistaken about the date of the information, as we shall show.

By interesting coincidence, we know that the longest appraisal, that of Chiang Kai-shek, is made up of three separate appraisals. In the second volume of his memoirs, A. I. Cherepanov tells that he consulted three descriptions of Chiang's character written by advisers who had worked directly with him. He then quotes extensively from them. He says he has forgotten who wrote them some forty years before, but that only two men could have composed the first one, either Nikolai Tereshatov or Cherepanov himself. He is convinced that the first is his own writing, judging by some phrases and expressions used in it. (Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, pp. 77-81; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 207-11.)

What Cherepanov quotes is all found in the same sequence in Document 49. That which he attributes to himself runs from page 1 down to the last paragraph on page 2, where the second writer's opinion begins. This goes to the last paragraph on page 3, where the third writer is quoted. However, by comparing Cherepanov's composite personality sketch of Chiang Kai-shek with that in Document 49, we see that the translator-compiler of our document left out the introduction quoted by Cherepanov and several paragraphs from his sketch. He also omitted six sentences in the third sketch that repeat information already given.

If either Cherepanov or Tereshatov wrote the first sketch, he probably wrote it in Canton before departing for the north (before January 13, 1926: see Doc. 23, list of personnel), or in Peking after he arrived there to report to the Bubnov Commission. The writer of the second sketch says Chiang is commander of the First Corps. The Political Council assigned Ho Ying-ch'in to command the First Corps on January 6, 1926 (Minutes #101). According to Chiang's "Diary," the transfer of command to General Ho was on January 20. The writer of the third sketch knew of Chiang's appointment as inspector general of the National Revolutionary Army. The Political Council decided on that appointment on January 15 (Minutes #104), and Chiang's "Diary" says that the appointment was made by the Military Council on February 1, 1926, but that Chiang refused the position on February 8. None of the appraisals says anything about the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident of March 20, 1926, so we deduce they were all written before that event.

From similar internal evidence we deduce the other sketches, except that of T'ang Sheng-chih, were written before mid-March 1926. Interestingly, the personality sketch of Ch'en Kung-po comes from the same source as the sketch of Ch'en given in Document 37, p. 14, though it is considerably shortened in Document 49. The last part of T'ang's sketch must have been written after March 25, 1926, when Ch'en Ming-shu and Pai Ch'ung-hsi arrived in Changsha to negotiate with him.

TEXT

(Translated from Soviet Reports, dated May 1926.)

[1] General Chiang Kai-shek

As a personality, General Chiang Kai-shek by his nature is a self-conceited, self-loving, reserved, and ambitious man, with some ideas of European progress who, however, did not altogether break away from his Chinese prejudices. With some knowledge of the General's character, by praising him in a delicate manner and speaking in correct form, much can be obtained from him; only one never must show one's self to be above or beneath him; one must be on the same level with him and never show that one wants to usurp even a particle of his power.

As an organizer, General Chiang is an energetic executor of his plans. His sojourn at Moscow, his knowledge of the order of things in the Red Army and its leaders, has had a salutary effect upon him. In comparison with other officers, he consented more readily to the introduction of reforms in the school, both of military character and in connection with the political training of cadets. In his actions he tries to imitate the leaders of the Red Army. After his election to the membership of the Bureau of the Party [KMT Branch in the Academy?], General Chiang Kai-shek began to take an active part in its meetings, which he attended together with his cadets and junior officers. At the meetings, in fact, he made it to be felt that he was the principal of the school, but did not protest against the introduction of certain political measures in the school.

He was conscious of weak points inherent in the armies of feudal generals and the absence of a political basis in such armies and, therefore, he agreed to the organization of political sections and the introduction of political commissaries.

He considers the advisers who are attached to his military units as commissaries of a peculiar kind, whose function is to be an organ of control and to weld together [2] the units which are in the process of formation. For that same reason probably he lets the communists carry on their work and even assists them.

Notwithstanding the acute ambition of the reserved and honest man, who dreams of obtaining a prominent place on the stage of Chinese history, General Chiang Kai-shek still knows how to curb his temper and how to feel the pulse of the masses.

As an active worker, he is hardly different from other Chinese military leaders of medium quality. As [with] the overwhelming majority of them, he easily becomes enthusiastic and then just as easily crestfallen, not knowing how to take a middle course and lacking the necessary coolness and firmness of character. His timidity in making definite decisions in military operations can perhaps be explained by his fear of making fatal mistakes, which would cause his downfall before he becomes powerful enough to afford making them. This circumstance compels him to be extremely cautious at present.

Other generals, subordinated to Chiang Kai-shek, outwardly are friendly to each other, but in fact are hostile to each other and feel a peculiar antipathy toward him; on the other hand, in spite of the small numerical strength of his army, they stand in a kind of awe of him because they see that the growth of the Whampoa (School and troops) is something entirely different from their own former growth or that of their rivals, and that some other force, incomprehensible to them, is growing here on some other foundations. It is difficult to foretell whether Chiang Kai-shek will turn an ordinary tuchun and cease playing with left principles, or if he will go farther in the same direction.

As a military leader, General Chiang Kai-shek holds the post of commander of the 1st Army Corps. He is more closely connected with us than all other military

leaders. He is studying Napoleon (in Japanese, as he does not know any other language). He has received his military instruction in Japan. He is a native of Chekiang, and formerly there were suspicions that he was always "drifting" in that direction.
[3] When General Hsü Ch'ung-chih was holding the post of the commander in chief, General Chiang Kai-shek did not display any special understanding of political problems, but now when he had actually to occupy the first place he is already rising above the narrow views of an army corps commander up to the understanding of army problems. After the capture of Waichow, he sent a telegram to the government, mentioning therein his own merits in connection with the constructive work of military character in Kwangtung, but stating at the same time that he was afraid of becoming an ordinary militarist and requested, therefore, to be relieved of military work. But when it was explained to him that he could not become a militarist because he had no army and that his army corps consisted not of his own troops but of the party troops, he stuck to this idea and put it forward in his speeches. He is quick in taking decisions, but often takes them rashly enough and then has to change them; he is stubborn and likes to have his own way against everybody's will. He enjoys prestige in the army and is a strict disciplinarian when on duty, but he knows how to establish friendly relations with the officers in command when off duty.

General Chiang Kai-shek holds in addition the posts of inspector general of the National Revolutionary Army and chief director of the Military Academy (Whampoa School). He is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang. He was one of the first Chinese generals who started to work seriously with the USSR. He knows how to choose people who show him absolute obedience. He readily agrees to innovations when convinced of their necessity.

[4] Wang Ching-wei

President of the National Government, president of the Military Council, president of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang, chief of the section of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, etc.—an old revolutionary. During the imperial period he participated in the revolutionary movement, also took part in the attempt on the emperor's (prince regent's) life; he himself threw the bomb. He was very intimate with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and during the last two years he had become his right-hand man. He is author of many resolutions and declarations of the Kuomintang. He is one of the most popular men in the Kuomintang and enjoys much prestige among the members of the party, although he is charged by the right elements with having sold himself to the Russians. His relations with the Russians are good, and he follows their advice. He is an ambitious man, capable of resolute and energetic actions, when he is certain of having behind him power and support.

Ch'en Kung-po

Chief of the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army; candidate for membership of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang; concurrently holds several other posts.

A former Communist; left the Communist Party on his own initiative for reasons unknown; has some tendency for anarchism and does not like to obey orders given by his superiors.

He has received his education in England [America] and is a well-instructed and well-developed man, especially as regards politics; in this last respect he is one of the foremost men in the South.

Formerly he was doing little work in the P.U.R. because he was concurrently holding many other posts, but recently he has been relieved of some of his duties

and, therefore, is now devoting more time and attention to his work in P.U.R.

[5] Ho Ying-ch'in

Commander of the 1st Army Corps; has been working in the Whampoa troops since their formation; at first in the school, then as regimental and divisional commander, now as army corps commander. He is very devoted to General Chiang Kai-shek and, without the latter's knowledge, does not undertake anything. He received his military education in a Japanese school; has limited capacity, but is working very hard. As commander, he is good enough, but being young (in eight months' time he was twice promoted from the post of regimental commander to be divisional and then army corps commander), he does not enjoy much prestige among the higher officers with the exception of the 1st Division, which he formerly commanded.

He is devoted to the revolutionary cause; he is working in complete agreement with Russian advisers and is following their advice.

Ch'en Ming-shu

Commander of the 10th Division; his native place is in the region in which his division is now quartered [Southwest Kwangtung]. He received his military instruction in the Military School at Paotingfu. He was regimental commander in the army of General Ch'en Chiung-ming; after the latter left the Kuomintang party, he severed relations with him and withdrew from military affairs, but later on came over to the side of the government. He is an energetic and ambitious man. He belongs to the extreme left elements, and is almost a Communist. At all meetings he makes speeches about the USSR and the Kuomintang, about party discipline and military discipline. Externally he is well-disciplined. He maintains friendly relations with communists and powerful persons. He is clever, reserved by character, and well-developed in the political sense. He is a good organizer and easily consents to all kinds of innovations, being very persevering in the study of new materials. He likes to surround himself with relatives and acquaintances, considers himself to be a superior authority, and behaves accordingly. He is one of the best fighting generals.

[6] Biography of General T'ang Sheng-chih

T'ang Shen-chih was born in 1891 in the district city of Tungan, Hunan province. His father was an influential personage during the reign of the Manchu dynasty and held several times the post of taotai.

After receiving education at home, T'ang Sheng-chih completed the course of studies in the Military Academy at Paoting and then entered military service in Hunan, where he was soon promoted to the rank of colonel, due to the influence of his former private tutor Sui San-hsi, who was a very popular person. During the second year of the Chinese Republic, he held a prominent post in Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. T'ang was permanently stationed with his troops at Changte, but in 1921 he was defeated and driven away from there. Having moved to Hengchou, he gradually became more powerful and obtained great influence. Having concluded an alliance with Chao Heng-t'i, he aided him during the "coup," and was promoted to the rank of general. In 1924 the relations between T'ang and Chao became strained on account of money matters, because Chao ordered his generals to remit the moneys collected by them in different districts in which their troops were stationed into the provincial treasury. This measure led in the course of time to a conflict, which ended in the downfall of Chao Heng-t'i. T'ang Sheng-chih was very popular in Hengchou and the population liked him especially because he did not allow his soldiers to molest

them. Politically, T'ang is an adherent of General T'an Yen-k'ai, commander of the 2d Army Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. Recently T'ang Sheng-chih became a fanatic (T'ang is a fervent Buddhist) in religious matters, owing to the influence exerted upon him by Kuo Sou-ch'eng. T'ang is a good military man. When he [7] was in charge of military affairs in Changsha, the population spoke in praise of him; when, however, the new regulations relating to Chinese customs were put into effect (the twofold increase of customs duties), the merchants and petty tradesmen became very dissatisfied. T'ang's soldiers are behaving very well. They do not wander about the city and games of chance and opium-smoking are severely persecuted. T'ang Sheng-chih is very much liked by his soldiers (it must be mentioned that the majority of his soldiers are very young: fourteen to eighteen years old).

Last year a secret agreement was concluded between T'ang Sheng-chih and Fang Pen-jen about going to the aid of T'an Yen-k'ai. When T'ang Sheng-chih occupied Changsha, he at first fell under the influence of the reactionary "Chenghsueh" Party (officers, officials), who tried to persuade him to join hands with Wu P'ei-fu. But after the arrival at Changsha of representatives from Canton and Kwangsi, T'ang Sheng-chih changed his line of conduct, left the "Chenghsueh" Party, and declared that he wanted to be a friend of the Kuomintang and would not persecute any political movement, provided it did not take too radical a character. He requires, however, registration of all unions and political organizations.

Part VII: Reactions to the Chung-shan Gunboat Incident of March 20, 1926

The following three documents record the reactions and accommodations of the Soviet advisers in Canton to the incident of March 20, 1926, in which Chiang Kai-shek briefly demonstrated his power against the Chinese Communists and their ancillary organizations in Canton, and against the Russian advisers themselves. This murky event is discussed in chapter 4.

Documents 50 and 51 are our translations of Chinese translations of Russian reports found in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 67-74 and 74-87. Document 52 is a translation of a Japanese translation of a Russian report compiled in Peking and marked "Most Secret." It was given a title in Japanese of "A Report to Moscow from Soviet Russia's Central Military Organ in Peking on Strife Within the Southern Government Centered Around Chiang Kai-shek," and it is found in *Peking Ro-taishikan oshu himitsu bunsho* (see Bibliography), part 5, pp. 1-11.

Document 50

Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Incident

The author of this report, General V. A. Stepanov, had served in Kwangtung since October 1924. He was adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in the First Eastern Expedition, the battle against Generals Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, and in the Second Eastern Expedition. He is not on the list of thirty-one advisers of January 13, 1926 (Doc. 23), and he may have been sent to work in the North. If so, he may have returned to Canton with the Bubnov Commission on March 13. He succeeded General N. V. Kuibyshev as head of the Soviet Military Group in Canton on March 24 and held that position until General Bliukher arrived early in May 1926.

This document may be dated April 2, 1926, about two weeks after the *Chung-shan* Gunboat Incident, if we accept the dating clue on p. 69, where Stepanov states that General Chiang Kai-shek came to Canton from Whampoa "yesterday." According to Chiang's "Diary," he returned from an extended stay away on April 1. Stepanov makes no mention of Chiang Kai-shek's speech of April 3, which outlined his important proposals on "Readjusting the Army, Tranquilizing the Party, and Setting a Date for the Northern Expedition" (see Chiang Kai-shek, *Min-kuo*, for April 3, 1926). However, on page 72, Stepanov mentions Chiang as "only chairman of the Military Council," a post to which he was elected on April 16. This disparity could be explained by the supposition that Stepanov knew that Chiang controlled the Military Council, if not yet as its chairman. The chairman, Wang Ching-wei, had disappeared soon after the incident.

This was Document 23 in our previous edition. Brief excerpts of this report in English are in Mitarevsky's *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 22-23. The Chinese translation in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 67, has the title "Stepanov's Report at a Meeting of the Communist Party Branch of the Soviet Commissioners Group in Kwangtung on the Split Between Chiang Kai-shek and the Russian Communist Party and Plans for Utilizing Chiang Kai-shek." We have chosen a title that more accurately represents the contents of the document.

TEXT

[67] Chiang Kai-shek's action against the Russian advisers and the Chinese Communist Party on March 20 came as a lightning shock to our comrades as well as the military and civilian population. As a consequence, [our] work in the National Revolutionary Army will have to suffer a long period of suspension. A thorough study of this matter requires a review of the entire incident, the gathering of all data, and an analysis of the various conditions. Only thus can we form a substantiated judgment. The purpose of this report is to provide some information on the incident by a discussion of the causes of the incident, the policies of our political advisers and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the consequences of the incident.

According to Chiang himself and others, the immediate cause of the incident was the movement of the gunboat, S.S. *Chung-shan*, from Canton to Whampoa.

Our group was originally scheduled to inspect the *Chung-shan* on March 19.

During the night between the 18th and 19th, the Navy Bureau received a telephone call for the gunboat to move to Whampoa. The deputy chief of the Navy Bureau, Li [68] Ch'eng-lung [Li Chih-lung], took this as an order from Chiang. Without trying to get confirmation, he ordered the gunboat to head for Whampoa. Our advisers seemed to have been aware of the inside story and ordered the gunboat to return and it returned to the city around midnight. The next morning, Li and other Communists were arrested by order of Chiang.

Several days before the incident, Chiang had received a series of threatening letters. When, on the 18th [19th], Chiang learned that the gunboat had first moved to Whampoa and had later returned to Canton, anchoring in front of the Military Officers' Academy under full steam and ready for action, he thought that someone was planning an attempt on his life. The culprit, he thought, could be none other than the Communist, Li, who had connections with the Russians. He therefore decided to arrest the Communists on the gunboat first and, around 9 o'clock on the morning of the 20th, ordered troops to surround our residence at Tung-shan and to disarm the guards. Meanwhile, in the city, the labor organizations, railway stations, and the Central Bank were also surrounded and Ta-sa-tao [Tashout'ou] was put under watch by an air squadron.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the commander of the Fifth Regiment came and Kisan'ka [Kuibyshev] requested him to withdraw the besieging troops. After returning to the city, the commander came once more to withdraw the troops and to return arms. The siege of the labor organizations was also lifted, but the siege of other places was not lifted until the 22d.

About one hour after the withdrawal of troops from our residence, Mr. Sung [T. V. Soong?] came and said that Chiang's action was imprudent. He was followed by Li Chi-shen and General Teng [Yen-ta?], who also criticized Chiang.

When Kisan'ka sent Ol'gin [Razgon] to see Chiang, Chiang apologized profusely. Ol'gin gently rebuked him and mentioned the death of Pavlov. Ivanovskii [Bubnov] and Ol'gin went to see Chiang again to discuss problems of the future and Chiang promised to call on Ivanovskii the following day to discuss everything.

Meanwhile, T'an Yen-k'ai and Chu P'ei-te called on Kisan'ka. They said that Chiang was counterrevolutionary and suggested taking serious measures against him. Wang Ching-wei, then sick in bed, heard of Chiang's move and also branded it as counterrevolutionary. In short, everyone expressed opposition to Chiang.

Chiang failed to call on Ivanovskii on the 21st. Various generals who came from Chiang's place reported that he still insisted on ousting the Russians and the Communists.

[69] The situation was therefore still tense. Our group outlined means of resolving the situation and decided to change our leader. We decided to delegate [V. I.] Solovyev to discuss the matter and all other problems with Chiang.

On the 22d, Solovyev and Chiang held discussions at the Political Department in the presence of Wang Ching-wei. Chiang left for Whampoa after the meeting. The generals considered this significant. They believed that even if Chiang did not immediately oust the Russians, he would make preparations for a second attempt against them. According to them, Chiang had been preparing for this incident for over a month.

On the 23d, Wang Ching-wei suddenly disappeared. He was reported to be in a hospital but could not be found anywhere. On the 24th, the government gave those of our comrades who were leaving a farewell party, at which it was able to bring Chiang and Ivanovskii together. After this meeting, Chiang again left for Whampoa. On the 26th, Chiang came back from Whampoa to look for Wang Ching-wei, but in vain. Then Chiang again left for Whampoa on his way to Humen. Yesterday he came to Canton from Whampoa.

On the 24th, our comrades began to leave Canton.

The foregoing is a brief account of the incident. We now go into conditions and causes of the incident.

The recent situation is characterized by the following trends:

1. Since the military victories in Kwangtung, the National Government has been greatly strengthened.
2. The people have confidence in the government's strength.
3. The people have confidence in the policies of party headquarters.

[70] 4. All those individuals and organizations that had opposed and attacked the policies of the KMT Political Council have been defeated.

5. The army has been brought under the control of the National Government.
6. The Military Council has succeeded in obtaining control over the military organization.
7. All organs have been working actively toward strengthening and centralizing military power.
8. Plans for construction, education, and training have been formulated.

In short, the National Revolutionary Army is preparing to become a strong force, able not only to destroy the militarists but to unify the whole of China under the National Government. We must pay attention to the political situation in the army. If it is good, I daresay the above observations are definitely not overly optimistic. As for our errors, our working procedure has not been suitable. Furthermore, the situation created by the characteristics of certain Chinese individuals invites attack. Our errors may be elaborated as follows:

1. Too rapid centralization of military power. (For instance, the establishment of the General Staff, the police, the commissariat, and other organs.)
2. Excessive supervision of the generals and various organs. (Russian advisers often assume leading positions, directly handling all matters.)
3. Inappropriate radical propaganda in the army on the problems of imperialism, the peasantry, and communism.

[71] The above points naturally and unavoidably caused unpleasant feelings among high-ranking military officers who, not entirely free from old militarist habits, managed at first to endure and be patient but finally resorted to open opposition. We normally pay no attention to Chinese habits, customs, and etiquette. This may be a minor blunder but is sufficient to cause unpleasant feelings against the Russian advisers among the Chinese.

The Chinese Communist Party has also committed many mistakes in Party work and propaganda in the Army. Its members fail to understand the process of organizing the Kuomintang and then secretly transforming it. They only try, as their primary policy, openly to expand the Chinese Communist Party and to grab complete control over everything everywhere. Thus, they have alienated the KMT and have aroused jealousy on the part of KMT members.

The CCP's mistakes, however, are in fact due to the insufficiency of our directive capacity and lack of liaison which make unified action impossible. Therefore, we, too, and not the Chinese Communist Party alone, should take the blame.

In short, there are significant connections between the March 20th Incident and the individual characteristics of our comrades as well as those of the chief culprit in the incident, Chiang Kai-shek.

My observations of the character of Chiang Kai-shek are shared by the Chinese Communists, including the chairman of the Central Committee [Ch'en Tu-hsiu]. We consider Chiang Kai-shek a peculiar person with peculiar characteristics, most prominent of these being his lust for glory and power and craving to be the hero of China. He claims that he stands not only for the Chinese National Revolution but for the World Revolution. Needless to say, the degree of his actual understanding of revolu-

tion is quite another matter.

To achieve this goal, power and money are required. He does not, however, use money to enrich his own pocket. He never hesitates to spend huge sums of money for grants and rewards. He is extremely fond of subsidizing newspapers in order to enlist support for his programs. His analysis of Chinese and world problems is extremely good.

He acts entirely according to his individuality without depending on the masses. However, in order to obtain glory, which is his goal, he sometimes wants to utilize [72] the masses, the Chinese Communist Party, and ourselves.

With his ambition to be the hero of China and his desire to utilize the national revolutionary movement, Chiang finds himself constantly wavering between the Right and the Communists. He speaks of the "Red Disaster," attempting to accord with Chinese public sentiment because the term "Red Disaster" is at present drawing much attention in China.

Chiang possesses much determination and endurance. Compared with the average Chinese, he is unusually forthright. He often accepts suggestions and plans from trusted subordinates. Yet he is not free from suspicion and jealousy. No one is allowed to argue with him over any matter or to act for him. Such is my judgment of Chiang as a person, though it may not be entirely sound.

When we review our mistakes in the light of Chiang's desire to be a hero, we know that attacks on us are inevitable sooner or later. The main problem in our future work is whether we can avoid the above mistakes.

Some of these mistakes have already been rectified. Others we will attempt to avoid in our future work. Members of the Chinese Communist Party are also engaged in correcting errors in basic policy. Nilov [Sakhnovskii] will report on this in detail.

The important subjective cause [of the incident] is the individuality of Chiang Kai-shek. Should Chiang actually have the above-mentioned unusual characteristics, there is no doubt but that we should, in the light of the overall program, utilize him by all means to carry on the revolutionary struggle.

The possible future appointment of Chiang to the post of commander-in-chief should sufficiently satisfy his lust for position and power. At present Chiang is only [73] chairman of the Military Council and he has at times acted in opposition to the Right. This affords us an opportunity to be allied with some of the extremists of both the Right and Left and is very helpful to us.

It would naturally be unfortunate both for the Revolution and for himself if Chiang actually wants further to attack the Left. Yet Chiang can never destroy the Left for, warmly received everywhere, the Left has substantial force. For Chiang to fight such force is to seek self-extermination.

Chiang, a man of intelligence and ambition, will surely not resort to such a course. He claims he has learned an invaluable lesson from the incident of March 20th. His action was not influenced by the Left but was instigated by counter-revolutionaries of the right. If we could inject into him a small dose of revolutionary ideology and surround him with the brave influence of the Left, we would ensure against repetition of the March 20th Incident. We are now creating conditions unfavorable to the occurrence of another such incident. We are trying to make Chiang cooperate with us again by satisfying his desire for glory and enabling him to achieve greater power and strength than he now enjoys.

Such is the general outline of our plan to utilize Chiang's characteristics for the cause of the National Revolution. It is permissible to make a few concessions to Chiang's political demands as the price we pay. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai and the local [Kwangtung Regional] Committee here share the same view.

Since our policy is based on utilizing Chiang Kai-shek, the organization of the

National [Revolutionary] Army should proceed in accordance with plans already formulated. These may be restated as follows:

1. Strengthen the centralization of military organs from the top down.
2. Continue to improve the organizational system of the army.

[74] 3. Improve conditions within the army, regulate discipline, and inspect army service.

4. Elevate the standard of officers.
5. Improve the quality of the troops.
6. Centralize military supplies in the commissariat.
7. Expand the work of secret agents and unify communications in the army.
8. Expand political propaganda work in the army.
9. Expand aviation and the navy.

The above are our tasks. The procedure of their execution depends upon the changing circumstances.

In accordance with instructions from the committee [Bubnov Commission?], I shall issue orders to all members which they will observe in carrying out their duties. These orders will also serve as the temporary regulations of our work and of our contact with the Chinese.

Document 51

Stepanov's Report to a Meeting of the Soviet Group at Canton

This document records a report by General Stepanov at a meeting of Russian advisers in Canton and the discussion among the advisers. It was translated from Russian into Chinese under the title, "Stepanov's Report on the Present Situation of the Russians in Kwangtung Following the Conflict Between Chiang Kai-shek and the Russians," in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 74. Internal evidence indicates the meeting was held between April 10, 1926, when the Communist Party withdrew its political workers from the First Corps, and April 16, when the League of Chinese Military Youth was dissolved (see pp. 75 and 82). The reference to political conditions in Peking (p. 77) is uninformed about the coup d'etat of April 9, and the Kuominchün's retreat from Peking on April 15.

The Russians mentioned as participating in the discussion were *Nilov*, whose real name was Pavel Sakhnovskii. He arrived in Canton in June 1924 and served as an infantry adviser to the Kwangtung Army, later the Fourth Corps. In February 1926 he reported to the Bubnov Commission in Peking, and he may have returned to Canton with the commission. He was married to Mira Chubareva, another member of the Soviet mission in Canton. *Grey* was a naval adviser and author of several reports in part V. *Beschastnov* was the real name of Timofei Andreevich Beschastnov, an artillery specialist who came to Canton in October 1924 with General Bliukher, and who participated in both eastern expeditions. In January 1926 he held the posts of adviser to the Artillery Inspectorate of the National Revolutionary Army's General Staff, to the arsenal, and to the Central Administration of Supplies and the Military-Political Academy on questions pertaining to artillery (see Doc. 23). *Gilev* was the real name of Gennadii I. Gilev, also an artillery adviser who came with Bliukher in October 1924. In January 1926 he was adviser on artillery to the First Corps and adviser on supplies to the Central Administration of Supplies and the Military-Political School (Doc. 23). He was married to Maria Mikhaylovna, another member of the mission. The real name of *Kalachev* was Samuil Naumovitch Naumov. In January 1926 he was political adviser to the Military-Political Academy (Doc. 23) and was, we believe, author of our Document 1, "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party." He was also the author of our Document 72. We have not identified *Hei-hsing*.

This was Document 24 in the previous edition of this work, but we have made numerous small changes for greater clarity.

TEXT

[74] There seems to have been a slight turning point in Canton since my last report. Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei remain the central figures.

Chiang has issued a statement of self-condemnation. At the same time, he has relieved all Communist commissars and political workers [in the army] of their duties and has demanded the right to investigate the Russians' residence and to restrict their [75] activities. Nevertheless, he appears rather inclined toward the Left Wing. I

presume you already know about his arrest of Ou-yang Ch'i [Ou-yang Ko] and demand for his dismissal by the Military Council. Chiang has also issued a telegram [April 3], strongly attacking the Right Wing's congress at Shanghai, although the congress is in favor of Chiang and actively opposed to the Communists and the Russians.

Chiang has never expressed his final opinion on the problem of political workers [in the army], nor has he insisted on his own demands. However, to show this was a voluntary action, the local [Kwangtung Regional] Committee has recalled all political propagandists and Communist officers from the First Corps.

Chiang intends to keep check not only on Communist work in the army but on the Communist Party itself. On the surface, he appears amiable and intimate with the Russians. He often asks for suggestions during conversations and sometimes openly reveals his own views and intentions. With the generals, however, he maintains an attitude of unity against outsiders. He has taken from our ordnance store machine guns and cartridges for distribution among the military organs.

The foregoing is an account of past conditions in Canton and Chiang's individual actions. Departing from facts, we now discuss the conclusions to be drawn from the above.

There are two different conclusions. One is that Chiang intends sincerely to temper the incident of March 20th and to cooperate with the Left for the cause of the National Revolution. If this should be the case, it would be very profitable to us.

The second conclusion is that Chiang's actions are intended to deceive his opponents in preparation for a second move.

Should we adopt the first conclusion, we would then recognize that Chiang is [76] basically continuing his efforts for the National Revolution and that we should in every way accept his ideas and give him concessions. Should we adopt the second conclusion, we would have to be prepared to fight him.

Whichever conclusion we adopt, our basic policy is to cooperate with Chiang to the very end possible. We should not, however, overlook the second conclusion even if we adopt the first.

The Chinese Communist Party is in agreement with this view and completely approves this basic policy. According to the chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP [Ch'en Tu-hsiu], prior to his departure from Shanghai, the CC had passed a resolution to the effect that Chiang must be utilized by all means.

Although the KMT Left Wing has not completely revealed its attitude, it in fact maintains the same policy as ours. As for the Right Wing, it is reported here that it considers our policy of alliance with Chiang as detrimental to it, and that it will do its best to destroy our alliance.

Reference is again made to Wang Ching-wei. To this day, Wang has not yet returned. His confidential secretary came here a few days ago and said that Wang, now in Shanghai, has recovered from his illness and will soon be back to resume his duties. This statement is not to be relied upon because Wang has written Chiang, severely denouncing him (according to T'an Yen-k'ai). In T'an's view, there is room for reconciliation, although it cannot be expected that differences between Wang and Chiang can be completely avoided. Efforts toward the reconciliation of the two sides are now in progress.

To stabilize the situation in Canton, a plenary session of the Central [Executive] Committee of the Kuomintang will be convened in the middle of May, following the suggestion of Chiang Kai-shek. Previous to or during the session, the two parties, the KMT and the CCP, may reach some kind of agreement. In short, conciliatory moves are at present in progress in all quarters in the hope of achieving together the successful conclusion of the National Revolution.

The Kuomintang is now engaged in further studying the position of the Chinese Communist Party.

The foregoing discusses internal political conditions in Canton.

[77] There are no special military developments. The armies are continuing the task of bandit suppression. The Second Army has been unsuccessfully engaged for the past month in besieging a strategic point (I have forgotten the name) at Ying-t'a-k'o [Yingte hsien]. A representative was sent to request Comrade Remi [D. Uger] for planes to bomb the place. Bandit suppression is also in progress in the South. The majority of the troops are undergoing general technical training in preparation for action.

You may have learned of conditions outside Kwangtung through the press. In our cable [from the Soviet mission in Peking?] of April 3, it is reported that the Kuominchün would not give up Peking because conflict between Wu [P'ei-fu] and Chang [Tso-lin] was about to erupt as a result of mutual hatred within the allied armies. The Kuominchün will exert itself to utilize this situation to negotiate with both sides. According to newspaper reports today, we can say that negotiations with Wu P'ei-fu have made relative progress. Although the party in the negotiations is not the central element of Wu's army, it is a part of Wu's army nevertheless.

These conditions in the North are favorable to the prospects of the Northern Expedition.

Conditions in Hunan and Kiangsi will now be discussed. According to a telegram from the commission sent to Hunan, T'ang Sheng-chih is inclined toward an alliance with the National Government. However, the government (or more correctly, the Military Council) insists that T'ang issue a declaration of formal alliance or it will not conclude any agreement with him.

A representative of Fang Pen-jen has arrived at Canton [April 1] from Kiangsi with the report that Fang would ally with the National Government. According to the results of our investigation, Fang Pen-jen still has a certain number of troops. Reports in today's newspapers about his visit to Shanghai, and that the commissioner of Shanghai is a leader of Fang's clique, are mere fabrication and politically motivated. In the opinion of our generals, we may use Fang when the Northern Expeditionary Forces are organized.

In addition, there are three divisions of the Kwangsi Army, totaling 9,000 men, which may also be used for the Northern Expedition.

Properly analyzed, the above conditions are of benefit to us.

[78] In discussing the Northern Expedition, the Chinese generals have made such concrete suggestions as what troops should be sent to the North. A representative sent to Hunan has suggested to Ch'en Ming-shu the dispatch of the First and Fourth Corps for the Northern Expedition. The problem has not been solved yet. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the commander of the Fourth Corps [Li Chi-shen] has expressed any objection to this suggestion.

The problem of finance is the basic obstacle to the Northern Expeditionary Forces. A financial campaign is now underway and in two or three months we may expect to move north. We only hope that political conditions in Canton will not deteriorate.

In view of general political and military conditions in Kwangtung and in China as a whole, our work in the National Revolutionary Army should still be divided into two categories, political and military.

Politically, we should strengthen the unity of the Kuomintang, strengthen in particular the KMT Left, and eliminate the counterrevolutionary elements of the Right. At the same time, we should pursue the task of allying with the KMT and the National Government.

There is a possibility of a split in the Sun Yatsenist Society, which is composed of three groups, the negativists, reactionaries, and moderates. The Chinese say that a portion of the society may be made to join the Left Wing or the Communists, another

portion to remain neutral, but that the reactionaries must be weakened or attacked.

In our military work, we should stick to our former aim of strengthening our work and the organs we have already established in the armies. We should do our utmost to make the army unite firmly with the present government and the KMT Left Wing. In talking to military officers and political workers, we should urge them to pledge their loyalty to the Party and the government.

The incident of March 20th may dishearten us, but we must forget it and keep up our efforts. We must look at all things from a broader point of view. In the presence of the Chinese we absolutely must not fight for seniority. We should observe [79] etiquette and the formalities. These are the most important things before us. Otherwise the incident of March 20th may be repeated. This point merits your special attention.

I have said previously that in two or three months we may be moving north. Accordingly, we should immediately study all data relative to the Northern Expedition, such as economic and military matters. Various reports should be prepared on an area basis to enable us to understand the situation in our army and in neighboring provinces. Conditions in armies that may oppose us in the future require particular study.

Questions and Criticisms Concerning Stepanov's Report

Q. What are Chiang Kai-shek's demands as to the work of the Russian advisers?

A. Chiang has made no definite indications or demands in his conversations with us. He did point out to Ivanovskii many mistakes of the Russian advisers. However, when I asked him exactly how the Russian advisers should work, he replied that they should work as before.

Q. Are there any connections between the National Government and the First Kuominchün?

A. The First Kuominchün recently sent a representative here who was entertained. The actual results, however, are not known. They may be revealed when the Northern Expedition starts.

Q. How should we deal with Yunnan?

A. With reference to Yunnan, Chiang reprimanded Kisan'ka for lending assistance to Yunnan and Kwangsi. True, this matter was kept secret from Chiang, but Chiang found out and suspected Kisan'ka of opposing the Northern Expedition. However, this matter is no longer a problem. The Chinese generals appear unanimously in favor of the expedition. At the same time they are most interested in the internal political situation in Canton. The present situation in Yunnan would not endanger the Northern Expedition.

Q. How are relations with Sun Ch'uan-fang?

[80] A. Nothing definite at present. All we know is that during the fighting between Wu P'ei-fu and the Second Kuominchün, Sun allied himself with Fang Pen-jen. When the Second Kuominchün turned to [was defeated by] Wu, Sun dissolved his alliance with Fang. I believe this is the cause of Fang's flight to Shanghai.

Q. Has the Local [Kwangtung Regional] Committee taken notice of the mutual relations between CCP and KMT members?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the CCP's policy toward the Sun Yatsenist Society?

A. (Answered by Nilov [Pavel Saknovskii]). The CCP now realizes the great mistakes they have committed, contrary to policy, in their work in the Kuomintang and in the army. The Communists aimed only at the expansion of their influence under cover of the KMT, without attempting to build up the KMT or pay any attention to the KMT Left. They openly took control of the highest KMT administrative organs

and political organs in the army and monopolized the labor and peasant movements. This has caused dissatisfaction among the majority of KMT members and a split between the two extremist groups within the KMT; the Right Wing and the Communists.

Currently, in setting up a preparatory committee for the National Peasant Conference, the Communists tried to place a few KMT members on the committee for the sake of appearances. They failed, for there are no KMT members working among the peasantry.

This is true not only of the KMT Right but the Left also. This is true not only of [work among] the peasantry but the Central [Executive] Committee and other departments of the Kuomintang. Our comrades in the Chinese Communist Party seem to have the same habit of monopolizing power typical of Chinese officials and generals who take on their own cliques and good friends as soon as they obtain high office (as Li Ch'eng-lung [Li Chih-lung] did in the navy).

The situation is even more pronounced in the army, where [Communist] political [81] workers man the most important posts and appoint members of their own cliques to various posts. They secretly pursue tasks unknown to the respective commanding officers. This arouses the jealousy and indignation of military officers of all ranks as well as non-Communist workers. A great number of the non-Communists are active elements of the Sun Yatsenist Society and many of them have been squeezed out of good positions.

Two facts to prove this: in each of the divisions of the Whampoa [First] Corps, four out of five [Political Section] commissars are Communists. (The chief of the Political Department of the Corps [Chou En-lai] is a Communist.) Of the sixteen commissars in the regiments, five are Communists, eleven are KMT members. Kuomintang members are more in the majority in the companies, however.

I believe that with their progressive political ideas, the majority of active elements of the Sun Yatsenist Society could have been affiliated with the Left Wing. Having been squeezed out, however, they turned around and opposed the CCP. In view of their own rank, the military officers feel they should be the directing organs of the CCP [Garble? The military officers feel their own rank superior to Communist political commissars.] They also oppose the CCP because they are dissatisfied with the commissar system.

If no basic solution is found to the problem of the mutual relations of the KMT and the CCP, it will be difficult to continue our work in Canton. One solution is to call a joint conference of the KMT C[E]C and the CCP CC at Canton to fix regulations for cooperative work. A preparatory meeting should first be convened with the immediate objective of comforting Chiang Kai-shek.

We have received a circular order from the Central Committee[1] stating that the chief duty of the Communist Party is the organization of the Kuomintang Left and the strengthening of its position. However, at the moment the KMT Left is absolutely empty. Not only has it no leaders, it has no masses. It is difficult to say how the Central Committee's instructions can be carried out.

We have private duties as well as official duties, namely, to get close to the KMT Left Wing and enable it to direct Party affairs and the peasant movement. On the surface, we should take an interest in and not assume the attitude of neglecting Sun Yatsenism and the Three People's Principles. The CCP has, in fact, acquired a legal [82] position in Kwangtung and it should not hereafter resort to unnecessary secrecy, thus arousing the KMT's suspicion and fear.

Recruitment for the armies should be temporarily suspended. Recall all Communists from the Second and Twentieth divisions of the First Corps. This tactic will meet with the expressed wishes of Chiang Kai-shek. On the other hand, the organized and sudden withdrawal of over one hundred Communists should sufficiently indicate

that the influence of the Chinese Communist Party is not weak and that the Party can still return to the First Corps in the future.

In principle, the CCP should be entirely open in the army and therefore it is proposed that complete lists of Communist members be handed over to the respective commanders, beginning with the Whampoa Academy in view of its large number of Communists. In the lower military units, Communists should form lecturing groups to emphasize that the CCP works in unison with the KMT in performing public duties and serving society. Under no circumstances should communism be stressed; this might arouse fear among the people.

The League of Military Youth is about to be dissolved voluntarily since political propaganda has been completed and secret alliances have been formed in various armies. This move is intended to induce the Sun Yatsenist Society to take the same step of voluntary dissolution.

At present, the Sun Yatsenist Society is allied with leaders of the Right Wing (Wu Ch'ao-shu and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng) for destructive activities, beginning with the Society for Reform of Labor and the Student Association. Due to their destructive activities in the student movement, a split has occurred in Canton's educational circles which formerly were unanimously opposed to the KMT. They are unable to achieve the unification plan under the direction of the KMT Youth Department.[2]

The Mechanics' Union and the Reformist faction in the Kwangtung Province General Labor Union have also split. The Sun Yatsenist Society attempted to obstruct the Kwangtung Labor Conference called for April 1. Although its attempt was not successful, several hundred delegates out of the more than two thousand delegates present withdrew from the conference. They would not remain despite earnest persuasion. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng actively participated in this as in many other such incidents. [83] Q. I have had contact with the Mechanics' Union and understand that it is taking part in all phases of the labor movement. For instance, when the workers of the "Small Third International" went on strike and got in touch with the union, the workers of the "Big Third International" insisted that it withdraw from the illegal organization. Consequently, the Mechanics' Union is not cooperating with the "Small Third International."[3] At present the union is still playing an important role, but I believe that if we take appropriate measures in dealing with it, it can be disbanded easily.

A. (Answer of Nilov.) You know more than I. The Mechanics' Union is one of the most important unions in Kwangtung. Its members are drivers and workers in arsenals, electric companies, and waterworks. The duty of our Communists is to join the union and to form a united front with its members against its reactionary leadership.

A. (Answer of Ko-lei [L. Grey].) The union is important also among seamen. I think our most important work now is to destroy the union. At any rate, we should be able to persuade the seamen on gunboats to withdraw from the union.

Q. What is the scope of the Northern Expedition?

A. (Answer of Stepanov.) To the Chinese, Peking represents the highest objective of the Northern Expedition and the temporary occupation of Hupei the lowest, depending on circumstances.

Q. Our work at various places does not seem commensurate with the increase of our staff. Are there any obstacles?

A. I have not heard of any obstacles to our personnel. Efficiency is not low. Our [84] people have perhaps been discouraged since the March 20th Incident. It is the belief among the Chinese generals that the scars of the incident have not been entirely healed. T'an Yen-k'ai has said that even if we advisers were to revive our former relations with the top leaders, the effect of the incident will always remain in the minds of the people. We must constantly remember this.

Q. Are the conditions prevailing the Mechanics Union as described above caused by lack of Communist workers?

A. (Answer of Nilov.) Precisely. There are very few Communists among workers. Only about two thousand workers were recruited into the Party from among the masses involved in the Hong Kong strike.

Q. What is known of the relations between Chiang and Wu Ch'ao-shu?

A. (Answer of Stepanov.) Wu is with Chiang nearly every day. Chiang does not conceal this fact but claims that he merely listens while Wu and Sun Fo talk. It is difficult to verify this statement.

A. (Answer of Pei-tzu-szu-ch'a-szu-t'e-no-fu [T. A. Beschastnov].) I should like to refer to an incident at the Nan-ts'e [Nant'i] Club prior to our departure for Hainan [Honam?]. When we arrived at the club, we saw Sun Fo, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Wu Ch'ao-shu, and others, who betrayed extreme uneasiness when the four of us appeared. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng forced himself to greet us and one of them went to make a telephone call, but he did not talk even with the receiver in his hand. This happened on March 19. They apparently thought that the Russians were there to arrest them.

A. (Answer of Grey.) The fact that the incident of March 20th is not quite ended may be proved by the appointment yesterday of General P'eng as commander of the navy. P'eng told me that no large-scale activities should be contemplated at present because the incident is not quite over. All in all, everyone and everything is dictated by Chiang. Take the Navy Department, where Chiang has four of his own appointees. None of them would do a thing without his approval.

A. (Answer of Stepanov.) Grey's words are too frightening. You know that we all go to Chiang's place very often and he is rather amiable to us.

[85] A. (Answer of Chi-lieh-fu [G. I. Gilev].) I should like to talk about our responsibilities. I feel that we should give priority to the kind of work that can produce relative results. Military and political workers should not be content merely with the fulfillment of their own duties but should think from the standpoint of the organization as a whole. For instance, Communists in the Whampoa Academy actually are of great help to us.

With reference to the Sun Yatsenist society, I learned about its leader through conversations with Communist cadres and with Wang Mei-yu [Wang Po-ling] at the academy last year. After three months, I got a chance to talk to him. He conducted me to the office of propaganda workers of the Academy where I was shown a large portrait of Lenin and a small one of Sun Yat-sen. I told him that the portrait of Sun should be enlarged because both Lenin and Sun are great men. He later showed me a collection of political literature, Communist literature on a big shelf and Sun Yatsenist literature on a small shelf. He told me that one-third of the academy students belong to the Left Wing and two thirds to the Right. He appeared to have had some advance knowledge of the March Twentieth Incident and cautioned me against it.

From casual conversations with Communist, Sun Yatsenist, and nonpartisan cadets, I learned that many of the members of the Sun Yatsenist Society are inclined to the Left. They asked me how the Communist Party is centralized and said that, in their experience, nothing can be decided after an organization has been formed. I explained to the utmost of my ability that there should be no distinction or discrimination within the KMT, that the KMT is unique, and that its duty is the National Revolution. Due to my inadequate Chinese, however, I was unable to explain fully. They apparently did not feel quite satisfied.

We should take note that the influence of the Right Wing is beginning to revive. Take, for instance, General Ch'en [Chao-ying]. At one time out of power, he is now in charge of the Humen Fort and strategic points at Whampoa, where he was once in command.

[86] The Left Wing is gradually inclining toward the Right, even to the point of join-

ing the Right Wing movement.

A. (Answer of Kalachev [S. N. Naumov].) Our comrades foresaw that Wang Mei-yu wanted a coup d'etat to take place. I once engaged in conversation with him and asked about his attitude toward Borodin's telegram. On another occasion, he wrote me about Chiang Kai-shek's reply [to Borodin's telegram?], in which Chiang said that Wang was muddleheaded. Hence, he redoubled his efforts against the Russians and even tried to surround them. When he [Wang] came to Whampoa, he asked me why the Russian Communists lacked confidence in him and I replied that they did indeed have full confidence in him.

I believe that Chiang Kai-shek is in fact a politician of no great consequence. When he was appointed commander-in-chief, he asked me with whom in the Russian Red Army he might be compared. I replied that he resembled Kamenev and he was much pleased. I consider it harmless to give him concessions.

A. (Answer of Beschastnov.) Chiang is after all the man we are relying on. He is extremely fond of the Russian advisers, except Rogachev, toward whom he harbors very bad feelings because Rogachev is not [would not be?] his adviser.

A. (Answer of Hei-hsing.) The incident of March 20 cannot be considered a defeat for Chiang. It is incorrect to say that Chiang lacks understanding of the causes of the events. He understands the causes of social conflict and is a very clever statesman. I believe that when the [KMT CEC] plenary session meets, all traces of the March 20th Incident will be wiped out and Chiang can be persuaded to lean to the Left.

A. (Answer of Stepanov.) The representative of the Central Committee of the CCP [P'eng Shu-chih?] said that Chiang is an individualist who does not rely on the masses. He said that if Chiang should be opposed by the Communists and the KMT Left Wing at Canton, he would be alienated and isolated.

However, under the present circumstances in China, Chiang will not be alienated. The Northern militarists, the students, and the merchants all attach great importance to him, and he himself realizes it. He is definitely not an ordinary militarist but a [87] militarist with revolutionary interests. He has studied the success and failure of various military men. I have personally heard him speak of the achievements of Washington, Napoleon, and Lenin. He is filled with revolutionary ideas far superior to the other militarists. I believe that trivial details of his behavior are but signs of his weakness for self-aggrandizement and self-glorification. They may be overlooked.

The incident of March 20 is perhaps not entirely without benefit. I agree with Hei-hsing. The incident is like cancer, for which it is wise to have an operation. Sores remain, however, and we should by all means see that they are cured.

No one can guarantee at present that Chiang will always be one of us, but we must utilize him for the cause of the National Revolution. Chiang has the peculiar characteristic of not depending on the masses. The representative of the Central Committee of the CCP has referred to Chiang in the manner of hero worship [referred to Chiang's desire to become a hero]. In China today, we must not scorn such a peculiarity. Napoleon at first also believed that the individual is the central figure in a revolution. Chiang is not yet as fearsome as Napoleon. We should do our utmost to alienate him from the Right Wing and persuade him to join the work of the KMT Left. I am absolutely not afraid of Chiang's peculiar character, but we must try to remedy it in time.

Q. What is the reaction of the Second Corps to the participation of the First and Fourth corps in the Northern Expedition?

A. According to Chiang, there is no one at present to challenge T'an Yen-k'ai for political power in Hunan. This may be untrue. However, any movement of the Second Corps at this time may furnish them grounds to attack Hunan. T'an Yen-k'ai, the commander of the Second Corps, shares this opinion.

Notes

1. This probably means the CC of the CCP. The instruction would be consistent with the ECCI's instructions to the CCP in April 1926, calling on it to struggle against the Right Wing. See Stalin, "The International Situation," p. 237.

2. This is a literal translation of the Chinese text, which is unclear.

3. The Peking Commission apparently mistranslated this passage. The terms, "Small Third International" and "Big Third International," are unclear.

Document 52

Summary Report by "Seifulin" on Political Developments in Canton in May 1926

This is a summary report by "Seifulin" in the Soviet military attaché's office in Peking, dated June 3, 1926, and based on reports from Borodin in Canton. Borodin returned there on April 29 together with Hu Han-min and other Chinese notables. Since the last date in Document 52 is May 31, Borodin must have reported by telegram in code. "Seifulin" was the assumed name of Albert Ivanovich Lapin, a Latvian born in 1899, who joined the Communist Party in 1916. He served in the Russian Red Army from 1917 to 1921 and then studied in the Military Academy (later named for Frunze), where he was a fellow student with A. I. Cherepanov. He was sent to China in 1925 and served in Kalgan as an instructor with the First Kuominchün from April to June 1925, and then in Kaifeng from June to October. He was then transferred to the military attaché's office if Peking and in February 1926 became the attaché, according to Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militarberater*, p. 170.

Apparently Cherepanov had access to this report, or to Borodin's original reports, when writing his second volume. His discussion of the activities of the Right Wing in Canton (*Severnyi*, pp. 105-106; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 221-22) is almost identical to the text of Document 52, pp. 2-3, on Hu Han-min's actions after his return to Canton, and those of the Rightists after Hu's departure. On page 103 (pp. 220-21 in *As Military Adviser*), Cherepanov summarizes a report by Borodin made to the Canton group of advisers at the beginning of June 1926.

The following is based on a Japanese translation of the Russian document available in *Peking Ro-Taishikan oshu himitsu bunsho*, part 5, pp. 1-11. The report was marked "Most Secret." In our previous edition it was Document 25.

TEXT

[1] Summary

The following report is based on Borodin's reports and concerns events in Canton, May 1926.

The Internal Situation

[2] *The Right Wing*. Following March 2 [20], the Right Wing interpreted Chiang Kai-shek's hostility toward the Soviet advisers as a symptom of a sudden turn toward the Right. It therefore attempted to approach Chiang. After the dismissal of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng on April 24, however, the Right discovered that it was hopeless to attempt to bring Chiang into its fold and started approaching Li Chi-shen and various other generals of Canton. The Right Wing was able for a time to win over Li Chi-shen, who mustered his army in the Canton area under the pretext of aiding Hunan. The Right Wing got Hu Han-min as their "Chief Advance Commander" and organizer.

Taking advantage of Wang Ching-wei's absence, the Right Wing, without in-

forming the National Government, made plans for an elaborate celebration in honor of Hu's arrival [April 29, 1926]. They even planned to erect a triumphal arch for him. [3] Preparations were also made for a demonstration supporting Hu Han-min as a representative [head] of the government. Hu issued a declaration in the newspapers[1] and submitted a report to the National Government [to the Political Council, May 3, 1926]. His report and declaration indicate that he does not intend to cooperate with us. He met secretly with Wu Ch'ao-shu, Sun Fo, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Ku Ying-fen, and other reactionaries and brought Li Chi-shen, Ch'en Ming-shu, and other Canton generals to his side. Furthermore, Hu told Chiang that Borodin was coming to make a settlement of the March 20th Incident and urged Chiang to arrest Borodin. This was an attempt to create a split within the Left Wing.

The negotiations between Hu and Chiang ended in the latter's refusal to meet Hu on May 8. The following day [actually May 10], Hu left for Hong Kong. He is now staying in Shanghai.

As a result, the Right Wing has suspended plans to erect an arch, but it is spreading rumors to the effect that Communists are preparing to put their theories into action. It is also demanding that Hu Han-min should represent [head?] the government and is inciting merchants and bankers to suspend business.

The local situation. The conference of the four business associations opposed the [4] appointment of Hu as a representative of the government. Nevertheless, because of the rumors, the Central Bank met with a great loss. Withdrawal of money from the bank increased greatly and many people demanded that the bank exchange paper money for silver. After March 20, this problem and the extraordinary disbursement disturbed the financial position of the government considerably. At the same time, bloody fights broke out at various places between peasants and small landlords.

Looting by armed unemployed workers and prisoners took place and the looting of ships caused constant friction with consular officials. In addition, strikes broke out frequently and a split began to develop in the student movement. On May 7, Chinese Humiliation Day, two students [of the Whampoa Academy: P'an Yu-ch'ang and Yang Yin-chih] were beaten half to death at a demonstration staged by the two factions [the League of Military Youth and the Sun Yatsenist Society]. Finally, the Whampoa Army took hostile action against the Communist faction in the name of the commanding officers and threatened Chiang Kai-shek himself unless he took action to purge Communist members from the Kuomintang.

On May 16, an anti-Communist demonstration was staged by the Whampoa Second Division and [Whampoa] students.

[5] *The Left Wing and the Left-Right Struggle.* Chiang Kai-shek demanded that restrictions be placed on the duties of Communist members (Communist political workers were ejected from the First Corps following March 20). The other commanders took a "wait and see" attitude.

Thus we were confronted with two alternatives:

1. Accept Chiang's demands in order to avoid a catastrophe which would otherwise be inevitable.

2. Adopt measures similar to those taken by Wang Ching-wei around the 20th of March in coping with the situation which we had then considered inappropriate. In other words, form an anti-Chiang alliance and, by the pressure of this alliance, force Chiang not to yield to the demands of the anti-Communist faction in the KMT. (Comrade Kuibyshev supports [or supported] this theory.)

The problem was solved by adopting a policy to satisfy Chiang and to yield to his demands, which are as follows:

1. Communist members are not to head the departments of the KMT's central Party headquarters.

[6] 2. A list of Communist members in the KMT is to be handed over to the

chairman of the KMT CEC.

3. KMT members are not allowed to become members of the CCP.

A joint council consisting of five KMT members, three CCP members, and one CI representative is to be formed to solve all problems.

However, it was agreed that upon the CEC's acceptance of these demands and the consequent satisfaction of the demands of the Whampoa commanders and the KMT center, Chiang Kai-shek would take action to arrest, purge, and otherwise bring pressure against the Right.

Following the CEC's acceptance of the resolutions, the following situation was created. In Hong Kong, it was believed that a revolution of the Right had occurred [7] and they [the British] declared their unwillingness to negotiate with the government. Hence, the Right Wing lost ground for anti-Communist propaganda by which it had been trying to intimidate the petty bourgeoisie.

The Right Wing was thus unable to gain political power and in fact lost a great deal. Ch'en Yu-jen [Eugene Chen] was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng was arrested on May 30. Chiang intends to send Sun Fo to Moscow and Wu Ch'ao-shu [former minister of foreign affairs] was forced to go to Shanghai. Furthermore, Fu Ping-ch'ang will probably be dismissed. In short, the Right Wing has been severely hit and has had to abandon its conspiracy.

Most people believe that the resolution on relations between KMT and Communist members does not indicate a revolution of the Right and that Chiang will probably be forced to oppose the Right. Borodin, for instance, found that he could convince Chiang Kai-shek of the necessity of having Wang Ching-wei join the conference on the Northern Expedition scheduled for May 29, despite the fact that Wang had joined an anti-Chiang alliance around March 20 and thereafter and Chiang was [8] aware of this. However, it was rumored that Wang had gone to Paris.

Reforms. A great number of measures have been adopted in order to win over the people, namely:

1. Sincere negotiations will be held on the [Hong Kong-Canton] strike. Inasmuch as the Right Wing has failed, Hong Kong will probably not delay the negotiations unnecessarily.

2. The petroleum monopoly was abolished and a proclamation to this effect was issued on May 31.

3. It has been decided to establish an arbitration court which will attempt to settle disputes between peasants and small landlords and between capital and labor.

The present local situation. As a result of the measures taken, the city has become very peaceful. All the business associations are taking great pains to express loyalty to the Kuomintang government.

[9] *The situation in the army.* A great secret enmity exists between Chiang Kai-shek and Li Chi-shen. Chiang thinks that, inevitably, there will be conflict between the revolutionary elements and Li Chi-shen's army (Chiang regards his own army as revolutionary and believes that Li's army is completely lacking in Leftist revolutionary elements. This is due to Chiang's conviction that Li is his rival and to his determination to get rid of Li. Although conflict is unavoidable, however, Chiang believes it should come after victory over Wu P'ei-fu.)

The External Situation

[10] No agreement between Sun Ch'uan-fang and the Canton Government has been concluded, although there has been an exchange of representatives and negotiations are in progress.

According to news from Shanghai, Sun is preparing against an attack by the Kwangtung Army which he expects to come through Kiangsi province.

In Fukien, Wu P'ei-fu's power is increasing. If circumstances turn to his favor, Wu would be able to apply pressure on Kwangtung from Fukien.

The Szechwan general, Yang Shen (number of troops, about 70,000), and [Kweichow general] Yuan Tsu-ming (number of troops, about 40,000) have sent representatives to Kwangtung for negotiations.

Yang Sen declared to the KMT that he would allow it to work among his troops and the people in his territory.

As for aid for Hunan, T'ang Sheng-chih's army has retreated to Hengchow [Hengyang, Hunan]. It is not engaged in heavy fighting and is suffering from ammunition shortages. Four divisions [brigades] have been dispatched to T'ang's rescue from Kwangsi. Around the end of May, one brigade took part in a battle. The remaining three brigades are in the area between Kweilin and Yu-chou [Hunan]. The 24th Regiment [Independent Regiment] from Kwangtung crossed the Hunan border on May 28. Ships were sent for around the end of May to transport the Tenth and Twelfth divisions of the Fourth Corps from the south [of Kwangtung]; the ships will probably arrive at Canton around the beginning of June. Five hundred thousand cartridges and $200,000 have been sent, and it has also been decided to send $200,000 worth of salt.

Note

1. According to Li Yun-han, *Tsung jung Kung*, p. 503, Hu issued a slogan "No party outside the Party [the KMT], no factions within the Party."

Part VIII: The Chinese Communist Party, July 1926

Most of the documents of the Chinese Communist Party seized in the Peking Raid were in Chinese. This was because Li Ta-chao and a number of other local Communist leaders in Peking took refuge in the Russian Embassy grounds in December 1926 after Chang Tso-lin's government issued orders for their arrest. The Communist Party documents discovered during the raid were the files of this group, some items brought into the embassy and others generated during the four months in hiding. Most of the documents were not burned, as were many in the Russian military attaché's office. When printed in *SLYM*, they were not translated, as were the Russian documents. However, many more Chinese documents were discovered and listed in the inventories of volume 5 than were reprinted.

All the documents in this part are resolutions adopted by the Second Enlarged Plenum of the CCP's Central Committee, which met in Shanghai from July 12 to 18, 1926. Preceding the resolutions is a list of contents and an explanatory note by the Secretariat of the Plenum (*SLYM*, III, "CCP," p. 60), which states:

> The Second Enlarged Conference of the Central Committee convened on July 12, 1926, and closed on July 18, 1926. The agenda consisted of fifteen items. Twelve important resolutions were adopted. A number of them, such as the resolutions on the peasant movement and the resolutions on the labor movement, require further supplementation. (Note that this does not mean changing the meaning of the resolutions but giving fuller explanations.) It was therefore decided to send the resolutions to the Secretariat for revision and printing. However, local demand for the resolutions was so urgent following the conference that we cannot wait until the process of revision is completed. Hence, the Secretariat has mimeographed the resolutions in their original form for preliminary distribution. The resolutions will later be revised and printed. The Enlarged Plenum instructs all local Party headquarters to convene meetings of our comrades upon receipt of this document. They should make detailed reports and enable every comrade to understand the important points of these resolutions and to apply them in actual work. It is also hoped that our comrades will be encouraged to discuss the resolutions. Results should be reported to the Central Committee.

We present translations of these resolutions in the same sequence as in the list of contents and as they were printed in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," 60-121. In our previous edition they were numbers 4, 6, 8, and 16-35. The policies enunciated therein were analyzed by Ms. How in chapter 5 of our text.

Document 53

Political Report of the Central Committee

[61] 1. *Changes in the political situation and our Party's policies at each stage, from the Enlarged Conference of last year (October 1925) to the present.* During the nine months from the Enlarged Conference held in October of last year to the present, political changes may be classified into three periods, for each of which we had a [62] different policy. The three periods are: (1) the period from the [Second] Chihli-Mukden War to Kuo Sung-ling's rebellion [November 22, 1925]; (2) the period from Kuo Sung-ling's defeat [December 23, 1925] to the withdrawal of the Kuominchün from Peking [April 15, 1926]; and (3) the period from the Kuominchün's withdrawal to the meeting of Chang [Tso-lin] and Wu [P'ei-fu] [June 28, 1926].

The first period witnessed the shaking of the political power of the militarists. During this period, the Mukden Clique was already routed, the militarists of the Anhwei Clique were weak, and the Chihli Clique had yet to rise. The imperialists were unable to control the various militarist cliques and revealed unusual confusion. The government of Tuan [Ch'i-jui] had earnestly colluded with the Kuominchün, and Wu P'ei-fu showed good will toward the National Government [in Canton]. It appeared that the Kuomintang in the South and the Kuominchün in the North might join together to seize political power throughout the country and establish a relatively Red government.

Our Party's policy during this period was dated from the time Sun Ch'uan-fang moved against Mukden. We advanced the slogan, "Extend the nature of the war!" explaining that the anti-Mukden war should be a "war for the freedom of the people," and that it should enlist all revolutionary forces under its banner. This propaganda had a great effect on the masses and penetrated the troops of the militarists. Hence, the rebellion of Kuo Sung-ling. We also used such slogans as "Oppose the pro-Parliament movement of the Chihli Clique" and "Caution against alliance between the Mukden and Chihli Cliques," as we foresaw that the Chihli Clique would certainly be pro-Parliament should it come to power, and that if the Mukden Clique were defeated, it would appease and join the Chihli Clique to establish a militarist regime. As we look back now, there was not a single mistake in our past policy.

During the Second period [December 23, 1925, to April 15, 1926], the imperialists attempted to suppress this high revolutionary tide by the formation of a military anti-Red united front of Britain, Japan, Wu P'ei-fu, and Chang Tso-lin and by the dissemination of anti-Red propaganda among the masses.

Our Party's primary policy during this period was destruction of the anti-Red united front. We proposed to set up a temporary "grey" government at Peking to absorb elements of both the Anhwei and Chihli cliques for the sole purpose of opposing Mukden. Before this policy could be executed, however, Wu P'ei-fu started launching [63] attacks on Honan from Hankow. We then proposed that Kwangtung [the National Government] should send forces to suppress Wu. Again, our policy could not be carried out. The reason was that our Party's political strength was not very great. Hence, despite good political strategy, we were not able to influence the Kuomintang and the Kuominchün to put it into effect completely.

The most important phenomena of the third period [April 15, 1926, to June 28,

1926] were the stabilization of militarist political regimes on the one hand, and, on the other, the intensification of secret rivalry among the British, the Japanese, Chang, and Wu. At the time, the National Government in Kwangtung mobilized its forces for the Northern Expedition. Although secret conflict among Britain, Japan, Chang, and Wu was very serious, Mukden and Chihli did not let this conflict lead to an open break because the Kuominchün was still a strong force.

During this period, our policy in the North was alliance with Mukden against Chihli and, in the South, aid to Hunan to resist Wu [P'ei-fu].

Had the Northern anti-Red army (Mukden-Chihli-Shansi) cooperated and jointly attacked the Kuominchün, the latter would have found it difficult to survive. However, due to lack of sincere cooperation among them, each having its own selfish motives, the Kuominchün was able to avoid collapse. As long as relations between Mukden and Chihli remain unchanged, the Kuominchün will be capable only of defense. It will not be able to take the offensive.

In the South, the dispatch of the forces of the National Government signifies nothing more than a defensive war against the anti-Red army's penetration into Hunan and Kwangtung. It does not signify a real revolutionary Northern Expedition.

The present stabilization of militarist political regimes can be maintained temporarily in view of the static condition of the Kuominchün. Such stabilization, however, definitely cannot last.

2. *Imperialist policy toward China.* The two most powerful imperialist countries are Britain and Japan. At present their one common objective is suppression of the Reds in the north and south. They differ, however, in their attitude toward the Tariff conference. Wanting increased customs revenues to be applied to the reorganization of the Nishihara loans, Japan advocates continuation of the conference. The British, fearing an increase would affect the importation of British goods into China, want to [64] procrastinate. The British are militarily more ambitious, attempting to annex all of China. The Japanese, on the other hand, concentrate their attention on the Three Eastern Provinces, advancing when they can. They are not as boastful as the British.

Aside from the British and Japanese policies, the United States' imperialist policies in China are relatively important. On the surface, it may appear as if the Americans are now planning to help the Chinese resist the fearsome imperialist aggression of Britain and Japan by assisting Chinese capitalists in their demands for peaceful industrial development and by opposing the Tariff Conference which cannot satisfy the hopes of the Chinese people. Their actual objective, however, is to take the place of British and Japanese authority through the huge capital provided by the Dawes Plan.

In coping with these imperialist policies, we emphasize opposition to Britain first, followed by opposition to Japan and then to the United States. British influence in China is deeply rooted and extends over great areas; Japanese influence is confined to a limited sphere; the Americans have no definite sphere at all. It is therefore our policy to utilize their differences and conflicts with a view to destroying their alliance.

3. *The attitude of various social forces with regard to the National Revolution.* In the development of the National Revolution we must know the various social forces and their general trend. The social forces in China today may be divided into the following four categories:

The first is the anti-Red movement of the militarists, compradors, bureaucrats, and the old and new gentry (new gentry such as college professors), a counterrevolutionary force allied with imperialist power.

The second is the revolutionary movement of the workers, peasants, and students. This is a new revolutionary force, counteracting the old reactionary force of the first category.

The third is the resistance movement of middle and petty merchants (such as resistance against taxes and levies).

[65] The fourth is the reform movement of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie have not completely abandoned comprador ideas. Bourgeois differentiation, however, will daily increase in the wake of industrial development. The difference of attitude toward imperialism between the bourgeoisie and the comprador class is this: One wants conditional cooperation with imperialism, the other unconditional cooperation. In other words, the former [the bourgeoisie] would cooperate with imperialism in return for certain concessions. The Chinese bourgeoisie find it difficult to develop independently since imperialism does not permit them to do so. At this time, the bourgeoisie are a force that cannot be disregarded. In the future, however, they will be a reactionary obstacle.

Of the above four categories, which force should we employ to further the revolutionary cause? The answer is, of course, the second category, comprising workers, peasants, and students, which is the only revolutionary force. The middle and petty merchants of the third category are economically oppressed by imperialism and by vexatious levies and excessive taxes. They feel keenly the need for revolution and do not oppose it. The workers and peasants must attempt to win over these groups in order to avoid isolation.

The bourgeoisie of the fourth category suffer from foreign capitalist exploitation of China through foreign capital and importation of goods. There is no escape from this oppression save by revolution. The bourgeoisie suffer also from vexatious levies and excessive taxes and the devastation of militarist wars. Thus, theoretically, they should be more revolutionary than the petty bourgeoisie. In reality, however, the opposite is true.

First, the Chinese bourgeoisie do not acquire capital by accumulating it from their own country. Capital comes from foreign sources (e.g., comprador loans) or from exorbitant land rents. The bourgeoisie cannot therefore sever their connections with imperialism. Secondly, seeing the development of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie desire a few concessions from imperialism, on the one hand; on the other, they fear to enhance the revolutionary strength of the proletariat. Consequently, they are in a dilemma between advance and retreat and, being irresolute, do not go forward.

There are two alternatives for the bourgeoisie. One is to be completely nonrevolutionary and to compromise with imperialism. The other is to take into their own hands the revolutionary movement and prevent the proletariat from assuming revolutionary leadership. In the latter case, they would seek concessions from imperialism on the one hand and, on the other, suppress the proletariat and prevent proletarian action. Once concessions are secured from imperialism, the bourgeoisie would then become nonrevolutionary. We know that the first path is not feasible and [66] that the Chinese bourgeoisie are now taking the second road.

The question, then, is, do we want the bourgeoisie to continue to join us in the revolution? Our answer is that for the time being we must still use the bourgeoisie. The reason is that if attacked too severely, the bourgeoisie would be drawn completely into the imperialist camp. This would further strengthen the enemy at the cost of the revolution.

Our attitude toward the bourgeoisie should differ from our attitude toward the people of the first category—the militarists, compradors, bureaucrats, and the new and old gentry. We want thoroughly to eliminate the latter and struggle against the former for revolutionary leadership. The bourgeoisie have actually acquired for themselves considerable force; the May 30th Movement in Shanghai was in reality led by the General Chamber of Commerce and not the General labor Union (with reference to the later stage). The backward workers, filled with patriarchal ideas, are easily drawn into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. This is even truer of the petty bourgeoisie.

We should build up the force of the workers and peasants, get hold of the petty merchants, and force the bourgeoisie to the Left.

4. *Dissensions within the Kuomintang.* Dissensions within the Kuomintang reflect the forces of the above-mentioned four categories: the reactionary Right (Feng Tzu-yu, Ma Su, Sun Fo, Ku Ying-fen, etc.) represents the first category; the Communists represent the second category; the Left (Wang Ching-wei, Kan Nai-kuang, etc.) represents the third category; and the new Right (that is, the Center, Tai Chi-t'ao, Chiang Kai-shek, etc.) represents the fourth category. Our policy toward the Kuomintang is therefore the same as our policy toward the various classes in the country. We unite with the Left and force the Center to attack the reactionary Right. At the same time, we guard against the rise of the Center and force it to turn left against the Right. The victory of the National Revolution will be assured if our tactics of united front are successfully carried out.

[67] 5. *The future of the national revolutionary movement.* As for the future of the national revolutionary movement, we foresee two courses: (1) the activation of the bourgeoisie by the petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the workers and peasants to establish national capitalism by revolution; (2) the control of the petty bourgeoisie by the comprador-bourgeoisie, who together with the compradors will compromise with imperialism, wiping out the revolutionary movement and realizing the Dawes Plan for capitalist aggression. At the moment, it is even possible that a segment of labor would lean to the Right. The first course is revolutionary; the second very tragic. We cannot predict which course will materialize. Our duty is to expand and strengthen the force of the workers and peasants, take hold of the petty bourgeoisie, and fight the big bourgeoisie for leadership of the national movement. We would be doomed to certain failure should the petty bourgeoisie be taken over by the big bourgeoisie for the reform movement. The revolution's future is very clear. If we want to lead the revolution, we must first have good Party organization. Otherwise, not only will we fail to hold on to the petty bourgeoisie, we may not even be able properly to organize the workers and peasants, much less expect to lead the Revolution.

As for the present condition of our Party, it may be true that our Party's nationwide propaganda has been effective. The actual strength of our Party, however, is far from enough to win control of the entire petty bourgeoisie of the country and to lead the Revolution. Greater efforts are needed in our work.

6. *The development and work of the Party during the nine months' period.* Viewing the Party's development in the past nine months from the favorable side, we note the following: (1) Membership has increased threefold; (2) while we have not been able to exert complete control over the petty bourgeoisie organizationally, we have been able to lead the national mass movement after a fashion, particularly at such places as Peking, Shanghai, Kwangtung, and Hunan; (3) the Party's influence during the country's political upheavals has been very great; for each political crisis, our slogans and policies have been able to guide the demands of the masses; (4) the labor [68] movement in Shanghai, Tientsin, Tangshan, and Hunan enjoys a firmer foundation than in the past. The Shanghai labor movement, in particular, has been gradually strengthened. Despite severe reactionary oppression, the foundation of the labor movement has not been completely destroyed at Tangshan and Tientsin.

It is clear from the above that our Party has developed. Many weaknesses, however, have been found in the process of development.

A. Although Party membership has increased in quantity, its quality has actually deteriorated. This may be witnessed from several angles.

1. Our comrades lack theoretical and practical experience; they lack a definite revolutionary philosophy of life.

2. Responsible workers among our comrades have a tendency to be mere employ-

ees; they lack the former spirit of hard struggle.

3. A certain number of our comrades have a tendency toward corruption (there have been cases of squeeze and inaccurate accounting).

B. Party headquarters of all levels, from the CC down to Party cells, lack sufficient capacity for leadership and training.

C. The organization of Party cells is unhealthy. (However, the fact that we are now able to attend to the setting up of Party cells is itself a sign of improvement.)

D. There is a serious lack of theoretical propaganda. Our work of agitation among the masses is not practical and fails to penetrate the masses.

E. The labor movement has become bureaucratic and lacks mass substance. An exception is the Shanghai General Labor Union, which is actually turning to the masses.

F. The peasant movement has developed the disease of left deviation everywhere. Either the slogans are extreme or action is excessively Left-inclined. Consequently, the peasants themselves often suffer great damage before the enemy has been hit.

In short, the present national political situation is characterized by stabilization of [69] the political power of the militarists. This definitely cannot last, however. The revolutionary movement will continue to develop. Whether the revolution is to be led by the bourgeoisie or the proletariat depends entirely on whether the proletariat's party is well organized. We must have the organization of a Bolshevik Party and be guided by the principles of Leninism in order to seize the leadership of the National Revolution.

Document 54

Resolutions on Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang

According to Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin in *M. N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 27, note 59, a Russian version of this document was published during 1927 in M. G. Rafes, *Kitaiskaia Revoliutsiia na perelome* [The Chinese Revolution at a Turning Point] (Moscow, 1927). Cherepanov quotes a section of the document in his second volume, *Severnyi*, p. 100; *As Military Adviser*, pp. 218-20. This document has been reprinted from *SLYM* with punctuation supplied, in KMWH, XV, 2599-2603.

TEXT

[69] 1. [**The Present Situation.**] Such events as the March 20 coup d'etat, the resolutions with respect to the Whampoa Academy adopted at the May 15 meeting of the Kuomintang Central [Executive] Committee, and the June 7 proposals to manage the question of the Communist faction, are all part of a consistent anti-Communist offensive. The armed Center is now in power in Kwangtung; the anti-Red movement of the Right Wing prevails throughout the country. They are all taking the offensive against the Communist Party. Changes in the objective political situation (the Kuominchün's defeat and retreat; in the North, the counterrevolutionary victory of the imperialists and militarists, Wu P'ei-fu's return to the political arena and conspiracy with the British, Japan's support of Chang Tso-lin and opposition to Soviet Russia on the pretext of the Chinese Eastern Railway incident, etc.) are of course partly responsible for making such attacks possible. Such attacks, however, are due also to errors committed by our Party.

We should launch a propaganda drive from the CC down to Party cells to explain that the present attacks on us by the reactionary Right and a segment of the Kuomintang Center are in harmony with, and in response to, the anti-Red movement of the imperialists and militarists and are in reality counterrevolutionary actions. Furthermore, we should also analyze the causes that have enabled the reactionary Right and the Center to make use of the present political situation so readily for attacking us, and we should formulate plans for the removal of such causes.

2. [**Past Mistakes.**] One of the chief reasons the Kuomintang Right and even the Kuomintang Center were able to attack us easily and to demand that we withdraw from the Kuomintang is the incorrect formula we previously employed in guiding the [70] Kuomintang, which in reality caused the Left Wing to be unable to participate in Party activities and in the fight against the Right. We ourselves created the situation of a KMT-CCP struggle which overshadows what is actually a struggle between the Left and Right. At the same time, since we had caused the Left to crystallize politically and organizationally, the development of the Kuomintang was naturally hindered. It was not able fully to absorb the revolutionary intellectuals and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The Right and Center, however, fully utilized the opportunity and exerted their influence over these elements.

We have failed to execute the resolutions of the Enlarged Plenum of last October

on the necessity for our local Party headquarters to act with even greater independence and to ally with the Left against the Right in the ideological and organizational struggle. Hence, we have failed to lay a firm foundation among the masses (unions, peasant associations, student federations, and so on). Furthermore, we failed to rely on the revolutionary force of the masses to oppose the offensives of the Right and the armed Center following deterioration of the political situation in the North.

3. [Our Policy.] The decisions regarding the Kuomintang adopted by the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee last year are: (1) We stay within the Kuomintang and oppose the Right, but avoid taking the place of the Left ourselves; and (2) We try to achieve more political independence for our own Party. These resolutions were adopted because we recognized that the Kuomintang is a political party representing the alliance of various social forces (revolutionary intellectuals, the middle, industrial, and commercial national bourgeoisie, handicraft and small-enterprise petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and workers). We recognize the development of the Kuomintang and our participation in the Kuomintang's work as prerequisites to a victorious Chinese Revolution.

Our policy in the National Revolution should be more precisely defined. We should make further efforts to achieve our own political independence. We should establish our own force among the workers and peasants in order to exert political influence over the revolutionary masses. We should organize the revolutionary tide of the petty bourgeoisie and concentrate it within the Kuomintang to consolidate the [71] Left Wing. We should bring the influence of the revolutionary force of the masses of workers and peasants to bear on the Kuomintang. We thus unite with the Kuomintang Left in a strong alliance and fight the bourgeoisie for the power of directing the national movement. Only thus can we insure seizure of leadership of the National Revolution by the proletariat's party. Hence, our policy within the Kuomintang at this time is: to expand the Left Wing and cooperate with it closely in order to deal with the Center and counterattack openly the reactionary Right.

If some comrades hold that the CCP should completely divorce itself from organizational relations with the Kuomintang and abolish this party which represents the alliance of various classes in the belief that the CCP is already capable of independently leading the proletariat and inducing other oppressed elements to follow it to finish the bourgeois democratic revolution, then they are completely wrong. Their view betrays absolute misunderstanding of the long-range view of the Chinese Revolution for national liberation. The reasoning behind the theory of immediate separation of the CCP from organizational relations with the Kuomintang, to be followed by mere cooperation with that party, is the same as that held by the KMT Right Wing and New Right Wing (Center) in demanding Communist withdrawal from the KMT. This tendency reflects the bourgeoisie's increasingly apparent desire in the past year to seize leadership of the national movement.

If some comrades still hold that Communists should monopolize Kuomintang organs and develop independently the KMT's organization and the work of [KMT] Party headquarters, then the experience in Kwangtung can prove this view to be erroneous also. The reason is that it is not suited to the KMT's present organizational form and social foundation. Communist monopoly of the Kuomintang would reduce that party to a narrow organization through excessive concentration of power. The result would then be the diminution and loss of strength of the great masses of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie through dispersion and desertion.

[72] Although these two views are diametrically opposed to each other, they are equally incorrect in terms of policy. They are equally dangerous to the Chinese liberation movement, with the end result of the separation of the Chinese Communist Party and the proletariat from the great masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie who would, to all practical purposes, fall under the direction of the big

bourgeoisie.

4. [**Decisions.**] The current erroneous tendencies within our Party are due in part to the recent extremely complicated objective situation. The respective crystallization of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie during the past year is naturally reflected in the Kuomintang. This is seen in the effect on the Center and Left of the conflict between Communists and the Right. Hence, it is more than ever essential for our Party to have a clearer, long-range view of the development of the National Revolution and a more definite policy toward the Kuomintang. It is also important that the Central Committee's view of KMT-CCP relations be well understood by Party members and the masses so that they can formulate correct viewpoints.

Although this (July 1926) Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee considers the solving of the problem of KMT-CCP organizational relations as a question for the next Congress, the following decisions should take effect at once:

a. Carry out the resolutions adopted by the Enlarged Plenum of last October for independent action by our Party in Kwangtung and elsewhere.

b. Positively develop the Kuomintang Left and correct our previous mistake of tying down the Left, thereby obstructing its full participation in Party work and in the fight against the Right.

c. Develop positively the Left's mass organizations outside the Party, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie (political clubs, etc.). Expand the foundation of the Kuomintang through these social organizations.

d. Convince the Kuomintang Left that the KMT organization cannot be one in which political power is concentrated in one class. The KMT should not have excessively rigid regulations and discipline. Due to the immediate necessity of taking in [73] more members from the petty bourgeoisie and the revolutionary masses, the organizational system of the Kuomintang should be more flexible. To illustrate, the Kuomintang at lower levels may at least assume the characteristics of political clubs in order to be close to the masses. It is not necessary to stick to rigid and self-binding regulations. Furthermore, social organizations with revolutionary tendencies should be allowed to join the Party as a unit. In this way, the Kuomintang would become a Party of the great masses.

e. Work together with the Left for a more realistic, daily struggle against the Right, to expose its compromises and treachery against the country and the people. Only thus can the Center be separated from the Right.

5. Our most pressing task with reference to the Kuomintang at this time is the anti-Right struggle. We naturally should still lend our active support to the National Government and the Kuomintang CEC in their current struggle against counter-revolutionary forces within and without Kwangtung even though they are directed by the Center. At the same time, we should maintain our own policy of supporting the interests of the laboring masses, this policy to be the basic condition of our support [for the KMT and the National Government].

Document 55

Resolutions on the Question of Organization

[73] Experiences in Party Development and Weaknesses

1. Since the last Enlarged Plenum [October 1925], our Party organization has expanded more than threefold. In the past eight months, despite the gradual ebbing of the tide of the May 30th Movement, our party at all levels has been able to lead the [74] mass movement under various conditions. From the standpoint of the national revolutionary movement, our Party has actually become a political nucleus. From the standpoint of the local mass movements, our Party has been assuming in many respects the position of leadership.

2. We have gained the following experiences from organizational work:

a. Through movements of various kinds, we have been able to get close contacts with the great masses, to develop mass organizations, and to expand the Party itself.

b. Due to the emphasis on expanding our work, our Party has been able, where the revolutionary tide is relatively high and the mass movement is relatively developed, to absorb the masses, among whom we are building our basic organization.

c. Due to the attention we have begun to pay to the work of Party cells, the Party has improved its social composition, absorbed progressive elements, and penetrated the proletarian masses. Thus, we have secretly built a preliminary foundation.

3. While the experiences gained from actual work are fruitful, our Party is still extremely young organizationally and it has many major defects. Chief of these are four.

First, our Party at all levels still does not realize the real meaning of organizational work. Not grasping the political significance of organizational work, many regard it as merely technical.

Second, the work of Party cells has not been truly established. The Party cells already in existence have merely acquired outward form. The Party at all levels fails to understand the significance of Party cells or their methods of work.

Third, the work of Party fractions is extremely bad.

Fourth, Party organs are unhealthy.

The Significance of Organizational Work

4. The significance of organizational work is not only technical but political. In [75] other words, organizational work is the axis from which the Party directs the mass movement. Without good organization the Party cannot direct an extensive mass movement or implement its policies. Good policy cannot be realized without good organization. A major characteristic of a Bolshevik Party is its organizational work. A young party depends on good organizational work in order to become Bolshevik, to grow from a small organization into a party of the masses, from an organization [for the study] of theories into a party of action, and to organize mass action through the basic work of Party cells.

5. Our Party is developing organizationally. There is, however, a great danger which may occur any time. This is the danger of weakness of the leadership and the

failure of subjective capacity to meet objective requirements, resulting in the loss of many opportunities for action. Weakness of the leadership would incur especially great losses in times of mass political action. This is the most serious organizational problem.

The objective course of the revolutionary movement is daily developing. Our Party's chief organizational duty is to push forward the revolutionary movement, hold the center of the movement, and guide it in every possible way. This is the duty not only of the Organization Department of Party headquarters of all levels. The present Enlarged Plenum has decided that hereafter the Central Committee should frequently dispatch special commissioners to the local committees, to inspect and execute these tasks. In times of crisis at any particular place, the commissioners would be all the more necessary.

6. What is the greatest obstacle to organizational work? It is the skeptical psychology toward developing organizational work. Under the present temporary militarist reaction, the development of the revolutionary movement depends not only on the reactionary situation but on the revolutionary masses of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The problem at this time is: If the masses are not in close contact with the [76] proletarian Party's forces, they may easily walk into the camp of the compradorbourgeoisie. From May 30 to the present, the problem of the mass movement is: To which force is the majority of the masses in the untied front to belong? If our Party fails to expand and lead the masses, the forces of the bourgeoisie and counterrevolution will be daily strengthened. Consequently, the Enlarged Plenum has directed its serious attention to this problem and restates the Party's slogans, "Expand the Party!" and "Enlist more revolutionary workers, peasants, and intellectuals!"

7. One of the Party's chief organizational tasks is work among the nonpartisan and unorganized masses. Our current important work is to develop, under many different forms and organizations, masses sympathetic to our party. We have accomplished a great deal through our work in relief associations, for instance, although local Party organs do not pay sufficient attention to it. We should hereafter further direct our attention to and activate such organizations as relief associations and athletic, educational, and cultural organizations.

The Significance and Methods of Work of Party Cells

8. A Party cell is not a division but the nucleus of our Party in various factories, mines, schools, or areas. These many social nuclei are joined together into one Party according to Bolshevik principles. The organization of cells is precisely determined by social and living conditions. However, the majority of our present cells have lost this significance. They are merely divisions of our Party, organized on the basis of revolutionary elements gathered from various social organizations or areas, and to whom Party training is given. Party cells fail to make themselves the nuclei of these social organizations or areas. Unless they perform this function, Party cells will never be capable of contacting and leading the masses. This most serious defect must be remedied at once.

[77] 9. There are five ways by which the above defects may be remedied in order to establish true Party cells.

a. At present, our Party is still founded on the local committees rather than Party cells, on the active workers of the local committees rather than those of Party cells. Hereafter, we must build the foundation of our party on cells. We must hold the cells responsible for the establishment of the basic activities of the Party. Each cell should see that its activities are well distributed among its members so that each member should know and execute the slogan, "All work to Party cells!" Each cell should carry on the activities of the entire Party (such as the labor and peasant movements,

cooperatives, relief associations, the women's movement, the youth movement, distribution of books and magazines, introduction of members, intelligence reports, communication of messages, etc., in accordance with the condition, membership, and needs of each cell).

During the period of secrecy, big Party cells may find it inconvenient to hold regular conferences of Party cell members because of the large membership. They may therefore be divided into small units to execute such tasks as the collection of Party dues, communication of orders, etc. We must remember, however, that the existence of small units is predicated on the above-mentioned situation and that they are not the basic organizations of the Party but merely subdivisions [of cells] in the factories, mines, and schools.

b. Powerful executive committees should be set up in Party cells to guide their work. In large cells where small units are established, the executive committee should be enlarged and should convene periodic meetings of the chiefs of the small units. The executive committee should have a planned, systematic, and progressive working program to carry out the resolutions and orders of the Party.

c. The nature of Party cells should be redefined in such a way that only Party cells of the following two types may be permitted to exist: (1) Party cells in factories, villages, or schools; (2) Party cells of streets or districts (determined on the basis of residential address). It is necessary to define the nature of Party cells in order to establish the work of Party cells and to avoid confusing their functions with those of Party fractions.

d. In big industrial areas (such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Wuhan, and Tientsin) [78] and big villages, where organization is developed and the number of cells has increased, sectional committees, with the sections defined by area, should be set up under regional or local committees. When several neighboring cells are joined together, a sectional committee is organized to administer the work of all party cells within the given area.

e. The organic system of the Party extends from the CC to the regional or local committees, from the regional or local committees to sectional committees, and from the sectional committees to the executive committees of Party cells and conferences of unit chiefs. The interrelationship of this system must be extremely close. The following organizational work should be strictly carried out among the masses, starting from the small units of Party cells: (1) political action; (2) development of work; (3) distribution and circulation of books and newspapers; and (4) collection of membership dues, etc.

10. In the process of development, any slackening and deficiency of organizational work may prevent the Party from taking action. All kinds of meetings must be held under any circumstances. A meeting of ten or twenty minutes may prove fruitful and effective if each member is well prepared prior to the meeting. Meetings of Party cells or small units are even more important. Every comrade has the duty of preparing his own reports and opinions. The duties of every unit chief, Party cell secretary, or executive committee member are to convene meetings, to gather reports for formulating conclusions, and to execute Party resolutions and instructions. Under regional, local, or sectional committees, conferences of active elements or conferences of responsible working comrades should be held as often as possible.

The Work of Party Fractions

11. The function of Party fractions is to realize the Party's policy and to increase the Party's influence in nonpartisan organizations such as labor unions, peasant associations, student federations, and various other organizations. Party fractions are different from Party cells in both function and organization. Party fractions are not

themselves independent units, nor do they form a separate system. Party fractions are established in accordance with the organization of the Party, under Party organs of all levels and under their supervision. Party fractions of different levels and nature exist from the CC down to the executive committees of Party cells. Party fractions are often provisional and changeable. Their existence is determined by Party headquarters [79] of various levels, which also appoint executive committees for those Party fractions that have a large membership.

12. The work of Party fractions is to represent collectively the opinion of the Party in carrying through the Party's policies. The decisions of Party organs must be executed, and to do this each and every member of Party fractions should be mobilized. Majority decisions of Party fractions, save those that have to be communicated to subordinate Party organs, must be executed by the mobilization of each and every Party fraction member. Within certain limits [members of] a Party fraction may discuss their work. In case of conflict of opinion between Party fractions and Party organs (such as between a Party fraction in a labor union at a certain factory and the executive committee of the Party cell of the same factory), it should be immediately referred to a higher Party organ for settlement.

13. Many defects have been revealed in the work of Party fractions. There is even lack of understanding regarding the meaning of Party fractions. The fractions also tend to become a second organization of the Party. These defects should be immediately corrected. Party organs of all levels must not overlook the fact that our comrades in Party fractions cannot be separated from the Party's basic organization.

Party Organs

14. Political parties cannot be without organs. The Communist Party, naturally, must have its organs also. Our Party organs are what Lenin called the organs of "professional revolutionaries." The function of Party organs is to develop the Party's organization and to execute the Party's political and technical work. Particularly when the Party is expanding, it cannot be without good organs and proletarian, scientific organization.

15. Party organs require two essential conditions to be efficient and healthy: (a) [80] perfect organization, suited to the requirements; (b) sufficient and responsible working personnel. In the past Party organs have been organized only in form, sometimes even to the point of having only a name but no actual work. This defect has been found in the organs of various departments and committees. It is partly caused by the insufficiency of the working force, but also by the failure of party organs to meet the necessary requirements. We must examine all defects from the organizational standpoint in order to seek reform. At the same time we must reinforce and more suitably distribute manpower so that responsible workers will be increased and strengthened.

According to the statistical report of the CC's Organization Department, based on present needs alone, the minimum requirements for nationwide directing personnel are 35 persons for regional work; 160 persons for local and sectional committee work; 160 persons for special or Party cell work, totaling 355 persons. At present, however, there are barely 120 persons responsible for the Party's work, an indication of the wide margin between actual needs and the available working force. We must train more personnel in order to save the situation.

16. It was decided at the last Enlarged Plenum that the departments of the Central Committee should have definite organization, that the secretaries of the CC and regional committees should not hold concurrent posts in the departments, and that there should be committees on the labor and peasant movements and a department of military affairs under the CC to carry out regular duties.

Only a part of these decisions has been executed; the greater part has not been realized. For instance, to this day there is no responsible comrade in the CC's Organization Department. Responsible comrades of the Committee on the Labor Movement are often dispatched on special missions to various places for temporary work. The Committee on the Peasant Movement is still not organized.

Following this Enlarged Plenum, we must endeavor to execute the above decisions and to correct our past errors. A central secretariat should be established to centralize the CC's technical work. Party organs at all levels likewise stand in need of reform. Unless the Party's organization is sound, we cannot push forward the revolutionary movement of the masses.

[81] Relations between the CC, Party organs of all levels, and Party cells should be close. Regular reports should be made by higher Party organs to lower Party organs and vice versa.

Document 56

Resolutions on the Work of the Propaganda Department

[81] Having examined the Propaganda Department's report, the Enlarged Plenum has decided that immediate reforms are necessary and that the following concrete measures should be adopted in our propaganda work.

The Problem of Publications

1. *Hsiang-tao*, the publication of the central political organ, should be made more stirring in order to reflect and guide the daily struggle of the Chinese revolutionary masses. Theoretical analysis should not be unduly emphasized and efforts should be made to (a) increase propaganda on the significance of local labor and peasant movements; (b) improve the communication of local political news so that important local events will not be neglected.

2. *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, the theoretical publication of the CC, should be published regularly every month to meet the needs of the revolutionary ideological struggle. In view of our Party's lack of theoretical ability, all the strength we do have should be concentrated for the time being in *Hsin ch'ing-nien*. (For instance, articles in *Hsiang-tao* emphasizing theoretical analysis and articles on historical theories in *Pei-ching cheng-chih sheng-huo* should be published in *Hsin ch'ing-nien*.) Studies on the Chinese economy and the history and theory of the labor and peasant movements should also be included in *Hsin ch'ing-nien*. Furthermore, the magazine should contain studies and discussions of CY problems, in order to make *Hsin ch'ing-nien* a joint publication of the Central Committees of the CP and CY.

3. Popular publication of the CC. A periodical, *Lao nung* (or *Kung nung*) should be published, first as a monthly and later as a weekly. Such a publication should be able to furnish workers and peasants with political guidance, collect data on the conditions of workers and peasants and news concerning their political and economic struggle, and publish letters from workers and peasants from various places. The objective is to enable the masses of workers and peasants to understand the situation [82] and significance of the national revolutionary struggle and to reflect the actual life and struggle of the workers and peasants.

4. Party organs. Further improvements are necessary in gathering data on the work and life of the Party in all departments of the CC and Party organs of all levels, as material for training and guiding our comrades.

5. An editorial committee should be set up to review and censor periodically all publications of the CC and bring into closer relationship with the Party the official publications of our labor unions, peasants' associations, and women's and youth organizations. It should enable the CC to exercise proper supervision of and guidance over all local publications. The committee should be composed of the chief editors of *Hsiang-tao*, *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, *Lao nung tang-pao*, *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien* (CY), *Chung-kuo kung-jen* (official publication of the All-China Federation of Labor), and *Chung-kuo fu-nu* (official publication of the Federation of Women). The committee should meet at least monthly to report and review the condition of the official publications of the CC, local Party organs, and labor unions.

The Department's Duties

Up to the end of April of this year, the CC's Propaganda Department failed to carry out the duties of the department. All forces must be positively reformed in order to carry out the following minimum activities:

1. Establishment of a publicity section to furnish the editorial staff of the official publications of all departments of the CC with weekly and monthly compilations of the editorials and news dispatches of Chinese and foreign newspapers and magazines.

[83] 2. Establishment of a library to index all important Chinese and foreign books by categories and date of publication and to collect all local and central publications (publications of the Party's labor unions, peasants' associations, students' and women's associations, and other official publications, books and publications of importance in Peking, Canton, Hankow, and Shanghai). When this work has been undertaken for a certain period, the indices should be distributed among organs of all levels. Regulations for loaning books should be fixed.

3. Daily routine: (a) draft outlines of propaganda on the political situation according to the Central Bureau's resolutions on propaganda, mobilization, and interpretation of the current situation; (b) issue regularly circular notices on the duties of local propaganda departments; (c) correspond with local propaganda departments in answer to their letters and reports; (d) review and criticize monthly all local publications according to the decisions of the Editorial Committee (of course, it is still necessary to guide local publications through regular correspondence); (e) make a general survey of intellectual and press opinion in the very near future. Such surveys should be conducted once a month thereafter to ascertain the reaction of the general public and various groups to our national and local "propaganda mobilization"; (f) make a preliminary survey in the nearest future on the condition and method of the regular educational work at different places (the work of Party cells in training our comrades in theory and Party duties) and the condition of specialized educational work (such as training classes). Thereafter, monthly reviews should be made on the results of such work.

The Central Propaganda Department should furnish the Central Bureau with written reports containing such items as the results of nationwide investigation of the work of the Party's central and local publications, their editorials on important events, and their editorial and translation record.

[84] The Problem of Editorial and Translation Work

The Central Propaganda Department must immediately commence editorial and translation work.

1. Decide on a minimum plan for the translation of theoretical material to add to the collection of books on the ABCs of communism.

2. Textbooks for Party schools and educational outlines for Party members:

a. *Ko-ming ch'ang-shih*, a simple and popular interpretation of the most important problems of the Chinese Revolution.

b. *Tang-wu ch'ang-shih*, an interpretation and explanation of theory, methods of propaganda, and organization of the activities of the Party, labor unions, students, and women (such as the significance of Party cells and the functions of Party fractions).

c. The teaching methods of lower Party schools (training classes) (practical curriculum and reference lists).

3. Stirring pamphlets: Very simple and popular pamphlets to explain the Fifth Manifesto of the Party on the current political situation [Manifesto of the Second Enlarged Plenum].

4. Collection of propaganda outlines on memorial occasions (such as the anniversaries of Lenin, February 7, March 8, March 18, May 1, May 4, May 5, May 7, May 30, Relief Day, youth Day, the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, Double Ten, Anti-Christianity Week, Antiimperialism Week, Workers' Memorial Week, anniversaries of Sun Yat-sen, Liao Ch'ung-k'ai, etc.), with reference material attached.

The Problem of Local Reports

Regional and local committees must submit regular monthly reports and prepare the following items (in case work is lacking in a certain category, an explanation is necessary so that plans for the initiation of such work may be prepared).

[85] 1. Monthly records of agitation. (Leaflets and results of the work of propaganda mobilization of the central and local committees of our Party and other cliques should be submitted in synthesized monthly reports with conclusions, in addition to urgent and separate reports submitted at the time.)

2. Monthly records of propaganda. (The work of theoretical propaganda in the clubs and research societies—Canton has enjoyed access to, and other places should at least make use of, the Central Committee's theoretical publications so that our comrades may attract the attention of noncomrades to our theories and carry on discussion with them through correspondence; local publications should pay more attention to debates with other local groups. The results of such work must be embodied in monthly reports.)

3. Monthly synthesized reports on the number of issues and the current slogans of local publications. Local publications should primarily stress local political agitation and problems. Publications of the Party's local labor unions, students' and women's associations should be sent regularly by express post to the CC's Propaganda Department. They should also be sent separately to the Committee on the Labor Movement, the Women's Department, and the CY. The Propaganda Department must not be overlooked merely because separate issues have been sent.

4. Monthly reports on the survey of popular opinion.

5. Monthly educational records. (Party cells should hold monthly discussions of theory to test our comrades' understanding of doctrines, monthly discussions on the current situation to broaden the political understanding of our comrades and the masses, monthly discussions on discipline to correct the views of our comrades or certain tendencies that manifest themselves in problems of organization.)

6. Monthly records of Party schools (the results, methods, and material of all training classes).

7. Monthly synthesized reports on the local effect of the CC's publications. (Criticisms of the CC's publications by local comrades and noncomrades, or the need for ideological and policy guidance.)

[86] 8. Monthly synthesized reports on the size and content of correspondence of local comrades with the CC's publications on politics, theories, labor, and peasantry (*Hsiang-tao*, *Hsin ch'ing-nien*, *Lao nung*). (Regardless who the writers are, all local propaganda departments should make reports on their correspondence.)

Correspondence with Workers and Peasants

In our propaganda work, we must immediately execute the resolution on worker and peasant correspondence in order that our Party may know and examine the opinion of the masses, which is necessary in guiding them. Worker and peasant correspondence may be organized roughly in four ways.

1. The Propaganda Department selects among workers those who can write ordinary letters and asks them to write freely about their own living conditions, their

work, and home, revealing their own reactions and knowledge of political problems.

2. The Propaganda Department selects and sends student comrades to workers' districts and peasant villages to record conversations and interviews with workers and peasants.

3. The Propaganda Department entrusts the responsible personnel of the Labor and Peasant committees who work in worker and peasant districts, with the task of establishing such correspondence through various means.

4. In case of outbreaks of strikes or resistance to taxation, the Propaganda Department sends its own personnel to worker and peasant districts, or delegates representatives of the Labor and Peasant committees, to gather correspondence on the masses expressing their views and reaction toward such an occurrence. Local propaganda departments should frequently prepare questionnaires for workers and peasants so that worker and peasant correspondents may fill in their answers.

[87] Central and local propaganda departments must themselves be reformed in order to execute these tasks. The Central Committee and committees of all levels should maintain an exceptionally cautious and strict relationship with [their] propaganda departments in regard to distribution of personnel and administrative procedures.

The Enlarged Plenum believes that not even 1 or 2 percent of the resolutions on propaganda adopted at the last Enlarged Plenum (last October) has been carried out. The central and local propaganda departments should not be held responsible. Nevertheless, the resolutions on propaganda are still appropriate. The present Enlarged Plenum believes that it is only necessary to outline very concrete methods of execution. Hence, the above concrete measures have been adopted which should be executed by central and local propaganda departments.

Document 57

Resolutions on the Labor Movement

[87] 1. Following the May Thirtieth Movement, the workers have proved that they are the principal force in the national antiimperialist movement. With the rising angry revolutionary tide, they have greatly developed class and national consciousness and initial organizational ability. Despite repeated slaughter and destruction by the imperialists and militarists, the workers have unceasingly carried on resistance and have repeatedly participated in an organized fashion in the struggle against reactionary militarists in Kwangtung and the Mukden militarists in the North. This proves the great advance in the workers' consciousness.

Militarist strife and oppression, natural calamities, and loose trade restrictions recently combined to bring about a national economic crisis, as is evident in the depreciation of paper money, the forced circulation of military notes, the soaring prices of rice and other commodities, and the arrears in government salaries, etc. The workers, whose real wages have dropped, have been hard hit. Hence, a wave of economic strikes has been spreading everywhere. Even the unorganized silk workers and handicraftsmen held determined strikes.

[88] The strike wave will daily grow stronger as the economic crisis worsens. The workers' hard-pressed condition can lead only to revolution. On the other hand, weakly organized strikes are easily suppressed by the imperialists, militarists, and Chinese and foreign capitalists. We must do our utmost not to lose any opportunity for leadership in resisting the enemy, so that the movement of economic strikes will ultimately strengthen the force of the Chinese proletariat.

2. From its inception to the present day, the Chinese labor movement has been under the guidance of our Party. This fact was reflected most strongly during the May Thirtieth strikes in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Therefore, with reference to the labor movement, our Party's problem is not whether or not the Party should maintain close relations with labor unions, but how to enable our Party at all levels to guide and train, through the form of unions, the broad masses of workers.

a. In guiding the labor movement, our Party does not aim at monopoly of labor unions but the ability continuously to bring up practical political and economic demands for the workers, and the capacity of Party members to struggle for their benefit and interests.

b. We exert our influence over the masses of workers through our Party cells in factories. Because Party cells in factories are organizations closest to the masses, they must instantly rise to struggle on behalf of workers as a whole in the event of any factory incident affecting the welfare of workers. (It is necessary to abide by the form of going through the union.) Thus, we organize and train workers on the one hand and, on the other, develop the consciousness of the masses of workers and guide their participation in the work of unions by using these concrete, day-to-day struggles. Unions are the schools of communism: we should further use the work of unions and day-to-day struggles to educate the masses of workers. In this way, we should be able to progress from the former monopoly of union work by our Party fractions to a labor movement in which the masses of our Party members exert an influence over the workers.

[89] 3. The present important duty of Chinese workers is to lead the national struggle for liberation. The united front against imperialism and militarism set up by the unions and by the mass organizations of other classes is the only strategy for realizing this duty. Hence, labor unions should issue statements of policy from time to time on the common interests of the people of all classes and lead the masses of workers to actual participation in the national revolutionary movement.

Weaknesses are often likely to develop in carrying out this policy. Either labor's interests are overlooked for fear of splitting the united front, or the slogans and demands of class struggle are extreme, thus obstructing the united front. We must realize that the firmer the unity of labor, the stronger the force of the united front. The collective strength of labor must be developed gradually in class struggle. Hence, neglect of the interests of labor not only results in the danger of its alienation from us, but shakes the foundation of the united front. At the same time, extreme slogans and demands of class struggle can easily give the bourgeoisie good propaganda material in order to separate and isolate labor.

There is a third weakness. In the execution of our policy, too much emphasis has been laid on superficial and abstract national political slogans and demands which cannot be applied to practical daily struggles. This weakness, which has become very widespread, accounts for the failure of our policy to produce practical action, with the exception of Shanghai during the days of the May Thirtieth Movement and Kwangtung at the present time. To realize our policy, we should begin with the acute problems of daily life of the masses, that is, local political and economic problems, such as exorbitant taxes and irregular levies, the price of rice, and the disturbance caused by armies. It is not sufficient for labor unions merely to issue a few proclamations in executing our policy. Labor should be the nucleus to call forth people of all classes to participate in practical resistance movements so that the united front may penetrate the masses and become gradually strengthened.

[90] 4. All central and local Party publications should truthfully publish articles and news on the labor movement. (Although several resolutions have been passed on this subject, they have not been carried out in earnest.) In the past, our Party's regular periodicals have had one common defect. Either the writing was too complicated and difficult or the discussions were abstract and vague, not based on reality. Articles contributed by workers were very seldom published. There has been some improvement recently, but the publications are still far from genuinely popular. Past experience tells us that only illustrated papers can exert wide influence among the masses of workers. Hereafter, Party headquarters of all levels should stress publication of pictorial papers for workers. Pictorial sections should also be inserted in all our other publications.

5. In the one year since its establishment at the second National Labor Conference, the Chinese National General Labor Union has gained the confidence of Kwangtung labor unions, particularly workers of the Canton and Hong Kong Strike. It has not been able, however, to exert influence over workers throughout the country. Although the third [National] Labor conference held on "May 1" this year failed to produce great influence among the masses of workers throughout the country, it was very significant in terms of education and propaganda. The best sign is that all labor unions in the country which have masses have joined the National General Labor Union (with the exception of a minority of Canton labor unions). The directing organ of the National GLU is also quite healthy.

In the nearest future, attention should be directed to the work of the Shanghai office of the National GLU. First, close organizational relationships should be developed with labor unions throughout the country. Secondly, a regular periodical should be published in Shanghai to lead the national labor movement. Thirdly, a system of rotating inspectors should be established for the direction of workers' struggles every-

where. If the highest directing organ of the National GLU can be established in the North to unify the national labor movement, the CC's committee on the Labor Movement should direct its attention to guiding and utilizing this organ.

[91] 6. It is a good thing to have many high-level organs to unify the labor movement. At the same time, however, our labor movement is faced with the danger of bureaucratism. We should try to adapt labor unions to the masses, that is to say, we should pay attention to lower-level labor union organizations. We have made two mistakes in the past in union organization: excessive emphasis on bureaucratic forms of organization, and failure correctly to utilize basic organizations, although we did pay attention to them.

Wherever union organization is illegal, it is not necessary to stick to the name or formal organization of labor unions. We should employ all types of organizations and names to organize workers (such as schools, clubs, dining halls, hospitals, music and athletic associations, cooperatives, and boxing clubs). Such organizations require only two conditions: the masses, although the number may be small, and class [nature]. Our past error in utilizing basic organizations in labor unions (Party cells or small units in factory departments) is excessive emphasis on form and strict, almost mechanical, [organization].

In fact, the main significance of basic organizations is their being the unit of activity of the masses of workers. Basic organizations should stress not uniformity of form but actual capacity to be the nucleus of the masses and, further, to be the active unit in absorbing workers and organizing unions. If basic organizations are too strict, they will become dead and mechanical and the significance and function of Party cells or small units of factories would be lost. (For example, a certain department in a factory has 100 workers, 20 of whom are members of the union. In case of mistreatment or oppression of any one of the workers by either the factory manager or foreman, the basic organization formed by the 20 union members should at once assemble all the 100 workers to a meeting for discussion and decision on a suitable line of action to oppose this particular incident of oppression. Should it be impossible to hold a meeting, the union members should proceed with the work of propaganda and agitation both inside and outside the factory so that the entire labor force of the department would sympathize with and join the union. They also should enable the laboring masses to learn the methods of daily [struggle]. This is the chief significance of basic organizations.)

[92] At the same time, we must also pay attention to the training and education of low-level union committees and factory workers' representatives. Most of these workers' committee members and representatives are strong elements in the factories. They must be given suitable training before we can properly push the organization of Party cells or small units in factories. This is the realistic method of organizing labor unions.

7. Due to China's political chaos and economic complications, it is very difficult to achieve uniformity of labor demands throughout the country. With the exception of Kwangtung, the demand of workers of the entire country is to obtain their rights and freedom. We should formulate such minimum demands as that for improved treatment on the basis of actual local conditions of workers. Although we may not be able to attain our goal immediately, we should start propaganda work. We should carry out propaganda for a maximum ten-hour working day and one holiday each week. Central and local Party headquarters should outline national and local labor demands for propaganda among the laboring masses and society in general.

8. In such light industries as textile, tobacco, and silk factories, young and female workers form a very important group numerically. They have been most active, participating in the union movement, strikes, and other mass movements. To encourage them to participate more energetically in the class struggle and the revolutionary

movement and to train personnel for proletarian struggle, we should guide them to fight and give them the necessary education and training. In all economic strikes, we should bring up their special conditions. In labor unions where there are young and female workers, we should select their able elements to be elected as members of union committees. [CY] representatives should participate in Party fractions of labor unions so that the CY can take uniform steps in its activities among the laboring masses.

[93] 9. In accordance with actual local conditions in the labor movement and the local minimum demands of the workers, the regional and local committees of the Party should draft practical immediate plans for the labor movement and submit them to the Central Committee for approval. They should also hasten and supervise the execution of these plans by our Party cells in factories and Party fractions in labor unions. In the national labor movement, the most important industries are railroads, seamen [shipping], and mines, and the most important places are Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin, and Tsingtao. The labor movement in different industries and cities all have their respective points which merit our attention.

a. With the exception of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway Union, the railway unions in the North are suppressed, unable to function openly or half openly. Railway unions have failed to build a foundation on the masses, and our Party cells on the railways have not been developed. Moreover, among the railway workers the difference between experienced and inexperienced workers is too great. Objectively, there are also many organizational difficulties. Henceforth, we should employ open or semi-open methods, regardless of form or name, as well as secret methods, to organize railway workers at major stations, from engineers and firemen to maintenance crews and porters. On the one hand, the railway workers should find means to oppose the treacherous militarists. On the other hand, they should unite on the basis of their most acute daily sufferings and develop close relations with other workers and peasants along the railways. To attain the above objectives, local Party headquarters should devote efforts to developing our Party cells on railways and recognize that the work of railway unions is of foremost importance in their work in the labor movement. Hereafter, the Federation of Railway Unions appoints only rotating inspectors to guide and inspect railway work; it is not to appoint regular officials stationed at various railway stations. The work of developing railway unions at each station is the [94] responsibility of local Party headquarters. The Federation of Railway Unions only has official relationships with railway unions at railway stations. Unions at railway stations developed by Party headquarters should also pay attention to maintaining close relations with the Federation of Railway Unions in order to strengthen the unification of railway unions. It should also report to the Federation on the conditions of its work to facilitate publication of regular periodicals to guide the railway workers' movement.

b. The Seamen's Union has built a foundation only among a group of seamen on ocean liners. Very few seamen of inland steamers have joined the union. Since the Canton-Hankow [Hong Kong] Strike, a group of the most revolutionary seamen have left their jobs. Hence, in the seamen's movement, secret work should be initiated in the immediate future on ocean liners. Attempts also should be made to get the seamen of inland steamers to join the union and to extend the union's organization to all major ports. Of course, the development of Party organizations should follow the development of labor unions. All local Party headquarters should henceforth pay special attention to the seamen's movement.

c. The miners' movement in Anyuan [Kiangsi] has been totally destroyed and no possibility of revival is in sight. There has been some organization at such places as Kailan [Chihli], Tzu-chou [Tzechwan, in Shantung?], Poshan [Shantung], Tsiaotso [Honan], Tayeh [Hupei], Shuikoushan [Hunan], and Sikwangshan [Hunan]. Henceforth

we should continue to develop the miners' movement at the above places and dispatch people to initiate the movement at such places as Fushun [in Liaoning, now Liaotung], Tsingsing [Chihli], Linch'eng [Shantung], and Tzu-liu-lin [Tzeliutsing, Szechwan?].

d. Although the Shanghai General Labor Union is supported by all Shanghai workers, its foundation is built only on a portion of the printers and textile workers. Henceforth, our most important task is the organization of seamen, railway, postal, electrical workers, longshoremen, and street transportation workers. Due to hard living conditions or their relatively strong class consciousness, the workers of Shanghai are most apt to stage unorganized strikes and riots. It is necessary for our Party cells in factories and low-level unions to become strong and developed before the action of Shanghai workers can be organized and planned. At the same time, we should [95] fight for the open existence of Shanghai labor unions and disseminate widespread propaganda on the general demands of Shanghai workers. Our Shanghai Party headquarters should, in particular, guide Shanghai workers to participate in the local movement for political and economic reforms, so that the workers of Shanghai may accumulate revolutionary experience and acquire their social status.

e. The labor movement in Kwangtung has two shortcomings: (1) a portion of industrial workers is still under the influence of a small number of reactionary leaders; (2) the long-standing traditions of the old guilds are still strong in labor unions. In our Party's work in the labor movement in Kwangtung, primary attention should be paid to enlisting the support of the masses of workers of arsenals, railways, postal and telegraph, and waterworks. Our Party should also establish a small number of model unions which are free from the old traditions of the guilds. It must not pay attention only to the so-called movement for the unification of unions. An urgent solution to the Canton-Hong Kong strike should be found. The revival of the Hong Kong labor movement is one of the principal tasks of the Kwangtung Regional Committee. Our Party cells in factories should pay attention to absorbing the masses of workers. Strict screening, however, is necessary in selecting union officers to join our Party.

f. Under severe oppression, the majority of workers at such places as Tientsin, Hankow, Dairen, and Tsingtao are still unorganized. Positive steps should be taken to organize the workers of these places. At the same time, we must avoid the mistake of excessively strict and mechanical utilization of Party cells or small units in factories. We should use the facts of daily struggle and employ all kinds of open or secret formulas to organize workers' organizations and basic organizations of labor unions. Special attention should be given to the development of Party cells in factories for the purpose of absorbing the strong elements of the masses of workers in preparation for the development of all types of struggle.

g. Special attention should also be given workers in small factories, shop employees, and handicraftsmen in various cities because they are the agents of workers in big industries and therefore constitute strong masses in the national movement. Although the organizations of these workers cannot be very strict, we must first of all [96] see that they are class organizations without bourgeois elements mixed in. This point deserves special attention.

10. During the past year, the working class of the country has been in a situation of heated struggle. Our Party has been busily engaged in directing this struggle. Consequently, responsible personnel of the CC's Committee on the Labor Movement were frequently dispatched to various places and unable to attend to their regular duties or to proceed systematically with the development of the national labor movement. Henceforth, the Central Committee should designate a responsible person in the Committee on the Labor Movement to exercise regular direction over all local Party headquarters in the execution of policy on the basis of the practical methods outlined in the above plans.

11. At present, we face a grave shortage of personnel for the labor movement, particularly low-level cadres. We should immediately establish at such places as Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, and Canton, labor movement training classes to train personnel to serve as low-level cadres. We should also establish an advanced training class in Shanghai or Canton to train national high-level leaders.

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Resolutions on the Peasant Movement

[96] 1. Tendencies in the Peasant Movement

In recent years the intensification of imperialist encroachment and militarist oppression and extortion, and frequent and expanded militarist wars have created the currently widespread peasant uprisings, such as the uprisings of the Red Spears in Honan and Shantung, the movement to oppose [oppressive] taxes and reduce rent in Szechuan, Shensi, and Chihli, and the peasant association movement in Kwangtung and Hunan.

These movements are marked by a number of common characteristics: opposition [97] to exorbitant taxes and irregular levies, advance collection of money and crops, corrupt officials, oppression by the *min-t'uan* and the devastation of civil wars. At the same time, positive demands have been expressed: demands for self-organization, armed self-defense, and clean and orderly government. In Kwangtung, where the peasant movement is relatively advanced, certain local political rights have been demanded (popular election of *hsien* magistrates, etc.).

In short, the peasants have become conscious of their own sufferings and cannot endure them any longer. They have, on their own initiative (whether consciously or unconsciously, in a primitive or organized fashion), risen to revolt against the classes which oppress and encroach upon them (landlords, local bullies, bad gentry, compradors, imperialists). In other words, the peasants have risen to participate in the National Revolution and have proved highly functional in actual politics (for instance, the victory of the National Government in Kwangtung and the defeat of the Second Kuominchün in Honan). They occupy an extremely important position in the Chinese national liberation movement.

In view of the foregoing tendencies, we may safely say that the people's political consciousness and position in political life will continue to develop and will become the principal force in the national liberation movement. To guide the smooth advance of the Chinese national liberation movement, our Party must secure the force of the peasantry and the directing power in the peasant movement. Therefore, the following resolutions are adopted by the Enlarged Conference.

2. Economic and Political Demands

The peasant movement in Kwangtung is already in need of a minimum political platform. From a national point of view, however, it is still premature to decide on an organized political platform. The present resolutions are not intended, therefore, as a systematic exposition of peasant demands, but merely to point out the most pressing demands in the country which require immediate action. As for a complete peasant political platform, it will have to await discussion at the Fifth Congress.

1. *Economic [demands]*:

[98] a. Rent ceilings to be fixed by the government. Peasants to receive at least 50 percent of the crops.

b. Limit exorbitant interest; fix the maximum interest at 30 percent.

c. Oppose advance collection of money and crops [grain tax], exorbitant taxes, and irregular levies.

d. Demand freedom from graft; all levies should be computed according to market prices.

e. Unify the system of weights and measures.

f. Prohibit hoarding. Promote the movement for agrarian consumers cooperatives.

2. *Political [demands]*:

a. Freedom of assembly for the peasantry.

b. Popular election of *hsien* magistrates.

c. Popular election of self-governing organs in the villages.

d. Open local finance.

e. Opposition to execution by the *min-t'uan* of the judicial powers of arrest and trial.

3. The Problem of Organization

1. Peasant organizations should not be too strictly confined to the form of peasant associations. If, in certain villages and towns, there already exist such groups as Village Federations or "Watch and Guard Associations," organizations which truly represent the masses of peasants and their interests, and which cannot easily be transformed, they should not be forced to change into peasant associations. Furthermore, [99] they should be permitted to join *hsien* peasant associations which unify the peasants associations of the entire *hsien*.

2. The organization of peasant associations cannot yet have a distinct class color. We should propose the organization of hired farm laborers and tenant farmers, but we cannot propose to exclude from membership persons who own a certain amount of land. Owing to the difficulty of setting up a suitable standard, we may only place a relatively general limitation and disqualify the following two categories for membership in peasant associations:

a. Those who own a large amount of land but do not till it.

b. Those who extort high interest.

3. Toward old, established peasant organizations, the policy of our peasant associations is to control and absorb them as far as possible so that the bad gentry and local bullies may not utilize their so-called legal organs to oppress the peasants. In case of conflict between landlords and poor peasants, we should find means to use the old peasant organizations as the mediating party.

4. The Problem of Propaganda

1. Agitation and propaganda should be based on the actual sufferings of the peasantry as the point of departure. Avoid the use of broad, vague propaganda and mechanical, preaching lectures.

2. Avoid active opposition to the superstitions and clan relationships of the villages. We should elevate the cultural level of the villages in a gradual and methodical manner. At times, we may lower our own standard of living to meet that of the peasants in order to gain close contact with them. We may at times even find it necessary to follow for the time being the superstitions of the masses in order to develop our work.

3. Class relationships in the villages are extremely complicated. Therefore it is not necessary to bring up the term "the peasant class." Our propaganda should be [100] based on the opposition of the entire peasantry to the bad gentry and local bullies.

4. Means of propaganda are pictorial papers and magazines, slogans, folk songs,

slides, and stories. It is advisable to use and adapt to our propaganda the fairy tales and legends of the villages. In any event, uninteresting, mechanical, and preaching lectures are not to be employed.

5. Policy Toward Landlords, the Min-t'uan, and Local Government

1. Our policy toward landlords is to unite self-cultivating peasants, hired farm laborers, tenant farmers, and middle and small landlords in a united front. Those big landlords who do not actively engage in oppressive activities are to be neutralized. Attacks should be concentrated on very reactionary big landlords. As for big landlords who are members of the bad gentry or local bullies, we should not simply propose the slogan, "Down with the landlords," for slogans attacking the bad gentry and local bullies in reality work toward overthrow of big landlords also.

2. Our policy toward the *min-t'uan*. Although the *min-t'uan* is the machinery by which the landlords, bad gentry, and local bullies protect their interests at the expense of the common people, it is impossible to hope that this system can be destroyed at the present time. Our policy is to disseminate propaganda among members of the *min-t'uan* not to cooperate with the bad gentry (members of the *min-t'uan* are all peasants). We should suggest that the *min-t'uan* chieftains should be elected at peasant assemblies or through other suitable means, so that honest members of the gentry may assume *min-t'uan* leadership instead of the bad gentry and local bullies. The purpose is to place the power of the *min-t'uan* in the hands of the enlightened petty bourgeoisie as the initial step, so that the *min-t'uan* may not obstruct the peasant movement.

3. The problem of local governments should be separately formulated:

a. We should employ the formula of revolt or internal splits to attain our objective in dealing with governments under militarist rule.

[101] b. We should employ the formula of the masses' demands for their rights and interests in dealing with local [governments] under the rule or influence of the National Government.

6. The Problem of the Agrarian United Front

Our principal policy is not to let the peasantry be isolated; we should avail ourselves of all opportunities and the so-called public social welfare to cooperate with the rest of the masses in a united movement. There are the following kinds of alliances:

1. In normal times, we may utilize joint conferences of workers, peasants, and merchants, or conferences of representatives of all circles.

2. At the high tide of [the movement for a] national assembly, we may organize associations for the promotion of the national assembly and set up branches in cities and villages.

3. In times of local emergency, we may organize people's peace-preservation committees. The policy and attitude toward various groups which should be adopted in the peasant movement are embodied in the various sections of the resolutions.

7. Attitude Toward the Church

In our verbal propaganda, we should do our utmost to depict the [Christian] Church as the vanguard of imperialism. On the one hand, the Church acts as espionage agent for imperialism, investigating conditions in the interior of China: politics, economics, popular sentiment, and customs. On the other hand, it uses such high-sounding words as "peace" and "universal love" and occasionally even spends money to buy the people's confidence. The Church wishes to deceive all oppressed peoples and lead

them to forget their own actual sufferings in order to insure a strong and lasting foundation for imperialist oppression.

We must not at this time create any opportunity of actual conflict with the Church. This condition is imposed by our present situation (the Church is allied with [102] militarists everywhere under the pretext of treaty protection). In case of obviously aggressive acts such as the occupation of land and forced purchase of people's houses, however, we should take action and stir up popular sentiment against the church.

8. Policy Toward Bandits

We should of course firmly oppose those bandits who oppress the peasantry. As for those who do not, we still should not allow them to join the peasant associations, thereby creating an organizational relationship. We should make them remain in a neutral position without being utilized by the bad gentry and local bullies in case of struggle between the latter and the peasants. If bandits are allowed to join peasant associations, peasants' organizations might easily be corrupted and invite outside criticism and attacks.

9. Armed Self-Defense

1. The peasants' present demand for armed self-defense is necessary, but the following two points must be taken into consideration:

a. Avoid exceeding the limits of self-defense. Such actions as interference with [local] administration and confiscation of the arms of the *min-t'uan* are defensive, not offensive, self-defense [*sic*].

b. It is not permissible to establish organizations of a permanent nature because it would inevitably give rise to conflict with other groups (such as landlords, *min-t'uan*, and military garrisons).

2. The name "self-defense army" can easily be changed to "self-defense corps" or some other title to avoid misunderstanding and jealousy.

3. The organization of the self-defense corps should not be complicated, but simple and expedient in action.

[103] 4. Political training is even more important for the self-defense corps than military training, because the totally disorganized and untrained peasants, once in possession of arms, could easily exceed the objective limits of action.

10. Relations Between the Peasant Movement and the Kuomintang

Peasant organizations need not reflect the coloring of any political party. The work of organizing the peasantry need not be undertaken in the name of any political party (it may be done in the name of labor unions). Where the peasant movement has been initiated by the KMT, we should cooperate with the KMT. However, with reference to relations between peasant associations and the KMT, the associations must be kept organizationally independent and not become an appendage of that party.

11. The Party's Development in the Villages

Our Party must devote the utmost effort to gaining the position of leadership in all peasants' movements. Party cells should be organized in every single lowest-level peasant association to be the nucleus in guiding the activities of the peasant association.

12. Methods of Work

We have not devoted a great deal of time to work in the peasant movement, and with the exception of Kwangtung, we have only just begun this work at most places. Although we have committed many mistakes, a good deal of experience has been gained. The following points should be noted with regard to our future methods of work.

1. *General points:*

a. Persons working in the peasant movement must first do as the peasants do in speech and action. Their living conditions and clothing must also be similar to those of the peasants. Only thus can they gain close contact with and disseminate propaganda among them.

b. It is necessary thoroughly to understand the sufferings of the people in order to express the demands of the peasantry; to know the objective limits of action in order to lead the peasantry to struggle; and to utilize the tactics of united fronts in [104] order to prevent the peasants from being isolated and defeated.

2. *Where there has hitherto been no work:*

a. Use should be made of village primary school teachers, comrades and city workers who are natives of villages, and students returning to the villages for holidays, to initiate organizational work. Primary school teachers are, in particular, the natural leaders of the villages. We should earnestly enlist this group in our ranks.

b. We should utilize various important events for propaganda tours in the countryside (such as propaganda on May Thirtieth and the Northern Expedition). At such times, we should take the opportunity to organize peasant associations or similar organizations.

c. We should find means of establishing village supplementary classes, village clubs, mobile lecture groups, and consumers' cooperatives to penetrate the villages and begin organizational work.

d. Investigate the living conditions, customs, and habits of the local peasantry to formulate the best methods to get close to and organize them.

e. Attempt to organize the many unorganized peasant rioters in the course of insurrections.

3. *At places where there has been work:*

a. Attention should be given to low-level and secret work. Peasant associations of hamlets or villages are the foundation of peasant organization. Conferences of peasant representatives of hamlets and villages should be held regularly. Sufficient preparation should be undertaken prior to such meetings, at which peasants should be encouraged to express their opinions to the utmost. Mechanical or preaching propaganda should be prohibited.

[105] b. We should conduct frequent surveys of the sufferings and all other conditions relative to the peasantry. To maintain the peasants' confidence and faith in organization, it is essential constantly to find out the peasants' demands and guide them in systematic action to gain their own interests.

c. We should find means to know and bring up the demands of the peasantry. When the objective situation does not allow the raising of such demands, a full explanation is necessary. We should inspire them so that they will not be disheartened. We must absolutely avoid resorting to outright suppression of their demands.

d. In order to strengthen the foundation of the peasant movement, we must develop our Party among the peasantry, so that it will become the nucleus in the development of the peasant movement.

e. Do not rely on political influence for the sake of expediency. Peasants should be taught in every way to have confidence in the capacity of their own organization.

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Resolutions on the Red Spears Movement

[105] 1. The Red Spears Association is a product of militarist political regimes. It is a primitive organization for the self-defense of the middle and small peasantry who can no longer tolerate the extortionist practices of corrupt officials, the burden of oppressive taxes and levies, the devastation of civil wars, the menace of bandits and defeated soldiers, the economic aggression of imperialism, and the squeeze of the bad gentry and local bullies. It may be true that a considerable number of vagabonds have slipped into the organization and that leadership has fallen into the hands of some bad gentry. Nevertheless, we absolutely cannot regard it as an organization of bandits.

The Red Spears in Chihli, Shantung, and Honan have proved and are proving now that their demands and actions directly or indirectly oppose militarist rule. The organization has become the real armed force in the National Revolution. We should do our utmost to guide this force and to see that it is not used by the militarists and local bullies.

[106] 2. The Red Spears Association not only is an important force in the national revolutionary movement, but merits our close attention in our work of developing peasant associations. In the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Chihli, where the Red Spears Association is most active, it is impossible to distinguish very clearly the Red Spears movement from the peasant movement. We should, however, see to it that peasant associations are made the general peasants' organization and the Red Spears Association is made the armed peasants' organization. In the immediate future, we must use the Red Spears Association to develop peasant associations. When peasant associations have become widespread and fully developed, the Red Spears Association should become the armed force of the peasant associations.

3. The Red Spears Association is a force in the people's opposition to militarism, but this force must be consolidated with and influenced by other revolutionary forces in order to minimize the possibility of defeat and the danger of its reactionary character. (In view of its loose organization and addiction to superstition, it cannot stand the test of battle. Furthermore, it is full of destructive tendencies and lacks constructive tendencies.)

4. We should assist the Red Spears Association in methods of organization and principles of action; such methods and principles should be clear, simple, and easily understood.

With reference to methods of organization, we should first carry out propaganda to the effect that all local Red Spears groups should join together to form a secret communications organ for exchanging information and mutual assistance. [The work of] this organ should be undertaken by our comrades in the Red Spears Association. Originally an organ of information and communication, it should gradually become a powerful directing organ.

The second step after the establishment of the communications organ is to find means of convening a conference of representatives of leaders of the Red Spears and Black Spears Associations to form a simple organization and formulate a political platform for common action. This common political platform should include the following:

a. Resistance to bandits

[107] b. Resistance to molestation by undisciplined troops

c. Resistance to exorbitant taxes and irregular levies

d. Resistance to impressment into military service and labor squads

e. Resistance to circulation of military notes. Demand that government paper currency be used in payment of taxes

f. Protection and preservation of local peace and order (that is, participation in the work of local self-government)

g. Supervision of, and making public, local finance

h. Opposition to corrupt officials

The above slogans should be conveyed in language that is most easily understood by the local people.

The Red Spears Associations' actions should at present be limited by the above principles as self-defense organizations. It is permissible to demand participation in local self-government, but seizure of local political power by force is absolutely not allowed.

5. It is unnecessary actively to oppose the superstitious dogmas of the Red Spears Association because they are the essential factor in bringing these people together to struggle and are unavoidable phenomena among backward peasants. We only want their activities to benefit the development of the Revolution.

6. Under the present peculiar situation in Honan and Shantung, the genuine Red Spears Associations of the peasants, those with bandit characteristics, and those utilized by local bullies have one common objective: opposition to Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Wu P'ei-fu. We should therefore see that they are welded into a united front for opposing local militarist governments. At the same time, we should strengthen the genuine organizations of the peasants.

[108] 7. The directing power of the Red Spears Association falls easily into the hands of the local bullies, the Red Spears becoming their tools. Furthermore, since they have the strongest force, the Red Spears Associations with bandit characteristics frequently become the basic mass fighting force of the local bullies. Our policy toward them is as follows: if we fail to bring them under the banner of opposition to the local militarist government, we should first of all try to take over their masses. The first step is to see that the genuine Red Spears Association of the peasants stands independently and unintimidated by them. The second step is to see that the Red Spears Associations with bandit characteristics are not utilized by others, but stand on the side of the peasantry to attack the local bullies.

Document 60

Resolutions on the Merchants Movement

[108] In the course of the national movement, Chinese merchants have three tendencies.

The most reactionary are the compradors of foreign firms, banks, and big stores. This pure comprador class has virtually lost all national consciousness.

Next come the merchants who have advanced from the position of compradors to become rising industrialists in textiles, silk, and shipping. Since they desire political assistance in expanding their enterprises, they appear to have a little political consciousness. They cannot rid themselves of the comprador outlook, however, and are antagonistic to the labor movement. They hope to gain a few benefits from the imperialists and militarists through compromise tactics. Furthermore, they are afraid of getting close to the masses and oppose revolutionary tendencies.

The middle and petty merchants are the only group that is revolutionary, or at least not counterrevolutionary. They have no direct economic connections with the imperialists and are subject to the double oppression of exorbitant taxes and irregular levies imposed by militarists and unfair competition at the hands of big merchants. Thus, they are in constant fear of bankruptcy. Since they own no factories, they are not afraid of strikes. Hence, they can be brought to close contact with the masses of revolutionary workers and students. Furthermore, they themselves constitute a great portion of the masses.

Our objective in the merchant movement is the masses of middle and petty merchants. They are an important element of the united front in the national movement. In the city, they are necessary to save the workers and students from isolation; in [109] the village, they are necessary to save the peasants from isolation.

The method of organization in the merchant movement is to organize the masses of middle and petty merchants in such organizations as merchant associations in order to transform, and not merely to unite with, existing chambers of commerce. The latter (especially in big cities) are not only monopolized by big merchants and are therefore unable to represent the middle and petty merchants, but are superficial organizations without mass support.

The important objective of our merchant movement is the organization of the middle and petty merchants against the compromising and traitorous actions of the big merchants and compradors in the national movement. We should oppose contributions by middle and petty merchants to the Merchants' Corps which protects big merchants. Instead, middle and petty merchants should propose the organization of defensive units composed of the city populace in general.

Merchant associations should be organizations composed exclusively of middle and petty merchants, without the participation of big merchants. In capitalistic big cities, it is desirable not to allow the participation of low-level shop workers, who should properly belong to organizations of commercial workers. They occupy a special status in relation to other merchants, with whom there are grounds for serious conflict.

In terms of the relationship of political parties, the revolutionary middle and petty merchants should be [*sic*] the masses of the Kuomintang Right. We should at-

tempt to steer them toward the Kuomintang Left. Where the Kuomintang Left has already gained influence among the masses of merchants, it may be well for it to direct the organization and activities of the merchants. However, whenever we have comrades in merchant associations, the work of our Party fractions must not be abandoned, in order that our political policy may be realized.

Document 61

Resolutions on the Women's Movement

[110] Having studied the report of the Women's Department of the Central Committee, we note a certain amount of achievement in the women's movement, which has demonstrated considerable usefulness in the national liberation movement. On the other hand, many weaknesses have come to light, such as failure to penetrate the masses and excessive emphasis on bureaucratic activities. [Party members working in the women's movement] in Kwangtung and Peking have neglected the Party's development. Publications are too monotonous and political. Hereafter, the following points should be given special attention in our women's movement.

1. *Emphasis on the masses.* We have in the past used such organs as the Woman's Department of the Kuomintang, women's associations, and federations of women of all circles in many places to activate and summon the masses. Frequently, however, the result has been neglect of the masses. We have failed to penetrate the masses and merely control these organs. Upon the outbreak of certain incidents, we issued manifestos and pamphlets and dispatched telegrams in the name of these organs. Such practice has created increasing fear and suspicion among the masses, separating us further from them and placing us in an increasingly isolated position. This is a very serious mistake.

In our future work, we should not, naturally, refrain from using such organs as women's associations and the Women's Department of the people's school [KMT] to summon the masses. Our primary duty, however, is to "summon the masses." To get hold of the masses, it is not enough merely to control certain organs, creating thereby a bureaucratic kind of movement. We must lay primary emphasis on work among the masses.

2. *United front.* At present, a number of cliques have developed among the masses of women as a result of class differentiation, especially in Kwangtung. Hence, a united front of all women's cliques has become a serious problem. We have been too subjective on this point in the past. We have too often merely aimed at our own activities and brought up our own slogans, paying little attention to the interests of women of all classes and the views of women's organizations of all cliques. The result was that our activities were monotonous and isolated and we have lost the sympathy of the majority of the masses. This is one of our past mistakes. We should hereafter [111] pay special attention to the united front of women of all classes and all women's organizations. To establish this united front, we must emphasize (1) more attention to women's own interests; (2) a certain amount of respect for the views and policies of other women's organizations when certain movements occur; and (3) avoidance of monopoly situations and other unnecessary conflicts.

3. *Female labor and women students.* Resolutions on the method of dealing with female labor and students were adopted at the Fourth Congress and at the Enlarged Plenum of last year. To this day, however, very little has been done. Little attention has yet been given to this problem at certain places, such as Kwangtung, Peking, and Hupei. This is a very bad situation. We must realize that the labor movement is the essence, and women students a tool, of the women's movement. If we fail to achieve results among these two groups, it is senseless to speak of all other women's movements.

4. *Peasant women's movement.* This has just been initiated. With the peasant movement suddenly and rapidly developing, however, the future peasant women's movement will occupy a very important position in the Chinese women's movement. Although we cannot as yet formulate concrete plans, we should at least begin to give our serious attention to the problem and prepare personnel for the peasant women's movement, especially in Kwangtung and Hunan.

5. *Popularization of women's publications.* It is a sign of progress that there has been an increase in local women's publications. Their contents, however, are not satisfactory. Either there is excessive duplication and redundancy, or the writing is too political and theoretical. Very few can really speak on behalf of women, representing their sufferings and actual demands. In the future, our own publications [112] and those under our control should institute improvements, avoid empty political and theoretical discussions, and concentrate on articles on women's own sufferings and practical demands, so that women readers will feel that the articles speak on their behalf. Only thus can we achieve results in propaganda and agitation among the majority of women who are numb and unconscious.

6. *Reform of local women's departments and committees on the women's movement.* Although these organs have been organized, they are for the most part ineffective and unable to guide the work of the women's movement. Reform of these organs is prerequisite to spurring the progress of the women's movement. The Party at all levels should take special note of this point.

7. *Expansion of Party membership and training of personnel for the women's movement.* Since the last Enlarged Plenum, the number of female members has increased considerably. It is still a very small figure, however, when compared with the number of male members. Furthermore, female membership is confined to Shanghai and Hunan. In Kwangtung, Hupei, Peking, and other areas, expansion of female membership has been extremely slow. This is indeed a very bad situation! Hereafter attention should be given to the development of female membership everywhere.

The shortage of personnel for the women's movement is even more acute, and consequently local work has been much retarded. The training of personnel for the women's movement (especially personnel for the female labor movement and the peasant women's movement) is the most important immediate task of local Party headquarters. As far as possible local Party headquarters should sponsor training classes for the women's movement, or special forums on the women's movement, or gather and regularly train responsible and promising women comrades.

Document 62

Resolutions on the Student Movement

[112] Students are an important group in the national revolutionary movement. This was clearly revealed in the May Fourth and May Thirtieth movements. From the objective point of view, the majority of students are bankrupt petty bourgeois youths and, from the subjective point of view, they are susceptible to the revolutionary propaganda and knowledge, to which they are exposed in the schools. They are an [113] extremely important group in the national revolutionary united front, second only to the workers and peasants. However, the students must themselves form a united front to centralize the strength of the masses of students in order to become a force in the national revolutionary united front.

We have in the past paid attention to the policy of a student united front in our student movement. By this we mean the unification of student federations. We have gained considerable results in Peking and Shanghai; elsewhere, we have either failed to adopt this policy or endorsed it only on the surface, lacking proper means of execution in order to obtain positive results.

Our policy to expand and strengthen the student united front should hereafter be based on the following principles, adapted to actual local conditions:

1. In our propaganda among the masses of students in the schools, we should stress the slogan of the unification of the student movement, with unity in organization, policy, and action, and without discrimination on the basis of religion, party, or ideology.

2. By the so-called student united front and the so-called unification of the student movement, we do not mean the unification of students of all cliques under our doctrines, policies, and slogans. Our policy is to present the masses of students minimum revolutionary slogans and policies which are acceptable to the majority of students of all cliques in order to unify the student movement.

3. By the so-called unification of policy, we mean the unification of policy in terms of action rather than ideology. Hence, in concrete situations, we may bring up only those slogans and policies which are acceptable to the majority of students in order to expand the student united front and unify the student movement. At the same time, in our daily political and ideological propaganda, we should bring up as far as possible concrete facts to stress the necessity of our revolutionary theories and policies. It is necessary to influence the thinking of the masses of students in order to [114] obtain political leadership.

4. We should cooperate very closely with students of the KMT Left Wing, but we should also earnestly invite the cooperation of students of the KMT Right, the Kuo-chia chu-i [Nationalist] Clique, and Christian students in political struggle as well as struggle for the students' own interests, in order to expose the incompetence of their leaders and encourage them toward the Left.

5. Our strength should be built on the masses of students in schools. As for the officers of student federations, we need only ally with the Left to secure the majority. We should not monopolize the organizations.

6. In our daily political and ideological propaganda, that is, analysis of facts and theoretical debates, we must not yield in the slightest to the students of the KMT

Right Wing, the Nationalist Clique, and Christian students. However, we must not lightly brand anyone as reactionary and counterrevolutionary. Furthermore, we should at all times maintain a friendly attitude in our personal relations in order to avoid unpleasant feelings on the part of nonpartisan students.

7. In our attitude toward mission schools, we may attack only religious education but not the entire student body of mission schools.

8. Our comrades in various schools should concentrate their efforts on studies but they must also pay attention to student activities, such as student clubs and oratory societies. They must do their utmost to avoid deviating from the masses of students in any given school. Only thus can we establish leadership among the masses of students.

Note

This document has been reprinted, with punctuation, in *KMWH*, XV, 2603-04.

Document 63

Resolutions on the Work of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps

[114] The organization of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps has developed greatly during the struggles of the past year. It is gradually getting close to the masses of young workers and has absorbed a portion of young revolutionary workers. By its [115] actions, the CY has proved its ability to lead students, workers, and the masses of youths in general to participate in the political movement led by the CCP. The Enlarged Plenum acknowledges its satisfaction in this respect.

But the CY is a revolutionary youth organization that leads youth to struggle for their own interests and to participate in general cultural movements and, under the Party's direction, political struggles. The Youth Corps has still not fulfilled its own mission, however. It has failed to adapt itself to the characteristics of the masses of youths. Attention must be given to correct this.

Following the May Thirtieth Movement of last year, the Chinese labor and peasant movements and the general national revolutionary movement developed greatly. On the other hand, reactionary ideas and organizations resulting from class differentiation are daily expanding and exerting a strong influence on the masses of youths. Under such conditions, it is the responsibility of the Youth Corps to secure, ideologically and organizationally, on the basis of the self-interests of youths, a greater number of young workers, peasants, and students and, under the Party's direction, lead them to participate in the current revolutionary struggle.

The CY should devote its efforts not only to expanding its ranks and absorbing more revolutionary workers, peasants, students, and other oppressed youths in order to penetrate the lower levels of the masses of youths, but should adapt its work to the characteristics of youths. Lacking work that is concerned with the needs of youths, the CY organization can never penetrate the masses of youths. Necessary political activities, however, must not be neglected.

The revolutionary function of Chinese students in the national revolutionary movement will continue to expand. If the student movement can be expanded under our direction, it would be of great benefit to the Party in the future peasant and urban petty bourgeoisie movements. The Party should hereafter direct the Youth Corps [116] in earnest, but the latter must not reduce its positive activities, thus adversely affecting the development of the student movement, because of the transfer of political leadership of the student movement to the Party.

Although it has been decided that membership in the Party or the Youth Corps should be determined according to age, Party organization is still lacking at many places. Furthermore, it is more convenient and suitable at certain places to organize the Youth Corps first. Where Party organization is lacking, it is the duty of the Youth Corps to help the Party to organize and execute the Party's resolutions. On the other hand, the Party should help the Youth Corps to organize where there is Party organization but no Youth Corps organization.

The Party should render greater aid to and direct the Youth Corps in its efforts to organize and to adapt its work to the interests of the masses of youths. In the labor movement, the Party should pay attention to and support the special economic inter-

ests of young and child workers. In guiding and assisting the Youth Corps, the Party must strive to preserve the independent spirit of the Corps and not interfere excessively in its activities, thus obstructing the development of its work. The localities should pay attention to reforming the organizational relationships between the Party and the Youth Corps at the lower levels. [The Party] must not arbitrarily assign work to the responsible comrades of the Youth Corps. Those who are members both of the Party and the Youth Corps should positively participate in the work of the Corps to fulfill their duty of leading members of the Corps to positive action. The Youth Corps should stress the training of positive active elements through actual work in order to strengthen the capacity of its low-level leadership.

In short, the work of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps should be in greater conformity with the interests of the masses of youths. The Party should regard the work of the CY as part of the work under its direction and lend the Youth Corps its earnest guidance and assistance.

Document 64

Resolutions on the Relief Movement

[117] The relief movement is a tool for the realization of the united front. It can directly unite all classes and parties to oppose militarist and imperialist oppression and indirectly arouse the great masses to participate in and sympathize with the revolutionary movement. Party headquarters at all levels should pay great attention to relief work and earnestly carry out the following tasks:

1. Party headquarters at all levels should help in every way to organize relief associations and establish and develop branch organizations at various places.
2. All party members are urged to join the membership of relief associations and as far as possible shoulder the responsibility for their work.
3. All organizations under our Party's direction are urged to join relief associations as member organizations; their members are urged to join as individual members.
4. Party headquarters at all levels should appoint a committee on the relief movement, its members to be selected from among Party members or members of Party committees. Party headquarters may also appoint a special commissioner to be responsible for the relief movement within their jurisdiction.
5. Party cells in schools, factories, offices, municipalities, and districts should appoint at least one comrade, or whatever number is suitable, to be responsible for the work of branch organizations of relief associations.
6. In big cities and big industrial areas, various committees on mass organizations should be set up under committees on the relief movement or special commissioners, to be responsible for organizing relief units among various groups, such as workers, students, peasants, merchants, women, and children, in order to maintain an intimate relationship with the various movements of the Party. When necessary, responsible members of committees on mass organizations are to attend meetings of the responsible comrades of the various movements.

[118] 7. Party headquarters at all levels should work with committees on the relief movement or special commissioners to draw up comprehensive plans for the local relief movement and a budget to be submitted to the Central Committee for approval. Such plans and appointments of responsible persons are to be submitted within the month of August of this year, in any case not later than the end of August.

8. Committees on the relief movement or special commissioners should be entirely under the Party's direction in terms of policy. The special commissioner of the relief movement of the Central Committee should direct local developments through local or regional committees. Where Party organs are lacking, activities should be temporarily placed under the direct supervision of the Central Committee's special commissioner.
9. Party headquarters should convene regular conferences of responsible personnel in the relief movement to acquaint them with the entire plan of activities of the Party as frames of reference for the relief movement. Party headquarters should refer all policy matters pertaining to the relief movement, solutions to important problems, and appointments, to the special commissioners or committees on the relief movement for discussion before decision.

10. Party members shouldering the work of relief associations should bear official titles and receive appointments from official organs, preferably by election at meetings.

11. Our comrades should shoulder the duties of actual work in official relief organizations. It is not necessary for them to hold the highest positions. Relatively high positions should be manned by nonpartisan Left elements.

12. The Left and our comrades together should hold the majority of the positions in official relief associations. Our comrades alone should not comprise more than one third of the staff.

13. Our comrades working in relief associations should earnestly cooperate with nonpartisan elements and avoid monopolizing everything. As far as possible, they [119] should report publicly on the work of the relief associations.

14. Responsible comrades in the relief movement should submit monthly reports on the condition of activities to Party headquarters for communication to the Central Committee.

15. Responsible comrades in the local relief movement should maintain a "grey" attitude in propaganda on the relief association. Their writing should be simple and popular and emphasize local problems.

16. In the event of the outbreak of reactionary oppression at any given place, the name of the relief association should be used to assemble all circles and organizations to put up strong resistance. At the same time, it is necessary to report on the true circumstances of the incident, together with photographs, to the National Committee of the relief association for extensive propaganda purposes.

17. Comrades responsible for the local relief movement should help collect data and material for the national propaganda publications of the relief association (*Kuang-ming pan-yueh k'an* [Brightness Semi-Monthly] and *Chi-nan hua-pao* [Relief Pictorial Review]). Emergency news, propaganda, and circular telegrams of the National Committee of the relief association should be published in local papers.

18. Our comrades should carefully investigate the condition of victims and refugees everywhere, regardless of party, class, and religion. This information should be reported to the higher organs of relief associations along with requests for appropriate remedial measures.

19. Our comrades should everywhere respect and abide by the regulations of relief associations. They are not to make changes at will which may provide pretexts for the opposition.

Document 65

Resolutions on the Military Movement

[119] 1. China is at present embroiled in a period of violent armed conflict between military forces bearing the colors of the National Revolution and the reactionary militarists. From the objective standpoint, we should at least carry out suitable political propaganda among the national revolutionary forces. At the same time, it should be [120] easy for us to work within the armies of the reactionary militarists in view of militarist rivalry and hostility, internal conflicts within the armies, and the excessive mistreatment of mercenary soldiers in the militarist armies.

In the villages, a great number of poor peasants have secretly organized armed organizations. Furthermore, they are beginning to organize armed uprisings of political significance, such as those of the Red Spears in Honan and Shantung.

The class struggle of the urban proletariat has been marked by many incidents of armed conflict between workers and labor thieves. Railroad workers in both North and South China are gradually demonstrating their capacity in civil war.

Our Party is a proletarian revolutionary party, prepared at all times for armed uprisings. In the course of the National Revolution, we should participate in armed struggles to help strengthen progressive military forces, smash the power of reactionary militarists, and gradually expand the armed force of the masses of workers and peasants. This type of work provides our Party with the experience of systematically preparing for armed uprisings.

The military movement has been largely neglected by our comrades. Our organization appears to be a study group. Although our comrades' attention has most recently been directed to the military movement, they tend to emphasize maneuvering high-ranking military officers. This shows lack of understanding of the responsibility of our Party in immediate military work and the meaning of gaining the experience of systematically preparing for armed uprisings.

2. As a result of six months' work, we have only succeeded in creating central and local working organs and their mutual relationships. We have made proper progress in collecting data and promoting workers' self-defense corps. Aside from appropriate political propaganda work in progressive armies, our work in enemy armies is largely characterized by attention to conflicts between high-ranking officers. We have failed to establish contacts with low-ranking officers and the masses of soldiers. [121] We have not begun systematic work with reference to armed peasant organizations (such as the Red Spears).

3. Henceforth we should try to organize soldiers' cells that can accept our command in reactionary militarist armies, and secure contact with the masses of soldiers. We should utilize daily events in the army for oral and written propaganda among the soldiers. At the same time, we should devote all our efforts to agitation and the organization of Party cells in arsenals and ordinance bureaus to cut the supply of weapons to reactionary militarists.

With reference to armed peasant organizations, emphasis should first be placed on the training of low-level leaders, particularly political training. With reference to workers' self-defense corps, emphasis should be on military and political training of the firm central elements of the corps rather than on numerical increase.

4. When we send personnel to do political work in the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuominchün, it is necessary to employ (few but good) principles. If someone becomes an officer, his duty is to see that the army becomes gradually more consolidated and revolutionary. He should studiously avoid premature differentiation of the revolutionary armies and his actions should be in complete accordance with instructions of local Party headquarters.

5. Military work is a part of the Party's work. Our comrades responsible for military work at various places should maintain intimate relations with local Party secretaries. They should report to the secretaries on the work situation and consult them on their work.

Part IX: The Northern Expedition, August 1926–Late March 1927

Arranged chronologically, the next sixteen documents reflect our two major sources, the files of the Soviet military attaché in Peking, and files from Chinese Communist leaders in refuge in the Soviet Embassy compound. Nine from the military attaché's office are reports by Soviet advisers on the progress of the campaign or on conditions in Kwangtung after the main contingents had moved northward: one instructs the military advisers on their duties as gatherers of military intelligence, and another is a policy document from Moscow generated in the Comintern. Seven of the CCP give views on military strategy, on dangers in the evolving political situation, on favorable developments in Peking and Taiyuan, and finally on a perennial problem—relations between the Chinese Communist Party and its Youth Corps. This last document is dated just twelve days before the police raid of April 6, 1927, that produced all the documents in this volume.

Document 66

Nefedov's Report on the Eighth Army

Document 66 is a Russian report translated into Chinese under the title, "Report of a Soviet Russian Military Intelligence Group on Its Investigation of Conditions in Kwangtung's Eighth Army," in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," 87-90. It is signed by a Russian named "Pavlov" and is dated August 9, 1926, in Changsha. "Pavlov," we believe, is the pseudonym of one M. Nefedov, who was sent by General Bliukher shortly before the Northern Expedition began to make contact with T'ang Sheng-chih and the Eighth Corps. (Cherepanov, *Severnyi*, p. 139; omitted from *As Military Adviser*. Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militärberater*, p. 258 thinks the pseudonym may be "Pavlov.")

T'ang Sheng-chih, the subject of the report, is referred to interchangeably as "Mr. T'an" or "T'an Yen-k'ai." Apparently this is a confusion due to the similarity of the sound of the names as transcribed in Russian and to the ignorance of the Chinese translator. We have corrected this error in our translation and corrected in brackets other errors in names. This was Document 43 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[87] This is a brief report of military intelligence in the Eighth Army.

There is actually no Kuomintang work in the Eighth Army. Li Wan-tao [Liu Wen-tao], who was appointed to take charge of KMT work, has been engaged in affairs other than political work. (T'ang Sheng-chih once said that Liu is very interested in activities outside his jurisdiction and neglects his own duties.) Buddhism is very popular in the army, supported chiefly by T'ang and followed by the officers.

[88] The various cliques in T'ang's civil organization are as follows:

1. Commissioner of Finance Liu Liang-chen [Liu Yüeh-chih]; Commissioner of Education Chou Hao-shan [Chou Ao-shan]; Commissioner of Civil Administration Fei Kuo-cho [Feng T'ien-chu]; and the representative at Kwangtung, Lei Chen-huang [Lei Chu-huan]. All of these men are of good repute in the province for their sound character. They are all friendly with T'ang Sheng-chih.

2. Commissioner of Reconstruction Tan Shou-sui [Teng Shou-ch'üan] (formerly director of the Mining Bureau at Sui-k'o-shan [Suikowshan]); Director of the Intelligence Bureau Liu Chia-hsin; and Director of Railways Liu Jung. While they do not stand for any definite political policy, they are connected with the compradors and are hostile to the first group and the Chinese Communist Party. They exert considerable influence over T'ang Sheng-chih.

3. Liu Wan-tao [Liu Wen-tao], a native of Hupei, studied at the Paoting Military Academy and in Japan and France. He is a man of self-esteem and eloquence, and has the characteristics of a conspirator. His slogan is, "Down with Militarism and Imperialism!" He is not really closely connected with the Kuomintang and is extremely hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. He has no confidence in the work of the Political Department and does not trust its personnel, for he suspects there are many Communists in the department. The Commissioner of Reconstruction, T'ang Shou-sui [Teng Shou-ch'üan], is a close friend of his; Liu therefore has connections with the

second group. T'ang rather looks down on him and calls him "dirty stuff" (this is very hard to understand. It may be a tactic of T'ang's).

The various military cliques are as follows:

1. Chang Tzu-p'ing group: Chief of Staff Li Ling-yung and Commander of the Second Division Ho Chia [Ho Chien].

[89] 2. Yi Yang-tsai's group: A student [graduate] of the Military Academy and formerly Chief of Staff to Kuan Hao [Kung Hao].

3. The Kwangsi group: Commander of the First [Fifth] Division Yeh Ch'i [Yeh Chi], and Commander of the Third Division, Li P'in-hsien, etc.

4. The Hupei group: Commander of the Hupei First Division, Hsia Tou-yin.

The various military cliques are of no great importance. They are all obedient to T'ang and they hold moderate opinions. T'ang Sheng-chih himself is lively, resolute, and radical in speech. He acts with great determination. Since he himself does not smoke, he forbids others to smoke. However, he must be hypocritical about this, because two fingers on his right hand are stained as dark as smoked sausages. It is reported that he used to smoke opium. He is a Buddhist and often brings a Buddhist statue to the front. There is always a statue of Buddha in his room and he often burns incense. He even plans to build a Buddhist temple.

T'ang believes that Buddhism points out the objectives of war, whereas Sun Yatsenism is merely the means of obtaining such objectives.

Now let us talk about the Paoting Clique again. The Paoting Clique absorbs elements who have never attended any school [never attended Paoting], such as Li Tsung-jen. Like other groups, it is not a strong organization. It was actually formed as a result of jealousy of Chiang Kai-shek. The clique is divided into those who are leaders and those who are followers (as in the Kwangsi Clique). The important elements are T'ang Sheng-chih and his armies, and Ch'en Ming-hsiu [Ch'en Ming-shu].

T'ang has already carried out his policy of organizing and training regiments. Should the National Government fail to appoint him to the highest position, T'ang would sever connections with it. Already, he has been talking about the idea of separation. It is difficult to foresee at the moment whether this would take place at Wuchang or Hankow [when the cities fall to the National Revolutionary Army]. Such a possibility depends first on the reaction of parties who are opposed to T'ang and, secondly, on T'ang's strength and speed in organizing alliances. I believe that, barring unforeseen circumstances, a split will not occur at Wuhan, for the relative strength of all parties concerned does not favor such an eventuality.

[90] Our present policy toward T'ang is not at all clear. We should not miss any opportunity to define our objectives.

Pavlov
August 9, 1926
Changsha

Document 67

Instructions to Soviet Advisers on Reporting Military Intelligence

Many of the documents seized in the Peking Raid concerned Soviet espionage in China, a subject we have dealt with only lightly. We include this document because it concerns the Russian military advisers in their ancillary role as intelligence agents. It was published in *SLYM*, II, "Military," 8-10; and later with punctuation in KMWH, IX, 1357-59. The American military attaché in Peking forwarded an English translation as his A-29, which the War Department received on August 24, 1927, and numbered 2657-I-281/111.

The English translation bore the title "Instructions Issued to the Military Instructors in China with Regard to their Relations with the Intelligence Department." At the end of this version is the subscription: "September 6th 1926 (The signature is cut out.)/No. 518/Peking. p.p. (?) V.A.Mat." The Chinese translation is entitled "Ma-ko's Instructions from Peking to Military Instructors in all Parts of China as to their Duties." It is subscribed "September 6, 1926, No. 586, Peking, signed Ma-k'o." It is possible therefore that the two translations, one into English and the other into Chinese, came from different copies of the same document. The same parenthetical remarks are found within both translations. The English version has not been published previously so far as we are aware.

A selection of documents on Soviet intelligence activities in China—only a small part of those available in Chinese—is found in *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 119-40, and a great deal is scattered through N. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*.

TEXT

Very Secret

Instructions to the Military Instructors in China with Regard to their Relations with the Intelligence Department

1. The duty of every instructor is (a) to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the military organization and the strength of the army in which he is working, as well as of the army of the enemy; (b) to gather constantly and systematically exact and up-to-date information about these armies, according to the special program of the resident agents of the Intelligence Department; (c) to transmit this information without delay to his superiors; and (d) to give at all times every assistance possible to the persons who are sent out by the Intelligence Department.

2. As a rule the instructors do not do the work of secret agents and do not take part in such work, but their duty is to indicate people who might be used as secret agents by the "Residencies" and in every respect to assist the representatives of the latter, strictly observing the rules of secrecy.

3. The instructors must procure and transmit through their superiors to the "Residency" of the Intelligence Department all official regulations, instructions, laws,

budgets, books, and magazines of a military-political and military-economic character, maps, ordinances, etc. as soon as they are published, or new supplements to existing documents of this kind, pointing out the alterations that have been made and the difference between the new and the former editions.

4. The instructors must take all measures to be informed of all new military-technical inventions and improvements in the sphere of military technical equipment, arms, etc., and they must inform their superiors of them, giving detailed descriptions, photographs, sketches, and if possible, samples.

5. The "Residency on the spot" establishes contact with the senior instructor of the local troops or region and keeps in close connection with him and exchanges information with him.

6. The intelligence work of an instructor is done in the following manner:

a. He must keep a detailed diary of everything he is doing, of the people he meets, of his conversations and impressions.

b. He must compose periodically short summaries and reports (not less than once a month) about his own troops and those of the enemy, as well as about the general situation about different military groups, their mutual relations, and their relations with foreigners. He must also give his opinion on all these subjects as far as they can have an influence on the strengthening or weakening of the military power.

c. He must write reports (or gather unarranged materials) as fast as he receives and accumulates information (not less than once in three months) of a military-statistical and geographical character, with a detailed description of the region (province) occupied by the army and of the neighboring provinces, paying special attention to communications (railway construction, description of roads, and surveys of them).

d. He must make short periodical reports (not less than once a month) about the revolutionary movement of peasants (bandits, "red spears," etc.) in these regions, about bourgeois organizations (secret armed forces), etc.

e. He must make separate reports about the organization of espionage (the leading organs, the staff, the net, the work) and counterespionage in his own and the enemy's armies.

f. He must note, in the form of a report, all his official conversations with various people—Chinese and foreigners.

7. All these reports and statements are sent by the instructors through their superiors to the Chief of the Group (the senior officer of the local troops or region), who transmits them to the local "Residency" for compilation, or, when there is no time to do it, sends them to Peking to the military attaché (the Central Residency of the Intelligence Department in China).

8. The expenses for the purchases of regulations, maps, samples, etc. are made at the expense of the Intelligence Department. The instructor must, however, first obtain the consent of the "Resident." He may send to him samples without having been authorized beforehand only when they can be obtained without expense.

September 6th, 1926
(The signature is cut out.)
No. 518
Peking
p.p. (?) V.A.Mat.

Document 68

The Chinese Communist Party's Proposals on Military and Political Strategy

The Peking Commission captioned Document 68 as "Letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strategy for Attacking Sun Ch'uan-fang and Plans To Incite Contention in the Relations Between Fengtien and Shantung." The document was signed "Central Committee" with the date October 13, 1926. It was printed in *SLYM*, V, "Military-Political Plotting," 57-58, and is reprinted with punctuation in KMWH, XV, 2605-06.

We believe the attribution to the Communist Party's Central Committee is correct because the Kuomintang Central Committee was named Central Executive Committee. Nor would the Kuomintang's Central Committee write of the Party's office in Peking in the form we find here. Thus, in Document 68 the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in Shanghai presented its views on the Revolution's military and political strategy just after the capture of Wuchang. But to whom was the letter addressed?

We suggest it was sent to the Communist Party Headquarters in Peking for the attention of Li Ta-chao, who was being commissioned to contact Li Shih-tseng, I P'ei-chi, and Yang Tu (all have biographies in *BDRC*) to persuade them to create a split between Chang Tsung-ch'ang and the Fengtien Clique. With respect to another aspect of the military strategy proposed—that is, for Feng Yü-hsiang's army to fight its way eastward, seize T'ung-kuan, and then link up with the Northern Expeditionary Force in Honan—Feng Yü-hsiang states in his autobiography that Li Ta-chao and Li Shih-tseng sent him secret telegrams and operational plans for his taking T'ung-kuan (Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo-ti sheng-huo*, III, 127, 135).

Document 68 may have been part of the files taken by Li Ta-chao into the compound of the Soviet military attaché when he fled there in December 1926. The Peking Commission stated that Document 68 was somewhat burned, presumably by the recipient.

TEXT

The armies of Sun Ch'uan-fang and Chiang Kai-shek have begun their battle along the Yangtze. The armies joining the battle are only those allied forces that Chiang Kai-shek first brought from Kwangtung; T'ang Sheng-chih's forces have not joined in. Aside from Sun Ch'uan-fang's adherents, Ch'en T'iao-yuan and Wang P'u, who have both given battle, he has sent the basic units of his main force armies of Lu Hsiang-t'ing and Hsieh Hung-tung to join the battle. It is difficult to predict now the outcome of a battle between the main forces of Sun and Chiang. But projecting from all present circumstances, Sun is sure to be defeated. With Wuchang already fallen, Sun has lost a relief force, and also the navy is wavering. There is unsteadying news in Anhui, Chen-chiang, and Shanghai, that after the capture of Wuchang the Fourth Corps, the victor at Wuchang, may join to do battle on the front line, and that in Anhui the old Party men, Po Lieh-wu [Po Wen-wei] and others, are agitating their

old force under Yeh K'ai-hsin to attack Sun, so there is no way by which Sun can be rescued. Now when the Northern Expeditionary Army has taken advantage of the defeat of Sun's army to occupy Kiangsi and Fukien, the first stage of the war plans may be considered completed. Hereafter we should pay attention to the internal situation.

With respect to the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, yesterday we received Comrade Borodin's telegram. We have already discussed this.

As to the question of which direction the Kuominchün should attack and how it should do battle with Fengtien and Shantung, we propose the following strategy: (1) the Kuominchün should plan as its primary scheme to take T'ung-kuan and drive to the Peking-Hankow Railway to connect up with the Northern Expeditionary Army. Thereby the Kuominchün can receive military equipment and first be solidified. (The next three lines are burned.)

To avoid conflict with Fengtien and to break up the alliance of Fengtien and Shantung, the only method is, on the one hand, to compromise quickly with Chang Tsung-ch'ang and ally with Shantung to eliminate Sun Ch'uan-fang's army; and, on the other hand, to use the same method to obstruct action by the Fengtien Army. (3) The terms of a compromise with Chang Tsung-ch'ang: aside from conceding the entire province of Kiangsu, give him part of Anhui and Honan. The only part of Honan we must hold onto is the juncture on the Peking-Hankow line where the Kuominchün and the Northern Expeditionary Army will meet—all the rest can be conceded. If necessary, all of Anhui also can be conceded to Chang Tsung-ch'ang. (4) Instruct Li Shih-tseng and I P'ei-chi of the Peking Kuomintang Political Department to open negotiations quickly with Chang Tsung-ch'ang but at the same time to incite ill feelings between the Fengtien Clique and Chang Tsung-ch'ang. We are willing to concede Kiangsu and Anhui for Chang Tsung-ch'ang to occupy but are unwilling to concede them to Fengtien because Chang Tsung-ch'ang was the subordinate of Po Lieh-wu [Po Wen-wei] during the 1911 Revolution and won merit. Now we hope that Yang Tu and others who are close to Chang will persuade him to send forces quickly to attack Kiangsu and Anhui to prevent Fengtien from taking them first. If Fengtien wishes to capture the two provinces, then Kwangtung can assist Chang Tsung-ch'ang to resist Fengtien.

Central Committee
October 13, 1926

Document 69

Tairov's Report to Borodin on the Situation at Wuhan

The following is a report submitted to Borodin by V. K. Tairov, who used the name "Teruni" and was chief Soviet adviser with the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. It is based on a Japanese translation of a copy of the Russian document which was seized in the raid. The Japanese translation was published under the title, "A Report to Borodin from Teruni, a Red Russian Military Adviser, Following the Occupation of Wuhan by the Revolutionary Army," in *Pekin Ro-Taishikan oshu himitsu bunsho*, part XIII, pp. 1-24. Tairov's report from Wuchang, numbered 191 and enclosing a map, apparently was written on October 30, the day after the launching of the Kiangsi offensive (see p. 7). The copy seized in the Soviet military attaché's office was badly damaged by fire. All illegible passages have been omitted in our translation. The Japanese translators were unable to identify some of the Chinese names and rendered them by sound in Japanese katakana. We identify such names in brackets. In our previous edition this was Document 44.

TEXT

[1] 1. For various reasons, especially lack of time (the courier is staying in Hankow only one day), I am unable to report to you in detail about the political situation in the North and the discord existing between generals of the Northern Expeditionary
[2] Army. Have you received reports from the front? Up to this day, I have not received any word from you. Lack of communication and coordination makes my work 80 percent more complicated because I cannot comprehend what is going on elsewhere. I am therefore unable to report much to you. The following report discusses only my contacts with Chiang Kai-shek, T'ang Sheng-chih, and others, and the situation at Wuhan.

2. Considerable Chinese blood was shed over the Wuchang Problem [battle for Wuchang], so much, in fact, that it caused us Russian comrades a good deal of concern. Finally, the issue was settled on the 10th of October. It was actually possible to have seized Wuchang earlier had we been willing to ignore circumstances peculiar to China. The fundamental cause [of the delay] was the unwillingness of General T'ang Sheng-chih to see Wuchang occupied by the Kwangtung Army. The Kwangtung Army (the Forth Corps) was actually before the walls of the city, but T'ang regarded and still regards it as Chiang Kai-shek's army.
[3] Up to the 10th of October, T'ang was most anxious to drive off the said corps, specifically the Twelfth Division, and devised various measures to this end. However, the Tenth Division under Ch'en Ming-shu ordered it to remain.

On the 2d of October, the Twelfth Division had left for Chin-niu [Hupei], to the east of Kan-ning [Hsien-ning, Hupei], and had moved farther toward Kiangsi. We informed Chiang Kai-shek of this and Chiang wired Teng Yen-ta, asking him for the condition of his agreement to dispatch the Twelfth Division [to Kiangsi]. Subsequently, I obtained definite information that a demand was made for the immediate return of the Twelfth Division to Wuchang. T'ang was not agreeable to this, however, as he

wished to occupy Wuchang himself . . . [burned]. Under our pressure . . . [burned]. Ch'en K'o-chueh [Ch'en K'o-yü], deputy commander of the Fourth Corps, led the Twelfth Division to Wuchang without obtaining T'ang's consent.

Between 10 p.m. on October 9 and 4 a.m. [October 10], the Twelfth Division, together with the Tenth Division and two of T'ang's regiments, entered the city of Wuchang. The Fourth Corps took half of the large amount of booty: 7,000 rifles, 12 cannons, and a great number of machine guns.

[4] It is generally acknowledged that Wuchang was captured by the Kwangtung [Fourth] Corps of the National Revolutionary Army and therefore comes under the jurisdiction [of the National Government].

Although it is true that the military situation did demand the dispatch of the Fourth Corps to Kiangsi, the action was taken also for political reasons.

T'ang removed the Twelfth Division following occupation of Wuchang and replaced it with two regiments under Liu Tso-lung. T'ang also tried to appoint Liu as commander of the Wuchang garrison to replace Ch'en Ming-shu. Teng Yen-ta opposed this in accordance with my advice, and Ch'en Ming-shu is still garrison commander. T'ang's attempt to appoint Liu as garrison commander is most significant for us for, since then, Ch'en Ming-shu is no longer in full accord with and tends to be rather aloof to T'ang. Things have now come to such a point that when T'ang recently offered to appoint Ch'en as chief of staff in his own army [the Eighth Corps], Ch'en rejected the offer.

[5] On October 15, due to the deterioration of the situation at the [Kiangsi] front, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Fourth Corps to proceed to Kiangsi. However, if the entire corps were to be sent, it would have been equivalent to losing Wuchang, our only base in the Wuhan area. I therefore gave the following advice through Teng Yen-ta.

a. Only four and a half regiments, totaling 4,500 to 5,000 men, should be sent.

b. The Fourth Corp's headquarters should remain in Wuchang.

c. Ch'en Ming-shu should remain in Wuchang.

My advice was accepted. Today, after most of the men of the Fourth Corps have been sent, we are still holding a commanding position here in Wuchang, although T'ang Sheng-chih does not realize it.

It is my opinion that many people (such as Teng Yen-ta, Ch'en Ming-shu, Ch'en K'o-yü, and others), having observed his actions in connection with the occupation of Wuchang, have come to realize just what kind of person T'ang really is.

[6] 3. Around the middle of the month [October] . . . [burned] we were forced to prepare for a new general offensive [in Kiangsi].

In order to rest and reorganize, the units at the front were ordered to withdraw to a point 60 li from the range of enemy fire. They were replaced by units of the Fourth Corps and one division under Ho Yao-tsu.

It was planned to begin the general offensive on the 28th of October. According to strategy, it was necessary to advance troops to the northern bank of the Yangtze River and make a clean sweep of the enemy at Wusüeh [in Hupei] (on the northern bank of the Yangtze, 60 li west of Kiukiang [in Kiangsi]). This operation could be accomplished only by the troops of T'ang and Liu Tso-lung. However, neither T'ang nor Liu even considered performing this task or attempting to do so. Realizing that such action would help Chiang obtain victory in Kiangsi, they not only did not wish [7] a victory for Chiang but even wanted him destroyed. T'ang spoke to me on several occasions as follows: "Chiang Kai-shek is fatigued. It would be better for him to take a rest, since he will not be able to accomplish anything in Kiangsi. If I were to take command, I would attack not only Kiangsi but Nanking." Up to the 29th of October, T'ang did not want to fight Sun Ch'uan-fang, because it was not evident whether Sun or Chiang would be victorious. Should Chiang be defeated in Kiangsi, Sun Ch'uan-

fang would make an ideal partner for T'ang.

It is clear now that Sun Ch'uan-fang will ultimately be defeated in Kiangsi and Fukien, if not in all of the provinces under his control. Therefore, T'ang has come to agree, but only after Sun's eventual defeat became obvious, to advance his own troops along the northern bank and to attempt to defeat the enemy, who recently advanced a considerable distance in the direction of the Wuhan area.

[8] Yesterday, October 29, I left Hankow with him [T'ang] and sent Nikitin [Gorev] to the combat area. At present, it is still difficult to say how sincere T'ang is in finally deciding to advance his own units along the northern bank. He has told me in a very spirited manner that he will positively defeat Sun Ch'uan-fang. Nevertheless, he is an opportunist. Seeing that Sun is gasping for breath, he wants a share in winning the victory over him.

On the question of Anhui . . . [burned]

The same job has been given Chan Hen Fan [Ch'ang Heng-fang] in Anhui as was given Fan Puin Jein [Fang Pen-jen] in Kiangsi . . . [burned]

4. Until recently, Sun's representative has been staying at T'ang's place, attempting a conciliation between T'ang and Sun. T'ang Sheng-chih concludes a peace when his allies are in a bad position.

[9] Chiang Kai-shek stopped fighting (because of cowardice). In order to negotiate peace with Sun Ch'uan-fang, Chiang was willing to let him remain in Chekiang and Anhui. When he discovered this, T'ang reversed his attitude toward Sun. (Chiang's telegram in reply to Sun Ch'uan-fang has already been sent to you.) T'ang is planning now to defeat Sun severely and has ceased all negotiations with him. This is most significant for us, since T'ang's offensive against Sun will cut off the road of retreat into Anhui for Sun's army, now in Kiangsi.

I believe that T'ang's attitude of the past several months is as follows. After T'ang met Chiang Kai-shek at Changsha, he found that Chiang was a person of neither military nor political importance. On the other hand, when Chiang saw that his two divisions (the First and Second) were completely disorganized, he became confused, took wrong measures, and became a mere shadow of his former self. In other [10] words, Chiang was only living in his membory of the past and on his vanity as a former dictator in Canton.

T'ang decided to take the following measures and devised all means to defeat Chiang in order to assume the position of commander-in-chief himself. Had we not provided support for Chiang, T'ang's plan would probably have been successful. Actually, Chiang's actions had all been foreseen by us.

Following March 2 [20, 1926], Chiang had exclaimed, "What stupid steps I have taken!" T'ang could not help but observe all these happenings . . . [burned]. Some people believe that our support of Chiang should be withdrawn . . . [burned].

[11] I cannot agree with this opinion because T'ang fails to represent himself as a revolutionary general. On the contrary, he has revealed himself as a general who is not in full accord with the Revolution. However, this does not by any means imply that we should sever all relations with T'ang. Indeed, I have given T'ang moral support and have shown good will toward him. I say that only moral support has been extended because we have not supplied an adviser for T'ang despite his requests. The wishes he has expressed and the requests he has made are numerous, as follows.

a. Borodin, or Galen, if Borodin is not available, but not any person of lower rank than they, should be his adviser.

b. The Soviet Union should communicate directly with him concerning the supply of arms (without going through the National Government).

c. The Soviet Union should provide him with financial aid (T'ang made this request in Hankow in September), etc.

The above requests have been conveyed to you several times.

[12] T'ang realized that I was objectively opposing his expansion by withholding actual help because I was supporting Chiang Kai-shek. He finally stopped talking about an adviser and our relations became such that T'ang began to look around for a new friend.

T'ang began to open negotiations with the Japanese in Hankow (even the captain of a Japanese gunboat visited him, and T'ang returned the call). He also negotiated with Sun Ch'uan-fang. Sun sent derogatory letters to Chiang Kai-shek and to various other generals of the Canton Government, but not to T'ang. Instead he sent two delegates. Hence, we may assume why until recently T'ang had failed to agree to advance his troops along the northern bank of the Yangtze River to fight Sun. In short, T'ang is like a beautiful woman who shows off her beauty, that is, the force of arms, [13] and gives herself to whomever gives her the most. Within the last few days, T'ang has begun to realize that Sun's defeat is inevitable and, though very cautiously, has begun to resume dealing with us . . . [burned]

T'ang told me he wanted to meet Ch'en Tu-hsiu and said also that he wished to draw up a list of members of the Provincial Government with us. I cannot trust his sincerity. (This list of members has already been conveyed to you by telegraph.)

When I saw T'ang three days ago, I recommended a military adviser for him. I [14] told him, however, that for the time being, although the adviser is an outstanding military expert, he is not a political adviser. A senior political adviser has been requested of Moscow and he will arrive in the near future. T'ang agreed to this. After the Kiangsi battle is over, I am thinking of sending Ol'shevski ["Voinich"] to him. It would be suitable to send Sinani [G. B. Skalov] as a political adviser, but Sinani should be placed under Galen as Peking wishes. I have conferred with Galen about this and he has agreed. If you agree also, will you send him here immediately?

My relationship with the two generals is as follows: I have been working together with Chiang Kai-shek and simultaneously manipulating T'ang. I should like to inform you that Karakhan has expressed his approval of this relationship.[1]

6. I have already reported to you in detail about the Paoting Clique. In the past several months [weeks?] I have noticed symptoms of discord among the various leaders (T'ang Sheng-chih, Ch'en Ming-shu, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, [acting] chief of staff of the commander-in-chief's headquarters and a Kiangsinese [Kwangsinese], and Hu Tsung-to, commander of the Seventh Division [commander of a division in the Seventh Corps] and a Hupeinese).

[15] a. Subsequent to our propaganda and maneuvers with Ch'en Ming-shu, the Wuchang Incident took place. This event helped to create friction between Ch'en and T'ang to some degree and has drawn Ch'en much closer to us. Ch'en Ming-shu has requested advisers and I have decided to send them after Kiangsi is settled. At this point it is quite obvious that Ch'en is not entirely an ally of T'ang's.

b. Pai Ch'ung-hsi is discontented. He feels that T'ang is holding full authority without granting even partial authority to other leaders of the Paoting Clique . . . [burned]. Pai Ch'ung-hsi is asking for a conference of the Paoting Clique in order to discuss the problem of organization of the National Revolutionary Army, in particular the organization of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army.

[16] Prior to the fall of Wuchang, we had noticed that the above-mentioned leaders were in agreement and their actions were in the open. It is clear now, however, that unity among them is completely lacking. (The fact that China is so full of contradictions helps our work a great deal.)

7. With the capture of Hankow, the National Revolutionary Army got another scoundrel. (This is Liu Tso-lung, commander of the Fifteenth Corps). I think it would have been possible to capture Hankow without him and regret that his surrender occurred at such a propitious time. Now he is just someone who is in our way. One might say that Liu Tso-lung is the Li Fu-lin of Wuhan. However, Li is harmless

whereas Liu is aggressive and tries to play an important part. In addition, he advocates the principle of "Hupei for the Hupeinese." T'ang himself seems to sense this but still draws himself to Liu. He still retains Liu as the military governor of Hupei. [17] Liu is said to be a very wealthy man, possessing ten million dollars and a vast amount of real estate. Wealthy merchants support him; he in turn protects them. For instance, after Wuchang fell, he sent two regiments there and placed flags on the roofs of homes of wealthy merchants and the Chamber of Commerce building, with signs in big letters: "This building is under the protection of Liu Tso-lung. No man, whoever he may be, may enter." As garrison commander, Ch'en Ming-shu could not help interfering and demanded the withdrawal of Liu's units from Wuchang. Ch'en declared that he would resign from the position of garrison commander if his demand was not accepted. It was due to this firm attitude that T'ang finally gave in.

Liu Tso-lung is a general who should eventually be disarmed and even T'ang recognizes this. The time, however, is not yet right. The matter should be reconsidered at a later date.

[18] 8. A suggestion has been made to Yang Shen to issue a declaration of alliance with the National Revolutionary Army. He has been appointed commander of the Twentieth Corps.

9. Ban Han Han [P'eng Han-chang], Wan Tin Pei [Wang T'ien-p'ei], and Ho Run [Ho Lung] are at Ichang and Shasi [in western Hupei] fighting the enemy under the command of General Ru Ji Jan [Lu Chin-shan]. The battle is still not yet won.

10. Fan She Min [Fan Hsing-min] is at Hsinyang, southern Honan. His army numbers not over 5,500. The other day, Teng Yen-ta and T'ang Sheng-chih paid Fan a visit. Teng was favorably impressed by the situation. There is no reason to fear that a grave situation will develop in northern and western Hupei, particularly if Sun Ch'uan-fang is defeated in Kiangsi.

[19] 11. It may be said that the Northern Expeditionary Army will have achieved its purpose if Sun Ch'uan-fang is defeated in Kiangsi. If the battle of Kiangsi is lost, it would mean the defeat of the National Revolutionary Army and the National Government. T'ang would make peace with Sun. Even Chiang Kai-shek has begun to realize this.

In deciding to let T'ang's corps move to the northern bank of the Yangtze River, we were influenced by the plan to start military operations in southern Anhui. As I have already explained, the objective is to sever the line of communications between Sun's army and the northern bank of the Yangtze.

It is clear that a crisis will occur as the battle moves toward Anhui. By moving toward southern Anhui, we hope to capture the entire province of Anhui. We believe this to be possible if the situation is still favorable to us after Sun's army is defeated in Kiangsi.

[20] Since it is necessary to occupy Fukien, decisive action should be taken there after obtaining victory in Kiangsi. Thereafter, we should put an end to military operations, because casualties in the army are great and the troops are terribly exhausted. It would be dangerous to advance farther north from [or, farther along?] the Yangtze River.

If the situation is unfavorable . . . [burned] the Chekiang problem must be settled peacefully (although the recent situation suggests this would not be easy). Chekiang should voluntarily ally itself with the National Government. A buffer zone should be created between Shanghai and the sphere of influence of the National Government. Such a buffer zone is absolutely necessary. It may be set up in Anhui province. Your advice on this matter is requested.

12. Even after the arrival of the National Revolutionary Army in the Wuhan area, the residents seem to show no significant change in their political views. The [21] responsibility for this should be borne by us. The army came to Wuhan without a

central political organ. Although we had insisted while at Changsha that it was desirable to have such an organ, nothing has yet been established. The Kuomintang Provincial Committee lacks power and the ability to handle political affairs properly. T'ang Sheng-chih alone is in command of the situation, with only Chen Gu Po [Ch'en Kung-po] (a lazy fellow) and Teng Yen-ta to challenge him.

Teng Yen-ta is a genuinely good Leftist, but he is young and lacks authority. Furthermore, he is overawed by T'ang's power and often loses prudence. Aside from Ch'en Kung-po and Teng, there is virtually no one else. Although Teng at times loses prudence, he is the "leader" of the Left and possesses more influence than the others. (We, that is, Teng and I, cooperate closely and are very intimate. We live together; in fact, I live at his house.)

[22] In view of the importance of this problem, it is difficult for me to understand the Canton Government's attitude. It is necessary that two or three Central [Executive] Committee members should come and set up the committee here, since it is impossible to begin serious business or to establish the Party's power without it.

In my opinion, it is necessary to settle all important problems (finance, organization of a central military organ, organization of the provincial government, etc.) after the Kiangsi battle . . . [burned]. As for a conference or congress, I should be able to do something about it. I should also be able to subdue the various generals since I do have considerable power to exercise. After the National Revolutionary Army wins complete victory, it would be most significant politically and for propaganda purposes to hold a Kuomintang conference or congress.

[23] This may be only a mistaken idea of mine (I don't think so, however) or an observation based exclusively on the situation at the front. It is very easy to make mistakes, especially in my situation. I have always tried to follow the dictates of reason in making decisions. However, since I have not received a single letter of instruction, I could have made mistakes. I discussed this matter with Karakhan in Shanghai.

13. For the past few days, T'ang Sheng-chih has been talking frequently about the organization of the Hupei provincial government. He ended up by holding a conference on this problem with members of the Chinese Communist Party. This has been reported to you in detail by telegraph. I shall await the arrival of the Central [Executive] Committee members (Hsü Ch'ien and others). Through certain Chinese persons, I will try to delay a solution to this problem as long as possible. I should like to have your instructions on this.

14. The courier is getting impatient. Since I have already written a great deal, I [24] shall close here. This letter is not in good order, I realize, but circumstances prevent my rewriting it. Please forgive me. Please let Abnold [M. G. Efremov] and Kalachov [S. N. Naumov] read this letter and give my regards to everybody and Fanny [Mrs. Borodin].

p.s. I am waiting for your instructions.

p.p.s. Please remember that I am in Wuchang and Galen in Kiangsi and that it is only through me that Galen can send confidential letters. I left Galen and arrived in Wuchang on October 25.

I am enclosing the most recent letter from Galen, written on October 17, before the current offensive.

Note

1. Karakhan left his post as Soviet Russia's ambassador in Peking in early September 1926, traveling to Shanghai where he stayed until September 19 before departing for Canton, according to the *China Weekly Review*, which says he departed for Vladivostok on September 26. On page 23 of this document, Tairov says he discussed matters with Karakhan in Shanghai. *CWR*, September 25, 1926, p. 105, and October 2, p. 138.

Document 70

Kumanin's Report on the Central Military Political Academy at Whampoa

This is the third document we have extracted from the American military attaché's submission numbered A-44, "The Whampoa Military School/A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents," the others being our Documents 4 and 24. We have used pages 3-4 and 29-33, which are attributed to "Zigon, the Deputy Senior Adviser of the Central Military Political School at Whampoa, dated October 30, 1926," according to A-44. "Zigon" was the pseudonym used by F. M. Kumanin (Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militärberater*, p. 276). According to Mme. Vishniakova-Akimova, he arrived in Canton in the autumn of 1926 and went north on November 15 with the first group of Nationalist officials (*Two Years*, Levine translation, pp. 313 and 255). Considering the date of the report we deduce that it records Kumanin's first impression on an inspection shortly after the graduation of the Fourth Class in October 1926.

Because our source for Document 70 is a compilation rather than an original document in translation, we cannot be sure that it includes all of Kumanin's observations, nor is presented in his original sequence. However, our source gives everything we have reproduced in quotation marks save the section on *The Fourth Graduation*, but we believe this also was part of Kumanin's report. The compiler of A-44 also quoted from the "Kolatchoff"—that is, Naumov—report, our Document 72, on the political convictions of the Fourth Class, stating that almost 500 of the 3,500 graduates were Communists. Underlining is given as in A-44.

As a footnote on Kumanin, in early 1927 he was adviser to General Li Tsung-jen, who remembered him as *Hsi-kan*—i.e., "Zigon" (T. K. Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *Memoirs*, p. 159), but by April Kumanin had become adviser to General Ho Lung. In that capacity he participated in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, was captured in Swatow at the end of the trek south, and was imprisoned for eight months before being sent back to Russia (Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years*, pp. 313, 337).

TEXT

[3] Description of the School

The premises, most of which are located on the island Whampoa, were occupied by the remaining cadets and the servants and upon inspection were found in perfect order. On the other hand, the premises which were vacant since the departure of the cadets to Saho (where field exercises were being conducted prior to two-day maneuvers) were in the greatest disorder. The furniture was scattered about in the rooms and the floor was covered with rubbish. The classrooms that were inspected were found to be very much neglected. The furniture was scattered and they were filled will rubbish. No school equipment was to be seen except boxes with sand, which looked rather like dust bins than "sand boxes." When questioned the officers [4] who accompanied us replied that these boxes were used for teaching tactics (terrain boards). As to school equipment and books, matters stood very badly, and the

officers themselves said that there was almost no equipment at all in the school. In the storerooms for sapper implements the latter were lying on shelves in disorder and standing dirty in a corner.

The school was mostly *armed* with Russian 3-line rifles manufactured at the American factory "Remington." The rifles were new, but not kept sufficiently clean. Rust could be observed on the metal parts. The cartridges were never cleaned. Some of the stocks of the rifles were broken. The machine gunners were armed with Russian "Maxim" machine guns, which were not kept sufficiently clean and in good order. The cadets in general did not know how to handle Russian arms. Not only the cadets, but even officers were not acquainted with the sight. At target practice an officer asked whether the Russian sight was calculated in steps or meters. The commander of the 1st Regiment complained that in his regiment the chambers of some rifles had burst during the shooting, and I replied that such cases might happen when the bullet or the barrel in general were not kept clean. As far as I know, such accidents had happened also in the Russian Army with the Remington rifles manufactured in 1918. To find out the reason for it, a commission had been appointed, which found that there had been overtempering during the manufacturing.

* * *

[29] *Discipline* is outwardly kept up among the cadets, though the greater part of officers of the school, with the exception of Gen. Fan, do not strive to keep it up. *Outwardly* the cadets are behaving very politely toward their officers, but *inner discipline* is evidently lacking. It happens that cadets expostulate with their officers. A [30] characteristic case of this kind may be cited which happened during the maneuvers. When an officer blamed a bugler for blowing the wrong signals, the bugler replied that he was playing correctly, but that the officer himself did not know the signals. The officer became very angry and beat the bugler, attracting thereby many onlookers from the soldiers and officers. Saluting which is in the Chinese army a sign of discipline is also not practiced by all cadets, especially with respect to junior officers, and those who are guilty in this respect are repeatedly reprimanded by Gen. Fan.

Maneuvers which were held in connection with the 4th graduation of cadets in October 1926 were of the nature of *bilateral exercises of two armies*, i.e., the northern and southern, *operating against each other*. They were divided into a series of episodic battles as follows: a clash between the northern and southern armies; a withdrawal from the battle and a retreat of the northern army and a pursuit by a southern army; and an advance of both armies against the would-be enemy on the defensive. One of these battles was *a night battle*.

The plan of consecutive operations had been worked out fairly satisfactorily though all instructions and orders were of a peculiarly specific nature which is proper to the Chinese army, and made it difficult to understand the purpose of the respective operation. None of the details were worked out which might have had an influence on the issue of the battle or on the coordination of the movements of the troops, but anyhow *no particular misunderstanding occurred*.

In spite of the fact that generally *scouting* is making very slow progress in the Chinese army, during these maneuvers it played in one case a very important role and might even have played a *decisive part as regards the issue of the battle*, had the vanguard of the southern army been properly organized and sufficiently strong. I failed not to point out to the officers who were present, and particularly to Gen. Fan, *the advantage the southern army had gained over the northern owing to the scouting*, and Gen. Fan asked me to *see that cadets were trained accordingly*.

As regards *the present order of battle of a Chinese company*, it is the same as of our former company deployed in skirmishes with intervals of an arm's length between

the soldiers. Only our company had supporting platoons and company's reserve which contributed to the stability of its position. In China, however, this is not observed. [31] As soon as the battle begins, all units are drawn up in a line and inundate the battlefield with manpower. This could be justified, if this manpower increased the fire and inflicted losses on the enemy, but as matters stand at present, and taking into consideration their present preparedness, *the marksmen can produce only the effect of crackers, but by no means of an effective fire.*

As regards *the night battle*, it can only be said that the southern army advanced in a pitch-dark night like at a parade, *without scouts ahead and knowing absolutely nothing of what was going on in front of it.*

Of the *commanders* it can be said that *they act without thinking*, and act *only in order to do something and not to remain inactive.* They are very fond of turning the flank of the enemy without paying any attention to the existing circumstances. *This maneuver predominated in all their actions.* They do not know the general plan and aim of the battle, and even when they know them, they do not act in conformity with the general situation. The *marksmen* almost never conform to the terrain and to the surrounding circumstances. The order of battle too does not conform to the fire. One often sees a company marching quietly in closed ranks under the fire of heavy machine guns. There is nothing to be said of *the communication* (liaison), as there was practically none, except by means of *signals*, viz., bugles. Only the umpires had telephones. The *attack* is effected very slowly: the parties lying in front of each other at a distance of about 1,000 meters, continue shooting to the last cartridge. The *critique* of the maneuvers took place at a general parade, after the maneuvers were finished. It was of course impossible to criticize the actions of officers in the presence of soldiers, and the critique was carried out accordingly. Attention was drawn to *general defects*, mostly *secondary* ones and chiefly relating to *soldiers* and not to officers. *Thus the activity of officers remained without criticism.*

Suggestions

In the conclusive part of his report Zigon makes the following suggestions: "Since the [32] Chief of the School lends an ear to all our advisers, it may be expected that the work will go smoothly. In my opinion, however, it is necessary to carry out as soon as possible the following measures in order to remove *very great defects* of the school.

1. *An inventory of all articles* in the school is to be made and all the articles are to be distributed among the respective storehouses which must be properly arranged, because at present most of them are unfit, and rifles are kept partly in boxes and partly in stacks.

2. *Arms must be properly kept and handled* by the men in order to avoid wearing them out too soon.

3. *The classes must be supplied as far as possible with textbooks and other requisites* by the time the school begins, i.e., November 1, 1926.

4. The program of the school must be revised and special attention must be paid to instruction in *shooting* and in training for *field services.*

5. A *shooting gallery* and small *target range* must be constructed. In addition, firing with small calibers must be organized.

6. *A military scientific society* must be formed at the school."

* * *

The 4th Graduation

The 4th graduation at Whampoa School which took place in October 1926 gave the following results.

Twenty-five hundred new troop officers, graduates of the school, joined the National Revolutionary Army. Almost one-third of them were Hunanese, and the rest were natives of Kwangtung, Szechwan, the Yangtze valley, etc.

The above-mentioned graduates could be divided into the following categories:

1. According to *social position*: 1,733 peasants, 350 merchants, 347 students, and 63 workmen.

2. According to *education*: middle school graduates, 80 percent; high school graduates, 10 percent; military school graduates, 8 percent; primary school graduates, 2 percent.

[33] 3. According to *age*: from sixteen to twenty, 30 percent; from twenty to twenty-five, 60 percent; from twenty-five to thirty, 10 percent.

4. According to *family condition*: single, 55 percent; married, 45 percent.

5. According to *classes* or *sections*: Officers' class, 800; noncommissioned officers' class, 850; political class, 450; artillery, engineer (technical), and commissariat (supply) classes, about 150 in each.

Generally speaking, the military and political training of the graduates of the 4th term (duration of training: seven or eight months) was quite satisfactory, particularly in comparison with the training received by the graduates of the previous terms, i.e., prior to the time when the "Kuomintang Military School at Whampoa" was reorganized as the "Central Military-Political School of the National Revolutionary Army."

As to the further distribution of the graduates of the 4th term, Zigon states in the above-quoted report: "150 are to be sent to the First Army Corps, 100 to the training division of Whampoa School, 150 to various provinces, and the rest to be at the disposal of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek."

Document 71

Kostuchenko's Report on the Bureau of Aviation; and General Plan for Organization of an Air Service in the National Revolutionary Army

This report on the Nationalists' Bureau of Aviation was written by one of the Russian aviators who flew in the early phase of the Northern Expedition but was ordered back to Canton with one of the planes at the demand of Chiang Kai-shek (V. Sergeev, "Report of the Senior Aviation Adviser," p. 127). Document 71 is subscribed "November 12, 1926/Canton/The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation/Kostuchenko"; and it covers the period September 15 to October 15, 1926. It may be compared with the Report on Aviation by L. Grey, written nine months earlier, our Document 35.

Attached to Kostuchenko's report was an annex, "General Plan of the Organization of the Air Service in the National Revolutionary Army," which is subscribed "Commission: Hellen. The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation/(Kostuchenko)/22 IX 1926." We have not identified "Hellen." The name Kostuchenko apparently was added by the translator of the document from Russian, for below he added "Attached to the Report 'Description of Conditions in the Bureau of Aviation for the period September 15 to November [*sic*] 15, 1926' written by the Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation Kostuchenko. Canton, November 12th, 1926."

According to Sergeev's "Report" cited above, which was written in March 1927, after the success of air operations at Wuchang and Kiangsi, Comrade Galen gave a task to work out plans and personnel on building aviation for 1927-28. "All recommendations on this question were accepted by the Military Council, the Commander in Chief, and by the Government." Sergeev states that the entire plan for aviation in 1927-28 is estimated to cost 2,600,000 dollars (he did not specify currency), but that "Neither Comrade Galen nor myself are confident of complete realization of the plan since the National Government has very limited resources" (pp. 129-30). The "General Plan" proposed in November 1926 and forwarded as an annex to Document 71, estimated costs for purchasing planes and other equipment during two years as $1,784,000. The General Plan doubtless went through revisions, but we know from Sergeev's Report of March 1927 that a purchasing commission was being sent to Moscow and that nineteen Chinese student fliers, observers, and mechanics were going to study in Russia (*idem.*).

The American military attaché's office in Peking sent Document 71 as Number A-21, and it was entered in the War Department as 2657-I-281/110 on June 21, 1927. Underlining is given as in A-21.

TEXT

[1] The following report gives a description of the conditions of the Bureau of Aviation for the period September 15-October 15 of the current year (1926).

Since the Field Department of the Air Service has gone to the front, the Bureau of Aviation is organized as follows: Military Department; Secretariat; subsection for translations; military supplies (technical supplies); section for economic affairs; school

of aviation; repair shops for aviation; section of aviation; Civil Department (at present the Society of Friends of Aviation).

The Bureau of Aviation, the school of aviation, and workshops, as regards their structure, are far from representing a congruous system or a regular organization that fulfills some definite function. Everything is somehow patched up and the work of the sections or officials is not clearly defined. The Bureau of Aviation is divided into subsections and sections, some of which are not needed and others ought to be attached to the 1st section, while the school of aviation is only a bunch of men of all ranks. The same may be said of the workshops. For instance, even the workmen are not divided according to their special abilities into general sections, not to speak of special sections.

Since the departure to the front of the Field Section under the Chief of the Air Force Lan Huei-hsing, the Bureau of Aviation has the following structure and personnel:

The Bureau

a. Military Department

[2] The Chief of the Department Chang Ch'ang-yen (Colonel), who is also acting chief of the air force;

[We omit details on the sections for Translation, Military Supplies, and Economic Affairs with names of officers and numbers of other personnel, twenty-seven in all.]

The period from March 20 to July 20 must be considered as the most difficult time of this year because the inner frictions and groupings that were then taking place had a very bad effect on the whole mass and on the work in the Aviation.

During the period of the directorship of Lan Huei-hsing, i.e., since July 20, this discord has partly abated and had the character of latent inner dissensions and struggle. These dissensions must be taken into consideration. Some interference in the administrative affairs on the part of the former Chief of Aviation, now Commissar for Aviation, General Chang Hsiung-yi, shows that the struggle has not yet stopped.

[3] There were no strong sallies on the part of the Chief of the School Wang P'ing-kung, because at that time the Russian airplanes had arrived and the whole Russian personnel was put to work, and Wang P'ing-kung, by his acts and tactlessness, had fallen into disgrace with Commander in Chief Chiang Kai-shek and was compelled to keep in the background.

Thus at present the inner dissensions seem not to be of an acute character. The reason for this is that the principal and more active mass of the aviation workers have gone to the front.

The latent dissensions among the Chinese workers still exist, but since the Chief of Aviation has returned from the front they have manifested themselves as follows:

The school had two Curtis planes and one Avro in good order. Eight aviation students were left in the school; the other students and the students for aerial observation were sent to the front. Eight aviators are also on duty at the front working with de Havilands, which are piloted by Russian aviators. The Chinese aviators do not fly because of the lack of airplanes and because they are not well enough instructed to be able to handle modern battle planes. Besides the whole staff of Chinese aviators is scattered over the whole front, at about five places. Under the pretext of having the Chinese aviators trained at the front, the Chief of Aviation took from the school one Avro plane and one Curtis and sent them to the front in pieces. The school remains now with one Curtis plane, and the scheduled flights of students which they are to do alone have been postponed for a long time. If he were not fighting against the chief of the school, he would certainly not have disturbed so heedlessly and roughly the work of the school, so much the more as all students have had flights of

up to fifteen hours with the instructor and are prepared to fly alone. He says that his notions have been approved by the Commander in Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, whose support he has secured, and he referred to it when I explained to him the harmfulness from the standpoint of the school work. In disturbing the work of the school he [4] delays its development and does not obtain the necessary results at the front, because the training at the front will hardly be possible, as the aviators are scattered over the front, and the intended sending of the best of them to the U.S.S.R. would leave the planes lying idle. He pursues his ambitious aims and injures the work and does it knowingly, because he agreed with me as to the uselessness of sending the two planes to the front, but he pretends that he has been ordered by the commander in chief to do it. Such manifestations of the struggle are exceedingly harmful; because for the sake of personal interests those of the government are being sacrificed, but this may happen also in the future. It is necessary to take in time the necessary measures to forestall this evil. At present the relations are only latent and preparations are being made, but doubtless Lan Huei-hsing, Chang Hsiung-yi, and Wang P'ing-kung are three thoroughly hostile camps in Aviation. With the support of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang P'ing-kung can easily overthrow Lan, because the whole staff of aviators may side with him. Chang Hsiung-yi being at the front and getting thoroughly acquainted with the work of the air service will have a great advantage over the other two, owing to his active nature, his cleverness, and his political preparedness. Manifestations of this struggle are the more possible as the vacillating policy of Lan Huei-hsing has not made him popular with the commander in chief and the generals.

The work accomplished by the Bureau of Aviation during the said period is insignificant on account of the following reasons:

The Acting Chief of Aviation Chang Ch'ang-yen is a novice in aviation. He has no experience in administrative matters, is rather inactive, lacks initiative, and has no authority over his coworkers. But Lan Huei-hsing may be considered a devoted man. His political credo is not clearly defined; he is a member of the Kuomintang.

I deem it necessary to dwell more minutely on the institution of the *Commission for the Planning of the Organization*, whose functions I consider to be very important, because the rather complicated questions must be thoroughly discussed and require a great deal of initiative on the part of the chiefs of the different sections of [5] Aviation. I succeeded in forming such a commission, which consists of the acting chief of aviation, the chief of the school, the commissar, the chief of the workshops, and the chief of the Section of Supplies. The first question solved by the commission was the working out of a *general plan for the creation of an air force*. This work has somewhat stirred up the sleepy heads and some of the details of the plan were rather hotly discussed. The reasons that brought about the creation of the commission and the working out of the plan are as follows:

1. Ready-made plans are usually badly understood and adopted by the Chinese;
2. It is desirable to develop initiative in the Chinese, at least to a certain degree;
3. It is necessary to make the plan conform to the conditions in China;
4. By means of a plan it is possible to avoid confusion and unforeseen incidents, which often happen in China to the prejudice of the work.

The chief idea of the plan is to have an equilibrium established among all sections; for instance, to have the question of purchase of planes coordinated with that of the number of aviators and other specialists; to bring up the problems of repairs and of the airplane industry and to adjust it to the modern requirements, to the state of the (Chinese) aviation and to the financial possibilities; to connect the question of training with the requirements of military aviation according to the gradual development of the latter. A very difficult question is the one of the staff of aviators, and in this respect the question of instructing and training deserves special attention. In or-

der that the air service and its poorly trained and inexperienced staff might be able to cope with the problems that will arise when the next shipment of planes arrives, [6] the whole plan has been divided into periods. Another very difficult and important question is the financial part of the plan. The budget provides only the necessary amounts for the purchase of planes and materials; as for other expenses, such as the pay of the staff, subsistence, and other current expenses, they are defrayed from sums paid out monthly according to estimates and in conformity with the requirements and the size of the air service.

In view of the small size of the air service it is stated in the plan that ordnance material will be supplied through the Ordnance Department into the budget of which they are included.

The sum of *$2,000,000* provided in the plan is a minimum, in order to avoid dissensions among the Chinese as to the question of markets, because it can be *seriously feared that foreign firms will come forward.* The Chinese are also anxious about the time of delivery and about transportation.

There are some very complicated questions in connection with the organization of aviation, such as: the question of instruction, *the additional Russian specialists,* the orders to factories, the purchase of airplanes for different purposes, the purchase of books, stationery, and equipment; the purchase of various building materials; the amount and time of credit. *All these questions are connected with Moscow* and *it is easier to settle them in Moscow,* leaving the whole work and the responsibility to the Chinese. To this end it is intended to create a *Chinese purchasing commission which will go to Moscow and will carry out the whole work under the supervision of a Russian adviser.* The sending of the commission will afford the possibility of having the orders given to Russian airplane factories, thereby avoiding the competition of foreign firms.

The commission will also settle the question of instructions, because *the sending of different specialists to Russia is unavoidable. The sending of Chinese to Russian schools is necessary for us because we thereby educate sound cadres of future workers and of adherents to our cause.*

[7] I have already mentioned that there is an apprehension that foreign firms might penetrate. A few days ago I was informed that the agent of an American firm had offered airplanes for sale at very advantageous conditions. I sent a detailed report on this matter to the chief of the South China Group.

According to some unconfirmed reports, the firm of Junkers has made an offer to the government to create a mixed company for aerial communications. It may be supposed that this matter has been taken up by the German aviators who have been dismissed from the air service and that they are handling the matter very carefully. Such things can of course do a lot of harm to us and it is therefore much more judicious to let Moscow have at once the orders to the full amount of the budget through the commission.

The plan for the organization of the Aviation is hereto attached.

Activity of the Air Service at the Front

No detailed news of the work of the air service at the front has been received so far. There are at the front three de Havilands which are being piloted by two Russian aviators. The Chinese aviators do not fly. It appears from the report of the chief of aviation that the modest aircraft has played a considerable part in the victory of the National Revolutionary Army. The principal achievements were the destruction of the morale of the enemy and the material loss inflicted on the hostile forces and the moral encouragement afforded to their own troops. The military activity of the airplanes consists of scouting, bombing, photographing, and keeping up communication.

The drawbacks he has noted are: the local geographic and climatic conditions and the absence of natural landing places which prevent the activity of the aircraft from being fully developed. The construction of aviation fields and aerodromes requires large sums of money and much time. Owing to the lack of time for the construction of landing fields, the aircraft is during maneuvers often a fortnight and more behind the front. Aviation fields made of rice fields cannot be used at once after a rain; they [8] require about four days to dry up. The great humidity of the air and the great heat cause the airplanes to deteriorate rapidly. It is therefore advisable to have amphibian planes. The local conditions make that feasible.

As at present only Russian aviators are working at the front, while the Chinese are not trained sufficiently to fly modern planes, he thinks that the best Chinese aviators should be relieved from the front and sent to Russia for a short course of instruction and training.

In summing up the activity of the Department [Bureau] of Aviation, it must be said that it leaves much to be desired.

1. It is necessary to reorganize the apparatus of the department and to give it a better structure.

2. Measures should be taken to separate the contending parties in the air service in order to prevent the harmful consequences that may result from inner complications.

3. The training and instructing of the other part of the staff should be intensified.

The School of Aviation

The School of Aviation is in a very bad state. The constant friction between the chief of the school and the chief of aviation has had a bad influence on the work and on the rest of the staff, especially on the students of the school.

Owing to the struggle between the chiefs, various groups were formed among the students according to their provinces, their political views, and personal sympathies for the one or the other chief. Naturally these groups were hostile to each other and being supported or oppressed by this or that chief, wrangled among themselves. They became demoralized and there were cases of undesirable excesses. Since some of the [9] students were sent to the front and others to Russia, the rest are divided into two camps—the Koreans and the Chinese. There is no great discord between them, but the Chinese enjoy the protection of the chief of the school while the Koreans are left to look after themselves.

At present the staff of the school consists of:

The chief of the school—Wang P'ing-kung (Colonel).

[We omit the names of Chinese instructors and list of staff members, numbering twenty-five, plus eight students, one being a woman.]

The school possesses now one Curtis in fairly good condition, one Avro and one Curtis, which at present are being repaired. Each student flies about fifteen hours with the instructor and is trained to fly alone on Curtis planes; but the fact that the planes have been taken from the school has delayed for a long time the commissioning of the students. One of the pupils flew alone and was quite satisfactory.

The practice flights were made without any program and very unskillfully, because the instructors themselves were not up to their task. There is no plan of instruction in the school and for some subjects there are no teachers.

The German instructors too could not do much, because there were no books and no proper classrooms, and *now they have been dismissed altogether.*

[10] To improve the work in the school and to inspire more life into the workers, I intend to create an Instructors' Committee, with whom I shall discuss all questions

relating to the instruction and the arrangement of the school. I am supplying the classes with books and other equipment. The motor class and the class for the study of materials of which the planes are made are already equipped; the outfitting of the others will be finished in about ten days.

The outfitting of the classes is done by the students themselves who take a great interest in this work. For the further development of the school it is contemplated to invite teachers and instructors from Russia.

To have specialists, i.e., engineers, prepared, it is intended to *arrange special courses for mechanics which will last eight months*. This is a very important question.

The reasons that the school is badly arranged and does not properly function are as follows:

a. The inner frictions and demoralization owing to the struggle between different persons and groups.

b. The unfitness of the chief of the school, whose standard of education does not differ from that of the other officers and who knows absolutely nothing of military science;

c. The indifference, the ignorance, and the unwillingness to work of the rest of the staff, especially in recent times.

The chief of the school gives very little of his time to the school. He comes to the training ground at seven o'clock and leaves at nine, and after that he does not appear anymore. The students are left to look after themselves, of which they especially complain. The political work in the school is done by a commissar, who gives also very little time and attention to the students and to the school.

[11] The greatest attention should be paid to the school and to the instructing, because on that depends the development of aviation. The loss of time in the educational work is very detrimental to aviation.

The Workshops

The workshops are in better condition than the school, but it is also easier to reorganize the workshops and to put them in order. So far the whole work has been done in a primitive way. Now there is some improvement: an electro-motor has been installed which is used for two small lathes, one boring machine, one emery wheel, two saws, and one wood-planing machine.

The staff is as follows:

1. Chief—Yang Ch'ung-yu (Colonel).

[We omit the names of two officers and list of staff members, forty-three persons.]

The general plan provides for an expansion of the workshops so that they might be able to construct planes. For the supervision of the technical work Russian engineers and specialists will be invited.

[12] The fact that little work has been done by the workshops is explained by the incompetence of the chief of the workshops and of his staff. They are willing to work, but the great drowsiness, inertness, and lack of character of the chief of the workshops account for the fact that nothing is accomplished.

The political life in the workshops is being directed by a nucleus of the Kuomintang which was organized in the beginning of November. It is supervised by a commissar who has been appointed a few days ago.

The Aircraft Section

This section consists of mechanics and workmen, five men, who under the supervision of a Russian mechanic are working on the two de Havilands at Canton.

No. 1 R(?)l has been overhauled and tested and is being used for flying. The motor works satisfactorily, but there is much vibration and it is possible that the plane will shake itself to pieces.

No. 6 Rl is also ready, but the motor runs very poorly and vibrates also very much. After each flight the motor fittings become loose, the clamps burst, and the radiator leaks. At present, practice flights are being made with Chinese aviators in order to acquaint them with the planes. The absence of bombs, of cartridges, and of an observer makes it impossible to undertake operations against bandits.

The Aerodrome

The flying field at Taisuto is put out of working order whenever it rains and is also in bad condition when there is a drought. The rubble used for filling up the hollows of the landing field has now gotten mixed with sand and there are consequently places that make taking off and landing very dangerous.

A flying field was to be prepared at Swatow. I went myself there and found a [13] suitable place, but the land costs 90,000 dollars, and as it is contemplated to introduce amphibious planes, the question of the aviation field at Swatow has been temporarily suspended.

The Civil Department

(S.F.A.F. "The Society of Friends of Aviation")

After the Russian airplanes arrived and when the moving to the front was being prepared, the S.F.A.F. was left to look after itself and during that period, up to the 15th of September, nothing has been accomplished by it. The working capacity of this apparatus is in general a rather low one and the events at the front have attracted the attention of the public to a stronger and more vital subject. When at the front aviation proved to be one of the most powerful factors in the military operations, the public centered its attention again on aviation. This opportunity was seized to arrange a "week of assistance to the aerial fleet," and to collect contributions. I worked out a plan of this "*week of aviation*" in Kwangtung. Several meetings of the nuclei took place and, as a result, it was found possible to have the thing done on a larger scale. *A "Society for the Creation of Aviation in Order to Save the Country" was formed.* The activity of this society will extend over all provinces. The plan of this society (translated from the Chinese) is hereto annexed.

Finally I must say that in order to have the work of the Aviation done properly and to develop aviation *it is necessary to have more Russian workers and specialists in all sections of the Aviation.* No time must be lost to carry out the plan; the present conditions are favorable.

The attitude toward the Russians is quite friendly. All their advice is readily accepted, personal relations are good, and they are trusted. The work is going on somewhat more smoothly.

November 12, 1926
Canton
The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation
(signed) Kostuchenko

[attachment]

GENERAL PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION OF AN AIR SERVICE IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

[1] The question of the creation of a powerful aerial fleet for the National Revolutionary Army has become the most pressing problem of the day. Within a very short time Aviation has grown into a world-wide redoubtable force which has brought about a great change in warfare.

A striking example of this fact are the events that took place at the fortress Wuchang. Our very small forces played a decisive part in the capture of this fortress.

The nature of the country, the character of the terrain, the absence of roads, of means of transportation, and of communications did not permit us to reinforce the army and to supply it with technical means which are of a vital importance in modern warfare.

Under such circumstances the only way of reinforcing the victorious National Revolutionary Army is to develop *aviation*.

Swiftness of movement, skillful maneuvering, flexibility and tactical maneuvering coordinated with the requirements of the battle will make aviation exceedingly useful under the present conditions.

The greatest activity must be displayed in the creation of the air force, as far as the means and the time will permit it. Having experienced the tremendous effect of aviation, our foes will doubtless try to ward off the blow of the National Revolutionary Army and its aerial fleet by using also aircraft which they possess and with which the imperialists will abundantly supply them. For any delay, for any loss of time, for the slightest mistake in the creation of an aerial force, we may have to pay dearly. The inability of America to create an aerial fleet in 1917-18 may serve as a good example. In spite of her huge financial resources and her highly developed industry, America was unable to carry out her program on time.

[2] In discussing this question, and taking into consideration the present political situation, the financial possibilities and the great extent of the front, the commission came to the conclusion that the first and foremost task in the creation of an aerial fleet is to form fighting squadrons, like ours, consisting of six planes each. Not less than eight of such squadrons must be created in two years.

Our young industry will not be able to carry out in its factories the difficult task of constructing airplanes, and yet the latter are wanted as soon as possible. They can be gotten from the U.S.S.R. on more or less long credit.

This plan proposes to have eight fighting squadrons formed within two years, and to have an adequate number of aviators and other specialists trained (by enlarging the School of Aviation). As for the avio-industry, the commission thinks that by gradually enlarging our workshops we will be able to change them into a factory which will start the construction of our own airplanes.

The plan is divided into four periods as follows:

[Abstract of pages 2-9. During *first period* before 1927, purchase from Russia two squadrons of seven planes each, one to be manned by six Chinese training in Russia since September 1925, the other by Russians; improvement of workshops; reform aviation school with Russian instructors, more training planes to train Chinese pilots, engineers, and mechanics. All at a cost of $485,000, currency not specified. *Second period*, January to mid-July 1927, purchase two more squadrons to be manned by Chinese now in training; enlarge workshops; continue training in the School of Aviation; construct aerodromes in Kwangsi. Cost $438,000. *Third period*, purchase two more squadrons to be manned by Chinese studying in Russia since August 1926; workshops able to construct training and fighting planes; aviation school to graduate

twenty-five aviators and fifteen observers. Cost $469,000. *Fourth period*, all of 1928, purchase two more squadrons of high-quality planes; workshop now to be a factory to build war planes and repair all planes; aviation school able to satisfy wants of the National Revolutionary Army. Cost $392,000. Total cost for the two years, $1,784,000. End of abstract.]

[9] Thus, at the end of the fourth period, i.e., in 1928, we shall have (a) eight detachments—forty-eight battle planes with a complete staff of aviators and observers; (b) workshops able to construct battle planes; (c) a school able to prepare twenty-five aviators, sixteen observers, and thirty specialists yearly; (d) completely equipped aerial routes connecting distant political and industrial centers of our country. The further prospects are immense.

If it is possible from the financial standpoint and if the circumstances will require a reduction of the time, two periods might be contracted into one.

The present plan covers to a full extent not only the financial problems, but also the ways and means for the further development of the aerial fleet of the National Revolutionary Army of China.

The division of the necessary amounts of money into periods, the gradual preparation during each period, and the great activity in the development of the air forces entitle us to hope that in a short time the difficult task will be accomplished and that the steel birds will stand on the guard of freedom and of the national rights of the Chinese people.

The President: (no signature)
[10] Commission: Hellen.
The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation
(Kostuchenko)
22 IX 1926

Document 72

Naumov's Report on Military and Political Conditions in Kwangtung

This "very secret" letter is from S. N. Naumov, who used the pseudonym "Kalachev." The translator of our source identified him as "temporarily Assistant Chief of the Group for Political Matters" and says that the letter was written from Canton on November 15, 1926. The next day, Borodin and the first group of Nationalist officials left Canton for Nanchang. The letter is addressed to Comrade Longva, that is, to R. V. Longva, who became Soviet military attaché in Peking in September 1926 (Heinzig, *Sowjetische Militärberater*, p. 170). Naumov was the author of our Document 1, "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party." In January 1926 he was listed as political adviser to the Military-Political Academy (Document 23).

Our source for this translation is a submission by Colonel J. R. V. Steward, the British military attaché in Peking, dated December 8, 1927. He numbered it Z-69, and it is now PRO (FO 228/3608/249). Italics are as in Z-69.

The document provides a most interesting appraisal of the military and political situations in Kwangtung four months after the departure of the Northern Expeditionary forces. Naumov states that his analysis is based on Borodin's view, which he shares. He also reports a basic disagreement between the views of Shanghai and Canton Communist leaders over "one cardinal question"—how to evaluate the Kuomintang and its left elements. Unfortunately, the detailed report on the Chinese Communist Party in Kwangtung, which Naumov planned to send in his next letter, is not, to the best of our knowledge, available among the documents taken in the Peking Raid. Perhaps a copy is in an archive in Moscow. Our Document 1 is much more than a study of the CCP in Kwangtung.

TEXT

Very Secret

[1] [Translator's title:] *Letter of Kalatchoff, temporarily Assistant Chief of the Group for Political Matters, Canton, to Longva, Military Attaché, Peking, November 15, 1926*

Esteemed Comrade Longva:

Some materials of military character relating to Kwangtung and several neighboring provinces and to the Fukien front have been already sent to you.

In the present letter I set before myself the task of throwing some light for your benefit principally upon *the political situation in Kwangtung* and, secondly, upon *the political situation generally*.

The present situation in Kwangtung is such that Paotingfu men or, to say more correctly, Li Chi-ch'en [hereafter Li Chi-shen] (commander of the 4th Army Corps and chief of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army) cannot as yet be considered 100 percent masters of the province, but one can positively assert that *they*

have 90 percent of the power in their hands, and that for the following reasons.

Military forces of Kwangtung now, when the 1st Army Corps has entered the territory of Fukien province, are distributed as follows:

a. two divisions (the 11th and 13th divisions of the 4th Army Corps) occupy the whole southern (from Canton) part of the province, including the island of Hainan;

b. the 5th Army Corps with almost all its units (with the exception of one regiment) is stationed in Kwangtung and occupies the whole delta of the river; some of its units are stationed along the Canton-Shaokwan railway and beyond Shaokwan;

c. units of the 2d and 3d Army Corps which are stationed in the Canton region have no fighting value, because they are newly formed, not yet trained, and not tested, consequently they cannot be regarded as reliable units;

d. in the Whampoa School the 4th graduation of officers took place in October and the 5th enrollment is being done just now. But if the graduates of the 4th class bore until the last day a very clearly pronounced *left character*, the general surrounding conditions under which the 5th enrollment is being done, do not permit to assert now with confidence that the left element will prevail in the school. Whereas among 3,500 cadets of the 4th enrollment almost 500 were *communists*, now among the newly enrolled 2,500 cadets only 100 to 120 communists can be numbered. Besides, the best officers, graduates of the Whampoa School, have departed with the Northern Expedition, and in the opinion of the Chinese Communists and of the old workers of the school, the newly arrived commanders are a *very undesirable element*. The majority of them come from the most different parts of the country, e.g., from the army of Sun Ch'uan-fang, from Szechwan, and even from Yunnan. However strange it may seem, some come from the camp of Chang Tso-lin, i.e., from the defeated units of Kuo Sung-ling. They are very proud of the fact that they served in the ranks of Kuo Sung-ling, but to tell the truth, I do not see much difference between them and other soldiers of Chang Tso-lin's army;

e. the 20th Division which is stationed at Canton cannot be considered a reliable military unit. One regiment has been sent to the Fukien front, the second is stationed [2] in the Canton region (by battalions), and the third is in movement all the time because it fights bandits. These two regiments, especially the last one, have so strained their mutual relations with the local population that perhaps it would be better not to have them here at all;

f. there is also the so-called "Gendarmerie division" (also of Chiang Kai-shek), but its formation has been started only recently and therefore it cannot as yet be considered a real force.

Thus if one takes into consideration the correlation of real military forces which are stationed on the territory of Kwangtung, the superiority belongs of course to Li Chi-shen; and Li Fu-lin, commander of the 5th Army Corps, will always act in alliance with him. Although one cannot draw a full parallel line between Li Fu-lin and Li Chi-shen as regards their political convictions, their points of view, etc., they still will always find a language in common, especially when the problem relating to Kwangtung will have to be solved. These two army corps are Cantonese as to their composition and represent the so-called "Cantonism."

In addition, the 18th Division of the 6th Army Corps is stationed in the region of Waichow (Huichow), but this region is so infested with bandits that one cannot take this division into consideration, because it is hardly able to cope with its allotted task of fighting banditry in this region.

If all military forces which are stationed in Kwangtung are roughly divided into followers of Li Chi-shen and followers of Chiang Kai-shek, they will form the following groups:

A. Followers of Li Chi-shen:

1. The 11th and 13th divisions of the 4th Army Corps.

2. Two divisions of the 5th Army Corps.

B. Followers of Chiang Kai-shek:

1. The 20th Division.
2. The Gendarmerie Division.
3. The Whampoa School (not absolutely).

C. Other units which have been mentioned above will hardly interfere, and therefore I consider them as being *neutral units*.

The situation now is such that it hardly admits even an idea as to a possible military conflict in Kwangtung. Still I considered it my duty to expose in this letter all the above-mentioned facts, in order to give a full picture of the situation. I will now describe *the political situation in Kwangtung*.

A. Peasant Question

Our workers in Kwangtung (a special group of comrades who are working under the direction of Borodin) have made a thorough study of this question. It is a generally known fact that Peasant Unions represent a sufficiently imposing force and form therefore the most pressing problem in the province. They have grown to such an extent and have acquired so much power that in some regions they impose upon certain [3] people their will and conduct their own policy which of course is not pleasing to the gentry or middle-class peasantry. *Peasant unions in Kwangtung embrace now more than 60 percent of the whole number of districts* (of the whole province). It is considered generally that about one million peasants are organized into unions, but to me this figure seems to be exaggerated. However, I can venture to say with confidence that there are in Kwangtung 600 to 700 thousand *really organized peasants*. The gentry are not only dissatisfied with peasants unions, but in certain regions are carrying on an active struggle against them. It would not be half so bad if the gentry alone carried on this struggle, but some units of the National Revolutionary Army, as for instance the 20th Division of Chiang Kai-shek, not only do not support peasant unions, not only do not assume even a neutral attitude, but very often carry on themselves the struggle against peasant unions and sometimes behave themselves even worse than the bandits. There were cases of looting, violence, and murder on the part of some units of the 20th Division toward peasantry. This is one kind of policy of some units of the National Revolutionary Army in the villages.

Li Fu-lin, commander of the 5th Army Corps, who has big connections with the gentry and is their leader, carries on quite another kind of policy. In the region in which units of Li Fu-lin's army corps are stationed, one can see placards with such inscriptions: "The National Revolutionary Army defends the interests of the gentry" or "The Northern Expedition is in the interests of the gentry," etc.

Peasants of the province are favorably disposed toward the Northern Expedition and even stand for its considerable extension, just in order to get rid of the troops from alien provinces. It is a peculiar fact that units belonging to Kwangtung army corps treat peasantry much better than others, although from an objective point of view they must be regarded as the least revolutionary army units.

Banditry. The banditry in Kwangtung province remains almost all the time on the same level. The only result of the campaign in connection with the suppression of banditry which had been carried through by the order of the commander in chief of the army was that in some regions the banditry somewhat abated, viz., *grew more passive*, but remained the same as regards the number of bands. In other words, it proved to be impossible to suppress it physically. For instance, the region of Waichow or Huichow, one of the regions most infested by bandits, formerly numbered about 5,000 organized and active bandits. *Now the same bands remain*, because those bands that have been completely suppressed are *a very rare exception*. Only *their numerical*

strength has somewhat diminished, so that by today the number of active bandits in the region of Waichow (Huichow) may be put at 2,000 to 2,500. It follows from what has been said above that the least experienced and specialized portion of bandits *under the pressure both physical and moral* (the campaign relating to the question of banditry has been carried through among the population quite well) lost courage and went back to their native villages. Almost everybody (I mean those who are on the spot) lays stress upon the fact that now only those elements who almost exclusively consist of *professional bandits* and who to 90 percent are recruited from among the soldiers of former Kwangtung armies of Ch'en Chiung-ming and of other generals, remain in the bands. The attitude of the whole population toward bandits is hostile, but the gentry very frequently utilizes the bandit bands for the purpose of *fighting the peasant unions*. It is necessary to mention, however, that only those bandit bands that to 100 percent consist of ex-soldiers agree to take part in this struggle against the peasant unions. The following circumstance is also worth noting. Individual bandits, especially during the recent period of time, began *to join the peasant unions*. Those [4] peasants are especially meant here who for a long time rather preferred to become bandits than to join the peasant unions. This circumstance proves that some peasants, namely the poorest of them, who formerly *for economic reasons* became involved in the banditry, perceive now that this banditry brings them nothing good, and in their endeavors to improve their material condition they join now peasant unions.

At least 25,000 bandits are now numbered in the whole Kwangtung province.

A special *Peasant Commission* attached to the local Party Committee (I mean the Chinese Communist Party), is working now, and our comrades also take part in it. The work of this commission is very productive and it sets itself the following *problems*: (a) to study the peasant question in the province; (b) to direct the peasant movement in the province; (c) to fight banditry by means of agitation and propaganda among this . . . (the last line is burned).

B. Labor Question

It will be rather difficult for me to give in this letter a complete picture as to the condition of *the labor question* in the province. Nevertheless, I shall try to mark out separate characteristic traits and features.

It is a generally known fact that Kwangtung province has not a large *industrial proletariat*. Such industries here as silk, oil, tailoring, bootmaking, carpentry, etc., bear exclusively the character of "guilds" or "trade-corporations." A few only can be called more or less *developed industrial undertakings*, as for instance, *railways of Kwangtung province*, the *Canton Arsenal*, and the *Mechanics Union* [?], i.e., the electric power station, the water works, several large machine shops, etc., which undertakings are consolidated into a single *Mechanics Union*.

Recently we had to live through several very disagreeable moments in connection with these very undertakings. In the Canton Arsenal, for instance, which employs 1,700 workmen (metal workers), one conflict after another has taken place within the space of about eight months. During the month of October matters reached such a pass that the government declared a lockout and all work in the arsenal has been at a standstill since October 26. There are many reasons which can account for this state of affairs, but the basic problem, the problem of principle, lies in the question relating to *the militarization of the arsenal* or to say more correctly, *the militarization of the working force*, against which the workmen protest in a most categorical manner. The contract which has been concluded between the government and the workmen as early as 1923 should really be dissolved because it represents a mixture of "middle ages" and of the "contemporary." (It seems to me that comrade Rogatcheff must be well acquainted with the story of the conclusion of this contract, and therefore he

will be able to give you all necessary explanations. For the moment I am not in a position to dwell upon this subject, but will do so in detail in my next report to which a copy of this contract will also be appended.) For the time being the arsenal [5] does not work, the workmen are agitated, public opinion, insofar as several labor organizations of Kwangtung and, partly, the merchants are concerned, is on the side of the workmen, and the government is in a quite militant frame of mind. This militant spirit may be necessary at times, but at the present moment it is quite inopportune. An interesting phenomenon is worth noting in this connection. Whereas the natives of other provinces, such as T'an Yen-k'ai and others, are in a militant mood, the natives of Kwangtung who stand for peace and tranquility in their province want to "liquidate" this conflict in a peaceful way and would be willing to make great concessions to the workmen. *On account of several causes, however* (they are all well known to you), *the fact that the arsenal does not work does not affect the regular supplying of the front and of the army generally with all necessary articles.*

The situation with the *labor question* generally may be characterized as follows:

a. The working masses became *much more active.*

b. The working masses are *very exacting* in economic questions. Up to this day there are 1,800 cases of conflict in connection with the "labor problem" which are to be adjusted by the department in charge of matters pertaining to peasants and workmen or the so-called "Conflict Commission." I used the expression "in connection with the *labor problem*," because among these 1,800 cases there are not only conflicts between workmen and capitalists, but also *-between workmen themselves.* For instance, it is estimated that in Kwangtung (to say more correctly, in *Canton*), there are about 5,000 tailors. Three thousand of them work for employers and 2,000 have individual or private enterprises at home and use their own machines. Now those 3,000 tailors who work for employers put forth several demands of an economic character and went on strike. At the same time they want that those 2,000 tailors who work independently at home support their demands . . . (the last line burned) . . . to comply with this demand. Now the conflict which has arisen in this connection is said to be adjusted by the governmental organ, i.e., by the said department in charge of matters pertaining to workmen. These 1,800 cases of conflict may be approximately apportioned as follows: 30 percent of cases pertain to conflicts among workmen themselves and 70 percent to those between employers and workmen.

c. *The economic condition of workmen is unsatisfactory.* A very characteristic instance may be quoted in support of this assertion. Within the last ten to twelve years workmen's wages in Kwangtung, insofar as forty labor unions are concerned, decreased on an average by 10 percent, and if one takes into consideration that wages are not paid regularly, that the purchasing value of money drops from time to time, etc., it will become quite clear that *the condition of workmen is far from being satisfactory.* In some industries, particularly in the oil industry, in connection with the introduction of mechanical means of production by some enterprises, an *unemployment* ensued and, as a result, the workmen who are employed in the oil industry are divided into two camps: one stands for the mechanization of production and another for production by manual labor. A regular clash took place recently between these two camps in the streets of Canton. Both parties were armed with bamboo sticks which were sharpened at both ends. In short, a struggle takes place from time to time in the street of Canton, *a struggle between middle ages and modern times or between mechanical production and production by manual labor.*

[6] There is some *communist influence* in the labor movement, but it does not bear a character of "monopoly." The Mechanics Union, for instance, is in sharp opposition to the Communist Party, and it almost does not include a single Communist. For a long time the Communists have been of some definite "weight" in the arsenal and only two months ago they met with a failure there. Prior to this defeat the Com-

munists numbered about fifty partisans in the arsenal. The Arsenal Committee consisted of seven persons, of whom five were Communists, one belonged to the left wing and one was a nonparty man. At present the situation is such that there are six rights in the Committee and only one Communist (secretly). You know that the strike and boycott at Hong Kong are at an end now, and that those workmen who have been employed as pickets are at present out of jobs. There are several plans as to their employment in the future. It was intended inter alia to organize them into a *model* military unit, etc., but for the time being this question is in the stage of being examined pending its final decision, and therefore they are almost out of a job. There is some danger, however, that some of them, particularly the youth (altogether there are about 5,000 of them), will become *demoralized*. This is provided for and corresponding steps are being taken. Of these 5,000 only about 3,000 remain now in the barracks. They are quartered almost exclusively at Canton and in its environs. *Political* work is being carried on among them. There are about 500 Communists in their midst, and these Communists serve as the main "cementing" element for them.

C. Students

The students of Kwangtung, i.e., chiefly of Canton, *cannot be considered as the most revolutionary students of China*, as might and even should be expected. The majority of the students are the sons of the local "gentry" and of merchants. The greater part of them are *active in politics*, but this very activity is of a *negative* nature. The students are a "reservoir" from which all sorts of counter-revolutionary societies, such as the "Society for the Study of Sun Yatsenism," diverse "Young Men's Christian Associations," etc. are drawing their forces. There are many reasons for this, but I shall mention only the principal ones:

a. In Kwangtung *the real nature of the revolution* is more evident than anywhere else. It is quite manifest there that the revolution is not confined to such general slogans of the people as "Down with imperialism," "Down with militarism," etc., and that *the real foundation of the revolution in China* lies first in the *peasant question*, i.e., in the agrarian revolution and then in *the labor question* in towns. The students, as being the most "literate" class, read books and have realized what direct consequences the revolution would have for them personally, and roughly speaking, they "force" events. They are already defending their own interests, i.e., they are already against the "deepening" or the further development of the revolution.

b. Finally matters came to such a pass that the government was compelled to close Kwangtung University, to dismiss all students and all professors, and to appoint a *Special Commission* consisting of Tai Chi-t'ao as chairman, and of Hsiu Ch'eng [hereafter Hsü Ch'ien] and Ku Meng-yü, both belonging to the left wing, as members. This commission must select a new staff of professors, *eliminating the reactionaries*, and do the same with respect to the students. It has already proceeded to fulfill its appointed task. It is too early, however, to speak about the results, especially if one takes into consideration that the chairman Tai Chi-t'ao, as well as both members Hsü Ch'ien and Ku Meng-yü, are leaving one of these days Canton for Hankow. At any rate it is quite probable that it will succeed to a certain extent in "moving" both the students and the professors "to the left."

[7] c. *The communist influence* among the students is for the moment very insignificant, but work in this direction has already started and it is to be expected that good results will be obtained.

D. Merchants

Merchants were, are, and will continue to be *partisans of the Northern Expedition*,

insofar as this expedition takes place outside Kwangtung and in perspective rids Kwangtung of "superfluous consumers," i.e., soldiers. On this ground both merchants and the Kwangtung army units will always have a language in common. The liquidation of the Hong Kong strike and boycott promises good profits to certain classes of merchants who within a short time will be able to restore their old connections with Hong Kong. For the moment, however, matters are moving rather slowly in this direction. Merchants are not particularly enthusiastic over victories which the National Revolutionary Army is gaining in the North. To say more correctly, they are quite indifferent to them. The only important thing for them is that not only Kwangtung, but also Hupei serve as bases for the National Revolutionary Army, and the rest does not concern them in the least. The above-said refers to a considerable portion *of small and middle-class merchants who least of all are interested in politics*. But there is also another portion of merchants who are at the head of Chambers of Commerce and of other commercial organizations, and who reflect to a certain extent the commercial and financial capital (i.e., interests) of Kwangtung. They have some perspectives as regards future and for that reason *successes of the National Revolutionary Army* do not leave them indifferent. It is very characteristic that during the banquet which was held on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the October Revolution, the representative of one of the Chambers of Commerce of Kwangtung expressed himself in these very terms: "Victory or defeat of the National Revolutionary Army do not leave us indifferent, because *in the victories of the National Revolutionary Army we see the defeat of the foreign capital and the possibility of the development of national capital and the national industry*." Such are the aspirations of the Kwangtung merchant class. The most conscious part of the merchants has no objection to making certain concessions to peasantry, because such a move on their part will extend the goods market, i.e., will increase the demand for goods. It appears that there is no unanimity as regards this question . . . (the last line burned) of Kwangtung. It is difficult, however, to say something definite in this connection, because it is quite possible that both the "gentry" and the merchants will come to an agreement on all points as regards the problem of *warding off from themselves real dangers of the "encroaching revolution*."

* * *

In the beginning of this letter I promised to say something about *the general political situation* from the point of view of those events which we observe and through which we pass here in Kwangtung. Before I proceed to do this, however, I must mention that all that will be said by me in this connection is based entirely upon the point of view of Comrade Borodin and of the Canton Committee of the Party and that I personally share this point of view in its entireness.

[8] The whole problem lies in the fact that *among the members of the Chinese Communist Party there are now disagreements as to one cardinal question*, viz., as regards the evaluation of the *Kuomintang Party and its left elements*.

These disagreements are the result of two different points of view, i.e., of Shanghai and of Canton respectively. The Shanghai members of the Chinese Communist Party continue even now to divide the Kuomintang members into "left," "right," and "center" and give their opinion as follows: "Our mission is to support the left and, partly, the center and to carry on the struggle against the right," whereas from the point of view of the *Canton* members, the mission of the Communists is to support nobody of the Kuomintang Party only *on the strength of his belonging to the left wing*, but to support those Kuomintang men who by their actions and behavior *afford the possibility of doing work in cooperation*. The actual conditions that prevail in Canton bear the most striking testimony to the fact that within

the Kuomintang party there is no such current which might be called *left*. Today "he," i.e., the left, makes a declaration that puts him forward as a *radical*. Tomorrow, however, this same "radical" will sneer at the peasant movement, because "within some peasant union one or two members proved to be ex-bandits." At the same time those Kuomintang members who reputedly belong to the center or even to the right not only do not make a slight of peasant unions, but *meditate deeply on the solution of the agrarian problem*. As an instance, General Chiang Kai-shek may be quoted, because recently he has been busily engaged with the question relating to the solution of the peasant problem. As to the "left" who always and everywhere utter high-sounding sentences about the revolution, at the least movement on the part of the masses of workmen and peasants, they begin to "beat a retreat," saying: "We did not think so" or "We did not realize that." In short, *they thought that together with workmen and peasants they would make a noise about revolution*, but *that only they, the "left," would derive any benefit from it*. This is particularly manifest in Kwangtung, where the workmen and peasants not only "make a noise," but *take effective measures in order to improve their condition*. There is as yet no such phenomenon in other provices. There, both the Kuomintang and the Communists within the Kuomintang spend their "honeymoon," and Shanghai must be principally under the influence of those organizations that have not yet gone through . . . (the last line burned).

In view of the pressure of time and of the necessity to mail this letter this very day, I am not in a position to throw sufficient light upon this most important question, but hope to dwell upon it in more detail in future letters, provided our mutual communication continues to be regular.

* * *

Conclusions

a. Notwithstanding the fact that at present the general situation in Kwangtung is very complicated, it cannot be considered now as an *independent problem*. Provided matters run smoothly enough in the North, i.e., at the front, there will be no troubles in Kwangtung. In case, however, there occurs in the North the least hitch, some change "as quick as lightning" will also take place in Kwangtung.

b. No matter how the circumstances turn out, i.e., even if the principal base of [9] the National Revolutionary Army and also our base are removed into the center of China, *Kwangtung will still remain one of the bases of our work in China*. Therefore it will be necessary to pay in the future due attention to our work in Kwangtung.

c. So far little has been done as regards the studying and summing up of our work in Kwangtung to which, however, I attach a very great importance. Very much work has been done in Kwangtung within the last three years and *the experience which has been gained in this connection can serve at least as an auxiliary in our further work in other provinces of China*.

* * *

In my next letter I will speak in detail about the Chinese Communist Party in Kwangtung.

(Signed) Kalatchoff

Document 73

Resolutions on the Chinese Communist Youth Corps Adopted at the [Sixth] Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International

The following is based on a Chinese translation of a Russian document published in *SLYM*, III, "Party Affairs," 18-32. The date, March 30, 1927, is given in the Chinese translation, apparently indicating either the date on which the document was received from Moscow or the day on which it was copied and checked by Kiselev in Peking. The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International was convened on November 12 and closed on November 21, 1926. We have translated the first two resolutions concerning the Chinese Communist Youth Corps adopted at the plenum, omitting the following resolutions: No. 3, on the CY's economic and labor work; No. 4, on work among peasant youth; No. 5, on the question of work; No. 6, on the CY's political training work; No. 7, the CY's work and tasks in the student movement; No. 8, on the problem of organizing a Kuomintang youth organization and occupational organizations; No. 9, on the CY's tasks with reference to the YMCA and the anti-Christian movement; No. 10, on the organization of athletic organizations; and No. 11, on the CY's tasks in the children's movement.

This was Document 45 in our previous edition.

TEXT

[18] The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International endorses the resolutions on the Chinese question of the [Seventh Enlarged] Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Since the close of the last plenum, the Chinese Communist Youth Corps has established very close connections with the majority of young workers. It has made greater efforts to help them and has reaped better results than formerly. The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International takes note of this fact with great pleasure and satisfaction.

The CY's decision to transform itself into a real organization of the majority of young workers in order to improve its work and to cope better with current problems [19] is correct. The plenum believes, however, that certain aspects of the CY's work have yet to be corrected (for instance, slow progress in establishing CY cells and failure to exert every effort to enlist peasants into the CY).

In view of these shortcomings, the CY should proceed in accordance with the following.

The Nature and Actual Conditions of the Corps

a. For many reasons, Chinese labor youths cannot but participate in the struggle of the Chinese National Revolution (such as strikes, the anti-imperialist movement, enlistment in the National Revolutionary Army and peasant associations) in order to obtain liberation. By leading the masses and demonstrating methods of revolutionary

struggle, the CY can daily increase the proletariat's influence. This in turn strengthens the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Youth Corps and facilitates the expansion of the revolutionary movement of Chinese laborers throughout the country. The CY's work must proceed from this premise.

b. Due to various circumstances the Chinese Communist Youth Corps has been primarily an organization of intellectuals, hence the great effect on the work which the corps should carry out (such as economic struggle, contact with peasant youths). The CY should be truly an organization which unites urban and rural proletarian youths. All peasant and intellectual youths who are loyal to and enthusiastic about revolution should be enlisted into the corps. Special care, however, should be taken to insure that the workers' cadres of the CY can realize proletarian leadership.

The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International earnestly declares that it is necessary for the CY to exert every effort to carry on work among Chinese labor youths in order to strengthen its own organization. At places occupied by the National Revolutionary Army, such as the industrial cities of [20] Wuchang and Hankow, the Communist Youth Corps should pay particular attention to expanding the scope of its activities and carrying out all kinds of work in the interest of self-development. The plenum believes it necessary to expend a great amount of energy and money in proceeding according to the above until the goal is achieved.

Political Tasks of the Communist Youth Corps

a. The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International concurs in the ECCI Plenum's estimate of the strength of the Canton Government and the Kuomintang army. The CY should strive to execute tasks which are advocated by the CCP. The plenum considers the execution of various kinds of work in the National Revolutionary Army as an extremely important duty of the CY.

b. Since the Communist Youth Corps struggles together with the Communist Party to strengthen the position of the Kuomintang Left Wing with a view to developing the Left and pushing forward the Revolution, it should give special attention to and establish relations with middle bourgeois revolutionary youths of different circles. On the other hand, the Communist Youth Corps should promote propaganda emphasizing the strength of the proletariat in order to help enhance it. The Chinese national revolutionary movement must proceed without delay. The CY should actively participate in and direct all activities of the Youth Department of the KMT as a weapon for training middle bourgeois revolutionary youths of all circles.

The Kuomintang Youth Department is one of the shields of the Kuomintang Left Wing. The Communist Youth Corps should support and find means to organize revolutionary elements of the middle bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia in the Youth Department, so that the utmost effort can be used to uphold the interests of workers and peasants.

[21] c. Half of the CY organs in Canton are secret organizations. Even work that should very properly be done is not carried out openly in the name of the CY. This is indeed a deficiency in the past work of the Communist Youth Corps and it has resulted in many mistakes. The idea was that open work might arouse the fear of bourgeois youths who would thus hesitate to go forward, but the actual result has been the failure of the laboring class, the CCP, and the CY to develop and to assume leadership of society. Even the program of giving revolutionary training to the Chinese laboring class cannot be carried out. While recognizing the general soundness of the CY's policies, therefore, the plenum cannot consider as suitable the secret manner in which CY organs carry out their work in Canton. The plenum believes that all necessary work should be done openly and positively in the name of the CY. All

activities conducted in secret and under cover among the laboring class in cities and villages under the jurisdiction of the Canton Government must now take the form of open struggle. However, the CY's secret setup and communications, liaison with persons working in the army, and means of secret direction should still be kept intact and strengthened. It is absolutely necessary to plant several persons to work secretly in every organ. They are not to participate in any public or open activities so that they may continue to perform their tasks secretly should a change in the general situation occur.
[pages 21-32 omitted]

Document 74

Minutes of a Meeting of the Provisional Joint Council of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee and the National Government Council

This document is part of the minutes of the seventh meeting of the "Wuhan Joint Council" held on December 29, 1926. Originally in Chinese, the minutes were translated into Russian and checked by Kiselev. For publication it was translated back into Chinese and printed in *SLYM* III, "Canton," 8-10. It was Document 46 in our previous edition.

The minutes of the "Wuhan Joint Council" are held in the Kuomintang Archives in Taiwan, and a passage from the minutes of this meeting was published by Professor Chiang Yung-ching in *Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wuhan Cheng-ch'üan*, pp. 57-58, so it is possible to check the Taiwan version against the *SLYM* version, which is the result of double translation. It is possible, of course, that there were different minute-takers, so that the two versions would not be exactly the same. We have compared the passage quoted by Professor Chiang against the *SLYM* version and have made some changes in our previous English translation, including some additions in brackets. The essential meaning of the passage proves not to have been distorted, though naturally words and phrases differ. The Peking Commission deleted the first part of the minutes.

TEXT

[8] Report by T'ang Sheng-chih on military movements and conditions in western Hupei.—[Since reaching Ichang and Shasi in western Hupei there have come telegraphic reports. According to personal observation,] the troops stationed at Ichang and Shasi have complicated [numerous] names. Their discipline is poor. By replacing tyranny with tyranny, they have caused dissatisfaction among the people. Several units originally belonging to the Provisional Special Army have become part of the regular army. They do not have sufficient numbers of men, however, and are called divisions or brigades with merely a little over a thousand or a few hundred men. In view of such difficult conditions, a military conference was held, the details of which have already been reported [to Central] which should immediately take measures to relieve the people's suffering so they will not be subject to the oppression and robbery typical of the militarist era.
[9] If the troops completely lack discipline, it would be impossible to raise military funds. [With troop confusion, rations cannot be settled.] The strength of an army is determined not by quantity but by quality, the army must not replace tyranny with tyranny. The progress of revolutionary undertakings [The Revolution] does not depend merely on military force but, even more important, it depends on the force of the people.

The government should have the kind of power that commands the respect of the army and the people.

Although the troops at Ichang and Shasi are supposed to number 50,000, this far

exceeds the actual number. At present the First, Second, and Third divisions have received regular training. The others merely bear various names and incur unnecessary costs. Moreover, these troops are of no use whatever except in soliciting contributions and resorting to robbery. Undisciplined troops cannot have combat ability. Failure to provide adequate revenues to maintain the army will cause the people to lose faith in our revolutionary principles.

At an officer's meeting [an army and people joint welcoming meeting] at Ichang, shouts of "Down with the Bogus Revolution!" were raised. On the other hand, [KMT] *hsien* and district Party headquarters have issued the slogan, "The Army is Cutting the People's Lives!" [and in county and district Party offices, there are some who say the troops are cutting off the people's lives, etc.] I have already reported the above to the Central [Executive] Committee for remedy.

It is difficult to fix the amount of necessary expenditures for the army, since accounts are lacking for checking purposes. [Next five paragraphs not quoted by Professor Chiang.]

There is only one enemy division left. After being disarmed and reorganized, it consists of only a few thousand men with no fighting capacity at all.

The Chairman stated: Since Commander-in-Chief T'ang Sheng-chih reported last time on the bad discipline of the troops at Ichang and Shasi, and their oppressive acts against the people, a telegram in the name of the Joint Council has been sent asking the commanders there to take remedial measures. Telegrams have also been sent to the headquarters of the Ninth and Tenth armies, ordering them to conduct a strict investigation and to take proper remedial measures.

The attention of all will please be directed to the slogans "Down with the Bogus Revolution!" and "The Army is Cutting the People's Lives!"

The question of the distribution of military funds in the future should also be discussed.

T'ang Sheng-chih: This question is a military one and, in my opinion, should be referred to the Office of the Chief of Staff [Commander-in-Chief] for investigation and action.

|10| *Adviser Borodin*: The special attention of the Commander-in-Chief should be drawn to the fact that financial unification is endangered by the Ninth and Tenth armies. We have been busy day and night, with considerable sacrifice of time, trying to protect the people's life and property. Should security be destroyed by the bad discipline of the Ichang troops, we will not only lose the confidence of the people but also face adverse effects in our financial [and foreign] policy. [We should ask the Commander-in-Chief to regulate and set them in order.]

The following resolution was adopted: [To] dispatch an urgent telegram to Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek drawing his attention to the tyrannical conduct of the Ninth and Tenth armies in western Hupei and requesting him to take proper measures to maintain the discipline of the said troops.

Checked, no error.
Signed Kiselev.

Document 75

Political Report of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (January 8, 1927)

This document, entitled by the Peking Commission as "Abstracted Translation of the Central Committee's Political Report (January 8, 1927)", was published in *SLYM*, X, "Military-Political Conspiracy," 41-43, in the ten-volume set with Chinese pagination and binding. Evidently it is a translation from Russian of a Political Report of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and originally it must have been in Chinese. The translation by the Peking Commission indicates many omissions, yet the incomplete text is intelligible. Two passages of the Political Report were quoted disapprovingly in "The Letter from Shanghai," by N. Nassonov, N. Fokine, and A. Albrecht, dated March 17, 1927. Their letter, too, underwent several translations, yet the quoted passages show that deletions in those paragraphs did not distort the meaning. The passages quoted are on p. 42b, #6d = "Letter," p. 426, or p. 420 in the University of Michigan reprint edition of *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* by Leon Trotsky; and p. 43a, #3 = "letter" p. 424 or 418.

This was Document 47 in our previous edition. We have refined the translation.

TEXT

[41b] 1. [Deleted] Marshal Chang [Tso-lin] has been moving toward an agreement within the last few days on Yang Yu-t'ing's plan . . . [deleted]. The Mukden Army is still trying in every way to avoid a direct clash with the Northern Expeditionary Forces.

a. It [the Mukden Army] hopes for the possibility of self-destruction by discontented anti-Red armies. . . [deleted] [so that] no matter which side in this war emerges victorious, it will still remain a powerful force in the country.

b. Hence, Marshal Chang [Tso-lin] is currently utilizing Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang to resist the Northern Expeditionary Forces in the Southeast and sacrificing their armies in key positions. Chang is trying hard to make arrangements in Honan . . . [deleted] planning to hand Honan over to Chin Yün-e and to appoint Chin Yün-p'eng to form a cabinet. Chang wants to make use of the 200,000 crack troops commanded by the two Chin brothers and to await calmly an opportune moment for action . . . [deleted]. However, Chang fears that the Kuominchun in central [western] Honan may align itself with the Party Army to attack the Mukden Army . . . [deleted]. The attitude of Yen Hsi-shan also engages Mukden's attention.

2. Under pressure from the Mukden forces, the Kuominchun has evacuated Paotow [in Suiyuan, December 25, 1926]. The plan of the Mukden forces is still to capture Wuyuan [in Suiyuan] in order to cut off the Kuominchun's source of ammunition supply.

. . . [deleted] the Kuominchun suffers shortages in ammunition and military supplies. Moreover, as a result of the defeat at Nankow [Chihli, August 14, 1926], it has lost almost all its artillery and cavalry. Hence, the Kuominchun finds it difficult to fight Mukden's well-equipped crack forces. . . [deleted].

3. Since the occupation of western Honan by the Kuominchun [early January

1927], the situation in Honan has become very serious . . . [deleted]. Both Chang and [42a] Wu [P'ei-fu] are still unable to command the Honan armies to resist the Southern forces. Although repeated orders for a major offensive have been issued, they have been of no avail.

4. The attitude of Yen Hsi-shan toward this war plays an important role. Final victory in the war between Mukden and the Party forces will go to the side that can unite with Yen Hsi-shan. Yen has recently demonstrated connections with the National Government. He has expressed a desire to resume Kuomintang membership and to organize a northern Kuominchun against Mukden. The National Government naturally wishes to cooperate in every way with Yen. On the sole condition that Yen resists Mukden, all his demands can be accepted.

The independence of Yen must also be respected so that he will not be under Feng's [Yü-hsiang] control. Even if Yen is not prepared to be subordinated to the National Government for the present and wishes only to enter into an anti-Mukden military alliance, the National Government should be willing to be allied with him for, upon the defeat of Mukden, Yen will not be able to get out of the jurisdiction of the National Government . . . [deleted].

5. Under the severe military pressure of Sun Ch'uan-fang, the autonomous movement in Shanghai has temporarily ceased . . . [deleted].

Our views on the Shanghai problem are:

a. Recognize Shanghai as the place where serious conflict with imperialism will be encountered. This problem will not be easily solved.

b. Mukden and Shantung will have conflicts over this problem also.

c. The Peking-Hankow Railway now becomes the center of military activity and we should concentrate all our forces on this line.

d. We should support the autonomous movement in Shanghai in order to create a buffer zone in the clash between the Northern Expeditionary Forces and the Mukden-Shantung forces.

6. With reference to the National Government:

a. In the provinces of Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi now occupied by the Northern Expeditionary Forces, the mass movement has entered the revolutionary path and revolutionary work has penetrated deeply into the villages . . . [deleted]. Assassinations of local bullies and the bad gentry continue to occur without end. The current social movement of the people is much more far-reaching than during the Revolution of 1911 or the May Fourth Movement [deleted]. A violent reaction would ensue should there be a military setback.

[42b] b. In the military situation . . . [deleted].

1) Considerable rest is necessary;

2) There is lack of military funds . . . [deleted] the Seventh and Third armies mutinied in Kiangsi . . . [deleted].

c. Upon the transfer of the National Government and the Kuomintang to Hankow, a provisional committee [Joint Council] was immediately organized to support the government. We cannot but approve of this. Even Chiang Kai-shek does not express any opposition to it. However, local Hupei Kuomintang members insist on self-government by the people of Hupei . . . [deleted].

d. Conflict of opinion among the leaders constitutes a very serious internal problem of the National Government . . . [deleted]. The conflict between Wang [Ching-wei] and Chiang [Kai-shek] . . . [deleted] we consider the problem of reconciliation between Wang and Chiang and among other leaders as the most important of all problems . . . [deleted].

e. The two most important countries, Britain and Japan . . . [deleted] have come to the point of discussing recognition. One [Britain] favors a division of government between the North and South; the other [Japan] continues to render active support to

Mukden to resist the South . . . [deleted].

f. On the basis of the above analysis, the most important tasks are as follows:

1) Continue the anti-Mukden military action . . . [deleted]. Since the fortunes of Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang have been receding, a direct clash with Mukden-Shantung will be unavoidable.

[43a] (a) Expedite military preparations. Particular attention should be given the Peking-Hankow Railway.

(b). . . [deleted]. Crush the main forces of Meng Chao-yueh . . . [deleted].

(c) A defensive position should be taken in eastern Hupei and Kiukiang [Kiangsi] to guard against a sneak attack by the Shantung Army.

(d) Under the KMT's influence, the people of Shanghai have been engaged in the autonomous movement. They oppose the stationing of troops in the city, and turned over the defense of Kiangsu from the Shantung Army to Pai Pao-shan, Li Pao-chang, and Feng Shao-min.

(e) The National Government and the National Revolutionary Army should endeavor to make contact with Yen Hsi-shan and establish an anti-Mukden alliance with him.

(f) The National Revolutionary Army should contact the armies in central Honan and connect them with the Party's army to occupy the southern bank of the Yellow River . . . [deleted] to obstruct the southern route of the Mukden Army. In the East, the National Revolutionary Army should withdraw to the South to threaten [?avoid threatening] the Mukden-Shantung Army.

2) . . . [deleted] continue efforts at reconciliation between the leaders of the National Government and continue to support the slogan, "Wang-Chiang Cooperation" . . . [deleted].

3) Disseminate intensive propaganda among the masses, awakening them to support and aid the National Government in solving the many difficult financial problems. Arouse an enthusiastic spirit in the army. . . . [deleted] issue the slogan, "Down with the corrupt and greedy officials!" The slogan "Reduce the people's burdens!" cannot be issued at the moment, particularly when military action is still in progress.

Document 76

Political Report of the Central Committee [of the Chinese Communist Party] (January 26, 1927)

In our previous edition this was Document 48, translated from a Chinese translation of a Russian version, which was itself translated from an original Chinese Communist "Report." See *SLYM*, II, "Political," 28-33, and punctuated reprint in KMWH, XV, 2619-22.

We have since acquired a direct translation from the Russian version, thus eliminated one step in the triple translation. This version, which we now use, was forwarded by the British military attaché in Peking, Colonel Steward, as Soviet document Z-52, in his Report No. XXXIX, on September 24, 1927. The British Foreign Office assigned it the file number F 8728/3241/10. Its PRO number is F.O. 371-12502/9115. This version was also published in *China Illustrated Review*, January 28, 1928, and short excerpts are in Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 148-49.

At a few points the Chinese translation in *SLYM* has sentences not found in Colonel Steward's version. We have added these and made a few other corrections in brackets.

TEXT

[1] After "the Hankow events" [January 3, 1927], Great Britain used every effort to call forth a unanimous reaction on these events, both on an international scale, i.e., on the part of other imperialistic powers, and inside its own country. These plans, however, have been so far unsuccessful.

1. On account of conflicts which arose in connection with the question relating to 2.5 percent surtaxes, the British were of the opinion that their tactics were very clever, because the Southern Government had already put these surtaxes into effect, and they thought that their consent not only would change the attitude of the Chinese people in their favor, but would also give the same increase of revenues to Chang Tso-lin and Sun Ch'uan-fang. Besides, this increase of Customs duties would cause the greatest losses to Japan; as to losses to England, they would be comparatively small. On the other hand, the increase of customs duties would also give powerful support to Northern militarists, because, as a result of 2.5 percent surtaxes, about 80 [2] percent of additional revenues would go to the Northern militarists and only 20 percent to the Southern Government. Actually, however, this question had only one result, i.e., it made the conflict between England and Japan still more acute.

2. Italy and France, because their interests were not yet affected, temporarily assumed a watching attitude and did not give active support to England.

3. The American Senator [William E.] Borah still holds his former opinion that the movement for national equality of China and the demands put forth in connection with this movement must be respected.

4. In England the Manchester party is in favor of concessions to China, the attitude of the Liberal party is perfectly quiet, and only the opinion of the leaders of the Labour party is comparatively unfavorable to the government.

British imperialism did not attain the desired unity of action either within the country or abroad. As regards its recent position in China, it tries to attract to its side the moderate party in China, the Kuomintang [Chinese version: moderate elements of the Kuomintang] and at the same time is making a demonstration with the aid of its navy.

As to militarists, they are also making a demonstration against the South, relying upon their armed forces, and, at the same time, they are trying to attract to their side the moderate elements of the Kuomintang; besides, they are spreading rumors that they can adopt "Sun Yat-senism" in case the Kuomintang cuts itself off from Red Russia and all radical elements are removed. In order to appease the people, they even put forth such slogans as the return of concessions, the abolition of unequal treaties, and the convocation of a national conference.

Imperialists and militarists both use the same tactics, but act in two directions. The future will show whether these tactics will yield results or not.

Were the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang united in aims and actions, these tactics would, of course, yield no results at all. Unluckily, however, the internal situation now is extremely unfavorable. The Right Wing of the Kuomintang is daily becoming more and more powerful. Although, since the Hsishan [Western Hills] and Shanghai conferences, this Right Wing suffered a defeat as regards organization and with reference to its ideology and tactics, it still gained a victory. Now there is a very strong and serious sentiment inside the Kuomintang against Soviet Russia, against the Communist Party, and against the workers' and peasant movement. This attitude was called forth by the following three causes:

1. General Chiang Kai-shek is [Chinese version: and Chang Ching-chiang are] convinced that there must be only one party in the State [Chinese version: the country] that all classes must be reconciled among themselves, that the class struggle must not take place, and that the Communist Party is unnecessary. There are many persons, who, being politically unconscious, share these bourgeois convictions.

2. There is a widely spread opinion that the present Nationalist revolution will end very soon and in its place a new revolution, the class or social revolution, will cease [begin]. Thus, the Communist Party is the greatest enemy at present, and not imperialism or militarism. Therefore, a resistance is shown to Russia, to the Communist Party, and to the workers' and peasant movement.

3. Some persons who perceive that the development of the Northern Expedition and the development of the workers' and peasant movement are successfully proceeding under the guidance of the Communist Party are beginning to be jealous and afraid of this party.

These three causes called forth a very strong movement within the ranks of the Kuomintang, which is directed against the Communist Party. But all conflicts that arise on the ground of these causes are comparatively unimportant. The main cause is, of course, the contradiction based on class differences. Convictions held by the bourgeoisie are, of course, opposed to ours. It was our fault that we did not pay sufficient attention to making small concessions to the petty bourgeoisie and to the proletariat [translation error?] in cases when their view and ours [Chinese version: and those of the proletariat] did not seriously contradict each other. Therefore, now, even the Left Wing is ill-disposed toward us. With the development of the Nationalist revolution these contradictions will develop more and more daily, and it will be impossible to avoid them. [Chinese version adds: Nevertheless, there are still relatively few bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements involved in actual conflict (with us). Conflict is due partly to the inexperienced action of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie and partly to our own mistakes in not giving proper attention to numerous problems and in failing to give concessions to the petty bourgeoisie.] Now the principal question which is worth most serious consideration is the possibility of

an alliance of foreign imperialists with the right or moderate wing of the Kuomintang, which may lead to a concerted movement against Russia, against Communism, and against the workers' and peasant movement, both from within and from without.

[3] As the situation may become extremely dangerous in connection with the possibility of such an alliance, our party has worked out the following tactics:

1. To make the masses rise and give military and financial support to the National Government. The purpose of this policy is to let the Kuomintang understand that the Nationalist revolution is still in the period of a most acute struggle, that it requires support on the part of the masses of the people, and that the time of the final victory has not yet come. On the other hand, this policy will lessen the feeling of fear that the Kuomintang has toward the Communist Party (now the Kuomintang is afraid that the masses of the people may ally themselves with the Communist Party and it suspects that the Communist Party works against the National Government and that the Communist revolution will come very soon).

2. The center, as well as the local, organs shall use every effort to carry on in all our publications the following agitation:

a. To make it clear that the Nationalist Revolution is not yet accomplished, that the purpose of this revolution lies not in the transfer of political power into the hands of the Kuomintang, and that the successful accomplishment of it must be accompanied by political and social changes, whereas now all power in the towns and villages still belongs to imperialistic and feudal forces.

b. To criticize the development of the bourgeois ideology within the Kuomintang, in order to refute radically the bourgeois ideology of such persons as Tai Chi-t'ao, Kan Nai-kuang, and others. The attitude of our party toward the bourgeoisie generally may be now regarded as being gradually established in the sense that in China bureaucrats and compradors in the cities, and landowners and gentry [Chinese version: evil gentry and local bullies] in the villages are, in our opinion, counter-revolutionary forces, and workers and peasants and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie are revolutionary forces. The middle-class bourgeoisie, being very weak, is constantly vacillating between the leaders of the revolution and of the counter-revolution, and does not take any definite course. In any case it cannot be included in revolutionary forces. Its real forces are insufficient to enable it to shake off restrictions imposed upon it by the class which possesses real power, and the absence of revolutionary resoluteness and of political consciousness hinders it from taking part in the revolution. Shanghai, for instance, is the greatest stronghold of the bourgeoisie, and yet the newspapers there dare not write anything about politics, being afraid of oppressive measures on the part of Sun Ch'uan-fang. [Chinese version adds the statement: Shareholders there are hoping for the dissolution of the Chamber of Commerce so that they may dispose of their property and raise the value of their shares.] Therefore, we must warn the Kuomintang that if it does not [Chinese version: that although it is not necessary to] take active measures against the bourgeoisie, but if it believes in the dreams of the bourgeoisie and directs the revolution with the aid of its force, it will place itself into the bourgeois camp and oppress the real revolutionary force of the peasant and working masses. We must adapt our tactics so as to save the Kuomintang from the passive inclination to the right.

3. As to foreign relations, we must concentrate our forces upon [the] anti-British movement. We cannot positively say that the British policy of creating an international alliance against us will not be crowned with a success. For a while we can forbear from extending the anti-imperialistic movement to Japan, France, and America, in order to keep Great Britain isolated.

All the above-mentioned points are very important, and if we succeed in accomplishing them, there will be no united offensive movement against us on the part

of all the powers, and, as regards internal politics, the Kuomintang will have no reason to be afraid of the Communist Party. All our party organs must clearly understand these tactics and put them into effect. In that case, only, it will be possible to ward off the present danger. The danger of the present situation lies in the fact that [4] the anti-Red movement may become a united one both within the country and outside of it. Then a much more serious situation will arise than the events of March 20, 1926, because then only Chiang Kai-shek personally and "the Society for the Study of Sunwenism" moved against us, whereas, now, we are confronted with the anti-Communist movement, not only on the part of the Right Wing and of the center of the Kuomintang, but also of a part of its Left Wing.

Document 77

Regulations Relating to Nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party in the Units of the National Revolutionary Army

This document apparently dates from January 30, 1927. N. Mitarevsky (*World-wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 35-36) quotes from the minutes of a meeting of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the CCP held in Shanghai on January 23, 1927: Following a report that Communist influence in the armies is "rather unstable," it was proposed that "a regular organization of our party-work be established in the People's army." The minutes instruct Comrade Wen "to work out a plan for organizational work in the National Army taking into account experience in the Russian Red Army." A week later, the Minutes of the Sitting of the Military Section on 30th January 1927 state (*Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 141-42, and *China Yearbook 1928*, p. 820):

> *Topic*: Wen introduces a plan of regulations relating to the nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party in the units of the National Revolutionary Army.
> *Decision*: The regulations, with additions and corrections introduced into them, shall be submitted for the definite confirmation of the Central Committee, as a plan of the Military Section.
> *Annex*: Plan of regulations relating to the nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party in the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army.

(A variant translation of *Kuo-min Ko-ming Chün* could be People's Revolutionary Army, though we consistently render the Chinese term as National Revolutionary Army.)

We believe Document 77 is the regulations introduced by Comrade Wen, perhaps with additions and corrections, and "Submitted to the Central Committee" as stated in the document itself.

The date may seem rather late for the Communist Party to begin organizing cells in the National Revolutionary Army, but there is confirmation in "The Letter from Shanghai" by Nassanov, Fokine, and Albrecht, dated Shanghai, March 17, 1927 (Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 421-22). These critics of the Communist Party's Central Committee and its advisers state that "until recently, there were no nuclei in the army." They also write that "The December [1926] Plenum of the C.C. adopted a decision to build nuclei in the army (*only of commanders, to be sure, with the prohibition against taking in soldiers*) and in January of this year, when the other Russian comrades (not for the first time) raised the question of work in the army, Comrade V. [Voitinsky] already expressed himself sharply against the organization of nuclei."

Document 77 was sent from Peking by the American military attaché as his number A-6, and we have it from a copy in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace in the Jay Calvin Huston Collection, Bk. II, Pt. I, Folder 3, #40.

TEXT

(Submitted to the Central Committee)

[1] Preliminary and rather incomplete statistics show that there are about 1,000 communists in the National Revolutionary Army who occupy various posts, beginning with posts of commanders and political workers down to posts in the staffs. All these communists are mostly working without regular guidance, receiving instructions occasionally, or by working together with senior comrades, or being instructed by the nearest military commission. Yet the fact that such a comparatively great number of comrades exist in the army could, if properly guided by the superior organizations, afford to the party the possibility of promoting in the army our principles and, on the other hand, to develop our forces in the ranks of the National Army.

In order to carry out the above-mentioned measures it is necessary to have the occasional work of the communist comrades in the army and their uncoordinated activity changed into regularly organized forms of the existence of communists in the army by means of constituting cells and superior organs of the party.

1. About the Party Cells

1. The basic organization of the party is the party cell.

2. The smallest military unit in which a cell may be formed is a regiment, a separate battalion, a battery, a staff of a division, a staff of a corps, and the staff of the commander in chief.

Note: An exception may be made only where there is a great number of communists in units smaller than those indicated above. The permission to form such cells [2] must in such case be asked for from the military commissions to whose district the unit belongs.

3. For carrying on the current work a cell consisting of ten or more men elects a bureau of three men; a cell consisting of less than ten men elects only a secretary.

4. For the guiding of the cells of a composite military union [unit?] (a division) a divisional bureau consisting of three to five men is appointed by the corps-bureau with the approval of the Provincial Commission.

5. For the guiding of the divisional bureau a corps-bureau consisting of three to five men is appointed by the central commission with the approval of the central military commission. [As in text.]

6. The corps-bureaus are guided by the provincial military commissions appointed by the Military Section of the Central Committee with the approval of the Central Committee. They consist of a specially appointed president of the commission and members and secretaries of the corps-bureau.

2. Connection with Local Civil Organizations of the Party

1. The lower cells of military units have no connection with the local party organizations.

2. The military organization establishes a connection with the local party-organization through the provincial commissions by means of the president of the Military Commission becoming a member of the bureau of the party. The secretary of the organization supervises the work of the Military Commission and takes part in the meetings of the latter.

Note: Exceptions are admitted when a unit, such as a division or a corps, is not stationed at the chief town of the province. In this case one of the members of the bureau of the civil organization must become a member of the Military Bureau.

[3] 3. The Military Commissions carry out the orders of the Party Committee in questions concerning the carrying on of campaigns and other local questions, and they supply the respective Party Committees with statistical information.

3. Conditions Under Which the Cells Must Exist

1. The existence of cells in the military units must be kept absolutely secret. None of the nonparty commanders and other officials must know of the existence of the cells.

2. The meetings must be held most secretly and should be convoked at such hours when none of the members of the cell might be called for some service work, in order not to arouse suspicion on the part of the commanders. Nor should the work be done openly in the units the commanders of which are communists, because there might be espionage on the part of the superior commanders, especially when the latter know that the respective commander is a communist.

3. The accumulating of records of the cells should be avoided and they must not be kept in the units in order to prevent undesirable accidents.

4. Meetings of the cell must be held whenever it is possible, but at all events not less than twice a month.

Note 1: If in one of the units there are communists even in companies and if a company in which there are communists is stationed at a great distance from the staff of the regiment and, when in the matter of secrecy, the absence of many people from the company might arouse the suspicion of the superiors, it may be permitted that only one representative of the communists of the company should attend the meeting of the cell. After the meeting of the regimental cell this representative shall inform his group of communists of the resolutions that were carried.

Note 2: Under the circumstances mentioned in note 1 a company-group may be
[4] formed, the responsible leader of which is appointed by the regimental bureau. In such groups the work is done exclusively according to the orders of the regimental bureau, the group having no right to pass resolutions on questions relating to the work.

4. The Character of the Work of the Cells

1. The work entrusted to a cell is threefold: to carry on political instruction among the members of the cell itself; to recruit new members of the party; and to carry out the program of the party in the unit to which the cell belongs.

2. Special attention must be paid by the members of the cell to the raising of the standard of knowledge among their members. To this end training in groups (in the form of small groups for self-instruction) and individual instruction should be practiced. The instruction must be effected according to the programs especially worked out to this end.

3. A very important task of the cells is the recruiting of new members of the party. The work must be done very carefully and with particular caution. In recruiting new members the greatest attention must be paid to the recruiting, first of all, of junior officers; in the second place every effort should be made to attract the soldiers and the intelligent elements. The methods of recruiting must be carefully worked out by the divisional and regimental bureaus.

4. The task of carrying out the program of the party in military units means that the cells must carry on political campaigns as practiced by the party, they must carry on instructions and agitations in order to bring about a contact with the workmen, peasants, and other toiling members of the country.

5. The members of a cell should never act in the name of their cell, but must do

[5] it personally, striving to become an authority in the eyes of their unit, so that our comrades might become the leaders of the social life of their unit. The influence of our comrades in the unit should be fully established.

6. The cells must give an account of their work to the higher organs of the party.

7. As regards questions relating to the life and conditions of their unit, the cells must never put forward any suggestions on behalf of their organization. It would be especially dangerous if the cells would openly criticize the activity of the middle and higher class of commanders. The cell must watch attentively the activity of the commander, but it should never take itself measures to stop the harmful activity of any person. In such cases the gathered information should be brought to the knowledge of the higher organizations of the party. An exception may be made during a battle when the harmful activity of some commander is manifestly evident.

Document 78

Report on the Work of the Peking Local Committee in the National Movement (February 10, 1927)

This remarkable Chinese Communist political report presumably was written for the Central Committee of the Party in Shanghai, but a copy evidently went into the files of Li Ta-chao or other Communists taking refuge in the Soviet Embassy compound. Dated February 10, 1927, the document when found by the Peking police was in Chinese, and it was reprinted in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 157-82. In our previous edition it was Document 50. The author of the report, Li Po-hai, was secretary of the Committee on the National Movement of the CCP's Peking Local Committee. The report refers to the Kuomintang as "The People's School," and the CCP as "Our School." It refers to KMT members as "schoolmates of the People's School," and to Communists as "our schoolmates." The report centers upon an election of officers of the Municipal Party Headquarters, meaning the Peking Municipal Headquarters of the Kuomintang.

The date of the election (January 26-29, 1927) and a confirmation of the results come in a separate report printed in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 126-30. This is the draft of a telegram dated February 5, presumably addressed to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. We have added in brackets the reported election scores of the nine elected members of the Executive Committee of Peking Kuomintang Municipal Headquarters to the chart on page 175 of Document 78.

Six of the nine recently elected members of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang's Peking Municipal Headquarters were arrested in the compound of the Soviet Embassy on April 6, 1927, and after trial were executed as Communists on April 28, though some, such as Lu Yu-yü, a reserve member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, were anti-Communist.

TEXT

[157] This is a general report on the Peking Local [Committee's] work in the national movement for the past few months, not a report on any particular month. Analysis of our current work requires occasional references to facts which are relatively historical in character. Thus, the content of this report becomes more complicated.

I. Analysis of the Circumstances of Work

Since the Kuominchün's retreat to Nankow last year [April 15, 1926], the city of Peking has been entirely surrounded by an atmosphere of White terror. Not only has it been impossible to stage open mass demonstrations, but severe setbacks have occurred in the secret work of propaganda and organization. For the past few months, the Peking Local Committee's political work in the national movement has in fact tended to be one-sided. Kuomintang work has constituted practically the entire work of Our School in the national movement.

Peking is the asylum of the reactionary political regime. Not only are the reac-

tionary militarists actively destroying the revolutionary forces, but the anti-Red movement of the Kuo-chia chu-i [Nationalistic] Clique is expanding in the wake of [158] of the militarists' anti-Red actions. The people of Peking, sunk in "deep water and hot fire," face imminent personal peril. Only the counterrevolutionary Kuo-chi chu-i Clique could have held the so-called Support the National [Five-colored] Flag mass meeting at Central Park under the armed protection of the Mukden militarists. Red propaganda is daily sinking, while anti-Red propaganda becomes increasingly violent. This is due to the anti-Red political environment which is reflected in differentiation of the mass movement.

In the course of the thorough-going anti-Red movement in Peking, however, a so-called Red United Front has materialized. The major portion of anti-Red propaganda has been transformed into Red education; Ankuochun Headquarters has virtually become the ministry of Red education! The masses of Peking with their feudalistic ideas are gradually leaning toward the Reds and they hate the anti-Reds. The intellectuals are divided into two camps, the so-called Reds and the anti-Reds. The president of Peking Law College openly said to the masses of students: "If we don't go Red, then should we go White? We do not oppose any political party, but we welcome the party that represents the interests of the people." The economics professor of Min-kuo University burned his books before his students, saying, "The economic principles I studied in the past are unsuited to modern needs, capitalist, and deceptive. Only Marxist economic principles are true. What a pity to have wasted more than ten years' effort."

There are many such objective facts, indicating that the Peking intelligentsia is leaning to the Left. The organization of Our School has expanded amidst the dense anti-Red atmosphere [since April 15, 1926?] from 300 to more than 1,000. The Kuomintang Municipal Party headquarters has expanded from 2,200 to 4,300 persons. However reactionary the political situation, the revolutionary political parties have made great progress. The Red United Front has turned from expansion to gradual stabilization. Such is our concise analysis and summary of the working environment in Peking.

II. Working Plans in the National Movement

[159] A. *The movement against the New Right Wing*. The Peking New Right Wing was born following the May Thirtieth Movement, the period of the most violent class struggle in China. The doctrine of the New Right Wing is based on the so-called Taichitaoism. Its leaders are those who one year ago were regarded as Peking Kuomintang Leftists. They include Lu Yu-yü, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, Teng Fei-huang, Ch'en Tzu-i, Wang Tung-cheng, Wang Chen-chün, and Liu Chü-ch'üan. When the Old Right Wing held the upper hand, they appeared very Leftist and wanted earnestly to cooperate with Our School against the Right. The policy of Our School then was, quite naturally, to assist the Left to oppose the Right. Following the alliance between our schoolmates and the Left, the Right daily declined until it died. In the previous elections of the Municipal [KMT] Party Headquarters, the Left scored a complete victory with our assistance. The Old Right then severed connections with Party Headquarters. Led by Lin Shen and Tsou Lu, it organized the so-called Number One, Southern Gardens Party Headquarters and convened the famous Western Hills conference to struggle against the Left Wing.

Drastic differentiation of Chinese society has taken place since the May Thirtieth Movement. Tai Chi-t'ao's theories represent bourgeois interests. Born in Shanghai, they brought about the emergence of the Peking New Right Wing. Members of the New Right Wing are those who before May Thirtieth were the most hard-working Leftists, violently opposed to the Right. The activities of the New Right are not in

any way different from those of the Old Right. Though subjectively they still claim to be Leftists, the New Rightists follow the track of the Old Right in their actions. The Old Right opposes Russia, communism, workers, and peasants; the New Right also openly rejects the Three Policies of the Russian alliance, the Communist alliance, and [support] of labor and the peasantry bequeathed to us by the late Dr. Sun. It abandons revolutionary work among the masses and at Party Headquarters. Instead, it concentrates on opposing Communists. Its anti-Communist propaganda slogans are:

a. The Communist Party monopolizes the Kuomintang.

[160] b. Class struggle is counter-revolutionary—it aids the enemy.

c. CP opposes the Northern Expedition—it is afraid of expanding the Kuomintang's political power.

d. CP alienates relations between Wang [Ching-wei] and Chiang [Kai-shek].

e. CP plots to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek.

The New Right Wing's active anti-Communist propaganda work has of course deceived a number of unconscious petty bourgeois elements. The New Right established in Peking the so-called Great League of Sun Yatsenism, based on Tai Chitaoism. The Great League of Sun Yatsenism is the mass organization of the New Right which at its peak had a membership of more than five hundred. However, when the banner of the movement against the New Right Wing was hoisted, the League's Leftist mask was torn off by the masses and its members dispersed like birds and beasts. Our schoolmates led the rising Left elements in striving to expose among the masses the crimes of the New Right. A few months' work succeeded in completely wiping out the masses' confidence in the New Right Wing. Leaders of the League such as Ch'en Tzu-i and others, afraid for their own guilt, dared not face the masses and fled overnight. For a time the Great League was in a state of complete anarchy. Now it is "preparing schemes in the tent." The only New Right leaders still around is Wang Chen-chün. Wang is unable, however, to lead the entire New Right Wing which is divided in Peking into three main cliques:

a. The Shantung Clique—leader, Lu Yu-yü

b. The Hunan Clique—Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, Teng Fei-huang

c. The Shansi Clique—leader, Wang Chen-chün

[161] Of these three, the Shantung Clique under the leadership of Lu Yu-yü is relatively capable of leading the entire group. Mo T'ung-jung has joined Our School. He used to be one of the leaders of the New Right and is able to lead over one hundred Kwangtungese. Mo now stands to the Left of the People's School. The masses led by him are also inclined to the Left, rebelling against the New Right Wing.

For the past few months the New Right Wing has been confronted with internal and external troubles and is coming to the end of the road. Its position among the masses is falling rapidly. Our School's policies and strategies against the New Right Wing constitute the principle force in exterminating the New Right Wing. We have been able to utilize the atmosphere of the movement against the New Right Wing to create the Left United Front. We feel that our former method of dealing with the Right Wing, under which our comrades fought hard and single-handedly against them, is inappropriate. The current formula of struggle calls for Communists to stand on the side of the Left masses of the People's School and to unite with the Left to attack the New Right. Although the struggle is in fact led by us, the New Right would not dare charge that all who oppose it are Communists. Lu Yu-yü has done the most in disrupting the alliance between Our School and the Left. Yet he can merely say to Hsiao Chung-chen and other Left leaders: "After all, we are brothers of the same Party; in the last analysis they (meaning CP) are only outsiders. It is true that our Party needs a left wing, but it should be an independent left wing of our Party, not a Communist Party-directed left wing."

The foregoing is a brief account of our work against the New Right. Although

the Peking New Right Wing may not have entirely collapsed, its foundation among the masses has been uprooted. It will be difficult for it to stage a comeback.

B. *The Left unification movement.* The Left unification movement was born in the course of the work against the New Right. It may also be said that the New Right's life was brought to an end because of the newly rising Left. Our School's policy is twofold: Unify the Left and oppose the New Right, simultaneously and without conflict [between the two aspects]. In the execution of the anti-Right policy, [162] the Left unified its masses and published numerous propaganda materials to expose the treacherous intrigues of the New Right. It also defined more firmly its revolutionary theories and policies. Recently, the atmosphere of unification of the Peking KMT Left has become very tense and the Left masses have gradually expanded. To centralize Left forces, Our School has joined with the Left Wing to establish Peking's "United Council of the Left," hereafter abbreviated as "United Left."

The United Left is the highest form of organization of the Left Wing in Peking. Comrade [Li] Po-hai is Our School's representative to the organization. Other Left participating organizations of the United Left are:

1. Practical Society
2. New Army Society
3. Szechwan Revolutionary Youth Society
4. New Yunnan Society
5. Ch'iung-yai Association
6. Soul of Hainan Society
7. Chung-shan Study Society
8. Reform Society
9. New China Study Society

The United Left has had a history of five months, during which its work was divided into two stages: the movement against the Right Wing, and seizure of Party power.

During the first period, the United Left completely executed Our School's policies in fighting the New Right. The Left's foundation among the masses was gradually expanded and strengthened. The United Left is the center of Left Wing mass organizations and directs their activities and work. Basic Left principles include Dr. Sun's Three Great Policies of alliance with Soviet Russia, alliance with the Communists, and support of the workers and peasants; opposition to the Sun Yatsenism of the Reform Clique led by Tai Chi-t'ao; and recognition of Wang Ching-wei as the central leader of the Left. Propaganda on Leftist principles has had considerable effect among the masses of the Peking People's School. Since the publication of the outline of Left principles, the differentiation of the masses into the Right and the Left has become more distinct. To ascertain whether any particular member of the People's School belongs to the Right or Left, it is only necessary to observe whether [163] his actions and thoughts violate Dr. Sun's Three Great Policies. Our Central Committee recently adopted the Three Policies as the criterion of the Left. Actually, we long ago utilized such theoretical guidance in working in the Peking People's School (the first period of the United Left). The work against the New Right Wing, centralization of theories, and the unification movement of the Left constitute almost entirely the program of the United Left.

We will now discuss the work of the United Left during the second period (the period of seizing Party power). During the movement against the New Right Wing, we created among the masses a tense atmosphere for "handing Party power to the Left." At the same time the New Right was deeply hated and loathed by the masses. Hence, it was natural that the New Right Wing was defeated in the [recent] elections of the Municipal Party Headquarters [January 26-29, 1927]. However, prior to the elections the extent of the New Right Wing's mass following had not been definitely

known. The Leftists therefore had to redouble their efforts to secure the masses.

This period witnessed the gradual expansion of the organization of Our School and the development of Left organizations. More than 1,200 of Our School's basic masses were in the People's School. A few months before the elections, we notified our schoolmates that each of them was expected to lead five Leftists of the People's School. Such is the work of the latter period and Our School's preparations and plans.

In short, all the policies of Our School can influence the Left Wing at any time. As the time of reelections to the Municipal Party Headquarters approached, the list of nominees for the following term was openly brought up. Although there were indications of a fight for power among a small number of Leftists, the result was that all accepted the decision of the United Left. In the elections, an absolute victory was scored by the Left and ourselves due to the unified activities of the United Left.

III. Analysis of Left Organizations

The failure of the Kuomintang Left to establish a centralized national or local organization is not a question of whether Our School approved of such a step or not. From the standpoint of the Left's class characteristics, Leftists are petty bourgeois revolutionaries. It is difficult if not impossible for the petty bourgeoisie to form a strictly unified organization. Hence, in trying to unify the Left masses, Our School did not [164] adopt a policy of "mixture" but the alliance method. This policy seeks to develop Left organizations through alliance by which all Left Wing organizations may develop on a horizontal line, using the concentration of forces to fight the objective enemy. However, several Left leaders invented various new schemes while executing our policy. They believed it necessary to centralize all Left organizations in order to achieve success in the revolutionary task. They would have all Left organizations dissolved and then centralized in one organization. We had to employ various facts and theories to dispel their dreams. The Peking masses are highly complicated. It is necessary to have various organizations under different names and with different characteristics to include them all.

Of the Left organizations, the Practical Society enjoys the longest history. When the United Left was first established, we at times used the Practical Society as the center of our work in allying with the Left. We almost always consulted with leaders of the Society, such as Teng Wen-hui, Hsiao Chung-chen, and Li Shu-yung. For instance, the list of nominees for election to the Municipal Party Headquarters was decided upon in consultation with them and the list of nominees to District Party Headquarters was presented to them for consideration before announcement by the United Left, because, as a leader among the Leftist organizations, the Practical Society is, relatively speaking, in a position where its mass following is relatively large. However, the current objective situation differs from the past. Our School's attitude toward Left organizations and individuals should follow changes in the objective situation. A new policy is now necessary.

Left organizations in Peking are showing signs of rapid growth and new Left leaders are constantly emerging out of the actual work. To secure the entire body of the masses, Our School must adopt an unbiased, just attitude and policy toward Left organizations. [Following] is a chart of Left organizations, listing names, leaders, and the numbers of the masses under their influence.

According to the chart, the total number of Left masses exceeds 1,300. With the addition of more than 1,000 of our schoolmates, there are altogether more than 2,000 persons. An analysis of the various organizations based on the chart follows.

1. *Practical Society*. The Society has a history of over two years. In the past, its work was simple and its mass following limited. Following the death of Dr. Sun, its members felt that the People's School had lost its center. At the same time, the dif-

[165] Name	Leaders	Leftists	Communist Party	Mass Total	Publication	Remarks
Practical Society	Teng Wen-hui, etc.	300	6	306	*Shih-chien*	May be regarded as pure Leftist
New Army Society	T'an Tsu-yao	189	75	264	*Hsin chün*	Entirely led by CP
Szechwan Revolutionary Society	Tu Yen	160	46	206	None	Led by CP
New Yunnan Society	Yang Li-hsien	63	7	70	*T'ieh Hua*	Led by CP
Reform Society	Liu Yu	140	76	216	None	Led by CP
Soul of Hainan Society	Mo T'ung-jung	116	6	122	None	Led by CP
Ch'iung-yai Association	Cheng Lan-chi	130	?	130	None	[Led by] Practical Society
Chung-shan Study Society	Yao Yen	40	25	65	*Chung-shan sheng-huo*	Led by CP
New China Study Society	[Liu [Yao-hsi]	160	45	165 [?] [205?]	Many publications received from this organization	Long history; not all its members are revolutionary

ferentiation of the Party into the Left and Right became daily more apparent. They [166] deplored the counterrevolutionary actions of the Right Wing but did not openly acknowledge their Left position until the spring of 1926. Since the Society unfolded its Left banner, the Left masses continued daily to join it, thereby expanding its organization and work. At the time when we joined the Left Wing of the Municipal Party Headquarters (the present New Right Wing) to fight the Old Right Wing, the Practical Society had not yet taken a firm Left stand. It even published Tai Chi-t'ao's ideas in its periodical, *Shih-chien*. The Practical Society participated in the united fight against the Old Right Wing. During the balloting, however, they plotted secretly and voted contrary to the agreed list of nominees. In the end, they were sold out by

the New Right Wing and failed. Therefore, at one time we were very cold toward them. In the one year following the elections in which the Old Right Wing was defeated, the Leftists took over positions from the Old Right Wing with few exceptions and have now become the New Right Wing. In October 1926, several leaders of the Practical Society and its masses favored the policy against the New Right Wing and later joined the CP to sponsor the great unification of the Peking Left [United Left], to which nine organizations of the Peking People's School expanded rapidly while the New Right Wing had to retreat before the masses.

Special mention should be made of leaders of the Practical Society such as Teng Wen-hui, Hsiao Chung-chen, and Li Shu-yung. Known as the three geniuses of the Practical Society, they command a much higher position than that of most Leftists of the People's School. They are fit to be considered as hard-working revolutionaries. They appear outwardly to hold a respectful attitude toward Our School. They often [167] say, "Communists [join] two parties; we genuine Leftists should also belong to two parties. After we bring the Chinese National Revolution to victory, we should immediately engage in the World Revolution and the proletarian revolution."

We are naturally aware that when in a good mood, the bourgeoisie can well make all kinds of pretty statements. However, we do not wish these Left leaders to reject the People's School immediately and to join Our School instead. Although they often talk of joining our Party, we have never actually introduced them. Of course those Left leaders of the People's School who have true class consciousness may join Our School, but it is not necessary or possible for the three leaders of the Practical Society to do so at this time.

On the one hand, they express willingness to join Our School and, on the other, they strictly forbid our schoolmates to join the Practical Society. They even suspect the extreme Leftists of the Society of being comrades of the CP and CY. Some of them have been expelled or detained under observation. An injustice was done in some cases. Although theoretically they favor cooperation with the Communists, their actions are still anti-Communist. No matter how we interpret their theories, the facts remain the same. It is not unusual for such problems to arise in petty bourgeois organizations. Many of our comrades are resentful of the Society's anti-Communist actions. Some loudly charge that it is inclined toward the Right, others suggest we break off all cooperation. Not so long ago, the Left Wing with which we were allied became the New Right Wing. They believe that the Practical Society may become the New New Right Wing.

These opinions and actions of our comrades are mistaken. Although the Practical Society will surely become Rightist and reactionary, we must not break with it at the [168] moment because of the objective situation. It may be said that alliance with the Practical Society is one of our Party's historical tasks.

Our alliance with the Practical Society has not been interrupted or broken off because of all these circumstances. Our attitude has been very polite and tolerant. All misunderstandings are settled frankly and sincerely at meetings. Up to the present, they have consulted us on major political policies and the work of the Municipal Party Headquarters. In the recent elections of the Municipal Party Headquarters four of its members were elected: two as regular members, one as a reserve member, and another as a supervisory member. Prior to the elections, the internal situation of the Society was healthy but, upon the announcement of the election results, many felt disappointed and its internal troubles multiplied. Our policy has always been to settle their internal disputes and squabbles for them so that the union of leftist groups would not be broken. This is the most concise account and analysis of the past situation of the Practical Society.

2. *New Army Society.* The New Army Society was established in the spring of 1926 under the sponsorship of Ch'en Ch'i-hsiu and others. With an original member-

ship of only about two score, it has become an organization exclusively of young students in a little over a year, its membership having increased to 326. (The above chart is based on the figures of last month.) Within the period of one month following the Kuomintang elections, over seventy new members have joined the Society. Our comrades occupy three-fifths and the Leftists two-fifths of the seats of the New Army Society Executive Committee. The Society is a relatively strong Left organization in Peking, and its mass following outnumbers that of the Practical Society. In terms of strict organization of the lower masses, it is superior to all other Left organizations. It has set up basic organizations in every university which meet biweekly to discuss theories and present reports on their activities. Under the leadership of Our School's cells and our comrades belonging to the basic organizations, the spirit is good and the work constructive at these meetings.

The executive organization of the New Army Society has been very unhealthy. [169] It is in fact completely under our direction. Our comrades who undertake executive work in the Society often hamper the work of the Society for the sake of our own Party work, thus causing loose organization and discipline. The Society's representative [T'an Tsu-yao], recently elected to the Municipal Party Committee, is a comrade of Our School. He has already started reorganizing the setup in preparation for reelections to facilitate selection of hard-working Leftists and ourselves for the Executive Committee so that we may develop our work. Our plan is to make the New Army Society the central organization of the Left masses of Peking. At the minimum, it should be of equal standing with the Practical Society. Poor work in the past had caused the organization to appear excessively Red. Our comrades' activities must henceforth be "grey" so that we may secure a large mass following among the petty bourgeoisie. The Society should also absorb enlightened members for executive work, which we must not monopolize.

3. *Szechwan Revolutionary Youth Society.* The Society was organized by a group of Szechwan youths at the time of the March Eighteenth Incident last year. It had only a little over forty members at the start. Owing to its local characteristics, it is difficult at present for the Society to develop into a mass organization. Most of its executive positions are occupied by our schoolmates. Our schoolmates shoulder the responsibility for many activities both within and without the School. At one time the Society almost suffered the fate of extinction. In the interest of developing the Society's work, many meetings of Our School's Party fraction in the Society were held. Last October, a partial reorganization was effected and the Society's work has since improved. The organization expanded from over forty to over seventy members. In two months from its partial reorganization last October to registration for elections in December, great progress was made in its work and its masses increased from over seventy to over two hundred persons. As a result of the elections, our schoolmates [170] were elected to two-thirds of the executive committee seats. Our schoolmates have again taken too great a percentage of seats. However, since this is an accomplished fact, nothing can be done about it. Fortunately, our schoolmates who were elected are not excessively Red. This organization is entirely under our leadership.

Our schoolmates, Wu Ta-yu, Jan Chao-jung, T'an Tsu-yao, Chu Chin-chih, and Tu Yen, all have high prestige and position among the masses. In the reelections to the Municipal Party Headquarters, the Szechwan Revolutionary Youth Society's representative who was elected as a reserve executive committee member is also our schoolmate.

The masses of the Youth Society are expanding and its work is becoming complicated. Our School's Party fraction which directs the work of the Society meets weekly to guide the development of work. Basic organizations of the Youth Society in the schools also meet biweekly in rather good spirit.

4. *New Yunnan Society.* The New Yunnan Society is a revolutionary organization

of a group of Yunnan youths. It has a history of only one year and its organization is not well developed. Membership from the time of its establishment to the present consists merely of a little over seventy persons. For propaganda purposes it publishes *T'ieh hua* [Iron Flower], edited by our schoolmates. A thousand copies are printed for each issue. The city of Peking is divided into six basic organizations, each of which meets often and in very good spirit. Its membership is not confined to elements of the People's School. At meetings, frequent discussions are held on such topics as "Communism," "Communist Party," "The Three Peoples' Principles," and "Kuomintang." On the theoretical level, our schoolmates have completely secured leadership. Our schoolmate, Yang Li-hsien, has a high standing in the New Yunnan Society.

The Society is national in character. It has organizations in Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, and other important cities. It has close connections with the Fourth [Third? Corps of the] National Revolutionary Army, from which it receives economic assistance. We also have a Party fraction within the Society, the secretary of which is our schoolmate [Yang] Li-hsien.

[171] 5. *The Reform Society.* The Reform Society is a revolutionary organization of Hunan youths which is local in nature. Its mass following increased to over two hundred persons soon after its establishment. Branches of the Society are located at the following universities: National Peking University, Peking Law College, Peking Engineering College, Communications University, Peking Normal College, P'ing [?] University, Chung [?] University, and Ch'ao-yang University. In the past we made the mistake of attempting to make the organization national and set up a central executive committee in Peking. This mistake, however, has since been corrected.

Due to the large number of Hunanese living in Peking, it is not difficult to expand the Society's masses. The Society is also entirely under our direction and many of our schoolmates hold high positions in it. It can be considered the largest mass organization of the Hunanese in Peking. From its establishment to the present, it has accomplished several striking feats which scared the old bureaucrats to death. For instance, in the elections of the Hunan Alumni Association and the activities of the Hunan Natives' Association, the The Reform Society has been outstanding. Its victories have almost completely deprived the rotten bureaucrats of their influence and prestige.

Centralization of command and unity of action are the most prominent features of the Society. Society members are fresh troops for the mass struggle. We also have a Party fraction in the Society which meets biweekly. The Society's representative who was elected as reserve executive committee member of the Municipal Party Headquarters is also our schoolmate. Executive positions in the Society were formerly divided between our schoolmates and nonschoolmates. To avoid monopoly and to encourage Leftists to take part in the work, we are preparing to reorganize the executive organ so that progressive Leftists may participate in its work. The future development of the Society's work will continue to prosper.

6. *Soul of Hainan Society and the Ch'iung-yai Association.* The Soul of Hainan Society and the Ch'iung-yai Association originally constituted one organization. Differences of opinion among leaders led to great conflicts and differentiation of its masses, resulting in division into two organizations of the Ch'iung-yai natives of Kwangtung. One is the Soul of Hainan Society and the other the Ch'iung-yai Association.

During the first differentiation of the Kuomintang, the Ch'iung-yai Association [172] stood on the Right, participating in the Western Hills Conference and affiliating with the Southern Gardens Party Headquarters. The Soul of Hainan Society stood on the Left. During the second differentiation of the Kuomintang, however, the so-called Leftist Soul of Hainan Society stood on the side of the New Right Wing and

the Right-Wing Ch'iung-yai Association turned Left against the New Right Wing.

Both organizations have an inglorious history, each attempting to attack the other as "Rightist" or "New Rightist." However, the leader of the Soul of Hainan Society, Mo T'ung-jung, has joined Our School and has introduced many of the Society's progressive elements to join us also. In fact, more than 100 members of the Soul of Hainan Society have now become very good Leftists. Meanwhile, the Ch'iung-yai Association indicates even more Leftist leanings. Its leader, Cheng Lan-chi, is called by outsiders a quasi-Communist. He works very hard. For instance, the Association has repeatedly issued proclamations on opposing the dispatch of British troops to China.

These two organizations compete in getting close to Our School, as if whoever is close to the CP is not counter-revolutionary. By getting close with the Communist Party, they hope to cope with the offensives of the counter-revolutionaries. For instance, they repeatedly ask Comrade Po-hai to deliver political reports and lectures on communism. Standing between these two organizations, our outward attitude is of course the same to both, but we are in reality closer to the Soul of Hainan Society, which has now become a Party-directed mass organization. The Party plans to eliminate conflict between them. It would be best for them to thresh out their former differences and unite again.

Our School has a Party fraction within the Soul of Hainan Society. Its representative elected as a committee member of the Municipal Party Headquarters is Comrade Mo T'ung-jung (CP), and the representative of the Association elected to the Municipal Committee is Cheng Lan-chi (Leftist).

7. *Chung-shan Study Society and the New China Study Society.* The Chung-shan Study Society was organized in July 1926, but is not well developed. In six months its [173] masses do not number over seventy. In fact, those who have real connections with the organization number not over thirty. Among them are many of our schoolmates. Of all Left organizations in Peking, this may be considered the most backward. Also, it has numerous internal troubles. Important persons in its executive organ such as Mi Shih-chen and Lo Szu-jui have now joined Our School. Yao Yen, the central figure of the Society, is a person of vanity and lust for power. He is the Society's representative elected as a reserve member of the Municipal Party Executive Committee. He was so dissatisfied with the position, however, that he even attempted to form secret connections with the New Right Wing. At the last elections, all the votes of the New Right Wing were cast for Yao Yen. With the New Right Wing's assistance, his name headed the list of reserve members. He has since been promoted to regular membership.

The New China Study Society has had a long history. It was originally not a revolutionary organization but many of our comrades are now among its leaders. Comrades Yü Shu-te and An T'i-ch'eng are members of the Society. Many of the Society's members work in educational institutions. Most of its progressive elements have been introduced by Comrade Shou-ch'ang [Li Ta-chao] to join the People's School. At the same time, quite a number have also joined Our School.

The representative of the New China Study Society elected to this Municipal Party Headquarters is a woman named Liu Yao-hsi. Liu is entirely a bourgeois young lady, absolutely incapable of accomplishing anything. She is understood to have had connections with the New Right Wing. Her present affiliation remains to be investigated.

The foregoing is an analysis of Left organizations in Peking. From this it is clear that, with the exception of the Practical Society, the Ch'iung-yai Association, and the New China Study Society, six of the nine Left organizations are entirely under the direction of Our School. The most important work of Our School with reference to Left organizations is to make them mass organizations and revolutionary. Our schoolmates should maintain a gray-colored attitude in order to penetrate petty bourgeois

masses and lead them to participate in the revolutionary struggle.

[174] IV. Recent Elections of the Municipal Party Headquarters and Our Policy

A. *The preparatory period of elections.* The recent elections of the Municipal Party Headquarters was the most important activity in the national movement in Peking. Our rival was the New Right Wing. A few months before the elections, we had rallied the Left masses and, in the course of unifying them, had created a tense anti-Right atmosphere. The position of the New Right Wing among the masses wavered, declined, and finally collapsed. Our policy toward the elections was decided several months before the event. The one important point was "Handing Party power to the Left Wing!" a slogan warmly supported by all Leftists of the People's School. Our School's position among the Left masses was considerably enhanced during the preparatory period. For a time (even now) the Left masses judged the masses of the People's School as revolutionary or counterrevolutionary according to whether their actions were anti-Communist or not. With the creation of the tense atmosphere of "Purification of Party Headquarters" and "Down with the New Right Wing!" during the preparatory period for elections, the fate of the New Right Wing became as perilous as a candle in the wind.

[175]

Regular Members of the Executive Committee, Municipal Party Headquarters	Organization Affiliation	Party Affiliation	Remarks
Wu K'o [1847]	CP	CP	Elected as Party's representative
Hsieh Pai-yü [1793]	CP	CP	same
Teng Wen-hui [1820]	Practical Society	Left Wing People's School	
Hsiao Chung-chen [1794]	Practical Society	Left Wing People's School	
Mo T'ung-jung [1847]	Soul of Hainan Society	CP	
T'an Tsu-yao [1830]	New Army Society	CP	
Cheng Lan-chi [1770]	United Advance [Ch'iung-yai Association	People's School Left Wing	Connections with Practical Society
Liu Yao-hsi [1690]	New China Study Society	Same	Past connections with New Right Wing
Lu Yu-yü [1287]	Great League [of Sun Yatsenism]	New Right Wing	Still has not assumed duty

B. *Results of elections*. The results of the elections of the Municipal Party Headquarters witnessed the complete realization of our slogan, "Handing Party power to the Left Wing!" Our School and the Leftist groups showed great tolerance during the elections by accepting the election of one Rightist member although we could have completely monopolized the elections. Lu Yu-yü, a member of the New Right Wing, was elected one of the nine members of the Municipal Party Headquarters Executive Committee. The above chart presents the results of the elections and the names of the members elected to the Executive Committee.

Of the 51 executive seats in the 17 District Party Headquarters, 37 are occupied by us. If this is the situation at District Party Headquarters, it is even more so the situation at Subdistrict Party Headquarters. Prior to the elections, we had preparations for controlling but not monopolizing low-level organs. And such have been the results! It should be pointed out here that some of the Leftists nominated by us for election were not our schoolmates but joined Our School after the elections. At some [176] District Party Headquarters, the Leftists we nominated were rejected by the Left masses for incompetence. The masses then directly nominated our comrades (though they did not know they were our comrades). The Left Wing sometimes nominated persons on the basis of ability to work. It was also inconvenient to oppose the nominations of the masses. In short, for many reasons we practically monopolize the lower-level Party headquarters.

Concerning the elections it must be said that the direction of the responsible comrades of the Local Committee was relatively alert and our tactics relatively effective. There were 2,095 votes cast. Our schoolmates Wu K'o and Mo T'ung-jung secured the largest number of votes for the Municipal Party Headquarters. They each got 1,847 votes. This was the first manifestation of the masses of the Peking Kuomintang. The following table is compiled to give a clearer picture of the mass strength of all organizations.

Organization	Original Votes	Additional Votes through Maneuvers	Total
Practical Society	250	80	330
Communist Party	1,000	300	1,300
New Army Society	200	40	240
New Yunnan Society	60	20	80
Szechwan Revolutionary Youth Society	150	30	180
Soul of Hainan Society	100	—	100
[Ch'iung-yai] Assoc.	100	—	100
Reform Society	100	—	100
Chung-shan Study Society	30	—	30
New Right Wing	150	30	180
[Total	2,140*	500	2,640*]

*The differences between these figures and the figure 2,095 as total votes cast is unexplained.

[177] The table sufficiently indicates the large number of votes we got. Actually, Left organizations are interrelated to a great extent. One individual may be connected with nine organizations. Thus, if each of the nine votes for him, his total votes would be

equivalent to those of nine persons although, in reality, there is only one person. From the organizations listed we should seek a hard core, a hard core controlled by our Party. And we may consider all the masses led by us as our own masses.

In the recent elections we got 70 percent of the total votes; 20 percent went to independent Left organizations such as the Practical Society; the New Right Wing did not even get 10 percent. Prior to the voting, we had not realized how few masses the New Right Wing controlled. We had expected it to poll at least 300 to 400 votes. But the election results broke its false signboard to pieces. [As the saying goes,] "Monkeys scatter when the tree falls!"

[178] During the election fight, our schoolmates unconditionally obeyed the Party's direction. Although one or two comrades who expressed a desire for municipal committee work might have had opportunist tendencies, they dared not openly rebel because they were definitely a minority. Under the iron discipline they could only admit their own errors. The situation in Left organizations, excepting a few organizations under our control, is entirely different. Some Left elements openly rejected the list of nominees which had been agreed upon and rebelled against their own organizations at the time of voting. They had other plans in mind for themselves. (Such problems occurred in the Practical Society).

C. *End of the elections—organization of the new Municipal Committee.* The result of the Municipal Party Headquarters elections was absolute victory for the Left and the Communists. The following table shows the organization of the new Executive Committee of the Municipal Party and the distribution of the work of the various departments.

Department	Department Head	Party Affiliation	Remarks
Standing members	Teng Wen-hui	Practical Society	Teng—Chmn.
	T'an Tsu-yao	CP	T'an—Secy.
	Liu Yao-hsi	New China Society	Liu—Treas.
Organization	Hsieh Pai-yü	CP	
Propaganda	Hsiao Chung-chen	Practical Society	
Labor	Wu K'o	CP	
Peasants	Mo T'ung-jung	CP	
Youth	Cheng Lan-chi	[Ch'iung-yai] Assoc.	
Merchants	Lu Yu-yü	New Right Wing	Lu has not assumed duties; his substitute is Yao Yen
Women	Chang I-lan	Wavering left	

The table shows the distribution of work among the various departments of the Municipal Party Headquarters. The work of each department is based on positive plans. Our Party fraction in the Municipal Party Headquarters meets once a week with detailed directions for department chiefs. Upon the assumption of duties all department heads immediately announced their political policies and printed department plans for distribution among Party headquarters at all levels. When the masses saw them they declared, "After all, the Party headquarters of the Left is different from the New Right Wing!"

We are deeply aware that the work of the various departments is far too inadequate. Revolutionary Party headquarters of the Left must not be satisfied simply with flattering statements from the masses to the effect that they are "different from

the New Right Wing." The new Municipal Party Headquarters must do its best to expand its work and positively correct the past mistakes of the New Right Wing. Future work entirely depends on Our School's direction.

V. The Left's Attitude Toward Our School—The Position of Our School Among the Masses

The Peking Local Committee's work in the national movement has passed from the stage in which we prepare to lead the Left to the stage in which we are actually capable of leading it. Confidence in [our] Party has been established not only among a few leaders; we already have an unshakable foundation among the masses. The attitude of the Left masses toward Our School has been mentioned in previous reports. We will now cite many facts to illustrate the Left's general attitude toward Our School.

[179] 1. The New Right Wing's propaganda that the CCP monopolizes the KMT—our Left comrades enumerate facts to prove to the masses that such rumors are fabricated by the New Right. As a result, they [the masses] have come into frequent conflict with the New Right Wing.

2. The New Right Wing's propaganda on the CP's opposition to the Northern Expedition—the Left is able to follow our explanation of Comrade [Ch'en] Tu-hsiu's article, "On the Northern Expedition," to counter-attack the New Right, to prove that it twists the meaning of the article and fabricates rumors.

3. The New Right Wing's anti-Communist propaganda—the Left is able to attack the New Right Wing for rebelling against Sun Yatsenism by citing Dr. Sun's Three Great Policies (Russian alliance, Communist alliance, and [support of] labor and peasantry).

4. The New Right Wing's propaganda on the CCP's plot to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek—the Left openly points out that their [the Right's] actions in playing to the imperialists' and reactionary militarists' manipulations are entirely counter-revolutionary.

In short, the Left accepts our ideas completely in repudiating among the masses the fancy anti-Communist propaganda of the New Right Wing. Our School stands completely in the controlling position within the United Council of the Left. It hold the final decision on all questions. The Left's respect for Our School may be compared with that of a person whose "five members [head, hands, and knees] fall prostrate in obeisance." The Left's outline of theory was proposed by Our School and all political and theoretical reports at meetings of the United Left are made by comrades of Our School. Naturally, such a weak Left is not what we had hoped for. This being the case, however, [the only solution] is slow, gradual correction of the Left's weaknesses through work. Whatever controversies arise among Left organizations, the parties concerned would not be satisfied with any settlement other than that justly brought about by Our School's representatives. During discussions of all questions, Our School's representatives must present the final conclusions in order to satisfy everyone.

[180] In its work in the national movement, the Peking [Local Committee] very well accepts the theoretical direction of Our School's Central Committee on the question of alliance with the Left Wing. Some CC policies and strategies have already been realized in Peking. Others are just being carried out. As for the CC's instructions for Our School's comrades to cope with certain bad tendencies in the work of the People's School, [we have to point out that] some of these tendencies have not yet materialized in Peking. This is because the Peking Local Committee was able to prevent such bad tendencies from arising in the first place. Since we succeeded in utilizing and completely realizing the Party's direction, we have been able to avoid any conflict with

Left elements of the People's School which may lead to rupture of relations.

VI. Conclusions

Summarizing the above-mentioned facts and conditions, we may realize the important mission of Our School in local political work in Peking. The Peking Leftists have not been able to carry out independently their historical mission. They have to rely on us everywhere. Weak as they are, how can they be expected to fight the Right and to participate in the actual revolutionary struggle if we do not help them to develop and grow and to adapt themselves to the masses and to cultivate their fighting ability?

The KMT's masses in Peking who are truly under the Left's leadership number at most 600. The Left has even less of a position with the masses in general. The Leftists have a very fantastic scheme. They think that the Kuomintang Left should merely carry out the policy [to support] labor and peasantry and that labor and peasantry should serve as the KMT's class foundation. This is entirely a manifestation of Left infantilism and we have already tried to correct it. We will now summarize all points as the conclusion of this report and the objectives of our work.

[181] 1. Exert every effort in the course of the national movement to develop our own Party and to possess the petty bourgeois masses.

2. Develop the Kuomintang methodically. There should be 10,000 members when the next elections of the Municipal Committee take place. Adapt the Leftists of the People's School to the masses and lead them to participate in the actual revolutionary struggle.

3. Enable the Left Wing to take over the social mass movement of the petty bourgeoisie.

4. Continue the anti-Right movement (the anti-Communist movement of the New Right is still continuing).

5. Maintain absolutely the same attitude toward [all organizations of] the Left. Correct the past concept of using the Practical Society as the center. However, at the Municipal Party Headquarters, which is not a mass organization, we should still associate with the Practical Society as the center in order to create a three-party form.

6. Disapprove of the concept that the Left should have a strictly disciplined and unified organization (because it is impossible).

7. See that Left organizations develop evenly.

8. Continue the United Council of the Left.

9. The Party (the People's School) should be the center of all Left organizations.

10. Unify Left theories and policies but disapprove of the formulation of a special Left political platform.

11. Promote propaganda recognizing Wang Ching-wei as leader of the Left.

12. Cautiously permit the Left to participate in work (under our direction).

13. Strengthen the organizations of the Left's masses and their alliance with Our School.

14. Avoid the principle of "iron discipline" in reforming Party headquarters. Promote the progress of Party members through educational means.

[182] 15. Exert every effort to push Kuomintang work among the masses and correct the past error of not producing any effect among the masses.

February 10, 1927. Po-hai's Report

Document 79

Report of the Taiyuan Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Political Conditions in Shansi

This document, like many others, has undergone triple translation—from Chinese to Russian, Russian to Chinese, and now Chinese to English. It was published with some deletions in *SLYM*, X, "Military Political Conspiracy," pp. 12-13, in the ten-volume set bound in Chinese style. It is reproduced with punctuation in KMWH, XV, 2647-48. The report is dated February 18, 1927, and signed at the end by Kiselev as to accuracy.

The name of two persons were reproduced phonetically, first into Russian and then back into Chinese. The senior adviser to Yen Hsi-shan, written as "Chao Tz'u-lung," is Chao Tai-wen (1867- ?), whose *tzu*, or courtesy name, was Tz'u-lung—with a different character for *lung*. The commissioner of police was rendered "Nan P'ei-lan"; he was Nan Kuei-hsing (ca. 1883- ?), whose courtesy name was P'ei-lan—again, with different characters. References to both men may be found in Donald G. Gillin, *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949*.

TEXT

[12] Yen Hsi-shan's inclination toward the South has already become a fact. Since Mr. Yen and Chiang Kai-shek each sent representatives to the other, their relationship appears very close. Local officials here not only did not suppress the rally celebrating the victory of the Northern Expeditionary Army, but Chiang Kai-shek's delegate gave a public address. When the delegate arrived in Shansi he brought a document appointing Yen Hsi-shan as commander-in-chief, a position as high as a military governor. Mr. Yen also sent a delegate to Hankow, who, on his return to Taiyuan, excessively praised the Southern [regime].

As to the military side, Mr. Yen is preparing for action. For example, the senior adviser to the commander-in-chief's headquarters, Chao Tz'u-lung (phonetic), went personally to Tatung, Suiyuan, and other places on an inspection trip; the commissioner of police, Nan P'ei-lan (phonetic) had already gone to T'ung-kuan to establish defenses. Also, Mr. Chao, on some day before February 15, called together us Communists serving in the Kuomintang for a preliminary talk, telling us there is a possibility that Shansi, the National Revolutionary Army, and the Kuominchun may act together. In the first decade of February, accordingly, the Shansi Army began to move. When the Fengtien Army dispatched more than 50,000 men along the Peking-Hankow Railway line, the Shansi Army immediately mobilized. On the one hand it proceeded to Tatung to cut the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, and on the other hand, it went to Niang-tzu Kuan [to be ready] to cut the Peking-Hankow line.

Judging by this circumstance [i.e., Adviser Chao's talk], the Communists are more important than the Kuomintang persons here. The Kuomintang people (the New Right Wing) are really weaker than the Communists. Most of the Kuomintang people don't want to work. Even if there are workers they only perform unimportant activity in the high-level Party Office . . . (deletion).

Those [of us] who came here knew we should emphasize lower levels of society and should guide the working class. One body of opinion in society holds that the New Right Wing of the Kuomintang enjoys special authority at the top, while the Communists below devote themselves to trifling work. Local officials here evidently [13] fear our power among the masses and strenuously try to keep in contact with us, hoping to avoid all [disruptive?] activity here. Besides, when we promoted the open-air rally to celebrate the victory of the Northern Expeditionary Army, on the opening day a majority of ordinary people took our guidance, so the local officials manifested a very respectful attitude. Since the second open-air rally (that is, the February 7th Memorial Day and the celebration of the Northern Expeditionary Army's victory), our propaganda has given a certain group in society a taste for studying communism. Here in the Ching-hua Bookstore most of the books are related to Communism, such as Bukharin's *What Should Be Known About Communism*, the Manifestos of the Chinese Communist Party, *Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Recorded Speeches*, etc. The market for this sort of books is large. Some people say that after the Kuomintang there still will be the Communist Party.

Now a very close relationship has already been established between Yen Hsi-shan and the Nationalist Government. Aside from this, Chiang Kai-shek knows well that Yen Hsi-shan is a leader of the capitalist class, and yet he wants to lean toward that sort of class; while Yen Hsi-shan considers the office of commander-in-chief a glory. But Mr. Chiang's purpose is to use the adjacent locations of Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang to create for himself adjoining power with which to resist Feng Yü-hsiang. But Mr. Yen's negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek is because of the great power of our side with the masses, and affiliating with our side is a means of being in touch with the masses . . . (rest deleted).

March 1, 1927. Signed Kiselev. Certified no errors.

Document 80

Report on the Split between Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih

The Peking Commission published this document under the title "The situation of the Split Between Chiang and T'ang." The caption gives the date, March 5, 1927, and calls it "Report in Russian, No. 22, original text marked very secret." Five copies were made and distributed: one each to embassy, military attaché's office, *So-hsieh-chi*, and two to *Na-mu*. According to Ms. How, a sequence of Soviet military attachés in Peking used the pseudonym "Soutchevskii." *Na-mu* may be S. N. Naumov, who used the pseudonym "Kalachev" while in Canton, where he was author of our Documents 1 and 72, the latter dated November 15, 1926. The Peking Commission added a note to the title, "Probably this document was a report from a Soviet spy in the southern army." In our previous edition this was Document 49, and it is found in *SLYM*, III, "Canton," pp. 65-67.

By 1927 Soviet Russia had an extensive spy net in China, including a principal agent in Hankow. The inventory of seized documents lists hundreds of spy reports, many by employed Chinese spies. The Soviet military advisers were instructed to provide regular military intelligence on the armies they served and enemy armies (see Document 67). In *SLYM*, VIII, "Secondary Russian Documents," p. 83b of the ten-volume edition, one finds listed "Report of a Spy on the Competition Between T'ang Sheng-chih and Chiang Kai-shek," but no date is given. On page 119b one finds "Report of a Spy on the Attitudes of Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih toward the Communist Party," but no date. We do not find our Document 80 listed in the inventories, either by exact title or by date.

We deduce that Document 80 may be a report by a Chinese Communist, but the far-flung military information points to a Russian military adviser or some Chinese with wide military connections, such as Teng Yen-ta. Does "No. 22" identify such a source?

The date, March 5, 1927, is the day before General Ch'en Ming-shu abruptly departed from Hankow for Shanghai, which threw the report's predictions askew.

TEXT

|65| The question of the removal of the National Government has virtually been settled.

Chiang Kai-shek has betrayed his dictatorial conspiracy in opposition to the Kuomintang Left Wing. His attitude was particularly clarified in connection with the appointment [recall] of Wang Ching-wei to the National Government. Chiang at first expressed a great desire for Wang's return, but, as soon as Wang had left Paris on his way back to China, Chiang cabled him and hinted that there was no need for him to return. Chiang's cable was delivered to Wang in Berlin; thereupon Wang returned to Paris.

Chiang's conduct eventually became known. Consequently, many wavering elements and a portion of the Kuomintang Right Wing in the National Government have

become alienated from him.

Aside from the split among government and Party members, Chiang has also lost the greater part of his influence in the army.

The army officers of [in?] Fukien and Chekiang are unwilling to render him support and are reciprocally supporting such other armies as the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth corps.

Following his appointment as commander-in-chief [of general reserves] in Kiangsi, Chu P'ei-te, commander of the Third Corps, can no longer support Chiang's policies. The reason is that should the National Government be moved to Nanchang (Chiang's policy), Chu's power in Kiangsi would be entirely lost.

The Fourth and Eleventh corps have had an understanding with T'ang Sheng-chih to turn against Chiang. The commander of the Eleventh Corps [Ch'en Ming-shu] formerly commanded the Tenth Division of the Fourth Corps, prior to the reorganization of the Tenth Division as the nucleus of the Eleventh Corps. Chiang wanted the Fourth Corps to be subordinated instead to Li Tsung-jen, commander of [66] the Seventh Corps, as a means to weaken T'ang's military power. Due to the opposition of T'ang and the commander of the Fourth Corps, [Chiang's plan] failed to materialize. As a consequence, Li Tsung-jen took a wavering attitude at Kiukiang, and planned to ally with a certain party at the right opportunity. When Li came to Hankow, T'ang and others succeeded in persuading him to join the anti-Chiang front and to assume an openly hostile attitude toward Chiang. The Ninth and Tenth corps also joined [the alliance against Chiang]. T'ang Sheng-chih defeated the Kweichow troops and cleared them out of Hunan. He has greatly expanded his military strength.

In short, the best elements of the National Revolutionary Army are no longer with Chiang Kai-shek. It would be premature to state, however, that Chiang has been completely defeated and can no longer figure in the internal struggle.

The people show some indifference toward the Revolution and appear less afraid of the National Government than they did one month ago. The capitalist class is uniting and is raising numerous demands, conditions, and regulations, a part of which have been approved by the National Government. The revolutionary movement is now in the stage of economic demands. The National General Labor Union is unwilling to make political demands, in the belief that they are inappropriate at this time.

The above facts prove that the internal struggle to destroy Chiang Kai-shek has not been entirely successful, although the government has moved to Wuchang.

To supplement previous military plans, the Seventh Corps was concentrated in the area around Lotien (Northeast Hupei) on February 18, to press the enemy in northern [southern] Anhui and, when necessary, give aid to the Hunan Army. The First Division of the Eighth Corps under Hsia Tou-yin's command should be dispatched to the area around Nanyang [Honan] to aid Fan Hsing-min (Fan Chung-hsiu) and to clear up the remnant forces of Wu P'ei-fu in northwestern Hupei.

Chiang Kai-shek has changed his plan to attack Shanghai. He has ordered that Shanghai is not to be attacked following the capture of Hangchow [in Chekiang] and that the entire forces under Pai Ch'ung-hsi (the Twenty-sixth Corps, the Twenty-first Corps [Division], the Second Corps [Division], and the remnant forces of the Twenty-second Division) are to attack Nanking. The attack on Shanghai is to follow the capture of Nanking.

[67] At the moment, the old forces of Sun Ch'uan-fang, such as the Fifth and Seventh divisions of Yeh K'ai-hsin and the Sixth Division of Ch'en T'iao-yuan, are turning south in the direction of Nanking, with the objective of occupying Nanking before the arrival of Pai's troops.

Document 81

Circular Notice on Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Youth Corps

This is translated from an original Chinese document signed by Lo Keng-ti and Li Jui-hsiang, and dated March 26, without indication of year. It was published in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," pp. 53-56, with the title, "A Circular Notice of the Chinese Communist Party Explaining the Mutual Relations of the CY and the CP." In our previous edition it was Document 5.

Another document in *SLYM*, III, "CCP," p. 200, "A letter from Pai Yung-t'ai Explaining the Code Name for the Northern Regional [Committee of the CCP] . . . ," states that the name had already been changed from Pai Yung-t'ai to Li Jui-hsiang. This letter is dated February 19, without mention of year. The names Pai Yung-t'ai and Lo Keng-ti appear in a number of documents in the inventory of Chinese documents seized, in volume IV of *SLYM*, and we believe Lo Keng-ti is the code name for the Northern Regional Committee of the Communist Youth Corps. Hence, it appears that Document 81 was issued by the two regional committees.

But in what year was Document 81 issued? In our previous edition, we dated it March 26, 1926. On page 117 of Julie How's much marked-up copy of the original work is the penciled query, "Can it be 1927?" Further study by CMW shows that 1927 is the correct year.

If the switch in code names occurred on February 19, 1927, we should expect many more Pai Yung-t'ai items in the files than Li Jui-hsiang items, for there could be Pai items brought into the Soviet embassy on or after December 1926 (when Li Ta-chao and others went into hiding there) or accumulated there up to February 1927, while Li items could only accumulate for six weeks before the April 6 raid put an end to Chinese Communist activities in the embassy. Inventories of "most important" and "less important" Chinese documents in volume IV show thirty-three files of documents to or from Pai Yung-t'ai and five from Li Jui-hsiang. Although only file captions are printed and none is dated by year, one file shows that 1927 was the year when code names were switched. Item 142 in the "most important" list is a letter to Pai Yung-t'ai reporting on an anti-British, anti-Fengtien rally in Taiyuan, Shansi. Such a rally would most surely have been held after the Northern Expedition had begun, and most likely in December 1926 after Chang Tso-lin seized Peking and organized the anti-Communist An Kuo Chun, or early in 1927. If the code name Pai Yung-t'ai was still being used after the Northern Expedition began in July 1926, then the switch could not have been in February 1926; it must have been in 1927.

Two other deductive approaches fortify this conclusion. On March 18, 1926, troops under the command of one of Feng Yü-hsiang's generals fired on a patriotic student demonstration in Peking's Tien-an Men, reportedly killing 47 and injuring 123. Li Ta-chao was wounded in the head and taken to Peking University Hospital. Other leaders of the demonstration went into hiding. It seems inconceivable that a document of this sort, emerging from discussions between leaders of the Communist Party and Communist Youth Corps in Peking on their mutual relations, would have

been issued only eight days after that tragic event, when many Communist leaders were in hiding.

Second, comparison of Document 63, "Resolutions on the Work of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps," with Document 81 shows that the latter echoes Document 63, which dates from mid-July 1926. To give a few examples: Document 63 mentions transfer of leadership of the student movement from the Youth Corps to the Party; Document 81 makes no mention of the Youth Corps working among students, only among masses of youth. Document 63 states that it has been decided that membership in the Youth Corps shall be determined by age (according to Document 2, the top age for YC members was reduced from twenty-eight to twenty-six, though it does not tell when this decision was made); Document 81 complains (item 9) that the Central Committee's decision on determining Party and Corps membership on the basis of age is not being carried out. Document 63 states that the Party, in guiding and assisting the Corps, must strive to preserve the Corps' independent spirit and not interfere excessively in its activities; Document 81 (in items 4, 5, and 6) complains of just such interference. Document 63 enjoins the localities to reform organizational relationships between Party and Corps at the lower levels; Document 81 closes with the injunction that local Party and Youth Corps organs at all levels should reform relations and bring the two bodies closer together.

TEXT

[53] The CY is a "hand" of the Party among the masses of youths. It is a youth organization directed by the Party. Aside from working in the political and labor movements under the Party's direction, it is entrusted with many kinds of work concerning proletarian youths and the oppressed masses of youths in general. Thus, it may be said that the CY's work is part of the CP's work. The proletariat is a complete entity. It has only one Leninist party. The masses of proletarian youths led by the CY should also stand under the CP's banner in order to unify action and struggle.

[54] The economic position of proletarian youths is much more oppressed than that of adults. Their sentiment is therefore more radical and their interest more intense than that of adults. It is therefore necessary to have a special independent organization to guide and develop youths. However, the CY is not a youth political party, completely independent of the CP. It is a subsidiary organ of the CP, as are labor unions and peasant associations. In order to secure the vast masses of youths, the directing team of the Party cannot alienate itself from the Youth Corps merely because the latter has its own organizational independence.

The CY is the CP's instrument for development among the masses of youths. The CP's policy is carried out among the masses of youths by the CY, which receives its political policies directly from the CP. No one has ever doubted this since the organization of the Party and the Youth Corps.

How close should the relations be between local organs of the Party and the Youth Corps in order to be of benefit to our work? In recent months, relations between the Party and the Youth Corps under the jurisdiction of the Northern Regional Committee have not been very satisfactory. Strictly speaking, it is due to lack of clear understanding of the Party as a whole. The following are the major errors and the problems which arise most frequently with respect to relations between local Party and Corps organs.

1. The Corps does not send representatives to participate at meetings of Party organs of all levels, and vice versa.

2. Party organs of all levels neglect the work of the Corps.

3. Corps organs do not carry out decisions of the Party.

4. The Party freely transfers comrades of the Youth Corps without notifying the Corps or paying any attention to its opinion.

5. The Party does not respect the organization of the Corps and neglects the opinion of high-level organs of the Corps.

[55] 6. The Party does not assist in the development of the Corps. It even compels Corps comrades to join the Party with a view to increasing Party membership in order to meet the requirements on Party development prescribed by high-level organs.

7. The Corps is prohibited from expanding or establishing cells in certain organizations or schools where there are masses of youths.

8. The Central Committee's decision on determining party or Corps membership on the basis of age is not carried out.

9. Problems of relations between the Party and the Youth Corps are not properly settled on the spot. Trivial matters are referred to high-level organs.

The above mistakes are due to the tendency of local [organs], which are hard-pressed with work, to concentrate on finding means to execute the directives of high-level organs. At the same time, it cannot be denied that they forget that the Youth Corps's work is part of Party work. They forget that the Corps is the Party's instrument for development among the masses of youths and that, directed by the Party, it is the leading organ of the masses of youths.

The Youth Corps is the reserve army of the Party. It is the school of Leninism. It should be greatly developed among the masses of youths and its membership should be greater than the Party's. But what is the situation now? The work and numerical strength of the Corps not only fail to keep pace with the development of the objective situation, they fail to keep pace with the Party. It should be emphasized that the Corps' weakness or lack of development not only imperils the Corps itself but is a loss to the Party. Lack of understanding of the Party and of communism is betrayed in the failure of local Party organs to pay attention to the organization and development of the Youth Corps and to provide for and promote its work. It is likewise betrayed in the failure of Youth Corps organs to accept the Party's direction and to act in unison with the Party.

Hereafter, local Party and Corps organs of all levels should hasten to reform relations between the Party and the Corps and to bring them closer together. Not only should the Party and Corps mutually supervise each other to correct past mistakes; Party organs should plan how to help develop the Corps and to direct its work. Youth [56] Corps organs should strive to realize the Party's decisions and to lead the masses of youths to stand under the Party's direction for united action and struggle. Reports on the Party's work should include the work of the CY.

Local Party headquarters are directed to pay the greatest attention to and execute the above.

Lo Keng-ti　　March 26
Li Jui-hsiang

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Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien (Collection of documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian conspiracy). Ed. and trans. Peking Metropolitan Police Headquarters, Inspection Bureau, Commission for Translation and Compilation, Metropolitan Police Headquarters, 1928.

A collection of 324 Chinese translations of Russian documents and original Chinese documents, printed in two nearly identical sets. One consists of four volumes, bound Western style and with Western-style pagination. The other consists of ten volumes, bound Chinese style and with Chinese-style pagination. Page numbers in our translations are keyed to the four-volume set; when using the ten-volume set, divide our page numbers by two. The collection includes photographs of articles and stacks of papers seized in the raid and facsimile reproduction of eleven Russian documents. The set bound in Chinese style is supplemented by an eleventh volume, a group of English translations published under the title *Soviet Plot in China* (see under that heading below).

There is an extensive *Index to Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien* by David Nelson Rowe and Sophia S. F. Yen, which also provides a table of contents of the ten-volume set. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1965.

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English Collections

The U.S. Department of State set up a special file concerning the raid and the documents translated. These have been issued in microfilm in the series USDS Microcopy 329, Reels no. 75-77, file nos. 893.00B/497-676. There is a photoreproduction of *Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien*, which, due to the photographer's ignorance of Chinese, is mixed up.

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